Episode #133: The Fight of Their Lives
“I really do applaud the energy and the determination and the courage of their PDFs [People Defense Force groups],” Zach Abuza begins in the second part of our interview series with him. “They've achieved much more on the battlefield than I think anyone would have predicted. In September, 2021. When they declared the start of their defensive war, the general assumption was these guys are going to get mowed down and massacred, and they've really done a much better job. That speaks to the intangibles, the morale out there, not just the materiel.”
Abuza, a professor at the National War College who shared his analysis of the Burmese military in our previous discussion, now turns his attention to the resistance units. He notes how early on, the PDFs were characterized as being “poorly trained, but well-meaning individuals who were going up against a military that has a sixty-year track record of just being absolutely brutal.” Not mincing words, he notes that outside observers saw them as little more than “cannon fodder” at the start of the conflict.
But much has changed since then, and now every single one of the country’s 330 townships boasts at least one PDF unit. Initially having almost no arms of which to speak, outside of the random bolt-action hunting rifle, over time they were able to increase their supply, with well-planned ambushes of military patrols for example. But as the PDFs grew in both number and materiel, so did the concern about how to effectively manage them.
Abuzza says, “The big issue for the NUG, of course, was how do you maintain any semblance of command and control? How do you have any sort of discipline, when you have these PDFs spread throughout a very large country across multiple combat zones, and in many regions, where there are internet and communication blackouts?” So although an effort has been made to extract at least some kind of nominal pledge from these groups to arm themselves solely for the purpose of resisting the military, with the eventual goal of creating a federal democracy, it is still up in the air as to how successful they have been. In fact, the ability of these groups to work out a consistent relationship is further complicated by the fact that the NUG has almost nothing to offer these now semi-autonomously functioning units in return for their allegiance—neither funds (an issue Abuza takes up in this The Diplomat article), nor arms, nor strategic military advice, nor on-the-ground leadership.
But still, as imperfect as the relationship between the NUG and PDFs may be, Abuza is amazed at the spirit and courage the PDFs have shown, which he attributes to the Burmese people’s steadfast determination to do whatever it takes to resist this military, as has also been witnessed through such activities as the Civil Disobedience Movement, the mass non-violent street protests immediately following the coup, and the more recent flash mobs. “People still feel motivated enough, they still feel it's important enough that they continue the struggle,” he observes. “And you know, the PDFs are simply another manifestation of that.”
To understand how the PDFs operate, Abuza insists that it’s essential to study how they were originally formed. They were not created “top-down,” driven by the NUG. Rather, they were constructed “bottom-up,” largely people coming together organically for the purpose of self-defense, in response to the Tatmadaw’s increasing violence in terrorizing their own people. As Abuzza explains, “I mean, human rights abuses are part of their strategy! It is part of their doctrine, the Four Cuts, the doctrine of counter insurgency. So I think these groups started to emerge, really trying to protect themselves and their community against this incredibly, brutally authoritarian and rapacious military.”
As a result, most PDFs are home-grown affairs, largely funded by the population they have been set up to protect, and most often limiting their activity to their local region. They derive their sense of legitimacy from the local population, something that the military clearly lacks, and which, in many cases, eclipses even local support for the NUG. Moreover, PDFs know their local terrain far better than any outside fighting force, giving them a massive advantage. But at the same time, this “horizontal network,” as Abuza describes it, has rendered large-scale organization and coordination much more challenging, and makes normative military procedures such as chain of command far more difficult to manage.
“Obviously, the NUG would like to find a way to harness all those different PDFs around the country, and make sure that they are still part of a chain-of-command and that they stay committed to the NUG’s long-term political end state, and that they are not going off the reservation; not doing things that might be tactically smart, but strategically stupid, like committing their own war crimes, and this has happened.”
It is not only the PDFs’ relationship to the NUG that is important, however, but also their relationship to the various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Abuza stresses that there are several broad categories that the various EAOs have fall under. First are those that have pledged active allegiance to the NUG, followed by those who more passively support it. Then, there are some EAOs who have pledged their allegiance instead to the SAC [State Administration Council] with the hopes of gaining future rewards, such as control of natural resources in their territories. Finally, some others are still largely uncommitted between the NUG or SAC, and are waiting to see who looks to end up on top so they can join the winning side.
Of particular importance is the Arakan Army (AA), which boasts 30,000 armed and well-trained soldiers. “I think the military is absolutely insane to start a new front with them, but they're not the smartest guys,” Abuza notes. Prior to the coup, the AA was not part of the government-sponsored peace process because the AA had made their own, separate agreement with the Tatmadaw, having fought the Tatmadaw to a standstill with neither side able to gain an advantage. Since the coup, the military has been tied down in battles up and down the country, and as Abuzza says, “The Arakan Army and their political arm have just done such a very good job of using the military's distraction to increase their own autonomy. It's not perfect, but they've been building up their capacity to govern and provide social services.” And so while the AA might not exactly wish to go into full-fledged battle, their soldiers are well-rested should the need arise.
Equally important are the Wa, who have largely stayed out of the conflict so far, “in large part because they control the very lucrative drugs trade that is fueling Southeast Asia right now. Things like methamphetamines and ketamine or some of the other synthetic drugs are pouring out of Myanmar in record amounts,” he adds.
An examination of the Wa’s situation invites an examination of Chinese intentions as well. Abuza points out that the Wa are led by ethnic Chinese, who draw support from China, as might be expected. However, the nature of this assistance is complicated, as it comes not only from Beijing, but also from the nearby Yunnan government, who is a separate actor. “So the Chinese play a real double game here,” Abuza says, adding that they exert various levels of influence and pressure on Nay Pyi Daw as they do on these various EAOs. “Beijing is unhappy and kind of tries to reassert control over foreign policy,” he says, “But I think the Yunnan government has so much influence over border trade over the special economic zones that are proliferating in Myanmar, and as well as in Laos and Cambodia.”
Moving now to the NUG’s relationships with these many EAOs, Abuza gives them passing marks. “The reason they've been able to win over the support of these groups is they actually have a positive political end state, something that addresses [their] grievances.” At the same time, he acknowledges that many of these EAOs still regard the NUG with suspicion, as just another Bamar-led group, and certainly haven’t forgotten their bitter disappointment with recent NLD governments, making the path forward unclear.
On the other hand, Abuza sees little chance they would consider negotiations with the Tatmadaw, whose peace plan is largely for these EAOs to simply lay down their weapons as a condition to the negotiations. “The military just has this horrific track record of betrayal,” he notes, “I could not imagine why any of those organizations would trust the military one iota… I don't believe the military has ever negotiated in good faith.” Although, he wonders if, as the conflicts continues to drag on, some ethnic leaders will simply tire of the bloodshed and begin to be open to the possibility of considering ceasefire terms, even if it’s with an organization that has a consistent history of violating agreements. This is a possible reality Abuza greatly hopes does not come to pass. “[The Tatmadaw is] so incompetent!” he says. “They're so psychotic, they are so power hungry, they are so greedy and self-serving.”
Among the different players—the Tatmadaw, the EAOs, the PDFs, and the NUG—there has been much discussion and debate regarding what percentage of different territories are controlled by which actors. However, Abuza believes that such an estimate is very hard to come by. Contrasting Myanmar with Ukraine, where battle lines are more conventional, he stresses how challenging it is to put hard numbers to a guerrilla conflict. But one significant shift Abuza has begun to see is PDF groups moving from purely defensive actions to more offensive missions, such as ambushes and attacking military camps. But he worries that any successes with this strategy may just be short term, and that sustaining a more aggressive posture will not remain a viable strategy due to equipment shortages. Rather, he advises “going after the military's logistics network, their supply, their armaments factories, the economy, which is already shaky, but they really have to go after the military's ability to wage war. Trying to fight the military in a conventional fashion is just not sustainable.”
Like many people, Abuza is keen to envision a post-Tatmadaw Myanmar, yet he is not eased by what he sees. “I could easily see the NUG winning the war and losing the peace, because they are unable to fulfill the aspirations of the EAOs and establish a true federal democracy.” Moreover, he wonders what would happen to these hundreds of PDF organizations throughout the country, which by that time will have become well-armed, effective fighting forces.
“This civil war right now is an opportunity to fundamentally reorganize the military, to reorient their role in society, their role in politics, their role in the economy,” he says in closing. “This is an incredible opportunity to rethink civil-military relations in this country, which is why I think it's imperative that the NUG wins, because if they don't, this cycle of military abuse will continue. And it will continue for decades.”