Transcript: Episode #211: Climb Every Mountain
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Host 0:20
Before we start today's interview, please allow me a word or two about our podcast. Even as Myanmar plunges into a civil war because of the military's bloody coup, the international community and media organizations have all but turned their backs on the country and its people. But this humble platform is committed to staying the course. We conduct nuanced, long form interviews with a variety of guests connected to Myanmar, so our listeners can better understand the ongoing crisis. Thank you for choosing to spend the next couple of hours with us today.
Brad 1:57
Welcome back, the ongoing crisis in Myanmar has many unsung dimensions to it, things that we might not even think that we're not even thinking about. And yet the impacts of the school the in the impacts of the ongoing violence on the economy, the people, and in today's case, the environment need to be addressed and they need to be understood. My guest today is going to be discussing specifically the interplay between conflict and environmental factors within the Myanmar context. And I think this is a topic that has completely flown under the radar for most people. But fortunately, they've published an article about it, which will be linked below this. So I strongly encourage anybody who is interested in the topic to go read it. But for now, I'd like to thank you for coming on. And I'd like to give you the opportunity to introduce yourself for our audience and tell them a little bit about who you are what you do.
Enze Han 2:57
All right, um, thank you for the invitation to come to talk about our research. So my name is NZ Han and a massage professor at Department of politics and public persuasion and innovators in Hong Kong. And so, the research that we have published in the link that you have already mentioned and discussed the relationship between rock terrain and forest coverage and insurgency, amen. So, so, specifically in the Myanmar context, our finding mainly is that conflict between insurgents and Myanmar government military most likely to occur being the middle level of forest coverage. So rather they happen. So, instead of have some instead of conflict occurs at extremely low or very high density of forests rather, they actually most likely occur in the medium to somewhat high forest densities locations. So what does that mean? means that there is a very strategic consideration when rebels and government militaries engage in militarized conflict with each other. And particularly this, reflect on the reasons that usually it is rebel groups that consider forest for refuge and tactical advantages that give the refuge to give that boggles because usually there is this so magical, military power relations, right in a sense that rebel groups tend to be less equipped and less numbered. So in some ways, forest coverage provide this shelter effect and for decades for rebel groups to seek shelter. as well as reduce the military advantages for the better equipped for military government militaries. However, we also saw, but this is general generally that the conventional wisdom, but then our results also indicate that usually it's not like, you know, more dance, a dance or the viruses and and more conflict. So but you know, in some ways when the forest coverage become too dense then the likelihood for conflict also decreases. So in some ways, what our results indicate that is this kind of in an inverted U shaped relationship between politics and, and forest coverage.
Brad 5:51
And so this is, so this is a departure from the previous understanding is what I'm getting that, yes, looking at the Myanmar context, most of the resistance groups historically have found themselves in areas that have very dense forest coverage and or are very mountainous and very rugged. So, we would presume that that's where the conflict is happening, but you're telling us that, contrary to the logical conclusion, it is not actually in the ethnic minority Heartlands where the majority of clashes are occurring.
Enze Han 6:29
So basically, essentially, essentially, we argue, we point out that, you know, conflicts tend to occur historically that is the case, right, usually conflict occurs in the ethnic regions, in within Myanmar, and particularly in a borderline area between your mind and neighboring states where and and in some ways, these areas are in high elevation, and we denser forest coverage in comparison, let's say with lower with lower Burma, Burma. But this relationship does not really mean that high in a mountain, it gets organic to the forest to get there'll be more conflict, right? Obviously, there is this kind of optimal level of place where the rebels can seek shelter, right, it's a which means it's unlikely, for example, for the Rebels to be engaging in military conflict in extremely high elevation or extremely dense forests, because those areas are in some ways very difficult to operate, right. So, that's why we look we found out that the places where the conflict occur in some ways is at the middle level of forest coverage and elevation.
Brad 7:50
Interesting and what So, in these areas, where you have this mid level of coverage and a mid level of elevation, who like where are these areas exactly, because we sort of think of Myanmar as the central strip of Myanmar is is reasonably low lying flat, lightly forested or not forested at all, and then we think of the eastern part in the western part as being quite mountainous and rugged. So, where would we find these intermediate zones and who lives there.
Enze Han 8:23
So, in our data set, and we will so first of all our data set we rely upon this existing conflict data set called Atlas. So basically, it is a data set called Armed Conflict Location and event data project right. So it's basically a global data set that reports on daily militarized conflicts right. So we basically stop you know, subset within the Myanmar contacts. Now, within the Myanmar context, we can see that during this time period we focused on was found 2010 to 2018. So this obviously was before let's say the current resistances or since the military coup, but then at that point, most of the armed conflict occurs you know in in in a in a in a peripheral estates for example with in Rakhine State with Shasta Kuching state and as well as obviously down to Korea and the country's current current state and so in some ways that that time and there's no reporter conflicts within less day the different nom nom ethnic regions of Myanmar.
Brad 9:51
Interesting. Interesting. So it is still we're talking about Rakhine, and we're talking about Qin. So these conflicts are still more Most likely to happen within the the states, the predominantly ethnic minority populated states, it's a wouldn't come into Mandalay region or Sagaing region or Maguey region itself that would that would not be sufficiently forested. Is that what you're saying?
Enze Han 10:17
At that time? No. That so we shouldn't we should obviously keep in mind that the time period we looked at was 2010. It was down 18. Right. So during this period, obviously, there is no armed resistances within Burma areas of the country. Right. So so in some ways, that is this kind of LSA, you can say it's a specific period of time, but then again, so rel Myanmar, like, like modern post independent history of Myanmar, right, most of the armed conflicts also occur in those mountain regions. So so in some ways, there is this, I guess, this harsh to say relationship, in a sense that, first of all, it is more likely for conflict occur between, let's say, Burma areas versus ethnic regions, right, that's basically patching of resistance or conflict within Myanmar for the past 7080 years. Right. It's usually it's is, is, is government troops versus rebel groups, right? Ethnic, ethnic rebel groups, that has always been the case. Now, for Burma areas. You know, obviously, you can talk about the Burmese Communist Party, but then even that, also, you know, the most strongholds like during the modern history are also located in the mountain regions, not in a central plain areas. So so you can see that in general, right. The reason that is the case, because central planning areas give government forces tremendous amount of advantage in their military warmaking, particularly if it's if air is flat, it's much easier for tanks for planes to spot you know, those places and and basically carry out conventional fighting in those regions. And so, so it is not a coincidence. Basically, even after 1988, for example, many pro democracy people tried to resist the military military, they went to the Thai, Myanmar border regions, particularly in current state area, because it was much more mountainous and heavily forested. So there is this, I guess, this this accumulation, and I think that is generally fair to argue even today, you can say, wow, it is resistant instigating region, but that's still a very small part of the country. Right. Mandalay and a lower ma still relatively under control by the central government Damodar.
Brad 13:09
So I find it quite interesting, because you Sorry, I take your point. Very well, the the, the the Myanmar military's sort of strength against the rebel groups, can I'd say be summarized as sort of the three A's, the armor, the artillery and the aerial assets? And, yes, like all of those favor, low lying plains. And they all have problems when it comes to mountainous regions. And this is something that we've seen repeated in, for example, the conflict in Afghanistan, we've seen this repeated in insurgencies in the Caucasus region. But you say that the strongholds of the military are themselves in mountainous regions, I think Pakistan would be would be a good example of that. Why is it then that the military who is so strong in planes would still build their bases in mountainous regions?
Enze Han 14:06
So I think you mentioned for example, a military try to gain strong strong foothold in areas that are higher in elevation or in forest areas like pan and other places right, but this is most likely a after fact, rather than before. So in a sense, that, so country like conventionally, it should not be the case, because generally speaking, right, it is the lower central playing areas, that is the strong foothold for the military. But then since since that, obviously, they didn't know the country and you know, since particularly you can think about let's say, you know, in the 70s 80s and later on and after the peace, process, etc, then the central government to the military, right, gained increasingly more, more stronghold in previously ethnic areas, right. So you can think about major townships in those ethnic regions that probably, you know, for example, due to, let's say, peace negotiations, and etc. So like always my last show, like, think about Michiana, those kinds of cities, right? This city's has, in some ways are heavily on the controlled by the Myanmar military. But still, right, these are after fact, rather than sort of conventional wisdom, but because in a sense that it is a process where the the, I just say that the central government expanded its foothold into this region, rather than it has always been the case.
Brad 15:57
Fascinating. And so, I wonder, can you can you speak to the results of this phenomenon when this is a country that has seen a lot of violence over? I mean, I was gonna say, since independence, but it's actually seen violence since before independence. So there has been a perpetual level of insurgency and conflict in this country for for well over a century. And you're saying that it seems to be concentrated in these specific types of areas? What type of effect does this concentration of conflict? Like have a is there? Is there any sort of measurable environmental impact? Or is there any environmental measurable demographic impact that is occurring? Is there some sort of buffer where animals and plants are being eradicated? Is there some sort of buffer evolving where people are simply fleeing these regions of moderate forestry and moderate elevation?
Enze Han 17:01
So our paper does not have anything specifically about those things. But from my understanding of it, my military or my central government, has always tried to use deforestation as a way to clear out this, you know, the areas that are holdouts for different ethnic arms, armed groups, historically. Right. So this has been a pattern before and which is exactly consistent with evidence in some other parts of the of the world, right. I mean, during the Vietnam War, the Americans tried to clean out forests, basically, then the Vietcong have no nowhere to hide. So, so this kind of tactics has been in use for a long time. So, so best so so we can, we can imagine that, for example, you know, the, you know, the, the Myanmar government understand its massive change of military understand that it is its advantage is in those sort of easily accessible regions and with transportation links. So as you can imagine that, at least, you know, during this period, right at the main, you know, how to say, competence will basically between the military and ethnic armed groups. So basically, if the Myanmar military was trying to eliminate those are, you know, ethnic armed groups, and then what they will do is try to clear out forests, build transportation links, and essentially gain stronger foothold in those mountain and forest areas and try to eliminate those resistances. So, but then, you know, that's a time when they had much stronger, I guess, confidence in yourself. I don't know whether they are doing that right now. Because right now, it seems, seems to me much more in a defensive mode and then than before.
Brad 19:12
So just want to circle back and just check one thing that so you say that they use deforestation. And you bring up the Vietnam example, which I think is very apt. But do you mean that the military itself is deforesting? Or do you mean that the military government is hiring, let's say logging contractors to disproportionately target these areas? Is this a corporate partnership or is this just being done with firepower and chemicals?
Enze Han 19:41
I think it's corporate that mean that has been, you know, studied before in a way that during the ceasefire, negotiations, government, central central government, basically make use of the ceasefire agreement. To to basically inject, you know, let's say capitalists development in the borderland regions in terms of, you know, logging companies etc.
Brad 20:12
Interesting. It's just so strange because when we look at the Vietnam example, famously, we had agent green and Agent Orange right being being dumped by the military as a chemical warfare but here it's not even chemical warfare it's it's corporate warfare utilizing private enterprise to do something that ultimately benefits the military. Right and they make money,
Enze Han 20:33
but it also can, okay, I think this is not necessarily a good comparison, right? Obviously the idea is good comparison, but not necessarily a very good comparison. So the not very good comparison part would be that Emile Amin, Myanmar military, in comparison with the Americans are probably are less desperate in in terms of its purpose to eradicate the rebel groups. So for me, man standing is there is tremendous amount of toleration as long as it does not go over too much, right. So that's the reason why I think that that's why that ethnic group has been in place for a very long period of time. And I think the military in some way tacitly tolerated that. So which means that they are not in desperate need to use like orange cage, so far chemical, chemical weapons, etc, to really burn out everything. Right. I think that's another one. Obviously, the other consideration is the American dunkers of the United States of America. So which means that if they they basically clear out everything and kill everyone, they don't really care. But I think Myanmar military definitely has this kind of ice. I see. I don't know, this image of self, it is Myanmar. Right. So which means obviously, if you if you if you destroyed all the environmental, you know, like forests and mountains, probably not gonna be good for the country anyway. And then, and also, I think, is empirical evidence also has shown that the military benefits from logging companies, so which means there is this financial consideration? That,
Brad 22:08
yeah, absolutely. So I just want to quickly touch on the actual data set that you that you use, because I want to make sure that we understand what does the what do the data actually tell us? And what did the data not tell us? So you're looking at a data set from 2010 to 2018. So this is during the Tanzanian government and part of the NLD. Government. Now, is it the case that you are only looking at conflict that exists between the Central Military and rebel groups? Or are you also looking at conflicts that exist between competing rebel groups?
Enze Han 22:48
So the data set is, basically is, as I said, it's a report. militarized conflict, and we only looked at fight fighting between armed groups or ethnic armed groups and the military. Right. So which means we excluded conflict between different ethnic armed groups, which in some ways, actually a minority, and majority of conflicts still are between rebel groups and the military. And in terms of let's say, this kind of data and its limits right. So, what first of all this kind of cough quantitative studies relying upon existing data sets of conflict usually has its limits, limits usually are because those data those data points are essentially reported a news about what happened in a particular day in a particular location, right. So that means there is a bias there reportage bias in assess that, what if there is conflict, something happened on that particular area or particular day, but there's no new news coverage of it, and then it will not be recorded. Right. So that is, I think, is a common problem for most of the Ethno armed group conflicts globally. Right, because it all depends upon news coverage of them. Now, during this period, and I think, you know, is mentioned on tastings period to NLD period, in general, that's relatively open period or Myanmar in a way that is better access. Let's put it that way. Right. It's definitely more news coverage of the country and then it's better access by both internal media as well as international media for for Myanmar. So I think I will say my confidence of reliability data data probably be better then than now. Right. So for example, today for example, it will be much more difficult to verify. And, you know, whether things happened in a particular day, particular location, because there's not much access into the country, but during this particular period, I think those kinds of access should be relatively okay.
Brad 25:18
And so you say it's, it comes down to news reports effectively, does that I want because ethnic minority groups, you know, for example, we have the, the Ka no good, they're, they're actually a, an AMI. But there are political Wings of these groups, and these groups do post on social media, they do sort of have their own news service, it's just that they don't use major broadcasts, would would the data collection include reports by these ethnic minority organizations, political organizations, or military organizations? Or would it focus on mainstream media.
Enze Han 25:59
So, I think that data collection process, so, these are not done by us, it was done by that accolade sort of project right. So, which means and we in some way, we also used ucdp dataset being super Salah in Sweden as a as a robust check. So, so that, so which means so, so the, so the, the main data used by these major international data sets, not connected, not collected by us is that they will be, they will live, they claim, they rely upon a variety of news accesses, and then they verify them. So, so just basically, we have to trust and at face value, at least, you know, the reliability on both datasets.
Brad 26:56
Yep. I mean, it's, it's the sad reality of, of doing this kind of work that, yeah, we can't, we can't have all the information that we need to have, at least what it is. It's okay, so let's, let's then move to something that may be a little bit more difficult to speak on, because it calls for conjecture. The data set obviously 2010 to 2018. A little bit. I don't want to call it out of date, but it is, you know, a different time period. Now that we're looking at the post coup conflict. The question is, what applicability does this research have to the post coup conflict? Have you been able to keep an eye on the situation would you say that the overall patterns continue to be in place?
Enze Han 27:47
So, I think, during the post coup period, I think that is some of the conflict dynamics has changed, right. So, I can I can think of that previously, most of the conflict will basically between the Central Military versus ethnic armed groups, but in the post coup period, at least you have resistance in by the majority population, which was not the case before. Right. So I think that changed the dynamic a little bit. But I same time, I think the at least from what I read of what's going on in Myanmar, that still majority of those kind resistances still occur in areas that are not flat central playing regions, right. And then in many for example, resistances for example, they went to mountain regions for training etc, right. So, so, each which means that people do understand the the how to say the the that the shelter and the coverage and the just kind of logistical sort of advantages that mountain forest regions provide for for resistances for armed groups right. This is because the dynamic of resistance still is a symmetrical in a way that even though obviously, some people are calling for you know, defection of the military to the to the to the to the you know, PDF is such a ban still in terms of actual numbers, right, that it's the central government Damodar still is you know, much bigger in size and then much, much better equipped, you know, with aeroplanes and with you know, with, with with missiles with you know, tanks etc. So, which means the warfare resistance warfare continued to be a symmetrical so, it's so which means that if you are in a symmetrical kind of war oftheir then you need something to balance out this asymmetry. So far is coverage provide this this this this advantage for slightly less number, you know, less numbered, less equipped resistances
Brad 30:20
interesting, because we we've seen sort of sporadic attacks that have taken place in, in other sort of more conventionally strongly defended places. I do remember 2021 The end of 2021, there was a pretty, pretty serious incident that occurred in Karenni. State. Not not too far from the border. Last year, if I remember correctly, the the Kitchin the Ka we're holding a an anniversary event in Cochin, that was bombed by the military and a large number of people died, do incidents like this represent a major departure from from the doctrine of warfare? Or are these just minor sort of incidents of opportunity that were taken by the military?
Enze Han 31:12
I mean, I don't know. I mean, I think my understanding is, I still think these are relatively unusual events, they don't represent the major, like they see the mode of conflict today. Right? So perhaps one day, the tide of balance between, you know, resistances, and the military will change. And then essentially, right, you need those kinds of major uprisings across the lower plains, you know, in a way to capture the central part of of Burma, right, Myanmar, or maybe doll and mandolin? Or can we just, but before that happens, right, I think most of the conflict continued to occur in relatively better covered regions. So perhaps you can have those kinds of periodic attacks, like, you know, like surprise attacks, but then they tend not hold on to those like regions very long, because they had a lack of like, you know, logistical kind of supply, etc. So that's why I think I probably would still treat them as a periodic kind of. But then, as I said, it can be this, the pattern in a postcode period, in general is different from the before, up from before, at least, a much larger resistances amount of the male population, and then most of those permanent population live in lower plains. So I think that is definitely a major difference from before.
Brad 32:47
Absolutely. And so, as this is kind of what I want to ask about, then is sky and, and Maguey divisions, like a very large amount of conflict is occurring in these two divisions. Now, these two divisions are very much to the north, in the northern part of the Burma area, what can you say about the geography of these regions? Are they more elevated and more forested? Or are they also plains regions?
Enze Han 33:14
So I don't know, I've never been to Maguey, or I've been asked again before, but my suspicion is that Chris, I'm basically kind of talking out of comfort, and I basically making our, you know, random imaginations, and, but I would suppose that, you know, part of those places, probably our most difficult to access, they might not necessarily have very good roads. People talk about, you know, in McGuane, lots of places basically have to reach by river. And so, so that's number one, my guess he's basically those kind of places maybe like that, or there is some kind of defection and that basically led to one region that be much better defended in that sense, or now, on the other hand, as I said, the Commodore is relatively probably in a more defensive mode today. So to properly it did not really try to take them out. So So my guess is that if we really did, it really did try to eliminate those strongholds, they probably won't be able to, but they choose not to. So that probably is a reflection of the general defensive mode of military in terms of picking It's fat for strategic reasons, that there'll be my other guys
Brad 34:50
are so that's a reasonably that it's a very interesting hypothesis. And I think, I think it's a very reasonable hypothesis as well.
Enze Han 35:01
Just making random guesses but I, you know, I'm glad I agreed on that one.
Brad 35:06
No, I do because again like it my instinct as well would be to think of so going like, Yeah, I noticed the gang is somewhat, you know, mountainous but not
Enze Han 35:18
obviously the parts of the game close to India right will there be a mountainous but I don't know where exactly those places were fightings ago now I'm not sure, but
Brad 35:28
I do know that I've seen the conflict heat maps. So most of the conflict that was definitely that was happening last year was towards the south of Saigon. So away from that, so it feels very much like the military would be able to steamroll with with the tanks and the helicopters if they really dedicated and the fact that the military's defections have historically? Well, I say historically, since the coup, the majority of defections have come from the supporting staff of the military, logistics and quartermaster support it, it makes it I think your perspective makes sense. In our context, when we look at a world where you have infantry, and you have the light infantry divisions, but you don't have the logistics, you don't have the trucks, you don't have the fuel, you don't have the people who can organize the mass movements of inventory from one place to another place. It would make sense that potentially the military doesn't feel confident, committing a lot of resources to McGuane Sagaing, when that would weaken them in other places, and they wouldn't be able to react quickly. Again, I also am guessing here, I'm speaking conjecture. But I think it's an interesting hypothesis. Definitely. But I appreciate you talking outside of your comfort zone. I know, I know, for a lot of academics, it's a very uncomfortable thing to do.
Enze Han 36:55
Yeah, as I said, like, I, I don't know, the topography in me, I suppose it's relatively flat regions, but but also, I guess they are not necessarily the most strategically strategically important regions. So probably, the military is picking its fight in a way that reserves its strength in areas that you consider is most important. And then and then probably wait.
Brad 37:26
So, knowledge is power. And the reason we do academia is because we we want to know things so that we can apply that knowledge. Is there any sort of predictive ability, is there any thing that this research allows us to guess or to conclude about the current conflict and about the direction that the current conflict might go in in the future? Is there anything any conclusion we can come to?
Enze Han 37:53
So, as I mentioned, I think, you know, what we describe is essentially an essay, metrical warfare, right? Which means that there is this power difference between the Central Military versus the resistances. Right. So, so the so that means that unless that power symmetry changes, then these kinds of resistances will continue to be environmentally related, in a particular way. Right. So, so my prediction would be that, you know, if we're talking about, let's say, you know, if you eat, the goal is to have a blessed day, like, you know, eliminate the military and then like, you know, revolution and take over the whole country, that will require to change a symmetry of power. Right. So which means that unless the resistances are becoming better equipped with tanks and aeroplanes and everything else, otherwise, that will probably be that difficult.
Brad 39:05
So, we are likely to see just a long term continuation of this distribution of conflict.
Enze Han 39:12
Yes, and I think I mean, obviously, we don't know. But I but I suspect the most of the resistances and conflict in Myanmar will continue to be this low intensity, but long term kind of resistance that has been characterized with for the country for quite a long period of time. So that's the that's the sad part. Right. But then again, you know, yeah,
Brad 39:49
yeah. It's the conclusion that we can come to. So, so I want to thank you very much for coming on and talking about this topic. By by sort of audition, we always want to end, giving the guests the opportunity to share some, some insight or some thoughts with the audience that you want people to, to leave this interview thinking about or considering, as they as they go on about their day and go on about their lives. So I'd like to invite you just to share some final thoughts and some final words.
Enze Han 40:19
Okay, so, um, and obviously, I mean, I, I've been studying Myanmar for the past, I don't know, 10 years. And, and I think, you know, obviously, many, many scholars have worked on the country. You know, but then, you know, our study is one of the few that they use quantitative methods. So that, I think, I'm confident to say this is one of the few studies used data sets and the quantitative method to study the country. Now, that in terms of in terms of methodology, obviously, there is not really, you know, one is better than the other, right, but then they provide different perspectives. And I will say, right, in a way that quantitative data sets tend to have much more macro views of things, and then quite a diffuse research are more specific in a particular location, and then can have more, more richer and, and more nuanced understandings of what's going on in the country. And then, and I think, one of the takeout obviously, will be that today, access to the country we've come back is very difficult. And then I think people will, will need to, you know, to have a sense of what type of methodology, you know, we can use to just continue to study what's going on within the Myanmar without this access, and I think that is potentially the challenge, but also, I will say these days in the more, you know, globalize quantitative data sets, people can have access to NIDA, increasingly more like say, you know, satellite data, like lots of geographic like GIS information systems that are providing those kinds of Stata, right, so but that require a new set of, like, purchase a methodology or, or a knowledge to use the datasets. Right. So so that means I think that is perhaps the future in a way that you know, there are more, more data, right. But then those data might not necessarily be easily accessible in a conventional sort of qualitative historical research type of way right now much more macro, and also quantitative and all computerized. And I think that is the analysis opportunities in terms of studying the country from afar.
Host 43:12
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