Transcript: Episode #258: Behind Enemy Lines
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Azad 0:10
before it came to me more, I spent four years in northeastern Syria, commonly known as the verge of a revolution. And especially in the aftermath of the battle, the SEC has this policy of, you know, punishing the civilians in the area, even people who had nothing to do with it kind of just a collective punishment of oh, this area was supporting to the rebels. So we're going to burn down, we're going to commit atrocities. And this has the goal of making people not want to support the rebels. When you have to fight the SEC, they themselves know that their position is not defensible. I mean, you're in a town with a couple 100 people with limited supplies, you can only get air supplies, and you're typically out number two and one. Also on our side, we have to consider that these people you know, a couple of years ago were students or teachers or doctors or local professionals or something like this, they never even thought in their life, they would have to pick up a gun.
Host 1:12
Before we get into today's show, I just want to add a quick reminder that any donations given to our nonprofit better Burma, will be shared directly with those in Myanmar who needed most, any and all donations will make such a difference right now. Go to insight myanmar.org/donation If you would like to contribute, or stay tuned to the end of the episode and hear more options. With that, let's get into the show.
Brad 2:41
Welcome back, we have a very special interview today. My guest goes by the name azaad. And he is actually one of a small number I believe of foreign based fighters trainers who have entered Myanmar and are actively assisting the revolutionary forces to make significant great gains against the Commodore. So we're very privileged that he's able to spare a little bit of time to speak to us today. And we're fascinated to understand the the underground insights that there's just no other way for us to get. So as I thank you very, very much for taking the time to speak to us. And I'd like to give you the chance to introduce yourself for our audience.
Azad 3:20
Yeah, thanks for having me on. My name is Ziad. I'm a I guess you could say internationalist from the USA. Until now, before I came to Myanmar, I spent four years in northeastern Syria, commonly known as the Rojava revolution. I spent that time with the mostly Kurdish but, you know, in alliance with the majority Arab SDF Syrian Democratic Forces. After that for years, I came here to Myanmar, and I've been in Chin State for about six months now.
Brad 3:50
Excellent. Alright, so let's jump into it. So Syria right off the bat, you as an American, did you, I assume that you would have been sort of aware of the war on terror that would have been a very large, large concept and the Rojava revolution, as has not been particularly well covered, I think in Western media, but when it is covered, we've heard some relatively good things. We've heard some really interesting articles. We're like, wow, like this this region that the Kurds are building, it's it's, you know, egalitarian, it's progressive, you know, they give rights to women and it they really made it sound like this island, this oasis, if I can use an Orientalist metaphor there of of progressive values within a region that is famed for, you know, consistent conflict and sectarian violence and things like this. How, how did the Syrian conflict come up on your radar, and what made you decide to go there and assist?
Azad 4:52
Sure. Well, I mean, that's definitely a whole can of worms. But exactly the thing that you said, Now, especially about them media coverage with Rojava? No, especially in the time of the war against ISIS, the war against Dutch, there was lots of very positive media coverage, especially with the big focus on the women that were fighting there and saying, Oh, look, it's this democratic oasis in a very undemocratic place. But the reality of situation was, is that more than just being a place with progressive values, it was at its font at its at its core. It was a revolution. And more specifically, it was a women's revolution. And as soon as kind of the fight against ISIS really waned off you see, also the coverage in the media also went off. Because the revolution there had its own very specific purpose, I think for the Western interests that were also involved in the Middle East. As the fight against ISIS slowly started to wane off, you saw a lot of that very positive coverage, a lot of that very high. You say like, you know, waxing about this, oh, this oasis of democracy. As soon as it started being a fight against Turkey, now, it's still the same revolution, still the same value, still the same ecology, still the same democracy, still the same women's liberation struggle. As soon as the fight started being against Turkey, who was trying to destroy the revolution, suddenly, the tone of the media shifted a lot. I mean, that's, that's a totally separate can of worms for me. But my draw to the Rojava revolution was that was that it's a fundamental underlying revolutionary characteristics. In the fact that similar to how we're seeing in Myanmar now, there was also a very strong internationalist aspect. No dozens of internationalist went to that revolution, to defend it to fight alongside it in solidarity and also ultimately gave their lives. No, it was that aspect that drew me to the rudrapur revolution.
Brad 6:33
So, okay, so clearly, you're quite sort of ideologically motivated, you're very passionate about this. And I do, I do take your point about the media coverage. And as someone who's worked on trying to spread sort of awareness of the Myanmar crisis, the lack of media coverage of the very fickle nature of media coverage is is a consistent thorn in our side. And I've actually remember someone describing Turkey, you know, there was I was watching a, knowing better on YouTube, just for those people who might be interested in his channel, I think he has good content. He'd sort of describes Turkey as the friend of the group who has the skeletons in the closet that everyone knows about. But everyone just sort of looks the other way because they provide value. And, and I take your point that once the fight becomes Turkey, who do we want to compromise those pipeline deals? Do we want to compromise those missiles system and placements? Do we want to compromise that NATO membership? Do we want to compromise, you know, 4 million refugees that Turkey is threatening to flood the EU with and the media coverage sort of backs off? Because they don't really want to poke that bear? So? So I really take your point. And I'm curious to know, once you arrived, I assume you had very clear concepts in your head. Once you you hit the ground, and you started to orient yourself, did you find that your expectations were largely met? Or did you did you realize this is completely different to what I thought?
Azad 8:08
Well, I went to Rojava when I was 19. So definitely no as you can say, as a as a young, I don't know, ideologically motivated leftist from the west know what you picture as revolution and what you picture as you know, struggle when you're, you know, sitting at home and what it's actually like, when you go do it is definitely different. Now, I don't want to say that my expectations were met or weren't met? No, it is it is undoubtedly, I think, the shining example of revolution in the 21st century. And in fact, I encourage anybody who is excited about democracy, as excited about people's struggle as excited about people fighting for their own freedom. You know, I really encourage everyone to look at Java as an example. So as far as like meeting my expectations, no, of course, I had no expectations to be met, if you will, but as to what I expected it to be like, and what it actually was like, of course, it was very different now coming from the west.
Brad 9:00
Interesting. So you spend some time in the Rojava? What were you actually doing? So I understand that you're a qualified sniper. And from our pre discussion, you were saying that they, they actually have increased the professionalism and the quality of the training that they're giving to people. It's a much larger establishment now. So what were you doing? What sort of training were you on the going and what sort of activities were you engaged in there?
Azad 9:25
Yeah, sure. So when I came to reserve, I came through the, you can say like the internationalist structure and other there's structures in place for internationalist people who want to come and support the revolution. But pretty quickly, I left the international structures and I spent most of my four years with the YPG, not just with local, Kurdish and Arab units, and also, you know, component militias of the SDF. And now in that time, when I arrived in 2022, when I left in 2024, this was just in the aftermath of recent invasion now in 2018 You You had another war of Efrain, in 2019, you had the works at a Kanye, get his fee, of course. And both of these were really serious defeat for the revolution. And so as a result of that, as I arrived in 2020, I kind of got to arrive at the same time as this huge overhaul. Even though the everything started kind of like ad hoc, it's a revolution under revolutionary circumstances. 2020 After having these serious defeats from an army that wasn't like ISIS anymore, no, the YPG the SDF had been accustomed to fighting, you know, a non state actor, suddenly they're fighting turkey. So from 2020 onwards, there was a, there was a very big restructuring, retraining, and huge increase, I would say in capabilities. And I basically arrived right at the start of that. So yeah, I got to most of our training that we were doing was focusing against, you know, how do you fight in against an enemy that has that has drone that has jets that's always watching you. And I would say that was our biggest headache throughout the four years that I was there was drones and jets.
Brad 11:07
When we when we look at Myanmar, then you would clearly okay you're young Western, you went 19 years old, you went, you went to Rojava? And I presume it might be an arrogant assumption. But I presume that you weren't really familiar with Myanmar at the time that you went to Syria. So as someone who's already engaged in a conflict, what brings Myanmar up on your radar? What makes you decide to travel there?
Azad 11:35
That's a really good question. Actually, no, like you said at the beginning, other than understanding that there's people in Myanmar, and like, for instance, even in 2020, before the coup. Now, the free Burma rangers who were active in Syria for a long time, they're also active, you know, as their name in Myanmar. And so especially in the kind of internationalist spheres and political spheres, people, like understood that there was something going on in Myanmar. But the level of education, the level of I would say accessibility of information was also really limited. And, of course, in the time that I was in Syria, most people were kind of we kind of had our nose to the grindstone, if you will, you know, there was other than some, like solidarity efforts with some other movements and other places, we were mostly focused on, you know, what was going on where we were. But that did change in 2023. The KDF actually sent a solidarity message to the YPG. And when that happened, it was kind of like a really big wake up for everyone who had known that there was a coup had known that there was people struggling against the coup, but both, you know, combined to the whole mess of situations that we're in and also to the relatively low availability of especially non English information about what's happening in Myanmar. Yeah, that it wasn't really on anyone's radar. But once that message got sent, you know, that kind of direct solidarity message, suddenly everyone started really paying attention. And yeah, that's also around the time where I really started to focus. Hey, you know, what is happening in Myanmar?
Brad 13:06
Yeah, absolutely. But then I find it this is something that just it really piques my attention, because a solidarity message, it's such a thing that we can very easily overlook, I think, you know, there was so many messages of solidarity after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and those continue. And there were plenty of messages of solidarity between Ukraine and Myanmar, and all these other conflicts around the world. Now that we have the ISRAEL PALESTINE conflict, we have many messages of solidarity being sent. And I think it's a very common very cynical thing to say that Well, look, solidarity is great, and it's cute, and all that sort of stuff. But it doesn't necessarily do anything. It's it's words, right? It's nice cheap words that you can put into a video or you can put into a letter. But here we have you an actual sort of flesh and blood example, that a message of solidarity actually has much greater potential as much deeper impact. And and you took not just your your body, your mind, your physical labor, but also, of course, the years of experience and training that you have accrued in Syria, which makes you a significantly more formidable, let's say, agent, to Myanmar to this other conflict. And that's just an incredible thing. I'm just I'm just always trying to piece it together. What was the process in your mind from seeing this message of solidarity, to deciding you know what, I should go over there and help?
Azad 14:45
Yeah, well, no, I would say, you know, before I answer that a little bit as to the importance of solidarity messages, you're at a time especially now in revolutionary history, where we do have it's not that there's no revolutions anymore. No, there are movements everywhere. of people trying to fight for their own, not for the for the control of their own lives. But I think everywhere, what you're seeing is that there's a lot of isolation in the world, especially amongst these revolutionary movements. They think I know how we felt in Syria is that nobody sees us. No, we feel like we're fighting by herself. We have to do everything, you know, for ourself. We're up against great odds, we're up against a great enemy, and only by our own strength, can we succeed? I think everyone feels like that no matter where you are in the world, no matter who you're fighting, and message of solid messages of solidarity, even though they're not material support. And there is some credence to the saying that like, oh, words aren't so no, they don't change a lot. What it does change is it really does break down that barrier of we're alone, we're fighting our own fight. Not and that's how I want to tie it into why I came is because really, it's not that these fights are all separate fights. No, you look all around the world, there are people in this kind of we can say the stream of democracy, if you want to make it like a cheesy slogan, where no people are uniting to fight for their own freedom to fight for their own self determination. And those fights are all very, very much connected. Now, anywhere that someone is fighting against totalitarianism, anyone, anywhere that someone is fighting against fascism, the enemy is the same. No, maybe the sides look a bit different. Maybe the specifics look a bit different. But the fight for democratic modernity in northeastern Syria, and the fight for a democratic Myanmar are very, very much along the same lines, the teams are the same, if you will. So in that regard. Now, as my time in Syria was kind of like itself coming to an end. Now, I kind of rode that wave of solidarity, if you will, and figured this is just the next place that makes the most sense to me.
Brad 16:48
Okay, fascinating. And so what's also interesting to me is that you're in Chin State. And yet the message of solidarity that came was from candy f k and the EFA, or incur any state on the opposite side of the country. So I presume that you didn't when you when you saw this message of solidarity, you made this decision? Did you reach out directly to the K MDF? Or were you just sort of casting a wide net saying, Can I find any contacts within Myanmar? Who can help me to to relocate and be effective?
Azad 17:16
Yeah, no, I definitely reached out to several different groups. But not just as it was mostly a matter of opportunity, as you know, you have to actually get into the country. Yeah. And there's just for security reasons. There were several other outside factors. But yeah, in the end, I ended up here in state for me, it wasn't very important, which part I arrived in.
Brad 17:39
Just a small small detraction, because you mentioned security factors. And, and I find this fascinating because fair, but fascinating. You as we discussed previously, you're not particularly afraid of of legal repercussion. And it's a really interesting thing, because people who go overseas to travel to the Middle East to fight for ISIS, that is whatever we want to call them. Those people are terrorists, they are they are recognized by states as terrorists. And if they try to return to their countries of origin in Western countries of origin, they are largely intercepted at the airports and they are charged with violations of all manner of of crimes among them, is going off to fight for a foreign military, which in many countries state, many country's legal systems is a crime. Although interestingly, you were with the YPG. And the YPG, are considered to be a terrorist organization by Turkey. He was a member of NATO. But we've seen many people who fought for various Kurdish revolutionary groups, have flown back to the United Kingdom have flown back to the United States have flown back to Australia, and have not been intercepted. The government must be aware of their activities, but they're not picked up. Do you? As someone who's who's put his life on the line? Do you feel that there's a sense where the home government is sort of sitting back and going well, I don't actually want to commit to this conflict. I don't want to pick sides in this conflict, but push comes to shove. In my head, I've decided who the good guys and who the bad guy is. And if my citizens are going off, and they're fighting for the good guys, even if they've technically committed a crime in doing so. I don't want to set a precedent of punishing them for having made that moral choice. Whereas if they fight for the people that I've chosen as the bad guys, we will throw them in jail. Do you do get the sense that that's going on?
Azad 19:41
Well, first I'll preface this with I'm not I'm not a lawyer. So at the risk of sounding uneducated. No, I don't I know that especially in Europe, the laws for going to other countries and participating in armed groups are much more stringent than us in the US actually the To my knowledge, there is no law I explicitly forbidding you from joining the militia or from joining the armed forces of any other country or any other group. There are some very old laws about like, what happens if you're like an officer in an enemy's army? Like that's, I don't know, that's just like old legacy stuff I don't think has actually been acted on in these recent, you could say internationalist things, you know, Syria, Ukraine, here in Myanmar. So no, I won't say that. I haven't been intercepted by the government. Obviously, when I came back from Syria, there was a several ordeals if you will. But the fact of the matter is that internationalists in Syria, are working with the SDF, which is a partner force of the US government. So if the US government were to then persecute these people, you know, under the lines of saying, Oh, you're with a terrorist group or something like this, then it does it's, you know, I don't want to project their motives, but it's definitely not a good picture for them. So at least in the US, there's no laws really explicitly forbidding you from joining armed movements. In other places, I know some European comrades who went to the same place I did and went back home, they actually did face legal repercussions. And while some of them charges were eventually dropped, some of them no, it ended up not being so bad. There definitely are people who have really had repercussions from going to the same place.
Brad 21:22
Fascinating. But so but So, as you say, the SDF is a partner force of the United States, you're now in Qin, I don't believe any revolutionary group is formally a partner force of the United States, or indeed a partner force of any NATO military. So do you have fears as as a foreigner in in this conflict? Do you have fears that if you return to the west, you will face repercussions this time?
Azad 21:51
Not really, I think the precedent doesn't really exist, there's been so many people going all around all around the world doing crazy stuff. That's, you know, I don't think the precedent is really there for me to get into much trouble. But I mean, who knows?
Brad 22:04
No, but I think it's a very interesting point, a very interesting thing to look at if if someone is considering going to these countries, I think, especially in the United States, the legacy of Guantanamo Bay is very strong. If someone were to go fight for ISIS, they could expect to be very, very, very heavily punished for for that and for the things that they've done. So it's it's interesting that there is that distinction seemingly being made, if even if it is, as you say, in the terms of legal precedent, rather than any clear sort of government policy guideline. It's still an interesting point. But then, let's move on. So Okay, now let's get into the the meat and potatoes here, the actual situation that's going on on the ground. So you're in Chin State, we have seen horrific things in Chin State. And lung town getting burned down three times, you know, there was a horrific case of a series of gang rapes that came out a few years back, just the absolute desperation, the destruction of the, you know, the fields for food production and the seizing of the harvests, and, you know, mass starvation. So the situation in Shan state that we've heard of, is quite horrific. And you are now in a position where you can sort of explain to us a little bit better what the military and strategic position is, is like, on the ground. So, I'm going to start with a question that probably does not have an easy answer or may not have any answer at all. But I want to ask you, in your estimation, what percentage of Chin State would you say is actively under the control of the Myanmar military.
Azad 23:48
Yeah, yeah, I know I know. Here's the thing it's a very small percent like Chin State being very mountainous Now mind you, I can only speak to the areas that have been so far but I can assume at least from what I from the information I've collected that it's the same place also in southern state which I have not yet been to no chance at an incredibly mountainous the roads are very, very bad transportation almost non existent. There's a couple of paved roads between each town there that means that in the past, you know, a couple of years since the coup that almost the entire countryside has been seized by know the we can say the the anti government groups and that means that every town has its little military base now but all of their outlying checkpoints all of their outlying you know, stations have, to my knowledge almost all been taken. It's only the towns that are remaining. Again, I don't want to say that's blanket true. But I mean, I can speak personally we have no when we're traveling between towns, even between regions, we have absolutely zero fear of like running into the top adult for instance. No, because there's so many roads going everywhere. We just know that in each city. There is a base and if you go near the base, there will be problems. But other than this, the type of guy has totally I mean, their grip on Shan State is almost gone.
Brad 25:08
So, okay, so let's just clarify terms just because I want to make sure that we're doing the most thorough job that we can. So when you say town and city, can you give us an estimation of what size constitutes a town or a city in the chin context?
Azad 25:23
Yeah, I mean, if you really don't have any big cities, I mean, other than No, we have a haka, which is the biggest city in Chin State. But it's like, if you look at Chin State, in basically a vertical line is all of the cities No, there's Ted, and then there's philam, then there's not long then there's haka these cities, I think, I don't know the specific populations, but like, definitely less than 100,000 people each.
Brad 25:51
Like, I think, like 20 to 40,000. Each of these cities are 20 to 40,000.
Azad 25:54
Wow, if I'm not mistaken, I don't I don't particularly know the the exact demographics, because also we don't spend most of our times in the cities.
Brad 26:01
Okay, I would imagine that. But yeah, cuz I'm looking up quick statistics on the side as well, just to just to get it. So we're not looking about a large, heavily sort of populated state at all, so what do we got here? Total population is about half a million, little bit less than half a million by the 2014. estimate for the entire state. So yeah, okay. So that tracks, and then you're saying that they have bases? So the military bases, are they located inside the settlements? Are they located on the edges of settlements? Or are they located a distance away from the settlements?
Azad 26:44
Typically in each town, Najin said is very mountainous in the towns themselves are also normally on top of mountains, the SSC base, the monetary base will typically be at whatever is the best strategic position over that town. So like the crest of the hill over the town, or if the town if there's the hills in the middle of the town, that will be in the middle of the town, if you will.
Brad 27:05
Okay, so it's sort of like that sort of medieval castle construction principle, like, you'll have a fortification and somewhere there will be a settlement? Yeah. Okay. Okay, so that's very interesting. So that means that there are a lot of civilians who are living in very close proximity to these military bases.
Azad 27:21
Yes, definitely.
Brad 27:24
Okay. And so that would mean that for strategic purposes, an actual assault on a military base, would almost necessarily endanger civilians who are nearby. Yes, that is the case. There's that. Okay, good. I'm just trying to build up a picture. Yeah, because I had imagined that the military bases were built far away from civilian settlements, as is, you know, more common in Western countries where you try to sort of segregate military activities from civilians. Okay, so, let's, let's Okay, so let's look at the situation because I got really excited when we were speaking previously, because of the things that you were saying about the the Tramadol, the reports that I have been receiving, through various means, but also, from the work that I do on this podcast from people has predominantly come from the east of the country. But what they've been saying has been that the military's effectiveness on the ground is very poor, that the tomato soldiers are not particularly well trained, they're not particularly motivated, and the equipment that they have is not particularly good. So can you explain a little bit about in your experience and your knowledge? What is the tomatoes, operational effectiveness, like on the ground in Chin State?
Azad 28:41
Yeah, sure. First thing, right off the bat, what is apparent, you know, before anything else, when you look at the top about is how bad their position is no, other than training other than their equipment, really their position, when you look at know, their physical position in Chin State their bases, as well as their numbers in the amount of reinforcements that they have. It's truly abysmal. Not like in a serious fight one on one, if you bring similar numbers at the top that are really just cannot defend their own positions, about equipment about training about the kinds of things that you see, I mean, in tandem, we were fighting and a lot of the soldiers that we were fighting didn't even have uniforms. No, like they I mean, they were just going out and whatever clothes they had, some of them weren't wearing shoes. So we know that the type of dog is very, very strapped for resources strapped for manpower, strapped for ammunition everywhere, and the limited reinforcements that they can dole out. They do a lot when they absolutely have to know so we know that the 10am base, they were in very bad situation. And up until the point that we started fighting, then that's when they finally got a little bit of reinforcement that they needed to fight. But other than that, we're seeing that the top dog is trying their best to only put their limited resources where they asked We have to, and that's meaning that in a place like Qin state where the conflict is really not as intense, as you know, where you might see in the south or the east. That means that their soldiers are, I assume being incredibly neglected and the disorders that we're getting in the informants that we're getting, are saying most of the same things.
Brad 30:16
Okay. And so I just want to clarify that it is both of these things. So you're saying that the actual strategic situation and logistical situation is awful, that they are not readily able to defend their their positions. But I want to clarify, is, are you saying that they're not able to defend the position? Because the position is itself strategically poorly designed, and favors an offensive operation against it? Or is it because the soldiers within those positions are themselves under equipped under trained and generally incompetent? Or is it both of these?
Azad 30:51
I would say it's much more to the second No, I mean, the bases that they're in their military bases know that they have their doctrine for how to set up a defensive position, and the positions themselves are good. But when it comes time for battle, you look at the actual amount of soldiers that they're able to put and utilize in the defensive these positions, or, you know, I don't know, to operate like an ambush, or a counter attack or something like this. And the resources just aren't there, they basically have enough to hold on to what they have, up until the point where there's an attack on them. And essentially, they either, if they're lucky, they get reinforcements. If they're not lucky, they surrender or run away. That's how most of the combat has gone so far.
Brad 31:27
So can you give an estimation for what is the physical size of a base?
Azad 31:34
Typically, the bases that I have seen so far now, of course, the outposts before and the outposts that have been seized in the past years have been even smaller, you know, anywhere from 20 to 60 people on a hill, but the bases that are mostly in Shan State remaining now are going to be like, you're not going to see more than 300 people. I mean, I can't speak to haka, or like South chin today, because I hadn't been there. But the remaining bases that we have here in Northern Shan State, each base doesn't have any more than I would say 250 would be a stretch.
Brad 32:01
But I mean, like in terms of physical land area?
Azad 32:05
Oh, very small, like, the breadth of a base would be like one kilometer, the width of a base would be like a couple 100 meters, and it would just be very spread out with the scores defenses.
Brad 32:18
So one kilometer to a couple 100 meters. So we're talking about okay, that's, that's not great. That's, that's, that's approximately the size of the US Embassy in Baghdad for for area of space. That's not great. Which to be fair, is the biggest embassy in the world.
Azad 32:40
But still, well, you might think, Okay, well, they have 100 soldiers, and it's just a small area, okay, well, that's no problem. But in the actual defensive base, you're not just defending the base, they also have to defend the town, the strategic points that would have advantage on attacking the base, you know, they have to worry about controlling movement going around their base. And when you only have, you know, a couple 100 soldiers to do that, it's really a difficult situation to talk about, for sure.
Brad 33:02
I mean, just mathematically speaking, if it's about, if it's about a kilometer long and about 300 meters deep, you're looking at 2.6 kilometers of base perimeter. If you have 260 men inside that base, which you say is a stretch, then you're saying you can only have a single combatant every 10 meters along the perimeter, and that eliminates the capacity for anyone inside that base to be fairing ammunition to be taken away wounded to be operating, you know, support weaponry, artillery, and things like that. So I would not enjoy being being a commander of a bit of a base in that situation, to be honest with you. Yeah, okay. So but this gives us a nice understanding of what it is that we're that we're dealing with here. And so that's the other thing I wanted to ask about the personnel numbers because the reports that we've seen again, many of these reports come from the east they come from Shankar and grainy, but sometimes they come from chin, a battalion, in in a standard military, a battalion is typically understood to be like 800 to 1300 men. In the Myanmar context, I believe battalions are officially defined as 500, for reasons known to nobody, but what we've seen in a lot of these bases is that a quote unquote, battalion could be as low as 120 Something men fighting men with within the base as well close to 200 civilians in the form of, you know, wives, parents, children, and civilian support staff. So the reports that we're hearing sporadically are that the bases that are supposed to have in the vicinity of about 500 Men defending them have typically half or a third of that as a pretty standard reality. Is that your experience?
Azad 34:54
Yeah, I would say that's accurate, and especially the part about a huge not every single base has A little wing of the base that is for the families of the soldiers, which presents its own difficulties, you know, when you're talking about an assault, but ya know, chronic understaffing, I would say, I can imagine that being the same case in the east.
Brad 35:13
Yep. And so you you spoke about reinforcements like they either get reinforcements or they surrender. Those reinforcements do they call because we've, I've categorized many, many times on this podcast, what I call the three A's, air support armor and artillery. And those three things were the three things that came up especially early in the conflict as the sort of undefeatable problems that the military presents. No one on the ground has active air defense, no one on the ground has anti tank weaponry, and no one on the ground has the ability to take out mortars and artillery. Is that what you're talking about when you're talking about reinforcements? Or does reinforcements mean armored personnel carriers and trucks just bringing in another battalion to try and reinforce a base?
Azad 36:00
Well, I wish it was armored personnel carriers and trucks, because if that was the case, in Chin State, no, it's an incredibly mountainous region, which means that not any of the places that they're going to get reinforcements from, which is either from other regions that have to physically drive to Chin State, or from other isolated towns in Shan state. If they were going on the ground, it's basically a death sentence for them. And that's why they don't do it. They don't even try to do it also. So all of the reinforcements is actually mostly coming in via airlift from helicopters. And like you said, Actually, yeah, what we are seeing is that mostly they, if they can bring personnel, they bring personnel, but they bring ammunition and especially they bring artillery ammunition.
Brad 36:39
Interesting. So armor, I assume is a non fact that like being mountainous tanks would be more of a liability than anything else?
Azad 36:46
I have not seen an armored car yet, let alone a tank.
Brad 36:50
Wow. Okay, good to know. So we're talking about a reliance on on mortars and artillery and a reliance on air support? Can Can you give us those personnel like bringing someone in on a helicopter? I mean, that varies. Like if you're flying in like a little bit, that's going to bring you like your full people. If you're if you're flying in one of those, like, I can't remember what they call the Super job is like that's 150 people. So like, what? How many people? Can they bring in with helicopter realistically?
Azad 37:20
Well, I mean, theoretically, they can bring in a lot of people know the Russian like mis you can fit, you know, upwards of 20 people onto it. But not at the same time there. The ability for them to send multiple waves of reinforcements is also limited. So sometimes even their helicopter flights are limited. Something that we saw in a recent battle is they're sending their supply flights, they're not even using like military helicopters anymore. I just found out about this helicopter called a husky not like a big aviation or something. But it's like an a really old helicopter that was used, like, you know, like decades ago. And they're having to use all of these like backlogs like whatever they can get to get their supplies to their troops. So I mean, they can bring theoretically a lot of soldiers per flight, but they have very limited flights, they have very limited space, and how many soldiers you can bring when you're also ferrying a couple 100 rounds of artillery is also limited.
Brad 38:19
I mean, just just talking about so I've just looked it up. So the MIAA eight, so the NATO reporting code is hip, in case anyone's following NATO reporting codes. This was introduced into service in 1967.
Azad 38:32
went on record, I'm not sure if it's the exact miaa where the modern version of it, it's just that's what it okay. I'm not an aviation guy.
Brad 38:38
Oh, yeah. Okay, so it could have been like, developed into their mind 24 or something. But still, these are still pretty old. Like even the 24 was deployed in 72. These are not great. This is not great. Okay. So the question, and this is a really important one, is it? Are those helicopters vulnerable? Like we know, helicopters have a lot of vulnerabilities? Is there anything that you can do if you know a helicopter is inbound? Is there anything you can do to shoot it? Is that can you throw a drone into the rotor blades and hope for the best? Like, is there any hope of of sabotaging that helicopter in route?
Azad 39:14
Yeah, I mean, especially with these Russian mi eight models, or, you know, even the modern version? It depends, is the version they're using? Is that the apartment version? Or is it the thin skinned version? And I don't personally know the answer to that, you know, which model template I was using. I haven't run into too many of their helicopters so far. But against normal helicopters, I mean, you can if you shoot at it with a machine gun, and you get relatively close, and it's trying to land that base, it's not going to enjoy it. Now, a lot of these places are very exposed their habitats and their bases, given the fact that they're, you know, on top of a mountain. There's relatively good visibility. So I mean, there's lots of options. I think the difference is just the forces here that are fighting their strategic capability. No, I mean, hypothetically, you could launch a suicide drone into it. If you wanted You could zero in mortars on the helipad beforehand and then you could have some kind of ambush. Now there's 1000 things that you can do. But so far, at least in our region, I haven't seen that kind of helicopter ambush be set up yet. But that's not to say that it's not not possible.
Brad 40:16
I was just thinking like it'd be nice. Got a very darkly say it'd be entertaining to fly a drone with an IED onto a helipad. Because, number one, no helicopter wants to land on it. But number two, no one inside the base wants to approach it to defuse it either. It's just, theoretically would just sit there. And and it would it would render the helipad inoperable. Until Until someone shoots out or something.
Azad 40:47
Yeah, you can you can like demolish it with other explosives. You could throw a grenade out or something?
Brad 40:53
Yeah. So that's okay. That's an important question is how far can you throw a grenade? How close are the distances? We're talking about? When when conflict happens around a base when someone's attacking a base? What is the proximity to the actual base perimeter, that the personnel would be?
Azad 41:10
Sec personnel would be know.
Brad 41:12
That that the actual resistance personnel would be like, how close do you get to the wolves to assault base?
Azad 41:19
I mean, of course, it depends on the specifics of the base that's being assaulted. Like in tandem, the term is like a very linear setup. No, so the base is all at the north side of the town. And there are like several outposts in the town stretching all the way to the south. So to approach the base, there had to be like an approach through the town, if you will. So there was fighting in the town first, in other places, know, where the base is maybe more accessible. Or you can attack the base first without having to attack the town. I imagine that's different. And in which case, then you get very close to the base. No, it's it's it's fighting up to the walls of the base. I mean, that just depends on the specifics of the battle.
Brad 42:00
And in terms of doctrine, I assume that if you're fighting your way through the town, that they know that you're coming through the town, I assume that the tomato would have absolutely no compunctions about using artillery and mortars against the civilian town. If they think that they're going to take out resistance fighters in the process.
Azad 42:18
Oh, that'd be yeah, in the in the fighting into them. As soon as the as even before the fighting started, the tug of war started using a lot of their ammo just to like blow up houses for no reason. They just started shooting out of the town.
Brad 42:30
Yeah, Jesus Christ. And so this is, this is a thing like, do they have a specific doctrine that they that they employ? Is there a standard operating procedure that you that you know, and that you understand, like, this is how they're going to react? If we If we attack them? Or is it much more just sort of disorganized and ad hoc?
Azad 42:53
In what regard?
Brad 42:54
So, for example, do you know if there's an attack coming? Would they Sally out of the base and try to take up defensive positions away from the base to delay you? Would they try to hit everything with artillery in front of you? Are they going to try and throw landmines and IEDs in the way to slow you down? Are they going to pull away from the base walls? Try to funnel you into like a, I don't know like a narrow areas, they can open fire with machine guns, or are they just going to hold up and take potshots with small arms?
Azad 43:24
Sure, there's, there's two things that I can say about this. One is, especially before the battle, and especially in the aftermath of the battle, the SEC has this policy of, you know, punishing the civilians in the area, even people who had nothing to do with it kind of just a collective punishment of oh, this area was supporting to the rebels. So we're going to burn down, we're going to commit, you know, atrocities. And this has the goal of making people not want to support the rebels. And as much as you know, as much as we don't want to admit it. It is of course effective. No, because these people are mostly farmers, villagers, you know, when they have their whole livelihoods destroyed when they have atrocities like this happened to them. It's not that they no longer support the rebels, but it's that they are obviously much less enthusiastic when fighting comes to their doorstep, because they know the barbarity of the top of them know, they know what will happen to them as a result of the fighting. So that's definitely one of their strategies in regards to not like this kind of psychological warfare against the populace. And to a large degree, it is very effective. No, people are much less enthusiastic about fighting coming to their religion now. On the other hand, no as far as like strategy in battle, now again, like I don't want to come off as like an analyst here or say no, like now I'm an expert on the topic. So far in battle. I've only been against them once intended, but from what I have collected, from what I understood from other people from other stories, and from what I myself saw against the SEC, there are when you're a soldier in a battle, I, at least speaking for myself here, there's multiple points where you say you think yourself, if he's smart, he will do this. Now, if the enemy is smart, he will do this or he will do that. And I would say in 90% of the circumstances, that wasn't the case, if you will, the enemy position was not the the smart position, you know, where you say, Oh, we have a weakness here. If you knew about this weakness, he would do this. You know, most of the time, that's not happening. What happens is when, when you have to fight the SSC, they themselves know that their position is not defensible. I mean, you're in a town with a couple 100 people with limited supplies, you can only get air supplies, and you're typically out number two to one. So that commander himself knows, okay, you know, we have to fight. So what we're seeing is they put up as much of a fight as they can. The casualty numbers actually in these battles are fairly low, actually. They put up as much of a fight as they can they withdraw as much as they can. And then eventually, either they break and they run away, or they surrender, because they themselves know they can't really fight, but they can't exactly just surrender without a fight as well. Obviously, there's the whole, you know, politics that they deal with.
Brad 46:06
But so where can they look, because the way they're described, you're saying that they're in these spaces? Where can they withdraw to like, surely if they if they're fighting from a base? Are you talking about fighting outside of bases, like in open territory, because if they're in a base, surely that's it like that, you're, you're done, you're either going to win this fight outright, or you're going to surrender because there is nowhere for you to withdraw to?
Azad 46:31
Yeah, I mean, that that is basically the situation for them.
Brad 46:35
Okay, so So do you, does this mean that you, you would engage the tomato outside of bases as well, that they that they do go out, they do operate in numbers, and they do carry out operations or get caught in ambushes when they're outside of their bases? For some reason?
Azad 46:52
I mean, yeah, they do have to leave their bases in the defensive, like a town, for instance, because I don't know, let's say, for example, there's a position in the town that has strategic advantage on the base, obviously, they leave their base to secure that position in the town as well. So it's not just that they're like turtle shells inside their bases. If that was the case, it would be even easier, you know? Yes. Okay.
Brad 47:11
So they can project some degree of power outside of the bases walls itself. They do sort of sally forth, occasionally.
Azad 47:19
So then, yes, but I think I think the willingness of the tatmadaw soldiers to fight means that those positions are mostly paper positions, where the commander has to put them there, because that's the right thing strategically to do. But then the second you start shooting at those soldiers, they're gone.
Brad 47:34
Right? Right, is it? And I'm just wondering, cuz I can't sort of picture it in my head. But is it possible to assault those positions, such that you cut off their opportunity to withdraw to retreat and you basically forced to surrender?
Azad 47:49
I mean, yeah, hypothetically possible, depending on the particulars of the battle.
Brad 47:54
Because if that's not the case, then it sounds from what you're saying that there's a lot of this loop of, I'm going to assault a position that both of us know you can't hold, we're going to exchange bullets, which neither one of us can really afford to replace right now. And then you're going to run home to your base and cry to your commander. And then later, you're going to come back and take this position that it feels a little bit World War One ish, right? Like, let's let's attack the trench. Oh, no, we've just lost the trench again. Okay, we're back to square one. Except we've wasted ammunition and we've lost some people's lives. Like, is that is that kind of a repeating cycle that's happening?
Azad 48:32
No, I don't want to make it sound so cyclic, but what I will say is that, not especially the combat capabilities of the people fighting SSE No, of the CDs and of the PDFs, and of the resistance forces here in Shan State, their combat capabilities in the in the top does come back abilities really are both let's be honest, not great. Now, these people are incredibly brave. These people are incredibly motivated, but we have to look at the reality of how much equipment they have, how much training they have within equipment. And when you look at both sides, and these clashes really compared to some of the conflicts, at least here. casualty numbers are very, very low. I mean, some anecdotal. An anecdote if you will, in a night and fighting antenna, there was a there was a morning attack that we did. And then sorry, in the morning, there was a morning attack and then that night, they did a night attack in between that morning attack that we did in between that night attack that they did not only was there no change in position held in the town, there was also an upwards of probably 4000 rounds of ammunition expended maybe 5000 rounds of ammunition expended and not one casualty from either side. If that can a little bit let you know how the situation is.
Brad 49:48
So I'm just wondering like is there is there a sense in which people are generally firing in the in the direction of the enemy but neither sides really committed to the idea of killing people like the we've heard that Add fresh soldiers or less experienced soldiers have this situation where they want to look like that. Did they want to help the side? But if you actually put someone in the crosshairs and say, take this life, a human instinct prevents them from wanting to do that. Do you? Do you think that psychological element is there?
Azad 50:19
No, absolutely not. No, I think these people, these people fundamentally want to kill each other. No, the rebels here are incredibly motivated. No, they're very brave, and against incredible odds, they're going in, they're putting their lives on the line. Really, I think the primary issue that we're facing until now is training. But we're very, very lucky that the top of our soldiers are totally inept. And of course, when they need to, they will fight and they will try to defend themselves, but they're really just bad soldiers. Also, on our side, we have to consider that these people, you know, a couple of years ago, were students or teachers, or doctors or local professionals or something like this, they never even thought in their life, they would have to pick up a gun. And the things that they learned, either they learned, you know, from open source or from other local groups or militias. So with that kind of fighting spirit, and with that bravery, they're going into battle. But of course, there is a there's only a certain point, you can get to that before you need some kind of advanced training naturally.
Brad 51:16
Okay. And the other one is, you said that the tomato launched a knife attack. And that's interesting, because you, I know that when we spoke previously, you mentioned that they don't have knife capabilities. And I know, for example, how significant this is because in in US doctrine, night dominance is so important is so fundamental. And that's why the US invested very heavily in night vision that they can disseminate to their frontline troops in these these IR strobes that you can put onto your your soldiers so that you can visually distinguish friend from foe. In a nighttime environment, the US has very heavily invested in making sure that if there is a nighttime operation, US forces don't just have an upper hand, they have the only hand in the game. And you You seem to have indicated that the the Commodore do not have any of that they don't have the IR strobes. They don't have the infrared cameras, they don't have the night vision goggles, they don't have any of that stuff. And yet, you say they launched a nighttime operation? That seems a little bit foolish to me. For them to do that do Is there any reason to have a preference for operating at night, even though they can't see or do you have any understanding of why they would do that?
Azad 52:38
No, I mean, I would say that was an anecdote. No, I wouldn't look at an operation. It was more of like a scarf. It was a skirmish on the frontline at night. No, it wasn't like they planned this whole night assault and they did something like this. Like I said they expended 1000s of rounds of ammunition and no one. Okay, so yeah, but and I don't want to say that the doesn't have my capabilities, because perhaps in more sensitive places in places that they care more about putting resources towards, it's likely that they do have some kind of capability like this, but from what we've seen so far and shouldn't state on the ground, any kind of thermal vision any kind of night fighting capability, night vision, we don't believe they have.
Brad 53:19
Are you think this is even the case for for aircraft, on bombing runs, that they don't have the ability to actually cite their targets?
Azad 53:29
I would assume that they have some kind of nitrogen capability, especially if they're in jets, you know, I would hope and I just know that in, not before we talked a little bit about we were in some camps while they were being bombed. And they weren't night bombings. And they missed by hundreds of meters and each of their targets somewhat so that they missed the military portion of the camps entirely. And they hit like civilians in the town, if you will. Yeah.
Brad 53:57
Okay. It's terrifying. And so can you give an estimation for how many bases you think they have across Chen state or what the total number of Tamil personalities in Shan state currently?
Azad 54:11
Total number currently, if I were to just if I were to just gander at my phone, and look, and look at each an hour to be incredibly optimistic with you.
Okay, so for Southern Qin State, I would say I'm totally unfamiliar, because it's a token of worms. Definitely. From haka, from haka and up, they for sure have less than, like eight or 900 soldiers. What Yeah, like, I mean, I don't know in Hong Kong, maybe they have a bigger base, but it's not more than 1000 soldiers in North Qin state and in southern state recently, no, like we saw on what's up there was a huge defeat, where they lost also a bunch of soldiers. Now all they have left is a couple more towns until the Qin state also solutions it being Erican Army also being present. Really the main power does not exist for them to dimension state. I don't know if I can give you like an endless they haven't like random numbers. I can't give you the specific Oh, they have exactly, you know, 1500 troops left or they have 2000 troops? I don't know, I just know that in each position. They are they they occupy an indefensible position, if that makes sense.
Brad 55:26
So, by your estimation, the north of Qin state is hosting in total, what we in a Western military context would consider to be one battalion is holding on to the entire thing. Oh, my God. Yeah. And I don't know whether it's it's safe for security reasons for us to discuss this. But can you give an estimation of the numbers of resistance fighters?
Azad 55:51
Like, really, I can't, because the biggest group numerically, which is CNA claims, I think, like 10s of 1000s of fighters. But again, I don't have a lot of experience with CNA, so I can't say how much of that is actual fighters. But we can safely say the tug of war is outnumbered for sure. 100% talking about that number. If I were to just count up a couple of the of the militias that I have encountered so far, and add up the numbers of how many soldiers they have underarms, then they're easily matched. They easily matched up about 800 or 900. When you combine all of the forces into state for sure. It's maybe even like many times over outnumbered. But the issue is how many of those numbers are fully armed and have ammunition to fight? And in what organization pattern? Are those numbers of organized?
Brad 56:46
Okay, so but at the very least, you can say that you've seen with your own two eyes, at least enough people to match the military's numbers. Oh, for sure. Okay. Okay. And so can you give an estimate again, like if any of this is too sensitive? We don't need to discuss it. But can you give an estimate for like, in your experience? What is the chance of someone who who puts their hands up and said, Yeah, I'm a fighter for XYZ organization? What is the chance of that individual actually having a weapon actually having say, you know, at least 100 rounds of ammunition, and having had at least a basic training, so they know how to shoot straight?
Azad 57:21
Well, I would say every fighter who has a weapon so far, has received some kind of basic training, depending on the group that they've been with. And as a, you know, obviously, this is just my estimate here. No, I don't call this empirical or anything. But I would say if you have any troop number that any militia gives you, I would assume like 50% of those people are armed and equipped.
Brad 57:40
Wow, okay, that's good. Yeah, that's all about Okay.
Azad 57:45
That's even with even with 50% of the of those numbers being harmed, that still outnumber the top and on many times over locally.
Brad 57:54
So. Okay, so then the obvious sort of follow on question from that. Does that mean that the numbers exist right here and right now, for just an overrun of all of the Dumbledore's positions? Or are the bases just intrinsically so defensible? That despite the numerical inferiority, and despite the incompetence of the military, they could still hold on to those bases?
Azad 58:21
No, I think the numbers in the I think that situation that you described, know, the the numbers to be able to do a complete, overrun, those numbers existed two years ago, those numbers exist now. The problem that exists in Chin State, also, as I'm sure you talk with people in the east, is that it's not one unified army, one unified movement to liberation state, there's already dozens of different militias, there's, you know, the two main factions of the Qin Brotherhood and the Qin land Council. That, of course, makes things complicated, because it's not just okay, we take the base, there's also a lot of different political considerations that have to be made. Not from a material perspective, if you look at troops and ammunition and soldiers, since they could have been liberated many, many times over. And I think that's a really important lesson to take away from kind of what's going on right now, is that the capability exists totally removed. From Shin state, I can say that without any kind of doubt, without the risk of sounding uneducated or something.
Brad 59:20
Well, so then, what sort of the obvious question, why are we here?
Azad 59:28
Now, again, I don't want to be too pessimistic in some of my kind of like outlooks, you could say, Now, the thing that is important to take away is that everyone here know is universally everyone here who is currently fighting is unbelievably brave, know coming from the backgrounds that they do, coming from the experiences that they had before being teachers, students, you know, to go from that to fighting again. announced before the coup, one of the most respected Southeast Asian militaries. Not to go from that to that is definitely a huge leap. And I think that right now in a lot of places, not to be very simple, just the training and the capability and the in the logistics, and the structure doesn't exist to organize a fighting force that can be effective on that scale, if that makes sense, locally, very effective, but on the scale that you need to strategically get rid of the Tatmadaw Friction state. So far, that coordination doesn't exist. On top of that. There's the various political issues, there's the various kinds of rivalries and stripes. And I don't want to speak too much on this because one, I'm a foreigner and I have only dipped my finger into the, you know, I can't speak to authoritatively on ethnic differences and factional differences and things like this. But I can, without a doubt attributed to something that is limiting the success of the rebels insurance state.
Brad 1:01:02
Absolutely. And so just the last thing on the on the thumbnail before we move on to the actual revolution itself until we move on to the civilian element of it, because I definitely want to cover that we recently did an interview with with someone who was representing an international organization trying to eliminate the use of landmines are they and they recently released a report on landmine, UC Myanmar, which as you can imagine, has gone through the roof since the coup and has been consistently quite high by international standards. For decades, have you encountered problems with landmines are in your experience of the military using landmines in Chin State? Are the revolutionary groups using landmines in Chin State? Have they become a problem for the civilians? are landmines something that you're factoring into your into your day to day operations there?
Azad 1:01:54
Oh, absolutely. And I mean, when you look at the position of the top dog, imagine you're the commander and you have to defend a base totally isolated, you have only a handful of soldiers and ammunition. Know, from their perspective, the only logical thing to do is to completely saturate their entire surroundings with landmines. I mean, you have upwards of I think it was a on a position in Kennedy Mountain, which got taken in late 2023, that position had no more than I think it was like less than 40 soldiers in it now for somewhere from 20 to 40 soldiers in it, that position had an upwards of 600 Miles surrounding it, it was like a little base on top of a hill was 600 Miles surrounding it. So they know in these situations where they don't have the resources, they don't have the manpower to be able to create an effective defense. The way they compensate for that is to just totally saturate the area with mines. And it's a huge problem, because then once these bases are taken, these bases, again, are in close proximity to the towns, you now have to deal with, you know, 1000s and 1000s of mines that someone has to dig up. You can't just leave them there. So yeah, absolutely. It's a huge problem. resistance groups. So far what I have seen, really have not gotten too advanced in the use of mines or IEDs. In my opinion, no, I obviously understand that mines are very touchy subject humanitarian ly, or from a humanitarian aspects, not humanitarian. But I think the capability in regards to mines in regards to making IEDs safely and controllably actually should be increased from the size of the resistance. Now, mostly what's happening so far is that these mines which are being placed by the tatmadaw, in the hundreds are being repurposed by the resistance, but they're being used very, very sparingly for the same reasons that that you're describing. No, obviously, mines are a huge humanitarian concern. But I think that with more education in minds, they can be used to greater effect by the resistance forces because right now, I would say there's actually under utilization of mines, or ultra explosive devices, I would say mines is I feel like it's like a touchy word.
Brad 1:03:59
It's not like IED is a pleasant word after asking her ID.
Azad 1:04:04
I feel like in my mind is more like, I don't know, I like that word better. But because I came from Syria. Yeah,
Brad 1:04:11
Yeah. Yeah. Maybe like is that because that's the thing. I think the application is different as well, because when we say mine, the expectation is area denial, right? Like there's a sort of sense of like a mine is an area denial weapon, whereas an IED is an ambush and assassination weapon. Yes, exactly. The feeling is a little bit different. So are you so regardless of terminology for the sake of politics, but are you saying that there's an under utilization of area denial? Are you saying there's an under utilization of explosives for ambush purposes?
Azad 1:04:42
Thank you for clarifying that. Because I was having a blank they're definitely the second one. No, okay. Yeah, absolutely. Not that there are very, no because again, we the people here who are fighting in the resistance are the people from the same town from the same villages, you know, the people who are attacking the military base. in these villages, are they joined these resistance groups from the same town as the military. So they're obviously very worried about using the top of the minds as kind of like an aerial denial tactic. And so far, I haven't seen that at all.
Brad 1:05:15
Okay. Okay. Yeah, which is I do know that it is happening in other states Shan State, for example, it is it is happening quite widely. And also that there is development now of battery powered improvised landmines, so improvised sort of area denial, weapons, but that may be more of an Eastern Myanmar phenomenon then, than a Western one. So, it's fascinating to say that you're not experiencing that in Chin State.
Azad 1:05:39
I think the big differences right now, the area that we have to deny the top dog is a bit different, like we control Chin State, functionally, the top dog controls, the towns that they're in and the immediate perimeter of their bases, which they themselves have mines. So if we also put mines there, it really doesn't make a huge difference, you know?
Brad 1:05:59
Because it's a two way weapon. Yeah, exactly. Yeah. Okay, so that, that is actually fascinating. And that's really good to know. Okay, so let's, let's, let's move away from Tramadol. Because I think we have a good understanding of them now. So. And let's focus instead on the terminal. So what I want to know is, you mentioned earlier desertions, right, you're getting diversions. And from some of the numbers that we've been provided, the number of, of Thermador personnel who have defected or deserted, are approximately, and these are all very rough estimates, but approximately double the number of nominal personnel who have been killed in action. So yeah, that actually some of the numbers that I was given by, by 911, international observer organization, is that you're looking at it like 20,000, people have just said, you know, what, screw this, I'm swapping sides. Whereas the actual number of people who've been killed in combat in a confirmed way by international observers is much lower, like, you know, 10,000, maybe like, you know, 14,000 of the highest at the time that the numbers were given. Right. So that was that was then. So this could have been like, a year and a half ago, it may have changed since. But the the that's the kind of idea that we have so are you seeing and since they very large numbers of desertions very large numbers of defections, or is it mostly people stay on their side until they get shot?
Azad 1:07:24
I think just due to the if you think about like numbers and percentages, you know, it's not like we have a base that has 1000s of soldiers nearby us that we're getting, you know, dozens of desertions but the fact that the nearby bases to us have only a couple 100 soldiers in the past two months, I would say I saw five disorders, which I mean, I don't know what the empirics on that, that you want to run the numbers but for bases that only have you know, like 100 people in them each to have you know, every month people who are running away, also risking their lives to run away. Not really what we know from inside the base, both from these people who are deserting and giving us the Intel and also from various you know, spies and things like this that exist no, we know that it's miserable. Like really right now to be an SEC soldier is is a miserable experience. No, you're underpaid. You're underfed, you're under equipped you if you have any kind of military sense about you, you understand that you are in an indefensible position. So they mostly spend their time like getting drunk hitting their lives. When they can, they can run away and they just wait for the attack to come so they can surrender.
Brad 1:08:33
Good God and I want to move away from Thunderdome because there's so much fascinating stuff we need to discuss, but it's just I can't they're like an addiction that I need to understand. So because here's the thing, right, these bases are supposed to have 500 men and and a modest contingent of civilians that they take care of. That's what they're supposed to have. Now they're their strength is at 150 On a good day. And a lot of the people in those bases have probably not been receiving proper medical attention, I would assume that malnutrition is beginning to be an actual realistic factor. You know, I don't know how often they're getting vitamin C for example. Do you have any concept of what is the critical point like if your base is down to the commander and his to adjutants? I assume they're not going to try and defend two and a half kilometers of perimeter by themselves. Do you have any concept of what is the critical mass that you have to reach before they say you know what? We don't have enough men to bother even pretending anymore. We may as well just surrender the base. Like is there a number that that in your experience comes up or I guess no?
Azad 1:09:39
I mean, I think I don't think it really gets to that point ever the only the only time you're gonna see that is if you have some kind of like isolated outpost. No, I didn't personally see but I heard stories of you know, the resistance forces would talk to the outpost commander and say, Look, you're gonna die if you stay here. We'll shoot near you shoot in the air. You Get your guns run away to your commander tell them you got attacked, you know, so. But on a large scale, when we're talking about, you know, the bases that are controlling the occupation of you know, these entire towns, I think that's really not going to happen. Because not to exaggerate like the life of a soldier or something. But really up until it gets to that point where it's truly hopeless, most soldiers are just going to stay in their spot, and then when they get the chance to run away in the shooting, they're just going to retreat until there's no more place to retreat, and then they surrender. That's typically how you can expect the progression to go.
Brad 1:10:32
Okay. And so this is a very important question from an international perspective, from an observer perspective, what happens to them if they are captured in battle? Or if they surrender or if they defect? What happens to these people?
Azad 1:10:50
Typically, they're well treated. I mean, I have been to several jails now of, you know, several different militias that are housing the people that are captured in battle, or the people who are you know, arrested otherwise.
Brad 1:11:00
So they are imprisoned?
Azad 1:11:04
Yeah, they're imprisoned, but well cared for No, I saw their living quarters. And they, you know, they're able to access their family every now and again, they have, you know, hygiene, which is definitely much better than what happens if, you know, a member from the resistance gets captured.
Brad 1:11:18
So, but but for all intents and purposes, they are essentially being treated as prisoners of war. Yes. Okay. So it's not that it's like, Alright, give us your guns. Give us your uniform Run along now and be a good boy, you are being detained as a prisoner of war? Yes, that's the case. Okay. Cool. And is that also the case? If someone deserts other if someone defects or would they be accepted and and have an opportunity to serve within the militia groups?
Azad 1:11:44
Now, something that I think you're seeing all across Myanmar? And the reason I say that is because you see these propaganda posters, propaganda pictures pop up everywhere, is that typically when a soldier runs away, the stipulation is run away, bring your gun, give us your gun, give us any equipment that you have, and we'll give you enough money, like, you know, to cover the gun to support yourself to get wherever it is. You want to go.
Brad 1:12:07
Yep. Yeah, I've heard of a million chat being being paid out to people who defend themselves. Yeah. Okay. So it's not, it's not so much that you defect. And now you join the resistance force, it's your defect, you give us your equipment, and we'll give you enough money to get a bus ticket and go home.
Azad 1:12:23
Yeah, pretty much. Now, there are of course, some people who do defecting join the resistance forces. But that's, you know, those are the those are the two main groups. Yep.
Brad 1:12:33
Okay, so it's not obligatory to join the resistance forces, if you defect, you can just go home. So now, you your capacity. So when we spoke previously, you medically you're not really, you know, a frontline fighter so much as you are providing training. And I'm going to leave it up to you to discuss that and describe it in whatever terms you feel is is not going to compromise safety and strategy. But I would love to hear about what is training? Like, in general, what training is offered to people who come in? And what capacity are you able to help him? Sure,
Azad 1:13:12
well, no, well, I do do training. Also, when the opportunity presents itself, no, I can tell them, I also went to the frontline along with the soldiers that I trained. So it's not that I have, you know, I didn't set myself any kind of like boundaries for my time here. Typically, wherever it makes sense for me to be I tried to be there. But because battles obviously aren't happening every day, most of the time, that just seems like training. So for the training that I do, you know, I don't claim to be like, you know, a super experienced soldier or, you know, some like Special Forces operator or something like this, the only thing that I know is, now we can say marksman skills, Sniper skills. And so this is the training that I give. And especially because most groups have a very big interest in developing these kinds of capabilities. I think, obviously, for good reason. No sniper skills are incredibly relevant and in a conflict like this. So yeah, I give typically between like eight, depending on the group, depending on the amount of people between two weeks in a month of just basic technical training. No, like I don't do any kind of like selection or No, I don't know, I don't like haze people. I just teach them here is no like, the technical information. No, here's how scopes work. Here's how ballistics works. Here's how these different calculators work. And here's how to use them in battle. Here's some tactics and that's that's basically it.
Brad 1:14:39
Okay, fair enough. And so, Is that Is that sufficient? This is the question like, what what efficacy do you see when these guys go to bail? Because like, honestly, if you if you took me someone who has no military training, you threw me a gun, gave me no training and sent me into the field like I've been to the shooting range. I I know what my grouping is like, it's not great. So I would have next to zero efficacy. What efficacy? Are you seeing after this sort of one month of training?
Azad 1:15:11
Well, is the training that I give enough to make a huge outcome in a battle or to like, you know, make some kind of big difference? No. I think it's very limited. Is my training good enough to make someone who before wasn't a sniper, and who didn't know how to use a weapon into someone who can be effective with a long range weapon on the battlefield? Yes. And I know, I'm very proud to say that when we went to the battlefield that saw the people that I trained, and I saw the result they were able to achieve. So effective in that regard. Yes. But what is desperately needed? Is more holistic training. No, I'm not the person who can who can organize an entire training program for a whole army or for a whole militia, to make them into, you know, an effective, well oiled fighting machine, you know, I'm not some genius general or logistical guy. I'm just a guy who likes shooting long range. So, so while the training that I give, and it's limited, you know, scope, I would like to believe is very effective. What is desperately needed is not a really holistic training platform, or really holistic structure that can start delivering victories on the battlefield. Because as much as we'd like to believe snipers were so important on the battlefield, the sniper doesn't win the battle, if you know what I mean.
Brad 1:16:24
Yeah. I mean that, but that's always the case, I saw a speech that always stayed within a speech that was being given by someone in in it wasn't really special forces selection or special forces. I think like pre selection, they were like the SF games in the US. And what it was basically telling these, these young kids who wanted to get into Special Forces is like, you're not the star of the show, that there are exactly two stars of the show in the US armed forces. And that is the marine rifleman, and, and the, the 11 Bravo, so army infantryman, as like they are the two groups, they are the ones who do things. Every single other person, whether you're a radio, whether your artillery, whether your army, your airport, your transportation, your special forces, your whatever you are Navy Seal, you exist to facilitate their core mission, and to make their lives a little bit easier. But without those guys on the ground, the infantry man on the rifleman on the ground doing the thing, you there's nothing for you to do, you're not going to achieve the objective by yourself. And I do that that kind of stayed with me like it doesn't matter how high up you are doesn't matter how special niche your job is. If the basic person who's doing the basic job is not there to achieve the the objective, all of your support work is going to be for nothing, because you're not supporting anyone.
Azad 1:17:42
No, I totally agree. And I think it's a really important point, because what you're starting to see is that all of these groups are now very rightfully investing in these kinds of specialty. We can say branches, no, like drone, team, sniper team, mind team, mortar team, no, this is this kind of we can say like auxiliary teams, which are very critical in battle. Don't get me wrong. But in a lot of the planning that I've had a lot of the discussions that I've had surrounding plannings for certain battles, sometimes these things are almost like leaned on, if you will, they say like, oh, we need to do like, for instance, talking about his jammers, they say we need to destroy the jammer so that we can get our drone team in the air so that we can win the battle, you know, but the so it's almost like, because the kind of capability of the general the general infantry is realistically not super high right now. Know that they want to kind of, Okay, what else can we do? What other solutions can we get? Which is, which is very, you know, it's on the right path. But what is really desperately needed is, is that kind of understanding that right now, just with men with rifles, we already have the necessity, the necessary material for victory. Like I can say that unequivocally No, no. So what is needed is the kind of professionalization the increase in capability, the increase of organization that is needed to turn those men with rifles, and in many cases, women into, you know, an effective fighting force that can really reliably handle serious defeats to the SSC.
Brad 1:19:17
And I think you've just, you've just come to the very crux of the situation as it is the military situation as it is, because, you know, I've dealt with so many people, whether they work in the NGO space, whether they work in the diplomatic space, political space, whatever analysts space, and, you know, I asked them like, hey, let's get lethal aid, lethal aid, guns, bullets, what can we do here? And everyone's basically giving me you know, the same standard lines that you expect to get in those situations like no, it is it is not politically popular. If we're talking about Israel, a country that the US is committed to protecting, you can get away with it. If we're talking about Ukraine, a sovereign state that's the pending itself against Russia, a traditional enemy of the United States, you can get away with it. If you're talking about Myanmar, who is undergoing internal conflict and is on China's doorstep, there are too many red flags. And and politically speaking, the willpower would not be there for something along those lines. And the question then of training, the question of this, this capability, and that's something that I know the US has experienced with, apart from just military materiel in Afghanistan that the the United States were supplying the Mujahideen with against the Soviets, they were also providing military training to get these people up to efficacy. That's something that seems to be much more palatable, it seems to be something that there's a greater tolerance for. And as you said, you know, private people, like yourself, are able to travel to Myanmar, or any of these conflict areas, you can provide this type of assistance, if you have the relevant skill set. And you're not engaging in international arms trade, you're not engaging in international acts of terrorism, anything like this, it seems to be much more achievable as as a thing that you can do to assist something that the government's are not going to crack down on. You know, you're not, you're not going to be sort of hounded you're not inflaming political tensions. Do you believe that an increase in the amount of training like people like yourself, who maybe have that experience, have the capability to, to impart that knowledge and impart that skill set to someone said, Look, this is how you shoot in a straight line. This is how you march this is how you set up a camp. You know, this is this is how we bivouac This is how we do all that sort of basic stuff. Like, you know, even the 10 weeks of basic training that the US Army sends that people through, do you believe that having that on the ground provided would significantly increase the capabilities and would significantly accelerate the liberation of Myanmar?
Azad 1:22:02
I would say it's a complicated question. No, because in any revolution, now, the answer is, how far can you get with just yourself? And at what point does there need to be some kind of external support? So that's why I think, no. Understanding solidarity is really important to know. Like, as, as I kind of introduced myself as a as a more politically minded, you know, person, I'm definitely not going to come here and say, well, for the success of this revolution, we need to have advisors from the west come and teach people how to, you know, do their left and right, that's definitely something not something that I believe, and especially from what I've seen so far in, especially with other groups that are currently existing, like the Aragon army, the Cochin independence army, and also carrying groups in the east, we can see that some groups are able to get themselves to the level where they are dealing those defeats. No, so I'm definitely not advocating that, oh, we need you know, people from outside to come in and give these trainings. Now. Well, I think that where that does happen, it can have a lot of efficiency and efficacy. What I think needs to be more analyzed is if you look at the places in the country, where these defeats are happening at a large scale and happening regularly. They're happening because and this is just my opinion, my view, I might even be wrong. The front in these places is united between the groups that are fighting, if you look at the aircon area, if you look at the Cochin territories, the fighting that's going on there is more or less unified fighting, none of these people are on the same page, if you will. Also, the I would say the standard to which those soldiers are trained is is is much higher than in many other places that you might look at Myanmar. So really, I mean, that's kind of the magic combo, a political unity or at least a unity and purpose so that we understand that we have one common enemy, and the ability to logistically organize yourself in a way that your your average infantry man has the support that he needs to be able to be effective in combat and has the basic infantry skills that he needs to be able to defeat the enemy. Really, those in my opinion are the two things that you need and in a lot of places like in Chin State, not to be pessimistic not to be pessimistic, but to be realistic. We don't have those. We have some very unfortunate factional issues and we have soldiers which know are not trained to the highest standard. Now that detracts nothing from their bravery detracts nothing from their willingness to fight or from their incredible intelligence and also creativity that I've seen on the battlefield. But definitely training, whether it's from outside whether it's from inside whether it's from internal research is one of the biggest necessities of the revolution at this point.
Brad 1:24:49
Absolutely. You okay? And so a very important point in what you're saying. It comes up and the just the other night I was I was part of a conversation with some people had had experience with fighters in Shin state, specifically, the I'm not gonna repeat the exact things that were said. But basically the gist of it was that there are significant problems with territoriality. And let's say disagreements between the different resistance groups who maybe want to have certain degrees of control, maybe want to have certain degrees of primacy. With regards to other groups, do you find in your experience that in Chin State, there is a, let's say, less than ideal level of cooperation between these different groups? Or are you genuinely seeing a better because of what I was hearing from Karenni state, for example, is that there is a very high degree of cooperation between groups. So what was your experience?
Azad 1:25:54
Yeah, no. As the situation as it currently stands, is that there are two kinds of blocks in Shan state there is the Chilean Council, which is mainly headed by cnh in the national army, and their associated CTFs. And then there is the Qin brotherhood. No, which is everyone else. Now, the bigger group there is the Chilean Council, the smaller group, there's Qin brotherhood, and both of them in their own terms in their own kind of sectors have been delivering defeats to the SEC. But not in really, this is kind of like an ongoing issue we saw recently in the fighting in MMA to be even there were clashes, you know, between the two groups, which is something especially this early in the fighting, we really don't want to see I mean, we don't want to see it at any stage in the fighting. But in a position, like Chin's day where the SSC is so weak, where that a unified front could genuinely truly in a very short time, absolutely blow them off the map, when you're in a situation like that. And then also, at the same time, you see these kinds of clashes. Really, it's it's, it's definitely disheartening. And I'm hoping now that in the future, that realization is made is that no matter what the differences are, whether it's no I don't know, like micro ethnic or about territories or about, you know, whatever these things are, that they can be handled in a democratic manner later. And that right now, what is needed is to remove the SEC from Shin state. That is what I hope happens, but at the moment, with the kind of big split between these two blocks, it has been not a huge inhibitor to progress against the SEC, from both sides, I would say.
Brad 1:27:39
And so because because you were talking previously, you're talking about like the unification like the organization rather, of the military potential that currently exists in Chin State right with you, you were saying that it is objective fact that the material and the manpower and the skill set do currently exist with ancient state to overpower the Dumbledore like you were very unequivocal about that. Absolutely. is So is this the main sort of issue that the different groups are not in a situation where they are willing or not in a situation where they know how to sit down, pool all of their resources and coordinate on on a major operation?
Azad 1:28:26
I wouldn't say it's, it's the I wouldn't say it's the primary inhibitor. But definitely, if that was the case, to where there was a unified front and a unified Strategic Command, then the situation would definitely be much, much different.
Brad 1:28:41
Absolutely. But nevertheless, like it's not, it's not manifesting itself, right. This this unified right now, frankly, yeah. And but you so you're saying that you don't believe that it is necessary for that unified front to come into existence for the complete liberation of Chin State to come to pass?
Azad 1:29:00
I think at the current rate at which the topic is losing in Chin State, I think no matter what their I mean, in the country, they're doomed. Now, that's just my optimistic take in general is that the tatmadaw is doomed, but specifically ancient state. Also, they're doomed. But the question is, on what timescale? On what timescale? Will they be removed from Qin state? No, the longer it takes to remove them from Qin state, the more time they have to recover? Maybe the more time they have to inflict losses on us as we tried to remove the Prussian state. So even even at our current state, no victory is absolutely certain insurance state No, there's no doubt about that. But this okay, and the amount of resources that it will take to achieve that victory, it would be vastly different under a unified front.
Brad 1:29:43
And do you have any sort of concept of the of the timescale? Like how long do you think even under the current rate of growth of gain? How long do you think it is before there are simply no basis left in Chin State with that model? in them. And therefore at that point, I would presume, if there are no bases left in Chin State considering how mountainous it is considering how remote it is, they would not be in a position where they could come into the state, because they would have no staging ground from which to operate, they would have to actually launch information. Yeah. So how long do you think that will take to get to that point?
Azad 1:30:21
Well, I'm not a military analyst. But I mean, at the current rate, which is that, you know, every couple of months, they're losing a city, every couple of months, they're losing a huge military base, you know, with hundreds of soldiers in it. I would assume that by this time next year, if they have not been completely removed from cin state than it is otherwise, totally, were majority under the de facto control of all the rebels.
Brad 1:30:45
Wow. Okay. So this, this leads on to sort of the last major area that I that I want to discuss with you and that is the civilian life what is going on with humans because it sounds to me from your description, it sounds very much like the military is is largely exists in two ways. Number one, they exist inside their bases, and they project power out of the base into Township, or rather, I should say into settlements. And number two, they exist in that they can carry out airstrikes artillery shellings and and other sorts of range the destructive operations just to murder civilians and make their lives difficult for the sake of it. These feel like the two things that they're able to do in Chin State currently. So what actually is life looking like currently for civilians in translate?
Azad 1:31:43
Well translate anyway, even before the coup, maybe, as you know, is one of the most isolated regions of Myanmar now the transportation infrastructure, the economic infrastructure is very, it's not great. It's not it's not great. Most of the people here I think I read this UN report about Shin state, most of the people here are either involved with like, logging, or you know, like the timber industry of some kind, or of agriculture, and that agriculture is also mostly not export agriculture, like right because it's so mountainous rice can really only be grown in a couple of valleys. So mostly people are growing you know, corn, which has been the historical local staple. So economically already the situation and state wasn't great. It was already remote and only after you know, 2008 Did you start to see some infrastructure projects like slowly start to bring roads internet stuff like that indigent state. Now after the coup, of course, a lot of people have left a lot of people have gone to neighboring regions, for instance, like Sagaing region also houses a lot of people from Kent State. And many people many people that I speak to in state both in resistance but outside of the resistance are actually very dependent on support from people in the diaspora. Now Malaysia, Singapore, also Europe and America know people who have left and gotten jobs there are contributing a lot that now I don't know how scientific This is, I was trying to understand it myself. But some people said that upwards of 50% Now I don't know how scientific that is. I just asked some people said that upwards of 50% of people who are still living in Chin State are receiving some kind of assistance like this from families outside so it's mostly day to day life. No doing whatever jobs that are available with support from family in the in the diaspora.
Brad 1:33:38
That's very interesting to hear because the the difficulty is, as you say, like a lot of people are involved in in agriculture and particularly say corn has a very high cultural significance in Chin State. And there's quite an interesting considering that corn is is brought from the New World. It's an interesting little Connect. I do love this about Myanmar like I was, I was amazed when I discovered that actually, in Kachin State. Obviously there's you know, there are different Christian communities all throughout the mountainous regions Kachin State is no different. They have a lot of different Christian communities, among them Presbyterians and the Presbyterian community back in the day in Great Britain come from the old many of them came from Scotland. And so there is a region in Kachin state, where they indigenously make kilts and bagpipes. Hmm, because of that, yeah, like I was just like, like, What do you mean that make bipinnate And my students were explaining they're showing these to me and I looked up the history it's Yeah, because Scottish Presbyterians came through and, and like, okay, bagpipes, this is awesome. Let's just Let's just make this a thing. So you have indigenous bagpipes in Kachin State in places. It's an incredible, incredible country that that just has this amazing what's the word Are we looking for this, this sort of melding of of external influences sort of seamlessly building into these these ancient and and native cultures and histories. So, gents, that is no different in that in that regard. But of course, we remember I think this would have been in 2022. I may be misremembering, but I remember the incident being that the military came right after the harvest period. And they stole the harvested foods, from the warehouses and from the silos in the granaries, and then they burned and destroyed the planting fields. So that not only was the harvest that they're taking that year that was supposed to feed that community for the coming 12 months destroyed. But so were the fields that they were supposed to use to plant the the food that was going to feed them for the following 24 months. So the military in one fell swoop, and basically guaranteed 48 months of starvation. So what I'm wondering is that now we're here in 2024, where in theory, we should be past that, that period, it should be that the land is capable of supporting people now, what is the food situation like in Chin State? Are they growing food? Are they able to feed themselves? Or are food shortages still rampant?
Azad 1:36:24
No, I mean, to my knowledge, it's not like there's, you know, it's definitely an affluent place. But most of the villages seem to be semi self sufficient. And especially with the amount of like help that's coming from the Aspera. No Chin State very close to India. So like, lots of rice, stuff like this is also coming in from India, as well, as you know, being connected via the couple of main roads that we have into other regions in Myanmar. There's no food shortage? No, but definitely, these villages are mostly being self sufficient. And we're talking to people what they grow, they know that it's not like there is an export economy for a lot of things here.
Brad 1:37:00
Okay, okay. But they are at least sufficient, they're there, they're not sort of died. Because that's the other fear is that you can have an ongoing conflict. And you can say, well, we're gaining ground in the conflict, we're pushing the military out. And then you look behind you, and you do the calculations. And you're thinking, well, by the time we push the military out, there won't be any civilians left. But so, so you're saying that at least in Shan State, the civilian population is sustaining itself?
Azad 1:37:29
Yeah, I think the combination of self sustenance and outside support is, is making it I mean, it's not like a perfect situation, obviously, especially in the wake of conflict has always refugees, there's always, you know, devastation, and it's, it's of course, saddening, but not it's not a crisis level.
Brad 1:37:46
Okay. Okay. So, this is really important to understand, it's really good to know. So, basically, it seems then that ancient state, civilian life does continue. Which it is something that that is very strange, I was I was listening to the interview that we did with with Yeshua, which was mostly focused on landmines. And I just keep going back to this, this interaction that he had with with my co host, and he was saying that he he lived in a war zone in Cambodia for a short period of time in the the capacity of humans to compartmentalize the fear of, of death, and put one foot in front of the other. And just keep operating, keep working. Keep doing what you need to do. Because if you don't get blown up today, you're gonna have to put food on the table somehow. And you know, is as dark as that seems, that's the reality and the way he described it of you, you rely on the people around you. So if the people around you are are getting on with life, you're getting on with life, if the people around you are running and screaming, you're running and screaming. So it's truly harrowing, but but also an insight into how how life works. But within that sort of scale, right, that that fear of proximal death or proximate, with the civilians, largely, especially the ones who are further away from the bases, we're not living in the major settlements, do they? Do they live in fear that the military might choose to blow up my village tomorrow? Or do they largely live with this idea that well, the military exists in the bases in the cities, but this doesn't really impact my life. They're not they're not likely to drive up to my village and just machinegun us, as they have done in many other villages. They're not likely to drop a bomb on a church service as they have done in other villages. What level of fear Do you think is really present?
Azad 1:39:42
No, definitely. The people here know the Talmud are very well by now know, their, their their method of operation. Obviously everyone knows because that's, that's kind of their goal. They want the people to know that they're mean and that they will do atrocities. No. So really, the people are scared but kind of as you described, it's it's kind of like, well, what do we do? No, I mean, for a lot of people, they choose to go on with their life up until the point where they cannot anymore. I'll give an example in the funding intendant. As soon as the fighting started, the first thing they did is that wherever they had control in the town, they burned down the houses. And that's where maybe you saw in the media, in those first couple days of fighting, you know, these big landmarks in the towns, these very important building, lots of these old homes were totally destroyed as kind of like a reprisal. But even in the fighting, I remember I was coming up, I was like cresting a hill to get to a sniper position. And I saw this old lady, this cabbage farmer. And I was like, yeah, what are you doing? In the tomato, because, you know, for a lot of people, that's the reality of war, wherever you go, yo, some people don't have any choice. Some people have to continue their lives no matter what hardship. And when people obviously don't like the SSC. And while the popular support for the resistance, I think goes without saying, ya know, lots of people just have to continue surviving.
Brad 1:41:06
That's harrowing, if you think about it, just that? I don't I find it difficult to, to imagine that I find it difficult to put myself in the headspace of a person who's looking at that situation going well. Sure, they might kill me. But, you know, I still gotta get to work. It's I mean, it's it's I suppose I'm very fortunate. I'm very lucky that I've never experienced that. I can imagine, I can imagine. But anyway, I think that what we've done here today, I think we've we've really opened up and given an incredibly important insight into the, into the simple fundamental realities on the ground, strategically, militarily. But I think this episode is just a incredibly valuable collection of details about the strategic realities, the military realities, the logistics, and, and just the civilian life. And the resistance as it is, I think is going to have a huge impact. I think it's gonna have a very far, far reaching impact. So I want to thank you very much for for what you've what you've said and what you've shared. And the insight that you've allowed us to gain into a conflict that has been quite murky, where we've operated largely on secondhand reports, satellite imagery, third party analysts, and we don't often get the opportunity to talk to people like yourself who are there courageously, and and have that insight and have that capacity. So I really appreciate I know that our listeners appreciate it.
Azad 1:42:38
So I think something that's really important. Now, when you're outside Myanmar, and you're looking in, no, regardless of how invested in the struggle that's going on, here you are, I think what it represents, and not just me more alone, also, I think the revolution in northeastern Syria and the revolution that's going on here touch very much on the same, I don't know, the same wavelength, if you will. Now, people all over the world, they're looking at these revolutions that are happening in the question is, people know, not governments, not states, not organizations. The question is people, when they're faced with dictatorship, when they're faced with tyranny, when people come together, and they want to fight for their own freedom for their own autonomy for their own self determination, can they do it? Not the everywhere you look at headlines, no, I don't know, mainstream journalists, cynical analysts or whoever, they always want to tell. You know, like, right now in Myanmar, you look at the situation, you'll find 1000 articles that are coming from this kind of how we say cynical perspective, no, they want to say, Okay, well, there's all these disparate ethnic groups and what's going to happen when the fighting is over, or the ethnic group is going to get along. Now, there's always these in the name of realism or in the name of objectivity, there's this very cynical outlook on the world, the best way to approach it is really to extract the hope that they represent. Now, what revolutions represent is really the ability for people to to enact their own will not for the people to decide how they will live their own lives, how they will lead themselves in sometimes that means defeating a dictatorship, sometimes that means going to extreme hardship, going to na extreme trials, to be able to bring about a new system or a new way of life in Myanmar, whatever it will look like whether it looks like some kind of confederacy whether it looks like a new kind of federal state, the important part is what is currently represented is the will of the people against the will of a dictator. No, if you want to make it as romantic as you like, the will of the many versus the will of the few. And so that is what we really need to be taking out of the struggle. I'm not talking about just on you know, like the local scale like here in Shan state that people can come together and they can enrich and state now and we're not also just talking about Myanmar, where the people of Myanmar can come together in the grid Myanmar, what we have in Myanmar, more so than just Just a fight against fascism, which it is, or a fight for democracy, which it is, what we have is another example. And what will become a string of examples that we will see of where people can come together in a democratic framework and create a new modernity that works for the people. Now that it's organized by the people to enact the will of the people, if you I don't know, I'm not the offensive, romantic political speaker, but you get what I'm getting at here. If there was anything to take out of what's going on here, I would say that, I would say it's not isolated. It's not happening in its own corner. It is a fundamental battle for human values. And it's not the only battlefield where that battle is happening. So yeah, you know, I myself, I was very inspired to come here by that fight. And I know that in the future, these people will inspire many other people and many other struggles. And we will see where that kind of democratic river where that kind of flow of democratic struggle takes us. I think it's not the not the last that we'll see in the 21st century of a struggle like this. So yeah. Also, tight Yeah, tying that off, if anybody would like to. I'm mostly located in Shan State, but maybe in the future that will change I will be here fairly long term I expect to be over at least next year, so.
Host 1:46:29
Thank you for taking the time to listen to this episode. As regular listeners are aware, we often remind our audience about our nonprofit mission better Burma at the end of the show. Truth be told, fundraising is hard work. And I can personally attest the fact that it's really no fun to keep asking for contributions. Yet the situation on the ground now in Myanmar so distressing, that we continue to do so on behalf of the Burmese people. What is most helpful at this time are recurring donations, which help alleviate both the stress and time involved in fundraising. If you were able to pledge a certain amount per month, our team can plan around having at least a consistent minimum amount to work within each month. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup, we welcome your contribution in a form currency or transfer method. Your donation will go on to support a wide range of humanitarian and media missions, aiding those local communities who need to post donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, refugee camps, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or your mark your contribution to a specific activity or project you would like to support, perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian work is carried out by a nonprofit mission that or Burma and your donation you give on our Insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fun. Alternatively, you can also visit the Better Burma website betterburma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause in both websites except credit card. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/betterburma. Additionally, we can take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search Better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either website for specific links to these respective accounts or email us at info at betterburma.org. That's Better Burma. One word, spelled b e t t e r b u r m a.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. We also invite you to check out our range of handicrafts that are sourced from vulnerable artists and communities across Myanmar. Available at alokacrafts.com Any purchase will not only support these artists and communities, but also our nonprofits wider mission. That's aloka crafts spelled A L O K A C R A F T S one word alokacrafts.com Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support.