Transcript: Episode #133: The Fight of Their Lives
Following is the full transcript for the interview with Zach Abuza, which was released on November 15, 2022. This transcript was made possible by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and has not been checked by any human reader. Because of this, many of the words may not be accurate in this text. This is particularly true of speakers who have a stronger accent, as AI will make more mistakes interpreting and transcribing their words. For that reason, this transcript should not be cited in any article or document without checking the timestamp to confirm the exact words that the guest has really said.
Host 00:38
Ha ha thank you for joining us for the next hour or two in this episode of insight Myanmar podcast. In an age of nearly limitless content, we appreciate that you're choosing to take valuable time out of your day to learn more about what is happening in Myanmar. It is vital for the story to continue to be heard by people around the world. And that starts right now with you.
Brad 01:43
day the way that we're gonna have a good day today welcome back. Today we're gonna have a reasonably informal discussion format for our podcast episode. My guest today is Zach, who has a wealth of knowledge on a variety of different topics related to Myanmar. And our discussion today is predominantly going to focus on the military and strategic realities behind the current conflict, focusing on the Dumbledore and how they have misrepresented their position, as well as the ethnic armed organizations and the PDF groups, strategies and tactics in responding to the military. So Zack, thank you for coming, I'd like to give you an opportunity to introduce yourself for our audience.
Zach Abuza 03:02
Thank you very much for having me. My name is Zachary abuser, and I'm a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC. And I've spent 30 years working on insurgencies and political violence in Southeast Asia.
Brad 03:17
Okay, thank you. So let's let's just jump straight in the tomato. We have heard for a long time. This line of reasoning this this sort of claim that the tomato is the second largest military in Southeast Asia following Vietnam, and is a particularly efficient and capable military by virtue of the fact that it has spent much of the last six decades in perpetual internal conflict against a range of different enemies in a range of different environments. Since the coup, we've had an opportunity to see the Commodores effectiveness in the plains in the mountains in the cities. Have they lived up to their own hype?
Zach Abuza 04:04
Absolutely not on let me get started, just say that military is probably significantly smaller than than normal estimates. The estimates are usually around 400,000 Men, when you actually remove take away the headquarters the medical, the military education, the logistics, the back offices, maintenance, procurement. That reduces the military significantly. When you take out some of the Air Force and naval personnel. You're probably looking at a ground force of a couple 100,000 troops and even those are divided between units that are Are territorially based, they tend to be less well armed. They are kins constrained to a certain region. They tend to have very little mobility they do not have very much in the way of air or artillery support. They tend to be very reluctant to leave their area of operation. Most of the fighting is done by the Tuchman, das, notorious light infantry divisions. And there are, you know, around 1112 of those li DS, they are better armed. They are mobile, they're not assigned to a certain region of the country. They're constantly being trucked or helicopters about the country moving from conflict zone to conflict zone. They have a horrible reputation for committing human rights abuses. violence against civilians, massacring civilians, raising the villages that we saw in Rakhine against the Rohingya, and of course, their predilection for sexual violence and gang rape of women. The Li Ds are in an effective fighting force. You know, they're, they're well trained, they're there, they have better command and control. They are better equipped, but even still, they have been operating at a tempo since the coup that they are not used to. You know, prior to the coup, the tatmadaw was, you know, famed for their ability to divide and conquer, they would concentrate their forces against one or two ethnic resistance organizations at a time. And, you know, at some point, negotiate a ceasefire with them when they needed to move or concentrate their forces on the next emerging threat. And this was, you know, 50 years of this, playing off one era against another cutting temporary ceasefires but never really entering into a durable political settlement trying to address score grievances. Now, all of that changed after the coup. You know, here they are fighting a multi front war against several er O's there seem to be itching for a new fight in Rakhine against the era con army. And, of course, their supply lines now are being targeted, and they're being targeted and they're having to fight in the Obama Heartland. You know, we see the fighting and singing the dry zone region. Never before did they have to worry about fighting in, you know, the Burmese majority regions and protecting supply lines through them. So I think it's very clear that the light infantry divisions after you know, a year and a half or more of conflict are operating at a tempo that is unsustainable. They have been taking casualties. They've had some desertions, they have lost some troops to as prisoners of war. But simply it's untenable to make troops operate on a tempo. Like what they're doing now, it just kind of destroys morale. After three or four months of constant war, military troops tend to lose all battlefield efficacy. And so I tend not to think that the tatmadaw was as well armed or equipped or disciplined as, or as large as some of the previous estimates. So let's let's
Brad 09:21
look a little bit at these numbers, because I believe it was after the 1988 revolution that the military leadership decided for itself upon this target of 500,000 as as the size of the military. And what we've found is that as they've been boasting that they have, you know, north of 400,000, close to 500,000, depending on on the source, but many of the battalions that exist, exist on PayPal, they have a name, they have a notional headquarters, they have unit insignia, what they don't have is actual people in the battalions. So there's this large element of a have paper army. So, you so you're saying that you believe that at the beginning of the coup, the military's actual number was hovering about 400,000? Or would you say it's closer to about 350,000?
Zach Abuza 10:15
Oh, I would put their number, well closer to 300,000. But if you start to remove the number of logistics or in militaries, we often would refer to it as the tooth to tail ratio. And a lot of militaries are very bloated in terms of their back offices, or their headquarters or logistics and things like that. The actual trigger pullers, in the Myanmar military was probably closer to around 200,000 people, but I think maybe up to 225,000, but it was much smaller than estimated, I think you really identified the problem of ghost soldiers, you know, these units that simply existed on paper, and they existed solely for the purpose of corruption. And, you know, the tatmadaw has always been an institution unto itself, it's never allowed civilian oversight, even after 2015. And so, institutional corruption is part of the culture, it is part of the general officer culture. It is how they get rich. And so I think that even the troops that we see are much less effective because of this endemic corruption. Let's
Brad 11:49
take a moment on that. And I don't want to linger too long on this, but I'm sure you have plenty of insights for those who have never actually been to Myanmar and who did not experience Myanmar prior to the, what I typically refer to as the faux democracy period, on the train sign in and generally 2010 onwards, the stories that you would hear are phenomenal, you know, the military receive, many of them receive rations of rum, which is a military ROM that cannot be bought in in shops, that's part of their remuneration used to be the case, I don't know if it still is that the military received vouchers for petrol, which used to be very strictly controlled and and vehicle owners would have to record how much petrol they purchased in a petrol logbook in their vehicles and the military kept a very close lid on it, but because the salaries of the military was so low, any one of a rank sufficient to receive you know, marketable quantities of petrol vouchers or of of RAM or of any other good that can easily be moved, would, by story frequently be found down on the street corner, selling off any of these non monetary elements of their remuneration to people who by law should not have had access to those things, in order to make the cash that they needed to survive the stories of just press ganging children and bribing local officials to take street children or orphans and throw them into military custody when they needed to get their recruitment numbers are Bob rife, and coincidentally also a crime against humanity. The corruption stems from from the highest echelons, but it goes all the way down to to the bottom and it seems to be a matter of sheer survival, like the treatment of the non officers, the enlisted men seems to be unsustainable, it doesn't seem to even be possible for them to live if they completely lived within the rules of the military, such as my understanding. So it seems that to add that historical context, all of the military have turned to corruption, if not just to become fatcats just to survive in in some cases.
Zach Abuza 14:04
Yes, the military is clearly always been a path of upward mobility. For people entering the defense services Academy which is the military college that when you graduate, you have a commission in the military that is a path of of economic advancement for your family and it's an opportunity for grafted is an opportunity to extort money from from your troops. The military has their two economic holding companies, these two conglomerates that control over 100 corporations and across the country that really have dominated the economy but the military forces soldiers to buy shares in that. Those conglomerates each month it's taken out their salary. And, you know, I think you're right what the military can do to kind of deal with the fact that the salaries are very low is that they offer these opportunities for concern for corruption, and they offer opportunities to have sinecure in military owned corporations, when they are retired. They offer opportunities for wives or other family members to gain employment in military owned companies. And then they can offer all sorts of different subsidies or direct handouts of commodities that, you know, given Myanmar's relative poverty are by definition scarce.
Brad 15:55
And, and I do think it's very important to investigate this line as well, because the military have for a very long time, as you say, being seen as a as a mechanism for mobility, the terrific and I would go so far as to say cult like treatment of military personnel and their family members, particularly when it comes to the women, the culture that I've heard tell off regarding, you know, women basically being sent off to work as as de facto domestic servants for higher ranked officers in the hopes of securing promotions for their husbands or brothers or of the widows of dead soldiers being raffled off to other members of the armed services. It's, it's grotesque, but it serves to keep everyone in the fold. But on the flip side of that coin, for people who come from very impoverished regions in in Myanmar, and I had a friend who was living up in Shan State, and she was telling me of poverty of the degree where 5000 Chad, would feed a family for a week. By contrast, in Yangon 5000, Chad would get me a taxi trip to work and back, that would be about it. And the options that many of these people faced in their communities were to become a farmer, to become a monk, or to become a soldier, and it was seen as a way to get employment. I've worked with many soldiers, and I've heard very commonly their desire to finish their service, go back to their family farms start a business, whatever the case may be. DSA was was the most sought out institution for a long time, the health care system that military and their families are given access to is significantly better than the healthcare system the average person has given access to. So a lot of people have joined the military for these reasons. But what I want to ask from that is, what does this tell us about the motivations of the people fighting in the Thermador? Versus the motivations of the people fighting against the demo?
Zach Abuza 17:59
That's a wonderful question, you know, when you see these attacks, and I understand why people enlisting in the military or get conscripted and even before the coup, we knew that there were fairly high rates of desertion from from the military, just because they treat their enlisted personnel so poorly, and they're so poorly paid. But But even still, because of the poverty in the country, a lot of people joined or served in the military. And there was a hope that after their couple year tour of service, that they would be in a reserve or a local militia unit would that would also augment their income. So there were all sorts of financial reasons to serve in the military. But here since the coup, you know, we've seen war, especially in the Obama heartland, right, the shelling of villages, the arsenic arseling of 30,000 homes. I mean, it's just incredible. The the, the degree to which the military is going out of their way to terrorize the population. And you have to wonder at what point you know, military units can be brainwashed, they can be indoctrinated, especially when they're fighting outside groups. So if they're up in the border areas against an ER row, they can be told, you know, only we the tatmadaw can hold this country together. Without us. The union and Myanmar would no longer exist. That's going to be very different when you're going in and race Seeing villages and shelling villages that look a hell of a lot like the the impoverished village you were raised in, inhabited by fellow barman's. And so I think at some point that that is causing a decline in morale. And, you know, we know that defections to the N ug and to the civil disobedience movement organizations are up. They're starting to happen not just in individuals, ones and twos, but but we've had entire units now. Either defecting there was one case recently where an entire unit just simply disobeyed orders. So, so discipline in the ranks is is starting to break down. And we also know that you know, there have to be desertions defections, we can measure. desertions are much harder to measure because people are simply disappearing from the ranks and going back to their villages. But all this morale within the force has to be down just because the operational tempo that the egregious human rights abuses and everything else that that the soldiers are being forced to give just on
Brad 21:31
that morale, I want to raise a specific dimension of this, because the soldiers are not getting the salaries. We know that MEC me HLD, these two conglomerates that you mentioned previously, that the military have shares and actually failed to pay out the full dividend amount in I think, the last financial quarter, and
Zach Abuza 21:54
any, any dividend in 2021. And I don't believe they've paid any dividends. Certainly. So. Yeah, it's and those dividends are kind of what allow people in the military to survive. Right. You know, it's that end of year bonus in a way that that puts them into the black.
Brad 22:22
Oh, wow. So that and does that does that extend all the way down to the enlisted? Or is that just officers only
Zach Abuza 22:30
just extend to the enlisted by by in very small amounts. It's the officers that really have and the senior NCO Corps, okay,
Brad 22:38
so So obviously, there will be a lot of dissent within the ranks, but there's there's one actually there are two elements. The first I want to discuss is these light infantry divisions. Now, the light infantry divisions there, so there are about 12 of those. Now, in theory, each of the divisions is about 5000 Men divided into 10 500 Man battalions, which in and of itself is a little bit unusual. So correct me if I'm wrong. A battalion is meant to be a self standing, fully functioning effectively independent force, it's meant to take care have its own logistics concerns. It's meant to have transportation, supplies, foods, ammunition, it's meant to operate independently, certainly in the SWIFT system. I know that's how they do it. I believe the Indonesian military operates on a an independent battalion system as well. 500 fighting men without without a supply chain, without their own internal transportation, does that really meet the military definition of a battalion?
Zach Abuza 23:48
No, and I think your estimates of the size of the LI DS is is too large anyway. But let's get back to it. When we're looking at these li DS as fighting forces. The goal is to have them you know these independent as as you describe accurately describe them. They're supposed to be pretty independent forces 500 Men ideally, simply, most are trigger pullers. But they would have some logistics supply. They usually had an artillery unit attached to them. But they were supposed to be pretty damn autonomous. The estimates now are that a lot of these LEDs are supposed to be, you know, well, over 500 men are probably operating at around 300 men. What is not clear and I have not been given a satisfactory answer on this is, you know, the military can continue to conscript people, that is one of the there advantages in all of this. Even if people hate the military and don't want to be conscripted, they still have those coercive powers. But what we don't know is how well the troops are being trained. And, you know, we had a better sense of the pathways into the LI DS from, you know, the time of conscription, the training that was involved, but who knows now? Are they replenishing those li DS. One thing that we have seen in the past year, is that the military has passed laws and tried to force police forces into frontline military duties. They've tried to get some of their static territorial based units to engage in more kinetic operations. So I think it's very clear that their manpower is clearly overseas, they
Brad 26:02
threatened the Red Cross, the Burmese ICRC personnel with frontline service. So desperate, I think, would be an understatement at this point.
Zach Abuza 26:14
Yeah, I think that's right. So
Brad 26:16
the point that I want to get to is, is their mentality. So as as grotesque as it is, the light infantry divisions, particularly from, from my experience, the 22nd 33rd 77/3 99th divisions, genuinely meet the standard for psychosis, they are insane. They are violent, they are brutal, for no good reason whatsoever. They seem to just genuinely have a penchant for wholescale destruction and as much human suffering inflicted as humanly possible. For the those familiar with World War Two history history, the deal of anger brigade, of Nazi Germany definitely comes to mind. How was their sort of motivations? Are they being affected by by defections? Are we seeing them lose their capacity and their numbers? Because it seems to me that they don't necessarily need to be paid their MSCM, EHL dividends, they just need to be given free rein to murder and torture and rape and burn and all these other things. And they will continue to be loyal. Is there any way that we can get under their skin and get them to start walking away?
Zach Abuza 27:38
Yes, you've identified the units that are responsible for the most egregious human rights abuses. And I would agree with your description that they're they're simply psychotic. They've they've been indoctrinated to the point of probable no return. So have there been some of them captured as POWs? Yes, there have been a couple of defections. But but very few are, we're talking ones and twos at a time, certainly not units. You know, one of the things that probably keeps them banded together, is the reality that if they do not win, they will be held accountable. It's very clear, people have been able to document their abuses. And I think the leadership of those units can really make a very compelling argument that if they do not prevail, and you know, how they prevail is through this is an even more extreme interpretation of of the four cut strategy to absolutely terrorize the civilian population into submission. But if they do not prevail, there will be accountability for them. And I and I have no doubt that is something that motivates the leadership of those
Brad 29:05
units. Absolutely. And so talking about leadership's motivations, when we're seeing, you know, dividends not being paid out, when we're seeing embargoes and sanctions against Myanmar and therefore, industries, most of which are controlled directly or indirectly by the military and their friends, the upper echelons the general staff, they are losing large amounts of money. On top of the fact that certain family members of the military have been indirectly targeted. They've lost opportunities for employment, for education, for international travel and so on. What is the loyalty of the General Staff like at the moment, can we can we hope for an internal coup anytime soon?
Zach Abuza 29:51
The this is a very hard question. I mean, I have assumptions that I can make about this As you can kind of assume that the inner circle around manaan clang. So when are still making out like bandits and getting very rich from this school. The question is the degree to which they are spreading that wealth and giving opportunities to control natural resources or be given sinecure in military owned corporations or shares in them. And that's just an unknown, I'm not sure we'll ever be able to know that it would make sense for the wealth to be shared fairly widely amongst the senior leadership, that is one of the ways that they've always been able to hold themselves together. And you know, traditionally, the Myanmar military has held together, there's not been a lot of factionalism that we've seen in other militaries in Southeast Asia. Now, that said, the SA C Minong. Claim. And so when have already been purging, the SA C, of some of the leaders, some of the military leaders, I think there's a very palpable sense of frustration that they are losing ground, there are good estimates out there by different think tanks and groups that the ers and the energy to gather control around 50% of the country. And even if that's a little bit exaggerated, it's not significantly exaggerated. You know, middle class has got to be very concerned that 19, nearly 20 months since the coup, the military has so little effective control over the country. And that frustration is borne out in the rotation of generals and the appointment of younger officers to senior positions, knowing that, that they owe their careers and their loyalty to middle class. So, you know, when you start to see that, you start to wonder if the generals are starting to get as rich as they can, while they can? Are they starting to get money out of the country to safe havens, as much as they can to protect their family's long term interests? Are they trying to get it out to the British Virgin Islands or the Cayman Islands or other tax havens? Are they starting to kind of build up their own? Or how should I say this? Or are they starting to think more about their exit pattern than they are about their operational responsibilities? And again, it's a very hard thing to measure other than anecdotally.
Brad 33:24
Nevertheless, anecdotes add up to become data. So I think I think it's important to keep an eye on on that, that movement, that sort of rats off the sinking ship, as it were. And isn't this. I mean, you mentioned like this high rotation of general stuff. There have been other sort of fanatical leaders through history who've gone through this, this paranoia phase of let's get rid of the generals or not even generals, it could be political advisors, whatever Stalin definitely comes to mind. Let's get rid of all the all the high ranking skilled, capable people who've been doing this job for decades and decades and decades, and let's replace them with young fanatical loyalists. The problem is that typically, young fanatical loyalists are not strategically skilled. They don't come with the same operational knowledge and capacity as the people that they're replacing. And fanaticism very often seems to be exclusive to level headed stratagem. So does this does this indicate that the high level decision making process of the tomato is likely to be undermined and become significantly more erratic?
Zach Abuza 34:40
I think that's exactly right. You know, it's going to get bad when there's going to be just an orgy of violence. You know, when when the real hardliners the soul wins, and these younger fanatics are in full control, who have argued that the reason In that they are losing ground is that they simply have been to restraint today, which is just insane because of the violence perpetrated towards the civilian population is absolutely egregious. But that's their thinking. And you're going to see a purge within the ranks across the military. When the senior leadership are demanding things that cannot be achieved, right, they're going to demand more territorial gains, they're going to demand more victories. And you know, the logistics network is overtaxed. Helicopters are, you know, burned through spare parts that are increasingly in short supply. The forces, the units are operating at undermanned staffs. And so, the senior leadership are going to be making these demands on the kind of one star generals and colonels and it's just unsustainable. And they will start to be replaced, because they cannot achieve whether we agree with what what they are being asked to do. They're in their professional military manner. They're trying to execute the plan. And I think when they fail to do so, you are going to see, you know, another round of purchase. And I think you did a made an very important point that it's not just in the officer corps, right? We're already seen some of the cronies of the military get arrested. And people that have been close to the military before, and it strikes me as rather arbitrary, and probably intentionally arbitrary, just to keep everyone nervous, unsure of their position amongst the leadership.
Brad 37:07
Interesting. And so this, this sort of leads into my next question, uncertainty, right, fear, uncertainty, and violence, not just violence, but violence that is shocking. This seems to be something that the military loves, they love to hit people when they don't know it's coming. They love to specifically target IDP camps and refugee camps. Instead of actually going after legitimate military targets, even though they know those legitimate military targets. We saw just last week, an Mi 35. Helicopter just strafed right through a school murdering children indiscriminately. And of course, very famously, the execution of of four revolutionary activists, which, you know, the first executions of the country since 1988. What is what is the purpose of the the military seems to love this, they seem to believe that this will have some sort of positive impact for their strategy. Are they expecting the people to just fold and collapse under the stress of fear? Or I don't understand this, like, do they not understand that they've pushed the people beyond breaking point and now most of them literally do not care about the prospect of dying? Or what's the what's the game plan?
Zach Abuza 38:29
Yeah, the military's counterinsurgency strategy, you know, going back multiple decades, is this four cut strategy. And it's basically meant to terrorize the civilian population into submission. It's trying to it's basically threatening to kill loot target civilians, conscript civilians into porters on frontline deployment, the use of sexual violence on an organized fashion, all these different tactics were meant to basically convinced civilian populations that that it was not in their interest to support ethnic resistance organizations predominantly at the time. You know, this is not a population centric counterinsurgency strategy that we have seen employed. In other countries by other militaries. There is no attempt to win hearts and minds. It is meant to terrorize. And that has been the military doctrine for decades. It is a campaign of terror. Now, what's fascinating about the current situation is it's not working the people are not being cowed into submission. And I think from a military leadership position, that's got to confound them. I mean, it's got to drive men on climate. So when absolutely batshit that the population continues to resist the military. Every day from from the north of the country to the south from from, you know, the Rakhine to the clinic, you have these people out there flash mobs demonstrating against the hunter against a military that has shown repeatedly a willingness to gun them down. And they are just not cowed into submission. The populations in the countryside continue to support the N ug and their PDFs, which are largely funded by local donations, and there's kind of no better sign of popular support for for the MDG than people who are living very close to to the edge, the limits of their their subsistence, to give what little they have to support the PDFs. And so I think the military just has to be frustrated beyond belief that nothing they do is working in terms of terrorizing the population, it's always worked before, and this time, it's not. And you see them lash out in terms of these indiscriminate artillery attacks on villages. Or you mentioned this heinous attack late last week of military helicopter using its 30 millimeter cannons, you know, these are weapons used to destroy armored personnel carriers and vehicles, and they're using it on a temple school against children. It's just terrific. And I think they're trying to signal that there is no limit to what they're willing to do in order to try to sow that terror back in the minds of the people.
Brad 42:35
I mean, like I hear what you're saying, but even the words coming out of your mouth are confusing to me. You say it's always worked before, I, I don't think the military understand the meaning of the word before. You know, I've spoken to people from from ethnic regions, as I'm certain you have as well. The things these people have experienced people, even of my age or younger, have experienced, you know, death squads coming to their village, and having to hide in the jungle. I've spoken to someone from Qin who, who said that the military used to periodically besieged the village and cut off food supply. And she's been close to death from starvation. And so she just doesn't care about dying anymore. Like she knows what it feels like she's okay with it. This is this is what the military have created, especially in the ethnic minority regions over the last 60 years. And if we look at history, we can look at, you know, ISIS, terrorism did not bring them a lot of friends, we can look at the IRA, particularly once the IRA started targeting civilians, the hearts of the British hardened against the separatist cause in Northern Ireland, because, of course they did. Because now these people stopped being legitimate political actors who have a legitimate gripe with the British military and British government, and have now become terrorists who are trying to murder innocent British children, and therefore they are criminals and therefore they must be stopped and the British are willing to take what they have to take in order to eliminate them. We saw similar tactics fail for for the eta in Bosque. These terrorism tactics do not historically seem to work out well, long term, they harden the hearts of the civilian population against these groups, and they are willing to entrench and suffer even greater pain in order to eliminate them in order to see justice done. Am I unfairly characterizing the history of terrorism here or or what's happening?
Zach Abuza 44:36
Well, I don't think you are. And I think in certain contexts in certain societies, you're absolutely correct. In others, maybe less so. And let me reference one work. It was a strategy document written by someone within al Qaeda, who's very critical of Osama bin Laden. I It was written by Abu Bakr, Naji, and it was called the management of savagery. And it would go on to become the founding ideal ideological document of the Islamic State. And basically, what the management of Savitri argued is that the organization should terrorize the population to such a degree and cause such horrific loss of life and bloodshed, that the people at some point will settle for that form of government that the group was trying to impose, however bad it was, at least there's some degree of stability. It's could be brutal Sharia law, but at some point, people would say, at least there is some degree of peace. And we can get on with rebuilding our lives. And I think that's probably closer to the tatmadaw mindset in this, that they believe that they can go out and terrorize these populations. And you were really accurate when you say at some point, especially in some of the regions dominated by the ethnic minorities, it's been constant war. It's never not been before. And you were right to kind of critique me and say, there was no before this has been ongoing for 60 years. And in certain regions, you were absolutely correct.
Brad 46:29
I mean, it's it's an interesting sort of general perspective on on this. And I suppose, I suppose the really big difference is that the military are not accustomed to having to whip the Bomar majority into line. I mean, thus far historically, it seems that the comparative piece that the central region has enjoyed, and a very, very, very heavy diet of pro military propaganda, and the demonization of ethnic minority forces, seems to have secured all the support that the military needs, that an apathy. That's the other big thing I've seen from the banal majority is, yeah, I'm sure the military is doing bad things. But you know, I don't know what's going on. They know better than I do. I'll just I'll just leave it be. And now everything's come out. And now everyone's you know, I've heard them all people turning around going, we were wrong. We were wrong to ignore the concerns of the of the Rohingya, we were wrong to ignore the concerns of the kitchen. We were wrong to ignore, you know, the Koran. Because when they said the military burned down their villages, and we said, that's not possible, the military doesn't do that. We were wrong. And and now we've seen firsthand what these people are capable of. And, and, you know, it's, there's definitely a reckoning. And so speaking on that, I want to know, is there any difference as far as the tomatoes effectiveness in fighting between the predominantly mountainous cold dry, sort of regions on the east and the west, where where a lot of the fighting has historically taken place? Kitchen, Shanker and, you know, chin and Rakhine, versus fighting in places like Saigon which Albemarle dominated and look mostly flat?
Zach Abuza 48:14
Yeah, no, it's it's completely new for them. And you identified it very effectively, when you said they've never had to fight in these regions before they could always count on that, at least the passive support of the population. The war was not being waged there. And they never had to worry about their logistics network being targeted in those regions. And that's different now you have ethnic Bhama dominated PDFs that are taking the fight to the tatmadaw they are targeting the Tatma das logistics network supply network, which is you know, in some regions has been decimated they're very hard hit and running low on on supplies. So I think this is a very new thing for the military. I think they're completely taken aback by it and don't understand it. What's happened and you know, I I'm kind of on the one hand sad that it's taken the bomber majority so long to appreciate what what the ethnic minorities have been going through for six decades. But but at least they are now and you know, as we start to think towards an end game, what a post conflict post coup Myanmar looks like. One would hope and again, I'm putting hope is doing a lot of lifting here. But one would hope that At the end Yugi and whoever they are working with to create a new constitutional order, appreciate the suffering that the ER rows and the ethnic minority regions have have been going through for four decades. And we'll really try to accommodate them through a meaningful autonomy, a meaningful power sharing revenue sharing agreement that addresses their core grievances.
Brad 50:35
I mean, yes, the word hope is definitely doing a lot of heavy lifting in that. But it's, I mean, I think there's a lot to discuss within that. And I think that one, we might better leave for another discussion, because there is an entire wealth of context that needs to be provided when we jump into that topic. But the point is very well taken. But I want to segue to a different question. And the question is of of the military's waning capacity. And this is not so much a question of morale. This is a question of materiel. You mentioned things like helicopter pilots being in short supply. My understanding is, many of the helicopters that the terminal operate come from Russia, and Russia being engaged in conflict in Ukraine, where their own efforts have become so desperate, that by the reports I've seen they've started literally emptying prisons, and commuting sentences for murder as in exchange for military service on the Ukrainian Front. Are the Russians likely to continue supplying these much needed resources to the Burmese military?
Zach Abuza 51:51
That's one would assume so. Right? The losses of the Russians since February this year are absolutely astounding in terms of, you know, they've lost close to 200. A jet fighters they've expended there. A lot of their short range missiles, their cruise missiles, they have lost 1000s of tanks and how it's through 's and pieces of artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. They've lost radar units. The losses are absolutely astounding, not even talking about the personal losses and those captured and taken prisoners of war, but just look at the material losses. The Russian military is really hard pressed. And if you start to think about their ability to reconstitute and recapitalize their forces, especially under such enormous international sanctions, and here, you know, the financial sanctions against Russia don't matter quite as much to them simply because they make so much money $150 million dollars a week from oil and gas sales. Right. But but the actual trade sanctions, all the high end machine tools, the precision cutter heads that they need for their military equipment are imported from Europe. All of their semiconductors are imported from either Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the United States, 1/3 of them come from China 1/3 from Southeast Asia, but they're totally dependent on those parts. And so one would say, look, given their pressing needs to recapitalize their forces, are they going to prioritize third rate clients like the Myanmar military, I largely assumed know that that Myanmar would be a very low priority. And yet, the other day when min Aung Hlaing was in Russia, he was touring a Sukhoi factory. And you know being shown the for you know, su 30s I believe it was that are going to be shipped that Myanmar is already purchased, they have already taken delivery of two of them and that these four are ready for delivery. So I am hopeful that many of these spare parts some of the higher end ammunition that the Myanmar militaries, defense industries are under able to produce indigenously that they will be in shorter supply. But there are some things that are still in the pipeline. And you know, it's really shameful that that this is being allowed. So
Brad 55:14
the other thing with with air power, like I mean, the military has a lot of airpower, as we've seen that that the attack helicopters are definitely a huge thorn in the side of the, the ethnic groups. And, of course, the bombing. You know, the aerial bombardment, there's absolutely no defense capability against that. But one thing that interests me is we haven't heard a lot about drones. And I happen to know that the Burmese military some while ago, ordered a consignment of I think 24 drones from from China is, I mean, are these like, are they? Are they likely to be not using the drones for some sort of reason? Are they just surveillance drones? Or do they just not have the capacity to utilize these? Do we know?
Zach Abuza 56:04
I am not sure whether they are simply surveillance drones, or they have been able to purchase the drones that are armed? And even if they are, have they had sufficient training on those platforms, you know, it's not something that you simply take delivery of and start using. So that I really don't know and cannot answer for you. Let's just go back to some of the other aerial assets. Yes, they do have their their fighters jets, and it's it's not a small fleet. But remember, they're also using gravity bombs. They're not using precision guided munitions, which does limit their efficacy. Again, they're used to terrorize the population, but they don't necessarily have great battlefield utility. The helicopters are probably a much greater threat to the energy and the ers simply because these gunships carry such an incredible amount of firepower in terms of high caliber machine guns, the cannons that they use, the the rockets that they are armed with. And the reality is a lot of those munitions are able to be produced in indigenously by the military in their defense industries. So to me, those are a much greater threat than than the jet fighter is even though the generals probably care much more about the prestige of of high end Soviet su 30s. From a military point of view, the helicopters are a much greater threat to the PDF send the ers. Now, that said I know the N ug and their PDFs and some are have, you know lamented that they do not have any anti aircraft capabilities. Some arrows do the wall, have some man pads, shoulder launch surface to air missiles, those so far have not entered into the black market space, but they could one day the one thing that I would encourage and I know that sounds really dumb, but the best way to target aerial assets is on the ground. You know, it's it's when they are parked doesn't take a lot to destroy or make a helicopter unflyable and the other thing is they're all dependent on aviation jet fuel. And so, there really needs to be a concerted push to target any tanker going near an airbase you know without jet fuel those things do not fly and that should have been a priority from day one. You can ground a force if they do not have the right filter.
Brad 59:15
Is there a shortage of of jet fuel in Myanmar? We've we've heard sporadic reports of difficulties in securing jet fuel Is that realistic or can they produce that locally?
Zach Abuza 59:27
I do not believe they have the capacity to produce it unfortunately, India and Singapore and some other countries have been willing to supply
Brad 59:36
and so this being jet fuel it would have to come by by sea generally this will come in through the port
Zach Abuza 59:45
by sea or overland from India. So it and then it has to be trucked up to some of the forward air bases so you know outside of Naypyidaw outside of Mandalay in say gearing up You do have these forward air bases. That really needs to be a tactical priority.
Brad 1:00:08
I mean, if it's coming overland from India, surely that means that the pipeline would have to go through all the trucks, whatever it may be, would have to go through era control territory.
Zach Abuza 1:00:19
You Yes, and I think that's why you see such incredible violence in, in the Qin states in parts of Saigon to control those communications.
Brad 1:00:33
Okay, that's, that's gonna make a little bit more sense now. So, okay, so there's a limitation on fuel, and presumably, limitation on on parts, do we have any understanding of what this this fleet was that the helicopter fleet was like and how its faring today, compared to that has there been a decline?
Zach Abuza 1:00:55
What my sources on the ground had been telling me is that they can see these helicopters being used in certain regions for certain periods of the day, so they don't have nighttime capacity, they're not equipped with night vision goggles, there are limits to what they can do in terms of inclement weather in their fine during different operations. You know, they you can put depending on the airframe, you know, between 15, and probably 25 troops in them. So, are they been used for kinetic operations to target? You know, and UT or the PDFs or the ers? Or are they being used more in a logistics capacity to ferry those Light Infantry Division, combatants from battle space to battle space? So we've need to understand that there are a limited number of those helicopters, and they're being utilized in in different fashions.
Brad 1:02:11
Interesting. And how are we looking for ammunition I mean, I presume that ammunition can be produced in reasonably large quantities domestically. But the artillery shells presumably are a little bit more complicated.
Zach Abuza 1:02:27
All of the ammunition requires multiple chemicals and components and brass casings. Many things go into the production of ammunition and arms. The military has a large defense industries base, and it's spread out throughout the country. We don't know really how well they're operating right now. They too, are subject to the weekend chat. They're subject to all sorts of, you know, the incompetence of the economic management, the breakdown in foreign trade, because a lot of the chemicals and components are imported. So I think we could assume that those defense industries are not operating at a full tempo. Okay,
Brad 1:03:35
so are we seeing any changes in tactics or behavior on the ground? In response to these, like, can we measure the impact that shortages of material have had on the actual troops on the ground?
Zach Abuza 1:03:51
So one thing that I have been paying attention to, there are a couple things I've been paying attention to. First, when I'm reading reports about artillery fire in Chin State or se gang or other regions. What's really interesting is actually how restrained it is you might get two or three shells into a village but no more. So that to me, tells me that they're actually concerned about the number of of munitions that they have at their disposal and frontline troops are not confident of the military's ability to resupply them. Another thing that I would look for is, you know, if you pay attention in just the media, you know, all the different arrows and PDFs are trying to show pictures on a daily basis of, you know, people, military troops, they've captured equipment, they've captured troops they've killed and sending in photographs and I spend a lot of time actually poring over those photographs. After looking at the quality and age and condition of the weapons, looking at the ammunition, and even with some of the people and takes they've had from the light infantry divisions, the better arm the better equipped the better trained units. It's incredible kind of the condition and quality and amount of ammunition and the quality of the kit are deployed with this is really quite surprising, shockingly low. The other thing that I would look for, again, is the degree to which the military has been utilizing their militias, and trying to impress them into service. That, to me shows that there are real limits in terms of their capabilities and manpower resources. And again, when ever a military is is turning to militias, you know, it's either it's a sign of their own weakness, but it's also means that the gloves are coming off because those militias tend to operate with far greater impunity, and a willingness to target civilian populations, they just feel that they are going to be much less account. So
Brad 1:06:29
let me play devil's advocate for a moment. Then, when we look at the militia, puce, it definitely come to mind throughout the blood drinkers, because of course, they have to have names like this, why would they not? You know, they they are definitely vicious. But can we make the argument? Is it possible that these are just independent citizens who truly believe in the mission of the military, who are trying to do their part, to undermine PDF operations in places where the military cannot operate? Because, you know, civilian casualties would simply be too high in densely packed urban areas? Like is there any way to to argue that this is not the military desperately reaching out to civilians, that even they weren't able to force into service? To get them to just do the dirty work for them?
Zach Abuza 1:07:22
I think that's a very fair point. And it's it's one of those unknowables. To what degree are some of these militias directly controlled by the military? To what degree are they controlled by veterans of the military who are now ensconced in local communities as village chiefs? Who, or as you know, people that run and administer military owned businesses, and who feel that their long term political and economic fortunes are tied to the military, and have a vested interest in the military succeeding? So I, I don't disagree with you. And you know, you're playing devil's advocate on this one, because I think you're probably correct. And I just don't think there's any way that we could,
Brad 1:08:23
very, so. Okay, so having discussed all of the range of different factors, the material losses, the morale losses, you know, the financial elements of this, what, what losses are the military actually facing in terms of personnel like to date, we've been at this conflict for a year and a half now a little bit more actually. So how bad are the military's losses looking?
Zach Abuza 1:08:55
At I can, I can tell you I can say that the energy is claiming that the military has lost about 20,000 Troops, which, based on my estimates of the trigger pullers, the people you know, not in rear logistics positions, but we're headquarters. You know, it's around 10% of the military force. I think that's a very high estimate. 10% losses would would be very large. One of the things that traditionally, militaries around the world calculate is that the number of wounded is usually three times the number of killed so if you're talking about You know, 10% 20,000 losses, then you'd be 60,000 wounded. And those estimates just seem very high to me and knowing what I do know about the lack of Battlefield medicine and the ability to get people off the battlefield, what what in the military, they refer to as the golden hour, right that that first hour of getting a wounded combatant off the field into a place where they can triage and save the life. You know, that's probably very low in Myanmar are very low indeed. So I don't know what the losses are, you know, I read the reports, but, you know, that come out in the open source media every day about seven here, eight there. In general, I tend to believe, show me the Pics or doesn't exist. I think there's a lot of for the morale of the ER rose for the morale of the PDFs? I think there is. People have inflated the casualty numbers. Now that said, I don't think over all in terms of killed and wounded and defections. I think a very fair estimate is probably about 15% losses. And while that's not unsustainable, it's hard to replace it. And earlier in the podcast I was talking about the military still has the power to conscript people. We don't know how well the post conscription training is going home. It's a question that Russia watchers are kind of asking right now has Putin announced his mobilization of 300,000. People yesterday? I think that would be a very similar question you could ask in Myanmar? Are they going through a basic training? What? How much training are they getting? Or are they simply being told this is how you load a gun and deploy them. And that's, you know, a very different fighting force. So, you know, overall, when we look at militaries, we look at both the material factor and the moral factor. And I think, without a doubt, the tatmadaw is is wanting, and both of those counts the degree to which I don't know, but it's very clearly 1920 months into this, the war is not going the way they thought it would.
Brad 1:13:00
Absolutely. And so I just want to double check it. So you're saying 15% total losses across the entire armed forces? That includes
Zach Abuza 1:13:11
Well, I would say 15% amongst the deployed, okay, so I'm not saying 15% of 400,000. I'm probably sent 15% of 200,200.
Brad 1:13:25
Right house. And so that's the that's significantly more impactful. And so the point that I want to check there is if we're losing, I assume we'd be seeing higher losses on people who are not frontline combatants, people who are supply train transportation and things along these lines. My understanding is it's easier for them to slip away, it's easier for them to defect. Can we can we wind up in a situation where you have, you know, say 5000 men ready to go? And you simply don't have the trucks to get them from point A to point B? Can we sort of neutralize an army in that way?
Zach Abuza 1:14:08
Absolutely. And again, Myanmar is a large country. I don't think people really appreciate the size of it, the differing topographies of it. The multiple fronts that the military is fighting on, and just how crappy the road network is. It's a very unsophisticated physical infrastructure to move people around. And so when you do have these vulnerable supply lines that used to be completely safe for the military, we see them increasingly dependent on moving men and equipment by rivers because the roads are just not safe enough. And, you know, in many cases, the PDFs cannot target they don't have the range to effectively target riverine ships, sometimes they do and they deserve credit for for going after those logistics networks. I think it's absolutely incumbent on the PDFs right now. And the ER rose to not fight the military. But to fight the military's ability to wage war, they have to concentrate on the increasingly depleted logistics network. And if they don't, you know, they just cannot fight the military, on the military's grounds, because those light infantry divisions, as you mentioned, are psychotic, they're better armed, they have better mobility. And so the PDFs really have to focus on fighting the military's ability to wage war, I really do applaud the energy and the determination and the courage of their PDFs. And the fairly durable not not perfect, but an alliance and working relationship with the different arrows. They've achieved much more on the battlefield than I think anyone would have predicted. In September 2021, when they declared the start of their defensive war, you know what the general assumption was, these guys are going to get mowed down and massacred, and they've really done a much better job. And that speaks to the intangibles, the morale out there, not just the material. That said, I'm concerned about their ability to sustain this over the long run. And conversely, the other side of the coin is, despite the losses that the military has suffered, and the setbacks and kind of where they are 1920 months into this. At some point, the military and the government have these advantages. Right. They have the ability to conscript they have foreign allies that will bankroll them, Russia will bankroll them, China will probably bankroll them, they're able to get sufficient support from India. They have defense industries, they have the ability to import material. They've been the beneficiary of the fact that the international community has really done very little to punish them and sanction that they have sent your rich they have the ability to you know, get foreign investment should should foreign investors come in. So, they have these inherent advantages and you know, in the long run, I do worry that that that gives them certain advantages. At some point the N ug and their PDFs will hit limits in their logistical networks. Their real vulnerability will always be that alliance between them and the different er o's and we know that the generals, Naypyidaw are constantly courting these CROs they're bringing them up for peace talks. And at some point, they will start to peel off some of that network. And so while the and ug has done a very admirable job, you always should worry about what happens when the conflict becomes our country.
Host 1:19:11
After today's discussion, it should be clear to everyone just how dire the current situation is in Myanmar. We're doing our best to shine a light on the ongoing crisis. And we thank you for taking time to listen. If you found today's talk of value, please consider passing it along to friends in your network. And please also consider letting them know that there is now a way to give the supports the most vulnerable and to those who are especially impacted by the military's organized state tear. Any donations given to our nonprofit mission better Burma, will go towards those vulnerable communities being impacted by the coup. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup. We welcome your contribution in any form, currency or transfer method. Your donation will go to support a wide range of humanitarian missions, aiding those Local communities who need it most. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and much more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution for a specific activity or project you would like to support. Perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian aid work is carried out by a nonprofit mission that or Burma. Any donation you give on our insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fun. Alternatively, you can also visit the better Burma website better burma.org That's BETTRBURM a.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause, and both websites accept credit cards. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/better Burma. Additionally, we take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either the Insight Myanmar or better Burma websites for specific links to those respective accounts or email us at info at better burma.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support.