Transcript: Episode #178: Locked and Loaded
Below is the complete transcript of this podcast episode. The transcription has been generated using an AI-based service and has not been reviewed by a human reader. Consequently, certain words in the text may not precisely match the speaker's actual words. This is especially applicable to speakers with distinct accents, as the AI might struggle to accurately interpret and transcribe their speech. Therefore, it is recommended that this transcript not be referenced in any article or document without cross-referencing the timestamps to ensure the precise words spoken by the guest.
00:00
What's going on in Myanmar hundreds of 1000s of locals are crowding the streets. The nation's leader,
00:09
a Nobel Peace Prize, has been arrested for walkie talkies. On Monday, the first of Feb while filming her morning routine,
00:17
this instructor accidentally captured the beginnings of a military coup, the military announced a one year state of emergency.
Host 00:36
Before we get into today's show, I just want to add a quick reminder that any donations given to our nonprofit better Burma, will be shared directly with those in Myanmar who need it most. Any and all donations will make such a difference right now. Go to insight myanmar.org/donation If you would like to contribute, or stay tuned to the end of the episode and hear more options. With that, let's get into the show. On this episode of Inside Myanmar podcast, I'm really pleased to be joined by Myles Vining, who has long connections to Myanmar and has some of some research from his life there to share that I think will be very interesting and very unique. Myles, thanks so much for taking the time to chat with us.
Miles 01:22
Oh, thanks. Thanks, man, I really appreciate coming on board. And this is really, really an honor to be among all the guests on the show.
Host 01:29
It's an honor to have you here. It's an honor to welcome you to our humble platform. Before we get into some of the research that you did and the implications of that research, can you just set the scene for us and tell us when you got to Yangon, what your early experiences were there and just kind of describe what how you found your way to gym gone and what life was like for you at that time?
Miles 01:53
Yeah, my parents moved to Yangon in 2003. I was about 13, or about about 13 years old 13 or 12. And I was transitioning from fifth grade to sixth grade grown up in Thailand. And my parents had a had two different jobs there. So we lived there for about five years 2003 to 2008. And I went to is why International School Yangon and Golden Valley from fifth grade to 10th grade middle school moved from sixth grade to 10th grade middle school to high school. And yeah, it was a I was a pretty obnoxious rambunctious, troublemaking kid who sort of had a very tough time fitting in didn't make very many friends pissed off a lot of people and teachers and kind of figured out my own way among things. You know, just like any other teenager in their in their prime time, so to speak, right?
Host 02:57
Yeah. So what was the experience like of just being a kid in Yangon and in I guess that's a two part question. You know, one part what was it like while you were being a kid and being in Yangon is an environment to grow up in? And the other part is the flip side of that the city of Yangon and Burmese culture what what was that experience like for a kid to be in?
Miles 03:21
I think it was it was kind of like a roller coaster in a lot of ways because you had a lot of leeway and freedom but you actually had very little opportunity at the same time. I mean, yeah, as like, I mean, as a teenager and Yangon, I went clubbing. I smoked cigarettes, I drank hard liquor, I went to crazy parties, like I would go to the US and people would be talking about oh, you can't go to these clubs because they're not over 21 And like, What are you talking about? I just went to like entire raves as a 1516 year old. So you had a lot of options. He had a lot of freedom, because there's a lack of law in a lot of ways. But there's very little opportunity in terms of you know, there was no what I was used to growing up in Thailand, right? There weren't that many sports teams. That is why you had like the soccer team the basketball team neither of which I was on except for one year like there was no boy scout or Cub Scout troops that that I wasn't you know, troop 731 and check my library. Yeah, that was non existent. You know, you had the American Center and then you had the you had the highest wide library, which was like okay, but it's like you could quickly read all the books there. You're generally can eat you're kind of confined to Yangon. I mean, technically you had to apply for like various passes to like, go to like kitchen and stuff like that, but no, you could get out to like, but gone to PA to Jai to, you know this again, not just again, but like to other to the beaches and stuff like that. So yeah, you could get out and then the, you know, the old dictatorship was there. It's like, you know, you kind of saw you saw it over where you went? It was a part of living. It's like in the end for as a teenager was on the more practical side of things. It's like, oh, well, you can't go by Susie's house because the roads going off. Oh, well, we can't go down that street over there because they have a roadblock down there. Oh, look, this generals coming through again, we got to like change all the traffic lights. But then the upside of that was like going down to the local guard posts on the intersection of like, en la. And like, given the dudes like six pack every month. And so every time we drive by, like, they would flick the lights, the stoplights to green, so that was that was like kind of like, I was kind of funny doing that. And you're but you know, you just you're you know, for me, I was just like, I was just a teenager going through like a really rough time with a kid against the backdrop of this, like, very crazy geopolitical, like, military dictatorship going on. And it was kind of like, oh, man, this is not a military dictatorship, alright, like, what am I going to wear for prom? You know, that's the kind of things like your priorities are like, Oh, they're, they're neck and neck, like they're all in the daily life of the society. And then like, oh, man, how am I how my buddies gonna see me every day. So it's kind of interesting in that sense, I guess.
Host 06:18
You know, what's interesting hearing you talk, because I realized that, and I'm sure you're aware of this, you know, so often, when when Westerners Americans are trying to bring their experience of Myanmar understand Myanmar to the world. And this is not just true today. It's not just true for the last decades, but really centuries going back to the brilliant the British colonial period and earlier European travelers. There's this this exotic phi nature that this Orientalist spin of how they tried to describe Myanmar, and there's, you know, people who've been there, Westerners who've been there longer try to get more authentic and try to break through the usual kind of exotic side lens, but it's still often there to some extent. But you're I mean, you're just talking about it in the most mundane ways. And indeed, you were there from when you were sixth grade. So I wonder, like, at that age, was was just this kind of normal life for you. Because often, whatever circumstances we're in when we're kids, however weird they are, that's normal. We don't know anything else. And so do you this kind of normal, exotic FIDE way that Myanmar is often portrayed? Do you feel like your early years of just by nature of being a kid and going through adolescence and teenage years there that that that that was something that you never really interacted with? And that your perspective and experience kind of breaks through the normal exotic side lens that it's often brought to the west?
Miles 07:38
Yeah, yeah. Because I would go back to the US in summers in the US was exotic to me, at the same time on their watches, and people actually obey laws here, and I can't just buy cigarettes or alcohol wherever I want. Like, that was exotic. Like, I was like, You people are weird. Like, you know, like, let me go back to where I feel kind of normal. Sort of a typical, like, third, third country or a third culture kid, kind of thing. For sure.
Host 08:09
Right. And so who were the so you mentioned going to is why that's International School? Have you gone? It's the elite private school there. Who did you go to school with your classmates? Were your friends. What was that experience? Like?
Miles 08:22
Um, it was a really a centric mix of international folks. I mean, you had all my classmates were generally I mean, Burmese Korean, Malaysian, like some Americans, a handful of Europeans. Very few, like Africans or South Americans. I don't think there was barely I don't think there's any South American kid at the entire school. Or me, um, very few Africans, like everybody was like, the children of diplomats of oil people or not only people, but like business people, NGOs, all sorts of different walks of life. I mean, you had there's a kid in my class, who was his dad was like a, like a teak dealer, which was like, totally illegal. Then you had like batchwise grandson, who was in like, the two years below us. And then you had a guy who's like his Burmese, but his dad worked for like the UN indoor for something. And then you had a bunch of all the Koreans were business. They're all business folks. That was a couple exceptions of MCs, but most of the Koreans were businessmen, business families, and then and then the European kids were mostly NGOs. So you had different NGOs that were in Yangon at the time whether it was whether it was un or some of others there couple of missionaries but not that many the taken felts where's the was the big missionary group there. They were a great actually above me David taken felt in Caitlin taken felt. And then you had some of you No, like pretty rich Burmese, Burmese families that hit businesses and stuff like that. So, but everybody, you know, everybody at the school ground everybody was sort of equal, right? No, there's no like pulling rank or like, oh, well my dad's a bigger businessman than you or my dad's this like no one really. No one really cared. And it didn't really make a difference. It was kind of like, oh yeah, his daddy like salesy legal teak and his daddy is like a big shop businessman. I don't care. I'm going to score against them either way, and soccer at recess. But it was it was a kind of, it was a backdrop if you noticed it. But most of the time is children. Like we never noticed that we just like it didn't matter who your family was, you went to the same house parties, you went to the same you're on the same soccer football team will same soccer or basketball team. That was just the backdrop of everything that was going on around you.
Host 10:55
Right. And you mentioned in your years that were there coincided with the Saffron Revolution, and Cyclone Nargis. So what was it like to be on the ground for those experiences, especially at that young teenage age?
Miles 11:06
Yeah, so saffron in 2007, that happened first. And that was that was, you know, because you were kind of everyone was sort of shielded from the political reality of everything. And when that happened, it's like, no, you could no longer face it or ignore it. So that was, I mean, to me, to me, since my family was so much more involved in Burmese politics and everything. It's like, I was like, sort of in tune to a drumbeat at all times, whereas a lot of the Burmese kids, they had a kind of like denial, where they were like, they would just deny that anything was going wrong outside, and they will just kind of live normally, and they did not want to be effective it I think it was kind of like a survival instinct among a lot of the Burmese and Yangon where it's like, yeah, you're living under a military dictatorship. Life sucks the economy's trash, but what are you gonna do about it? Like, just keep on truckin? Right. If you try to do it, like, there's no us doing anything against it, you just get shot down in the street. And with the International kids, most a lot of them were like, totally oblivious like that, especially like, sort of the business kids and stuff like that. They're like, military dictatorship, like what does that even mean? Primarily, I think because like, their families are interested in business, it's like, if you're anything deviating from the from the profits, and the bottom line is like, that's just not important. Right? So that's what they were living with. So like saffron rolls around, and like school gets, you know, shut down. The American embassy is like, you know, everybody has radios at the embassy. And everyone's like, you know, on call for that. And it's not until probably a couple of days after, everybody sort of makes himself scarce. And pretty much everyone just goes into lockdown, and just stays at and just stayed at their house, or they would like refuge at like other people's houses, for example. And you'd had kids who'd like, stay over at their friend's houses or, you know, for that kind of thing. But as long as you stayed home during the revolution, like nothing really would happen to you. And especially for a lot of the kids at that school, I mean, they're pretty privileged as it was, and they all lived in their their literally their golden towers. There was a there's a well, there's still an apartment complex there, right called Golden Tower One and Two kid kids, a fair percentage of the school actually lived in those towers. And it's like, well, you just lock yourself up in there and you're good to go. So I don't know. Like, I would I want it to go out and I was falling in my family was falling very intently for everything. And we were making like tentative plans like to be like, Okay, well, things get really out of control, like, okay, my dad was like, Hey, have a bag packed, like, you know, get ready if you have to leave the house now. Like, we're going to abandon this, this and this and just bounce. So like that was that was in the backdrop of everything. And then everything kind of petered out and settled down and it's kind of like, Is it really over? Is it really over and then say, okay, school started and again, it's like, well, yeah, it really is over for going back to school. That was not. And then Nargis happened, and I think this the semester was even curtailed a little bit. Nargis happened, it was kind of like, I remember, I think, like it was a weekend that Nargis happened, or third, or something, and it was like, the storm came and it was nuts. And it was like, you know, trees blown down, utter devastation on the streets. It didn't you know, it didn't really affect many of the buildings in Yangon. It really affected a lot like all a lot of the trees went down and that many buildings are actually damaged. Like maybe yeah, maybe some fences here and there, but it's mostly like foliage. But then it was I think, I remember it being like, Sunday evening, we were like, Okay, are we going back to school or not? And then words slowly trickled around by phone and was like, hey, maybe come to school like midday, it'll be a half day kind of thing. And then like later that evening, it's like, no, no, no, we're not You're not going back to school until like Tuesday. And then it's like, Tuesday rolls around or something. It's like no, all bias wise out for a whole week. So and then we we basically had the week off and There was like, I think there was like some assignments of homework here and there like some odd things. And then you'd be like, we went into like, we went into school would to just receive homework and then come back kind of thing. And that was kind of that and then Yangon sort of cleaned itself up afterwards. But but that was my last year in Yangon. So to kind of kind of big dramatic events to finish our four years there.
Host 15:21
Yeah, right. So that's a great backdrop for just understanding who you were at the time and what you were doing there. Let's get into some of the meat of the real work and substance that you started on and like a rather surprising way and where that information went and the implications of it, why don't you start us off with? I believe the story starts with you giving cigarettes to embassy guards, correct me if there's another beginning. That's the one I heard and start us off there?
Miles 15:49
Well, yeah, so I mean, as like a teenager, not really fitting in not really having many friends. And then at the same time being fascinated, kind of, for my interest in video games from playing Medal of Honor and Call of Duty and Counter Strike, that led to extreme interest in small arms. And because I didn't have many friends, I had to very quickly figure out something to do in my time off. And I quickly began this obsession with going into guard posts and becoming friends with guards, because every every diplomatic mission had a police guard posts assigned to it. Every large NGO like the UN, right, the UN, all the UN spots had guards assigned to it. A lot of the traffic circles and a lot of the intersections had police had policemen assigned to them as well. And they would be in their little guard shacks. And these dudes would just like, sit in their shacks all day, they would fill out their report logbooks and then maybe the like, the sergeant of the guard would come by, like once a day or once a week. And they had these old rifles like em sixteens, and one carbines, like from the Vietnam era, and Second World War. And they barely, like a lot of them did not have ammunition for them, they were kind of just like an honesty check, like, alright, don't do anything in front of me, or also have to report you, or I'll have to like blood stroke you or something. And I was I was young, you know, six, like, like 14 1516. And I was interested in going into the service, I'd hang out with the marine guard a lot. So to me wanting to be around, sort of young guys in the service was like what I really wanted to identify with, because I knew I was going in that direction. So I kind of identified with, with a lot of these younger guys, like not much older than me, some of them very much older than me. And so how would just began, I began this adventure series of trying to look at all their guns. And so it would become a game. And I would be like, Okay, if I can get the serial number of a rifle, that's a win. If I can, like, look at the entire rifle, that's a win. If I can, you know, have the rifle in my hand, that's a win. If I can take it apart, that's a win. If I can disassemble it and take pictures of it, then if I can make a video with it, that's a win. You know, that's like the ultimate win right there. And I started doing that. And I wasn't successful, like, like, many out of many times, but many times I was successful. And that's when I started recording, like all this information about these elves. Like I want to start writing down all this stuff. Like I can't just be like, messing around. I think it was a big, like real, real revelation to me one day when I was like, Wait, I've been looking through all these guns, and I haven't been writing down anything about them. Oh, man, I've gone through like 2030 Guard checks already. And I haven't written anything that's terrible. Like that, like those serial numbers, and I lost a history. So I started writing them down and cataloging them and writing about the condition of the firearms. And you know, that's when things like, you know, kind of like a diligent researcher would like, Okay, let's get down to the statistical details of stuff, look into things. And I would come up with all these weird tricks like bringing cigarettes to them or hanging out with them. And I had a story and I had like, cheat cards written down in Burmese that said, like, can I see a rifle? And they would be like, like, Who is this like, 15 year old freaking, like glow over here? Like, yeah, see my rifle? Like, I don't know what you're going to do with that, like you weirdo. But they would a lot of these guys like just lonely young dudes on posts. Sometimes they do with their families. Sometimes they'd be with other buddies or friends and they just like, Okay, this is entertaining here. Yeah, look at my am 16. What is it going to do? Right. So, so that's what I did. And there's some amusing things out of it. I mean, there are certain times where I remember one particular their time when I was like looking at one year on University Avenue. And then I heard, like I heard over the radio that, like the commander was like, hey, who said over there by your posts, and the guy was like, Oh, it's this Galois. And the commanders like don't don't let him look at your gun. He's already been here before. And I'm like, Oh, darn it, they got me. Like, ah, you know, and then I'd make it a competition on like Saturdays because I had a bicycle. And I used to ride all over Yangon. Like, I would go like my longest rides would be from like, the intersection of Indian law and university down to Shwedagon, or down to the embassy, or down to over to do burn Park. You know, I would just get a round. And so I would be like, Okay, I now would like sort of recon my route. And I'd be like, Okay, well, I know, I can do a route, where I can pick like, there's like five or six guard posts on it. And I had to, like, pick those guard posts. And I tried to like, Okay, how many can I get today, I think my biggest my biggest rate was like four or five guard posts in one day. And then I had to come up with like tricks to remember the serial numbers like because with a guard that wouldn't let me like, I would have to like, you know, memorize a serial number, and then walk away and then quickly write it down out of sight, right. So it was just this big game to me. And I really, I really enjoyed it, it was kind of like the thrill of holding a real 16 or holding a real one carbene or real this or real bat, you know. And I enjoyed it a lot. And I didn't have very many friends. And I didn't, you know, play too many sports back then. So this was my, this is my ability to get out and have fun. And I dug it. And, you know, I was able to see things like when guards rotated in and out. And I mean, it's like, if I were some sort of like some sort of intelligence asset, like I could tell you things about the lord of these guard posts, like new battalions that moved in and took over, you know, I could tell because like, okay, it's a different rifle this time, and I start seeing the same rifles in other locations. So I could be like, Okay, well, that rifle has appeared and to other spots in the city, you know, because they've moved around, or that squad is this. So I mean, all this stuff, right. But that, that led to my interest in sort of Burmese small arms, and sort of figuring out like, everything became a puzzle to be solved, right? And it's like, I've learned about the guns. And I'd be like, Well, how did they get here? And what what do these serial numbers mean? And how do I deduce more information from this? And how do I, what's the bigger picture? And what's the bigger story that I can put together? And that's where I, you know, jump to into more research about, well, how did a Browning Hi Power end up here? Or how did a, a, a in SW, Ks and up here that apparently everybody has seen is made in Yugoslavia, but really, it's made in China? And what are these all in 16? So it became like a mystery to me. And I was like, wow, this is crazy. I really want to dig down because I was reading about all these guns in like gun magazines and gun books and stuff. And I was reading their histories and everything. But I was like, man, there's nothing out there on Burmese stuff. And I was like trying to research Burmese stuff. But there is nothing out there on it because nobody had written about Burmese guns apart from like Andrew self. And then a couple choice, you know, articles and arrow already a little bit here and there. But it's like nothing really substantial. And I was like, Darn, like, I really got to dig into this man. Like, if I don't no one else kind of will. But more just because like wow, like I need to, I need to research this stuff. So I just began and that's how it started. And it really culminated I mean, and then I started getting more and more professional with my gun writing. And I ran into the editor of small arms review at Knob Creek machine gun shoot in 2008 2000, early 2009. And it very I ran into him and he's like, Oh, I was like 16 years old. And I was with my uncle. And I was like, Oh man, that's Dan Shay over there. I want to go meet him. And then my uncle was like, Yeah, let's go meet him. And he was like, How was Danner is Mr. Shea around? And his wife was like, oh, yeah, Dan's over there. And I'm like, Dan, Mr. Shea. I'm like, really, really amazed to meet you. And like, you're the only gun magazine I read like small arms reviews the best because it had like history. It had descriptions. It had like new stuff, old stuff. Everything was like even at that young age of 16. I could be like, yeah, guns and ammo. It's like, that's all a fad. It's like, all that stuff is paid advertising anyways. But che Well, I was like them. And then he did the craziest thing. And he asked me like, oh, so what's your story? Like? Like, what are you going to expect asking any 16 year old like, what are you really going to expect back from them any 16 year old in the world? It's like, well, what do you have to offer man? It's like, I was like, Well, I've been in Burma and I've been researching like, I've been doing a lot of research. I'm not even doing I'm like, I'm in Burma. And I've been looking at a lot of Burmese guns for the past five years. And he goes, Hmm, how about you write me an article about that? I'm like, what, like jaw dropped to the floor? Like, what the heck? So I get with my uncle. And he's like, Okay, this is how you should do it structure this way. You know, I write this thing that goes through all these revisions actually give it to like two different English teachers I had in high school at the time. Like, I don't even know if I'm right. Like, I was so excited about this thing that I wrote it all up and like, did the formatting myself in a Peden, gave it in a PDF form, like I spent more time than I did write an article, because all I had all the information already. They wanted to write, you know, but I did all the formatting. So I put all the captions in and I put the pictures in setting and all this stuff. And I was so proud and proud of that. And I emailed it to Dan, I was like, Dad, like Mr. Shea, like, here's what I have so far. And he goes, Look, we do the formatting kid, you just send us the text, the pictures and the captions, and we got the rest. And I'm like, I'm, I'm so embarrassed. I'm like, oh, no, he's gonna reject me because I like, did the wrong thing. This is terrible. But eventually got published under the pseudonym of V. KENNETH called Burmese small arms development. And I wrote several more after that for small arms review. And that's the beginning of my small arms career, in terms of writing and researching.
Host 26:29
That's incredible. Just going back to the actual moments of, you know, all the tricks you played in terms of riding your bike to hit different posts and learning Burmese expressions that you can tell them to get to see the weapon, taking pictures and, and trying to get more and more information from those weapons. Did you have any close calls with that? I mean, this is this is a totalitarian dictatorship. This is, this is not a safer free society people have many people who've done far less have gotten far worse. So did you have any close calls and all this experience? Or did you ever have any fear of any, any close calls or repercussions that would impact you or your family?
Miles 27:07
Not really, and I mean, like to be dead honest, it was kind of my white privilege was really works for me in all this. And it's like, if you want to call a spade a spade, it's like, if I had been an Asian kid, if I had been even a brown American kid, it's like, no way would I have been able to get out and get away with this. Like, I probably would have gotten kicked probably would have gotten cussed out at because I was this like, random white kid showing up on a bike and saying, Hey, man, you want some cigarettes? Can I see your M 16? Like, it must have been like, if you land, I don't know, if you if you drove up to like, like, like a, like a medieval castle in a like in a smart car and said, Do you mind if I get some coffee? Like, that's the that's the equivalence I guess. So that no, I didn't ever once really feel any repercussions. I was never really like, like, when guys didn't want to show me their stuff, they would be very upfront about it. And they would just be like, no Dongmei like, get out like no leave, like, I don't want to talk to you kind of thing. I'd be like, Okay, I'll go, you know, um, and I sort of had it, but the thing is, I sort of sort of built that into my plan as well, because I wouldn't ever I wouldn't ever like, like I built up a dialogue. And the climax of that dialogue would be, can I see your rifle? Right? And if they said, No, I would be in a position where I would because I'd be asking them about their day. I'd be like, Oh, how are you doing? How's it going? It's like, oh, it's a hot day. Like, oh, is this the Israeli embassy? Like, oh, is the ambassador here? Like, oh, wow, how long have you been on here? And then be like, Oh, can I see your rifle? And they'd be like, No, of course not. And I'd be like, Oh, no worries, man. Oh, hey, here's a cigarette. You have a you have a lighter, okay. Boom, boom. All right. Hey, man, I'll just be on my way and I'll leave so I would build out build that into the dialogue. So wouldn't I would not be like just rolling up on a bicycle and be like, Hey, let me see your rifle. It's like no way like although I did get away with that a couple times. But you know, I had to strategize it and you had to like pitch it perfectly and you had to like go in for the kill and you had to read the situation. I had to be aware Okay, was this like you know, the posts that I got away with it the most were like, plate like outposts like in the middle of nowhere like down some back alley and it's like the Yugoslavian embassy was a favorite of mine because it was like down this alley right next to my house easy kill. And I had a fantasy on like my last couple days in Yangon of like stealing their FKs and leave the country with it. But I was like, Man, if I steal their SK is like because I thought I could get away with it because I I knew where they kept it. I knew that they slept at night and I knew they just hung it up inside there because I've been that post at night. But I was like, man if I stole their sky That guy would like go to jail like he would be so screw and I was like he didn't, he wouldn't deserve that at all. He's just some, like, 20 year old no nothing just doing his thing. It's like, I got doesn't need to go to jail. Like the frickin like the frickin major who's like killing people in current state, that guy needs to go to jail. It's like, you know, so I didn't like, you know, but But yeah, I had to like strategize it perfectly. You know, you there's no, there's very little room for error kind of thing, because you had to, like, make the perfect elevator pitch in that sense.
Host 30:31
Yeah, Gosh, I wonder if you're giving any CIA agents listening in and idea of utilizing 16 year old kid, what 16 year old white kids in some far corner of the world for different missions, because it just the way you describe it, you know, it's just it's so it's so random and unexpected, and out of the blue that somehow defenses are already down? And in terms of how you're able to, to talk and navigate and have these conversations. And basically, I mean, what's so interesting is, you started out in your own description, you're bored, you don't have friends, you're looking for things to do you have this one passion that is starting to animate you. And there's, there's this gap of knowledge in the world about this thing. And so it becomes kind of this mystery is a 16 year old kid you're looking to do. But then in the process, maybe even unbeknownst to you in as this has happened to organically suddenly you're like, you know, your intelligence gathering, like you're learning things you're not supposed to know.
Miles 31:19
Yeah. Oh, yeah. I could tell you, I could tell you like, which posts had ammunition and which didn't like which guns are working and which weren't. Like what guides were cool and what weren't, like that kind of thing. Yeah, like it, but I wasn't realizing it. I was just doing it. It was a challenge. And you know, what it kind of interestingly, like it kind of started as a challenge, too, because I remember, there's this other kid at the American Embassy, who told me very early on in my time in Burma. He said, like, one time I remember he said, Hey, you know, those guys don't have them any ammunition, right? Like the one of the Marines asked that guard the guard hut and said, Oh, do you have any? Like, let me see your ammo. And he's like, Oh, I don't have any animal. And it was because of that. I was like, like, how does he really know? Has he actually seen it? So there's always like, a bit of like, No, I gotta find this out for myself. Does he really not have ammo? Because that was like one of my original like, quests. It's like, these guys really not have any ammunition? Like, that's a crazy thing to have, like, how do you have a soldier? Like, how do you have a policeman on duty with a rifle? No ammo. And so what? And I turned out and the answer I found out was some of them did, some of them didn't it depended, you know, and it depended on that kind of thing. So, you know, always, always take a good challenge for what it's worth. Right.
Host 32:36
Right. And I'm also wondering, because you were there during the Saffron Revolution, I know that you were you're pretty sheltered. But did any of your knowledge of firearms and kind of who, which, which different units were having access to? Which weaponry? Did you have any any access or insight into what forces were being deployed during the Saffron Revolution and the implications of that?
Miles 32:59
Not really, because the forces that were used in saffron were they bust in like these mega police units that weren't there before. And they like they reinforced everything. But it gave some insight into what they had, because the Burmese brought out some stuff that no one had seen before. And the police had stuff in the army had stuff that was like, What is this? See that? Well, for example, this Burmese 40 millimeter grenade launcher called the ba 40, I believe, but it's a single shot breech loaded, side swinging grenade launcher. That was that was very interesting. It was one of their first uses of actually polymer. But stocks and polymer furniture that people had seen and new happened around the same time that the MA series of rifles got an update on an upgrade with Polymer furniture as well. Brown this particular brown polymer furniture that they're known for their later variants that had not been seen before. They also brought out a bunch of old stuff that people didn't realize they had as well bred guns, for example. And I got some of the fringes of that. So a little bit like a little after the saffron, it's like as guard posts were like, because they left a bunch of, they left a bunch of cops like on duty around the city. And so I was able to like get some of those cops as well. And they brought out a bunch of old stuff that they hadn't you hadn't seen them with a long time Leanne fields brand guns, Webley revolvers, that kind of thing. So yeah, that was that was more revealing it was there's very little I could tell doing it. Things were just moving too fast and too heavy for anything to make a difference in that time period.
Host 34:46
Right. So let's get to some of your analysis that you ended up having. I mean, again, this would have to emphasize the started out as something you were doing. You were bored. It was a game it was a challenge, but then you start to develop This this real catalogue of including photos and videos and where which weaponry is belong into which post actual serial numbers tracing where the gun is from and start and start to get curious about how these different weaponry got in this, I'm just going to start with a very open ended general question and maybe go into more detail based on what your answer is. But what what did you find generally, what were the implications of what you were finding what these weapons were, where they were from, and anything else you found as you started to build this catalog?
Miles 35:31
The I mean, the overall sort of summary of Burmese small arms development is that the Burmese need to rely on external countries for their small arms development, and they favor an entire they favor and ability to manufacture everything in house from from soup to nuts, as it's sometimes called. So on a lot on on almost every derivative and variant of Burmese small arm that has been used by the Burmese, it has been entirely manufactured locally, by local industry. At first things get imported, you know, wholesome from those from those parent countries, so to speak. But eventually the entire line is produced right there. And that's a big effort for our country to do. And, of course, in the dictatorship where you spend all your money on the military. You know, that's not it's not as hard to do. But it's a significant challenge. And the Burmese rely on these sort of, on these, like tech Parent Technical countries, so to speak. So for instance, before 1988, the country to cut the country was West Germany, through the companies of Heckler and Koch and Fritz Werner, Fritz Werner did all the import export into Burma and set up the technical know how, and set up the factories that produced the Heckler and Koch designs such as the G three. And in slight variants of the HK 33, which were will G three was known as the ba 62, the ba 72. And then there was another variant that was very similar that people attribute to h k 33. But it's actually not an h, k 33, at all. So that's a big deal with that, in that you have all this tech that's being brought in and then produced locally, right? After ADA that switch to Israel. And, you know, it's a big, it's a sticking point, prior to Ada, there's little the only one of the only Israeli exports to Burma was like a couple Spitfires in the 50s, or in the 50s, or 60s or something. And there's very little relationship between Israel and and Burma until after 88, where West Germany breaks off relations and then Israel comes to the forefront and says, Hey, we're willing to be your your arms partner. And this is a very, this is a very conniving part on the way of Israel that no one ever talks about because, you know, both countries, both countries saw each other kind of like I guess the we're in the movies where you have like two characters that are just lost, but then they kind of lock eyes with each other and then they're then there for each other for life kind of thing. So both Israel and Burma need each other at the UN whenever they need like, hey, Israel, give me a vote on this and I'll give you a vote on that Israel moreso than Burma because I mean, there's very little for UN that affects Burma right but there's a lot of the UN that affects Israel and it also other cases as well. But so that's an example where so Israel swoops in and completely revamps, Burmese small arms production and all the infantry arms all the small arms and use by the Burmese infantry, Burmese military at the squad level, the light machine guns, the underbarrel grenade launchers, the main battle rifles and the carbines are all of Israeli design and manufacture is really designed not of Israeli manufacturer in the beginning you have some Uzis that get imported but that's about it. And that's where we kind of are today not as strong with Israel as Israel Wiens off like slightly but ever not so slightly because there's still a lot of connection Israel like even you know, within the past couple years Israel selling like patrol boats and stuff like that and Israeli Burmese connection is still very strong Israeli embassy in Yangon is one of the most indigenously heavily guarded facilities in Yangon. You've got mi on it, you've got multiple guard posts on it, you've got all sorts of stuff on it. Where's like the American Embassy is definitely the, you know, most heavily protected embassy in Yangon. But that's only because the US makes it so right. The Israeli embassy in Yangon hat is heavily protected because of the Burmese presence around it. You've got several posts, like you've got at least three posts that are like sort of front middle and set front, middle and rear at the entrance to the Israeli embassy, then you've got Burmese posts that are actually an Overwatch positions above the embassy. And sometimes you have Burmese guards and Burmese policemen on top of the embassy and you have mi inform mi officers, it plainclothes officers like roving around the embassy as well. And that doesn't exist at any of the other embassies. To that extent. You didn't even have that the US Embassy, you had a couple you had like one or two guard posts. And that was it. And maybe one behind the American Embassy and one foreigner, but there's really MC more so. So you have this, you have this, you have this theme of the Burmese working with a country to to produce their small arms locally and indigenously. The interesting thing as well, though, when it comes to small arms production, like a lot of people, a lot of like arms experts or defense experts, you know, they have a lot of theories. And there's so people always like to have conspiracy theories about small arms in terms of saying, Oh, well, maybe they're going for the bullpup. Or maybe they're maybe they're going to switch over from 762 to 556. But the reality of the matter is that small arms are such a minor factor in the generals minds in like geopolitical stuff. And in battle. I mean, it's really only it's really only the American military, that takes small arms so seriously, to such an extent where we have, I mean, we have an active effort to replace the M 16. and M for probably every decade since the Vietnam War, like that we poured millions of dollars into and as never replaced them. 16 other countries don't even come close to that in their small arms. programmings. Right. So my point is small arms are not very important, like geopolitically or even, you know, via military strategy. I mean, the country, most countries in the world, it has to take their small arms like utterly failing miserably, all the time, catastrophic malfunctions, like we lost that battle, because our battle rifles weren't good enough. You know, it takes that kind of they takes that kind of a failure for for that to happen for you know, there to be a public outcry enough to say that the generals need to say, oh, man, we really need a better rifle. Otherwise, small arms are really not that big of a deal. Why one nation switches from one caliber to another, or from one rifle to another, it really isn't based on that much strategy. The USA in the US and the UK, it is in Europe, it sometimes is, but other countries not so much. So small arms, though, are an indication of these greater ties, right? So small arms are usually like, like the like the icing on a cake, right? So it's kind of like, they get thrown, they get chucked in there along with bigger negotiations. So it's like, oh, we're gonna, you know, this country is going to help out that country with like oil reserves, and this and that. And oh, by the way, we'll upgrade your small arms program as well from some six two to 556. And that's like, Oh, check, check, check. Oh, great. We get a more modern rifle. That's cool. But if we didn't get a more modern rifle, that'd be fine as well, you know. So I take that you take that to mean that the small arms development in Burma has always tied itself to larger political partners like Israel in West Germany. So it's like Israel's relationship to Burma was crucially important for Burma. The small arms aspect of it happened, but in what, like Burma did not create scrutiny and not solidify very good relations with Israel, just to upgrade their small arms programming. No, it was the to relate, the relationship began, and it was very important. And then the small arms, the small arms development and indigenous production of Israeli designs in Burma was kind of like, yeah, we need that. Yeah, make it happen anyways, but if that didn't happen, then we'd probably they probably still continue with the G three series, the ba 62, with the Ba 72 and the ba 63, for example. So that's something to really take into account with these relationships. Like what's the bigger picture? What's the bigger country behind this? You know, that that and they come out through the Small Arms aspect of it, whatever it is, in terms of the design and the development?
Host 44:24
And was your this some as you were a kid just going around and learn about the different weaponry that existed in these different posts. As you were building that catalog? And you were looking at what the patterns were within that catalog? Did that add up or relate to this insight about the relationship with with Israel specifically?
Miles 44:44
Not really, not really until later once you put all the big pieces together? Because you're too busy putting little puzzle pieces together, right? You're too busy thinking like okay, how did they get this front sight post done? Or how did they get the design for this? Or how did they get this done and stuff like that? That's that's the More important thing at that point. You're not really thinking of the bigger picture. You're not like, Oh, that makes sense. That's why this company did this at that time because of this geopolitical relationship. You just know like, okay, Burma and Israel, they're strong together, boom, that's important, I have to keep that in mind. That's why the design of this handguard is the same as that one on the Israeli version. That's important. But beyond that, because as a technical specialist, you're in the weeds so much that you can't you can't deviate into bigger stuff, it doesn't make a difference. Because what you're trying to do as a technical Small Arms researcher, it's you're looking for the itty bitty grainy details of variants and derivatives of patterns. When when they were introduced, when they were phased out who's still using them? How are they still using them? Was it in combat? Was it not in combat? You know, that kind of stuff? You are so ingrained in that the bigger relations stuff is kind of just a backdrop. It's kind of like, oh, yeah, well, okay, strong relationship with Israel. Got it. That's why these two designs match up moving on, you know, it's that that's the aspect I took to it as a technical spoilers researcher, right. Now, there's other kinds of small arms researchers that are not so technical, and don't really care about it, they don't get in the weeds. And they're the kinds of people that are like, ah, big relationship, Israel, and, and, and Burma, or Germany and Burma, or Singapore, Korea and Burma, it's like what's going on here? But as a technical guy, it's like, you can't be concerned with that kind of thing a lot of the time.
Host 46:30
So can you I know, this was probably on your part, you know, a multi year, you probably even longer than that experience of, of going through this mystery in this puzzle to get to the other side and start to see where the pieces fit. Can you give us some very brief snapshot of maybe aha moments, or maybe when certain patterns started to become clear, take us through at warp speed of going from a technical specialist who's just trying to get serial numbers and pictures and, and, and a basic understanding of individual weapons to the bigger picture? How did that? How did that process take shape for you?
Miles 47:07
Um, I don't know, I think in terms of once I started connecting with other researchers and connecting with other people. And my research started getting published more and more, and I started getting in contact with more people. And especially, you know, getting in contact with more Burmese enthusiasts about this kind of thing. That's when things kind of like, wow, I'm like coming full circle now. And getting in expanding that reach. Right. I think that's where that happened. One of the aha moments for sure was there is a weapons program in the 1990s called the earmark your mark one or something the em, er, k one, and in the Irrawaddy, and in some other places people were like, like people were jumping to conclusions they should not have been jumping into at all. And this is where this is where it pays like you need people on the ground, looking at the firearms in person, like dissecting them and taking them apart. There's no amount of open source research, or our Osen or like online, whatever that's going to replace somebody looking at that gun and checking it out with the right knowledge in hand. And this is an example of that, because there's this the earmark series in the 90s on the gas pipeline in Korean and Mon state. People started freaking out about it and saying is this a Burmese connection to China is Burma copy in the QB Z bulk book, you know, jump into all this stuff and blah, blah, blah and pictures were out of it. And people were like, Whoa, people went from Burma might have a bullpup to Burma and China are gonna rule the world now. Like, like us unnecessary because I was able to take pictures of it and get right up on it at the defense services Museum in Naypyidaw. And it wasn't until I showed it to another researcher that we both looked at it and he said, That's a totally fake gun. It's a non gun. It's just made out of wood and, and paper mache and plastic and metal row like and we were able to look closely at it. And I was like, Yeah, you're absolutely correct. So the whole earmark thing was fake. It was a nothing. It looks like a firearm from from afar. Yeah, looks like you know, it's a it's a working bulk book. But if you actually get up right on it, it's like this is just a mock up. So that's something that's that was a big aha kind of thing with that particular design and being like, well, everybody thought this thing was a gun this whole time. It's not, it's just, it's just a mock up prototype that led to nothing, you know, so don't don't jump to your conclusions before you have your evidence in hand. Right. That was a big deal with that. Other moments, other moments, very interesting moments, I would say is sort of talking to people who would go against this stuff. There's a particular moment I remember when I was talking to some Korean guys who were telling me that they are consistently finding law like 50 caliber cases out in the jungle, but single cases, I had known that the Burmese had a 50 caliber anti materiel rifle. I had known about the existence of it by had it known about the field use of it in combat. Now, the Qur'an had known about the they had found these 50 caliber 50 BMG cases, but they didn't know what was shooting them. Because, as far as they knew, the only thing that was shooting them was heavy machine guns and heavy machine guns don't leave behind a case or two, they leave behind a mountain of cases. And especially in that jungle combat, it's like, no, they're shooting and then they're moving, there's no time to pick that stuff up. You're moving all the time. So and you can't really carry it with you because your weight is king. So when they told me that I said, I know what you're talking about. You're talking about this 50 caliber anti material rifle. And they said, aha, that's exactly what's out there and what we're up against. And they told me that and I knew that now, the Burmese or us are actually employing this thing in combat, because a lot of countries will say, well, we'll have these guns on parade or whatever. And they'll have them. There's a difference between having a capability and actually using it. A lot of people say it will claim that they're using something or what are actually are using it in the field, but they're actually not actually just saying that they have it. And that was a big deal. That was a big difference for sure.
Host 51:30
But I think in your catalog as well, he started to collect information about all the small arms. I think I remember you saying that you there was one of the things that struck you Was this the vast diversity of where all these weapons had come from when they had come from what condition they were in you were also tracking serial numbers with that. Tell us a bit about your experience in in building this catalog and some of the mysteries that came up? How did how did how did this come from here? Why Why would you never expect to find this piece here and what stands out in terms of as you were gathering and collecting this information?
Miles 52:06
I think one of the biggest thing was this cassis was the M 21, SK, SS. And all the Burmese for some reason, thought they were from Yugoslavia. The interesting thing is you you you always have to you have to account for what people tell you in the field like the EMIC and etic perspective, right, because Yugoslavia was a major supplier of illicit arms to Burma, like there's what were you the sloth particularly you Just loving arms dealer. Right. Now, the M 21 was fascinating because it was a sanitized Chinese fks carbene that the Chinese actually produced this whole series of, of firearms of small arms that were under what was called the M 20 series and these were sanitized. What I mean by that is they had no Chinese markings, although markings on it were in were had English, you know, will will mean Arabic numeral numbers. So if they were captured, and the Chinese produced this during the Vietnam War era, so they could hand these out to allied nations. And then they could use them in fights, but they wouldn't have a direct tie to China. And they had the M 20 Tokarev, which was a handgun, the M 21, which was this ks M 22, which was a which was a an AK 47. And we're in you know, a mill de K. And then they had the M 23, which was an RPD which baffled me for the longest time until I finally saw a version of it in the Chinese military museum have an M 23. Marked RPD. And that was my like nail in the coffin. I had suspected that the RPD was it that there was a Chinese M 23 rpd for many years until I saw that one piece and that finally confirmed and I was like, yeah, there was one. But then 21 s ks was very interesting, because, like as a kid, I was collecting all these SK SS and I was like, who makes them? 21 and on the internet and everyone I asked and you know, no one knew no one knew who made them. 21 Right. So I was like, What the heck, come on, someone has to know and I was like, Am I just it really like a lot of these early finds back then, like really baffled me and really sort of shook my confidence as like a gun guy because I was like, I don't even know. Am I doing something wrong here? Am I looking up the wrong thing? Am I reading the wrong books? It's like, are all the books I'm reading wrong? If none of these have the same 21 as chaos in there. So that was something that was a big deal to me, right? And then I was finally found out later. It's like, okay, yeah, I'm 21 SKF that's actually kind of well known within certain intelligence circles, but not the larger community. So that was there. Then the other thing was, the Singaporean M sixteens. Kind of these things are just, you know, hiding in plain sight like, and that's where it's like, you look at an M 16. It's like, oh, that's an M 16 product from the Vietnam War era. And it's like no, two names Singapore, probably after the Vietnam War. And those were Are the mod 613 M sixteens? Produced in Singapore? And that was interesting to find out. So not all M sixteens are created equal, right? You look at a lot of them 16 Is there. Yeah, they did come from Vietnam War era, that a lot of them were actually surplus were actually handed off to Cambodia. And you had a lot of these cross Thailand, illicit gun runs, you know, bringing in semi trucks of M 16, from Cambodia to the Caribbean and then being captured and then shown up in by the Burmese police. Right. So that was interesting. That was something that stood out some other weird stories. I mean, you had Egyptian Greeners, Greenore shotguns that were originally made for Egypt Egyptian contract that use special ammunition, but once they had in Burma didn't use that special ammunition. But it was so essentially, if a prisoner stole a shotgun and ran away with it, he couldn't just load it up with anything. That was interesting. You have a number of weird, crazy stuff and one carbines, you know, from Second World War, and afterwards, we're in use that was like, really, that was where, you know, everyone carbines in the land fields were some of the cooler rifles that I definitely, you know, mess with over there. Because I was picked them up and as a kid like, man, like this is the this is the rifle that like stormed Normandy or did this, that it's like, the real historical connection was like, I'm like, I'm 15 and Yangon holding an f1 car being that still enacted? Right? It's like, it was a crazy experience to like, experience that for the first time, you know? So.
Host 56:36
So what are the implications of that? What do you think? I mean, especially having some of the weirder ones about, like, finding weaponry that's made in Singapore or something or found its way to Egypt? Were you just left kind of holding this mystery of just kind of establishing, okay, this, this gun is actually from this place, and somehow it ended up here. Were you able to make any hypotheses or even go beyond that and develop some theories as to what it meant that these that you were finding these weapons made in these kind of unusual places ended up in the end gun?
Miles 57:05
Well, for the I mean, the hypotheses with the Burmese is that they never throw anything away. As long as it's working, they keep using it and they cannibalize parts. They refurbish wood, they paint it over, they keep what they have. And that is a recurring theme, whether you know, when looking at like sort of third world economies or third world, small arms dynamics, can you see the same thing in Iraq and Syria, you just don't throw anything away. If it still works, you use it. Or if it had air, if it's broken, or somewhat messed up, you make it work somehow or another you just don't throw it away. That's something we don't understand in the US. And the Burmese are able to keep things in service for a very long time. Many years after they're decommissioned everywhere else in the world. They're able to keep things still running. I mean, the Qur'an do it. On another insane level, they read barrel and read chamber stuff into different calibers. And you're like what this is a G three barrel and Iliyan field stock shooting like 556 or more. My favorite one is an M 16 barrel in a land field stock shooting Burmese 556 That's one of the most insane create, it's one of the crazier creations I've seen, when it comes to small arms, it's like combination of all those three would not be normal would not exist. If it weren't for the economies that play there where you got shot out in 16 barrels, you got Lee Enfield, you don't have ammunition for you got Burmese ammunition that can't be shot through M 16. It's like you got to make them all work. So you put them all together and you make it work. So that's something there. I mean, I mean, it's just like, all these all these weird relationships that the Burmese have and they have to skirt around things. They have to use captured arms, they have to use stuff and World War Two, they make these weird deals with Singapore and Korea. They have to have this extensive relationship with Israel to skirt around the rest of the world as well. You know, they lose their ability to use anything West German so they have to cut it like you know, Fritz Werner cuts off their ties and stuff. For it will Fritz Werner and Rheinmetall so it's like, you know, it's just the story of small arms, any of these weird places, just like it's telling the story of the country and all the weird background NISS that comes into it. I mean, the Yugoslavian thing? Yeah, the Yugoslavia and toke ropes were sold to Burma for a while and then you've got a bunch of them flowing around you have one of the rarer burn high powers that collectors like to get marked Burma army that were a high power contract from the 1950s. So so yeah.
Host 59:44
Right. So this as you built up this catalog, and you were and again this is happening organically and starting as a game and then suddenly you you find that you're having this, this intelligence research that you're doing it's been it's been published the overall All amount of data that you collected and then shared, I guess a two part question. You know, one is that were there other people like you that were collecting this kind of information or working at it from a different angle or publishing, analyzing in different ways? And then to the other corollary, that question is the work that you were doing? Where did it end up going? Where did it this raw data that you were putting out there? Were there other other scholars or analysts that were then or even intelligence services that were then taking that and perhaps moving the ball a bit more down the field and analyzing and understanding it beyond the capacity of what you could do when you're collecting it?
Miles 1:00:37
Yeah, things? I mean, I've kind of like, like it, I know, it is safe to say no, nobody has written more about Burmese small arms than me in English language in small arms, journals and reports in the Western world, like, full stop, period, nobody else has written as much as me and I'm, I'm, I am humbled and saying that, and I know it's the truth. Because I've written it, and I've seen everything else. I've researched everything else, I've gone, I'm going in tails on it. So but as a result of that, I'm kind of like, I kind of get carried back and forth. And there's various researchers at various times I've crossed paths with and then gotten in touch with or they've gotten in touch with me. I mean, I had wouldn't lab like as a kid, as a high school I had wouldn't laboratories reached out to me and a handwritten note asking me about cartridge had stamps from DVI. And I didn't even know what wouldn't laboratories was and later on, as an adult, I found out wow, wouldn't laboratories reached out to me like, you're actually a really big deal. In that sense. So I mean, I don't know it's kind of cyclical as well. It's like, as I go on, like, people get in touch, and then I share what I have, or I help with what I have, and then I move on, or they move on, and that kind of thing. So, um, I don't know, in terms of intelligence services, none of the intelligence services, either they're interested in my work and they consume it, or they don't. Or they don't tell me or they don't want to get in touch with me, I don't know. But it's definitely out there in the public domain in small arms review and recoil on the Vickers guide, Volume Two, in the free Burma Rangers field recognition guide that gets passed out to any NGO that wants or asked for it. That exists, I mean, small arms survey as well. I mean, I don't know, it's out there for sure.
Host 1:02:35
So we're talking about the research that you did into the small arms of the target or the Burmese army? Did you conduct any research or have any, any analysis of some of the different emails that are out there and the small arms they employ?
Miles 1:02:49
Yeah, slight, slightly, and you to a fair degree to a to a fair degree, but not as much as the top middle top middle was like, that was the big fish for sure. Because the EAS are just tough, they're tough to research, a lot of times, with the Koran, there's a lot of interesting things going on, but the most fascinating is definitely with the law, and then the kitchen, those are the those are the those are second to second to first big fish in Burma when it comes to small arms, stores and research because the one that kitchen are making their own stuff, and that's, that's where the eye, you know, your eyes go up and say, Wow, they're actually producing this, you know, in the jungle. And they're not only producing it and making it themselves, but they're selling it to the other Ayios. So it's now become like an industry and of itself in Burma, whereas before was a cottage industry, you had different factions, you didn't you had different Ayios you know, making their semi making their stuff. And really, it was more craft production, and improvised production of things and you know, the PDF, continue that to this day by working with 3d printed things and making, you know, very improvised and crude crudely produced small arms, but the kitchen and Wha, you know, didn't take it up to the whole next level of industrial production of small arms, because of their because of their proximity to China and ability to work with Chinese machinery and technical advice. And possibly, you know, implicit implicit Chinese support as well, on some level, right?
Host 1:04:25
Tell us a bit more about that. Tell us what you've learned about small arms production and kitchen and wha
Miles 1:04:29
Well, the wall for sure, are known for it. And the wall, we're known colloquially for it, I mean, like sort of around the Ayios. Okay, that's why okay, this is a Chinese AK. And they're roughly identical to each other. And then the waa have a number of different variants, but it's essentially it essentially comes around the Kalashnikov and the type at one production. Within both the kitchen also produced their own borders. Both or one of them has their own RPG or grenade grenade launcher, very It's as well. But the the mountain the interesting thing I would also say as well is the amount of variance and derivatives that exist between those two between the kitchen and the wall is very telling, because it's one thing to produce, you know, a firearm of any type. The next, the next level is actually producing a variant and saying, Okay, we're going to make it with this stock. And this particular configuration, or this variant, with this type of furniture, or this barrel length, or now we're going to shoot rifle grenades from it, you know, and all those different differences, that means you have to retool production, you got to change up the production line, you have to add this, you have to test this, and that is sort of a sign of an advance that that is a sign of a very mature arms arms production facility, the ability to create variants, to create prototypes to test variants, and then use them as well. And the interesting thing about both the WHA, and the kitchen is that they make enough to arm themselves and then they sell it to everybody else. I mean, and now you have now you have Corinne Karenni Eric can different other Ayios you know, purchasing brand new rifles, you know, from the mall, and that's showing up all over the place, too. So it's like, not only are they producing arms of their own accord, but now they're actually arming all the other Aeos whereas before the other Aeos had to deal with and themselves right prior to the 1990s and 2000s. I mean, definitely the kitchen and maybe the wall, you know, they were they only had to purchase surplus stuff from elsewhere. They only had to deal with the leftover AKs from wars gone past and you know, old them sixteens and all sorts of stuff. They had to they had no choice but now they're actually making their own they they control their own arms making destiny. So that's an interesting point there.
Host 1:06:53
So when you're talking now, I assume you're talking post coup you're talking the last two years of the the emerging civil war that this is this is taking shape within among the different videos and
Miles 1:07:04
know the cucina Purdue had the kitchen have been producing since at least the last decade within the last decade, they've started the wall I've been producing before that. And sewing. Oh, selling, selling somewhat, but the selling has accelerated since the coup greatly selling Yes, selling that happened. Pretty cool for sure. In 2018. But to the extent that exists now. No, now it's they're all over. And now you know the current colloquially refer to the wall as the wall type at once as a wall, aka it's not really an AKA it's a type 81. But they could refer to it as a type 81 as a as a y k. So it's even got a name now. Whereas before you had you had current you would say okay, this AK here, this is this is from Wal, they don't call it a Y, okay? They just say no, no, it's from wha state like I bought it from a walk guy who brought it here. That's how I know it's from wha. But there was no, there was no common name for it saying it was wild. But now there's a name for it. And people say no, this is this is a why okay? It's like, you know, the secret's out in the open, so to speak.
Host 1:08:13
And as the military trying to stop this, I mean, especially after the coup, you know, the wire are somewhat in their own autonomous area, and they're not there. They there haven't, as far as I know, there haven't been direct skirmishes. And yet, if you were describing that they're the arms that they're producing and selling are, then the major source of which is then being turned against the military. I would think that there would be some action the past couple past two and a half years to want to curtail that from happening.
Miles 1:08:39
Yeah. I mean, in current you have you have corrupt Burmese commanders and corrupt Burmese bases that are actually selling their own ammunition to local Korean who then can relay and then use it? Oh, nice, saying, yeah, so you've got like this weird dynamic of like, they're fighting the people, they also supply at the same time. So you've got stuff like that going on locally? So yeah, so to have the wah, like, be able to, like, transport that stuff. It's right, it's probably right up there with the heroin with the opium shipments that get to the Thai border, you know, and it's like, Okay, we're gonna dump this opium on the Thai border, and then we're gonna sell all these, you know, type 80 ones to the Caribbean, then the Koran or something. So, you know, it's the same kind of, you know, drugs, guns, and on all that illicit stuff, follow a lot of the same paths and routes and touch points, so to speak. Right.
Host 1:09:38
And are you finding that since the coup there's, there's been an increase in supply of all those?
Miles 1:09:43
Oh, definitely. You see, you see why Kate was so called Why case I mean, all over all over karate. I mean, you see it in the social media, you don't even need to be there to see that. You look at karate, karate fighters and it's like, they all have they're all these wild type at once, and then you saw it with you see it in our can as well with our can buying a lot from the kitchen, because it's a very distinctive rifle at the kitchen make two. Yeah, yeah. Eric can Yeah, they can army. You see them with a lot of these kitchen rifles too. Yeah.
Host 1:10:17
So one of the things we've been hearing for the past year is just how much the PDFs are under supplied how they, they have a fighting spirit, but they just don't have any material to actually do anything. So we're talking about the kitchen and wall made materials getting into the other ethnics. But what about the PDFs? How are you talked briefly about just the the attempts at the this crude 3d printing? But what is what is the story with the PDFs getting access to their own weaponry?
Miles 1:10:44
I think it depends per PDF and how well they're supplied, how well connected they are how much they are trusted by the CEOs that they work alongside. I mean it that is so situationally dependent across the entire country. You can't say you can't say like the PDFs are badly armed or Well, it's like some places they got some Gucci kit in other places their slingshot and grenades, you know, so so it depends really where they are and what they're doing. In a lot of ways, yeah.
Host 1:11:17
And where does the N ug fit into these connections between getting between acquiring and transporting an army in the appropriate defense group? So if any, is there any role they're playing? It is? Or is it mainly just there? So as we know, there's so many PDF groups spread across the country now and splintering groups and various names of local defense forces is it is the N ug not so much involved. And it's really just the the character and nature of those those personal relationships on the ground and the charisma and the in the character of the individual leaders of those units.
Miles 1:11:53
Yeah, I don't think venue energy is involved at all. I mean, these days, I mean, these arm trafficking networks have been around for decades, you know, since the Cold War, right. And, you know, people are always hunting for more guns, and they're always wanting to get more stuff. So it's like, however, they make it happen, they make it happen. So they don't they don't need then ug to help them with that. It's like they, they're Don't worry, like, if the if any of the CEOs want to get better stuff, and they have funding for it, they will like because they need it, and they know they need it. And it's just the amount. It's just an amount of funding. Honestly, I mean, because you can only support you can only support yourself with burnt with Capture Burmese stuff to a certain extent, you can't you cannot fight a war off a captured material. It captured material usually is nice. It supplements your armory. And it's an kind of an extra bonus on top. It's like, Oh, great. Yeah, we captured a couple Burmese rifles and a couple and some ammunition. But it's like, yeah, but you don't have the backlog of support for it, you don't have the spare parts for it. You don't You're the ammunition that the Burmese use doesn't even work in an M 16. Because it jams up or fails catastrophically. Which is another very fascinating antidote that I haven't seen anywhere else in the world, where in Burmese ammunition Burmese 556 will not function correctly, most of the time in an American produced 556 M 16, then that's something that is known within all the ethnic groups, it says Do not shoot Burmese ammunition in an M 16, if you can avoid it. Okay, if that's all the ammo you've got, okay, you know, go ahead, but be aware, like that's going to jam and it might pull up your rifle. So that's something that is kind of interesting. And that was that a design intent or a fluke, on the part of the Burmese did the Burmese intentionally, you know, work with different powders and intentionally find a way to isolate them 16 and say, We're gonna shoot, we're gonna produce rounds that work well in our rifles, but then blow up the other side's rifle, or did they just, that's a complete fluke. And they're like, this just happens to blow up and I'm 16 put it in it. I don't know. I think it's more the I think it's more of the effort of this just happens to blow it up. I don't think it's an intentional thing very much. But if it was, it's like, that's like, some secret genius we got going on. But I don't think the case they're too worried about getting their rifles to function to begin with. Sure. So yeah,
Host 1:14:25
so to clarify my last question, I think there maybe was some miscommunication. I wasn't asking if the N ug is involved in getting different ethnic groups or weapons of course, I know that different ethnic groups would would be in charge of that. I'm talking more about the relationship between the PDFs, and the N ug 's. And I know that's quite a complicated thing to untangle. It's also not a monolithic answer. But you know, there is a ministry of defense and some of the PDFs are some of the PDFs are within the umbrella of the MO D some are not and the the MO D as well as various other Minister Trees of the NG G has been involved in looking at how they can, they can support these defense groups that are protecting local regions from military tax. And sometimes we just see, you know, there's just fundraisers out on social media and especially in Burmese online spaces have different groups that are that are trying to raise money for different defense funds. And I don't know exactly where, where that money goes in terms of what they procure how they procure it, but have their but we also hear news anecdotally. Yeah, you're you're on the ground. And I'm not but hearing news about different PDF groups that just simply don't have anything left and are needing to get are needing to find that material in some way. And so have there been explorations that you know, of looking at these kitchen and wall factories, that that could be supporting some of the different PDF groups? And I don't know what the energies involved involvement with that would be? Or if that would be more of a direct relationship with those individual defense forces?
Miles 1:16:08
Yeah, that's a very complicated answer. Yeah, I think the PDFs are just stuck at the bottom of the barrel. And they're just scrounging because the EAL lounging enough has is, so it's like, if EHRs are like, oh, man, we just got this new shipment of wall type 80 ones, like we only got 10 of them, and we got 20 of us. And then Tennant that PDF squad over there, no, you're not gonna get any of these type bitty ones. This is for us. You know, that's, I think that's just the bare bones reality. Is that the Yes, like, Okay, some of the videos are allied with different PDFs in some capacity, but it's like, at the end of the day, it's like, yeah, but we're not going to give you our best stuff, though. You got to find your own. I think that's the reality, and a lot. So
Host 1:16:54
there's not, there's not enough good stuff coming from these kitchen and wha factories to be able to spill over the PDFs. Sounds like there's barely enough for the Ayios to get to get some modicum of what they want.
Miles 1:17:06
Oh, yeah, yeah, there's definitely not enough for the iOS, I mean, the wall are selling it. But I'm willing, I'm willing to bet that the WHA are not selling as much as they want to, to the iOS, it's kind of it's kind of like, you know, what, why don't want to I don't know, what is the more of this demographic doesn't have more Rolexes? It's like, well, that demographic doesn't have the funds to afford that. So like, that's, I think that's the I think that's what it comes down to, in that.
Host 1:17:36
And you talked about the crude 3d printing that some PDFs have experimented with, in trying to, to, to have some kind of arms? What do you know about how that process has gone?
Miles 1:17:48
I mean, there's only those isolated videos that I've seen on social media, I haven't actually seen one of those in person. It's, it's, it's a party trick. I mean, great. You made a gun out of plastic. That's, that's awesome. But would you but the thing is, like a gun needs a firearm or rifle that a soldier is going to carry into battle, it needs to function and it needs to function reliably. And it doesn't function reliably, that soldier is not going to trust it, and he's not going to want to use it. And that's a very integral part of this kit. So having something like a 3d gun, it's like, that's awesome for a couple shots or a burst or two or a magazine or two. But after that, how is it going to function then? I'll tell you the one of the one of the worst things that exists those you have these airsoft components, these BB guns that look like M sixteenths that will click on fours that are produced. One of them is this company that was produced in Taiwan from a Taiwanese airsoft company, and a bunch of those were making them to Burma. And they were not, you know, they weren't real unforced. They were airsoft lower receivers and airsoft components kind of works together with what we call real steel barrels and bolts. So real volts and barrels like coming together from parts kits coming from somewhere, I don't know, either produced or not produced, but maybe coming from us parts kits or something. And a lot of CEOs are are still using them to this day. And they don't have a choice because they say either I use this thing that works a lot of the time but it rusts in a couple months, or I don't use anything at all. So that's the real that's the real terrible part about that.
Host 1:19:34
I've heard other talks about the MO D and other ministries of energy exploring the possibility of setting up their own small arms manufacturer a factory somewhere in in in some liberated area that they control. Have you heard anything about that? And what would be the challenges or difficulties of trying to do that at this time?
Miles 1:19:55
I'm incredibly difficult. Um In the best, what the best that you could do is parts manufacturer is producing smaller components. Because a lot of the problem that a lot of these old rifles have is that they're just getting old, they're wearing down, and in the jungle, a lot of stuff rots or rusts, or all sorts of things. And if you can, if you can produce the small components, that's something that's quite doable, you can produce all of the components using various 3d printing measures, or the various other ways to keep the service the components, right, it's not it's not a matter of getting the product, it's a matter of maintaining the product. That's something that's definitely doable, but it hasn't really been done in a lot of ways. There was you can look you can look on the internet, there was a an attempt to CNC M 16 lower receivers in Masonic that got seized by the ties, um, a couple of years back, and that's online, you can see that. But that's about that's about it, that that exists there. It's like, small arms manufacturing is tough, because you have to have you have to be precise, you have to know what you're doing. You can't waste metal. And it has to work has to function has to function under stress. Right. It's it's a different kind of manufacturing than say producing, you know, thermoses or shelf, for example.
Host 1:21:26
Sure. Yeah. Right. I realized the next question I'm gonna ask might be a bit out of the scope and in what we're talking so you can let me know if you have an opinion or analysis or if it's a bit a bit overwhelming from the more technical conversation we're having. But just I realized, as we're talking about the the access and possibility of different small arms for different groups and what that means for the current conflict, the bird's eye question of that is what what would actually help at this time and we hear conflicting things from conflicting opinions from different sides. Some sides, obviously saying resistance and defense saying we just need more weapons, if we were able to have more weapons, we'd be able to defend ourselves more and have and that that's what the democracy movement like Ukraine and resisting the Russian aggression, this is what the resistance forces need in Myanmar to finally be able to, to resist and overcome the dominant aggression. Of course, the other side of that is that these weapons don't go away and that you're, and that by pouring more weapons and more ability to fight and kill in the country, that you're just creating a future balkanization, that's just going to get bloodier and worse as time goes on, really need to look at solutions outside of this. That's obviously somewhat as accurate as that might be in one way. It's obviously a privileged, privileged thing to say for those who aren't living in villages that are facing these terrible attacks and have no means to defend themselves. Do you have an opinion or thought about where you come down on your analysis between this? This this range of opinions, views? I
Miles 1:23:05
mean, you need I mean, that that I mean, you bring up Ukraine and the answer to Ukraine, the thing that made the difference in Ukraine wasn't generally more weapons, it was specifically more quality weapons and weapons to defeat the Russian threat, which in the beginning of the Ukrainian of the Russian offensive, the answer was javelins and, and laws, and those were very specific. It was, it's, you know, we could make a reference to the US stingers in Afghanistan, but there's a lot of controversy there. The US sting us supplies singers to the Mujahideen did not finish or end the war. It made a difference, but it wasn't overly strategic. Because when the US introduced stingers 1986 the Mujahideen was, was all like the Russians were already in there, sort of like Man, we were looking for a way out already. They hadn't done that the Mujahideen hadn't completely been crushed, right? The singers were introduced too late in the war, they did make a difference, but it's like the war was already going a certain course now, and the way Russian helicopters responded to those singers is they they changed their flight profiles, they altered their time on landing zones, etc. They're able to deal with them. Right? They're able to alter their tactics. But in Ukraine, for example, it was the it was the end laws. It was the it was the triumph of technology of the end laws and the javelins that made the difference against Russian armor where the Russians just fill up pieces when all their tanks started blowing the bits all around them. So it was very specific, right? It wasn't it wasn't a million M fours that made the difference in Ukraine. No. In fact, Ukraine has a huge surplus of small arms besides manned portable or man pads that make a difference, right. So the difference in the Burmese context is something like that in low altitude, air defense weapons will, will change the battlefield entirely. I mean, everybody's calling for everyone's calling for early warning. Why do you need early warning when you can blow that thing out of the sky? Now, okay, the difference with a with a man pad is that you want something that is effective at those lower altitudes. So you can hit helicopters, so you can hit low flying aircraft. And where it turns into something like Ukraine, where they shoot down a Malaysian airliner, that's where things get kind of out of the way fair, right? That's where you get like a plane flying from Bangkok to India, like gets blown out of the sky over over one of these EAL areas. That type of weapon system would make a tremendous difference for the CEOs, because that's because the CEOs, they have the strategy, they have the guts, you know, they have the ability to take the Burmese head on in a lot of places, they have that ability, but what they don't have is the ability to deal with the air power. And that's these low altitude air defense weapons which the Burmese have air superiority of the sky, they were completely unmolested. And if you had some of these air defense weapons, that would completely change the game. And in Ukraine, it's changing the game because as both both sides in Ukraine, like neither side has air superiority over the other, like everyone thought Russia would knock out the Ukrainian Air Force on the first day of the war. They didn't. And Ukraine, both sides use of air power, they go up to the line of contact and a little, maybe a little bit beyond it, but they don't go further in because of the air defense capability of both sides, right. So it makes a big difference. So if the EAA has had that, that would be a tremendous tipping point. Not more, not more, and fours, not more of that, that would definitely help too. But if you had that kind of ability, huge, it'd be tremendous.
Host 1:27:06
But is there any hope of getting that?
Miles 1:27:08
Not really because the people that own that stuff like the US and the European countries that really advanced air defense systems they're reluctant to give that out because they don't want another Malaysian airliner being blown out of the sky as in Ukraine now. Now but the thing is what blew the Malaysian airliner out of the sky was a massive air defense piece I mean, I don't even know the name of it, it was you know, something on four wheels that you know, watched and hit an airliner at you know, 10,000 feet but the videos don't need to hit anything at 10,000 feet, they need to hit everything at 5004 1000 feet and below that that's what's going to make a big difference. You
Host 1:27:49
referenced before about how well armed and trained and courageous the different ethnic findings unit units are and infer that if they were that they'd be able to hold their own and more against the Burmese military albeit with the superior airpower that the Burmese military definitely has but looking at the current the current nature and status of of the different ethnic armed organizations in terms of their the weapons they can bring to bear their fighting units, their morale and then the Burmese military. How would you differentiate or analyze the makeup of these different fighting groups right now?
Miles 1:28:32
I mean, it totally depends on the group I mean, some groups are extremely poorly armed other groups like surely poorly armed low amount of funding other groups have a lot of funding and you know they produce their own stuff the wall in the kitchen the Eric can for example the AAA they don't produce their own stuff but they've got a lot of funding somehow some way and they're able to buy a lot from the one the kitchen and you can go online and you can see all that you don't need to be an arrogant state to see that there's a lot of there's a lot of modern day stuff that's with Eric and army and it just depends on the group I mean some are well off some aren't. Right
Host 1:29:14
right so like just going from from your knowledge of of those different groups and where they're at now and then looking at where the various military is now how would you how would you break down where those different groups are standing different status of what they have and how capable they are?
Miles 1:29:31
Well the wall for sure, like taking the top kick for sure. The wall have their own you know, Air to Air Defense, low altitude air defense missiles, right they have that kind of stuff, Soviet era kind of things. The the wall or one of the biggest standing armies, like one of the largest standing armies like in Southeast Asia like with the amount of troops that they have to bear in the capacity that they are like, you know, we want to compare what what kind of funding they have and stuff right compared to these others. Southeast Asian countries, the wall for sure. And then I'll then look at Chin, you know, come up next because they're second runner up because they produce their own stuff as well. And then our can army. And then after our can army, you probably go down the line if some of the Shan Shan contingent groups and then the Wyoming, the Korean and the Karenni. The corinium are definitely Brank ranked in the lower part there as well, because the Karenni they have more troops than they have than they have fighters like it's, they're, they're off by a lot. But they're they make up for that in their ability to bring the fight to the enemy. And they're really courageous in that.
Host 1:30:43
Yeah. And the next question gets into, again, a bit more wider than the more technical areas that we're, we're talking about. But you might have an opinion on this. When we met each other last month, we were we were in the course of one conversation, someone who was also there that was on the ground made the reference then is also connected to many of these different ethnic organizations reference that if there was a way to bring some of these ethnic fighting forces out the military wouldn't last a week, it would be over instantaneously. I'm sure that's a analysis that you would sympathize with. And yet that hasn't happened. And there's no real hope of that happening. So what's your thought on and you mentioned, you referenced this now the craning you're one of the few groups that are actually taking the fight to the enemy, as opposed to the others. What are your thoughts on on the difficulties and challenges of having some of those other fighting forces be able to have any kind of coalition coalition much less even, it's not a coalition just being able to go out to go to go beyond from defending their own areas to being able to take the fight to the Burmese military?
Miles 1:31:45
I think that's quite, you know, it's there. You know, like, if you had like a coalition, like converging on Yangon and Mandalay and maybe it all, you know, kind of thing like, that is, so I think that's, that's like future talk. But it's tough. So many of these groups just want to hold on to what they got, and they just want to stay there. They don't have the capacity to go beyond what they got, in a lot of ways. They're barely holding on in so many ways. It's like, offensive, it's like, no, Every act is defensive. You can't you can't go on the offense, when you're still fighting the good defense. It's, you can't it's too too difficult for so many of them. They don't have the capacity. They don't have the manpower, they don't have the arms to support it. And I think for a lot of them, I mean, you look at you listen to some of the Karenni talk, and they're and they're like, man, we're, we're just trying to get them out of our land here. It's like we weren't, we weren't even a part of this mess, until this coup happened. And now we all joined up to like, get up against it. So that tells you it's like, we don't really need it. You hear a lot of crony talk and the they're still talking about uniting the country, it's like there isn't an interest to go into Yangon and like, do everything. If all ethnic groups could say, hey, if tomorrow, we can just click our fingers, and we'll all just be at peace. And we'll all get the sort of federated federated democracy we want. It's like, that's all we want. We don't want to raise Yangon to the ground. We're like, let's just like, just leave us alone. You know, I think that's the end goal. The end goal is not to stream into Yangon. like sure, like in Saigon 79. Right.
Host 1:33:25
Yeah. And that's why a lot of analysts that I've been seeing reports of lately, have been predicting just a very long, protracted standstill that we're not having the resistance forces be able to have the well or the means to be able to come together to defeat the common enemy. And the enemy itself, the Burmese military does not have the means or ability to be able to fight battles on so many fronts and take over the country. And so we're looking at a period of of both sides just kind of being dug in as continued bloodshed happens, and perhaps there's not, and there's there continues to be not much intervention or support from neighboring countries or the international community. What's your outlook on where we stand and where we're going from here?
Miles 1:34:15
Yeah, I mean, it's, you know, it's, it's perspective is such an important thing, right. So I've heard like, I heard a PDF guy, talk about, you know, and he only recently joined up right within the past, like, like two years or something since the coup was joined up since the coup and, you know, I literally heard him relate a story of how, oh, the, you know, the the top middle is on the downhill they're using, they're using rice like wicker baskets with straps as their backpacks because they don't even have backpacks because they're using wicker baskets with straps. And I thought I didn't say anything to him, but I thought about this and I was like, I've seen like, there's images go online, and you can see images of Burmese patrols in Korean, like walking around with wicker baskets on their backs as backpacks as far as a decade plus ago, like even two decades ago. So it's just like, what's your everybody's perspective is is different, you know? So if you think of that, and I liked and I want to take that as like, well, you could look at, you know, that guy's looking at a Burmese column and saying, oh, man, they're using wicker baskets as backpacks like they're on the downhill. It's like, they're, you know, they're not doing this, but it's like, no, you actually, you actually are just joining this gunfight, you're actually just realizing this for the first second, they're using wicker baskets as backpacks, it's like, they've been using them as rocks for some time. That doesn't mean they're on the downhill. So that's an important point in perspective, knowing it, so I think that's something to take into account on all this. I mean, it's just like, this is kind of like what's epitomized, you know, 1984, in terms of you have like, these three great armies, and none of them, like went over each other. But none of them can like ally or or beat each other. So you're kind of stuck. And it's like the balance, I think the balance is to your aren't your two got two forces on a seesaw, and the balance is never going to be totally one way or the other, that armies are always going to have the financial funding, they're always going to have the airpower, they're always going to have the manpower, the ethnics are always going to have the jungle, the Hyden, they're always going to have the popular support of the people around them, but they're never going to have the funding, they're never going to have the there aren't gonna have enough funding of so to speak. Because even though the kitchen, you know, have funding to produce their own stuff, it's like they still can't go on the offensive because they still can't, you know, take that to the Burmese because guess what, they don't have airpower. So the Burmese have this trump card, right. So they can't nothing's there, both both sides are actually balanced out until one side becomes unbalanced, that's when things changed. That is when things change, but that's not going to happen. And the reality, I think, is that the Burmese on the top, like the top at all, you know, 400,000 men or whatever it's like the top middle of created, that the genius of the top middle is that they've created an industry out of the military. The military itself is a state within a state. And everybody in the military owes their allegiance to it, their whole livelihoods to it, you've got I mean, it doesn't this isn't a military, like this isn't a professional army that exists elsewhere. This is an entire livelihood, an industry within itself. So it doesn't matter how many men the top middle lose, you people are not going to desert because if you desert, your family has nothing, you've tied your family to that complex, you know, all your food is from there, everything is from there, you know, if an entire battalion gets wiped out, like you're gonna be like, that sucks for them. But I'm still around, and I'm still eating pretty good. Why would I? You know, why would I because the reality also of it is that, yeah, that battalion got wiped out. But there's still another 400 battalions out there that are not wiped out. And as long as you're in one of those other battalions, and if that battalion, if you're if they're only losing, let's say, an entire battalion, or an entire company getting wiped out to the man, I mean, once a year or once every couple months, that's actually not many, compared to a military of 400,000 men. There's actually a lot more guys out there, it's like, they can take in take those losses really well. In fact, you know, you can take a 300 men killed, you can take 300 Men gone, because you still have a lot more, you know. So until you're losing colossal amounts of men, then it starts making a difference, but still not that much, because it's just a numbers game at that point, and you're not going to beat it. Right.
Host 1:38:59
Right. So with the military, not quite being able to win and consolidate power, but also not on the verge of losing. Does that put you in a somewhat pessimistic outlook in terms of where this is going and how kind of bad and bloody this is going to continue to get when? With with no solution really in grasp?
Miles 1:39:19
Yeah, I mean, it's it sounds like a Forever War until, like, I mean, but there's several trump cards here, right. airpower is one of them on the battlefield. airpower is a trump card. So that's why if the if iOS had quality air defense weapon systems, and they could take out the aircraft, you lose that trump card, you lose that confidence and you lose that tactical ability, because the fact of the matter is on the on the field in the field, like the fact that they have air power is their own sort of reserve. The if the the by the Burmese have an air power, you know, company commanders and battalion commanders can make, you know, bold, risky decisions because they they know that as long Once they have calm, as long as they have communications, they can always call for Air and Air, it might or might not come, but if they really push it and they have a good you know, air to ground and close air support relationship going on air will come, you know, and they and they know they can they have that confidence that air will come. They can make this bold move, they can hold out a little longer. They can go places, they don't need to, you know, they don't need to without that airpower. It's like, Oh, should I really should I really stay here and fight because the downside to fighting here is that, you know, I could get completely wiped out. But if they have that airpower, it's like, well, I can just call for air. And if I have calm is up, I'll be good. And I think the other flip side of that coin, the other trump card of that is that home base of support that industry, if you start losing that that industry of support, if you start losing that military industrial complex, where it becomes hard for the state to maintain families and widowers and and you know, everybody in the rear, that's when you start with that support starts going away, and it doesn't become very beneficial to be a member of that complex. You know, that's the other way that can go down as well. And it's like, well, why should I keep on supporting this complex if it doesn't do anything for me in the end, the fact of the matter is, it does a lot for you know, a Burmese privates family, they get to live, you know, in a in a in a family dorm, they get to getting a ration of fuel, they're provided for if the guy gets killed, they get some sort of stipend, they get some sort of monetary compensation. It's like that's a good deal if you've got nothing, right. So if that goes away, there's less to fight for.
Host 1:41:41
Right? It's good to have understanding of those scenarios and little things that you could pull out or push in and that will make that difference. What possibility do you see of any of those happening or what actions could be taken to encourage or push things in a direction where the democracy movement can can gain that edge?
Miles 1:42:01
I don't know. Um, well, a trump card on the battlefield is air defense weapons right that's that
Host 1:42:06
but you don't see that as coming from any actor anytime soon.
Miles 1:42:10
Unless the wall are willing to part with some of their stuff. And if the wall are interested in doing that, that might be a possibility for them. But even then, it's like I don't know how well the wolves air defense stuff works up against the Burmese make 30 fives and make you know make 20 nines and am I am I eights and stuff like that? I don't know how well it goes up against it. In terms of the homefront, I mean, what do you what do you do? Like, starve the population? Like? Like start start a plague? Like, introduce locusts into the plains around Yangon and Mandalay? It's like to kill all the crops one year, it's like, I don't know. Like, that's it like now that's bordering on like internal genocide. Right.
Host 1:42:58
Right. You mentioned about the why we've been talking about them in sight for much of this conversation. And the question just occurred to me, what do we because you've been talking about the wall, possibly using some of their defense systems, the fact that they're producing all these weapons that are going to the Ayios that have been fighting the military? I know, there's a long and complicated history between the wild and the Shan, and Chinese and the, and the Burmese, of course, but as far as present day goes, what do we know about the relations between the wall army and the tatmadaw? We know they have their their autonomous zone, and they're, they've been largely staying out of direct fighting. But in terms of some and then we all of course, the drug trade is a huge component as well. There are many ties there, it's a very complicated question to ask that would be its own podcast to really go and analyze this. But to give us your brief answer your brief analysis of what do we know of the the wall Tomodachi relations at this moment? And then how would that play out in effect, what the wall would be willing and not willing to do at this time as the conflict goes on?
Miles 1:44:06
Um, we know that the wall control more of Shan state than we know. Um, that's that's for sure. Then this then is talked about the wall control the wall control many more cities and areas that that that is often talked about, I mean, for the people that work there, it's obvious on the ground when you like, Okay, you walk into the city, it's all one, it's only a couple of Burmese guys, or a couple of top middle guys. But the war and just such a precarious position, and they don't want to mess with anybody else around them. They want to just they have their slice to heaven, you know, and they got China as the backer, and they got the drug trade to like keep them going. And they're like, Yo, we just want to hold on to our own little piece right here. We're not going to get involved with anybody else unless we can make money which comes with the fine with the small arm sales, right? And again, maybe another way to look at it. The small arms sales as well. Like I said earlier, small arms being sort of an icing on the cake. Is there something else going on that the wall are doing where it's the small arm sales are actually a sort of secondary thing for the one, they're not actually a primary motive? They're like, they're like a secondary sale. Well, what else is happening that? I don't know? Is that within the drug trade that's going on? So? I don't know. I don't know the answer to that at all, to be honest.
Host 1:45:25
Sure. Yeah. Fair enough. Another question. I have this I'm thinking of as we're talking about this, as we talked about the standstill, and we're talking about the military dug in, in in their bases in central areas, and urban areas, especially. And then the ethnic areas, also just just holding on and defending their homelands and not moving beyond that. The third actor in this that that doesn't have that not to say these other two areas are positions of safety. But the third actor, which is definitely not in a position of safety, or the PDFs, and where the PDS fit into that, and, and the 10, those that have joined resistance forces, either local resistance forces of military coming to the area or otherwise, that they seem like they're very vulnerable. And as this conflict stretches on, and starts to be, if it's not already become the new normal, what happens to the PDFs and where the PDFs go, and what they evolved into, that seems very concerning. And as well as not quite clear as to what their path would be.
Miles 1:46:32
I think the PDFs evolved into what the ABS DF did after AAA, right, they get folded into the ethnic groups they peter out, they, they get sidelined, and it's their members sort of retire and they become the you know, they they go into politics, or they go into, like, you know, other ways of being reporters and stuff. I mean, this is where you see, I mean, you meet all these like Burma activists who are super old, like in their late 40s and 50s. Now, and it's like, oh, what's your story? It's like, oh, yeah, protests during Yangon. 88. A BSDF. Right afterwards until the early 90s. Then I got sick of that. And then I turned into this as a reporter or as a politician, like an outside politician in some way. You know, it's like, that's, that's, that's probably the stark reality of it.
Host 1:47:25
Yeah, you reference that they could be like the ADA BSDF. The other analysis I've heard is that rather than that they become like the 1950s KMT were they the Chinese Nationalists were they become roving bands and marauders perhaps go to drug or arms trade, get up to other kinds of criminal networks and or because they have no home to go to and their cause starts to become less hopeful. And they just have to find a way to survive off the land wherever they are.
Miles 1:47:56
Yeah, that and that, in of itself is, you know, one of the most crazy metamorphosis of like the especially on the wall became to be what they are, it's like, Can coming done getting defeated by CPB and then CPB itself evaporating and then getting taken over by the wall and then coming in what it is today? It's like, Whoa, how did that happen? Right? It's confusing.
Host 1:48:18
It's really confusing.
Miles 1:48:20
So where are we now? But the thing, the difference is the differences with the coming time with the CPV is that both of those were organic, you know, units to begin with, like they had, they were already a unit on their own, like they had already formulated, been under some sort of formal training before, they had some sort of structure. They're like, they're like, they were rebels. They were literally, they became rebels without a cause. Right. Whereas the PDF, don't have that structure before. And they sort of they're the PDF seem more like, you know, rock bands that clash together, you know, they haven't really they have a bang up time with it is for a couple of years, but then they break apart for various individual reasons and goals and all sorts of different things. I don't know that might be the cause that might be the end of the PDFs in that way. And then they go their separate ways.
Host 1:49:15
Yeah, we've already seen that maintaining the morale and the material has been hard enough as it is. And I should just clarify for listeners you were talking about the CPP. That's the Communist Party of Burma. Yeah, I don't know. So I wanted to return to some of the earlier part of our talk, which relates to this part of our talk. We were You were referencing your investigation into small arms in when you were living in Yangon around 2007 2008. And that's obviously some time ago now it's 15 years ago that you were doing your research and finding the information. So the information you collected then was based on that current reality and what you were finding as As the years have gone by, and especially since the coup developed, have you been keeping track or following what small arms they have, what they're getting, what you're seeing what they're using, and the possible implications of that.
Miles 1:50:13
I'm not particularly my Burmese Small Arms research kind of ended. Well, I kind of like I've taken a break from it since 2019, I would say. And then it's like, what I've done since 2019, I've focused much more on other areas of small arms research, which has been the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, which I'm done with that as well. And right now, I'm like, I'm not doing any small arms research. But I mean, I still like keep up with it. And I'm aware of like developments happening. And you know, some of the newer like the wall type 80, ones that show up. And then, you know, the biggest sort of the biggest developments I've seen since the coup are definitely things like the Burmese Glock. And really, really the biggest thing is the expansion of the Burmese small arms production into working with polymers, elastomers, and polymer molding. And so that shows an indigenous development of plant plastic components of frames of stocks, of things like that, which guess what point right back to Israel, in addition to Turkey, as well. And there's this whole like kebab between Turkey will what was originally terrible. This is this, this whole relationship between Turkey and Israel, where a lot of will Turkey would produce a lot of small arms for Israel, but then Israel would say it's really produced there. So and there's this whole, because Turkey has this huge small arms industry, that is essentially kind of acts like a kind of like a made in China, for small arms, like will produce whatever you want, at whatever quality you want, and just branded however you want as well, right? So Turkey has a lot of that going on. So you have a lot of Israeli arms that go up that way. There's something called the Delta Defense Group, which a derivative of has, you know, showed up in Syria as a Delta defense, pistol, and then is also an Israeli manufacturer. But then now it's also showing up in Burma in some ways. And then you have a lot of like CIA designs, a lot of these is really aftermarket accessories, which again, might be indicative of not a primary effort between the two countries, but maybe Israel and Burma, you know, when Burma bought the patrol boats from Israel was like, Oh, hey, and we'll throw in these aftermarket accessories as well as sweeten the deal, kind of things that may have been going on. And you see a lot of that with the MA series, the Burmese small arms there. So that's the biggest new thing in terms of Burmese development on that front.
Host 1:52:50
Right, right. Well, this has been just so educational for me, and thank you for walking us through your your your early years and early research. And then up till today and analysis on the coup, we've talked upon so many different areas and so many different angles, you've loved a lot of different questions from from different perspectives out you and you've been able to return all of them. So it's been been quite impressive and quite educational to learn your insights and your background and extensive experience. There's a lot to talk about. We've talked about a lot on here. So far, there's probably a lot more left to be said. So just before we take leave, I want to check in and is there of all the multitude of questions I've asked are there are there things that haven't come up or haven't been talked about perspectives or, or different areas that that haven't been explored, that you might like to touch upon now?
Miles 1:53:41
Um, I mean, Burma is, is in terms of small arms research, and this gets into more technicality. I mean, there's so much afoot in Burma that is just so undiscovered and such Virgen research territory by small arms researchers like in the field that I used to be in it's quite disappointing that like nobody is really has an interest to take it on. And it's kind of it really is. Because I mean, diving into small arms research in Burma, you can go down some of the most amazing and fantastic rabbit holes and relationships and geopolitics and you know, last ditch things and then who double crossed who and backtrack. What and then what, where things are getting made and what secret deals were going on. I mean, it's, it's all there, right? All these crazy things happening and also developments in small arms use and you know, there's designs that are blow your head, blow your mind away, like, wow, this happened and you did that and, you know, this design took place and manufacture this, you're able to figure that out and, and how does the 556 not working this or that or anything? It's all there. It's like the whole the whole shebang is there. But no, but it's untouched and nobody's interested in it because it's like the dark hole that Burma is And it's, you know, it's kind of I mean, it's just like it. I mean, it's like, well, no surprise there. It's like the world doesn't care about Burma yet again, you know, so. And that's something that is the the field of small arms study, this field of small arms research in Burma is just as bleak as the field of everything. Study when it comes to Burmese anything. And that's the that's the that's the unpleasant truth. And I think is epitomizes it.
Host 1:55:28
Yeah, that's hard to hear. But that's definitely the truth and whatever. I've definitely been my experience of many years living there that whatever the the field is, that has been talked about, sometimes you're going back to, you know, 120 years ago of some colonial report that came out, because that's the last study that's been done and whatever that particular area is. So, you know, I, I hope that Conversations like this on our podcast platform are doing their small part and being able to bring out different voices and different topic areas, plant some seeds, I know that we've had episodes in the past that have that have have truly planted seeds and have set people off on their own their own missions of scholarship and explorations, whether their hobby or something more academic, but we're rigorous but you know, there's, there's a lot of misinformation and Burma's been the victim for many years, many centuries of reductionist reporting and thinking reduction is combined with exotic side of being able to tell the simple stories and the non nuanced approach and messages. And so hopefully, conversations like this are getting a bit more into the weeds and presenting more of the nuance and more of the background, not just the answers that we have, but also the many questions that that we're all left with. And that that, that they're doing some small parts and people listening, having their own interest and starting to pull some other threads and go in different directions with them.
Miles 1:56:48
Yeah, I mean, it's, you know, it's becoming since the advent of like social media and the internet, and like, there's been more interest in that, too. But it's kind of like, I almost wonder if it's actually there actually hasn't been more interest. It's just the fact that the internet is around that it's like, what's the gauge of interest is higher? If that makes any sense? It's like, it's like saying, like, well, before the advent of maps, nobody knew where China was. After maps happened. Everyone seemed to know where China was like, wow, interest in China is growing. It's like, No, it's not that interesting. China's growing is that maps were made, and people saw where China was on a map. It's like without the map people didn't know. So without the internet, people also wouldn't know. So the overall interests in Burma is like still the same. It just seems like there's more interest in like Burmese small arms, like with the advent of the internet, but really, no, it's still the same as it's ever been. You know, so I wonder, you know, I often wonder if that's the case.
Host 1:57:51
Yeah. I mean, we're also the we also has to be said that we're talking about a terrible conflict that's been going on for for going on two and a half years now. And even when you go and talk to educate people that in the West that are the new that a coup happened, they don't really even know the conflict is still going on. Or they get the basic events confused of like, what hasn't always been a dictatorship, or Oh, yeah, what what was Aung San su chi doing? It's just, there's just really speaks to that incredible lack of reporting and interest and engagement in Western countries and, you know, talking about the standstill that they're in, that we've established in, in this conversation, and yet there are things to break out of that standstill, but there's, it continues to be this victim of an engagement of reductionist combined with exotic fight thinking and so again, that's where we hope that Conversations like this are able to pull some of those threads and just show a different view and vision than just the simple story that's been repeated from one decade to the next.
Miles 1:58:51
Yeah, yeah. Yeah, unfortunately.
Host 1:58:56
We do what we can right Yes, true. Great, well, thanks again for spending this time this has just been it's been great to hear your background and your knowledge and experience and expertise of all these topics. It definitely gives me a lot of food for thought and sure of our listeners as well.
Miles 1:59:14
Yeah, and thank you so much for for being interested in it and then forum on this really bygone odd topic when it comes to the whole field of Burma study anyways, you know, but really appreciate it and it's an awesome thing to see what you're doing here with the podcasts and keep on trucking you know.
Host 1:59:48
I'll be honest, not only is asking for donations, my least favorite thing in the world to do, I find it pretty uncomfortable as well. Yet it is an unavoidable but necessary task in order To ensure that our platform can continue to bring you stories from post coup Myanmar. And unfortunately, the truth of the matter is that there is a basic minimum cost to keep our engine humming. So please allow me to take a moment for that least favorite and uncomfortable thing to do, and ask sincerely for your generosity in supporting our mission. If you found value in today's show, and think others might as well, we ask that you take a moment to consider supporting our work. Thank you for taking the time to hear our spiel. And with that, it's off to work on the next episode. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup, we welcome your contribution in a form currency or transfer method. Your donation will go on to support a wide range of humanitarian and media missions, aiding those local communities who need it most. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, refugee camps, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution to a specific activity or project you would like to support. Perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian work is carried out by our nonprofit mission that are Burma. Any donation you give on our insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fun. Alternatively, you can also visit the better Burma website better burma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause in both websites except credit card. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/better Burma. Additionally, we can take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either website for specific links to these respective accounts or email us at info at better burma.org. That's better Burma. One word, spelled b e t t e r b u r m a.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. We also invite you to check out our range of handicrafts that are sourced from vulnerable artists and communities across Myanmar. Available at a local crafts.com. Any purchase will not only support these artists and communities, but also our nonprofits wider mission. That's a local crafts, spelled ALOKCRAF T S one word a local crafts.com Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support.