Transcript: Episode #336: Between The Junta and A Hard Place
Below is the complete transcript for this podcast episode. This transcript was generated using an AI transcription service and has not been reviewed by a human editor. As a result, certain words in the text may not accurately reflect the speaker's actual words. This is especially noticeable when speakers have strong accents, as AI transcription may introduce more errors in interpreting and transcribing their speech. Therefore, it is advisable not to reference this transcript in any article or document without cross-referencing the timestamp to ensure the accuracy of the guest's precise words.
Speaker 1 00:00
The regional leaders are stressing the need for continued engagement with Myanmar. The leaders of Malaysia and Indonesia have called for a special ASEAN meeting to discuss the political crisis in Myanmar.
Speaker 2 00:41
It is frustrating that the five point consensus plan has not been implemented in a way or at a scale and a speed that we would wish the situation in Myanmar is deteriorating. I music.
Host 01:06
Thank you for taking the time to listen to today's episode. As you know, the current crisis in Myanmar is extremely concerning, and we appreciate that you're taking time to stay informed. There is even value just in becoming more aware and helping to inform others. So please consider sharing this episode so that more people may learn about what is really happening in the country. It's critical to ensure that this issue remains present in public discourse. Now let's get to the interview itself.
Wong Chen 01:42
Hi. My name is Wong Chen. I'm the Member of Parliament for Suu bang in Malaysia. I'm also the current chairman of the international relations and international trade committee in Parliament Malaysia. I put a position on what Malaysia is supposed to do this year as Chairman of ASEAN regarding the Myanmar crisis and Myanmar conflict. And to be fair, I think most Malaysians are not engaged in this matter, since we don't have a border with with Myanmar and trade in Myanmar has always been relatively small, but we do have a lot of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia. So I think the Malaysian perspective is mostly looked upon the refugee issues of Rohingyas, rather than the civil war in Myanmar. So but as chair, my Prime Minister has a history of facing injustice, and also be incarcerated for about 11 years in total. So he's a man who has been at the receiving end of human rights abuse, and the Myanmar conflict is, of course, human rights crisis. And I think being in being Chair of the ASEAN this year, we will try our best. Olysses, he will have in his mind to do something better and to improve the situation Myanmar, including human rights, but potentially even starting the process of negotiations or discussion amongst all warring parties with a view for peace in the future. So that was the gist of the introduction. But then I broke down the process of our thinking on this issue, at least from my committee. I don't speak for the government, even though I am a member of the ruling party, I am the chairman so of the legislators. So we are looking at it from a understanding of two outcome in the Civil War. One is that they continue to fight, which I understand is the both sides are getting a bit exhausted, and then a situation where stalemate. And then the other option is that they decide to go for peace. That's the only way you can end the civil war. So in that. Context of it, they continue to fight. Then what can we do in ASEAN to, you know, disincentivize the fighting. So, you know, core issues like making sure that revenue does not flow to both sides, because their revenue base is either power supply to Thailand, rail to China, Jade trade to Singapore, possibly, you know, there are drugs as well. There's also scams. So all these things the ASEAN needs to put an end to it. So the banking, for facilities for this kind of thing, maybe we can work together as a block to ensure that this, this money to supply and to fuel the war ends. Another is a direct, you know, intervention in making sure that we don't supply jet fuel to the junta, we don't allow weapons to cross our borders, to end up in both sides. So anything that we can do to, you know, to make sure both sides, the warring sites have no capacity to fight is important. I think that that could be something that the ASEAN members can agree to do. And you know, for the last two years or so, most ASEAN nations have been hit by scams. You know, Malaysia lost billions of ringgit in the last three to five years. So there is an economic cost. We don't do anything. So I suppose what I'm trying to say is, you know, if they choose to fight the war and continue the war, our job as a economic bloc or political bloc, is to make sure that we do not allow them to continue to do so by limiting weapons funding and doing all we can to stop this kind of thing, right? And hopefully that will result in them getting into a situation where they think this, no, this is not a winnable site for anybody, and therefore they start the peace process. Alternatively, is that we start now quickly, under the leadership of Aung Ibrahim, to talk about peace now, because we Malaysia is quite unique, because we have our number one trading partner is China, right? And of all the most important countries around China has border in Myanmar. China is the superpower here, and therefore, you know, whatever they do will have a big impact on the war, whether ending it or not, Malaysia can try to leverage our good ties with China and seek for China to take a more peaceful solution to this matter. That's important, because next year, Philippines takes over, and everybody knows that Philippines and China do have disputes on the sea, so we will miss that opportunity to start a dialog for peace if you don't work faster in Malaysia for this year in particular. So the other aspect that I raised, and this is really from Khun kasih, my friend who advises me from time to time on Myanmar issue, is to engage the the Thai royal, Royal Thai Army, because they do have ties with direct access to sec. They do. They also talk to the rebels. So I mean, Malaysia is just, you know, we don't have border, as I said earlier. We don't have those connections. We do have an envoy, but nobody has the best access and best influence, other than the Royal Thai Army. So those are the two things, and basically, that's what I said in the conference yesterday.
Host 08:27
Sure, thank you for sharing that with our wider audience who wasn't here. And I want to follow up with several of those threads. The first one being I notice in describing both the nature of the conflict as well as the resolution of the conflict both sides. And that has been a critique of some in the democracy movement feeling this kind of both sides ism you know that from where they see it, they had their rights stripped away from them. They had atrocities plunged on them. They've been put in a situation of defending themselves from a real kind of terrorist mafia state that instead of protecting them, has put all of their forces on them, is intentionally bombing IDP camps, schools, innocent civilians, displacing millions spreading across the border, et cetera, et cetera. I don't have to describe all these to you. I'm sure you're very well aware of it. And so there's both in the nature of describing the conflict as both sides ism as well as looking at a resolution or peace talks or coming to the table where the military is one figure in that, there's been a lot of pushback from those in the resistance, the democracy movement, however you want to call it, in the sense both that this is an aggressor. This is a human rights violator. This is a genocide instigator, as well, as, you know, on one hand, just the brutality. On the other fact, the unreliability. You know, when has the military ever said things or done things that they've then abided by? And so there, there, there is. There does seem to be a bit of tension in from outside. Side and from ASEAN, perhaps wanting both sides and the military specifically to be involved in in the present and the future of the country. And those that are resisting the military seeing it as unreliable actor is an understatement. But you know, really that's it's murder, it's rapist, it's abuser. Why would they ever want to sit down at a table with that. So how would you respond to that concern?
Wong Chen 10:23
Well, you know, in the war situation, everybody justifies their position. I mean, I'm not, you know, I'm not a fan of the junta at all. Let's not get this wrong. You know, they have their arguments about what they wanted to do, their position, so and so forth. For us, I think Malaysia will has a small role to play, but that role is important to be as neutral as possible. If we want to be a facilitator for negotiations and discussion, I think that needs to be put up in the front if you want us to support you. We do many MPs in Malaysia do support the Myanmar struggle against the junta, but if you want us to be a venue or a facilitator for negotiation, then the official position of the government will be very different, right? I know there's a lot of appetite for continuing fights. I know some rebels feel they're making gains, and I know it's wrong for the junta to bomb people and you know and that they are conscripting people who don't want to fight. So to me, you know, we have to take a step back and not take a moralistic position yet on this issue, as a facilitator for negotiations, again, all combatants can choose to fight, right? What we have to do is to make sure the fight is within the Geneva Convention, and that we have to make sure that you know, where possible, we don't feel the fight. So that means control the supply of money, make sure banking is not there's no money and money laundering, there's no weapon supply and and force both sides to come to the table. I think that's what really should be done. But we also need to worry about what a future, you know, ceasefire and the future look of that government, government, we will be like, you know, is it going to be a federated state? It's going to be autonomous states, or I don't know, right? So I think our main concern, as chair of ASEAN and ASEAN is divided on this guy, it's quite obvious, let's not be around the Bucha. So as chair, the responsibility is to step back, not to take a moralistic position, per se, but to say we can facilitate negotiations because we have China as a friend, and we need to navigate this with the help of the Thai Royal Army. That's what we're looking at. You know, I think people choose to fight if they choose to fight when they're ready to negotiate. We're here available for us to, you know, for the warring parties to come and seek someone to broker this peace. I think that's the position we'll take, and that's, unfortunately, one of ASEAN weakness as well. But you know, the way things are, this is the best we can do.
Host 13:21
What do you think the current status should be? Of the five points consistent consensus, where, where, where are we with that, where, where is ASEAN with that, and how should it move ahead with how it's been or been not in many ways implemented?
Wong Chen 13:34
Okay? Well, well, ASEAN issue is the five point consensus is there, but it's just we cannot get it done, right? One of the main reason we cannot get it done, and a lot of people don't understand this, is that the politicians or leaders of all ASEAN countries value domestic concerns more than their neighborhood friendship pact. And that is quite apparent because we we let ASEAN run by civil servants, you know. And civil servants are not the most creative as a rule. They are. They tend to be more straight, you know, like straightforward. They don't think outside the box, because they got to take instructions from their bosses, who are politicians, until we get the political will from politician and tell their civil servants ASEAN, this matter on ASEAN, should be decided by political actors. Then you will see some real movement. Otherwise, you know, most ASEAN meetings are run by civil servants, and then the politicians come and cut the ribbon, you know, kiss the baby and do the cake stuff, right? And I think that is a fundamental issue. If ASEAN, not just on the Myanmar core issue, but to do that, we need the population of ASEAN to care about this conflict. So in in Thailand, I'm not sure how many percent. Lot of people care, maybe 30% I would imagine, because your neighbors, but in Malaysia, is like down to 2% so it is only 2% of people care. So why would the politician care? Leave it to the civil servants who run ASEAN. You know, that's why the five point consensus cannot move. It's, it's a lack of political will. So, I mean, for me in Malaysia, I mean, you know, I'm with a PHR. We are a human rights organization. I can I go to my constituency, you know, it's a big constituency, 500,000 people, but full of middle class people, lawyers, doctors, accountants. When I raise issue on refugee, they say, you know, maybe you should be focusing on our issues right? Or when I raise issue about wars and human rights, they say, Well, you know, look at Malaysian human rights first. I think we face a lot of that thing a lot of people don't understand. So you mentioned ASEAN is run by, in all practical purposes, by civil servants. The political will is not there, so we have to change the entire narrative to get the people to tell the politicians we need this resolve. And I can tell you this most voters, and I've been a politician for 15 years now, most voters don't care about what happens in another country, which we don't share a border with, and they all all, they really care. What is economics in truth? Right? 70, 80% votes are all economics. 20% on, you know, emotions. We need to redefine the narrative that we need an economic block in ASEAN and Myanmar being rich in resources. J rare earth, you know, and population and hard working people you know, inventive people, you know, once they're out of this because of a civil war, it hurts ASEAN overall. It will hurt Malaysia indirectly, in terms of economics, if you can get that messaging across that is not just a huge issue about humanitarian crisis or the right thing, or the moral thing, the war is bad. It really hurts your pocket. Then I think we can get maybe, for Malaysia, 10% to 15% or 20% of the population saying, yes, Wong Chen, go and solve this problem, because it's important to our pocket, right? And we can, you know, we hope that this that's the same for all the neighbors of Myanmar in particular, then maybe we will find a will to solve this otherwise, you know, this warring factor, factions will continue to fight and justifiably. I mean, for the rebels in particular, it's not, it's not an elected government. This is a junta, and the behavior is bad. What we all know this, right? But, you know, we, if we are going to be mediators, we cannot take a judgment call and try to step back, right? Because I think even the junta have families as well. They have children. You know, they are humans too. Not every soldier is pro the junta. I mean, things can change, right? So I think the point is to stop war, and to stop war means sides have to give way. If one side is just, just refuses to budge, maybe something may happen internally in that in the junta. We don't know, but we have to do the bits we can. We should stop the flow of weapons. Stop trading with them, stop allowing rare earth and Jade and all these kind of minerals to come out. Just stop it. Just stop it, because it hurts us. It allows the scam centers to set up, and it costs us billions. China is an interesting case study, because China suffered a lot, a lot of scam victims, so the Chinese government took a stand. But it changes from time to time, because Chinese foreign policy is evolving at best, and it's generally more hesitant than the US or the West.
Host 18:57
Yeah, so well, let's go into China, because you've referenced them several times in your answers, and particularly China's importance, given the current ASEAN chair is in Malaysia, and that Malay Chinese relations are a bit smoother than Philippine Chinese relations, which are happening next year, and that has been a topic of of considerable inquiry and curiosity, is what exactly are China's evolving relations with Myanmar? And of course, that has to be broken down between, are you talking Beijing and napida? Are you talking Kun min and the ethnic areas? Where do the militias and the scam centers and the narcotics and the the the resources fit into all that? So it is a simple question that becomes more and more complicated as you look on it. But what is your because you have referenced China's engagement in trying to resolve the Myanmar crisis, what do you see as China's angle or or desire, or the way that that ASEAN could work with them to find a peaceful resolution?
Wong Chen 19:55
Well, you know, I don't have direct access to the Chinese leadership, so it's. Way beyond my pay grade. But I do meet, you know leaders who are. You know my counterpart, like committee members from China, from the Chinese Communist Party. So every time I see them, I just, you know, I'm a blunt person, directly to the point. So whatever I say, here is probably my guess what's really happening. But, you know, in this world today, we have four major conflicts. We got Gaza conflict, which Malaysia is invested in for, for a reason that we have a long historical, you know, Muslim tie them. And the second one, of course, Ukraine, is coming to an end, hopefully on better terms, we hope. And then the Sudan matter, even Sudan is making some progress, because there's been some victories for one side. To me, I'm not taking sides on who's going to win. So then the last one is Myanmar, right? So if America is doing Gaza wrongly or rightly, and doing Ukraine, then the remaining two wars will be Sudan and Myanmar. So the focus is going to be on Myanmar and Sudan. If these two wars are settled, that Myanmar has a border with China, puts China in a difficult position, right? There are, of course, conspiracy theories saying all sort of things that the West is not interested in solving a border clash or border wall next to China to keep China busy in that site. But if that's true, then it's logical that the Chinese will need to do something. You know, they need to solve it as soon as possible, because they don't want this torn on the side, right? And what benefits are there for China having this conflict in ASEAN countries. Make ASEAN countries worried, because we all know China is the superpower, so they should behave like a superpower and help us resolve this matter. I think if they do that, I think the good will amongst ASEAN countries in China just improves over time. But if they don't do that, status quo remains. We have good ties with China overall, right? Except for maybe Philippines and Vietnam on, you know, sea issues. But then China will miss that opportunity to increase that good will and see the whole world focusing on them once Ukraine and Gaza is out. So I think Chinese Foreign Policy guys, you know, they are smart. They are much better than us. They probably can understand this basic idea that if Trump performs right or wrongly, then China needs to perform too, right. So let's hope they Race to the Top, race to the bottom on this issue. And I think that's the basic messaging I've been been saying to my counterparts in China, that you really see an opportunity. I mean, to stop the war, right? I mean, do we need to sacrifice another 30,000 people for war that cannot be won by either side? Or will China take up that responsibility and, you know, try and do something good, because the next flashing point will be Taiwan, and that's going to take another five hours discussion on this method, right? So you know, they can get gain some good will by doing the right thing.
Host 23:16
To flesh out your thinking of China, doing the right thing, ending the conflict, being able to engage positively. You know, there are many ways to end a conflict, and there are many ways to create, quote, unquote, peace. You know, for whatever that means, we're seeing Trump in Ukraine use the words of peace, ending the conflict in such a way that is, is in many ways, removing the agency of the Ukrainian people and putting them in a position that is certainly not what they've been striving for, for for this time. And one can see in Myanmar too, there is very clearly a way for China to engage in such a way that that quote unquote stability comes, but that stability and that end of conflict and that quote unquote, peace may not, may not also bring about democracy and human rights and and supporting those, humanitarian aid, the displacement, everything else that's going along with it. And so when we're looking at China coming in and engaging in the right way, just to unpack more what is meant by that, as well as what is meant by, you know, them trying to create a resolution to create peace. What does that look like for as we look especially at for the betterment of the Myanmar people, which we don't know if that is in China's interest, for the stability that they want.
Wong Chen 24:35
I mean, I don't know. I don't, I don't speak the Chinese, right? But all I'm saying is, there is that opportunity to do something more, because the focus after Gaza and Ukraine is on China. So if China needs to see the big picture, how they negotiate with the junta and the rebels remains to be seen, right? We don't know the details, but I don't think Chinese negotiation tactic. Is as brazen as the Trump administration on Ukraine or Gaza. I mean, Gaza is extremely hard to swallow. Ukraine is I would say it doesn't help Ukraine, but again, they are facing an existential threat, so it's after Ukrainian, whether they want to accept that or not. And you know, so far, Trump starts high, very demanding. He's considered some Ukraine seems to be interested in the rare earth issue. So it's a process. I think the Chinese do not negotiate in this kind of style. They will probably favor more concessions to the SEC, you know, but can the Rebels take a lesser position? I mean, but I won't be so dramatic as trauma. I think it's more constant. The Chinese probably make up their mind and say, this is on the table. The way we look at how Chinese do things is that this is on the table. You don't want it. I just woke up, you know, but this is an opportunity, I think that needs to be laid out, because if they can't agree, at least they're talking you know, it's so important for us. You know, MPs who are pro human rights. We just want, we just want war to end. I mean, it's the people who choose to fight the combatants. It's up to them, but it's the people, the people are caught in the cross fire, right? And that's the super majority. You know, to us, our mission is to get the wall to end at all costs, but it's for the leaders to make that political wisdom to accept not but if you asking me, what is China's negotiation tactic, or what, of course, they're going to be maybe 60% pro the the SEC and 40% for the Rebels, I think that is. You know, of course we achieve, we try to achieve 5050, but it's not likely to happen. China, being their position, flip flopping between supporting the rebels a bit and then supporting the the SEC. You know, all these are also going to be big issues that are coming out at the geopolitical space right with the end of the war. What's Russia going to do? Are they going to pursue more global south cooperation. Global South gonna say, Look, you guys started war there. Maybe you shouldn't be that close to you guys, you know, and then. But when you look at the West, and you look at America in particular, they're sending back migrants, they're doing many things. They're threatening, threat, tariff. Who do we go to for leadership? Right? It's super complicated. I think for for many of us in this called Global South countries, we're trying to hedge our bets, and even the Europeans themselves are considering this kind of thing. So it's very difficult here. But back to the Myanmar issue. Is a window of opportunity that we have to try. You know, I'm not super optimistic, but the first thing to do, and I think the most achievable thing that we can do, is to get the Thai Army to be advisers to ASEAN for the next three years or so, all the way leading to Singapore, in particular, they have a very important role to play when Philippine takes over, because even the Filipinos are probably more detached than Malaysia over the Myanmar crisis. So at least you have that continuity of people that really know what's going on. And because Thai, the Thais have, you know, skin in the game, right? You know, they have a long border, 2040 kilometer. Of course, is important to Thailand. You can't ask Philippine to deal with the thing, because it's so distant from them. So having that, that special advisory continuing, is super important. I think that that is achievable, but I would like to see my Prime Minister attempt to call a conference, and, you know, meet the rebels officially, and then meet the SAC officially, and then, if the vehicle happens, get them on the same table, right? I mean, that is really our, our, our attempt to do something in the next nine months or so, yeah.
Host 29:21
So you spoken a bit about the different Myanmar actors that that you would like to see brought to the table discussions to reach out, have conversations, etc, etc. And I want to break down each of those parties. I have questions with each of those one by one. To break down the three main parties. We can say the the SAC the ethnic leaders, and then nug, your democracy activists. So these, these are, these are three general, big, broad groups we can speak about. Take the SAC first. The pushback I would have there is, is considering, you know, who is the SEC really going to listen to? Anyone? Is. There anyone who could reach out to them? And to give some background to this question, I've spoken to different diplomats, others on this podcast who've been involved in Myanmar for not years, but decades, and to a person each of them has said, at many different stages of the past Myanmar regime, there has been ways to reach out to people in that regime and to talk. And this one is completely different. It is just, it is a wall. It is very difficult to have any kind of engagement and discussion. And so when, whether we're, you know some of the plans that you're, that you were discussing, some of the things that you'd like to see, you know, whether it's ASEAN reaching out through the Thai military to military relations, that's very interesting, that hasn't necessarily been done as a strategy or plan, so that that is something new and interesting to consider. But ASEAN, of course, has had very limited engagement. And we see how the SEC plays off every engagement with ASEAN, with UN with other countries, for legitimacy, just simply, whatever they can do for the photo op and forward legitimacy. They're just, they're playing that game, you know, pure and simple. To what degree does China have in here? You know, Operation 1027, in some ways, was seen by analysts as as a sign that China was fed up with the SEC not listening to them, and and then the UN itself. So, you know what? What evidence is there, really, to date, that the sac, and really, when you say SAC, your document online, is really listening to anyone and what, what can be done to, you know, recognizing that to be able to find new ways, you've already suggested one of them, the Thai military, to military relations, that is kind of a Thai advisory board that's very interesting. And so that's one direction we can go. But other directions, or other thoughts you have on on how to actually have engagement with the SAC, given how difficult it's been these past four years from any party, no, that's the thing, right?
Wong Chen 31:52
We cannot give them legitimacy. So it's easier to use if, if the Thai, Thai Government and the army agrees that, you know, let the body of the Thai government, which is the army, to to talk to them and to formally talk to them. Will the will the government would junta agree to meet up formally. Of course, they want to right, but we have to be advised by the time, literally, how serious are they? The only way you can force the junta, which is why I started the idea that I don't think there's going to be, you know, I think they will continue to fight, because that's the way they are, right? But what it means, essentially, is that the we got to use the other things, which is stop the weapons, stop trading, stop orders, to put pressure on the junta, to see that there's no way out. They cannot win this, and that they're running our weapons. So that can do two things. Once we push them in a desperate position, then they will concede. Because, you know, if they feel that, you know, China can tell me what to do, but I don't have to listen. But, you know, I'm still getting jet fuel. I'm still getting bombs from Russia or India or China. What is there to talk about? Right? It's my country, I decide. But when all these things stop, you know, then they will feel a lot of pressure, because it will create pressure for the leadership and also the junior ranking officers in there might think about other things, you know. So that pressure is important to get them on the negotiation. Negotiating table for us, we are no experts. Malaysians don't don't have a clue what's really going on. We let the ties lead us on that, because they've got skin in the game. So I think it's super ambitious to get a miracle to, you know, get that negotiating within the next nine months. But you don't mind, boss is very charming, Ibrahim and and he has skills. So if all sides, the suppliers of weapons, agree. And we do have ties with Russia because, you know, by virtue of Malaysia trying to join bricks, we have their ties with India, Russia and China. If all these three agree to do something more, let's try a window of three months with no weapons for them. Can we get, you know, the banks in, whether it's in Singapore or in Thailand, to stop it for three months. Let's try it out and see what kind of pressure we can put them, and get the Thais to talk to them, because they at least meet each other, the Thai Army, and then report back to us and see where there's an opportunity before we end our our championship. Because when Philippine takes over, it's going to be, you know, you're already starting from ground zero again, that's going to be very difficult.
Host 34:41
One interesting thing about that plan that brings up the question of the Thai military itself, and what are their motivations, incentives, aspirations, of what they would like to see if they're that key player, they suddenly become quite empowered into how they want to bring that relationship.
Wong Chen 34:58
Yeah, so we have you know Prime Minister Aung prime is appointed tak chin as advisor. So by virtue of that, he will have access to the Prime Minister of Thailand. And I think from what we understand, what the political situation in Thailand at the moment, the military and the government have cordial relationships. So let's hope that can be the tool for us to do that the Thai Army main concern is, of course, they're there to protect the borders of Thailand, so they have an important mission to do for their own national national security. So you don't have to second guess their commitment to this matter, right? Whether they're bad actors, they're bad actors everywhere. You know, I think I would like to believe that the the majority of the Thai Army is there for national security, not for, you know, other illegal activities that may happen at the border. Right? The vast majority, and the sake of the national security of Thailand is more important than a few bad, bad actors on both sides. So hopefully that that understand, because what we need to do is we need to send them a clear message that Malaysia wants to do something about Myanmar, and this the way we want to do it. And are they agreeable? Then we will approach Russia, India, China, and see, can we try? Can we try? Otherwise, we will miss that opportunity. You know, the Troika thing is complicated, because when Singapore takes over, you know, there are a lot of Myanmar businessmen in Singapore, and there's a lot of trade, so they might be reluctant as well to pursue this further.
Host 36:42
So you really see this as a unique window of opportunity that you have to hit.
Wong Chen 36:46
Tiny one tiny and we got to run fast, because, again, geopolitics, there is reason for China to move on, right to do something more Russia, complicated. I mean, this Russia. Idea of putting a nuclear power plant is just, it's not something that we will support.
Host 37:04
Yeah, certainly, certainly. So moving on to the next act of the UG, and we can almost look at the inverse of just as the military is this actor that's that's putting itself anywhere to craving legitimacy, trying to to put itself anywhere that it can get shades of it. The nug is being denied legitimacy in so many places, and we've, again, we've spoken to people on this podcast who have called for some type of diplomatic recognition of the nug, that there's different stages and levels of diplomatic recognition, and there could be a lower level one that allows them to simply to have some kind of office that's a diplomatic mission, to say nothing of travel and travel documents, the difficulty of passports and visas, and how many nug members are living, quote, unquote, illegally in May sought, and, you know, just, just the the real hardships that they're under. But you know, they've also been denied that legitimacy from this is not just putting shade on ASEAN, but the wider international community, un you know, the the international structures and formalities of how states are recognized. The nug has fallen in the cracks of that complicating the matter further is that there it is an open question of the relation that the nug has with the fighting groups that are in the country. How much are they supporting them, directing them. How much are they aligned with them? I don't think, I don't know if there's a person out there who really has a conclusive answer for for all of this. As Anthony Davis said on our podcast, the this is the first example he's ever seen in the history of a revolution anywhere where the so called central body of that revolution is not revolutionary. And so the there, and the final spin to put on it is that one can say that the nug had a and the company and you see, and CRP H that had its mandate from the 2020 elections, and and those that were not imprisoned, and how the members came to be chosen after 2025 this does become more of a question of the nug zone legitimacy and how to move forward in that and so and so. All of this is just a tremendously complicated situation for what the nug is and how they're dealt with, and how and and then also just the for those of us that would like to see a resolution where democratic aspirations are honored. The nug is that imperfect, but best embodiment of that. And so to whatever degree they are denied access or legitimacy or travel or anything else, it does harm those interests of the aspirations that they're trying to seek. And so looking at the second actor of the nug and how they could be involved in conversations, in legitimacy, in having a seat at the table, in further access and privileges. What would you like to see there?
Wong Chen 39:52
I have friends in the nug because, you know, before the before the coup, they used to come to Malaysia quite often, and they'll. And we will have dinner and do Yangon. It's a favorite there. But, you know, in the Civil War position, the nug really need to take part in the war, otherwise they will not win the respect of the rebels. And this is the problem, right? And rebels are ethnic based, you know, and the nug, I would say primarily Burmese, right? Can they raise an army? I don't think so. Do they have the capacity to do so? No, they're lawmakers. They're not, you know, as you as you put it, right, they don't have a history of fighting. So what role would they play? I don't think they will play an important role yet, because the rebels who think that, you know, we're doing all the fighting when the peace come, you want to rule, so we have to, we have to either, you know, I they have to engage them more. They have to put up something. I don't know what it is, but they are, of course, severely underfunded. I'm sure right. I think they will have a role to play at the at an election, if possible. You know, after the ceasefire starts and that we have a structure going forward otherwise, you know, they, their main role is really to continue what they're doing, which is, you know, getting the International, you know, people, people still interested in the war and the sympathy from international bodies, but beyond them, I'm afraid that they might be locked out of the negotiation table later. But if we are doing the mediation, perhaps we can find a role for them. Yeah, I think that's the that's the reality. Joah, there is no there's no other solution to where they are unless they raise an army. And strangely enough, it's also the same issue being raised by the Rohingyas, right in the army? Are they putting an army, or is the army fighting? Which Side Are they fighting for? Is also a bit unclear.
Host 42:00
It's also hearing that I'm struck by the contradictory angles of two things you've said in the conversation, which I think also just calls out the complexity of the situation. On one hand, you've talked about the desire to want to bring to incentivize all parties to stop the fighting, and yet, on the other hand, the because the nug has not ever engaged in the fighting, because they have not effectively raised an army. They almost need to effectively wage an army to then battle, to then stop it from engaging, and then have some more credibility or legitimacy. And so they're, they're in this position where they, they they haven't engaged in the fighting, to be able to stop the fighting. I mean, directly, of course, there's, there's a lot of things they've done. Things they've done behind the scenes and alignment, but their their lack of, maybe their lack of staying power, comes from not being directly out there in the field.
Wong Chen 42:52
That's right. I mean, you know, when we started this conversation in this podcast? I mean, you know, we, all of us hope that they will come to a peaceful settlement, but I think 99% they will just continue fighting, right? I mean, the American Civil War ended, one side winning. That's the only way wars end, right? So they will continue to fight. So if you don't fight, those who fight will feel hard done, if you are coming in and say, I should be the central government later, right? I mean, that's the that's the full reality of humanity, the way we operate. So but they do still have a role to play. That's what I'm saying. But if we are mediating, we can probably carve out something more for them at the negotiation table, but whether the rebels accept it is another issue. But I think the bigger, complicated thing that to us immediately cease fire, but the structure of what comes after that is a big headache. And for that, I think ASEAN probably can find, can do both, can do more, because we are so diverse, right? We have in Brunei, a royal family ruling. We have one party states. Up in the north, we have democracy like Malaysia. So it's quite good that we have that diversity and that we can find a middle ground for a new Myanmar post war, where hopefully the Burmese, whether in the form of the junta, or nug inside can live with the others.
Host 44:25
When you talk about the nugs role, I'm curious to what degree you think that they were just kind of put in a position with very little wiggle room, where they didn't have a lot of options to maneuver this way or that, And to what degree you think, retroactively, looking at at these past few years, they could and should have done things differently that wouldn't have landed them in this position. And I say that with the context that we have you reference Kun Kasi. We've had him as a podcast guest twice on our platform, and a couple years ago, he did go in pretty heavily on ways that he thought the. G really was missing their chance and speaking very openly and transparently about what he was telling the nug behind closed doors, saying it publicly of what they should and could be doing to better their own chances, in no way you know, missing who the real aggressors and and victims and and perpetrators are, but also not completely giving them a pass. And so that, that was a couple years ago, we spoke to him, and he might have a different view than you. So I'm one. You. So I'm wondering for you right now, do you do you see, to what degree do you see the nug as kind of a victim of circumstances, and to what degree do you think they could have had a bigger role to play or still do?
Wong Chen 45:33
Well, I don't like to, you know, say what might have been, but going forward, what they must do, and this is basic organizational structure. They need to have a firm leadership on who is actually leading it. But more importantly, they need to raise a lot of money, you know, from the diaspora, and convince them to give them money so that they can organize themselves better, whether into a fighting force, or a better public relations machine or something like that. It's just basic stuff, you know, if they go around, like the Ancient Mariner that you know, stopping people and telling about the stories of their woes, it's not going to go far, because people do get exhausted. Every year I go to the Ipu, I meet them, and it's sad, you know, it's sad. So I think they have to self reflect themselves. Where are they going? And I think out there, a lot of people who are living in democratic countries, Myanmar is Burmese, will be supportive if they can show I know what we're doing. I know what we're doing, right? And they have to, really, you know, find proper leadership moving forward. One of the problems with the ANU Ji is, of course, Aung San Suu Kyi herself has no news coming out. We're not sure what's happened to her, but the Rohingya episode was quite nasty to say, so I think those good real was burned, so they were stuck in that. I think that was partly the reason why the international community was a bit hesitant, or don't know how to deal with this issue. Right. On the one hand, they were perpetrators of abusers, and now they are in the run. You know, do people talk about karma, you know, straight to the point, right? So I think a lot of repairing needs to be done. They need to find a proper leadership, and they need to energize the core supporters in the diaspora to give them and a foot in the you know, to get get insight on the table, if ever we get a ceasefire deal going on.
Host 47:43
I appreciate your candor in that answer, and I just want to underscore the initial words you said in responding to that that were, you know, on one hand, quite alarming, but another hand not a surprise, that you said something like, well, we need to know who the leader is. You know, we need to know who to talk to. And that's just kind of stunning that, that, that international bodies, allies don't exactly know in the nug, who's who's doing what, and who to talk to to do what?
Wong Chen 48:08
Yeah, but, you know, my engagement with the nug, and it is quite limited, to be fair, I'm not an expert in in the matter. It has been always, you know, Dr win, when I meet him at Ipu, so there was never a move to say, Look, maybe we should have a big talk with the big boss. Who is the big boss? I don't know. Yeah, right, you know, I mean, I met, at the early days, I met a person called Dr San. I don't know where his position is at the moment, so it's a bit, seems a bit unstructured for me, and I'm, you know, I'm supposed to be chair of the foreign policy for Malaysia.
Host 48:46
Yeah, yeah. Well, as a friend of mine, who's a democracy activist, said on one of our podcasts. She referenced how, you know, if you were to, if someone were to ask, what does the SAC stand for? I can give them an answer in one minute, exactly who they are, what they want, what they stand for, who's in charge? If you ask that same question of the nug, I don't know how to begin answering that. I don't know if they know how to begin answering that. That was, she said that something like two or three years ago. So, you know, so what you're really talking about is, well, you use the word organization. I would also add innovation to that, that there, there has to be a way to speak outside of this echo chamber, really, of, you know, sharing the troubles and the problems of the systems of the situation that's there. As I've said to people before, revolutions aren't supposed to be easy. You know, they are hard to win and they require and certainly, you know the sacrifice, the resilience, the dedication that has been there, that has been there in spades, that has been there in Myanmar, beyond what I thought was really possible in the human spirit. I've never witnessed anything like it myself. But I think beyond that, there also has to be this sense of of innovation and of change, and of responding, of adaptation, respond to the situation. And I think that's where I think to put. Some of the things you say as well. One might like to see a little more.
Wong Chen 50:02
Yeah. I mean, it's unfair for us to create science and to comment, because we're not in that situation. But if they do want an advice, you know, they got to get we got to get the act together.
Host 50:14
And I think this is advice coming from you and your position and what you represent, and others like Kun kasi and like you that are there ready to help. I think this is vice that they would best Well, listen to and respond to. This is, this is, you know, the better kind of unsolicited advice they can get for moving forward. Then looking at the third actor, these are the different ethnic groups. I want to reference what I heard from another guest from this conference that that spoke to us on the podcast, and was talking about when the chair was with Indonesia and they had shared how at that time, the Indonesians talked to every single party involved. I think the number they gave was 146 different groups that they spoke to. And the way they described it was that there was not enough string to be able to stretch to indicate the gaps and the differences between the viewpoints and the stances of these different groups. And because of that, they then went on to say, to posit, that now that the chair is in Malaysia, what they don't need to be doing is talking to more groups. We've this has happened ad nauseam, and we know what the answer is. Nothing new is going to come of it. I know I'm kind of pushing back to what you said, but I want to to bring this comment to again, looking at how do we have dialog with these, with these three groups, I think that there's two kind of pushbacks and comments I want to make to get your reaction on one is that, you know, is this comment that there has been so much talk and engagement already, we know what those positions are. What comes next after that's important. The second being is that really, from the start of the conflict, before the conflict, going back to the peace building attempts in the transition period, and even before that, there has been a constant criticism, and this is again, beyond ASEAN. This is US and US led the international community, un et cetera, that there has been a lot of top down approaches, a lot of bringing in systems of change, that they're trying to contort the Myanmar reality towards that as I've talked to some of the people involved in that process, and they've said, they've told me, off the record, candidly, that sometimes they feel that the discord intention is greater after their meetings than before, and these are professionals coming in, applying frameworks that are just simply not working. And so this is, yes, this is a complex situation that has a history of a lack of success. And so looking at these two elements, and now that the chair is in Malaysia, and looking what you're hoping to do. How would you respond to the way that these ethnic groups can be engaged more effectively than we've seen?
Wong Chen 52:45
I don't think we can do better than Indonesia, but Malaysia is more multiracial, and more diverse, I think, in some ways, than Indonesia, even though Indonesia has, you know, Papua all the way to ace, right? So we do have those skills, similar to Indonesia, to talk to all sort of people, all sort of races, all sort of groups. But again, you know, we are three months, four months in as ASEAN Chen. We haven't done much, and the envoy has been traveling a lot, so that's he's doing that bit. But I think in dealing with these kind of groups, you have to just argue in the same way as we deal with my constituent the economic issue, if they can see, you know, most of them are probably not interested in human rights or justice or fairness or whatever. I don't, and I think even in their own groups, I don't think they're getting a democracy that they want, sure, right? So we got to lay out the economic issue quickly to them and to me, you know, they've cobbled together all this ethnic group into this thing called Myanmar or Burma. Should we unwind that? Should there be more autonomy? And if they're autonomous, can they actually make a living? Can they, you know, help each other. Can they collect tax? I don't think they can do it. So there must be a structure where the fiscal issue of all these Warring States, all these little, little, you know, ethnic group need to be given a deal where they feel that it's it makes more economic sense being together as a country called Myanmar, rather than being separate. And that is, that's going to take even longer than the ceasefire, I can tell you, right? But maybe they will break into 10 groups or nine or I don't know what the permutations are. And maybe there's a structure where they keep 60% of the revenue themselves and give 40% to a central government. I mean, we have to start looking at this kind of thing and propose to them, do they agree? Because for 440 groups to agree. I mean, you know, you, like the United Nations, you never get anything done, right? But, but I think brought. People just want to have respect, but more important, economic growth. And they're all very poor. But what is interesting, like the harmonics, right in us, they're quite successful. I mean, they are. They're quite a force to be reckoned with a lot of money. So you do have ethnic group, which are, you know, quite inventive, quite innovative, and with funds so they can grow their own country quite fast, if they so decide. The question is, you know, will it having more states rather than one? Myanmar? Is that going to be another geopolitical battleground for those superpowers like India, US and China? And that doesn't help to stabilize ASEAN vision of an economic block at one point. So I think we have to start talking. Ceasefire is super important. But you know, how do you reconstruct this thing? I don't know you've been in Myanmar much, much longer than me. I've only been there once in my life, right? Is it possible that they live together? I mean, in Malaysia, races tend to be, you know, we have issues, but we are, we are generally respectful of each other, and we get along. There is a sense of what Malaysia is, you know, and Malaysia is, you know, basically five big ethnic group, right? But 140 I don't know. Is it possible? Maybe we do need to break it into 910 I don't know, but, but there must be a commonality a federal system that allows the the states more more power on education, on language and stuff like that. But they should unite for infrastructure, roads, you know, Army, probably independent police force of your own, you know, a bit like Australia, I suppose, right. This kind of model is something that we must really start talking about.
Host 56:58
So last question I have is looking at at the ASEAN model itself, and again, going back to interviews with Kun Cas, he was he, among several others, have been quite critical of this roving chair that it's so short, the institutional memory isn't so much carried. He's put out different models of suggestions that he would like to see on our podcast, you referenced here just simply, even if the chair is roving, which we'll get into in a moment, if it should be, but even if it is, that.
Wong Chen 57:27
The it's run by civil servants, we don't political will, right? That's the issue.
Host 57:31
That the Thai military could at least they can be consultants that can move along with that roving chair is a possibility. But I want to open up this question for greater exploration. It sounds like you're also critical of this model. Do you have suggestions of a different way of engaging that could be more effective than how fast it moves?
Wong Chen 57:51
No. I mean, we can set up an entire whole division with actual politicians, right for the Myanmar crisis. You know we've been talking about. I mean, I've been, I've been an MP for 1213, years now, and I've been involved in IPA for so long. It's just, it's just not working, right? We know this. They know this. We pass so many resolutions, which are all, you know, non binding. I think it's time that we look at a parliament model, not necessarily like a very big, expensive one, but just say five MPs from each country right to lend that political will to do something, and then the civil service then can be told to pursue this thing. Because if you ask the ministers to do it, their loyalty is 99.9% to Malaysia, to Singapore. You know, they can't be focused on this issue. So a simple structure is say, let's get a a interim parliamentarian, a parliament ASEAN parliament, entering ASEAN parliament with, you know, real people who are interested in finding solutions, get them in there and work with the Thai, Thai Army. And then, you know, at the big, big level, to talk to China and all the big countries, US and India, you know, pursue, ask the government to do that, if you don't get that political will, civil servants are just, you know, I mean, it's unfair to say all civil servants are just doing that civil service job. But in the case as serious as Myanmar, you need political direction. I think that that is a potential solution. Then, you know, whoever takes over. The guys are still there. The guys who really want to want to see the end of the war are still around to guide the next chair of ASEAN. Otherwise it's not going to work, right? You know, on a separate issue, I've been trying to push for ASEAN to look. At climate change as a unified model, because in ASEAN, that you know, what we know is we have different political systems, so that makes it very difficult to unite. But more importantly, we have Singapore, which is super rich, and you've got countries like Laos, which is struggling. The economic disparity between these two means we can't even have an economic model. So but in climate change, we can, so we need to show some solid improvement, you know, we can sell Laotian hydro credits traded in Singapore's, you know, high tech banking sector, you know. So we need to find this commonality to build an ASEAN, ASEAN image beyond the ASEAN handshake or singing the ASEAN song of a new logo every year. It's a shame, because, of course, we do need to, we need, we need to push harder to unite. We're facing unprecedented geopolitical issues coming up from the Trump administration. But it's even, it's not even without Trump, if we're facing, you know, climate AI, core issues that will shape, shape the world, and we need to do something about that, otherwise, you'll get picked off one by one. You know, individually, small little countries in Southeast Asia.
Host 1:01:21
Yeah. Well, I thank you again for appearing on this podcast and speaking so candidly about a range of issues where, in some cases, there's really no good answers for and and telling us your ideas and thoughts and strategies and how to engage. I think this is very informative for our listenership to hear and to know.
Wong Chen 1:01:41
Well, you know, pray for us. I suppose I'm not particularly religious, but in this matter, I think we cannot give up. I know that it's going to be difficult and it's a long haul, but every time we fail to do something, and we've been elected into office, we are, you know, we're causing harm to people. I mean, this war has to end everywhere, not just in Myanmar, but we should feel, I think all members of parliament in ASEAN should feel an extra burden, because it's really our brothers and sisters out there, our neighbors, that need the full help. And Joah, keep up the good work. You know, I find it strange that you're from the states and you're doing this a lot more than a lot lot of us who are in ASEAN. So you know, keep up your good work.
Host 1:02:34
We've come to the conclusion of today's interview, and after this discussion, it should be clear to everyone just how dire the situation in Myanmar continues to be through this platform and the urgent humanitarian relief that we offer through better Burma, our nonprofit, we're doing everything we can to shine a light on this continuing crisis and help those who are most vulnerable. So if you found something in today's conversation meaningful, please consider sharing it with friends in your network. That's a simple yet powerful way to raise awareness, and if you're moved to do more, please consider supporting our efforts together. We can keep the spotlight on Myanmar. See how you can contribute by visiting insightmyanmar.org/donation you