Transcript: Episode #249: Fighting Fire with Fire
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0:11
In another blow to Myanmar's military junta, ethnic minority and group has claimed that its fighters have seized control the town in the western Rakhine State. The American army says that it's to complete control or the township near the Bangladesh border.
0:30
Now a rebel group in western Myanmar says it's captured a strategic town near the Indian border from the ruling military, the American army apart part of the rebel coalition and they say they've taken the town in Chin State. This is what a Myanmar's main routes through to India, a rebel offensive has posed the biggest challenge to the military government since it sees power in 2021.
0:52
To see whether morale continues to collapse in the Myanmar military, we've seen large scale surrenders and defections of Myanmar soldiers. Not yet enough to damage it its core fighting ability, but enough really to raise questions about the long term sustainability of this military regime, which of course sees power in a coup nearly three years ago.
Host 1:19
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Brad 2:49
And welcome back. We're joined once again by Nathan rustler, who's previously been on to discuss some very interesting information, some intelligence that he was able to ascertain through satellite imagery. And today we're going to be having a discussion on a very important topic that has relatively recently erupted again. And that is the actions of the American army within and around Rakhine State, specifically targeting the Rohingya minority, something that hasn't had as much focus on it, as perhaps it should. So hopefully, we can shed a little bit of light. So Nathan, I'd like to thank you very much for coming on and sharing this with us. And I'd like to give you the chance to introduce yourself for those in the audience who can't remember the last episode you did with us? Yeah, thank
Nathan Ruser 3:33
you so much for having me on. Yeah. So I'm Nathan Russa. I have I'm basically a geospatial analyst focusing, especially on sort of tracking human rights in contexts where on the ground investigations are really restrained or impossible. They'll focus pretty heavily on the situation in Myanmar since since the 2021. Coup.
Brad 3:56
Okay, so let's sort of look at this, let's sort of lay out some of the ideas. So first of all, our economy. Who are they? I think a lot of people would be familiar with the economy in a more recent context, because they're part of the three brotherhood alliances that were behind Operation 1027, started in October of 2023. And, of course, that has painted them as two things. Number one, it has painted the American army as being tentatively allied to the energy to the pro democracy movement being opposed to the military. And secondly, it has tied the American army to the northeast of the country, which is where the three brotherhood alliances are operating from. But the American army is a much more complicated case than that. So what what can you tell us about who they are and what they do?
Nathan Ruser 4:46
Yeah, well, of course, I'm not necessarily a specific like historian of the American army, but they're a very interesting case in that they're one of the newer, but more powerful and more capable ethnic resistance organizations. Shinzen Ayios in that I believe they were created in about 2009, which when you compare it to sort of stuff like the KLA that was started in the 60s and even earlier, shows how recent they are. Yeah, throughout much of their history, they've been a ethnic armed group that's sort of been based in other parts of the country. So when they started, I think they had a big presence in Cochin, like you said, in North Shan State, and they've also been in current state, but they're very much a nationalist organization. And one that always has seen their home as the era can sort of state in western Myanmar. And during I think, since 2019, they really started capturing large swaths of that of that state from the especially the rural parts of that state from the Burmese military. And this was before the coup. And so they they managed to have quite capable warfare and quite sustained and the same warfare against them Myanmar military for quite a long time, leading to, I think what's been described as the world's longest internet shut down in that part of Rakhine American state. And then since the coup, they actually went quite quiet for a while, I think they were happy to consolidate their territory, while the Burmese military was overstretched elsewhere. Then, yes, other than a few brief scuffles, they really started kicking up kicking into gear again at the launch of Operation 1027. With the three brotherhood Alliance and by sort of end, late November and early December, they were starting to make real significant moves across American state. They captured and sort of I should also say in southern Chin State. So they captured the town of poletto in Chin State, I believe in early January. And since then, they've really been on pretty unstoppable march through large parts of Eric and Rakhine State. But I think by my latest count, they've captured about 15 different towns and cities across the, across the state along with dozens of military bases, including stuff as high as the division level military bases, and they've really, they really look like this theme rolling through the Burmese military in the area. And the Burmese military itself that the hunter is sort of being at the moment as though it's preparing for a sort of prolonged siege in the state capitol. And so, yeah, and as far as ideology, they definitely they have been nominally resistance aligned, they've had close communications with the N ug, but by and large, they're not a National Resistance organization that they're very nationalist for this specific part of American state. Yeah, they're one of the more nationalist groups I would say out there. And even though since the coup, there has been a much a much more compromising position, I think, taken by a lot of Ayios and er, O's that yeah, there they are, definitely seem to be one of the ones that are more looking for a lot more. I forget the word, looking for a lot more self determination and self rule in that Federalist model than a lot of other Aeos.
Brad 8:30
Yeah, and I think, just for the historical context for the listeners and linguistic contexts because Rakhine and Archon are two different phrases that get thrown around, but they all they do come from the same roots, they are effectively the same thing and Aragon is the terminology that was used by the British among others. And that region which we call Rakhine State today, was was part of a pre colonial polity, the Arakan kingdom, that was not historically part of of Myanmar. So there's that there is there is historical context, which I'm not fully qualified to speak on. But just for those listening, it would be worth looking into this because there is reason for a lot of people in that region to complain and say, well, it's as a result of the British intervention that we are part of Myanmar, which is a complaint that you hear in many different parts of Myanmar, which were during the colonial period and before the colonial period, not part of the sort of centralized Burmese polity. And of course, the Archon are their own ethnic group. But Rakhine State is the state where we see the Rohingya. And although parts of Rakhine State have been quite accessible, that there has been tourism to that state for years and years and years, other parts of that state as you say, A was subjected to as long as the internet shut down and have been in complete darkness since well before the coup. So there's there's a lot of, of complexity to unpack here. And this is the other point that I want to sort of drive home to people, because I know you touched on this is that the Iraqi army really was just kind of keeping their powder dry. For a very long time, I think, correct me if I'm wrong, I think they number something in the vicinity of about 30,000 as a military force, and that I think that makes them one of the largest Ayios in the country. Would that be correct?
Nathan Ruser 10:37
If it's tricky to say, I think any sort of estimate of troop count, especially since the coup is wildly difficult. They have certainly have a huge, a huge sort of number of troops on the ground there. And rooms, that seem to be pretty rapidly expanding it. That seems as though the American army has their has their hands in a lot of pies throughout Rakhine State, and has really strong presence in a lot of just the community there. We've been like an arm sense, but also in just like a government, that governance sense.
Brad 11:13
It does very much come across that way. And I think for for a long time, we're looking at say 2021 2022, I would say well, I would say even for the majority of 2023, although there were some incidents where I know some members of the American army were were besieged or, or were ambushed by the Dumbledore, these, these were very sporadic, these clashes were not major engagements. So for the first basically the first three years of the coup, the American army, oh, the two and a half to three is our economic seem to just be sitting on their stockpiles sitting on their manpower, and, and not jumping into the fight, which I know was a point of contention among a lot of groups around along the country, who felt that the American army were not, you know, pulling their weight, but they they seem to be, or at least the reports that I heard where they seem to be able as a result of this, to maintain relative peace and stability within Rakhine state, because the military didn't view it as an immediate existential threat. And so they focused elsewhere. And so you didn't have that same sort of intense fighting in Rakhine state that you that you would have in, say, Maguey division or going division or chain or Shan. So I think
Nathan Ruser 12:33
it was a very strategic move on their part in that before the coup in the fighting, sort of through 2019 and 2020, they managed to capture, they managed to capture themselves a large base in the rural parts of the towns of the state. And so when the coup came, I think they focus very much on expanding, they're sort of below the threshold of conflict presence in the state, sort of establishing presence in a lot of these areas, sort of recruiting from them, and just growing themselves very rapidly while the hunter was looking elsewhere at the nationwide revolution that was taking place. And so when Yeah, and like we said, when they did take the gloves off and stop trying to capture territory, again, they have been remarkably successful very quickly.
Brad 13:25
And I suppose it's not surprising when we look at the condition of the military, I think we've had you know, Zachary was a is a is a good friend of the platform. He's been on multiple times. And one of the themes that comes through when when you talk to him is that the soldiers working for the military have been in a permanent state of combat deployment for largely the last three years. And as they then they don't have enough manpower to rotate out. And as a result of that their nervous systems have have reached breaking point. Many of them are probably suffering from from psychological trauma that, you know, that we that we do see in military personnel often engaged periods of not just engaged periods of fighting, but also engaged periods of heightened stress and panic from being in a situation where fighting could emerge at any moment. Not that we're particularly sympathetic to, to, you know, war criminals, which which many of the military personnel are, but it is a factor and the American army have fresh troops who are who are thinking, who are calm, who arrested who are capable, and who can operate under these conditions in ways that the military has not been able to operate for years at this point. So So taking that into consideration, bringing those fresh troops into the fight really, I think is just something that the Burmese military was in no way shape or form, able to respond to they had absolutely no way of putting up a reasonable defense against a military that is that is well stocked well supplied. well rested, and is ready to jump into a fight that has already been raging for three years.
Nathan Ruser 15:05
Yeah, obviously I can't independently verify this. But there are. I mean, we've seen reports of soldiers that were fighting for years in Northern Thailand state surrendering to the three brotherhood Alliance getting sent to Russia, then being transferred to the anxiety column in Mayawati to try and recapture that, which has been unsuccessful, and now reports of them being transferred to Rakhine or erican. State to fight against the American army. Yeah, very much that I guess I should also note that I don't think the American army has escaped casualties are escaped fatigue through all of this. We've heard reports that sort of have been under the surface and reported in winter media, but seemed to be accurate. Have there been occasions where the hunter gets good intelligence and manages to conduct an airstrike on the meaning and kill scores, if not hundreds of economic soldiers, and likewise, and moreover, a lot of their military attacks have been against real military strongholds, they've sort of been pushing into these very well fortified positions. So I'm sure they themselves have taken a good deal of fatigue and casualties, I think. Davis put an estimate on one of your previous podcasts, looking at how many casualties he thinks the economic has possibly taken, but they're certainly not sort of being breezing through. But yeah, when you look at the when you look at the situation on the battlefield, it's there a way that one team that one side has the upper hand there?
Brad 16:37
Absolutely. And I think I think it's very telling that once again, you're talking about airstrikes, and, you know, I've long categorized as like the three A's is what I tend to refer to them as of, of armor, artillery, and aerial hell, which seems to be the only real advantage that the Dumbledore has. Because that's what people cannot really defend against, you can't effectively take on a tank, you can't effectively take on an artillery shell, and you can't effectively take on, you know, an ad to surface missile. But you can very effectively take on troops on the ground. So it is, you know, as you're saying, if the military can get intelligence and can carry out an airstrike, then they can they can wreak a lot of havoc. With that. That's that's their one dance move. Effectively, that's still available to them. Yeah, it certainly seems to be the case that on the ground, they're not good.
Nathan Ruser 17:27
Yeah, and a bit, it's a bit off topic. But with those three A's, I think the Burmese winter was really failed to use armor in a decisive manner. It doesn't seem as though they're using armor at all. And now since operation tend 27, large numbers of ethnic resistance organizations now have artillery as well. So now sort of the only thing that's really left for the hunter is those airstrikes.
Brad 17:54
I mean, I remember this was quite a quite a while back on this podcast, but we we interviewed Khumba, who was the commander in the I believe it was the the Caroni nationalities defensively, or defense forces KDF. And what he was basically saying is that they had armor in currently state, which, you know, I mean, it's not terrain wise, it's not necessarily the best state to have armor in. But he said they had armor, but it was very limited. From his description, they were basically driving the same like two or four tanks around the state, to different locations to try to make it seem as though they had much more armor in play. But what Komodo was saying was that will, if Arma shows up, you just you just go somewhere else. You just go somewhere, the tanks can follow you. And then you just you play cat and mouse in that way, you can avoid tanks relatively easily. You can avoid helicopters easily. They don't care about rocks, they don't care about forests, they don't care about, you know, water, they don't care about any of these obstacles. If they know where they have to go. They will go there. If they know where they have to drop munitions, they can drop munitions there, and they can they can respond very quickly. And so from his description, I think he said they had about 30 minutes from first contact. They knew that they had approximately 30 minutes before our support would arrive on the scene. That was that was the window of time they're dealing with. There was no armor that was able to respond to a situation within a 30 minute window. And so it's it's it seems to be a nonfactor just from a logistical perspective. The targets they're up against guerrilla fighters, you know, rebel fighters, small bands, with small arms who come out ambush and then disappear. It seems that Ahmed doesn't really have much, much of a role here. AMR is much more effective in devastating civilian villages. It's great at leveling houses, but not not particularly good. It seems that actually winning any any strategically valuable objectives.
Nathan Ruser 20:00
Yeah, that matches exactly what I'm seeing as well. Absolutely. I have more experience than a commander on the ground or anything. But yeah, that that tracks.
Brad 20:10
But I think, again, and this is why it's good to talk to so many people, obviously, you would not have the experiences of a commander on the ground, right? That would be ludicrous. But a commander on the ground is often limited to understanding what's going on in their area of operations. And with you looking from, from a satellite perspective, the type of information that you're able to provide us that the type of that vertical, nationwide view is something that a commander on the ground individually might not be able to, to provide, if we got all of the commanders on the ground together. And they all gave us all of the information that they had, and then we could synthesize it. Yes, we'd probably have, you know, a trove of information. But that's not feasible. We can't do that. And I do think that the perspective that you're bringing, and the perspective that individual commanders are bringing overlap, but they're not exactly the same thing. And so I do find it very, very valuable when people who are looking at it from very different perspectives, you're looking at a top down, some people are looking at it from very up close. And if those two perspectives agree, then to me that is a very, very, very strong indicator that, okay, we have we have found the correct information, we do understand what's happening. Because I do think no matter what perspective you have, no matter what angle you're looking at the thing no matter how zoomed in or zoomed out you are, it is always possible for something to be 100% true in your perception based on your data. But actually, to not be true in reality. And just because of the angle from which you're viewing the situation, you would not have the ability to double check that. So I do think it's very valuable for you to be able to say yes, from that top down view. That that is that is tracking what people are giving us from that very sort of localized zoomed in on the ground perspective. I don't think we have to synthesize the types of data.
Nathan Ruser 22:10
Yeah. And I think that sort of perspective, actually, on the topic of these arson attacks in Booth sedang, has been uniquely useful in the fact that allows for a much more systematic survey of what's happened. And that sort of starts to decode the violence that we've seen in a way that the sheer restrictions on communications, and the basically the only source of information being very involved and very interested in, in fairness, theory, bias perspectives, I think I think that's where this is where that sort of method of finding out information has been Yeah, particularly helpful.
Brad 22:51
And I think that does segue us very effectively to the topic that we do want to be discussing today. So within the scope of Rakhine State. I think the listeners would probably be aware, obviously, in 2017, there was a massive genocide against the Rohingya. This, you know, the United States has recognized this genocide as a genocide formally, which, you know, it seems to have been hailed by the international community and by the international NGOs, as the correct decision based on on the description of what we got. What I think some people might not be aware of, is the role of the American army within that. So as you were saying the our economic seems to have not just military control over Rakhine State, but also heavily heavily involved in administration in local government. in Rakhine State things don't generally happen without the economy knowing about it or without the economic giving it there, okay. And the economy has not historically been on good terms with the Dumbledore the federal military. And yet, the Dumbledore carried out a genocide within Arkham or within Rakhine State. So what can we say about the role of the American army in that 2017? Genocide?
Nathan Ruser 24:13
I think it's hard to say stop beyond speculation on that, at least from my experience, in that I think the level of junta, the level of the Burmese military injecting groups from across the country in northern Rakhine State as part of that genocidal violence, I think that has probably made the American army less of a important player in that in that their normal sort of presence in the local administration, and everything probably dissolved away pretty quickly in the face, like, you know, in an effective sense in the face of sort of the hunter sending I don't know if it was two or three divisions, but like a significant number of troops into The Hmong door and build the dang and that sort of area. I'm also a lot of this happened before the American army was massively present in big parts of American state like they are now. I think what is an important place to to note is that the American army has been recruiting very widely from the, from the community and from the population in American state, especially in the last couple of years. So I think even if there wasn't a massive involvement of the American army in the 2017 violence, and I could be mistaken about that. I think and again, this is definitely speculation of evidence by specific things that I can point to. But I would very much expect that some of the people fighting on the ground in Booth Adang township now are the some of the same people that were involved in the communal violence in 2015 and 2017, merely from the fact that they have recruited so widely from those areas and such a large portion of especially more nationalist minded people in northern Rakhine State and now and now with the American army.
Brad 26:19
Yeah. And I'm going to make a statement that is going to come across as much of a generalization it's going to come across as a very simple statement to make, but it is a statement that I can stand behind and that is to say very simply, the Arakan army as an organization does not like the Rohingya would rather see the Rohingya not exist within Rakhine State more broadly would rather see them not exist within Myanmar. And this has also been a major point of contention. The national unity government has made statements that they intend to see the repatriation of the Rohingya one and a half million of whom are living as refugees in Bangladesh at the moment at significant cost to Bangladesh, coincidentally, and the Rohingya again for those who are not aware of this, the military government did not recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group, there are 135 officially recognized ethnic groups before the coup. The Rohingya were not among them. And I know from from journalist contacts of mine, that under Article 66 D of the Communications Act, which basically provided censorship powers to the authorities, even the word Rohingya was censored from from media they they were referred to as, as Bangladeshi illegal immigrants or even as Bangladeshi terrorists. So the rhetoric against the Rohingya has been intense. And one point of contention has been that the American Army does not seem to have a clear position on the Rohingya. They seem to one day say yes, yeah, we're fine. Everything's done. Everything's in the past now. We're willing to let bygones be bygones and, and we're fine with the range now. And then other days, it seems like nothing's changed at all. And everything's back to the old ways of No, we do not want them here. We don't we don't want them in our state or in our country. So the relationship has been very tense between the economic and the Rohingya population. And this has caused tensions between the American army and other pro democracy groups within within Myanmar. And I know that that sounds like a very hyper simplistic just, you know, three word slogan type of type of statement, but I do think it's an important piece of context to provide the the our economy historically just does not like the Rohingya and does not want them to to exist in in in Rakhine, I don't know whether you would you would feel comfortable, cosigning that statement or whether you'd rather stay agnostic on that. But I do think that that's an important point to put out there.
Nathan Ruser 29:08
Yeah, I think it's challenging to say to what regard to what to what extent sort of inherently discriminatory and arguably apartheid policy the American army has towards your hanger in the end that the junta you can see from the get go their their policy towards the Rohingya issue has always been one of essentially apartheid at best. So I don't know how much you can add how much from what we've seen so far, you can ascribe similar policies to the reckon army, but and they have been willing to build up on narratives of communal harmony, harmony and sort of building the community together when it's been convenient for them. And I think in a PR perspective, that there's also the undeniable fact that there have been launched some pretty horrible diatribe against them in their official statements and communications, they I still don't think I've ever seen anyone from the economic use the word Rohingya. They use Bengali or if they're feeling a bit more generous Muslim. And I think the biggest truth in where rigging our economic relations really lie is just talking to rethink activist. There's within all the hanger activists that I've at least had experience with and talk to there's there's a pretty universal dislike and distrust of the American army. And I think that speaks more than any of sort of my analyst perspective to what could.
Brad 30:50
Absolutely. And so let's look, let's look at what's happening currently. So from my perspective, I was not, I was not fully aware of what's, what's going on. So what happened to me, I actually teach, I still teach Myanmar students. And the students that I'm teaching, you know, they're from diverse backgrounds, they come from all sorts of different different places and different locations. And it's a little bit difficult with, with what I do, because I get called by students all the time, saying, I can't submit my homework, I can't submit my assignments, because I'm in an air raid shelter, or we had to leave our village. Right. This is something that happens to me every semester, multiple times. And what was happening to me a couple of weeks ago, towards the end of semester, is I had Rohingya students telling me, the American army is coming through the refugee camps, where they were, they were, they were staying like these are students who are literally living in refugee camps. And still studying, still trying to get some sort of qualification education upskilling as, as a way to hopefully escape that. And they were saying, We can't submit on time, because the economy is coming through. And they're recruiting. And I was confused by that. I was like, the economic doesn't like you. Like, I know that you're Rohingya that I know, they don't like you, why are they recruiting you? And they explained well, they're not recruiting that they're forcing people to do manual labor, for the American army. And that I had heard a couple of reports of this going on, here and there. I didn't know what to make of them until I had students contacting me saying, Look, I gotta go, I gotta hide, because I'm, you know, fit young male. If the economy finds me, they're going to force me to do manual labor for an indeterminate period of time. And I don't want that to happen to me. So clearly, there has recently been a lot of I don't even know how to describe this, that our economy has clearly been acting in a very in a very bad way towards Rohingya populations, Rohingya communities. And the report that that you've sent to us, which they left a trail of ash, I believe is the title of the report, subtitled decoding the American army's arson attacks in the Rohingya heartland? It seems that not only are they forcibly recruiting people for manual labor, but they've in fact, gone on a spree of burning down Rohingya settlements. So can you shed a little bit of light on to what, what happened over the last couple of of weeks or months? And if if at all possible? Why?
Nathan Ruser 33:57
Yeah. So I might share that in the manner of rather than chronologically sort of how I've been aware of stuff happening in a way that I think that sort of helps the helps explain it. In the further for the better part of this year, we've sort of, as I mentioned earlier, we've seen the our economic going through really capturing huge parts of Rakhine State. Essentially, the way that that arm campaign has worked is that they've captured the entirety of the countryside. They've captured all the rural areas, they've besieged the the military outposts and the military bases for weeks, if not months, and then one by one, they're sort of going in and attacking and overrunning them. So this this is the context of sort of how the economic battle has been going in Rakhine State throughout this year. The same time as the hunter has been really facing precedent To defeat not just in American state, but across the country and I'm just out of court force of habit, I'm sort of using grok on American state a bit interchangeably. They're, like you said sort of different words for the same thing. My editors hate when I do that. But um, yeah, not just in Rakhine State, but throughout the country. They've been facing a huge, huge, unprecedented defeats and that's led to massive manpower issues. Basically, it's the conscription law. It's it's mass mobilization and recruitment. So so much of this year in many ways, the writing's being on the wall for Rakhine State for the hunter. It's very much, almost indefensible outpost for them, except for perhaps Perhaps its way which might last a bit longer. But definitely the countryside in this small and not capital town, in the writings very much been on the wall that this is this is the American army marching, they bet going to take it essentially, it's a matter of how long it takes rather than if it happens. And so in that context, sort of starting in February, we started seeing really what I would say transparent efforts to vote communal and sectarian tension from the from the junta. And that's been a technique that they've used throughout especially Operation 1027, but also throughout their whole history that if they don't think they can control an area, they try as hard as they can to make an ungovernable for whatever non state authority moves in next. And also another thing that they've been historically very good at is these divide and conquer tactics, this this almost psychological sort of warfare, a divide and conquer between between groups. And you could see that on full display throughout the Rakhine Ranga communal divide. In February and March, you started seeing sort of junta, the hunter co opted and coerced Rohingya youths into holding anti Ira Kaname rallies in the places of a controlled it's debatable sort of how much it matched community sentiment because like I said, it's pretty clear to me that a lot of the Rican community is not think highly of the American army. But this was very much, very obviously a hunter directed sort of loitered to the divide and spoke sectarian conflict. And it was published widely in Hunter media, pretty widely derided in resistance media, including I think, by the American army is just a transparent, empty ploy to sort of try and make community relations worse. And so a lot of these original protests got swept to the side. But then after the conscription law started being enforced in late March and early April is when stuff got a lot more complicated and a lot a lot more worrying. In that. Like we've said that the junta has never recognized Rohingya people as citizens, it's never even recognized them as residents. They're given like bit a temporary verification card, or something. I don't know the exact term. But it basically given a card saying hey, I don't belong here. I will have to leave. But this is my name. That sort of being the hunter's administrative view towards your end gifts for for years on but despite this, they were very much caught up in that forced mobilization force conscription, moved by the junta and we started seeing hundreds of Rohingya youth across the, across the state being conscripted not just by the, not just by the military council, but also by Rohingya militant groups that had previously fought them. And I would love to hear your perspective on that a bit later. But the American Rohingya Salvation Army and the RSO I think it is, began also recruiting from Rohingya communities and and fighting and mobilizing side by side with the junta. And that also involved I should note force recruitment of Rohingya youth in Bangladeshi camps. I think I've heard we heard reports of children as young as 14 being forcibly recruited by the RSO and fighting side by side with the junta Lum, but with the effect of that in in April 11 to 17. The junta directed and was involved in widespread arson campaign in Booth young town. This was by our estimate, it burned about 2400 structures and booth downtown. It was committed by impove at least Rohingya militants and Rohingya militias. And so this basically appeared to largely target disappeared largely target Buddhist and Hindu neighborhoods. And several neighborhoods, especially in the south of Mukhtar dung were entirely destroyed in this. And it's often campaign that I'm also basically destroyed basically seem to burn a lot of the multi storey apartment buildings like that they're more built up part of the town. And then this is where the sort of concern really started. This is this is where the warning signs of this going from a transparent sort of propaganda ploy to divide. And stoke communal con flicked into what looked like this spiraling escalation of communal conflict in a way that really sort of was worryingly reminiscent of the 2017 violence and 2015 violence. And then there was quiet for a while, at least for Mike, from the outsider perspective, I should say, in that you saw increasingly violent rhetoric coming from the American army, sort of basically saying, agree with us or else to the Rohingya community. You sort of saw scattered reports of violence against the Rohingya community by the American army. But it really came to a head on the night of May 17, and may 18, where report started coming of the rest of booth did hung down town being kept being burnt down, as the American army moved in and captured it. And so the reports pretty immediately from eyewitnesses and activists were blaming the American army for this. Essentially, yeah, from our from our estimates, about 50 acres of booth, the downtown was burned in this overnight on the 17th and the 18th. It really targeted Rohingya neighborhoods, and basically burned the rest of booth the downtown that was not destroyed in the fire last than the previous month. One thing that was sort of confusing to me, one thing that was confusing to a lot of people, I think, Well, firstly, there was the situation on the ground in Booth the dunk that night, which I think we'll get into, which we should get into later. But that being a remarkably complex thing. There are also reports of upwards of 200,000 people fleeing that violence and booth at our booth. Adang is not a town of 200,000 people use it. And it's quite a small, small, quite a small out not not a small town, but definitely not the count of hundreds of 1000s of people. Um, so that left a question in my mind of why were there so many people in the town. Following that I sort of started looking through satellite imagery of the area afterwards. And what we established was that without 50 or 60, rank, predominantly, you're hanging villages across the booted and countryside had actually been burned in the three weeks preceding that it would it was just a level of violence and not a level of violence. But it was just, it was arson attacks that remained under the sort of threshold of detectability. Given the intense communication difficulties and the intense sort of humanitarian disaster taking place there sort of that information didn't seep out to the outside world. But once we once we started looking at the satellite imagery, we can actually tell that only about six or 7% of what was burned in from April 24. To may 21, was actually within booth had uncanny itself so that the vast majority of this awesome campaign happened in the outlying more rural villages. And we started to establish one by one sort of the the extent of that campaign, the extent of that awesome campaign against what appear to be mostly Rohingya villages throughout the countryside of Budo.
Yeah, and that, that that sort of answers that question of why there were so many people and booth downtown because they because they had fled from the villages that had been destroyed over the preceding few weeks into booth downtown. And then subsequently, on the night of the 17th 18th, God got displaced from booth to downtown itself. And so our estimate is that about 8500 structures across booth did and township were destroyed in these arson attacks that burnt about 50 or 60 villages or hamlets. And this is a very, very rough estimate based on very, very poor input data, that we expect that that directly displaced in the home to about 50 At least 50,000 people.
Brad 44:46
So, okay, so let's let's just sort of rewind and yes, and retrace a couple of those steps. So to go to the sort of font of all human knowledge, Wikipedia The population of booty down is notionally about 50,000. But as you point out, and there's one things, Rakhine is not a particularly well developed state, so the state has more than 3 million people as a population. However, although that's the 2014 figures, that does not factor in the the mass exodus that happened during the 2017 genocide, or the preceding 2015. But nevertheless, despite this, it only has about 16 major settlements across the state. And so it is very much the sort of place where you might have a town, which has a notional population of x, but it will be surrounded by a series of villages, some of which can be a reasonable distance away, but they are still very much economically dependent on that town that that town would be the only major human settlement within any practicable distance. And so if you need a specialist, if you need a doctor, you need a replacement for for essential equipment or something, that town would basically be your first and in some cases only port of call. So that that's something that that should probably be taken into consideration.
Nathan Ruser 46:20
Yeah, if you can just quickly say on that, I think there'll be a PDF bigger there suffers from it conflating the township population with the town population. So I've just opened up the township report that's based on the 2014 census, and it says there were the the population of the town itself, the city dweller population, if I use Google Translate, our idea of it is about 18,000. Whereas the countryside, the rural population in the township is about 190,000. So yeah, it's a very, really skewed population and booth didn't
Brad 46:56
Okay, so so we're gonna say is about 190,000 metro metropolitan regions. So we have 90
Nathan Ruser 47:02
So the total population in the township is according to the 2014 census, which again, is very interesting in Rakhine State and that I don't think it properly counts Rohingya people, and I'm not sure how they're referred to the township population that says is 206,000 with 20,000 of those being considered urban population?
Brad 47:26
Yeah, yeah. Okay. So quite a, quite an urban sprawl set. Oh, quite a quite not even an urban sprawl, quite a sort of low density type, population heavily dispersed across across the township. Yeah. And
Nathan Ruser 47:44
one other thing that might be important context here is that during the 2017, genocidal violence, large parts of booth Adang was sort of relatively untouched, so parts of northern booth are down and parts of southern booth or dang near Rotterdam township were, was there was mass violence there and the sort of villages all got destroyed. The Rohingya villages all got destroyed in that violence. But a big part of central Bhutan was sort of left relatively untouched. And so when you look at the survey, sort of the Rohingya population in Myanmar prior to this this recent, these recent attacks, it was really, in terms of in terms of Rohingya people living in Rakhine state that weren't in the displacement camps. The majority of them were in booth that uncapped ship.
Brad 48:37
Okay. So yeah, and so again, considering that, you go to the, it's very interesting, you go to the Wikipedia page, and it says, this is population estimate for 2021. But if you actually look at the source, it's a population. It's a statistics document from 2016. And it estimates the Rakhine population at 6%. The Rohingya population only 3%. Yeah, I don't like 2016 would have been a very difficult time, I think to get reliable information. Yeah,
Nathan Ruser 49:13
I think I think off memory, the that the 29th, the 2014 census report, says, splits it into ethnicity, or Yeah, in the township, and I think it was something like 150,000 of the 200,000 people were just not in any of the lists. Like if you summed up the total list of the ethnic groups combined, it was about 50,000 compared to the 200,000 of the total Township. So it's grappling from that I suspect, it was probably about 150,000 Rohingya people in 2014 that weren't counted in the census, in ethnicity data, but did make it into other figures.
Brad 49:55
I mean, that's, that in and of itself is kind of absurd, like, effectively we're just thing is that this is a township. And for those who are not familiar with the concept of Township, it's, it's kind of equivalent in many ways to your, like local council area, the lower house of the Federal Parliament is elected, you know, one representative sort of per Township. So, in in the city, obviously, a township can be a very small physical space, because you have a very high density of people. But when you get out to more rural areas, a township can be a surprisingly large piece of territory. And what you're effectively saying is that in this district, in this township, three quarters of the population, we're not counted as existing for the for the purposes of the ethnic component of the census. Yeah,
Nathan Ruser 50:49
I think, yeah, if for all the people in the States, it's very much like a county idea of a thing. The township thought of just the other the less regular County. Um, but yeah. And the, the sort of follow on from that is that it means records of the people in the township and even more in neighboring mullendore. At that point, I'm not only one citizens but didn't have any form of identification didn't have any form of access to government services, didn't have any form of basically existence within the state bureaucracy.
Brad 51:26
Which is not particularly surprising, unfortunately. So I want to jump then to something that you that you said something that's very important about the events that occurred. So unless I misunderstood you, what you were saying is that these arson attacks, this campaign of arson, carried out by the American army was in response to an arson attack that was carried out by the Rohingya, specifically targeting Buddhist parts of Boogie Down city are both in our town, I should say, is that correct? Yes.
Nathan Ruser 52:04
So obviously, I can't necessarily draw the exact is happened causing this to happen, sort of? What is it correlation versus causation, I can't necessarily pull the whole causation out of it, because I 100% don't have any insight into what the soldiers on the ground were sort of thinking. But what we can see is that there's a very clear pattern after April 24, of whenever the American Army captured a military position. Within days, the neighboring villages would all be burned. When we look the military positions in Booth a downtown that the American Army captured before that wouldn't directed us and campaign in both the downtown they that that that didn't happen. I can't remember the exact dates but in in the early April, I think was the first week of April, they captured a battalion in northern booth to dunk Township. There was no arson attacks in response to that, but every one after that, between the between the theory of the hunter directed arson attack in Bucha, downtown, the complete capturing of the township, so neighboring villages being burned within days of the within days of the position being captured.
Brad 53:27
She's so so effectively, it seems that the state is in a a situation where arson attacks like organized campaigns of Austin are just part of this. What would we call it retaliatory terrorism? Or or what? Because it seems like it's not arson, for the sake of actually achieving any strategic goals. It's awesome for the sake of, I'm angry because a position has been captured. Or I'm angry because I don't like this particular group of people. And I finally captured a position that I'm able to just lay waste to their homes for the sake of it. Yeah,
Nathan Ruser 54:05
so obviously, a level of speculation here. Um, but I think it did fulfill a strategy, a very deliberate strategy from the hunter, which was to stoke and provoke communal violence. I think that was a very considered and strategic moot decision that they decided to make was to commit these asset tax to make life worse for people living in territory that they would do not control. Um, but then in terms of the retaliatory OS attacks by the American army. Yeah, I think it I think it sort of is basically just retaliation against the Rohingya community against the conscripted or the few militant parts of that community that were involved in the previous violence was sort of them just taking a blanket hand of immediately punishing the Rohingya community in response to that, and yeah, in terms of the positions that it Again, pure speculation that from from my perspective, it sort of appears to match that mold of the fighters that captured the position. What do they do now? Now we'll take out that our anger, instead of taking it out on the hunter position, we'll take it out on the Rohingya villages nearby.
Brad 55:16
So this is pillage and burn in a very literal sense.
Nathan Ruser 55:20
Yeah, it to the point where, essentially, because I've been tracking sort of the fall of the military units in the area broadly, but I definitely don't have it, like committed to memory. And then I went to the steps of trying to date the arson attacks as well as I could throughout the throughout the state. When I looked at it afterwards, they basically you could almost rack the American armies, military gains across the township by those fires. That's why That's why I titled the report that they left a trail of ashes, they as they sort of move through and conquered big parts of buta dang town the the arson follow.
Brad 55:59
But, so just I just need to underline this because it seems so obvious and so basic. But so the American army is liberating positions from the control of the Thermador. And in celebrating that, that gain, they are retaliatory Aliy. Raising and burning Rohingya settlements, not the group of people that they've been fighting against, not even allied to the group of people they've been fighting against it. Like it feels like there's no connection between A and B.
Nathan Ruser 56:41
So when you know, when the ask when the junta directed often attack in Booth downtown happened. Think all of the level headed people looking at it saw it saw it for what it was a transparent attempt to sort of leverage this increasingly desperate and coerce this desperate population and CO opting coerce them into sort of trying to inflame communal violence and communal tensions that really have existed since 2017. Under the surface, I think we all saw that in April as an immediate immediately as this is, this is a deliberate ploy to spoke these communal tensions, then yeah, unfortunately, the American army seems as though it fell immediately into that trap of escalating these tensions further and committing further atrocities. And and that because I think, throughout both quantum media and American and American army media, there was a huge focus on it being Rohingya villagers were Hinga militants that burnt down booth at downtown. Not necessarily in the official media, but sort of in pro Hunter, Facebook groups and whatnot. And so I think there was very much that they saw the Rohingya community as responsible for burning down Bucha downtown and that's what the retaliation was for. Even though even though and there's this really complex thing that I don't fully understand about the level of involvement that the Arakan, Rohingya Salvation Army and the RSO has had in being involved in the force recruitment and being involved in fighting with the junta I don't necessarily see what they get from that and why why them as an organization has decided to decided to fight with the junta which which they, in all honesty, their attacks on the junta is what Dave, the junta the excuse and sort of what prompted that genocide. Of course, the genocide wasn't because of the Eric and rancor Salvation Army, but it was attacks by them on the hunter that prompted that the quote unquote, clearance operation. So yeah, they have seemed to be involved quite heavily organizationally in with the junta in recent months. And that's something that both the American army, the ergonomic is really strongly focused and fixated on. I think that that sort of explains why they retaliated against the committee, of course, of course, like it's an atrocity to mentally punish and retaliate, retaliate against the entire community for the actions of a few militants, and especially considering how many of those individual militants on the ground would have been coerced and CO opted into into doing this. But yeah, I think that that sort of is the logic behind it.
Brad 59:35
But it's so I mean, in any other case, I would call it childish. It reminds me very much I was in Yangon in 2017. And I think whenever the Rohingya issue came up, there was this thing of I believe there have been two rapes that were carried out by I Rohingya against Buddhist women or possibly Western Ranger men who who had raped at one Buddhist woman. I can't remember the exact details of it. But this was what kept getting brought up every single time. Right when it whenever you you spoke about the Rohingya issue, this was just an immediate response. It's like all but you know, they, you know, they're raping us. And it's not even one of theirs raped one of ours, which in and of itself is a very unhelpful way to look at that. But it was they are raping us it, it was, we can take a couple of examples of violence. And as long as the relative ethnicities are correct, we can keep publishing stories about them, we can keep pushing it aggressively. And we can try to build it from not just well, this person committed a crime against that person, but we can turn it into an us versus them existential threat. And the tragedy is that the media and and you know, all the sort of pro military, Buddhist nationalist, Mahabharata, you know, whoever else groups on on Facebook, did a phenomenal job, they were very successful in fanning these flames, to the point where the all of the predictable talking points that anyone who is familiar with rising social tensions rising, you know, ethnic tensions, or religious tensions or territorial tensions in any other context, you know, whether we're looking at, you know, the breakup of Yugoslavia, or whether you're looking even in the more modern, more recent context, you're looking at the United States, like tensions between Latino migrants and and, and white Americans in in southern states in the US the exact same talking points, the exact same arguments keep coming up. They're very predictable. But in the Myanmar context, they were very successful at seeding those talking points, seeding those propaganda stories, and getting people to stop you. The Rohingya in this, in this existential sense of all of the Rohingya are unified against us, because there have been some instances of violence and because the Ranger have some, you know, armed organizations, resistance organizations, terrorist organizations, whatever you want to call it, and it feels very much to me, like all they're doing now is going back to that 2017 playbook, and thinking well, was so successful last time, let's just do it again. And if what you're saying is true, it seems everyone's just buying it hook line and sinker. Yet again. I don't know whether you'd agree with that characterization or not. But that just, that's just that's just how what you've described to me while you were talking about the current situation. All my mind was going to was, man, I heard this in 2017. Like, I remember hearing the exact same things being being said, it just seems to be a complete repeat of the same stratagem. Yeah.
Nathan Ruser 1:02:57
And it's certainly a shocking echo of some of the violence, I think, especially in violence and rhetoric, especially in 2015 and 2016, as a precursor to the 2017 genocide. But yeah, it's really a shocking echo of a lot of that. In terms of the rhetoric, and in terms of even the communal violence and sectarian clashes we're seeing on the ground, I don't have as much experience in the Burmese context on the ground. But what I have noticed, just in general, is that that especially in Southeast Asia, there's in many parts of Southeast Asia anyway, there seems to be a shocking, shockingly widespread, anti Muslim perspective. I think in Myanmar, it's probably more pronounced than anywhere else. But I think a lot of the rhetoric Yeah, it goes down to this existential threat. It really sounds similar to arguments of white replacement that you hear in the far right circles in the US and just by chance this morning, I was watching. I was watching a Louis Thoreau documentary on white nationalism, and a lot of what they were saying just reminded me of the rhetoric that we hear against Rohingya in in Myanmar. I think it should be noted that the NL D, the democratically elected government, from 2015 to 2021, was as involved in this as as any as like they're certainly not a shining light will look at in Rohingya community relations. They were perhaps not the direct perpetrators of the genocide, but they were very much involved in the rhetoric and the defense of it and the enabling it. And so, I think the NUJ government has taken a bit more of a progressive step there. They use the term Rohingya. I believe they have Ranga member in the cabinet, that they definitely have taken more positive steps in this than previous Yes, governments have before. But I mean, we're clearly seeing, especially I mean, it's complicated. It's further complicated by the fact that the American army was able to sort of so this implausible deniability saying we didn't do it, it was the hunter that did it. But but we still haven't seen sort of statements that name a perpetrator from a lot of a lot of the National Resistance in Burma renouncing this violence. I think even I forget what position he holds. But the ranking member of the UG cabinet sort of said on the day that the burning happened with with I don't want to put words in his mouth, but the context of your tweet that he put out seemed like he had an understanding that it was likely the American army. You could see even that was just like, whoever the perpetrator is this, this is not acceptable. And I think that's one of the things that I hope my report does I don't want to just rubbish the era Konami or rubbish, the National Resistance for no reason I very much deliberately want to provide sensible and clearly demonstrated evidence of the perpetrator so that there can be a more can be a more principled perspective and statements from from actors on the ground that I think have a very narrow but but potentially critical opportunity window of opportunity to sort of stamp this communal violence out before it becomes anything worse. I think there is actually I think there's one, relatively, this is going to sound a bit a bit callous of me, but I think in terms of sort of conflict resolution and community resilience, I think the fact that the hunter has played a very transparent ploy in inflaming these tensions is also an opportunity that both the American Army and the Rohingya community can potentially point to as a way to sort of de escalate these these sectarian tensions. But yeah, I think there's an I'm hoping that I'm hoping that sort of National Resistance and actors involved sort of start to see this as as a very narrow window to stamp out this this violence and then hopefully not repeat the 2017 genocide.
Brad 1:07:23
Because very important thing that you've just mentioned, there's, of course, that the economic were able to hide behind the military, a lot of people were able to hide behind a lot of things. I think the military themselves did a very good job of hiding behind the notionally civilian government or the pseudo civilian government of, of that sort of window of time 2016 2021 Because the international community had largely decided, well, if there's a civilian government in charge of democratic elected civilian government, then they must be the ones to be held responsible. And everyone internationally knew Anson sushis name, nobody knew me and eyelines name and the American army, I think, even Mamata violently, Buddhist nationalist organization, all of them were able to sort of hide their roles behind the military and say, Well, you know, the military are the ones doing it, we maybe wanted to patriotically uplift the spirits of the military as they were valiantly defending our country. But we ourselves did not do anything. But in this particular case, the issue that we're looking at today, you're saying that this is unequivocally not the Damodar, that that it is, the Austin attacks are congruent with the movement of the American army. And so you're saying that this is not the military burning everything before they lose the positions? This is the American army burning everything, after they take the positions? Is that correct?
Nathan Ruser 1:08:53
Yes. So I think when when the sort of news of booth Adang burning, initially broke, I as much as anyone was skeptical that it was the American army, in that the Burmese junta has a very established track record of burning down villages, that they're not burning down towns and cities that they're not able to control. The American army hasn't really done this in a systematic manner before. And one thing that for me in the immediate aftermath is that that sort of struck down into me that it was the American army was that I witnesses reporting that the American Army gave a deadline of leave the town by 10am, that's when we're going to commence our attack. And to me, I was thinking, Well, why would they start burning the town down 12 hours before a deadline that they gave that day? Um, and I think further American army sort of statements have muddied that muddy the waters there further, when we look at the situation in Booth downtown. In that they said that they said at the time 100 troops that were being overrun in Tactical Operations Command west of town had fled into the town itself. So based on the available information that we had, it seemed, on that night in Booth downtown, there was the hunter present, there was the American army present, and there was a massive number of civilians moving through the area as well. That really I think is complicated, especially considering almost all the reporting on this arson campaign has focused on it's often attack really has focused on both the downtown and not the surrounding villages. But when we started looking at the surrounding villages, the evidence and the idea of perpetrators became much clearer in that the economic statements that they themselves put out provide a pretty useful timeline of their of their conquest of the of the area. So for example, in a statement in early I think it was on May 4, they put out the statement that just after they captured the divisional level on moc 15 headquarters, they put out a statement, and then part of it, it said, for the majority, for the most part of 2024, we have besieged the moc 15 headquarters. I'm starting in the last week of April, there was 12 or 13 days of clashes to capture the bass. We finally captured and overran the bass completely on May 2. So that establishes very clearly that at least in the Eric and army's own words, they had the military presence in that area was literally just that military base for a good part of 2024. That it wasn't and that the American army was actively clashing in the base over the late April. Meanwhile, four kilometers away, we saw the first village being burned on April 24. And that is clearly out of the reach of winter authorities on the ground there. We another example to look at is after this happened. The American army put out a lot of public relations, arguably propaganda statements sort of showing demonstrating that they were helping the Rohingya community. They pointed to one village in particular to the northwest and booth downtown. And it showed videos of them on May 14, sitting with a bunch of Rohingya people on a field saying we rescued them from Burmese military siege, and also showing that they provide a Military Treatment medical treatment to some civilians on the ground on the 14th of May. And then when you look at the satellite picture of that same village, you can see that on the 14th of May, where video evidence clearly demonstrates that it's the American army in control of that village, by a had started in the spire. The burning had started in that village, and within the next two days that that Rohingya Hamlet in that village was entirely burnt down. Now the thing that sort of points towards the discriminatory and sectarian nature of this is that there was an ethnic dinette Hamlet to the east of that village within like a couple of 100 meters, there were a hanger village was there a hanger Hamlet was entirely burned and effectively raised and destroyed. Whereas the dinette which is a Buddhist ethnic group in the area was relative was pretty much untouched. So one example we looked at was that there was a masjid, on the edge of the village that was fully burned less than 200 meters away, there was a monastery that was untouched. Sort of time and time again, we were able to demonstrate that through the American army, his own words, the territory that they the burning, the villages that were burning, were happening in a time and place that they were under full control of it's also became increasingly clear as we kept seeing loss and attacks in the area, following May 18. So there was a there was a handful, probably about 10 or 12 villages that got burned from May 19 to May 21, especially in the West of Bucha dung Township. And that was at a period when the military had basically been entirely extinguished from the township every military position had been had been overrun and captured.
Brad 1:14:25
So clearly this is happening. And clearly, the IRA economy is responsible for this. Now, my understanding is from from discussing with you the our economy is not currently we're recording this in in the middle of June 2024. The our economy is not currently doing this, or at the very least they have scaled back significantly on their arson attacks. As a result of of awareness of what's going on. Is that Is that fair to say?
Nathan Ruser 1:14:58
Yeah, so the last detection I can have of arson attack was May 21. And I haven't seen any reports of villagers burning and look for that. And I haven't been able to find any satellite imagery that suggests the villagers have burned on one complicating factor is that that is about when the monsoon came so that we've had a lot less clear satellite imagery of the area since then. But I expect that I expect that the campaign has has stopped, at least for now, in terms of I suspect, that the evidence that the attention that the roofer downtown itself burning would have caused would basically make it so that the further villages being burnt, would not be under that threshold of detectability. I think they would be reported on especially by Rohingya activists. And yeah, so basically, I've seen no reports of burning villages since May 21. I've got no satellite imagery to suggest that there has been I don't know if I can conclusively say that there hasn't been any cases because of that monsoon. But yet it appears that it's over.
Brad 1:16:05
So how long in your estimation, has the arson campaign in Rakhine State? How long did it last for
Nathan Ruser 1:16:13
there was the initial junta directed Austin in Booth downtown that burned about 2500 structures that took place? April 11, to April 17. Yep, yep. Then there was the retaliatory campaign by the American army that took place, the earliest detection that we have is April 24. And I believe I started on April 24, I'm confident in saying that it appears to have ended on May 21. So that would be let me just have a quick look at the calendar. That would be essentially unto three, basically four weeks. Yep.
Brad 1:16:54
Okay. And so because the big question, the very important question and something that, you know, one of those cases where the top down view is, is probably not going to give us the answers to it is, are these attacks that are being ordered by the command of the American army? Are these attacks which are being actively allowed by the command of the American army? Or are these attacks that are happening in defiance of the instructions of the commanders of the American army and are being sort of independently carried out by by personnel who who have fallen outside of the control of the centralized command structure? Is there any reportage Is there any commentary? Any clue that you could use to figure out whether the commander of the American army is behind this agnostic and neutral on this, or whether they are genuinely opposed to this? Because your report says that the American army themselves vociferously denied the allegations that they were responsible for the burnings. But is there any any evidence that you can point to that would help us settle this question?
Nathan Ruser 1:18:10
I'd suspect and like like you said, this is not a thing that we can determine from that that bird's eye perspective. Well, I suspect it was a very grassroots campaign. I suspect it was initially the initiative of like commanders, local commanders on the ground and local fighters on the ground rather than the central command. I suspect that it is directives from central command that is largely appeared to have stopped the arson attack, following the attention and the negative attention that is brought on but what I would also say is that during this period, during the time that the arson attacks were happening, the central leadership of the American Army made their rhetoric very clear that that was some of the most poisonous and venomous anti Rohingya rhetoric statements that we've seen from the American army ever happened during that time. As much as I don't think that fighters on the ground are scrolling through Twitter and reading um, I forget the commanders name throughout map something as much as they're not reading his Twitter feed and seeing the venomous tweets. It is the venomous anti Rohingya tweets that he's putting out. I think it's, it makes the general anti Ranga venom and rhetoric clear and even though I suspect there was not a odor from Central Command, and I in fact, I suspect that it was central orders from the central central central command and the American army that stopped this. I think very much. They made their position clear and they effectively greenlit not not in a literal explicit sense, but their their rhetoric made it clear that that fight is underground. This was an appropriate thing for them to do. So, so that's I should mention that all of that is pure speculation. I have no evidence this Report anywhere. That is my impression.
Brad 1:20:01
Because that's what I want to ask you about. Because I think that's, that's a very interesting conclusion to come to. And I think it's a very powerful thing. It doesn't matter whichever city it is, it doesn't matter whether the central command is driving the arson against the Ranger or whether the central command is valiantly out there trying to prevent it. But it does matter that we know what's going on. Because that is that is going to come into our understanding of the American army as an organization because it if the American army genuinely opposes the burning of the villages, which in your estimation, you're saying that they don't really oppose, they just don't care. But if they genuinely opposed it, then it would be phenomenally telling and terrifying, that their men were able to run rampant for a month before Central Command was able to regain order. That would be an unforgivable lack of discipline and control. And it would it would point to an organization that is not capable of actually operating as a as a well disciplined, well regulated cohesive unit. If the American army was actively behind the attacks, the central command is actively behind the attacks, then that tells us very clearly that anytime the economy turns around and says, Well, we're willing to sort of break bread with the Rohingya, we're willing to talk about repatriation, we're willing to sort of, you know, let bygones be bygones. And you can totally give us autonomy and self rule in the future Federal Democratic Republic of Myanmar, and you can totally trust us not to use that autonomy, to go out and continue to perpetrate genocide outside of any federal government, regulatory oversight ability, we need to know that those words can't be trusted. So your your Inkling is that the American Army Central Command simply just doesn't care. Burn the villages don't burn the villages. The message is, we're not going to punish our men for burning the villages down. Right, you want to do that? You can do that. And coincidentally, we hate the Rohingya. And we want to remind everyone of that. But I do want to know, like, where do you get this impression, from what it was like the impressions can be very, very valuable. Even if there's no direct evidence, you must have had some reason to come to that conclusion, you must have had something that made you think this is the most likely outcome, I'd be fascinated to know what that is.
Nathan Ruser 1:22:31
Yeah, and that's a challenge. I should say that, yeah. Again, they're a low confidence assessment of this and even lower confidence of whether I can say how aware the central media of the American army was during this awesome campaign. I, my experience and the battlefield success would suggest that they have quite strong unit cohesion, Stripe, quite strong sort of command and control. But yeah, I suspect that they simply just didn't consider it much of an issue until it started getting negative press that and that's when the directive probably the directive that I suspect came out to stop it happened. Yeah, yeah, very low confidence very much based on the vibes and nothing else. So don't draw too much on it. But I, despite the rhetoric that the reckon army has, I cannot really imagine explicit commands coming from down from this central command saying burn these villages in the same way that I can very much see that as a systematic, organization wide strategy from the junta. Um, and also during that period, we saw statements that were sort of very superficially reconciliatory saying, Look, we're evacuating Rohingya civilians. And it's impossible to sort of say whether how much of that is just them trying to manage the PR relations. But yeah, just my impression is that I would be surprised if there was an explicit odor coming down. Just from my experience with the era Konami even though they're even though they're they're a ultra nationalist, arguably group that is quite authoritarian, I would not, they have not sort of managed they have not proven or demonstrated that sort of a systematic tactic and strategy that they use in the same way that the junta has.
Brad 1:24:33
It's just. I don't know how apt the comparison is, but it's just the thing that this reminded me of, for those who are familiar with US Civil War history. Is is the capture of the city of Columbia, in in South Carolina, and basically what happened like Sherman, Sherman went to Columbia. And the soldiers were already singing songs about burning the city to the ground on the way to the city. And when they got there, they raided alcohol stores, and the soldiers got drunk. And they burned the city. They committed horrific acts of violence and cruelty and plunder and pillage and all these things. And Sherman himself as commander was approached by someone saying, Look, this is not accepted. Like you can't do this to a civilian city. And his response was like, Hey, man, like, these idiots left a whole bunch of whiskey in the city. I mean, that was stupid. Now, my man a drunk, well, what do you want me to do about it? Like, I can't control these people. And he just stood by and sort of watched the town burn, I'm sure I'm sure a lot of people would have a lot of differing takes on that particular historical incident. But it just sort of reminds me of that, that element of the that campaign where it's just, you know, I don't condone the town being burned down. But it's already happening. It's already on fire. And, you know, what do you want me to do about it? It's, it's this cold, callous sort of indifference and the end of the day, I think the big takeaway is, if you do something that is illegal, or you do something that your commanders do not want you to do, but you do not subsequently face punishment for that, then effectively, you didn't do anything illegal. Like it may have been illegal on paper, but the message from on high is coming very clearly, that you can treat this as a completely legitimate thing. And we may give speeches about it after the fact, and we may chide you, and we may do that. But realistically, you didn't get punished for it, we don't consider it to actually have been illegal, we don't consider it to actually have been wrong. And from from what I'm getting for you, it doesn't seem like the economy's going to punish anyone. For for what they've done here. It doesn't seem like they're going to set the standard to say, Okay, no, this was unacceptable. And this is not going to happen again. It seems that the message is being sent that if you want to go after the Rohingya, you want to persecute them, you want to burn down the mosques, you want to burn down their villages. We're fine with that. We're okay with that. And I think that's, that's a terrifying, terrifying message to send. And I don't know if there is a solution here. But it does seem to be harkening back to what you were saying, this window of opportunity to, to correct this issue. It does seem that the the N ug and the other Aeos, the PDFs need to sort of put aggressive pressure on the ACA to say no, you you have to set a standard and you have to set an example. And you have to punish the people who are responsible for these crimes. Because if not, you're just opening the door to a continuation of a cycle of violence that that Rakhine State has has seen for decades.
Nathan Ruser 1:28:03
Yeah, I think it's, too. It's too early to say what the American army's response to this is going to be. I think right now they're focused on obfuscating and denying. Um, but But hopefully, yeah, I think this isn't anything that has not happened before. We can look at plenty of examples in what jumps to mind, especially as the 2000s communal violence in Indonesia with very similar sort of levels of sectarian violence happened and reconciliation from that occurred, really surprisingly quickly, and and successfully. Of course, not in all cases. But, for example, if you look in central Sulawesi the level of reconciliation between Christian and Muslim communities there has been well, it was pretty quick and shocking. And that's why I sort of wanted to draw attention to that that germ of being able to pass the buck for this violence from all involved parties saying this is a this is what the junta wanted. This is what the country sort of baited and because it was that was very much used as a strategy in Spencer Lewinsky for that reconciliation. I genuinely believe that the American army is an actor that the National Resistance has much more leverage over and can sort of try and guide and raft policy in coordination with them more than any actor has influence over the winter. And so I still genuinely believe in in given that binary choice between one time and Eric and army control of Rakhine State. I still think the despite these atrocities, I still think the American army is a Better Place at das should they make genuine moves to sort of climb this uphill battle to restore reconciliation and restore community relations? And so yeah, that's, like I said, there's this, there's this window where I see de escalation as possible. And I see that de escalation as crucial. And accountability is a big part of that. And so that's where I think the National Resistance leverage as a huge part to play in. And that was one of the challenges in writing my in writing the report on this in that I wanted very different messages to send to the National Resistance and the international actors, the National Resistance is very much you have got to demonstrate clearly to the American army, that this is not acceptable, that they have to make concrete steps to bold people accountable and to and to restore community relations in the Rohingya Heartland that they now sort of undeniably control. But then international actors, I didn't want people coming away with the idea that oh, look, the American army is as bad if not worse than the Horntail. We should we should back the answers. So it's this? Yeah, I think it's important to make it clear that what, yeah, what's important is accountability and concrete steps from the American army to de escalate and, um, and just sort of start restoring community relations.
Brad 1:31:39
Because I think the difficulty here is, you know, you're saying that the combined resistance can put pressure on the economy. But does the resistance recognize this because a lot like most of the first two and a half years, of whether or not it's most of the first two and a half years, in fact, most of the first three years of the conflict had this, this undercurrent of like, we're trying to court, the American army, they're a major player, they're a significant player, and we want them on side and they've been remaining strategically neutral. But we want them on side, we want them to join. And we, we, you know, we saw some clashes between the military and the our economy, but as I said, they were not major clashes. And until, you know, 1027, three brotherhood Alliance, it was kind of up in the air, like, is the era Konami going to sort of sit this one out and wait to just grab Rakhine and form an independent country as the dust settles? Or are they going to join on one side or the other or what's going to happen, and now that the economy has joined, and that they've been so successful, as part of the three brotherhood Alliance, the propaganda value of the operation 1027 cannot be underestimated. And any kicked off? You know, in Kachin, they had that operation, I think, Oh, 307, titled, you know, in the same way that operation 1027 was titled. So it's, it's described as sort of the turning point of the conflict. So I wonder whether there's not this hesitancy on the part of the other players, whether it's the energy proper, whether it's, you know, Ministry of Defense, whether it's the PDFs, whether it's the other videos, to try to hold the economic to task. Now that the economy has been so successful against the military, and has been so instrumental in PR value of really flipping a switch, like after Operation 1027, we saw the people who were already hedging their bets towards the resistance movement, absolutely say, Oh, my God, yes, the resistance is going to win, the military has no way to win. And the people who are trying to stay in the middle that people may be like leaning a little bit towards the military after Operation 1027. A lot of them started switching going, okay. No, the military clearly cannot hold on to this. They can't keep up with this pressure. They're retreating on all fronts. So because the economy has been so instrumental, particularly in the northeast of the country, I just wonder whether anyone's actually willing to say, hey, you know, what, you need to clean up your act, or, or we can't work with you. Because the threat of the American army turning around and saying, Okay, fine, then then continue this conflict without us, I think is just not a threat and most people in the resistance are currently really willing to, to play chicken with. Yeah,
Nathan Ruser 1:34:34
and I think that's very much up to the National Resistance to demonstrate and to emphasize to the American army that if you want to be part of it, if you want to part in a future or future democratic future democratic federalized Burma. This is unacceptable. Like to hope that despite the national This dictate that the era Konami has had. And they are clearly nationalistic bent, like to think that they would rather play a role in a future federalize Burma then act as sort of a pariah rump steak sandwich between India and Burma. Um, I think, in their statements, the fact that they sort of have shown as much willingness to align themselves with the National Resistance, I think does show that they would prefer a role in in a future without the military. And notably, they I think they've quite explicitly said and, of course, what they said and what they do is a different matter. But I think they've quite explicitly said that they are only looking for autonomy within a federalized Myanmar. They're not looking for independence. So I so I hope that the one thing that I would say to the N ug and other National Resistance organizations and movements is that, like it or not, the Rohingya issue cuts into the international community in a way that a lot of Myanmar doesn't. So you talk about the propaganda gains that the National Resistance can get from demonstrating their strength with the American army and in Rakhine State. I think there's as much propaganda costs and costs to the sort of narrative and standing of the National Resistance in the international community. If they if these atrocities continue, and if these atrocities even even more worryingly escalate, I think that would have a more negative value for the for any National Resistance movement than the positive value of sort of the show demonstrating the military conquest of Americans date through the American army. I would.
Brad 1:36:52
Absolutely, and I think I think you make a very strong point, that the the resistance, if the resistance is serious about courting the international community, and it recognizes the importance of the international community in a post victory Myanmar, and it will be essential, because something that we've also highlighted on this channel many times is that the war is is just the current obstacle. But after the conflict is over, Myanmar has to come to terms with the fact that first of all, a lot of people are dead. A lot of industries have gone dormant and have to be restarted and there will be a significant delay. The electricity sector is on the verge of collapse. If it hasn't already collapsed, the agricultural sector has been severely damaged, food shortages are likely to continue. And so that combined with the fact that the coup period has seen a lot of major international players withdraw from the country. International not just international political support, but also international economic support and investment in the country is going to be essential. And if if the resistance if the national unity government is serious about recognizing the importance of that in a serious about courting the international community and trying to portray a future post coup, federal union as Federal Democratic Union, as as a fellow player on the on the democratic world stage, then this could be a massive win. Being seen to publicly hold to account allies who are engaged in criminal activity or terroristic activity, I think I agree with you would be a phenomenally big step it would, it would send a very powerful message to Western actors, that maybe maybe the resistance is not perfect. But there is a lot of integrity to be found there. There's a lot of trustworthiness to be found there. And there is a genuine commitment to the principles of, of democracy, of federalism of you know, respecting all ethnic groups and respecting all religious groups and respecting all cultural and linguistic groups. And I know obviously, many in the international community have that hesitation to have that feel. Just because someone says we want to have democracy, we want to have federalism, we want to have autonomy, we want to have protections for our racial, ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups, doesn't mean that they necessarily want to do that the military also pretended that they were trying to drive Myanmar towards a a democratic system, and we're trying to protect the rich cultural tapestry of the country. Of course, we know that that was a lie. But I do agree with you. I do think it's a very powerful point. And it's a very important point to try to get across to the leadership to the national unity government, at the very least, that holding the American army to account even if it causes a certain degree of internal strife, even if it causes a little bit of strategic difficulty from military person Active from an international perspective setting that tone sending that message, it would be an invaluably, powerful and useful step to take. And it can really help to rally that international support that's been lagging quite a lot lately, especially since the world has been focused on conflicts in the Middle East and conflict in Ukraine and Russia.
Nathan Ruser 1:40:22
I say this with full sincerity and cynicism. I'm sure this is something that every facet of the NUJ government and every activist and lobbyists for the National Resistance are already knows that a lot of the Western world a lot of the international community is looking for any excuse to not support a non state resistance group. And I think how you strategically handle this? Yeah, I think, looking at how looking at giving the international community genuine and valid evidence that post junta, Myanmar is not going to be all roses and sunshine is a is a real strategic risk, especially when we're trying to win the community. And the National Resistance is trying to get deeper and deeper ties with the international community. And the international community that lifted for decades has just been very hesitant to support anything that's not an established state.
Brad 1:41:31
Yes, I think this is this another thing that I've said multiple times while while doing this job, and something that only came to realize after the coup, because I you know, I, I'd always sort of been politically engaged and being surrounded by people who work for the government and people who would work for the United Nations and things like that I was cynical, but I didn't fully grasp it until it happened in a context where I was very deeply engaged, very deeply connected, following the developments day after day after day, even when the mainstream media around me no longer were interested. The realization that I came to is that isolationist dictatorial regimes actually do more to protect and support one another on the international stage than notionally democratic open pro international cooperation states do. And I think what you've said is completely correct. They're looking for an excuse. Everyone is always looking for an excuse to not do something, it's very easy when you're an autocratic, dictatorial regime, you do the thing that you want to do. If allying with a specific country or doing business with a specific country suits your bottom line, you do it, if it doesn't suit your interest, and you simply don't engage with them, you don't really have to justify it on a moral principled level. But when you come from a democratic state, when you come from a state that has built itself on this high minded rhetoric of but you know, peace and love and egalitarianism, you know, rights for all sorts of different minority groups and the principles of democracy, you you're in a much difficult, much more difficult situation, because you can't morally, look at the Myanmar situation and say, Well, you know, this is not our business. It absolutely is your business. Because these are people who are literally fighting to the death for democracy. They're fighting for the thing that you've been speaking for all these centuries, they're fighting for the principles and the values, the modernity and the equality, the gala tea, that you said, has to underlie any successful modern state. They are doing the thing that you said that they should be doing, and they're asking for your help, help that you've tacitly indicated, you'd be willing to offer to a state in this situation in order to achieve these goals. And that makes it very difficult, very awkward for these states, who now don't necessarily want to commit money. Because budget overflows are happening everywhere. They're very unpopular. Governments always want to tell people that they're cutting back on spending. They don't want to commit military personnel material. It's very unpopular to get involved in foreign conflict. It's very unpopular when your soldiers come home in body bags. It's very unpopular, particularly in the United States, when there have been so many unpopular foreign conflict. It's a very hard sell. So everyone's looking for an excuse, in any excuse will do. And if you can look at a group and say, well, maybe this group has been trafficking some drugs across the border. Maybe this group has been engaging in types of warfare that we don't like maybe this group has been targeting specific minority groups. That can be plenty that can be more than enough for a government or for a government agency to simply say, No, we cannot in good conscience allow our country to cosign the actions of this organization to aid this organization and what they do meaning, if if this organization is doing 90% Good, but 10% bad, we still can't morally justify being party to that 10% Bad, the possibility that our tax dollars paid for those crimes to be to be committed. So it's, it's a little bit ironic, it's almost an impossible barrier, but you kind of have to be perfect. If you're looking for that international aid, you have to be flawless. You have to be a Disney story, good versus evil, you have to be righteous, you have to not make any mistakes. You have to make sure that you're you're completely on top of everything completely transparent, completely forthright, and maintaining a standard that even these countries themselves do not maintain. But if you want their help, and you want them to give you something, you basically have to play the game of being so perfect that nobody can find the floor with you. Which is an impossible ask. But as as I think you very rightly point out, this is what you have to do. If you need that international help you you have to distance yourself from anything that could possibly give them an excuse to say no, we can't be allied with you.
Nathan Ruser 1:46:12
Last time I was on this podcast, I butchered a quote from status calvess. But I'm at this time I'm recording and I've got his book in front of me. And this is this is really been a thing of guiding thesis in explaining to me sort of why foreign policy, especially in Liberal bots of the international community has been so ineffective in protecting civilians in civil conflict. I'll just read it out. By transgressing the jus ad bellum the right to wage war, rebels could not hope for protection under the jus in bello, the laws of war, they were instead subject to the laws of peace. Hence, the treatment of rebels for a long time was excluded from the general trend towards humanization of warfare. In a state of experience revolt insurrection, rebellion revolution, or Civil War was essentially beyond the purview of international law. I think that's a very helpful, helpful sort of sentence and thesis in explaining to people in the Burmese National Resistance, exactly why and exactly how much of an uphill climb. They have the to getting support in the West. And I that's just as statement, a thesis that's really held with me throughout seeing it action in theory AI in basically any civil conflict in the last in the last 10 years. If you compare that to the military aid that's gone to a state in equally abusive situations such as Ukraine, that's just really guided me and how to navigate some of the some of the institutional status barriers that non state groups have in achieving recognize that recognition or support.
Brad 1:48:03
It's so callously bureaucratic, when you think about it, what that quote basically boils down to is saying, you're fighting for the right reasons. But you didn't get the appropriate paperwork before you started fighting. Therefore, we owe you nothing. And we are not even going to extend you the normal levels of protections that other people would receive in the fight that you are fighting. It's kind of grotesque, in a sense.
Nathan Ruser 1:48:32
Yeah. And I think it's a very, it's something that's very much drawn on this idea that the only in traditional, especially in realist views of conflict, it's only a state actor that has the has the right to use violence. And that's something that we've we've seen for I forget my intro to IR courses from however many years ago, but that's something that we've seen sort of reeled in that a state has the monopoly of violence. The corollary of that is that it's only a state that can legitimately use violence. And so yeah, I think it's just yeah, very bureaucratic theory based on centuries old. Theories where where rebellion was more banditry than anything else, compared to the recent trend of within state civil conflict. Yeah, I think it's still guides. It's like Mikey said bureaucratic notion of black boxes that you need to feel before you can decide to shoot back at someone that's massacring hundreds of people in street protests.
Brad 1:49:44
It will I always describe this as coming down to the question of legitimacy. That and this is something that I've seen in the Myanmar context since the coup as well. Everyone seems to be paralyzed by legitimacy because Oh, Who is the legitimate representative of Myanmar to the United Nations? Who is the legitimate representative of Myanmar to the ICJ, who is the legitimate representative of Myanmar as an ambassador to any of the many sovereign states that Myanmar has embassies in? These are questions that it seems, in the majority of cases, people do not want to make decisions about governments do not want to make decisions about this. Governments are happy to just go with incumbency, even the United Nations has been kicking the can down the road through their Credentials Committee for, you know, two years now or longer. It might be like three years now that they were due to initially rule on this. And they just kept deferring and deferring the decision. And, you know, John Walton has continued to act as, as the representative and has done a very good job in that role. But he does so by virtue of incumbency. He hasn't been affirmed post coup by the United Nations as as actually the legitimate representative of Myanmar. And this question of legitimacy, it stacks on, because, well, if we don't know whether or not you're the legitimate representative, if we don't know whether or not we can call the national unity government, illegitimate government, this puts us in this awkward situation where governments don't know whether they're supposed to be recognizing the military government where they're supposed to be recognizing the NUJ and therefore companies in these countries don't know whether they can legally do business with them, like it comes down to something like arms trades, you can legally sell arms to a state actor, if your government is okay with that. But if your government can't decide who represents that state, you can't reach out and offer them. Those those types of goods, you can't you can't sell those things to them. So this question of legitimacy, really has massive flow on effects, it stops you from being able to raise your voice in a lot of international fora. I think our sound is very good example of this. It, it leaves you sort of neutralized and silenced and and unable to access funds, as a lot of money. Myanmar has a lot of money sort of overseas that they can't access. It has a lot of effects. And until someone is willing to stand up and say, Here you go, I'm giving you this gift of neutrality. You kind of just stuck in limbo. No matter how good you are, no matter how moral you are, no matter how many people support you, if you didn't take that box, if you don't have those trappings, you don't have those official things that give you legitimacy. You you just don't have access to the majority of things that you need to have access to, in order to successfully serve the needs of your populace in order to successfully defend them against insurrection or invasion, in order to actually you know, get your two hands into the dirt and start building the country back up after a conflict such as Myanmar has experienced, it may seem very bureaucratic and very technical on the surface. But when we really get down into the flow on effects of, of the question of legitimacy. It's it's, it's paralyzing. It really brings everything to a grinding halt. If you can't get over that, that barrier, or at least that's how how I've seen the the Myanmar conflict evolve, that it just keeps coming to these dead ends because well, we don't have the legitimacy. We can't do this. And then you have to turn to two alternatives, which may not be as reliable or may not be as palatable is what it is.
Nathan Ruser 1:53:42
I think foreign policy, especially liberal foreign policy, very much desires and seeks institutionalism. And the status quo is again, it's an issue of correlation versus causation. But I think a good example of that that idea of statism from beforehand, is looking at countries perspectives on the ISRAEL PALESTINE war, I think so much of a determination of how a country views that is do they consider Palestine a state? So yeah, I think just to reiterate to any, any spec, any any cog in the National Resistance, I think it's just really important to make clear these institutional, challenging barriers, and that's why sort of keeping this legitimacy and keeping this honestly moral superiority superiority, I think is massively important and changing the conversation. Another thing I'll say in regards to the reckon army specifically, but also the National Resistance more generally, is that one of the things that sort of cuts through this trend is reconstruction and reconciliation and all of that which, which is broadly supported in a uniform sense, I think. And that's something that foreign policy can foreign foreign governments can grasp onto and say, Look, we're doing good. Um, even if they even if they've had no role in doing good to prepare the scene for that. And I guess the point of that is the potential repatriation of Rohingya community to Myanmar, in a place where their rights are respected. They are they are, that their rights are sort of respected and there is a safe world for them to live in. That is a massive opportunity for for international legitimacy for Myanmar, if the economic can build and do that uphill climb of making our current state, something a place that is welcoming to Rohingya people, like you said that up to 1.5 million in, in Bangladesh that that is, would unlock a massive source of international legitimacy and a massive source of international assistance and support. And it's a not only is the atrocities and the violence against Myanmar's Rohingya community and population, massive waste of human resources, it's also a massive waste of economic support, international support and everything else.
Brad 1:56:26
And, yeah, I can only just underline that and say that I desperately hope that this episode and this information gets out so that people, number one, understand what is going on. And number two, hopefully, this information reaches people who are in a position to make decisions, and helps them to to understand how to do that calculation and helps them to understand that the moral course of action in this instance, is also the strategically optimal course of action. And it's not always the case that that's true. But in this instance, it definitely is. So in wrapping up, I want to thank you for coming on and discussing this issue. I think we need to be doing our due diligence, we need to be neutral. And we need to look at what's going on in Myanmar, we need to call out crimes that are being committed no matter who is committing them and why we need to make sure that we are we are holding everybody to account. And yes, and I very much appreciate you helping us do that today.
Nathan Ruser 1:57:33
Yeah, thank you so much for having me on. And he and yeah, the point of me writing this report, I'm beyond beyond the humanity of it and the holding and the sort of revealing human rights abuses. But beyond that, there are a lot of people in the resistance, saying that the Burmese military has burned down hundreds of 1000s of houses, they've probably displaced over a million people in Oregon State and other places directly by arson. Why focus all the attention and the condemnation into this account. So honestly, the reason why is because the worrying echoes this has of the pre genocidal violence, the horror of potentially this communal and sectarian violence, exploding and snowballing into violence, similar to what we saw in 2017. It also so that we could also to offer evidence and clearly demonstratable and supportable facts that help us get past this initial phase of Nile obfuscation from the American army and this looking the other way of the National Resistance. And I really, genuinely hope that getting these facts into the public domain and making them clear in a transparent and very demonstrable way, sort of lets this conversation evolve from denial. We didn't do it, pick it up with the junta. Let's let's look at how we can meaningfully start to reconcile these communities and restore relations.
Brad 1:59:14
Absolutely. And so that that report again, just for those who do want to find it, they left a trail of ash decoding the American army's Austin attacks in the Rohingya Heartland was published by the Australian strategic policy institute a SPI and will try to link to it under this episode as well in case people want to read it. It's it's relatively short, but it is quite powerful. very impactful. There also, obviously maps and satellite imagery to support many of the statements that we're making. So if you have this open as you're listening to the episode, I think it is going to help to illustrate the things that we're talking about. But before we conclude the episode, you may remember from last time, we always invite the guests to finish the episode. with some final thoughts, it can be related directly to this or, more broadly to something related to the Myanmar context. But anything you think the audience should should take home with them and mull over as they go on about their day. If you have anything you'd like to share, I'd like to invite you to do that now.
Nathan Ruser 2:00:15
I mean, I think I've rambled on, rambled on quietly on a very topic and a lot. But I think, for me, I think understanding the international response to Myanmar really boils down to this status worldview. And this status quo worldview that the international community has my I hope that especially that quote, which has been really guiding to me my philosophy, but I think that I hope that it sort of helps explain, especially to the people of Burma that might be listening, who were just so confused and horrified by how the world has turned such a blind eye. And it doesn't fix it, but I hope that that can sort of start to help it make more sense. And one other thing I just quickly want to say is that I'm hoping to we're hoping to get the report translated into Burmese quite soon. Um, for anyone that's more comfortable reading Burmese than English, though, they probably wouldn't be listening to a two hour podcast in English. But if I'll share that with insight when that comes out, and I think I hope it will be posted by the progressive voice of Myanmar. When we when we get that translated, I hope if that's something that's more comfortable for the audience to read it in Burmese hopefully that should be available soon.
Host 2:01:40
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