Transcript: Episode #317: The Usual Suspects
Below is the complete transcript for this podcast episode. This transcript was generated using an AI transcription service and has not been reviewed by a human editor. As a result, certain words in the text may not accurately reflect the speaker's actual words. This is especially noticeable when speakers have strong accents, as AI transcription may introduce more errors in interpreting and transcribing their speech. Therefore, it is advisable not to reference this transcript in any article or document without cross-referencing the timestamp to ensure the accuracy of the guest's precise words.
Host 00:21
Before we dive into today's conversation, I'd like to say a brief word about the nature of our long form interviews here at Insight, Myanmar podcast, simply put, all of our discussions are guest driven. Our discussions go deep into the expertise and perspectives of our guests, because it is our belief that when we are able to open up to the experience and voice of others. Well, we all learn. So with that, let's sit back and enjoy what follows.
Host 01:18
I am I'm really pleased on this episode of Insight Myanmar podcast to welcome Derek Mitchell, who was the US ambassador to Myanmar from 2012 to 2016 he was recently the president of the National Democratic Institute, and is currently a non resident Senior Advisor to the Office of the President and Asia programs for the center of Strategic and International Studies. So Ambassador Mitchell, thank you so much for taking the time to join us. Thank you for having me. You've had a long and deep engagement with Myanmar, from your early work with Senator Ted Kennedy's office to your roles at the Pentagon, and later being the first US Special Representative from Myanmar. I'd like to ask before your ambassadorship, what initially drew you to focus on Myanmar?
Derek Mitchell 02:30
Well, that's a it's actually an interesting question. It did not start with Senator Kennedy. It started a bit later. It's very serendipitous. In fact, a good friend of mine said later, when I became ambassador that maybe it was fate that things happened as they did. I was unemployed early in the 90s. I was between jobs, and I went to see an old mentor, and in the course of the conversation, he flipped an invitation that night. And if you know how it is in Washington, when you're young and unemployed, and you look for any free meal you can get and to get out there and network. So he gave me an invitation to some dinner, an awards dinner in the early 90s, and it was for this person I'd never heard of with a name I couldn't pronounce. On behalf of this person I went to the event turned out to be for Aung San Suu Kyi. I think it was a lawyer's award, some kind of human rights law award. And on the way in, I actually saw this book, freedom from fear, sitting on a table. It must have been a display copy or something. And I, you know, being unemployed and without much money, I grabbed the book, probably was display copy. I took it and I went home. It was a summer of 92 I think 1992 and I read it cover to cover. I had studied Asia before. I'd gone to graduate school for Asia, and I'd sort of focused on Asia, lived in Taiwan and such. And I, you know, I was interested in China in particular. But I remember reading this thing cover to cover in that summer, thinking to myself, and I guarantee you, this is true, thinking to myself the whole time. Why am I reading this? I will never do anything with Burma. And thinking to myself at that moment and again, I swear this is true. I wonder if I'll look back on this. Am I thinking this? So I read this thing, cover to cover, and I was fascinated by him, by this person, you know, this woman, whose name I can barely pronounce. And I ended up working for National Democratic Institute where I later became president. I was a kind of a program officer, and one morning on National Public Radio, I woke up and they announced that this person had been released from house arrest. It's 1995 so the president of NDI got in touch with me and said, Let's go over and see her, which we did, and we sat with her, and like I said, was September? Was it September? October? I think of 1995 and to meet her was to just completely fall in love with who she was and what she represented, and her courage. And that really connected me. A whole generation of people who were fascinated by her and who got a taste of what Burma Myanmar is all about, were just tied to it. So in the years after that, I left NDI, ended up working and did international security work for about 15 years, at first at the Pentagon and then at CSIS, where I'm back doing. A lot of us, Alliance relationship work and China work and things like that. But and even worked in the Pentagon in the late 90s in the Clinton administration. But always had my eye on Burma, or read the cables on Burma or watch what went on. And I used to say people that my head is with Asia and Alliance relations, my heart is with Burma, and again, never thinking that I'd ever do anything with the issue, but it was that was sort of how I got my start and interest, through Aung San Suu Kyi and through that sort of serendipitous engagement and exposure to the issue.
Host 05:55
That's a great story, and thanks for sharing that personal background. I think that a lot of people listening, a lot of foreigners that have been engaged in Myanmar for some time in some capacity, even very different from yourself. I think there's something in your story that we can identify with, of something that you find through serendipity, whether it's through human rights or diplomacy in your case, or whether in my case, through meditation, and any number of different ways that one is brought into thinking, Oh, this, this is, this is a a place I want to know more about. And then after taking some of those initial steps onto trying to learn more and to engage more, there's something that just kind of takes hold and never lets go in the best sense of the word.
Derek Mitchell 06:38
There is absolutely something different about Myanmar. And I think everybody, when I was ambassador, and people would come visit, they always said it was the most fascinating place they'd ever been in their lives. And as you say, I think everybody who does work on Myanmar has a story about what it was that connected them, that when you when it touches you, even diplomats, aside from me, State Department, people who go on to other assignments, they always look back on the Burma assignment as being somehow special. There's something about the place and about the issue that sticks with people. So when it goes through its unfortunate cycles of tragedy, we really I always say it breaks the heart of every person that touches it, because the country deserves so much better.
Host 07:19
Yeah. And I think that that when you're talking about there's, there's a kind of distinction or flavor of Myanmar that's different from elsewhere. It, it does bring up that famous ruder Kipling quote of Burma being a place like none other, which is basically every travel agency has on its, you know, as its motto and tagline, and this is where that balance comes in, of acknowledging this sense of pool, this magnetic pool, for those that come into it through whatever capacity, and yet trying to also acknowledge the exoticism. Because really, if that quote symbolizes anything, it's this kind of non nuanced, exotic way of looking at the Orient of the other. And for so many, again, for so many who come, whether I've spoken to many people and that have come through diplomatic missions as well as human rights or meditation, really, all over the gamut, people talk about their experience of breaking down, that that generalization that they come in with of a land like no other, and starting to appreciate the nuance and complexity, which will definitely get in as the interview goes on.
Derek Mitchell 08:25
Yeah, no, that's absolutely right. That's what's interesting about it is, I don't know. I think it must be for some people, it's an exotic quote, exotic thing, and that attracts people. It's something different. It's so, you know, it's Asian, if people don't do Asia that, you know, that whole trope of exoticism. But I think it was also wrapped up in this notion of just Aung San Suu Kyi her, you know, not just her name, but her figure. I mean, just she is an individual, the lady in the junta, or the monks in the military. That very simplistic. It was an easy issue to draw you in in the old days. And then I think, as you suggest, and as we'll get into here, we start with that kind of very simplistic, un nuanced dualism. And as you scratch the surface, and as people do and as you do, you realize this. It's one of the most complicated places in the world. I mean, as a side, people get into it because it seems so simple, and then if they stick around, if they do, they realize it's one of the most fascinatingly complex places and tragically complex places. I think that also dissuades people over time, once they realize, you know, the lady is not just an icon or some she's a politician and she's a human being. And the monks, even the monks, are more complicated than they may have seemed. Buddhism or Buddhist monks can be complicated. That's where you really see who's interested in the country and who's not. And I used to say that, you know, the way we used to talk about Vietnam, as you know, Vietnam is a country, not a war. You. You had to come around to that as Americans, it's a country, not a war. See it for its full complexity. I kind of used to use that a version of that when I was ambassador, that we have to recognize that Myanmar is a country, not a cause. I think for many people, for a long time, it was a cause, something you project onto. Maybe it's a factor of what you talk about exoticism or otherism, but it's a country with its own dynamics, its own humanity, its own context. You have to understand, if you really, truly care about it, and I think we have to come to that complexity and stick with it and recognize it isn't a cause. It's a country.
Host 10:38
Right? And that complexity and nuance is exactly what we'll get into in the conversation that follows, as well as the reason for this platform and this format to begin with, to allow that space and time to have the story unfold and develop on its own, rather than these simplistic, reductionist ways of looking and just short quotes or headlines. And that moves us into your appointment as ambassador. That was in 2012 this was significant, very significant for the country and the relations of us and Myanmar as well. You're the first US ambassador to Myanmar in over two decades after 1988 and it signals a major shift in US policy at the time. So can you take us back to that time and what the atmosphere was like in Washington.
Derek Mitchell 11:23
Well, I came in, you know, not at the very beginning. I came in, you know, it was just say, 2011 I became the envoy, first special envoy, and then Ambassador a year later. And that was, you know, 2011 was two years into the Obama administration. Obama famously that line about, you know, we will unclench our fist to those who extend their hand, or, I'm sorry, we will extend our hand to those who will clench their fist. That came from his inaugural address in 2009 so Burma, Myanmar was sort of the, the first, one of the first kind of tests of that. So, in essence, it was part of a little bit of a well, we're going to, we're going to see if this works. We want to be, want a different relationship with those traditional adversaries. And they had in mind, of course, in the side of their heads, Iran, North Korea, I think they had in mind in Cuba, which they opened up to later. But Myanmar Burma was sort of the first of these to test it. Now they came in and they did a review, first thing in 2009 a review of policy, and they came out with this idea that we should break the cycle of isolation, simple isolation, maintain sanctions, but reach out and see if there's something there. We can engage and get a different result that in and of itself, I should say, was a result of a piece that I had written for Foreign Affairs, a major magazine in the West, a global magazine, really out of Washington, where I posited this. I had done Myanmar stuff in the 90s, and I realized that sanctions were necessary, but not sufficient, because we weren't getting the results that we wanted. So I wrote a piece saying we should have a special envoy, and we should have somebody focused on it. 24/7 to keep sanctions and do and so basically, the Obama folks took that idea and Congress actually authorized. I authorized what I had suggested that there'd be a special envoy. So I actually called for a position to be created that I ended up filling. Not a bad thing when you're looking to get a job, you know, get Congress to create a job for you. So, you know, first, they actually authorized it during the Bush administration, but time ran out on them, and Obama folks asked me to do that and took over in 2011 so that was the context for all of it. And I came in a couple years in, there had been engagement by Kirk Campbell and Joah and others with fan Shui at the time. But I came in just as the insane had taken over. Fan Shui stepped to the side, ostensibly than San took off the uniform, became president, and there were indications from very early on, then from Thane San's initial addresses and some other things he was saying, that there may be a new day that he was looking for a different relationship with the outside world, that he was looking for reform from within. But we didn't know how serious he was. We didn't know if it was a false dawn, and that was my assignment as the envoy, was to go and to gage what was going on here, and to also engage with Aung San Suu Kyi directly, ensure that we had access to her so she can help us also think through what was going On and whether she believed that there was something different, because there had been false dawns before. So that's what I came into and people forget. I mean, it was very they wasn't even certain I was going to get a visa. I wasn't sure that they were going to accept me. There are a lot within the Burmese system, the government, that did not want a special anything. They don't like special. Voice they want to be normalized through diplomatic channels, but I was a special and they didn't know if they wanted to work with me, but they ended up doing that. And we could talk about how that evolved, but that was the initial sort of entree.
Host 15:12
And then when you arrived in Myanmar, how did that optimism compare to the reality that you found on the ground? What were the impressions of the government, civil society and the Burmese people's expectations as you started to settle into that role.
Derek Mitchell 15:26
Yeah, well, let me say again there. You know, Obama announcing me as as ambassador was a year into my assignment. That was after a lot of things had changed or had evolved. I started in July or August, I guess maybe in August of 2011 and there really wasn't any change there, I don't think any political prisoner releases of note, maybe there might have been one round. I don't think there was, though. So I was arriving, you know, Thein San had met Aung San Suu Kyi, as I remember, it was a famous picture of Aung San Suu Kyi under a portrait of her father, and they had taken a picture under that portrait, which is a signal they had a conference, I believe, on economic reform again. There was just a different atmosphere, a different tone. But during my time, starting in September, when I had my first visit, there started to gradually be releases from political prisoners and more and more openings, and my first visit again was to test this. And I basically told folks in every meeting. I said, Look, my line, my talking points were, I'm interested to know whether you are serious about what you say. You say you want democracy. That's what they told me. We want to be we want to democratize, and we want a good relationship with the United States, and we want peace. And I said, Well, if you want democracy, you wouldn't imprison those, you know, people. You would imprison people who were there only because they were favored democracy. You would release them. If you wanted peace, you would talk to your you know, internal, ethnic adversaries, as it were, and you wouldn't be fighting them. You would allow for civil society, if you believed in democracy as well. So I would said, Look, if you're serious, you would do these things, and if so, the United States is very interested in a different relationship with you. And said the sanctions that we put on are not to attack your country, but because we care about your country, we could easily exploit your country under your the current conditions. But we choose not to, because we want to see something different, we choose to hold back. But that will come off as we see conditions change on the ground. And that led to a so called action for action policy, or as they took action, we took action to return, and then we made a big splash. As you remember when we had the Secretary of State go, that was a real turning point, one of the turning points when we just decided that was actually something early on discussed, even before I arrived as envoy. We were talking about, should Secretary Clinton go? And my comment to the State Department folks was that can only happen if we, you know, we can make conditions right on the ground. We just simply can't send her. Aung San Suu Kyi has to be fine with it. We'd have to see release of political prisoners. We need to see something. And in fact, some of those things happen. Aung San Suu Kyi was fine with that. She got comfortable with it. Political prisoners were released. We saw some peace processes, so nascent peace processes. And then Secretary Clinton went and then a huge release of political prisoners. And that was the what cascaded to the announcement of my being the ambassador, a resident ambassador, in the country, which we hadn't had in 22 years. So there was a lot that happened there that was about testing the waters. And they knew, I mean, I was basically saying, you know, you need to prove the skeptics of the United States wrong. People don't believe you're sincere. And they got really annoyed with me because I kept saying, you have to do more. You have to do more. You have to do more. And so eventually, though, things moved on their own moment.
Host 19:08
Thank you for clarifying those months and the year before the ambassadorship. And I think it's fascinating to think about these meetings that you're having with really, on, say, on the edge of the frontier of this closed country that is taking these these tentative steps, and you're describing actions that need to be seen as evidence for the US to reciprocate and to believe that there's something genuine. And I guess what I'm curious about, you know, the actions that they actually took. That's something for history books. That's something that's documented, we can see what was actually done there. But what's behind the actions is what you had a peek into the window of, and that's the sense of the personal engagement of meeting some of these military leaders who had their own were coming from their own background, their own aspirations, maybe their own ambitions. Or, you know, their own, their own plans of what they want to accomplish. And so behind the actual actions that takes that are taking place, your meetings, your meetings that are happening over the course of this time, months later, years, as going from the beginning of those meetings, being in the same room with them and having a conversation, seeing their personality, their understanding of the world, the things that you can't really find in just the eventual actions that take place. What stands out? How would you characterize if you were to bring listeners back into those rooms, of what you took away from that?
Derek Mitchell 20:36
Yeah, look, there's a lot of risk in those days. We weren't certain of anything, and are certainly aware that they could be playing games with us. I think you're getting to the issue of, what were their motivations? Do they have ulterior motives that were behind this? And they were playing a game with us so that we release sanctions, these sanctions, and, you know, we'll get to, I'm sure those debates about were sanctions lifted too soon, and all that kind of thing. But I didn't judge them by their intentions. I judged them by their actions. And then, of course, in diplomacy, you do judge people a bit as you get to know them and watch them, whether, you know, there's a degree of sincerity behind it, again, whether they would follow through on what they said they would do. And I suspected they had suspicions of us, you know, they wonder what we were up to. There was always a suspicion. Are you there because you want to balance China? Are you here for some other ulterior motive? Are we being used in a pawn for great power, rivalry and such? So, you know, I would acknowledge that to them too. And I'm sure you want to see sincerity from us. You don't want to hear just words from us either. So, you know, that's where I said, Look, if you were sincere about certain things, I had a sense that they didn't know what they meant when they said they they wanted democracy. Did they know what democracy really was? Did the military know what they meant when they kept saying, we want to professionalize? We'll get to the military as a separate issue, because we're really talking even though these guys in government were former military, they were different than the uniform military, and it's the so called quasi military leadership. There was a different vibe between the two, and there were different personalities, different individuals. And I did get a sense, and again, it took a while that that there was a sincerity behind the desire for change and to have a better relationship. This is key, a better relationship with the United States. Now this is the question, why did they reform? Why did they do this at all? Did they, you know, you know they had, were they really on their heels? The military was in charge there. They weren't really in danger of losing power, but I think they did, you know, I would ask them that question. Some people would explain that, you know, they would look around the region, they realize they're falling behind. You know, you know, the military people there are very proud and very proud of their country. People are very patriotic, nationalistic. I think they were a bit ashamed of where they stood in relations to others in Southeast Asia and in their region. They used to tell me that, that, that, you know, they looked around the region and said, which countries are the strongest, and they tended to be friends of the United States, allies in the United States. So they wanted to be a friend of the United States. And I suspect that you know all the years that if you you know, studied Myanmar, they would always talk about, you know, the Colonials in the West. And they had this hang up about the British colonials, British colonialism, as most countries in that region did about their colonial history, but they may have sort of woken up and realized that the way things were, they weren't being endangered, of being colonized from the West, but being colonized from the north. And that they needed, like most of these countries in Southeast Asia, a balance vis a vis China. They have a long border with China, and they wanted to have some kind of balance against that, and didn't want to be a vassal state that you don't have to know much about Myanmar to know that they are not terribly enamored of the Chinese. And if you're a small power, if you're a power of 50 plus million people, with a billion people on your doorstep, you're a little bit nervous, with a history, of course, of poorest borders. So I think a combination of those things made me plus getting to know these people, watching their actions, I got a sense that they were that this was legitimate. Something was happening, and as we saw more and more of these actions, of course, over time, where they eased restrictions on civil society, they released a massive amount of all the major political prisoners were basically released in January of 2012 just about six weeks after Secretary Clinton's visit. We expected them to trickle out little by little. But and I was there, I was having conversations with folks just the week before or days before. And I was in Thailand. I woke up middle of the night, I saw the list, and I called back to the State Department. Said, this is everybody. This is literally everybody that we would want out so, and they started a peace process with a Karen, and then, you know, so there's a series of things that just happened over time, and we decided to invest in that. And instead of being action for action. I think this is where many in the outside, you know, the NGO community, in the outside, misunderstood. They kept talking about action for action, way past the point that we were thinking action for action. Instead of being responsive and reactive, we decide to be forward leaning and try to shape and through engagement. So diplomacy is should be doing is not just being reactive, but being forward leaning and trying to help shape outcomes you're looking to achieve. So you know, for after a while, it wasn't waiting for them to do something, but taking actions we thought would be an investment that they would see, that would help continue the progress that we saw, and in fact, we kept, we continue to see that progress through that next year. And Obama then visited in 2012 late 2012 after he became ambassador, and then we saw it slow down, after a time when I could see it slow down. And we just say the final thing here in the strategy, in my view, there were two things that were in my strategy. And I'm not saying that US government had the strategy, just saying was my personal inner strategy. One was that what I want to do is put, if move. It's like I had the metaphor of almost a sailboat. You put wind in the sails of reform. That's what we were doing. We're trying to use American diplomatic leverage. They wanted something. They want a good relationship with us. They were concerned about. Whatever they was concerned about. Let's use that, whatever their intentions, to get them to do things to move reform, push reform momentum forward so that it made it much more difficult to tack back than it was to keep going. That was the strategy, make it much more difficult, you know, increase the cost of them ever attacking back. And they could. I never felt they could not attack back. People said, Is this irreversible? Nothing's ever irreversible. So I never thought otherwise. And then the second strategy, of course, was get to the election the ultimate, the ultimate arbiter of whether this was sincere or not, frankly, was going to be the 2015 election, in my mind, because all that happened during most of my tenure was a top down liberalization. But in 2015 would be the ultimate test whether they were willing to to transfer at least some power, much of the power, not all of it, because military had control the parliament, of course, and other key ministries and such in the economy, but they were willing to have a real election and transfer that kind of power and go to that next stage of reform. So that was always my strategy, is get as much as you can, to test things, to use American leverage to push this offshore as far as you can, and then Ultimate test would be the 2015 election.
Host 28:05
That’s a fascinating inside look and appreciate your transparency as well in talking through this process, this very delicate process, an unknown process, in some ways, an unsafe at times, process of trying to figure out these monumental decisions and fleshing out the strategy you had and what you wanted to see and how you were trying to get there. And that's really what we're trying to do this conversation, is understand what you were experiencing and facing and thinking as you were doing it, to understand how we got to where we are today. And I think of everything you just talked about, the one thing I want to go back to before moving ahead in talking about engagement and sanctions, because that is a big topic, is you did make reference to how the individuals you were meeting that were military, but more in government, and the individuals that were military in military, even though it's there's a tendency to want to conflate them, that there was A difference that you felt and experienced. And I think this is relevant, because as we continue to understand why in the world, the 2021 coup happened, and what they were thinking, what their motivations were, and understanding they're not monolith, I think this could be helpful to go back and revisit these early stages of change. And so if you could flesh out a bit more of what difference or distinction you were noticing between those military that were in government and those military that were in military, right?
Derek Mitchell 29:26
Well, it really comes down to a couple personalities, because it is about the leaders. So it comes down to Thane San versus min Aung hain. And my experience with both, and not just Thane sane, I didn't see him personally a lot. I didn't go meet him. I met people around him or but he would be the one ultimately making decisions that led to, as I say, the indicators that there was something different happening, the the easing of the of the constraints in society. So so whether it was the people. Around Thane San in the ministries or in the president's office, or just him and myself, you got a sense that they were they were sincere to a degree. Now, they may have other motivations. You can go to the individuals, and maybe we don't have to get into that here. And maybe certain individuals had their own ambitions and such and hang ups, but yeah, we found that they were producing. They were delivering. They said the right things, they explained why they were doing things in a compelling way that seemed to make sense. They would tell our interlocutors over and over, this is not just for show. We're sincere. We're on a different path. We're not going back. Help us do this. We really want it. I mean, it's a consistent message that we want to change. We want to get out of this rut that we're in. And you can't argue, when you were they released political prisoners. They allow Aung San Suu Kyi to be in the parliament. They legalize the NLD. They form a degree of at least some partnership that started to falter over time between thang San and Aung San Suu Kyi, at least in the first six months to eight months to a year or so. So you start to see them really be interested in reform and peace, as difficult as it is, and it was, it was the military min all lying that, you know, I met him. I can't remember the first time I met him, but you know, I would continually talk to him about, well, what is your ask him the question, what do you see your role in this reform process? Because a military, even if it were, there were former military in the government, that's when you're out of the military, or out of the military. You know, the commander in chief is the one he's in that's still a state within a state. So he had the autonomy to do essentially what he wanted. And I can never get a satisfactory answer from him. I never saw in him that same commitment to reform, or that same vision, or what to call he just wasn't the same kind of tone to his approach to things. He was very rigid. He's very, by the book. He was very, you know, nervous, in a way, I think he got more confident over time, which worried me. But when I met him at the start, he seemed much more nervous and unsure of his position. He was a younger guy, of course, compared to these, compared to the civilian leadership, but he he just never demonstrated and conveyed a compelling or convincing commitment to reform of the military that would have to go along, you know, a military in a civilian context or any reform context, it just seemed like old guard talk that they had to be there to safeguard the unity of the country. And even when the peace process seemed to be moving fairly well, reasonably well, at one level, you'd see the military offenses at another level. So there was never quite a symmetry between what was happening with the president's office and what the military was doing. I'm not saying that they were completely separated from each other. There might have been coordination, but I would hear a lot of frustration from the people in the president's office toward men online. They did not respect him. They saw him as a junior guy. They kept begging me. I said, Please, can you take him out somewhere? Expose him to things, expose him to the world. He doesn't know anything about the world, you know? And I said, I can't do that. I can't take him to the United States. I can't, you know, he's gotta, they've gotta stop fighting. They gotta stop killing Khin. They've gotta stop oppressing people, and you know, and take account of what they do. And I kept telling them along that we would reach out to you. We can do more with you of some kind, very carefully, but you've got to show that you're committed to peace, you're not killing your own people. So that was the difference. And those you know that discrepancy, I mean, we can get into how that evolved, but that never really changed over the time I was there. That doesn't mean I should say, Well, I'm sure we'll get to the election 2015 that their intention on the civilian side, so called civilian side, was to just allow Aung San Suu Kyi to take over, you know, or that they they were fine with, well, if we lose, we lose. I just think they hadn't thought it through. I think they were playing it step by step. They weren't certain where this was all headed. They may have felt overconfident about the results of an election, given what they were doing, and maybe the sense that America was working with them, and that would somehow work out to their benefit. But so I think they were very surprised in 2015 and who knows if they knew that that would be the result in 2015 would they have done what they did before? I'm not certain they would have. I'm not certain they would have, but that was also part of the strategy. Was, look, you. Know, work with them, make them think they can win the election or do whatever. Just work with them to and and define the terms for them until time that they decide they want to go a different way.
Host 35:15
Yeah, there's a lot there, and that also you're, you're describing this looming threat, this dormant volcano, that of danger that's sitting there that really, everyone we've spoken to that was involved in those years has talked about that, that threat, which ultimately, tragically, as we know, turned into what it did in 2021 and you're describing the early stages of this engagement, and that also, I think, highlights and really underscores the strategy that you mentioned, this two prong strategy of wanting to, on one hand, wanting to to get to those 2015, elections, knowing, as you say, Nothing is irreversible, but this is, this is our best chance, along with the opening and engagement of society And the flow and momentum that could bring to make it harder to go back. And this brings us to that very important topic of sanctions and engagement, very contentious topic, even now, looking back for decades really, from 1988 US, policy towards Myanmar was heavily centered on sanctions as a means to pressure the military regime. And this as we've talked to many guests who've explained this role of sanctions, there's the obvious sanctions that are preventing access of these this Hispanic regime, to certain things and resources. But also there's this moral component of moral outrage of this, this feel good kind of way to to be able to speak out and speak against something that you think is wrong. And sometimes these can be aligned, and sometimes not so much that that's another part of this. When you took on the role you advocated for a very different approach, one that emphasized engagement alongside reform. And so I wonder if you can explain that, thinking what you did, why you did it, and also in hindsight, what was your assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions up to that point, and why did you believe a shift in strategy was necessary, and what was the path that you proposed?
Derek Mitchell 37:23
Yeah. Well, you know, I'm different. I may have been different than other counterparts or other colleagues in the US government. I've never really discussed this frankly with them about what their strategy, what they wanted. I think there might have been people in the administration that simply want a normal relationship with with Myanmar, for maybe geopolitical reasons. I'm not certain about this, but it could have been people who just saw it as, look, sanctions haven't worked. We need a good relationship. We want a normal relationship with ASEAN. This is, this is just an obstacle to American strategy in Asia, and so let's just get rid of sanctions, and we'll find any excuse to do so. That was not my approach, anyway. And you know, I was for sanctions again, we go back to where we started. My initial engagement on this issue was in the 90s, and with NDI, when this issue of sanctions, Aung San San Suu Kyi was very favorable to sanctions, and I was one of those who was focused on imposition of sanctions to demonstrate that it can't be business as usual, you have to send that, as you say, moral signal, in particular, if the people the country are saying this now, you can have a debate on that question. Did people the country really want sanctions? And I used to hear an interesting thing. I remember I heard when I first was envoy, that one of the civil society leaders privately said to me, you know, we need your businesses here. We need you to invest here. We need you to we need America to be investing here and involved with us. Not the Chinese said, but don't lift your sanctions, which was a contradiction. And I think it gets to your point of the moral quality versus the practical. And I think it lived within even many people in Myanmar, where, in a practical sense, they wanted America there and engaging in helping shape and they didn't like us holding back, while Chinese or others that they didn't like were shaping things, or just simply, the government there was able to shape things without without another influence. On the other hand, they wanted to feel that moral backing that you're with us, and there was that quality of sanctions that you're with us if you have sanctions, that you're sympathetic to human rights issues, if you have sanctions, and if you lift them, you're not interested in sanction and not interested in the moral interested in the moral issues. And that that became almost a definitional way of looking at sanctions, which I came to around to viewers, not where we certainly by by. You know, after this Clinton visit, as things really started and momentum started, I. Happen, and we saw release of political prisoners and real, you know, reform happen. Why is it we have sanctions? And it became kind of, I think there were big pushes within the Obama administration, just get rid of them. And I was little bit more hesitant. I was maybe overthinking it, but maybe it was right of, okay, what's the right way of doing this? Because I agree, the signals, we don't want to go too fast in lifting them all, because then they feel okay. We got what we wanted. We got the signals, and maybe the opposition, democratic oppositions, you know, they would feel sort of let down by it if we did it too fast, as if everything was perfect. And the ethnics, of course, they were still fighting. Nothing had changed for the Khin, in fact, it gone in reverse. When I was there, they started a fight again. The Karen started a peace process, you know. So there are a lot of reasons why you can say you have sanctions. A lot of reasons to ease them. And I think the decision I came to, and I agreed with others in the administration, is we need to ease them, do it advisedly, but we need to send a signal that there would be a, you know, a response. There would be a benefit to those who are probably fighting within their own system on whether it's worthwhile engaging the United States and engaging in reform. It wasn't there. I'm sure there are debates. I know there are debates. Within the than San regime, there were harder line people who didn't like this, who felt like this was giving up their power. So we had to also show that we were sincere and prove their skeptics wrong by following through. And that's where we were reinforcing the CENTER AGAINST, I would say, the extremes on both sides, where some people were like sanctions until the end, and others were, you know, on the other side, the Myanmar side, where we can never trust the Americans. They're only going to use us and well, there's some trickery here of some kind. So that was the thinking in those days. And Aung San Suu Kyi again, she was various minds on this. She agreed with it over time, but she wanted to make sure it was done in a thoughtful way, and one that she felt comfortable. And this is where, because she was the one who pressed for sanctions, of course, originally, and she was when people say, Well, you're only hurting the people you want to help. You hear that for the anti sanction people, you're only hurting the people. The military wasn't hurting them. You're just hurting the people. And I went back to my time when I worked for Ted Kennedy early on, the South African sanction debate, where, when that argument was made, Desmond Tutu would come and say, Look, we're already hurting. We need to feel your moral force. We need to feel you out there that you care about us. Sanction us because we're already hurting. And I use that as sort of my The reason why I favor sanctions is because Aung San Suu Kyi, who represented the people. You know, in the election 1990 she clearly was a representative for the only one we could legitimate one. We can see she was saying, sanction us. So even if there was a debate inside, and I heard a lot of that debate of whether it was for Myanmar people, she was legitimate representative, we should follow her, her guidance, which is what we did. So that just evolved over time, as I sort of literally one day on a piece of paper, wrote on one column, why keep sanctions and why to lift sanctions? What the pros and cons were, and I really came to a conclusion that it was time to start easing them, start lifting them. But again, we didn't lift them all until 2016 we just eased them so that more different influence can come in to kind of, again, put different more wind in the sails of reform, and to show more leverage and more leg, and more, I think, fodder for the reform minded folks to Say, See, we're getting something for this. Let's not turn back.
Host 44:03
Right? And I think you're really taking us into the dynamics of the decision making process, where you do have hard decisions in front of you with imperfect information and trying to do the best with them, and you going deeper into that decision making process. And as it turned out, you referenced in 2006 referenced in 2016 that the US did lift nearly all the remaining sanctions on Myanmar, and that included targeting military owned companies. That move was, as you've mentioned, to encourage further reform and that and and that very delicate balance of do we want to try to open things up and push a momentum that we can't go back, or do we want to still have some leverage of control here and that ultimately, most of those were lifted. However, as we all know, tragically, a year later, the military launched these attacks on the Rohingya that has escalated into what's now. Unofficially known as a genocide. And so with the advantage of hindsight, which obviously you don't have then, but with the advantage now of that hindsight, do you think that it might have been a mistake or misguided to remove all of those sanctions, particularly those that enabled us businesses to engage, to to engage with military owned entities like Mia Wadi bank?
Derek Mitchell 45:21
I don't mean I wasn't I was gone by that time, and my understanding of the and I favored lifting of sanctions, i I'll be very honest about this of what, what Aung San Suu Kyi had said at the time. She her desire was as as given to me was I need still leverage on the military, but she recognized that, and this was a BA I favor lifting of most sanctions that she needed to deliver, that democracy needs to deliver. If there's an election for the NLD, they want a landslide, and we still have a do not invest sign on Myanmar, and she can't get investment coming in and showing that she's delivering jobs and opportunity and infrastructure and such that doesn't. And people will say, Well, you know, military or the USDP that will say, Oh, well, see, they didn't deliver. So we wanted to help. We want to demonstrate that there was a benefit to having an election where they turned over power, and also to help the democratically elected leader, Councilor, deliver, but she did say, you know, be careful on the military side. Now, I left in March 2016 this stuff happened in September, when she came around, you know, the fall. And my understanding was that you couldn't lift some, not all. It had to be all for a variety of reasons. It was, I think it had to do with the emergency declaration and other things that you just couldn't piecemeal it. So that was what it was. I don't think that there was a whole lot of investment that rushed into miawati bank or that American businesses were, you know, they didn't rush in anyway, because there were so many other constraints, banking constraints, all kinds of problems of investing in in Myanmar. So wasn't as if there was a gold rush. So that's one side of it, of the sanctions discussion then and and how it worked out. But to get to your question of regret, because of what happened a year later. I very strongly believe they're not connected. I think there's been this strange, you know, there's, there's correlation without causation, right? Just because it correlated. Or, you know, in in timeline, you can say, Oh, well, they lifted here, and then they did that there. I don't believe that one caused the other. I think they just happened to be, you know, coincident. I don't think the military was thinking, Oh, wait to for the lifting of sanctions, which they weren't. So, you know, they cared about them, but it wasn't the thing that made them, you know, stay up at night. They weren't waiting for that in order to, you know, hope that the Arsen would attack them and then they can wipe out. They always wanted to wipe out the Rohingya. And they, they were, of course, struck in 2016 Arsen attacked arising in 2016 and everyone knew, if it happened again, that the military might do something even more drastic, which happened. I was actually there that week in August of 2017 when it happened. I was just, I was on my way to Kachin, state. Was just, you know, I worried deeply about what might occur. And, of course, the worst happened. But I don't believe that the the sanctions were the reason. I just don't think that there's some magical quality of sanctions that if only they were on, kept on, that somehow the military would have been more restrained on the Ranga. There were a lot of other factors that went into that despicable and tragic and genocidal act.
Host 49:01
You've referenced how looking at Myanmar, the personality of individuals, plays such a big role. You talked about things San and and Min alaing and your experiences with them, and, and of course, there is. There was no greater figure during your time than Aung San Suu Kyi and how important she was, and, and so I have a question about your understanding of her, her personality, her role in a 2021 interview with BBC. You said, quote, The Story of Aung San Suu Kyi is as much about us as it is about her. She may not have changed, she may have been consistent, and we just didn't know the full complexity of who she is. We have to be mindful that we shouldn't endow people with some iconic image, beyond which is human end quote. And I think this is very true, and I think that previous conversations with other guests we've had on I can't remember who exactly might have said this, but some guests pointed out that she became almost a canvas that over. Time people were, and this is prior to 2015 especially, people were able to write on that Canvas what they wanted to see and what they wanted to create and and that that became what she symbolized for various peoples. And even, you know, interestingly, even for you, you you mentioned how drawn you were. I think it was 1992 of reading her book and seeing her figure at that time. And so looking back now at your interactions with her and that BBC quote in particular, how did your perception of her evolve over time, and did you see signs early on of the complexities that later became more apparent? And what do you think the world misunderstood about her leadership and her political approach.
Derek Mitchell 50:45
Yeah, yes, of course. I mean, I saw her countless times, dozens of times, when I was ambassador, and it was easier during my time than it was after I left, because then she was counselor and Foreign Minister and all of that, as I understood it, you had a sort of a circle around her that kept people away, but I was able to see her in her home or up in napidaw and have a lot of conversations about a lot of different things. And yes, she's, you know, she look she there's some things that are absolutely consistent. I think she's very, very devout. One thing I learned about her, I think is underestimated about her, is that she's very devout, devout Buddhist. And I realized as I looked she's, you know, she's non she believes in non violence. And all this talk of you know that people are sort of attacking her for the Rohingya issue in 2017 and beyond and defending it and all the rest. You know, we can get into the complexities of how she dealt with that issue. But you know, I think her commitment to non violence is very deep, very sincere, very Buddhist and all. But also, you know, Theravada Buddhism is about intentions, and I think she judged people. I realized this over time as I learned more about Theravada Buddhism, that it's not about results of your actions, it's about the intention of your actions. And so I would find her saying things about, you know, including when she was counselor, she would always say things like, you know, there would be peace if, if people had really the right intentions, the right motivations. Like, if you know the ethnic armed organizations had the right intentions, we would get peace. And it wasn't that simple. I you know, it was more than simple intentions. There's a lot of other factors, very practical, deep seated trauma and mistrust, which is the defining characteristic of the country is mistrust. So those you know, seeing that I she, you know, she said herself early on, repeatedly, people will come to her, and she just got so frustrated and angry when people would come to her and say, you know, after, you know, she won election in 2012 you got to start being now a politician, normal politician, not this icon and this symbol. And she would get furious with people when they said that, and everyone would say this, and she'd say, I've always been a politician. I've never wanted to be an icon. I've always been, you know, I never asked to be an icon. I've always been a politician, a party leader. I'm here to govern and to win elections and such. No, you can say it's a little disingenuous. She certainly played that icon thing very well, as you would as a politician. If someone's going to give you that kind of or project onto you all this authority and give you that power, then you use it for your interest. And she did. And I think people you know, made her into that figure. And people, and to be very fair, as people come to me now and they say, you know, maybe we put all of our eggs in that one basket, and that was the problem. We put too much trust in her. We shouldn't have put all of our eggs in the basket of Aung San Suu Kyi. My response to that is, we didn't do that. The people the country did that. She won. I mean, the NLD won a landslide in 1990 they won the exact same landslide in 2015 and they won essentially the same landslide in 2020 even when, I think at an individual level, a lot of places her, you know, they didn't, necessarily, as I saw her, in ethnic areas. They weren't enamored of what they saw. They felt she was more of a BA born nationalist than maybe that, that that big, thinking, unifying person. But, you know, that's, you know, I think that was that that was a factor this, that people just didn't realize that she, she was a politician. I mean, there are some people that say that we, we projected onto her, we gave her. We shouldn't have put all of our eggs in that basket, that we should have diversified. And why do we put everything into Aung San Suu Kyi, in my response. Is always to people that we didn't do that, that the people of Myanmar did that, that there were elections in 1990 where her she and where she wasn't running, but her party won a landslide. And then it happened again in 2015 almost exactly the same result. And then again in 2020 even in places where they might have been frustrated with her. People decided that they wanted a single party, unified party to be, to be opposing the military, and that she represented that somehow unified opposition, that democratic opposition to military dictatorship. Now I remember early on when one of my first meetings, when I was envoy, that someone had said when I had asked the question of civil society, do you agree with Aung San Suu Kyi when she's reaching out to the government and she's wants to run in 2012 elections? And someone said, you know, we may not agree with these things actually, but she's our leader, because we know, when she passes from the scene, there's going to be 100 people trying to take her place. And that's not healthy. They mean, which was, I thought, quite brilliant in a place. I mean, tactically brilliant for for Myanmar, in that it's so divided. This has always been the military strategy, right? It's divide and conquer that people realize they need to be unified, at least in her. So they put their trust in her. And so we also decided to put our trust in her, but we didn't have access for many years to anybody else, to many folks, even to her. When I arrived, though, I definitely made it my job to look around and meet with as many angles of this diverse country as I could. I mean, it was exhausting, but it meant meeting with a whole range of different voices in the country so I can get a more nuanced sense, so that our policy could be more nuanced over time. But Aung San Suu Kyi herself was, I think, quite consistent in who she was, in that she was dedicated to her party. And I think this is what we got, maybe mistook a little bit is we may have projected onto her that she was somehow above party politics, or above politics. But in fact, I realized over time that she was the NLD leader, that when she spoke on things and she pushed the United States or suggested certain things we do, that it was as much for her political benefit or for the nlbs political benefit as for the national interest benefit. And I don't mean to say that she didn't have the national interest at heart, but I realized she really did think like a politician, like a Party politician, and it wasn't necessarily as the the iconic national figure. She really wanted to win that 2015, election. So that's one other thing, as we look at her, as we understand her, aside from the personality or character issues and such, you know, but just as a professional that she we may not have understood where she was coming from on some of her her advice at a personal level, of course, I found her quite charming. We had wonderful conversations. We love we have. Both are crazy about dogs, so we'd spend the first 510, minutes of every conversation talking about our dogs, and then books and such. And, you know, she was just, you know, could be quite warm, but quite stubborn, you know, and quite particular. Anybody who meets her with her nose, she has her own mind, and if she doesn't agree with you, you know, she will freeze up, so you have to find a way to deal with that, of making sure you can get ideas in there that she may not have thought about before, in order to help her understand where others are coming from. And I think that was always maybe a flaw of hers, was her inability to maybe listen and take in alternative perspectives that would maybe have helped her as she had to manage different personalities as leader, as essentially the national leader.
Host 59:12
I mean, as you say that, I can't help but think this is a fundamental tenet of living in a democratic society, that there are different voices with different opinions that you take in, that you consider and that you you even, even if you might not be swayed by them, that you you have some acknowledging of their existence and their and and that that exists and so.
Derek Mitchell 59:38
Of course, even more than that, I would say even more, is that you have to be able to get along with people you don't agree with. And that's the other politics. You find a way. I mean, that's why finding in America, we're having problems with our democracy. But you mean you have to, if you're an affected politician, you don't miss you find people distasteful, maybe you don't like them personally, whatever it is, you still find a. Way to deal with them, to deal if they have power, particularly, find a way to disarm them, or to work with them or and I think she again, judged people by motivation. She, over time, started mistrust thang San, even though things San continue to do reasonably good things, she's, you know, at least in the surface. And I think he meant what he was doing on reform. She saw that he's either coming at her expense or her party's expense, potentially in the 2015 election, or she didn't like the fact that he said he'd do certain things vis a vis her, and that he didn't follow through, or that he was weak, or she just didn't like him or didn't respect him as much as others who were stronger or did what they said. And again, as you suggest, in a democracy or in politics, you have to be able to get along with different personalities that that you're not or those that you're not comfortable with, and find a way to give them face, maybe protect them, if they feel if they have power and they feel unprotected, so that you can get to the next level for your country and for yourself, for your political for your political future, certainly.
Host 1:01:12
And as you say that, I'm recalling something that Burmese friend has said to me, theory, who's been a multiple guest on this platform, she's referenced how one of her concerns with developing Burmese civil society and politics is that when people disagree, they just stop talking to each other. They just stop almost immediately. There's this, this, this real, intrinsic fear of the act of disagreement, and so you just turn away from them. And she talks about, she's in some of the panels and forums that we've organized, she's talked about the importance of not turning away and talking behind the back with that disagreement, but turning towards and talking to the person and the act of being able to engage civilly yet critically. This was something, you know, I was at the American Center for some time when I first came to Myanmar, and I was a trainer there, and this is something that became part and parcel of some of the training sessions we would lead, is because you can't have a training session if you can't talk critically and honestly. And there was such a fear in the training room, at first, among the Burmese participants, to say something that was critical to say something that was that would make someone uncomfortable, or that was too direct, and so we had to do a lot of work getting to the point where we could see how you can, you can gage constructive criticism that was actually, you know, with love, with with care, with consideration, that was able to talk about a sensitive issue, that that that there was a divergence of opinion, and to talk about it while upholding respect all the way through, and to come to a place where everyone wins at the end. We might not all agree, but we all win from being able to hear and to engage. And this is what theory is getting at, too. Is this? This, this ability to be able to talk past your differences, not necessarily to come to a resolution of of everyone agreeing and being happy with it, but from acknowledging that there are different opinions about this, and we have engaged with those different opinions, and now, according to the system, we'll have to find a way to work it out. And we're not gonna all be totally satisfied, but, but this is a fundamental part of, I think, a democratic mind and democratic society, and not to go too far off on it. But this is also the the current danger that I think we might be having in our country of of turning away from these conversations and and resolving these differences through a system. But you know, so certainly we're not the paradigms of how everything works in its perfect form. But getting back to the Myanmar example, I think that, and to the Aung San Suu Kyi example in particular, that this, this seems like a quality of leading a democratic society, that even though she spent a lot of time in the west and a lot of time in democratic societies, one wonders. Her, as you describe it in personal interactions, her, perhaps we could say inability to embrace some of these democratic ideals being and when you're a top person in the system, that does become more problematic.
Derek Mitchell 1:04:15
Yeah, well, a number of things there. First, it's wonderful to hear you were a trainer at the American Center in doing this. So thank you for doing that. It's wonderful to hear. It's an extremely valuable work, and it does remind me, because I remember speaking to a group of young people at the American Center, the old one, the one that was the former North Korean embassy before we built the new one. But I remember a bunch of people telling me all at once, telling me what they thought about something. And I had to stop, and I said, you know, and this is a question, you know. It stirs in my mind. What you what you just said, Is this, is this something from the past 60 years, or is this something that's culturally from, you know, forever? In Myanmar for decades before, because what I said to them was, you're all talking to me like you're just talking and telling me what you think. And I said, democracy is not just the right to speak, it's the responsibility to listen. And you know, I think for 60 or 50 years, or at that point or 55 years, people, all people do was talk at you. And you know, dictatorship you're talked at. You know, in when schools, right in Burmese, schools you're talked at, you got to recite back what you're told. There's no discussion. There's no, you know what, I think. But, and so now, when they've opened up free speech, everyone's like 54 million dictators. So that's not democracy. It's not simply the right to speak. This is what I always have a problem with all the tech Bros and Zuckerberg when he he equates free speech to democracy, it's not and Facebook is not democracy. That's just a bunch of people pontificating. There's no listening, but it's connection. As you say, democracy is a culture. Democracy is a mindset, and it's a way of interacting. And as you say, it's building trust, it's listening and understanding others in their full diversity, and seeing the common humanity amidst that diversity. I think I could still say diversity on this platform. I can't say in the United States anymore, but I can say it to you, but I mean, this is you're getting it right the point. And you know, it is a question, is this a Myanmar thing, or is it simply a product of 60 years of being talked at and everybody being nervous because of all those deep, deep divisions of divide and rule, maybe from colonial days too, and that's what needs to be overcome. Now, you're exactly right. Aung San Suu Kyi, this is what we invested in. We invested in someone we had hoped would be above all that would be that person that would be, if I may say, or I hate to say Western, but she was obviously lived in Britain, but at least had that Western democratic instinct. It's it's Eastern too. It's universal wherever there's democracy. But at least she was, she was in the West, so that Western democratic instinct, but had the the BA Mar credibility to translate that, and she would be that person to to take over and be that lodestar. This is the kind of country we want to be. This is the vision we want to get to. This is what my father fought for and died for. Even Fiat, she had to make it into a myth. This is always my and I used to engage her on this question. I used to talk to her about the need to give the speech, but it was essentially, here's where we need to go. It needs to be everybody is treated equally under law. It's what we fought for doesn't matter what religion they are, doesn't matter if they're a citizen. Doesn't matter if they are. You know, everyone is part of our our fabric, and we need to be listening to one another, etc, etc. But you're right. She unfortunately did not necessarily model that ideally. I think that was some of the disappointment that people had, that she saw civil society as, you know, who voted for you? They voted for us. You know, you should listen to us, because we were elected. When democracy, I would say it didn't, doesn't stop on election day, and you continually have to listen, and there has to be that trust building, which doesn't exist in the country. So what you're getting at, I think, is really very core to the challenge of the country, is really a defining challenge, is how the place holds together without use of force.
Host 1:08:32
Yeah, and when you know, famously, when she said that, that that she's always been a politician and not an icon, I think that's fair to say. But I think where that starts to break down is where being a politician is somehow mutually exclusive with not having this. You can be a politician and have this democratic mindset and have this and be shrewd and be and work towards victory and and and be strategic and, quote, unquote political, and yet still have whatever we want to call this democratic mindset. And I think that somehow, in saying that it came to embody being a politician, was somehow being out of the democratic, democratic structure of politics. And that's, that's where it breaks down somewhat well.
Derek Mitchell 1:09:19
It's how she interpreted it. I mean, it depend how she wanted to be. You know, we didn't invest in simply any old politician. We thought she was something different, as Aung San daughter. And I think that the people in the country also may have expected that, or hope for that, she was a symbol of democracy. But I think they were looking at some of the ethnics, ethnic nationalities. They were looking for someone who would speak for their rights, as well as ba Mar rights and and I think she may have spoken of that in general terms, but didn't provide the vision. I think what the country needed at post 2016 was not another person to govern, you know, someone to govern well. They needed someone to lay down. Particularly. Is the unique figure that she was. I don't know anybody else who could have done it. That was actually the thing that Myanmar had that no very few other countries you have that in Mandela, you may have that Havel, but somebody who can define what this new country's principles were, what the lodestar was. You know, like our Declaration of Independence, that we use as our lodestar in the United States. All are created equal, and we're we're striving to that we used to anyway, but there was a kind of a striving to be better every day, a more perfect union in our Constitution. You know, I we had hoped, I had hoped, and I had left by that time, but I did encourage her during my time to give that speech, to provide that vision, because that's what we hoped that she would be at that level, a higher level. But I think she thought of herself, interestingly, as a, maybe a level, slightly below that, which is just someone who would govern well and who would win elections and be a politician. And there's something noble about that. Get your hands dirty. Be in the mock. You know, don't, don't be a serial but I think the moment really required that visionary thing, so that when she passed from the scene, which is inevitable, that people will look back and go, that's what we need to aspire to. And I think every country needs that. I think Myanmar needs that. I think that's the tragedy of the lost opportunity of Aung San Suu Kyi is, I think, the they don't have that now. And there's the question of who can step up to provide that. I'm not sure there really is anybody.
Host 1:11:30
And looking at what it takes to live in a democratic society is, as we've mentioned, it's listening to different communities, different perspectives. And nowhere that I've ever been in the world, have I found the level of complexity and diversity that's found in Myanmar and and I noticed that up to this point in our conversations, this has been a fairly ba Mar centric discussion us Burmese relations. You referenced how when you came there as an ambassador, you felt it was very important to start to carry out conversations and connections beyond the main figurehead of Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD, and to speak to other voices and learn a more nuanced approach. And so I think this is a good opportunity to check in about what kinds of people you spoke to, what you learned, and to move beyond this, as our listeners surely know that Burma Myanmar is not a is far more than its ba Mar majority in leadership, and has been for some time. And so moving the conversation beyond this ba Mar centric focus, which is, of course, very valuable to begin to look at the engagement but, but you're not going to move ahead with Myanmar and with democracy unless you understand the complexity and diversity of those other people's living there. So what was your experience and who you were talking to, and what you were learning on that front?
Derek Mitchell 1:12:56
Well, let me just say, you know, we did a strategic review. And number one, I mean the defining challenge of the country I mentioned earlier, defining challenge of, you know, the trust and all that really is a corollary to what I consider the defining challenge, which is not democracy per se, which we've been talking about, or Aung San Suu Kyi, or the BA March or the military. It's what I mentioned earlier, which is how this place holds together, peacefully, peace, peace with justice is the defining challenge of the country, and I think that's something that's lost outside of for all those years that we got enraptured by the country. For whatever reason it was Aung San Suu Kyi. It was that figurehead, and otherwise, why would Bono and George Soros and Mitch McConnell and John McCain and Barack Obama? There's no issue that where there is a coalition like that of people like that who all care about an issue, and it really come down to that singular figure. But as you if you really understand the country, you realize the defining challenge is, how does this place hold together peacefully? And that that gets down to the ethnic issue of peace with justice, of trust among amidst its diversity. So I spent a lot of time on that as I could. It's a complicated matter, but that meant endless conversations, endless not in a bad way, I don't say that negative way, but as many conversations as I could had, and traveling around the country to meet with with ethnic leaderships the here to make sure they knew that the United States wasn't there simply for, you know, easing sanctions, bringing in business, dealing with Aung San Suu Kyi, dealing, you know, doing that big, the traditional Big Picture engagement, but that we were interested in that big strategic question too, in that as we move forward, we were taking into account those ethnic voices that we were mindful of, that we weren't going to rush forward and work with the military when they were killing Khin, you know, and their oppression of. Of Rohingya has occurred, and other things that were going on at that time. So it just meant I had a lot of conversations I engage with the government, often on their strategies, on the peace process and and on, just on the Rohingya issue itself, which we haven't talked to in depth. You mentioned it in referring to 2017 but there was no issue that I probably spent more time on than that. I made countless I don't think I was ever any other place in the country I went to more, except maybe Naypyidaw and maybe Mandalay. Not even Mandalay, probably that I went to more than Rakhine State in northern Rakhine State to deal with the Rohingya issue. Just endless amount of meetings to try to figure out a way, because I realized that was a ticking time bomb and that that can go any time. So these issues were very front center in my mind, very much active in my what I did, when I was there, and very much what I was dealing with my counterparts, my ambassadorial counterparts. We had a lot of conversations, a lot of joint visits and meetings on these questions, you know, because that was, there was no and it was interesting that Thane San was the one who said this, and I thought it was actually a wonderful line, and he would repeat it over and over, which again, would tell me some sincerity in having this line as your mantra, which was, you can't get peace without democracy. You can have democracy without peace. And he was right. So that told me that they saw those things intertwined, that they are working on them as one thing. And I absolutely believe they they do go together. Our democratic ambition, or ambition for the country and human rights will never succeed unless there's a true lasting peace, and that peace has to come with justice, and that meant the rights for the ethnics. So we did what we could on those fronts and but I left. Whenever people said, you know that I left, and it was such a success. And look at the election. Aung San Suu Kyi is there. And, you know, I think a lot of NGOs were probably saying, No, it was no success. Nothing changed. I didn't agree with that, but I always felt that the black mark of my time and the ticking time bomb was a ring good question. And I said that in every every panel I did when I came back is there is no mission accomplished. There's nothing been succeeded. Here you have that issue that's flashing red can go off any moment to blow democracy out of the water. And I even told I'll Suu that before the election, she's gotta get on that question quickly, because that will override anything else that she does in her when she won.
Host 1:17:37
What was her response to that?
Derek Mitchell 1:17:41
She said, I'll be very honest seeds on this stuff. I said, you know, there was a time during the election period in 2015 where we had, you know, there wasn't a whole lot to do with the government. There was out campaigning. So I got, I facilitated with my counterparts, my ambassadorial counterparts. You know, what do we do to prepare them to whoever wins, to deal with the Rohingya issue after the election? Because things had slowed down. Clearly, it slowed down by 2014 as you get to election season, who no one's going to be dealing with Muslim issues as it was an election loser. So I knew by 2014 2015 there was not going to be much progress on the regular question. So by summer of 2015 I got them all together, we got strategies and how do we set up for success? And then I went to da Suu, and, I guess, September, before the election, and said, Look, give me somebody from your team if you win, which I figured she would if it were, you know, for a free and fair election, knowing her popularity, we want to work with someone to figure out, how do we make sure that we can help you achieve your objectives? We need to discuss this. We can be partners in this to help get the Rohingya their rights and to ensure stability so that you stay on this democratic path. And she said, Well, we'll have time for that. I don't have anybody to deal with that question now. And I said, and I, as I mentioned, I told her, this is the ticking time bomb. We need somebody. I don't need a shadow government. I just need somebody you trust that we can talk to to deal with this. And she resisted, and I think she's when we worked on the a non commission, Kofi, Aung commission. Just as I was leaving, you know, she announced that when she took over, I left two weeks before she took over. And I think that was used as kind of, well, we have the Aung commission. We don't have to focus on this for a year. That's what you do when you put, you know, commissions out there. It's a way to focus on other things. And I think that was a very important year. And we know what happened that year. In fact. We know the day the a non commission report came out with, the day the arse folks attacked, and then the response, the genocidal response, occurred. So, you know, it's not an easy issue. She was very worried about it. She said, You know, there were Khan. Don't like the NLD. They don't like her. It was difficult for her to deal with. Politically, I'm not saying was easy thing for her to deal with. But, you know, I think she underestimated, and others underestimated, the damage that that would do to the country, you know, and I kept warning thing, San government, San Suu Kyi had the same you know, either of them really had the right urgency, or they felt they had the political space to do what was necessary.
Host 1:20:31
Well, they wouldn't. They quite literally, wouldn't use the word Rohingya, or like it very much when other people used it, they referred the word Bengali, which suggested that that these were not legitimate citizens of their country. And so, you know, everything you described just now is more the political calculus or balancing this with with other aspects of leading the government. But I think an important aspect of here, too, is her, you know, that is that anecdote that that's an anecdote that came out from some meeting at some point that's been famously repeated over and again. This her, her anger at one point of a diplomat saying the word Rohingya, and then and correcting them and saying that we don't have any Rohingya. We have Bengali and so in your many encounters and conversations with her, you know, I wonder to what extent it became a question, even of terminology that was being allowed to be used. And you know, where that personal dynamic came into it? Yeah.
Derek Mitchell 1:21:35
No, that wasn't an issue for me during my time. And I remember I had a I had several conversations with her about the issue, and I remember one entire conversation about the Rohingya at some point. I think I just come back from Rakhine, and I was telling her, this was, you know, this is a very serious issue. It goes to the heart of the of the future of the country, and it's getting more and more international attention. And you know, you forget that it had a lot of attention during my time. Even, you know, it blew up in 2016 20 particularly in 2017 but you know, this was getting a lot of editorial attention. But no, I could use a term, Rohingya without a problem with her. And we had very good conversation. She was not overly sensitive about it. She would give me some history behind things that unu had played on the Rohingya card and in the old days. And that was a sensitivity for the Rakhine and for for others, you know. And she had an assistant who was Rakhine. She wasn't a virulent nationalist, but she was a nationalist Rakhine who was a good person, but, you know, would push back on some of my lines and maybe whisper in here, here a little bit, but I don't think that was determinant on her perspective. But i don't know i I'll be I saw her several times after I left, and she definitely had changed on that issue. I think I'd seen her after the violence in 2017 I think so. It was the first time I'd ever heard her use the term Rohingya San, Rohingya Stan, which was definitely a change that made me worry that I don't know who was getting to her, who was whispering in her ear, and it might not have simply been people inside the country. Could have been people outside the country who had her ear on this question. And I think your anecdote was something that happened over time. It would be very I couldn't tell you why she changed in that to that degree.
Host 1:23:38
So when you spoke to her, you could use the word and not be corrected and not have emotional response. What word did she use when she was talking?
Derek Mitchell 1:23:46
Well, that's a good question. I don't remember. I don't think she ever used Bengali. I don't remember being I always remember Bengali being the word that the government used. Were Khin obviously used, and the government would use. I don't think she had a problem with the word. I mean, she might have even, I'm sure she used it. I don't think she even said the Muslim. You know, famously, of course, they didn't run any Muslim candidates in 2015 I think, right, the NLD. And that was, again, just sensitivity to political dynamics at the time. But I don't remember her using any other term, or the Muslims there, of course. I mean, there are more than Rohingya. They were being oppressed there. Of course, you know the command Muslims. So you could actually be, you could be correct when you say the Muslim issue of Northern Rakhine state, because it wasn't simply Rohingya, and maybe, maybe she did that, but it wasn't a sense. It wasn't as sensitive as it became.
Host 1:24:53
Terminology has been such an issue as I often say. I mean, what country has two different names that you have to. Balance every time you speak to just simply name a country, and then somehow it has this political connotation of what name you happen to use. And with Rohingya, you know, it did. It did following the the sensitivities of the leader. Again, the leader has such an important role in setting the culture as again as we're seeing in our country. That, you know, when she became very resistance to even the use of this term, and even as it would come in official document documents, documentations, reports, etc, just the use of that term in Burmese society became something that was contested. I remember a friend who worked at an international organization that was they had to hire a Burmese worker, and they had to literally have a litmus test that the person that was coming on for the job had to be able to use the word in a report, and they couldn't fill the job opening, because there was such a resistance to anyone wanting to come on and do this job and to simply use that word. And then, of course, we have to fast forward that to after the coup, where there has been a shift, especially among the younger generation, of public apologies, of realizing that to a large extent, they misunderstood the solidarity and the plight and everything else, and that, you know, there's a Rohingya in minister in the nug. Of course, this is not to say that there that people are just over a bias or over a racism and and when we've had Rohingya voices on here that have still continued justifiably shown concern and hesitation about the motivations of the nug and the past history, and what how a federal democracy can really work for them and ensuring them. But to just, what I mean to highlight is just the warp speed combined with the complexity that Myanmar represents. I mean your this, this term being something that was not so contentious to suddenly being so contentious. You just to give that one anecdote, you can't even fill a job opening and, and, and there's this famous anecdote of Aung San Suu Kyi rejecting, what a, you know, really, really emotionally, what a diplomat saying to then post coup and steps towards a reconciliation. So it's just, it's just a warp speed of complexity that one has to wade through.
Derek Mitchell 1:27:22
Well, I mean, yes, you're absolutely right. It still was, though, a verboten word for it wasn't as verboten as yours as it became later. I mean, in the sense that you couldn't even fill a job, if you had to mention it, but it was still very sensitive issue. Always it had been, you know, during my time, certainly and before then, because of the baggage it had. You know, if you you say Rohingya, then you're in the Rakhine mind. You are favoring separatism. You are favoring terrorism. You're favoring violence. Or if you know it did have a weight of a baggage, I know, if you accept them as an ethnic group, then the ethnic group has a right to territory, and that comes at the expense of Rakhine, right? I mean, it did have a lot of baggage under under law there that if you called them a certain name, they get certain types of rights that could come at the expense of particularly the Rakhine and that was to the Rakhine people, the third rail. And you know, I, I avoided it where I could, because it was an obstacle to what we wanted, which was getting these people their rights. The Rohingya needed their rights, and the only I realized, I tried to explain to folks, even the government, one of the reasons they may be holding on to that name so much. And there are a lot of folks, to be honest, within the Rohingya community who didn't want to use the name. There are a lot of people that didn't even accept the name. And this may be again, I can speak freely about this now, but even five years ago, I couldn't say this without probably getting, you know, stabbed in the back by by people in the NGO community. But it's simply a fact that there not everybody believed in that name, even within the Rohingya community and many and it was sort of an obstacle, because what I would say to the government was, the reason they're holding on to it, though, is it's all they have left. You hold on to something like that if you're taking away their rights little by little. They can't marry, they can't move, can't get a job, they're in they don't have equal protection. You know, they're stateless. They're going to hold on to whatever they've got left, and what they've got left is this name. And if you were to give them their other rights and say, look, the name was an issue that we have an issue with for whatever reason, but we'll give you your rights, you might be able to defuse this. And frankly, my concern, most of all, was not the name. So. It was the people, you know, these people were suffering. This community was, was, you know, always on the edge of disaster, being trafficked, of course. I mean, forget about the genocide of being trafficked. They're being abused by other Rohingya. They're being abused by Rakhine, by, you know, they're being abused by Arsa or RSO, all these by their own people. It was a desperate situation that needed to be addressed. And I felt there was so much attention on the name, including from the outside community, from the NGO community, that actually obstructed our ability to get things done for the reason that you say it became and it wasn't simply 2017 as before it stopped conversation, and I didn't want to take away their right to a name, but what I did want to do is figure out a way through so that we can have the conversation to get them their rights that they deserved. But we were working across purposes, and by the time 2017 came around, became so polarized. You couldn't it was so like Gaza, you can't even start to have a conversation without, you know, being sucked up into some you know. You know, endless debate that doesn't end well. There's no way you can come out looking good, you know. And that's a shame these people are suffering as a result of all of this. You know, I have to, I'll be honest again, during the second Obama visit, Obama went twice, the first sitting US president ever, to go to Myanmar, and he went in 2012 and he went back in 2014 for ASEAN, when Myanmar was host of ASEAN. And the biggest issue at the time, one of the biggest issues, the Rohingya issue, had descended. By that point, it's getting pretty bad. There were issue events that were quite controversial and deadly, but people were pushing the say the name campaign. Obama has to say the name. And I thought that was the most counterproductive, destructive, pointless, kind of, you know, what we want to do is have him go there and push this thing forward, make progress on that, among other things. And saying the name would simply set it all back. If we were to make that the issue. He ended up saying the name, you know, where he said the name once, and we made this, we actually made this agreement. We decided where he should do it. It was on Aung San Suu Kyi porch after his meeting with her, if you'll see, look, yeah, he didn't mention anywhere else he avoided it. Was saying it because, you know, it would have been explosive. That was one explosive thing. When he mentioned Rohingya in his speech in 2012 would have been more explosive in 2014 but he went on when he did the presser after his meeting with her, that's where he mentioned Rohingya. So we can say he said the name, but talk about a completely pointless exercise. Didn't help a single person. In fact, could have set things back, and in many ways, did set things back. So that's that's but you're getting a huge point. The same with Burma, Myanmar, that question of what you call it? No, that was the biggest issue for us the first year of our you know, after that, basically our first year when I was envoy and Ambassador, was, what do we call it? What does Clinton call it? What does Obama call it? Because to give the wrong name is to send a signal to one or the other side. And I just think we have to get past these name issues to get to the heart of the problem.
Host 1:33:26
Absolutely. And I mean, what you're also getting at is just this quality of, well, two things that are coming to mind. One is the quality of what it means to work within an imperfect system, trying to make decisions within that imperfect system moving forward, and what it and then what it is to be outside that system where you're advocating for beneficial changes, but you're not, you're not having some of those same hard decisions in front of you, but you not to denigrate anyway, in any form, the role of activists in trying to push things that are maybe inconvenient or uncomfortable into the light to want to seek a better resolution. This is, of course, another feature of a democratic society and but, but there is a there is a combative nature and just a different way of sitting and looking at things according to those two rules. And the other is what I mentioned before with sanctions that so many past guests have spoken to is this sense of and it doesn't just go to sanctions. It's just the sense of moral outrage. And you know, we we're going to have Ellen Goldstein on the podcast later, whose book came out about her role, as in being the head of the World Bank and in Myanmar for the transition period. And this is something she hits upon so much in the book, which is this sense of of of bad things happening in Myanmar and outside actors, whether they're activists or people who aren't on the ground but are in a a leadership capacity, in her sense, in the World Bank. But you also see this with other organizations and. And just wanting, just feeling this drive or urge to say the thing which is going to cleanse or stand up to righteousness or be a force for truth, be a force for good in their sense. And sometimes it's completely counterproductive to to to being trying to work within this imperfect system, trying to make the tough decisions that that sometimes the morally righteous, outspoken activity is not in the interest of what you're actually trying to support or bring about.
Derek Mitchell 1:35:28
And that's absolutely critical. That's the art of diplomacy, as it were. I mean, you look back and people will say, Oh, you were there during the good times, you know? Oh, yeah, you're lucky. You were there when there are a lot of decisions, a lot of things that happen, that things could have blown up. We could have gotten it wrong. We were taking risks. We did, you know, but yeah, it's, it's, it's balancing these different things. It's easy to posture yourself as morally righteous by standing up on certain principle and holding it, holding it firm. But you know, the goal should be to make things better and have a much and it takes much more, as you say, for a place as complicated as Myanmar is endlessly. There are angles to everything. There's a land mine in every step you take. Everything looks simple, but we can you take every step there is. We don't realize how the complex, the histories and the baggage and the mindsets, all of that that goes into it to understand why the term Rohingya back to the days when Muhammad Ali Jinnah was asked, when the Rohingya people, you know, had asked Muhammad Ali Jinnah to be part of Pakistan, East Pakistan, today's Bangladesh, right after World War Two, and they were going to take a chunk of Rakhine State and become part of East Pakistan. That's in the mindset. How many people know that? You know, that's in the mindset of Rakhine. So a lot of these things go, I'm not defending at all, of course, violence or, you know, and what they've done to the Rohingya, but to understand where they're coming from. I guess your your issue of of where people are just talking and not listening, and what it takes in a democracy, simply in a society like this, or even just to deal with countries in diplomacy at all, you have to be listening so that you know where they're coming from, where their baggage is. And once you know their baggage, then you can try to account for that baggage in how you get them to a different place. You basically say, I know you're you believe this, and I know why you believe these things. I've listened to you, I understand you, but what you're doing is actually counterproductive for your own interest. That's what I used to do with a Rakhine. I would say, you want to have peace, you want to have development. You want to have you know what dignity and a reputation, good, international reputation. Everything that you are doing right now in relation to the Rohingya question is counter to those things. So I would say, even on your own terms, let me, let's work together on getting you to a better place. The Rakhine have a proud name. You get your development. You're not the least developed state in the union, and there is true peace here, and you're not victimized by ba mar or whoever else. But if you're on the outside and you simply see victim and victimizer or oppressed and oppressor, then you're not going to get very far. Unfortunately, I get if you're Rohingya, there's a press to depressor. And I don't grudge any Rohingya for speaking on their own behalf, for their own people, or uniquely victimized, but I'm just talking I think this is, frankly, where we were talking past each other, with Daw Suu, with Aung San Suu Kyi. This is where we you know, the one thing you can say that in defending her on this stuff is, I think she saw, and this goes to her own character, in her own the way she views stuff. We talked about her being somewhat stubborn and, you know, strong willed. And I think she looked at the world and said, you don't get it. You don't get the history here. You don't get that Arsa attacked. You don't get the you know that there are people who died that day and that, you know, and that, you know, we didn't start, and there's a history here, and all that kind of stuff. And you can't just side with one side. And of course, we were saying, you don't get it. This is genocide, and we're not going to sit by and watch whatever the whatever the explanation for it, you cannot defend this type of disproportionate violence. We just We can't sit by and watch it and have business as usual. And I think we just talked past each other, and we didn't acknowledge that arson attacked and that they may have felt they were defending against a violent attack, as silly as that attack was with, you know, 19th century scimitars, but an attack that killed Hindu, she always used to say it was an attack, but she didn't recognize, she didn't give any brief to the international concerns that we had about the violence, and found a way forward that way, so that, I think, created this impasse when. We were talking past each other, and therefore we we forget how alienated we were from one another, right until the coup, and then suddenly we're back in sync where things are sort of back in the old order, where we were with the Democratic Opposition and the militaries on the other side, which was a unique, you know, foolishness of the military, in a way.
Host 1:40:19
And I do want to move to that post COVID reality. I'm glad that we've been able to spend so much time on your time in the country. I think that it's really valuable to be able to look back and walk us through those years and those conversations, to better understand today, but conscious of your time and moving towards what's happened the last four plus years. I think the first question to start off, which I'm really interested in, is that you because you've particularly argued that engagement, when it's done strategically, it can be more effective than isolation in influencing Myanmar's trajectory. And so to take that background of understanding and analysis to today. In the years since the coup, the military has shown very little willingness to compromise. It's, as we all know, it's continued brutal repression, doubling down on holding power at all costs and using violence as a tool, sometimes the only tool, to retain power. After the coup, you wrote that external pressure alone was unlikely to topple the military, and suggested that a quiet diplomacy behind the scenes might be necessary to shift the calculus. And so given this reality, given your background in Myanmar, how you've seen the sanctions and isolation and engagement play out, also the concerns about legitimizing or even trusting the military to any degree to have conversations. What are your thoughts on engagement with the SEC, the current military leadership at this time, if that is a pathway to achieving any results, and if not, then what alternative would you suggest?
Derek Mitchell 1:41:57
Yeah, well, I'm not sure the quote about external I mean, certainly never external. External action is never going to make the determining difference inside a country, certainly in a situation like this. But I'm very much believe that much more pressure from the outside is necessary and has been necessary and hasn't there has not been enough. I mean, from day one, we need to shut down their weapons, their now it's their fuel, their money, their families, access to international society, all of that. I mean, there should be absolute, airtight pressure, not just from the United States, but from the frontline states, to to this regime, to say, this is unacceptable. This should have been much more from the very early days so, and I'm not sure I really believed in that much engagement early on, I think once they made their decision, they made their decision, if there could have been a way to talk to them and get them off their ledge, I just very skeptical that anything would have done so early On in this after this coup, to be very frank, I do think, though, and these days I don't know that engaging the military is going to do much. I don't see them. I don't know if they're looking for a way out. They might be, there might be some in the regime, looking for a way out. And it gets to frankly, what my original strategy or tactic was when I was envoy, when I first went, I thought to myself, you know, all I want to do is find some people within the system who have a different idea of where, of how to preserve the natural interest, who wanted to get out of their, you know, their rut of, of of dominance, of military dominance, and then they kind of revealed themselves pretty quickly to me. When I was envoy, I would do that same kind of thing again, if there's any way to find people outside the country or people within the system who were coming out to have a conversation and see if they were give a sense that where there might be trade space here. But I don't know that engaging the military gets you anywhere. The SAC at this point gets you anywhere. And as you say, it can give them sort of a lifeline. I think we need to do much more, frankly, of engaging the ethnic nationalities, those the realities on the ground are forming. For the first several years after the coup, you couldn't see really much. It was very amorphous. You didn't know where things were going TO to work their themselves out, and therefore there was nothing to grab on to, except for the nug was out and about. But now you're seeing the Kachin, you know, strengthening their control. Of course, the Arakan army is pretty much taken our Khan state, Rakhine State, and there are others in Karenni and Kyaw Karen Of course, we need to be engaging these folks much more and building trust with them and understand. How we can get them humanitarian assistance, how we build trusting relationships with them in order to and then how we can encourage them to have trusting relationships with one another. Because the future of the country is going to be built from the outside in. It's not going to be ba Mar centered as it were. It shouldn't be. This is a revolutionary moment, and I think this is, as we talked about, the defining challenge is really what this how is this going to hold together peacefully? So now this is kind of the real Myanmar coming to the fore of whether it's federated or confederated, whatever it is that's, frankly, where this place always needed to move. And now it's happening violently. Unfortunately, I don't know how you get out of the cycle of violence, even if the military weren't there. We don't know how we get out of the cycle of violence with all the military, all the weapons floating around, but that should be our approach, to be honest, is working with them and thinking through how do we create the conditions for a future Myanmar that is peaceful, the people live side by side in peace and dignity, with national identity, but also respecting the most multiple identities that have always existed. That, to me, is the future, and that's what we ought to be focused on, less about engaging the military, though, the military, some component of the military will likely have to be part of a conversation. But I haven't seen since Min Aung Hlaing still has his firm grip as commander in chief. I don't see anyone to work with, to be honest. That would be constructive to be honest.
Host 1:46:39
Right? Of course, as you're saying this, you're focusing on the Burmese side, and who could be engaged or not engaged with there. And the way to approach it, the other side of it is the we. And the we is now the Trump administration, if you're talking from US policy standpoint. And so with the Trump administration returning to office this year, US foreign policy is seen to be more transactional, unilateral, more focused on narrowly defined American interests. Myanmar is one of the rare cases in recent history. They had real bipartisan consensus spanning Obama, Clinton, McConnell, McCain, W Bush in there that helped shape policy, but you talked about the coalition that, even outside of politics, that were able to come along and agree on this, but given Trump's skepticism with multilateral engagement, his prioritization of economic and security deals over democracy promotion, given his administration's willingness, both in the past administration and what we're seeing in this one to willingly engage in authoritarian regimes. How would you suggest those advocating for Myanmar now adjust their approach? And do you think there's a way to frame Myanmar's crisis, whether in terms of countering China security concerns, economic opportunities, in a way that would resonate with Trump's foreign policy instincts and somehow keep the country on Washington's radar for hopefully on the right side of history, if they do engage right
Derek Mitchell 1:48:08
the we I talked about, it is the United States, but it's also, again, frontline states and other interested parties. But I think, to be very honest, this will seem maybe somewhat disrespectful to our ASEAN friends, I think us is, is very important. Can be very important. Can be very important in this, because I don't know that ASEAN has really stepped up, or any ASEAN state has been able to lead in a constructive resolution here, but so I think American involvement will be very important in this. But you're right, and this. But you're right. And in the issue of Trump, the key to anything he's, you know, he the key with Trump is to stay below the radar. You don't want to get on his radar screen, his personal radar screen, or those around him. So the key, first of all, is not to raise the profile too high is, I think, secondly is, you want to get, yes, I do, you think, I do think you want to get, obviously, the attention of others in a position to assist with this for us, and constructive engagement on this question, so we can, you know, if we have someday some assistance to provide, if we don't have any foreign assistance to provide, I don't know how we can play a very constructive role, but if we end up having some foreign assistance at some point to provide, that should be done at lower levels where people recognize that. I think, as you mentioned, a couple factors that make Myanmar important right now, I wouldn't make it about great power competition, per se, US versus China. But you can simply say, look, China. China's all over the country, shaping it for their to their ends, not in the interest of the United States, not in the interest of our allies, but most importantly, not at the interest of the Myanmar people. Myanmar people don't want China there. So. China is the only one doing it. They're there shaping and we're not present. That's a and they can even say this is a fault of the Biden administration. Now it might get the Trump administration's piqued interest. They want to, you know, they want to, you know, show distaste for what came before and say we're doing it differently. So you say, look, they didn't do anything that made a difference here. We can make a difference. You can make a difference Trump. And you can balance the Chinese influence there. Otherwise, we're just handing over a very strategic location to China. Secondly is, yes, I think you can use the issue of not just economic benefits, but the magic rare earths question in Kachin state, that there is a lot of resources here that would be of interest to the United States or others that should pique interest now. So that can get attention below the level of Trump. One hopes, with people that are we're looking at the world, and we've got so many problems around the world. Why should Taiwan? Why should Myanmar matter? But there's also a double edged sword there, as I'm sure you're as you listen to this, that you don't want people who instrumentalize countries, who potentially will look at Myanmar as a great instrument vis a vis China, or that want to take their stuff, take their minerals away. I mean, I'd be great if the United States can get the rare earths, but in a way that works for the benefit of both sides, in my view. You know that I don't want to, I think if you're a Myanmar, you don't want to put yourselves in the position of being instrumentalized, and therefore they will fight to the last bur Burmese. And it doesn't matter with people who don't care about the country, they might use this information to fight a proxy war vis a vis China, or do other things that are that are unhelpful. So there's a there's a delicate balance there, and I think that has to be dealt with very sensitively. You have to work with people, maybe, who can, who can navigate the Trump administration? Find people that really care. I think McConnell's office will be helpful in that you don't have McCain anymore. I frankly, am going to, I'm going to try that myself. I know some people in the Trump administration and try to help talk this through. And I think a very key thing for the United States in all of this, to be honest, is we need to have a special envoy. And I pushed for this from the very early days after the coup, not like I was sitting in Washington, but somebody deployed to the region who can go to all the capitals and try to work on a coordinated approach. And again, I think if you can get enough attention in the Trump administration that they see value to paying attention to Myanmar, but not so much that they're putting their focused a lot on it strategically, they can give an envoy the ability to manage it and then report back that to me is the sweet spot. You get a good and that's not me. And I'm not saying it's just not like my foreign affairs piece, right? Because I'm, you know, I'm a Democrat. It wouldn't be me, but someone professional within the State Department who can do this, who can navigate that and and get America, United States in the game, I think can be very helpful.
Host 1:53:24
Thank you. The last question I want to ask you is we've touched upon this in the conversation, but to ask it directly because you do have a background in analyzing China's rise and the implications for US foreign policy. You've written books on China, and have spent time studying the language and the politics and the culture. And so given your background of understanding China and your extensive work in Myanmar, how would you assess China's role in the country's current crisis, what are they doing? What hand are they showing, and what do you see in current Chinese Burmese relations? And as well as going forward, I know that even as I say, Chinese Burmese relations that breaks down in so many ways. Are you talking about Kun min or Beijing? Are you talking about napida or some of the ethnic some ethnic areas, as always you would with when it comes to Burma, Myanmar, you have these, these simple, straightforward questions that then have to be broken down into incredibly complex answers.
Derek Mitchell 1:54:31
No but I think overall, and not getting to the local interests, I think we're looking at big China, Beijing, Myanmar. I mean, my understanding, I heard that Xi Jinping is quite obsessed with Myanmar, that in the among Southeast Asian countries, at least, I think in Asia, he's really, really quite interested in what's going on. But I think they see this as their I think fat minu talks about as their west coast as I mean, but I think this is their sphere of influence. This is. Uh, not their territory, but their Suu tea, as it were. They want to be the dominant player. They want to be the arbiter. They want to have special, special dispensation. I think they liked it before my got there, and before American, before the reform period where they they had their way. And I think they like, they liked it when Joah Suu is alienated from the west and leaning to them. And they like to get back to something like that, where they have a special position in the country. So I see this. They see it as, I think their their sphere of influence, and they want America nowhere near their border. They want to have, they don't want to have America present to any great degree or the West, and I don't think they care a wit about the Myanmar people. I think, you know so Wang Yi I think, kind of demonstrated it when he went several months ago, and he said two things at the same time. He said there should be not no internal interference in the affairs of this country. And when I was here, I got everyone together, and I told them what's up and what they should be doing. They got to get this thing done. And this has to stop, and this has to do this. And people can look at that and kind of laugh about the obvious hypocrisy that the Chinese are saying no external interference, and yet they're the ones in there playing games with Northern the mdaa, and with, you know, after Operation 1027, and all the rest of this. But I don't see, I don't think they see a discrepancy, a difference between the two. I don't see them seeing themselves being an external actor. And I think this is a wake up call, and some degree to those in Southeast Asia that there is no hypocrisy in their minds between no external affairs, but we are an arbiter of what goes on here, because this is their rightful role, and that has been the historic role in the countries and near abroad throughout, you know, most of Chinese history, and I think they see an opportunity in Myanmar for that. So, you know, they want access to the Indian Ocean. They want to get the resources for their development. They want a privileged place, and they want the west out. That's what they want.
Host 1:57:18
Well, thank you for that, and thank you for your time here going over all of these very important, sensitive, delicate points that we've been able to address.
Derek Mitchell 1:57:29
Well, it was interesting when you told me at the start that this was going to be a couple hours. It's very expensive. I did speak expansively, so I hope I didn't lose anybody, and I didn't, I didn't wander too much, but no, this is a place, as we started, that has, I think, very deep resonance for those of us who watch from afar. I don't know if there are people inside the country or listen to this, or people on the outside who are Myanmar, but it remains a deep of of deep importance to those of us who were touched by the place, who have experienced it, and we're not going to forget or do what we can to help. And it's hard for me. We talked a lot about my time there. I don't I'm now going to write about it. I have now a contract to write a book about this just as of the last week, and I put that off for a time, I'm going to finally do that. And a lot of what I've talked about, I suppose I'll put in that book, but I it's tough for me to look back, because that Myanmar, a lot of respects, is gone, but there's a new Myanmar that will form, and I just hope and pray that that will be finally the country gets the peace with justice that it so richly deserves, and I just want to send my My thoughts to everybody who was struggling out there.
Host 1:59:03
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