Transcript: Episode #129: The Pit and the Pendulum
Following is the full transcript for the interview, which was released on October 28th, 2022. This transcript was made possible by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and has not been checked by any human reader. Because of this, many of the words may not be accurate in this text. This is particularly true of speakers who have a stronger accent, as AI will make more mistakes interpreting and transcribing their words. For that reason, this transcript should not be cited in any article or document without checking the timestamp to confirm the exact words that the guest has really said.
00:06
So your job yeah
00:10
thr boil knew the key job on the low limit that junta HR say dollar Hey dice llegado lawyer not a lawyer couva day got paid for the Myanmar has sentenced the O sentence the ousted leader Aung San su chi to another three years in prison will based on this sentence alone no impact on our team
Host 00:46
again thank you for joining us for the next hour or two in this episode of insight Myanmar podcast in an age of nearly limitless content, we appreciate that you're choosing to take valuable time out of your day to learn more about what is happening in Myanmar. It is vital for the story to continue to be heard by people around the world and that starts right now
Brad 01:19
John a look at the way have a good day. And welcome back to another episode on insight Myanmar. Today we will be delving into a political topic we're going to be discussing the concept of political neutralism specifically with reference to Myanmar's recent history. Today I'll be joined by Andre opacity and Hunter Marston who have co written a paper entitled The pendulum of non alignment, charting Yamahas great power diplomacy 2011 to 2021. The paper was published in the Journal of current Southeast Asian affairs and is available to view online for free, we will be putting the link to the article down below. So gentlemen, welcome to both of you. I noticed that you co wrote the paper but you wrote your own sections of the paper, largely independently. So I wonder whether we could kick off with Andrea. And you can take us through the first few sections of the article, in your own words for the benefit of the audience.
Andrea Passeri 03:14
Sure, first of all, thanks for having us. It's a great pleasure to be to be here. And essentially, as you said, our article deals with Myanmar's neutrally store non aligned diplomacy. And essentially, what we all know, or at least those who work on Myanmar's foreign policy is that the country as constantly relentlessly prioritized a neutral list or non aligned diplomacy since its very independence. Yeah, yet, in our humble opinion, Myanmar has done so in very different and sometimes even opposite ways. And this is, by the way, why we titled The article has the pendulum of non alignment because again, in our opinion Myanmar's foreign policy as resembled the shifting motion of a pendulum, tilting back and forth between two ideal types opposite archetypes of non aligned behavior, which we labeled as positive non alignment on one end, and negative neutralism. The former stands out as a very dynamic and proactive type of non aligned behavior, which in a nutshell is seeks to assert independence and freedom of action in the international arena through the achievement of a diversified range of international partnerships. On the opposite side of this spectrum, negative neutral ism instead seeks to achieve the same goal which is again our challenging and independence, especially visa vie great powers through South aloofness. So, even though the gold the purpose of the two strategies is pretty similar, their ratio is actually totally different. And after providing a theoretical framework about these different types of non aligned behavior, we analyze the trajectory of Myanmar's foreign policy between 2011 and 2021. And throughout this period, we identify a series of stages as well as various crucial turning points, where Myanmar, again shifted from one approach to the other. So this is a nap in nutshell, the topic and the arguments that we tried to develop in this article.
Brad 06:39
Okay, thank you. And Hunter, if you can go over the sections that that you authored. I think specifically the history? Sure.
Hunter Marsten 06:47
Well, first, I should mention, you know, Andre, knows a great deal of his history and wrote a fair amount in the introductory sections about the history of Burma's involvement and really leadership in the nonaligned movement during the Cold War. But, of course, you know, it's impossible to fit an entire history of a country, dating back to post colonial era into a limited size paper. So what our paper does is focus on the recent administrations of the USDP party and the NLD and primarily compares those before touching on very briefly, the post coup junta foreign policy since 2021. So building on the theoretical framework, which Andrea outlined already, we look at the thing, seeing yours through this lens of positive non alignment, and argue that based on the demonstrated performs, and political legitimation earned by those sort of technocratic and I don't think progressive is the right word and Myanmar, which doesn't really have much of a progressive movement, but the allowing multiparty elections under a very carefully scripted military owned constitution, political reforms, including the release of political prisoners, and the invitation of foreign direct investment and international businesses into the country, as well as the release of Aung San su chi. All together, boosted Myanmar's ability or capacity to hedge again and to engage with a variety of external partners. So it did so while also welcoming a spike in incoming investment and trade. And so for the first time in decades, we saw a very proactive foreign policy from Naypyidaw. And I think these are evidenced enough, you know, we identify a number of data points, but in 2012, President Obama came to visit Rangoon or Yangon, meeting with Aung San su chi. And this really heralded a new step in the country's political future, or direction at the time later in 2012, Aung San su chi and the NLD, contested by elections, and actually managed to enter parliament with 40 Something seats at a time. So all of these incremental steps, built some goodwill among the West primarily who were easing economic sanctions that they've had against Myanmar for some time. And at the same time, Myanmar stepped up its diplomatic engagement in international fora, like the United Nations. I think it was 2012 when it was 2014 wasn't an Andrea one. Thing st traveled to New York City for the UN General Assembly and gave a very positive speech saying that Myanmar wanted to be an international The responsible player internationally once again. So, very notably, Myanmar chaired the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2014, which was generally regarded as a success. So I think this really solidified the countries coming out into the world again, and reentry on the world stage, positive and proactive way. All of these signs are what we point to in Myanmar's foreign policy of positive non alignment and engage more with the West to mitigate over dependence on China and authoritarian friends, such as the Communist Party in China. Following the Thane sand administration, the NLD overwhelmingly won the 2015 election and Aung San su chi came to the helm in 2016. When the NLD entered parliament in a leadership role, and unfortunately, very soon afterwards, the already simmering tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine State and not only in Rakhine State but they really swept across the country and the level of alarm This triggered internationally. As well as the ensuing bloodshed, really massive scale of violence in the military's brutal crackdown on Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, led to a return of international isolation in Myanmar was once again under economic sanctions from the EU and the United States. And at this time, it found itself really in a sort of on the backfoot, and its foreign policy was much more reactive rather than proactive. And despite the nlds election manifesto in 2015, promising a non aligned, independent foreign policy. Actually, what we saw was a much more or less proactive foreign policy in terms of the nlds engaging with international partners, given the relative isolation that faced from the likes of Washington and Brussels. At the time, Aung San su chi ended up ended up traveling abroad less engaging less in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, generally making fewer appearances abroad. And when she did travel abroad, she went to Hungary, for example, and met with Viktor Orban issuing a very bizarre joint statement about the shared difficulties of Muslim immigrants, which was not a good look for the country abroad in terms of winning friends in certainly the Muslim majority countries in the neighborhood like Indonesia, but generally around the world, the NLD government was suddenly espousing a much more inward looking and narrowly focused, sort of Myanmar first policy. And following this trend, the military took power in 2021, in February in a coup, and the trend of international isolation has certainly deepened as the country now faces really overwhelming economic sanctions from the west. But at the same time, the military junta has doubled down on its engagement with the likes of China and Russia, identifying a few authoritarian friends that it can work with. And you know, most famously saying, I think that words of general so when the Myanmar would learn to walk with a few friends again, so it finds itself isolated and unable to generate economic growth, the health care system has overwhelmingly just collapsed, and the country's foreign policy is more. So at this point, the trend of negative neutralism is really solidified. And, you know, going back to this idea of the pendulum swinging from one direction to the other, what we saw in the years 2011 through 2016, were sort of the gradual opening up of the country and proactive foreign policy, which is very soon thereafter swung in the other direction, and is now very firmly on the side of negative neutralism. Okay, thank
Brad 14:16
you. So, there's, I mean, there's a lot going on in this article, and it seems to try to cover both the underlying philosophical and political scientific concepts, as well as specifically examine milestones in in Myanmar's political history, at least since the 19 era. And I'm touching on sort of earlier chapters as well. So I want to begin by examining some of the the ideas and the concepts that are being put forth in this article. And the first one is the contrast between what you refer to as negative neutralism and positive non online And so, in the article, and I believe, Andrea, you were you were the author of this section outlining the differences between these. Yes. So you, you outline negative neutralism as disengagement from the international community, economic self reliance, and a sort of a distrust of the outside world in very simple terms. While positive non alignment, you seem to characterize more as being interconnected with the international community, but not necessarily subservient to any one country. In fact, the word you use here and you do use this word a few times, you define the worldview as a virtuous, ethical tone. Now, I find that very interesting, it almost feels to me, like positive non alignment is almost trying to position your nation as the one to which other nations would want to align and trying to be a role model within the international community. And negative Mutualism is I think, what most of us would just refer to as isolationism. Would that be accurate?
Andrea Passeri 16:13
Yeah, that is absolutely accurate. I would say that the idea behind positive non alignment is to project your country as a responsible stakeholder, and a good citizen of the international community. So again, the concept of positive non alignment sort of underscores a logic according to which the goal is to achieve a very diversified range of diplomatic partners and interlocutors we each and this is probably the key part can act as reciprocal counterweights so that the country doesn't become over dependent on one single partner, patron, protector, and so on and so forth. And this is in the case of Myanmar, clearly, an antidote to me coming over reliant on China, the People's Republic of China, the strategy of positive non alignment in the case of Myanmar, was formulated with a clear target in mind, which is once again, the PRC.
Brad 17:39
Yes. And so, on that topic, it, it always seems to be that this comes down to what I want to use the word sovereignty. A lot of countries, a lot of governments, particularly governments that have a nationalist bent, like to use the concept of sovereignty. And we saw sovereignty as a rallying cry. In, for example, the Brexit debates back in 2015 2016. So it is a term that is used quite broadly. And the notion of sovereignty as one country is right to act, the way that it wants to act, without other countries influencing it would seem like a driver of these non alignment policies, this non alignment stance, the question that I want to pose, and this might be a very naive question is, is it ever possible for smaller countries, what I think you refer to as secondary actors, to actually be independent of the whims and the actions of larger countries, because it feels to me like, if you're completely self sufficient and isolated, then in theory, you might be able to do it. But if you interact with the outside world, and you depend on that interaction, the big countries can say, either, you have to do things the way that I want you to do them, or I will use my sanctions to positively cripple and punish you. And that is going to drive you into the arms of another great power, like is it possible for small countries to actually be sovereign and independent from
Hunter Marsten 19:16
large powers? Yeah, it's a very good question. I think, rather than provide a definitive answer, I would just point to sort of a phase during which I think Myanmar came closest to doing this. And, you know, possibly we could go back further to the era of Burma's involvement in the NonAligned Movement. But I think more recently, the clearest example was the increased flexibility that Myanmar had in its foreign policy, as a result of Western sanctions dissipating, and, in turn, because the economy was growing suddenly leaps and bounds under the theory insane administration. and this isn't because of some economic genius within the sane, sane government, it's purely because the country changed its direction so drastically that the world was suddenly perceiving Myanmar in a new light. And business people were flooding into the country to strike new deals as news frontier. But at the same time, this sudden interest, like you were saying, countries are able to, or non alignment. The way you put it, I think was interesting that essentially positioning your country as the spot or the place where countries want to align other other partners want to align with. And I think that's that's notable in that Myanmar was suddenly able to push back on China. So the example everyone points to was things sayings decision to suspend the controversial mute so hydroelectric power dam in northern kitchen state, which was several billion dollars in Chinese investment. And this really caught Beijing by surprise. Suddenly, it was on the backfoot. Whereas just a couple of years ago, China enjoyed overwhelming economic dominance in the country. Suddenly, little Myanmar was pushing back and saying, You know what, actually, we're going to suspend the steel, put that on ice. And suddenly, Beijing was forced to actually compete for influence in the country with the likes of Washington, and European countries who were suddenly more involved. And then another notable project was the choke few special economic zone and deep seaport in Rakhine State, which the Myanmar government renegotiated. More recently, under the NLD. Government. I forget exactly what year this was perhaps 2018 When the government renegotiated the shareholder arrangement to favor Myanmar stakeholders, more than the Chinese conglomerates that were involved in the project. And this was in a sense, are in essence, Myanmar economic sovereignty, the rediscovery of its ability to craft deals that were beneficial to the country, rather than simply ceding territory or ceding resources to overseas investors like China across the border. Not to say China's the only one sort of rapaciously coming in and snatching up resources, certainly Thailand is involved in that too. But China being the country's largest trade, largest trade partner, it was really a surprising sign of the times when Myanmar was able to assert a measure of sovereignty and push back on Chinese economic involvement in the country, because it now had other options to hedge against China and use other partners to protect in largest space.
Andrea Passeri 22:45
Yeah, if I can add my two cents, I would say that it's impossible by definition for a small country like Myanmar, which is, by the way sandwiched between two giants like China and India, to be completely autonomous and independent. Having said that, there are strategies, insurance policies that can help countries small countries like Myanmar, to sort of manage the risks associated with living so close to great powers and you know, entertaining on equalizing metrical relations with this with this power, so the idea once again, is to avoid putting all eggs in one basket and diversifying the pool of your strategic partnerships, diplomatic partnerships in order to at least reduce the degree of dependence that you have on one single actor, okay.
Brad 24:06
And so, this sort of leads into into an important question. I mean, you two are obviously experts like this may be obvious to you, but one would presume that in a in a state administration, they would have people who can understand this who understand the strategic position, the value, the resources, the potential that Myanmar has, and would understand that a positive non alignment is objectively superior for Myanmar, than negative neutralism or an isolationist policy. So what do you think was the driving factor for so many years of of isolation, often a wins coup?
Hunter Marsten 24:48
I think in a nutshell, regime survival. You know, it got to the point where Myanmar's military actually began to see reliance on China as a threat threat to its sovereignty. And I recall seeing a report of sort of, what would you call it, Myanmar doesn't really have a history of think tanks. And it's emerged from within the defense services Academy. But a sort of white paper emerged that actually pointed to China and economic dependence on China as a state of national emergency. And really, for the first time, they saw the chief national security threat to the country as this Chinese economic dominance over the country. So there are certainly voices within the tatmadaw, or Myanmar military, which do see China as in China's economic dominance as a threat to the country. And more recently, also, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there have emerged reports of, you know, various tabletop exercises were in someone in the Myanmar military, and you know, most of this is sort of not well sourced or quoted in the media. So it's not, you know, I'm not 100% sure how accurate this is. But supposedly, a report emerged that said something like, you know, we have to plan for the eventuality or the hypothetical scenario of a Chinese invasion, you know, what lessons will China learn? And, you know, what if China invaded Myanmar next. So it certainly seems clear that there are some, you could call them paranoid. But there are voices within the Myanmar military that see China as a major threat to the country's security. But that said, the reason it never became sort of a decided, obviously, it came to a decisive point. It came to a head, I think when the military crafted this roadmap to democracy, or discipline, flourishing democracy, as it called it, with its 2008 constitution, that China was a major reason for the structural change in the country's politics. But I think, you know, the same reason applies to the way the country the military has reverted to its dependence on China now, despite seeing China as an economic and national security threat, because what it underlines is that China is intimately connected to the top my sense of survival, as a regime without China's economic underpinnings and support. And that extends to the diplomatic realm as well. The terminal is essentially isolated and won't be able to hold itself up. So then
Brad 27:36
it's very interesting that that's, that's the case and it's also something that seems to be a mindset that we do see across a lot of other Southeast Asian Asian nations. And I just want to first question what is the role that the colonial legacy has played in the the political desire for sovereignty and largely just the desire to be left alone by by external powers within the Southeast Asian and broader Asian political community.
Andrea Passeri 28:14
In my opinion, the legacy is huge. And you know, when you experience that kind of, situation of colonial dependence of subjugation from external powers, that definitely leaves a mark a scar on you. And the legacy of the of the colonial Hira is definitely alive and kicking when it comes to Myanmar strategic culture. And the imperative of safeguarding a certain degree of independence and autonomy and room for maneuver stems, also from that kind of legacy. And as you said, this is not something unique to Myanmar is pretty common in the all of Southeast Asia, where countries experienced similar traumas, as far as colonialism and European imperialism is concerned.
Hunter Marsten 29:27
Yeah, just a second, Andrea's comment. I often think of a book by a scholar. I know Andre and I have both. Who has influenced both of us. The work of John George Yari, who wrote this great book in 2010, called the limits of alignment. And his whole theory essentially hinges on the colonial legacy in Southeast Asia, which really informs small states. reluctance to get in bed too deeply with me jrpower partners and as a result of this colonial memory, which oftentimes involve ceding territory to foreign armies and bases, for instance, you know, the Philippines with Subic base in Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, these countries saw partnerships or alliances as really impinging on their own independence. And so I think this is very true in Myanmar's case as well, you know, Myanmar, was occupied and ruled by the British for for many, many years, and subsequently was invaded by Japan. So it had to fight multiple wars to free itself from these colonial occupying forces. And really, I think this left deep scars on the country's national memory, and especially lead to actually the power and vision or self identity that the terminal continues to hold of itself as the protector of national sovereignty.
Andrea Passeri 31:01
This shared legacy is also pretty visible and are enigmatic when you look at the role that Southeast Asian states played in the non aligned movement from 1955 onwards, when they again, sought to assert sort of equidistant position between the two power blocks, which was again considered as a crucial prerequisite to be relatively free, and independent and autonomous, in the international arena. So there is definitely a shared legacy that relates to colonialism, and in turn informs the way many Southeast Asian states formulate and then implement their alignment strategies, visa vie, great powers.
Brad 32:03
So I'm happy that you bring that up. Because I wanted to ask about ASEAN specifically. And I know that with Hunter we discussed this on a previous podcast contrasting the Ukraine crisis and the Myanmar crisis. But ASEAN sort of draws parallels to the European Union. But at the same time, it's very different. The European Union is much more comfortable implementing policy across the union, and calling out member states who fail to meet certain standards. For example, the European Union is calling out Hungary is calling out Poland for the absence of rule of law. We're seeing all sorts of punitive measures being considered the withdrawal of voting rights, the withdrawal of European Union funding, ASEAN has a very strong history of non intervention. And this Myanmar crisis has really pushed that policy to its limit. But what to what extent is this desire that Asian states generally seem to have for non alignment, driving us Ian's response to Myanmar or lack of response to Myanmar?
Hunter Marsten 33:17
Yeah, it's a great question. Andre, if you don't mind, I think I'll just weigh in, I think Ozzy on is unique in many respects here. The diversity of ASEAN member states and their governance systems essentially means that no one is going to criticize the more authoritarian partners. Because Azerbaijan's cohesion as a whole really hinges on the idea that all members respect their counterparts. right to govern as they best see fit. You know, these are internal affairs as they see it. And Thailand has most notably voiced since the coup, I think over and above the European Union. The example of the African Union is an interesting one to look at, actually, the AU suspended Burkina Faso after a military coup earlier this year, and has condemned coos in Africa. So it's been a vocal critic of authoritarian tendencies within member states, of its own, you know, African Union members. Far, far from the Allianz response, where you see a few conservative voices, the likes of Indonesia, most recently Malaysia, as well as Singapore who have been critical of the Myanmar military. But as young just lacks the enforcement mechanisms, the collective spine, if I can say so, to really put up a stiff response and speakers one when one of its member states really goes goes in the wrong direction.
Andrea Passeri 34:54
Yeah, I mean, I think that we should also consider that the European and union and ASEAN are really different. As far as the integration blueprint is, is concerned, like, the ASEAN way to integration favors a very loose structured respect of the principle of non interference, as Hunter was saying, the idea that decisions should be taken by consensus instead of majority. Whereas on the other hand, the European Union practices a tighter form of integration, even though as a European, I guess, we are all frustrated by the fact that the EU very seldom speaks with one voice. So, that is not, you know, the, the guarantee that a sovereign nation will act or will be able to actually, you know, speak with one voice and be truly effective when it comes to dealing with security crisis that is, as in the case of Myanmar or the ongoing war in Ukraine. But ASEAN and the EU and the EU are truly different creatures when it comes to the way they envisioned their integration project, Azam sticks to the slogan of you know, unity in diversity. And this is essentially due to the fact that when ASEAN was first established, at the end of the 60s, its founding fathers were so different on so many levels in terms of their political regimes, religion, language, historical backgrounds. So, the idea was to build again a loose structure that would encourage and support a progressive integration between these countries. But the the European formula in this respect is truly truly different.
Brad 37:17
So, so I want to just ask a question that definitely calls for speculation. But could Myanmar historically speaking like looking from the coup of near when onwards, could Myanmar have successfully followed a, what you would call negative mutualist? Or largely isolationist policy without falling backwards as it did in social, in economic, in political and in basically every kind of metric? Could they have pulled it off successfully?
Andrea Passeri 37:54
You mean practicing successful form of negative mutualism?
Brad 38:00
Yes, because you talk about autarky or self sufficiency. And Myanmar, for example, is an exporter of a lot of goods like could they have the resources they have the food? Would it have been possible? Or was it just always doomed to failure?
Andrea Passeri 38:16
Well, in my opinion, especially when it comes to promoting the economic development of a backward country like Myanmar party, I'm like positive non alignment definitely brings way more benefits than negative mutualism. But again, positive non alignment cannot be practiced under all circumstances. And this is probably one of the most important points in our article, because the main hypothesis the crucial factor that we sort of highlight in order to explain why certain countries like Myanmar alternatively rely on different forms of neutral is behavior and why certain turning points eventually materialize is due to the degree of political legitimization retained by their leadership's So, again, the I thought is is that we developed was that a higher degree of political legitimation both domestic and international, sort of sets the stage for the adoption of a more dynamic, proactive blend of non aligned behavior, whereas a low degree of political legitimization paves the way for or negative mutualism. And these could be seen, for instance, when it comes to on Sunsoo cheese government after the outbreak of the Rohingya crisis in 2017, which dealt a mortal blow to the nlds government, especially legitimation, especially in the international arena, and as a consequence of that, uncensored, she sort of increased a her xenophobic traits as a hunter was mentioning her earlier with regards to her visit to Budapest. Whereas when political legitimation is high, between 1948 and The Hurleys, 60s, under Prime Minister new or more recently, under the time sign administration, the leadership feels confident enough to embrace a more proactive dynamic blend of alignment strategy, which again, we nicknamed as positive non alignment,
Brad 41:21
I definitely want to move to the legitimation because there's there's a lot of information about legitimation in the article. But the reason I'm I'm sort of asking this question I'm playing the devil's advocate, as it were, is because you do talk about the development of countries. And there is a certain degree in which you could understand the hesitance of countries like Myanmar, who look at organizations like the International Monetary Fund, who look at heavy investments that have come out of countries like China. And they might say, Look, I'm not comfortable opening up, quote unquote, if it means taking on, you know, very large loans which I have to repay, which come with so many strings attached to that I'm effectively in a debt trap. This is the this is I think the behind the scenes problem. For a lot of smaller countries trying to do this positive non alignment. I may be completely incorrect, I may have misunderstood, but is there a sense in which they would very legitimately the Myanmar military would have very legitimately looked around and said, No one is going to really help us, everyone is going to want to give us loans that are going to trap us in an endless cycle. So to protect ourselves, we it is better for us to be negatively neutral, would that have been a legitimate line of thought?
Hunter Marsten 42:48
I think that was the line of thought essentially espoused by the Burmese Socialist Party back in the 70s and 80s. You know, turning inwards and self reliance was really the explicit doctrine put forward by the military junta at the time and the Socialist Party. But I think, you know, ultimately, it's not successful because an underdeveloped country like Myanmar doesn't have the resources yet to completely go it alone. Other countries, you know, notably during the Cold War did more successfully practiced practice neutrality or non alignment for certain periods of time. Ultimately, Cold War, bipolar pressures really exerted such overwhelming force on these smaller countries, like Indonesia, and even Cambodia and Laos tried to sort of profess neutrality that, you know, they were upset by military coos or actual, you know, wars being fought on their territory. You know, India perhaps withstood these pressures to a greater extent, given the size of the country. But Myanmar is turbulence. Throughout its history, you know, it hasn't really found a way to go it alone. And despite the military's best efforts, that go it alone mentality has essentially led to the country's overwhelming poverty among the general populace. And that doesn't extend to the military, which has mostly been able to reward its own and ensure that there are corrupt cash cows and flows to keep loyalty and keep junior officers in line. But, you know, the converse, the converse of this, perhaps would be you know, if a country like the United States was to truly practice America first and sort of wall itself off from the rest of the world. It would have the resources to go it alone for you know, conceivably decades perhaps given, you know, its abundant natural resources and wealth already extant. But, you know, even Trump's America first, for instance, which you know, I don't think really compares to negative mutualism, still, sort of, you know, didn't extend to the true sort of negation of multilateral trade deals like NAFTA and engagement with its neighbors, Mexico and Canada, which suffered from, you know, this time when, when the United States foreign policy was in upheaval. But essentially, I guess what I'm trying to say is that, you know, to truly practice negative mutualism, and actually guarantee your populace have living wages and sufficient bread on the table, I think you have to start from a position of relative advantage. Whereas Myanmar or Burma, you know, perhaps had that, you know, sort of inherent in advantages when it was granted independence in 1948. It was at the time seen as the rice basket of Asia, it had Rangoon University Yangon International Airport was a hub, it looked like it was well poised to actually succeed on its own practicing a form of non alignment. But that was positive non alignment and the negative neutralism that the military espoused in subsequent decades, gradually walled the country off, contributed to international isolation and declining trade flows. And the investment that was coming into the country was in extractive resources, which took the country's natural wealth out without leading to sustainable revenue generating streams of income, jobs and growth. For the wider country. It benefited the military benefited some of the military's cronies. But negative neutralism has never really led to a successful economic or national development.
Brad 46:55
Okay, so let's let's sort of jump into the meat of the argument here. And that is the relationship between the types of aligned the types of non alignment whether it's negative or positive, and political legitimation. So the the article is basically arguing and please correct me if I'm wrong, that Myanmar starts off reasonably negatively. isolationist following me wins, cool. Then we move forward into the insane era, which I typically refer to as a faux democracy, but nevertheless opens up, starts interacting with the West, start seeing sanctions being lowered, start seeing some punishment. And then we have the NLD government continuing that trend. Until the Rohingya crisis hits the NLD government loses a lot of its international clout and the sense of legitimization of the government, as perceived by the international community. And that triggers a backtracking and a descent back into this more isolationist. Well, we know what's best for our country, we're going to do what we're going to do anyway, the international community can take it or leave it. And that obviously has been greatly exacerbated by the coup, which one of you refer to I think, very beautifully as the new era of praetorian rule. Would that be an accurate sort of picture here?
Andrea Passeri 48:21
Yeah, it was definitely it was, as you said, there is a first visible shift following the transition towards a quasi democracy in 2011. Myanmar progressively turns towards positive non alignment. And as you saw from our article, our opinion is that the times in here I was quite successful, one more in terms of domestic reforms, and as far as the RE approachment with the West was concerned, and then we have yet another shift in the opposite direction, namely towards negative mu neutralism, following the outbreak of the Rohingya crisis, which impacted not only on Myanmar on Ansons uchis International popularity and legitimation but also in terms of per government's domestic legitimization. Especially these are the non Balmer constituencies.
Hunter Marsten 49:42
I think it's an important point in the NLD years because frequently as an international observer of Myanmar, I need to remind myself that the sort of western view and criticism of the nlds defense of the military So especially Aung San su chi is defense of the military's crimes against humanity and the charges of genocide that were leveled at The Hague, you know, wasn't really, as decisive or existential, a turning point for those within Myanmar who still supported the NLD. So the majority of Myanmar people actually really had wed themselves to Aung San su chi as the leader of the country's democracy, and her nationalist and xenophobic perspective and denial of the crimes. The persecution of Rohingya, and deaths and reports of all sorts of torture and abuses, didn't affect their support for the popularity of Aung San su chi at the time, that subsequently it has changed as more Burma have come out and said, you know, we actually sympathized with the Ranga. And, you know, realize that something terribly wrong took place. But at the time, the domestic sources of political legitimation, were still fairly strong. Aung San su chi is international sources of legitimation had declined as a result, economic sanctions snap back into place against the military. And as a result of the perception of Myanmar's inner turmoil, turmoil, overall investment and trade started to slow. So these started to erode the sort of some of the basis for her political legitimation. But by and large, she still held loyalty within the country from Yeah, my voters.
Brad 51:38
And, and I want to thank you for bringing that up, because I remember being there at the time. And it was very, it was very jarring to see that while there was an actual international case in The Hague going on, and evidence had been brought to the, to the light of the public through, for example, the work that writers did, but many other publications, you know, found information and evidence of these crimes. There were huge billboards all along the main roads, you know, saying let let us support our leader Aung San su chi, and everyone was very happy and very proud when she when she went to the Hague, to defend the country against allegations and and repeatedly denied them. And I think that this really is important for one of the big points, that that comes up in this article, which is the contrast between domestic and international censors of legitimation. And the idea that this is a sort of, vicious cycle, if you lose domestic legitimation, you are likely to follow policies that are also going to lose you international legitimation. While when you see an increase in your legitimation in one area, you are likely to pursue a policy in the other that is going to increase your legitimation as well. Is that what we were seeing with the fall of the legitimation? Of the NLD? About 2017?
Hunter Marsten 53:05
Yeah, so the two are very much related, as you note here, so I don't have the specific charts in front of me. But what our paper points to is the declining GDP growth and foreign direct investment in the country, which peaked under the Thane seniors, again, we're not praising things same government, you know, it's not like the USDP was the savior of Myanmar by any means. But comparatively, the data shows that Aung San su cheese tenure saw declining economic growth. But you know, and here's where it's it's linked the sources of political legitimation. Because Aung San su cheese or the nlds election manifesto in 2015, and 2020, which was largely the same pledged economic growth and jobs as sort of the forefront of their policy pillars, you know, it did, to a certain extent, begin to grate on the party when they couldn't generate the promised economic growth that they saw. And you know, similarly on the peace front, uncensored, she pledged to prioritize national reconciliation between various armed groups. She replaced the insane government's previous peace dialogue, working group with her own and was largely unsuccessful in bringing together these disparate groups with the military, which the military had built some support for under the thing and sand or USDP era. So all of these sort of related policy failures did start to chip away at the domestic political legitimation but as I said before, overwhelmingly, the majority and Myanmar people still saw her as the best bet, and therefore, the NLD received a huge share of the votes in 2020. Once again, confirming the country's support for the NLD and nonsense up to Despite these gradual erosions of political legitimation Yeah,
Andrea Passeri 55:05
there was, however, a trice that Hansen Suchi and the NLD had to pay in order to win the 2020 elections and in order to sort of nurture these declining domestic legitimation, which was turning their eyes again towards China, and we can see that if we compare the attitude and the approach showed by detain sign administration with regards to China's Belt and Road Initiative, which was pretty cold and diffident versus the enthusiastic approach and mindset that characterized on Sunsoo cheese, participation in D VRI. So again, there is a price you have to pay in order to practice positive non alignment or at least you have to be strong enough and you have to be legitimized enough to both domestically and internationally in order to implement a successful strategy of positive non alignment. And in the case of the second half of the Ansan sushi administration, the credit the popularity, the consensus was not there. And this is why the NLD government increasingly relied on negative neutralist approach, which also meant looking once again, back at China as Myanmar's main economic partner, but also diplomatic protect, or, for instance, at the UN Security Council where China utilized as it did various times back in the previous decades, its veto power to protect Myanmar from the diplomatic fallout of the 2017 Rohingya crisis.
Brad 57:33
And I want to stress that that's a significant thing. China does not use its veto power, as often as as some people would assume it very often waits for Russia to veto something. It doesn't like the negative fallout. So the fact that the Chinese were willing to defend Myanmar in that case, I think, is pretty significant. But I want to turn to a different question on this idea of legitimation. Which, in your paper, you point to a classification system by Holmes, which enumerates, seven different types of legitimation? We're not going to go through all of them, because it's not particularly important. But what is relevant is that I find that the rhetoric of the military Thermador very heavily is based on a series of things like what Holmes characterizes as old, traditional, basically, you know, divine, right, we're all by divine right, the teleological, we are the ones who know what's best for the country. Other people don't know what's best for the country. So it's best not to even ask them, and, and a nationalist type of legitimation saying, Well, we're here to protect the country, we defend the country from external threats, therefore, we should rule the country. These types of legitimation don't really have a huge amount of currency among most Western countries generally. So how did the things say in administration, especially following the passage of the 2008 constitution, that it was farcical and the 2010 election which was so transparently rigged, that the NLD boycotted outright How did the things ended? ministration win legitimation in the eyes of the international community,
Andrea Passeri 59:21
um, a quick one, political reforms and economic reforms, namely the progressive liberalisation of the economic sector, and, you know, the 1000s of prisoners that were released the lifting of the censorship law, there were several steps that endowed the 10 cent administration with a proto democratic type of legitimization which again, as you said, doesn't stem from the 2010 elections, which were totally rate. And also, of course, the decision to readmit the NLD, which will later win the 2012 by elections in an landslide also fueled this kind of proto democratic legitimization that the times and administration progressively enjoyed throughout its quinquennium in power.
Hunter Marsten 1:00:33
Yeah, I think the international component is perhaps easier to see, you know, domestically. So I was in the country first in 2010, before elections, working with civil society when people were, you know, literally, I don't like to describe me, Mrs. You know, sort of living in fear, like Christina Pink's book, exactly. But there was a palpable sense where civil society organizations were operating underground people, you know, were looking over their shoulder, and I was worn to look out for military intelligence, compared to 2012, you go back. And I should add, you know, before 2011, or 2012, people couldn't gather publicly in numbers more than five. And so just the feel of everyday life returning on the street within the country after 2012 or 2011, when political reforms began a pace was was very discernible, immediately noticeable. Just seeing people go to the mall, go shopping, you know, hanging out young people carousing, it seemed like a different culture all of a sudden, not to say that that was all substantive political reform, because much of it was merely sort of superficial as you know, we can now observe with the military, the quickness which was with which the military snapback to control over the country's political institutions. But on the international side of that, you know, there was a great deal of excitement, I think, most notably with the travel of US officials like Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, who visited twice, coming for Ozzy on again, in 2014, or the East Asia Summit in Naypyidaw. And I think the US was essentially all in on this bet. And part of that stems from the things and administration's ability to signal some genuine seriousness about reforms, but also a willingness to push back on China, which really got the attention of Washington. So the Obama administration in 2008, had initiated a Burma policy review, nominated a special envoy Derek Mitchell, who then became the first US ambassador to the country in over two decades. So the US was moving very quickly to signal that supported me Mrs. reforms. And unfortunately, a lot of this hinged on us concerns with Chinese influence in Myanmar, and it saw democratic Myanmar as a potential partner in its Democratic Front. You know, to put it crudely Democratic front against China. You know, US foreign policy, Indo Pacific politics are a lot more complicated than that. But I think that really lent a lot of momentum to the pace with which international partners embraced Myanmar once the European Union and United States lifted economic sanctions. Everyone was rushing in to do business.
Andrea Passeri 1:03:34
Yeah, I mean, as Hunter, rightfully sad, I guess that the timing of these opening up was also perfect, because it actually unfolded pretty much simultaneously with the pivot to Asia. And, you know, in hindsight, I guess we can claim that the Rio approachment with Myanmar was probably the main success, the main, the most important outcome of the pivot to Asia itself. So the timing was definitely a factor also in this in this respect, but just to circle back to your question with a very quick note, I think we should also highlight and unter dated previously that detain sign administration was fairly successful also in terms of the peace process with domestic ethnic minorities, the Ansan Suchi. Government he narrated a ceasefire agreement that had been hacked and brokered by the Tyneside administration, whereas on the other hand, the nlds mission of sort of recreating the 21st century path long conference to bring to ensure a permanent peace in Myanmar turned pretty quickly into a fiasco. So that is also another element that I guess contributed to tank signs rising legitimization, both domestically and internationally.
Brad 1:05:27
Okay, and so my question is the international community's response to all of this. Because I do remember being there in during the NLD years, and seeing the same sort of policy, I remember that there was a lot of soft diplomacy happening, Australia was paying for education for the, for the military and for the public service. I know that India was doing much the same. I know that China was doing much the same. The Americans had the American Center, there's a lot of soft diplomacy going on. And there was this feeling that Japan, Japan, definitely, although I may be wrong, I may be wrong. And maybe you can speak to this. My understanding is Japan, does it sort of out of a sense of apology for for World War Two, is that an accurate description of Japan's policy there.
Andrea Passeri 1:06:23
That actually happens during the 70s with the so called Fukuda doctrine. But in through Japan never left. i My sense is that Japan actually never left Myanmar even in the darkest days after 1988 it. It stayed in the country. And of course, we do pivot to Asia, we did a real approachment between the United States and Myanmar, also Washington's junior partners, European Union, Japan, Korea felt more confident to actually engage the train sign administration
Hunter Marsten 1:07:10
in Japan historically has built an enormous amount of goodwill in Myanmar, because it's the largest provider of ODA or official development assistance and Japanese businesses, as Andrea alluded to have been in the country for a long time and have strong relationships.
Brad 1:07:29
And I believe they still are the largest, the largest source of scholarships as well for tertiary education out of the country. So I've definitely noticed this as well. But my question areas, was the international community like did they? Did they see through this and just understand that, well, Thane saying is still better than Danshui. And he's still willing to push back a little bit on China. And we can try to balance Myanmar's position a little bit, even though we know he's not really going to take the country democratic, or was dancing, successfully selling the idea of long term reforms towards a democracy to the international community?
Hunter Marsten 1:08:15
That's an excellent question. I think still people are going to be arguing about this today. You know, at the outset, I think it's clear that Thun sway appointed the insane because he was seen, as I guess, a relatively unassuming sort of political leader, he wouldn't rock the boat, so to speak. So he wasn't anybody's predicted. future president. And you know, this is largely why schwimmen was so upset about his role as speaker of lower house because he was the number three and the junta and assume that he would be sort of the next top guy. Whereas staying sane was was really unexpected. And many people came to the conclusion that he was picked precisely because, functionally, I wanted to spread out the power across this new semi civilian government so that he didn't have any immediate challengers come after him. Because historically, dictators and Myanmar have not really exited stage peacefully and enjoyed retirement like Don Troy has actually.
Brad 1:09:23
Absolutely. So then, looking at en su chi, there's a different thing. They obviously during the Tanzanian government, we see the transition away from isolationism, towards reform. And then after the range of crisis, we see the opposite reaction. And I wonder, did the international community react differently than it would have? Otherwise, the situation under the NLD was not as dire as it was under Tan Sri, the genocide of the Rohingya to one side for a moment and obviously it is a heinous crime against humanity that needs to We investigated and prosecuted, but in terms of political freedoms, in terms of economic development in terms of openness, the country was not running back to this near win era, sort of hyper isolationism was the level of condemnation and the sudden pivot from the international community more harsh, just because they they perceived any step backwards? Or, or did they really see a downward trend that was not going to stop otherwise?
Hunter Marsten 1:10:35
It's a good question. And again, a lot of this is still up for debate hotly contested. But I think so a couple things to say. Firstly, is the dramatic fall from grace of uncensor chi, the hopes and expectations on her as a redeemer of the country's politics and democracy were so high around the world, especially in the West, which, you know, had put her on the cover of Time magazine awarded her a Nobel Peace Prize. She was seen as a champion of democracy for multiple decades, you know, this, you know, relentless champion for the country's future and reconciliation against the military. You know, there's this sort of meek, quiet, determined leader under house arrest, standing up to the powerful Myanmar military. And so when she came out, as you know, relatively supportive of the military making conciliatory statements like, you know, my father was the founder of the Myanmar military, Burma army. You know, that was one thing. But then when she defended the the military against charges of genocide at The Hague, people thought, I said, people, the West really reacted very negatively, very strongly and vocally because this was seen as the ultimate betrayal, Aung San su chi was defending the entity that that Western countries had sanctioned and vilified for generations or decades, really. So I think that's one one factor. But you know, at the same time, there were other signs that were worrying politically, the NLD government actually targeted more independent journalists for charges of defamation, when it spoke critically, when journalists or activist would speak out against the NLD. And you know, really anodyne stuff. The security forces would go after and target in prison and press charges against these journalists. So there was a sort of creeping crackdown against civil society under the NLD. Not to say that this was something that rose to the level of the previous military junta, it certainly didn't. But things weren't all sorts of peace and democracy under the end of the other.
Brad 1:12:58
So I want to sort of free frame this in terms of legitimation. So yes, absolutely. Under the NLD government, we saw a rise in the application of section 66 D. of I believe the Communications Act, which is effectively just a censorship law against against journalists. And definitely something that once the Ranger issue started to come to the fore, the government actively used to, to quash dissent and disagreement on that issue. But what you're talking about with regard to Anton switchy, here, and the fall from grace, that speaks to the charismatic type of legitimation, the idea that you have this, you know, glorious individual, and that, historically, I think, has always fallen flat. I mean, we look at a recent example, President Obama, he came in on this huge wave of hope and reform and all these sorts of things. But the political establishment and the political realities of the United States and the checks and balances are such that he cannot single handedly reformed the nation answer so he very similarly, could not reform the nation, especially under the 2008 constitution. And I would say that her legitimation rests more on the fact that she actually won a landslide victory in a democratic election, even though a quarter of both houses of parliament went automatically to, to the military. So how does she fall from grace in terms of of the West's sense of legitimation when she continues to be the democratically elected leader of a country and she continues to have the support of the people in her country? These are just because this charismatic figures formed from Grace's of the Cinderella story. We no longer have, or was there something else going on?
Andrea Passeri 1:14:50
Well, I guess that at the end of the day, what really mattered and what really triggered these brutal a reality check from further west and is visible for from Grace was that in 2017, on sensor che decided to side with the military instead of calling the military out. And yeah, you could say that, too was a risky move it could have led to new incarceration to the end of the NLD government. But again, this is probably what triggered the fall from grace. And we should also consider that when the NLD. Government to koffice, one of its main goals was to reform the 2008 constitution. And even in that respect, we didn't see any any progress. What happened after the 2017 crisis was that the narrative of the Ansan Suchi, government shifted towards a nationalist rhetoric, which gave birth to a series of meaningful moves both in the domestic arena and internationally. Domestically, for instance, the idea of building a wall at the border with Bangladesh in order to prevent the influx of foreign immigrant immigrants was again, clearly a decision that was informed by nationalist, xenophobic rhetoric, which clearly stands at odds with D. narrative that had been embraced by the NLD party and its leader, between 2012 and 2015, where the NLD was an opposition party, but also during the first half of the NLD administration, namely between 20, the start of 2016, and the summer of 2017.
Brad 1:17:28
And so, finally, I want to turn to the modern day. So we've seen the opening up to the international community on the 13th, saying the continuation under the NLD. And then the fall from grace of the NLD. And last year, we saw the seizure of power in a coup. Now, in terms of legitimation. The military dictatorship has no legitimacy as far as the international community is concerned, except that Russia will protect them in the Security Council. But I don't think any country in the west at least, would stand up and say that the military has lawfully legitimately taken power. They do not have the support of the people. And they tangibly do not have the capacity to administrate the country on the ground. So as far as legitimacy of legitimation is concerned, they're pretty much at zero. And we've seen massive sanctions being racked up. We're seeing international companies pulling out of the country, we've seen Chevron and Woodside and totaal, and so on. So what, what is likely to happen here? Do you think that mean online is going to try and do something to increase his legitimation either domestically or internationally and try to win the support of the international community? Or are they going to double down on isolationism?
Andrea Passeri 1:18:48
I will leave the second part of the question to answer but essentially, you are you're right. The current military government folds outside beyond our analytical framework based on the concept of legitimacy because it it's right to rule so so to speak, is based exclusively on coercion rather than legitimization. So the shift right now is towards negative Mutualism is from negative mutualism, pardon towards a full fledged blend of isolationism.
Brad 1:19:33
Would you say that what we're seeing currently, is a stronger trend towards negative mutualism than we had during the near wind years? Or is it not that far gone yet?
Andrea Passeri 1:19:44
I would say that it's stronger. And Myanmar is already more isolated Danny tools, let's say in the late 60s or early 70s. So I guess we are already one step further They're in that respect.
Hunter Marsten 1:20:01
Yeah, without looking too much to the past. Although I think there are some differences, you know, they when also forcibly evicted Indian and Chinese nationals living in Burma at the time. So he had these sort of random spouts of violence and xenophobic paranoia as well. So I think the trend of negative mutualism was very strong under the new wind regime. But you know, went through various ebbs and flows at the same time. And may wind for a time was also courted by the West, because of his rejection of the former Communist Party, and Chinese communism and its influence in Southeast Asia. So we've seen as an ally in that regard, but looking forward, Myanmar has junta has deepened this trend of negative neutralism that we identified. And I think, you know, there were very few proactive elements of that to begin with. But you know, at least minimum laying made a show of Ozzy on diplomacy, trying to engage that regional organization. And they still sort of do, even though ASEAN has basically given them a bit of a cold shoulder by denying, junta representation at the senior meeting levels, summits. And so I think that's rubbed the junta the wrong way. And they've really pushed back on ASEAN and really rejected international diplomacy outright. And that said, they've doubled down on their partnerships with Russia and China. And it's not as simple as sort of a return to outright reliance on China, which we had seen during the 2000s in the 1990s. Today, I think MIT online personally, probably has a lot more interest in the partnership with Russia. So MIT online, since he came to power as the commander in chief, roughly a decade ago, he has traveled to Russia himself at least seven times. So he's put a lot of personal FaceTime in this relationship, and really sees Russia I think, as a hedge against this reliance on China. And at the same time, you know, he's really the junta has bent over backwards to invite the return of Chinese investment and infrastructure projects, really, in the early days of February after the coup, Minh online was already making statements about the welcoming the resumption of hydropower projects as a subtle or not so subtle invitation to China, to really stick stick around and remain friends with the military. Despite its, as you note, its inability to command control over the majority of the country's territory. But Russia, you know, provides an alternative now, in many ways, and the Myanmar junta has been importing billions in Russian arms for some time, Russia is the second largest provider of weapons. And I think that's really a strategic asset that the military will not soon forget, given its historic mistrust of China.
Brad 1:23:08
And I want to just touch on that ASEAN point a little bit, because ASEAN has not exactly cut off relationships with the junta we recently saw representatives of the military being invited to a security summit, which in and of itself does make sense. And you note in the article as well, that men online supported the five point consensus of ASEAN, until he got back to Myanmar, and started talking about well, yeah, sure, but only after we establish a control domestically, then we can start talking about this consensus as a leader. Is the Myanmar military likely to try and gain legitimacy through interacting with ASEAN or throwing it on a bone? And is it unlikely to allow the military is my question here to gain that level of legitimacy through interaction with the organization, while we see some countries in ASEAN, like Malaysia with the Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah pushing back against the military and reaching out to the national unity government to give the N ug, that same sort of legitimation in the eyes of the international community?
Hunter Marsten 1:24:16
Well, I think, like I was saying early on, the junta really saw Xian as an important legitimize or of its rule. And it sought to make a great deal of the significance of things and various junta officials to ASEAN summits that played well or I shouldn't say played well, we don't really know how it plays in the domestic media when it's published in the likes of global new light of Myanmar state mouthpiece of the Myanmar military. But you know, the fact that it splashed all over the cover when ever men are playing meets foreign officials, when Cambodia's who instead visited the country in March. You know, the hunter really plays this up and sees any interaction with foreign leaders as important to its legitimation, even if that doesn't play at all domestically, and that's only to an internal audience to say, either to the military look, we're doing great, you know, stick with us and stay loyal, or to the people that resist the military rule. There's no hope in resisting look at these leaders embrace the Myanmar military detachment, ah, you know, we are already we have secured our legitimacy. So I think there's sort of a twin message there, but but the point being that Ozzy on has, inadvertently or inadvertently played into that, you know, some countries, some members of ASEAN are more careful to not grant the junta, those basic acts of legitimacy. But others, like Hun Sen, you know, reckless in, you know, giving up those appearances for a no cost, you know, while making a case for the release of Australia's Sean turnout or meetings with Aung San su chi. But really, you know, Clinton is not giving a serious effort to diplomacy and working towards a diplomatic resolution here. He's, you know, trying to undergird his own political legitimacy at home by going on these sort of goodwill tours.
Brad 1:26:13
Absolute Absolutely. So, gentlemen, I want to thank you both for your time. And for a very stimulating discussion. As is our custom, we do try to give all of our guests an opportunity to leave the audience with something to mull over, or some final thoughts that we didn't manage to cover during the course of our talk. So Andre, I want to begin with you, is there any concluding idea that you would like to leave our audience
Andrea Passeri 1:26:39
with? Oh, I would like simply to say that our work is still a work in progress. And there are still lots of things that can be uncovered. Both theoretically and empirically when it comes to Myanmar's foreign policy trajectory. And yeah, we hope that our piece will serve at least as a source of inspiration. And we hope to see further contributions coming out on this niche topic, which in our humble opinion, is pretty relevant. As far as the future of the Asia Pacific is concerned.
Brad 1:27:29
Okay, thank you. And Hunter, any final thoughts or inspiration from you?
Hunter Marsten 1:27:34
Yeah. Well, thank you. It's been a pleasure to join the show. Again, I'm really glad we had the opportunity. Andrea and I are to discuss our paper here. We also have a book chapter coming out soon, hopefully on this topic, through the Institute for Southeast Asia studies in Singapore, which we'll talk again about the sort of recent non alignment postures of successive Myanmar governments. But, you know, to push back again, against our own theory in a way, or just sort of problematize it you know, typology, our typology is not predictive in a way, really, the future of Myanmar remains unwritten. And I think, if we can make any sort of educated guesses of any future government under the likes of a national unity government or democratic coalition, there are lessons to be learned what what goes into successful governance in Myanmar. And this is a combination of economic policies and social messaging. But Myanmar is so complex, and so fraught with divisions and historic mistrust between ethnic and religious groups. So any government that's going to be able to guarantee security, peace and democracy and human rights across the country will have to do something to deliver sustainable growth and equitable jobs, to a variety of people while working with ethnic minorities and bringing everybody under sort of a bigger umbrella to earn trust and buy in into the next Democratic chapter, which I'm confident will eventually come. I'm not sure when the country has a long road long uphill battle to get back there. But the country's youth and the generation that came of age in the 2000s and 2000 10s, fought for many years to see the decade of limited democracy that we saw, ripped away most recently. So I think that generation still holds on to many of those lessons learned and have built on some of the lessons of the recent coup and some of the shortcomings of the USDP and LD governments and will hopefully contribute to more holistic and wide, inclusive policy for their country's future going forward. It's all our
Host 1:30:04
so called 3d showing showing our team again thank you for taking the time to listen to this show, I realized that this is an enormously difficult time for many people who love me and more these days, myself included, and at times, you might despair that there's anything at all we can do to stop the horrors unfolding there. However, just the mere fact of staying informed is helping to bear continue to witness and keep a focus on this issue when much of the international media has moved on. And the only way that we can do our part in continuing to provide this content is through the support of generous donors and listeners like yourselves. If you found this episode of value, and would like to see more shows like it, please consider making a donation to support our efforts, both monthly pledges or one time donations are equally appreciated. Thank you deeply in advance. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup, we welcome your contribution in any form, currency or transfer method. Your donation will go to support a wide range of humanitarian missions, aiding those local communities who need it most. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military affection campaigns, undercover journalists, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and much more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution for a specific activity or project you would like to support. Perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian aid work is carried out by a nonprofit mission that or Burma. Any donation you give on our insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fund. Alternatively, you can also visit the better Burma website better burma.org That's b e t t e r bu R rma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause, and both websites accept credit cards. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/better Burma. Additionally, we take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either the Insight Myanmar better Burma websites for specific links to those respective accounts or email us at info at better burma.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support