Transcript: Episode #99: Contrasting Ukraine and Myanmar

Following is the full transcript for the interview with these guests, which appeared on April 14, 2022. This transcript was made possible by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and has not been checked by any human reader. Because of this, many of the words may not be accurate in this text. This is particularly true of speakers who have a stronger accent, as AI will make more mistakes interpreting and transcribing their words. For that reason, this transcript should not be cited in any article or document without checking the timestamp to confirm the exact words that the guest has really said.

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Host  00:48

these during the current crisis unfolding the Myanmar events are happening so fast, it can feel challenging just to keep up with them. And we're working to increase our podcast production to stay abreast of this ever changing crisis. Besides our podcasts, we encourage you to check out the blogs on our website insight myanmar.org where you can also sign up for the regular newsletter. You can follow our social media as well just look for insight Myanmar on your preferred platform. With that let's head to the

01:17

Millennium edition gift today it's listed as a PSD Metallica routine after the video the link is below here behind up but it's not a nice too much of a country because the guy posting this right now see the audible version there is no magician get zero but it has to learn to manners rather than it is rather than more calm. So what I would underscore and then actually for commodity Christian inflates this the CCP crochet breed Nimona press the bicycle industry for over seven minutes and work with lots of guides as I show you through my photographs enough of me the molecules that came out of an academia standing in the middle of a desert was killed the whole of you but yeah, most of you guys that are members or you sat down strong, but as I said it was struggling with an idea.

02:28

Have a stab ocms Here's the translation by Emily Channell-Justice kennel justice. The girl has golden reflections in her head. Bells on her wrists butterflies in her stomach. Large flowers damp with Crimson in the courtyard. She dreams every night, the war's over. And when the evil echo of the shooting season one and all of the living returned from outside the girls window is shop alized and ruined as the morning fog pours like watery milk around upgraded swing sets and parking meters. The neighbors II have jingo in her pockets and small coins spill when she descends the dark stairs to the basement to sleep. What sustains her ribbons and chains pictures of parents still young still living the roots of memory running deep in the warm skin of the past dubs like angels flock to her window everything that she cares for cares for her attentively all these things that she believes in so hopelessly. A look at the weighted average a good day. So,

Brad  04:24

today I'm joined by an expert on Myanmar's political situation as well as an expert on Ukraine's political situation. And we're going to be delving into a compare and contrast session, particularly with regard to the international reactions to the ongoing crises in both Myanmar and in Ukraine. So, Hunter, I'll start with you. Can you introduce yourself and just give us a brief overview of how you think the international community has responded to me on last crisis?

Hunter Marsten  04:56

Sure. Thank you for having me on the podcast. It's a pleasure Good to be here. My name is Hunter Marston. I'm a PhD student at Australian National University where I work on the international relations of Southeast Asia. My background is more specifically in Myanmar civil society. I first traveled to the country in 2010, doing research for an NGO based in Thailand, and then returned in 2012 for a short fellowship in the US Embassy. And I studied Burmese language throughout graduate school at the University of Washington, and continued to write about Myanmar, and more recently traveled back to the country in 2019, studying fake news disinformation and the 2020 election. I think I will sort of leave my own background there. But looking to the situation in Myanmar and the international community's response to the February 2021. Coup. I think we could note a few things. The western condemnation was swift was relatively univocal and the sanctions that came into place, while impressive were probably insufficient to change the junta's calculus and its grip on power. Notably, the United States has shied away from sanctioning Myanmar oil and gas enterprise IT has some business interests in the country, including oil companies Chevron which continues to operate although it is trying to divest from its takes they're working with Myanmar gas enterprise and the knighted nations has been unable to really forge a coherent response given the role of China and Russia on the UN Security Council. So the UN General Assembly has passed resolutions advocating a non binding arms embargo. But at the level of the Security Council, we haven't seen any concrete action that would actually hamper the military's hold or ability to control the country and to expand sanctions beyond sort of the EU, UK, US. The usual list their ASEAN countries for their part, that is this Association of Southeast Asian Nations have been a bit divided based on maritime and mainland Southeast Asia and live democracies and autocracies of the region. So for instance, Singapore has been very deliberate in its refusal to impose sanctions on Myanmar. And zooming out just a little bit. Japanese and Korean businesses have been very wary of posts to the business environment due to the political instability and many have withdrawn. But on the whole, Japanese and Korean firms remain engaged in the country. And China probably Myanmar's most important partner has essentially adopted a hedging strategy. It was at first cautious to condemn the coup. More recently has celebrated Myanmar China historic partnership, and said that no matter what China is there to support Myanmar, it's engaged with the resistance groups and the national unity government that formed in the wake of the coup. But at the same time, it's kept the military close, and I think has been careful to preserve its long term influence there while not condemning outright the military's violence. So all told the international community has failed to stand with the united response to the coup, and therefore the military continues to hold power and face really little backlash internationally.

Brad  09:04

Okay. So thank you for that. And I'll move now to Emily Channell-Justice. Same thing, if you could introduce yourself and give you an overview of the international community's response to the invasion of Ukraine.

Emily Channell-Justice  09:16

Yeah, thanks so much for having me. I'm happy to have you no interest in this discussion, because I think it is really striking the shift in responses. So I'm Emily Channell-Justice channel justice. I'm the director of the tamariki contemporary crane program at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. By training, I'm a socio cultural anthropologist, I've largely worked on protest movements and activism in Ukraine. My my dissertation research took place in 2013 and 2014, during the Euro Maidan protests. So at that time, I was looking at the phenomenon of self organization. So kind of how ordinary people were working together to fill the gap. gaps left by the Ukrainian state which was at that time incapable of, of, of meeting people's needs in various capacities. And my more recent research has been on internal displacement that has been a problem or an issue for Ukraine since 2014, since the war began. So this is really an unprecedented global response I've been studying, basically what we can call the crises that have happened in Ukraine since 2013, and 2014. And while there was a lot of interest in Ukraine in 2014, when protesters overthrew their government, and when Russia first invaded, as we know, the sanctions, in response to the United States sanctions in response to the takeover of Crimea, were not substantial at all. In fact, many of us have been left wondering, you know, if they had been more substantive at that time, could this have been prevented? Obviously, we don't know the answer to that question. But now we're seeing a very robust global response that is largely organized around sanctions. These sanctions have included major economic sanctions. So the cutting off of Russian banks, the cutting off of Russian political figures, people who have economic and political power oligarchs, the sanctioning of Vladimir Putin himself. These have all been positions that the United States as well as the European Union have kind of agreed to, to all take. Those sanctions certainly have had an important impact on what's happening. But there remains a lot of, there's a lot of places that they could still go. And by that, I mean, many countries in Europe are reliant on Russian gas, to heat their homes. And they are very hesitant to cut off their reliance on Russian gas. And that's frankly a huge problem, because as long as the the gas economy functions Russia can function. Today, there were some new developments about sanctions that several European countries expelled Russian diplomats, this is in response, in particular to the atrocities that were uncovered over the weekend, and Bucha, and other villages around cave. So there is still a ways to go, you know, there's still ways to increase sanctions include increased the global response. These, again, are all non military responses and Ukraine has been clamoring for military aid. They've been asking NATO to intervene to close the Ukrainian sky to protect people on the ground from Russia and bombardments. That's, that's something that hasn't happened. There's been a lot of disagreement about whether or not it's even a good idea to send decommissioned fighter jets to help Ukraine. And the reason is because of course, Vladimir Putin has made both overt and veiled threats about a nuclear response if there's any Western intervention. So I would say, you know, the global response has clearly been more, more, more united, more aggressive toward Russia. And still there, there is certainly more that that can be done. And then Ukraine is certainly asking for more to be done.

Brad  13:13

Okay, thank you. And, you know, as both of you were speaking, I just hear so many comments, I get so many statements that just can't apply to both of the conflicts, there are so many overlaps, despite the massive glaring differences. So we'll try to go through it, you know, in a semi sort of ordered and structured way, I want to touch first on the United Nations, both the Security Council and the General Assembly. So quick recap for those who have not United Nations savvy, the United Nations Security Council contains five members who never rotate. And that includes the United States, it includes Russia, and it includes China, any one of whom can veto a resolution brought to the Security Council. So let's start with the easier case. Let's start with a simpler, more straightforward case, and that is Ukraine. Russia being on the Security Council. What has been the buzzworthy activity in the Security Council and the very predictable outcome of that, Emily Channell-Justice?

Emily Channell-Justice  14:13

Well, there's frankly, only so much that the Security Council can do because Russia can veto everything. And at this point, China's position has been I'm not sure neutral is not exactly the right word. But because there has been a lot of evidence that they're taking certain Russia narratives and running with those, but they are certainly not going to be willing to go against Russia on any vote from the Security Council. So any security resolution is simply not going to pass at this point, if it benefits Ukraine or if it's in favor of Ukraine in some way.

Brad  14:49

So I want to move down to Hunter because the what what Hunter said specifically about China being hedging their bets, I think is a very appropriate way to put it. So what has been a The Security Council movement with regard to Myanmar considering that the junta does not have a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Hunter Marsten  15:08

Well, Security Council basically hasn't spent much time on Myanmar. The UN General Assembly, there's been more discussion, of course, because Myanmar is a permanent representative, our ambassador to the United Nations, UN General Assembly is loyal to the national unity government and has actually been vocally critical of the Myanmar military. But as far as the level of the UN Security Council, the divisions within the Security Council again, namely Russia and China, have prevented the body from dealing with the VMR junta, largely because China is important. The largest investor and trading partner of the country and Russia is its, I think its largest arms provider at this point, although China has certainly run up there with it.

Brad  15:59

Because I do remember there being some actions and some attempts to get any resolution or any document through the Security Council with regard to Myanmar, this would have been probably in about May of last year, and and it just fell flat. And from my understanding was Russia and China who just simply were not willing to engage with those resolutions. So I don't know how deeply you would understand this element of the United Nations. I certainly have no clue what's going on with it. But I'm wondering, do you understand what's going on with the Credentials Committee? With regards to Myanmar?

Hunter Marsten  16:34

Well, yes, I can't claim to be I'm definitely not a UN expert here. But the fascinating situation that we find ourselves in now and terribly depressing simultaneously, is that Myanmar. So the National League for Democracy that was ruling nominated an ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, who has been serving for at least five years, as far as I know, when the junta took over, they didn't immediately go to change over their entire Foreign Service that extended to Ambassador is in the UK and US who have taken, you know, independent stands to criticize the military. But by and large, Myanmar is junta is unable to really do much to recall its foreign ambassadors. So it's tried strenuously to appoint its own replacement to John Lowe to him at the UN. But because Gemma tun was already credentialed or recognized as the legitimate representative of Myanmar to the UN, the UN had no impetus to immediately make a decision on this. And for some time, it said, we, you know, we will have to wait until our Credentials Committee meets. I think this was September last year when it sort of came to a head. And essentially, they kick the can down the road by saying, you know, the standard refrain you hear from many foreign governments, which is, we don't recognize governments, we recognize states and as such, you know, Chamo term was already recognized. So he would continue to be recognized as such, despite general turns personal loyalty and views, which were very critical of the junta he's calling for international action against the junta boycott of arms sales to the Myanmar military, has called for support very vocally for the national unity government, and the displaced elected leadership of the country. So as far as I know, the Credentials Committee will have to meet again to decide on this soon. I can't remember when the next date is. But it's a very interesting predicament that the UN finds itself in. And from time to time, we've seen this in history before, for instance, with Afghanistan and the Taliban. I think we're seeing this all over again. But you know, it recurred back in the 90s as well, when the Taliban came to power displacing a government in Kabul previously. There's several other countries. I haven't looked at this recently, but there is some historical precedent for this. And the Credentials Committee has never really had an easy time resolving it. But in this case, I think it's especially difficult because the national unity government, which charlatan has sworn loyalty to, doesn't really have a seat and make it mean it does not have a seat and maybe also the sitting sort of heads of state are all now scattered in the case of Myanmar's resistance and the military has taken over the institutions of Myanmar state, but are not yet recognized as legitimate representatives of Myanmar. So we have Have this continued dilemma.

Brad  20:04

So continuing on the theme of the Credentials Committee, and this is absolutely a longshot of a longshot. But I do remember Emily Channell-Justice that there was a claim or an or a plan to assert that when, when the Russia that when the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia just assumed the seat of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, and that this was not done in accordance with the actual due process of the United Nations in the Ukraine was going to try and take this argument to the United Nations to have Russia removed from the Security Council, based on this is, is anything happening with that? Or was that just a flash in the pan idea?

Emily Channell-Justice  20:52

I, as far as I know, that's not something that is being taken especially seriously at the UN, although, in my opinion, it's a legitimate position to take. That's absolutely true, that Russia seems to have decided that it was the inheritor of the Soviet seat, because it was the first Soviet Republic while all the other Soviet republics have gotten dealt a smaller hand or worse hand, by not having the same access to power, you know, that that decision didn't foresee the type of state that Russia would be calm. It didn't foresee that the autocratic regime that would develop and you know, hindsight certainly is 2020 in this case. But I see every reason to take President Solinsky his request to rethink this seriously. Because, at this point, we do need to ask ourselves, you know, this is a this is state sanctioned atrocities that some are calling genocide. Now, I mean, at what point do we say we are not going to stand for a country like Russia being having veto power on the UN Security Council? It's certainly worth asking the question. Obviously, there are other countries, you know, that have plenty of power that it's worth asking the question about to and I'm not saying that that's not the case. But you know, President Solinsky, is asking us to rethink it. Let's rethink it. Absolutely.

Brad  22:15

So you've, you've used the atrocity a few times. And now you've mentioned genocide, and I know that these are terms that are used daily in the Myanmar context as well. So let's, let's turn now to the possibility of judicial intervention and post factum judicial processes. So I think the Russian case might, I'm not sure, it might be a little bit more straightforward. So what we'll start with that one, we have footage, we have photographs, we have evidence of severe violations of civilian law and of military law, we have clear violations of the Geneva Conventions. What is the legal recourse that is available here?

Emily Channell-Justice  23:02

Well, if it is both more straightforward, and not because neither Ukraine nor Russia, are signatories are members of the International Criminal Court. So it is up to the ICC to potentially pursue a case itself, which which it actually has has expressed interest in doing and in some cases, has already started to do with regard to Russia. So you know, that, in that sense, it is a little bit out of Ukraine's hands, although I will say that the Ukrainian government is doing everything in their power to collect the type of evidence that they think that they would need to support such a case. And that includes not only the footage that you've mentioned, but people who are working to take testimonies of witnesses who are gathering that kind of information. And I should add, that they're publishing a lot of a lot of information about, for instance, the Russian brigades that were involved in the atrocities in Bucha. That was all published on the one one of the government ministries websites yesterday. So they're doing all they can not only to make sure that that information reaches the ICC, but that it reaches the public and so that the public outcry against these atrocities is probable and so that people can be held accountable, because what we understand now, is that while many people have been kind of calling this Putin's war, we know that there are many, many Russians who have made these things happen. And whereas previously, the question about justice and holding people accountable was really sort of considered kind of far off, right, because Putin cannot get arrested by the ICC because he's certainly never going to leave Russia. And Russia is not a signatory member, so they have no requirement to extradite him or anything like that. The only way that Vladimir Putin would end up in a trial at the ICC is if there is an actual turnover of power. And whoever gets in Power after him does turn him over to the ICC. Right? That's the only circumstance in which that can happen. But now all this evidence is showing that it is certainly not just Vladimir Putin, who is to be held accountable for these crimes. And so I think by doing that the Ukrainian government is also trying to push toward a broader potential move towards some kind of justice to some kind of accountability. That goes, you know, they are now holding many Russian prisoners of war, the possibility that they might turn those people over to the court, for example, I think, is one so. So it is, you know, I think there's a couple of options. I think the obvious best case scenario is that is that Putin is on trial at some point. But I think a lot of people know that's not likely. So they're doing basically trying to find other mechanisms to find Russian, you know, hold Russian soldiers, for instance accountable.

Brad  25:51

Absolutely. And I think there are a lot of parallels to the Myanmar situation there. So, for example, the case the ongoing case, between the Gambia and Myanmar with regards to the Rohingya genocide has, has continued, and it is, in fact, representatives from the military, who continue to put forth in your mask case in the International Court of Justice. So starting with with that 100. Do you see that as any sort of legitimization of the hotel does this have long term ramifications as far as judicial intervention is concerned?

Hunter Marsten  26:29

Some would certainly make that case. Personally, I guess I'm not enough of an expert on international law to say one way or the other. I think the fact that the ICJ is proceeding with this case is significant because the world sees and hears evidence of the military's atrocities against Rohingya. But of course, the military has continued to deny that any genocide took place, and has essentially been accusing the international community of bias and having political motivations for these charges. And it's also tried to very bizarrely link the Gambia has case to the LIC or the organization for Islamic countries in some sort of global conspiracy theory. Now, interestingly, Myanmar is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court, but the national unity government has expressed support for a case at the ICC saying it would cooperate. So the energy has at every turn, taken a very strong stance to differentiate itself from the military's position and say, Actually, we welcome international scrutiny and international legal or investigations into the military's crimes. So there are potential avenues that would grant the energy further legitimation or even outright recognition by international bodies that are willing to work with it on such investigations. Part of the ICJ case has continued to operate with militaries. representatives who are defending the themselves from these charges, which essentially is in line with, ironically with Aung San su cheese defense at The Hague previously, in which she denied the military's atrocities, and really took a pro military stance. So all in all, there's not a whole lot of change there. But I do see opportunities on the margins for working with the N ug to share further evidence. And then you know, now that the conflict and Myanmar has evolved to such an extent that we see increased military defections, there are actually military officers and soldiers, rather who have participated in these crimes in Rakhine State, who have now volunteered to share our testimony, which would be damning of the military's crimes. So I think it's possible the military's case could unravel at some point, given the sheer abundance of overwhelming evidence that makes clear that the military was burning down villages, displacing Rohingya people and other crimes, including murder, rape, and the use of torture. So these massive human rights abuses we may finally see some justice it's gonna be a very long road ahead.

Brad  29:22

Absolutely. And I know that even in the Myanmar context where we have somewhat less direct sort of evidence Dr. Sol Sol, for example of vn ug has since very early days of the revolution been documenting, and and has served as a sort of collection point for a lot of people's testimony for a lot of people's videos and photographs and any type of evidence that they can provide for for these atrocities, but I find it interesting that I understand that Russia is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that okay, that did not come as a bombshell but neither Myanmar nor Ukraine as a signatory to the Rome Statute, so is in the Myanmar context on switches, historical ties to the military and her continued desire to project herself as having that strong connection to the military. The cause for Myanmar never signing?

Hunter Marsten  30:21

That's an excellent question. I. I could, because certainly, yeah, certainly there were opportunities. I mean, yeah. 98. So, you know, if you look back at the years of military dictatorship under these Lorcan, SPDC regimes that preceded Aung San su chi is eventual turn in power from 2016 to 2021. I suppose there were opportunities you could say for Myanmar to sign on. It makes a lot of sense for me that Myanmar would not sign on to the Rome Statute given you know, for one that it continues to use landmines against its own people. There are numerous reasons why the military would want to avoid any or ceding any ground to international investigative bodies to interfere what they see is their internal affairs and their sovereignty. Of course, Aung San su chi had an opportunity to sign on to the Rome Statute in her more than five years in power. If you count her parliamentary role since the by elections of 2012. However, I see there are larger, more deep seated than cynical motivations at play here on sensor cheese, overwhelming, overarching goal was to earn the support and trust of the military to further embed. I'm partly speaking from her own sort of remarks and record here, I'm not defending her her side or person specifically. But if you take her line, she was essentially trying to win the military support by not being a threat by not jeopardizing their interests or encroaching in their sort of strategic affairs. So avoiding signing the Rome Statute would be couldn't be conceived as one such way to say, present yourself as not a threat to the military interests. I find that, you know, persuasive, it probably wasn't a priority for the government. At the same time. I think the NLD government was focused on rebooting the economy and a continuing limited privatization and anti corruption measures after decades of military rule and continued military rule essentially under the USDP and even an auntie years under the 2008. Constitution. So I think it makes sense why uncensored, she wouldn't sign on to this statute. But at the same time, I wonder if anybody has ever actually put on her desk, sort of, you know, a briefing about the Rome Statute first place saying here's a good idea, or this is something to stay away from it probably wasn't even discussed.

Brad  33:14

Okay. I mean, that's, you know, there's that old adage never, never ascribe to malice, what can be ascribed to stupidity, or laziness? And it does hold true. So about possibly. So then Emily Channell-Justice, same thing. Why is Ukraine not like I see Ukraine has accepted the the the jurisdiction of the court, even though it's not a member of the Rome Statute, and that happened in 2014. For reasons that are probably not going to be surprising, but why would a country who borders a massive nuclear power is trying to make itself more, quote unquote, westernized is trying to join the European Union? And so why would they not have prioritized this?

Emily Channell-Justice  34:02

Yeah, it's a good question. It's always possible. I mean, one thing to remember is how important multi vector foreign policy was for Ukraine up through 2014. And by that, I mean a balance between prioritizing Ukraine's European interests and its Russian interests, because Ukraine's economy and frankly, political system has been deeply tied to Russia for a long time since its independence, really. So I think there are certain moves political moves that Ukrainian leaders simply didn't do, because of the potential harm it would do to their relationship with Russia. In the longer term. I mean, it certainly not not that there were necessarily specific cases that this would affect, for example, but But even the perception that a move might be turning Ukraine too far from Russia. Ukraine's political leaders are always very careful not to do anything that would attack it. Is Russia simply because economically they've been so reliant on Russia? So I that would be a guess. But again, it's it's hard to say. And we also know how many different political interests have often been involved in Ukraine. It hasn't. The governments have rarely been unified enough to, to make this a platform that everybody could get behind. For example, there's too many different political interests, too many oligarchs who have some hand in what's going on. So I would, I don't know if it's stupidity or malice, again, in this case, but it just probably didn't necessarily seem relevant, or seems potentially to antagonistic to Russia to be worth the risk.

Brad  35:43

I mean, that absolutely. Makes sense. Although, once again, it just feels like a policy of appeasement, which then comes back and, and, and hurts us later down the road.

Emily Channell-Justice  35:55

Right, which, how did how did we guess? You know, nobody really guessed that. That. I mean, I think it's also important to remember that that Putin for a very long time also saw Ukraine as an important partner. So, you know, it's only until very recently, just very, very recently that he has come out with this rhetoric of Ukraine doesn't exist and shouldn't exist in and isn't a state. Previously, he's fully recognized Ukrainian independence. So you know, that there's also that that balance to consider. There was never any motivation to reset that balance, I guess. And a move like, signing on to the Rome Statute might have potentially thrown off the balance.

Brad  36:40

Fair enough. So let's turn from the full international scale down to local organizations. So let's do a side by side comparison here once again. So on Ukraine's doorstep, we have the European Union. And we have NATO, which contains most of the European Union, as well as most of North America. How has the response been recognizing that Ukraine is not a member of either, although would like to be how have these two organizations responded to the invasion?

Emily Channell-Justice  37:09

Well, the European Union has has been a pretty interesting response. We've seen a kind of effort to fast track Ukraine's membership to the EU that Poland has been a real advocate for however, we do also know that Hungary has indicated that they would veto such a move and Viktor Orban re election on Sunday is pretty much secures that. So, yeah, the EU has been reasonably supportive. One of the reasons is because Angela Merkel is no longer in power. And she was certainly somebody who prioritized Germany's relationship with Russia, because of gas. And there's been a big shift in the past couple of months in Germany's position here, because they, they they have been a big problem for Ukraine over the past few years, simply because they wouldn't. They, they were treating the Nord Stream two pipeline, which would allow Russian gas to be delivered to Germany, bypassing Ukraine's pipelines. They were treating that pipeline as a commercial deal and not a political one. And Ukraine was Ukrainian position was that this is a huge disadvantage for Ukraine security, which was true. And Germany's had to reverse that. And so I'm using Germany as an example here, because they are an important voice in the European Union. But I would say that the response of Ukraine's immediate neighbors in Poland in particular, which, of course, is a member of both the EU and NATO, it's been it's been really interesting, because Poland has been so immediately responsive in in opening their borders to refugees, which the number of refugees as of now is over 4,000,002, over 2 million of those have gone to Poland, that's a huge number of people. So the EU has really, you know, they've suspended the need for documentation for Ukrainian refugees. The citizens of most European countries have mobilized really rapidly to help with with humanitarian aid. So those those things I think, are really significant. Do they change Ukraine's potential to join the organization? I'm not really sure that they do. And as far as NATO goes, it's sort of a similar thing, right? It's the NATO countries have all actively condemned the Russian invasion. But because of the the nuclear threats that Putin has made, they're all very hesitant to do anything more substantive than that, although the the NATO troops NATO has shored up troops in the Baltics, which is very, I don't know if that's significant, necessarily, but the Baltic states are, of course, one of the later groups of countries to join, join NATO. Those are also post Soviet countries. They also have much to fear from a Russian invasion. And as we know, countries like Finland and Sweden that have never really in the post to World War order, they've never really prioritized joining NATO. And here they are considering it really seriously. So it certainly this has really caused, I think, a reassessment of what the organization of NATO is and what it does, because it previously was never, it hasn't been put in this situation, really, in terms of a major, you know, global crisis with an active antagonist, a clear, you know, obvious antagonist in this case, who himself has used NATO expansion as an explanation for his own actions. So in that sense, it's really, it's really forced NATO to sort of have its own existential experience, you know, what, what is this organization? What is it supposed to do? And what is its obligation to a country like Ukraine that clearly wants to be a member would not have become a member in in a decade or more, if this had not happened, and now is at the at the forefront of of protecting, you know, the entire European Union from a Russian invasion?

Brad  41:07

Absolutely. And so let's then turn to the equivalent, which would be Austrians response. And one of the key differences, of course, you know, Emily Channell-Justice, as you pointed out, Russia gas there's a huge, huge, huge, huge economic incentive and canceling nordstream hurts the Russians, but it also hurts the Germans. So we have, you know, a strong economic incentive, as far as the European Union is concerned to try and preserve ties with Russia. Do we see any equivalent of that hunter in in Southeast Asia? Is there any economic incentive for these countries to support the junta

Hunter Marsten  41:44

not nearly on the same level, so Myanmar's economy is far smaller. Thailand and China both import natural gas and oil from Myanmar and China to a larger extent relies on or has wider interests in Myanmar's extractive industries including timber and mining. But I don't think any country is dependent on Myanmar's exports or its resources. But that hasn't stopped the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from in part protecting Myanmar and Myanmar military is what I mean based on geostrategic interests. So to simplify things a bit Russia and China are both vying for influence in Myanmar. But then the authoritarian countries of Southeast Asia including Thailand, which is a neighbor of Myanmar, and even though India which is not a member of ASEAN, but next door on the west, have both adopted sort of a sort of real politic partnership defending the Myanmar junta and maintaining cooperation with the Myanmar military in the case of India, based on geostrategic interests. In India's case, that's largely not due to economic reasoning, but because Myanmar's military has helped India's military to eradicate separatist forces in eastern Naga land and within Myanmar's Western Northwestern frontier. So the military cooperation has been essential to both militaries, counterinsurgency operations. And again, India's competing for influence with China. It doesn't want to see the Chinese dominated Myanmar, and therefore, over the last decade has invested significantly in the military relationship as a way to sort of counter China's influence. And India has sent representatives to Myanmar's military parades and naval chief. India's naval chief has visited Myanmar as well. And India has even given a submarine to Myanmar's Navy, not sure what that will be used for, can't really see many practical uses for it. But I think it's emblematic of the larger strategic relationship and the importance that India has placed on Myanmar as a partner.

Brad  44:12

So let's let's let's look at India for a little moment here. Because if we're talking about Nagaland, and we're talking about, you know, the north eastern parts of India, many of the regions in Myanmar which border India are not at the moment functionally under the control of the military or if they are it's only a partial type of control. Qin state is very much not allied to the military Kachin State is very much not allied to the military. So going previously was, you know, largely controlled by by the military in the SEC, but that seems to be the point the, the, sort of the central point from which the energies are ground forces and grounded ministration seems to be radiating outwards. Would those developments affect India's interest in in pursuing a policy with the SEC as opposed to the NUJ?

Hunter Marsten  45:12

I don't think for India, the question of who has control on the ground in those regions is affecting decision making in Delhi. But it certainly influences India's perception of the general instability or stability emanating from Myanmar. So you mentioned chin and Saigon state. Both have been some of the heaviest hit by the military is counterinsurgency operations. And we shouldn't even, you know, dress this up in insurgency language. I think the military has just gone into villages across Qin and Saigon and burned down villages, you know, in the hundreds of households at a time. I mean, I'm seeing news of this every week. And Chin State is particularly heavy hit. A friend of mine from chin was telling me that a third of the homes in his village, his hometown have been burned down. Or actually a third of the homes are still standing, I think two thirds had been destroyed. So the military has just laid waste indiscriminately to civilian residences across chin and second state. And that's really fueling prolonged resistance against the military. So you've seen the chin defense forces and people's Defense Forces groups emanating from Saigon and chin have been some of the strongest actually in putting up resistance at any cost a great cost to the Myanmar military. And at the same time, you've seen hundreds of 1000s internally displaced in Shan state, as well as 1000s Fleeing cross the border into neighboring Museum in India. And interestingly, the state of Mizoram and local politicians This is really reflective of India's federal democracy, federal union and decentralized nature of the of the country's politics because the state of Mizoram has actually been very, relatively welcoming to refugees flowing from Chin State into India, despite the Modi government in Delhi, saying essentially, we have a zero tolerance policy for such refugees saying we won't accept further refugees coming from Chin State. Yes, Mr. Ahn has been offering up some resources to protect those displaced by me, Mrs. Conflict. So you see a bit of a center periphery divide even within neighboring India's reaction to Myanmar's conflict.

Brad  47:40

Well, and so let's look into the actual sort of states of Assam. So we're getting very mixed responses. My understanding is, you know, we've got the Foreign Minister of Malaysia, who seems to be very open to interaction with those in our own lives, the head of the nujs Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while simultaneously we have I think its proxy con from Cambodia, who seems to be pushing for more engagement with the junta and more acceptance across ASEAN from the junta. So what, what's going on internally in ASEAN?

Hunter Marsten  48:16

Yeah, I think you've really hit on the crux of it here. So as I said earlier, one way to look at this division is between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, although that's that's rather arbitrary to say it's based on geography, which it's not some of the democracies and I wouldn't really include Malaysia as much of a democracy. It's a functioning democracy, I guess it has a parliamentary system. But it's, you know, fairly authoritarian in nature. Yeah, I think you see the likes of Malaysia, and especially the Philippines, and Indonesia, being some of the most outspoken in terms of advocating for an active response from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as Singapore, who has advocated for a strong diplomatic response to prevent the Myanmar military from sending its representatives to ASEAN summits, for instance, and saying that the military needs to stick to the five point consensus, which was agreed roughly one year ago, and an ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting or a special summit on Myanmar. And then, as I alluded to earlier, the authoritarian mainland, primarily mainland governments of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Cambodia, and LAO have in Thailand, of course have been largely silent or protective of the Myanmar junta, and you mentioned Cambodia. So this year Cambodia's Chair of ASEAN and therefore has nominated or has the right to put forward its own special envoy to Myanmar. Last year it was Brunei and Brunei have special envoy to Myanmar. So he and Prime Minister Holmes and have adopted very soft language generally, in a sort of soft, light touch when it comes to confronting the military and have, by and large, just met with Myanmar junta representatives, both have traveled to Naypyidaw and min Aung Hlaing, but have not met with representatives of the national unity government or the National League for Democracy. consent, for instance, has said, basically, we want to welcome Myanmar back into the ASEAN family, we can't ostracize them forever. And at the same time, we don't see an end to this crisis, I don't see any room for negotiation. So, you know, we're going to basically wait until Indonesia as chair next year for for any real action on this, which is just, you know, shockingly derelict in duty here to completely overlook the responsibility of Special Envoy, and the mission of the ASEAN chair to bring about some resolution diplomatically to this crisis, which is really undermining us aeons ability to function as a cohesive whole, which had never truly had. But this time, it's really an existential issue for for ASEAN, because, as you know, husband been unable to decide which government to recognize and has barred the military from sending representatives to high level meetings. They're still welcome at lower level summits, or for within ASEAN, more programmatic and technical meetings. But, you know, this crisis is really undermining the international community's perceptions of ASEAN as a credible institution, and a body that is capable of governing its internal affairs.

Brad  51:50

So, so let's look at that, like the five point consensus came out a while ago, and it was not particularly harsh. You know, it's a little bit vague. And then on top of that, it hasn't really been changed or updated since it originally came out. And yet, we're still seeing, you know, people being murdered every single day, we're still seeing more and more evidence coming out of atrocities in Myanmar. So ASEAN by saying, we want to stick to this or ASEAN by saying, we want to find a diplomatic solution. Are they actually being pragmatic? Like, is there a way for them to diplomatically politically resolve this situation? Or are they just trying to sort of look like they're doing something without doing anything?

Hunter Marsten  52:36

Well, at this point, there are a few other roadmaps put forward. And the importance of the five point consensus stems from the fact that Myanmar was military and men online himself, Commander in Chief of the tatmadaw, signed on to and endorsed this document, the statement that came out of the April summit last year in Jakarta. So the five point consensus calls for restraint and dialogue among all parties for the cessation of violence, and for the nomination of the special envoy which we have seen. So at least one step has materialized, although that took from April then until September for Brunei to put forward or for Ozzy on to, except for nice, Special Envoy use off everyone to Myanmar at the time. So the you know, the document is there in that it presents tangible steps that the military has agreed to, although minimal planning has essentially invalidated that the day after he returned from the meeting. Almost a year ago, he said, you know, their suggestions are non binding. We want stability and peace first before we can actually follow through on this path. And more recently has actually said we refuse to negotiate with any terrorists, as his junta has alluded to the national unity government and various resistance forces across the country, thus undermining one of the key or central tenets to the five point consensus. So at this point, there's very little hope that the five point consensus offers a viable roadmap going forward, unless Ozzy on is able to enforce more coercive measures to get the junta to follow through on them as promised.

Brad  54:30

So let's let's, let's focus a little bit on this because I, I'm really interested in both in the Ukrainian context and in the Myanmar context, the value of dialogue and of negotiation. I know that there's some very interesting stuff going on in both. We'll we'll start with the Myanmar context for continuity purposes. So looking at the Myanmar junta dialogue in negotiation with them have historically not turned out well. They seem to follow a policy of exceptionalism Where rules bind others and can be used to punish others, but they can discard the rules whenever they would like to. And this was very evident, you know, with with Slock, this was very evident when they just sort of got up one day and decided, okay, the elections don't count, like after the 1990 elections when they said that, by definition, we are in charge, because we are the military. And while democracy is adorable, if you fail to elect the correct group, your democracy is invalidated ipso facto like this seems to be a recurring theme. And so we saw I think it was Christine Heiser from the United Nations calling on dialogue with the military. In a move that was widely panned, is there actual possibility of genuine outcomes from engaging with dialogue and engaging politically and diplomatically with the military? Or will it only ever be a delay tactic for the military to win a strategic upper hand?

Hunter Marsten  55:57

Yeah, that's been a long running debate in Myanmar, for Myanmar sort of analytic community and diplomats alike. And there are of course parallels, which I'm sure Emily Channell-Justice will touch on with regard to the Kremlin, and Putin's, you know, playing a skillful manipulation, manipulation of the international community and delaying tactics, buying for time. So you mentioned that 1990 elections. That's one interesting parallel now, because the military, of course, has promised to hold multiparty elections in 2023. free and fair elections on its terms, as it says, unlike what it sees as the rigged 2020 elections, although there's no evidence of any electoral fraud, as the military has repeatedly alleged. So in 1990, the way the elections were structured, multiparty free elections, which the National League for Democracy competed in, the elections were essentially held, and the outcome was to have whichever party one would put together, would have the majority of seats in a constitutional referendum to write the constitution for the country's future. Because the country hadn't come up with a constitution since the 1974 socialist era constitution, it was going to essentially be a new era in the country's politics. But once the NLD one military realized very quickly what a mistake it made, and invalidated the election results, because they couldn't imagine the future in which politics was written by the opposition party. Now, nearly two decades later, in 2008, the military crafted its own constitution, the 2008 constitution, which it continues to refer us reference to, in terms of upholding the rule of law in the country as it sees things which doesn't make constitution guaranteed the military 25% of all active or parliamentary seats across the country for active duty military. It also gave three of the largest most important ministries to military command and gave the military control over an important body, a National Defense and Security Council. So the military had its interest in trying and saw itself as relatively insulated from attack or threats from other parties such as the NLD. In the future, that 2008 constitution is what guided the 2010 elections on its terms. So when 2010 came around its own preferred party, the ustp. One and took over in 2011, thereby protecting its interests and sort of smoothing the transition to a semi democratic era, much different from the 1990 era. And so now, what we can imagine taking place in 2023, if elections actually take place, the military is going to be very careful to stage manage any transition to more reflect lessons learned from both the 1990 debacle and the 2008 2010 transition, which even though very carefully rigged to protect the military's interests, somehow still weren't enough permit on playing who decided that the NLD is continue continued hold on power was a threat to his personal interests.

Brad  59:25

Absolutely. So let's then look at the parallels. Emily Channell-Justice, we were seeing some very, very interesting things going on with regard to negotiations. I mean, we've seen Zelinsky pushing very hard to join NATO and join the European Union. And we've seen a lot of, you know, a few months ago, a lot of bluster and saying no, Russia does not have the right to stop us from joining NATO. Now we see a willingness to concede on that point we're seeing, I think Zelinsky demanding that if there ought to be negotiations that have to be held directly with Putin. Is there going to The value in this can they come to a resolution?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:00:04

I, I your guesses this kid is mine. I mean, everything you've said is accurate. But the problem is not Zelinsky his willingness to make concessions. The problem is Vladimir Putin's good faith. I mean, every promise that Russia has made so far has gotten broken, when it benefited Russia to to break it. So, you know, and that includes things like promise to evacuate civilians from besieged cities like Morocco. Those were supposed to be agreed upon things that then couldn't happen because Russia decided not to. So I think it's I think it's right, for Zelinsky to continue to negotiate. He has said that any real concession not that not necessarily the question of Ukraine's future and NATO. But the actual fact of any territorial concessions that will have to be decided in Ukraine by referendum. And I can tell you from from the majority of people I've spoken to, they are not going to accept any territorial concessions in order to get peace. That's just a general position that I feel feel is pretty common among most people. You know, I think it's also important to just remind everybody that Ukraine has been neutral. Ukraine was not in NATO in 2014, when Russia invaded them in the first place. So So Ukraine's promise of neutrality guarantees nothing. Ukraine was also, you know, it gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994, according to the Budapest Memorandum, in exchange for, presumably the protection of its security, by the United States by the UK and by Russia, that has also been violated. So Ukraine is in a in an in a position where the onus seems to continually be on Ukraine to continue to negotiate. But why on earth? Would they negotiate with any of the current actors, none of those actors have shown themselves to be interested in preserving Ukraine's sovereignty no matter what they have promised? So while yes, certainly a negotiation for peace, by diplomatic means is desirable, that would be a wonderful thing to have happen. But who can Ukraine trust at this point to make sure that that does happen? Why Why would Ukraine trust Russia, let alone you know, the countries that have abandoned it in the past. And that's why we're seeing this discussion of third countries such as Turkey, or Israel being involved in some of the negotiations. These are countries that don't have that history, that bad reputation in Ukraine of abandoning them in their time of need. I don't know if those are really feasible options. Turkey and Israel both have great interests in having good relationships with Russia. So that could be a different kind of disadvantage for Ukraine, if those are the countries that are are representing the negotiations, but it's certainly something to consider as as Ukraine's pleas for more aid and military aid from Europe are falling on deaf ears.

Brad  1:03:01

So, I mean, it's a pretty bleak situation. But the core question really is, with these, you seem to be of the of the position that negotiations are a good thing in general, if we can do them, if we can do them. Well, they're a good thing to do. Do you have fear that the Russians would simply hide behind negotiations? Clearly that the invasion is not going as they planned, the Russian military invasion is not going as abysmally, as a lot of Western propaganda would have us believe. But it's not going to plan. Could it be a delay tactic?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:03:32

Yes, absolutely. I, yes. I mean, that's kind of related to what I said before. I mean, there's no reason to believe Russia is being serious about any of this. So I, I'm fearful that they're using this to secure some kind of concession from Zelinsky. While they are repositioning, as we know that they are right now, in order, you know, maybe they'll use this as a concession get a concession from Zelinsky, that Ukraine will preserve its neutral status, and then Russia will reinvade with vigor, the eastern territories, and then Ukraine will have no course of action in response to that, in terms of getting any international support. So I just I mean, I remember reading an article, you know, February 20, or something like that, where Emmanuel Macron had said something like Putin promised he won't escalate the situation, you know, and I believe him and then Putin goes and escalates the situation. I mean, European leaders at this point also should know better than to trust anything. Vladimir Putin says, whether or not that will push them to actually do something to help Ukraine negotiate better, or a better deal. That remains to be seen.

Brad  1:04:41

Absolutely. So look, we've gone through the International we've gone through the political, we've gone through the judicial, we've gone through the diplomatic. So let's get into the actual nuts and bolts of it. Myanmar and Ukraine both are countries which have overwhelming support for democracy and democratization. They want to grow Guess they want to move away from crony capitalism, they want to move away from dictatorships. And as a result of that, both of them are currently embroiled in literal, not figurative armed conflict, where people are dying every single day, civilians are dying every single day. We cannot avoid that. So let's start with Ukraine. There has been support for the Ukrainian defense of the nation, there have been shipments of weapons. But obviously, we have not seen any deployments of troops. And even the concept of a no fly zone is being skirted very widely, with people saying that that could trigger World war three. So Emily Channell-Justice broad stroke, what has been the international support for the military operations?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:05:46

So far? Well, we really to answer this question, we do have to go back some ways, because it's one of the things that the one of the reasons that there hasn't been, I think a huge response to support Ukraine with more troops and more equipment is because many countries have been helping Ukraine's military reform since about 2015. And that has been some actual equipment that we know of. But that's also been with training that's also been with, for instance, Ukraine receive large shipments of drones that it didn't, nobody knew how to use them. So people are being trained to use drones. We've seen that those have been really, really effective against the Russian incursion. So there's different ways the military aid for Ukraine's military isn't a new conversation. It's been on the table for for years and the different the different levels of commitment that the United States, for instance, has shown, you know, yes, Ukraine is asking for more actual substance of military equipment right now. But we can also argue that the United States commitment to training and updating the capacity of Ukraine's existing military since 2015, has been equally as important, if not even not more important, I guess we can't say more important than actual military equipment. But it has been essential in Ukrainian military success that is absolutely unexpected, especially by the Russians who don't seem to know how effective that training was. And then as far as the territorial defense units and other kinds of volunteer militia groups, that some in some places are serving as military units, for instance, in my Upul, the its territorial defenses that are responding, in addition to the Ukrainian military, and then in other places, those territorial defense units are working with things like evacuating civilians from from places that are besieged, the response has been largely crowdfunded. You know, those those units are raising money. And lots and lots of people across across the world are donating to those to help people get those military military equipment that they need, as well as you know, tactical medical kits, medical supplies. So the the military aid question. It isn't, I think it's important to say it's not just limited to what what equipment people are your countries are giving to Ukraine, but what has been built over the past, you know, eight years really. And by the way, I would add that Turkey is also another country that did give Ukraine some of these drones that were used to destroy Russian tanks. So again, just going back to the question of where does a country like Turkey lie in this conversation about negotiating for, you know, peace or any kind of settlement in Ukraine? They've certainly got different interests as well. And they've they've shown different positions in the past.

Brad  1:08:37

I mean, that's sort of oddly opposite, considering Turkey's role in the missile crisis that in turn precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis. So it's back to old times.

Emily Channell-Justice  1:08:51

Yeah, and the other thing that Turkey has got a kind of interesting peripheral role here is that Turkey actually has has made clear that the the fate of the Crimean Tatar population that was displaced from the Crimean peninsula after the Russian invasion and annexation, Turkey is very concerned about that that was an important ally for them. That that has been seen as one of the reasons that perhaps Turkey would take a more Ukrainian side because the Ukrainian government has long given the Crimean Tatars, more political autonomy. And I'm sort of just waiting to see how that one plays out because I think that Depositions are interesting.

Brad  1:09:30

That's fascinating. So So then Hunter let's let's turn to Myanmar now obviously a very different situation. Ukraine, we have an armed military with Ukrainian flags on their shoulders. In Myanmar, we've seen the development of the Myanmar military through Russian imports and Chinese imports and eclectic purchases across the world. What sort of support are we seeing for whether it's the CEOs that the pre existing ethnic armed organizations or the PDF groups, people's Defence Forces have formed since the coup.

Hunter Marsten  1:10:02

Well, logistically, there's very little support for the CIOs and PDFs, the international community has not, for better or worse, has not taken sides to support either the Myanmar military or the PDFs, and the armed groups across the country. So there were fears early on, that this conflict would spin into something like proxy war on the along the lines of Syria, with Russian support for the military. And I don't know whose support for the PDFs and ethnic armed groups that hasn't really materialized. Although the CEOs, of course, some of them do rely on material support from Chinese weapons coming across the border, whether that has the tacit or right, support from Beijing is disputed. But that's the only sort of internationalization of the arms flows to the resistance in the country. So the CEOs actually have been supporting the PDFs in there, which are relatively the newcomers here. And many of those PDFs or their ranks are filled by civilian fighters, which of course is a bit of an ironic or non sequitur. The idea of civilian fighters by that I mean, civilians from places like Yangon and Mandalay that have gone to the jungles of current state and elsewhere to take up arms to fight against the military. And some PIOs have been more willing to give training and weapons or allow collaboration with these PDFs, which remain, you know, relatively loose knit across the country, and reliant on training and weaponry from these, those which don't have formal partnerships with the PDFs. So it's not so much a proxy war as the military has overwhelming advantage because it continues to enjoy material support from Russia and China. Although with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the fear is now that Russia's military weapon really will be going purely to domestic resupplies and less to places like Myanmar in the military, which was reliant on Russian weaponry, and particularly aircraft. So Myanmar's military has actually been suffering severe setbacks across the country on the ground, surprisingly, and much like the sort of situation we've seen in Ukraine with the asymmetric advantage. Not exactly playing out to predictions and the PDF have managed to or have claim to kill 1000s of troops at this point. And scores of military soldiers on the field from time to time and sporadic attacks or prolonged, engaged holdouts of villages in strategic locations where they have bases set up. But the military because it's suffered these setbacks is more reliant on air support to go in and essentially just a fire bomb its enemies and the military, by and large is, is equipped with Russian helicopters and fighter jets. So the relationship with Russia, of course, is very important for the Myanmar military. But Given Russia's own internal preoccupation or external preoccupation with the Ukraine conflict. I think that it's entirely conceivable that Myanmar's military might soon find that it has nowhere to go for the logistical support, resupply and technical replacements that it needs for certain parts that its Air Force relies on to enjoy the continued advantage over the ground forces that have really sprung up around the country to contest the military's hold on power.

Brad  1:14:12

So, you know, at the risk of getting to strategic and to logistical. We have dual concerns with regard to Myanmar number one, when the dust settles an armed population with you know, pistols and rifles under every bed. Obviously, this is a situation that is best avoided, but it's something that which drifting towards because black market arms dealers, funneling weapons across the border is how a lot of these organizations are getting their hands on material. The second concern is, as you've pointed out, the military is relying overwhelmingly and increasingly on aerial superiority, occasionally ground armor, but that's not quite mobile enough for their needs. So air superiority helicopter Isn't things like this, in an ironic return to previous conflicts, including Russia, we're seeing the Mi 35 Hind the same basic helicopter the Russians used in Afghanistan. And this could be this could be an excellent opportunity to provide the Myanmar people with things like Stinger missiles or javelins. Because those a are used once and then discard, they don't contribute to a growing stockpile of weapons in the nation. And number two, they can actually start making a dent, mi 35 Goes for about $36 million brand new. A stinger missile nowadays goes for about 120,000. So it could be an economic sense as well as a material dent. And and I believe that we have seen shipments of these types of weapons to the Ukrainians, why do you think there's no interest in delivering these to Myanmar?

Hunter Marsten  1:15:54

Well, I think for one, Myanmar's conflict is less understood. There are over a dozen different armed resistance groups within the country. These conflicts, many of them date back to the independence of the country in the late 1940s. And the conflict is also it's far away from Western capitals and the likes of the US and NATO countries. But at the same time, I think there's a fear which is legitimate, that arming various resistance groups would only exacerbate conflict in the country and lead to sort of a new Cold War type proxy battle on Asia's mainland, which could easily spin out of control in unpredictable directions. Well, and you know, of course, the ethical concern is that, you know, contributing weaponry will only prolong the fight and lead to greater civilian deaths, which I think is is a major reason you see put forward for the hesitancy to arm Ukraine against Russia as well.

Brad  1:17:10

So yeah, so I just wanted to ask Emily Channell-Justice about that point is, how much is that playing into the discourse with regard to giving weapons to the Ukrainians? Because there certainly has been flow of weaponry. Are people saying this could turn into a proxy conflict between east and west that goes on for years?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:17:31

I I don't think I would characterize it like that. At this point, because, in particular, at least now have the hesitation on the part of NATO to get involved. It this is clearly you know, I think Well, I think if we go back to kind of the the a little bit before the invasion began, when Putin was claiming that this was going this was really about Ukraine's not joining NATO, then I think a lot of people were framing it as a kind of proxy or as as the fight between East and West, the fight between democracy and dictatorship playing out in Ukraine. Now, it seems much more clear to most of us that this is always it was always about Ukraine's right to exist at all. And and that that put more clearly a stop at nothing to stop Ukraine from existing. So I mean, maybe in five years from now, we'll look back and see it as the beginning of of of a new as a proxy war that developed into something worse, I'm not sure. I think right now, while we're in the heat of it, there's there's too much to you know, there's there's too, too many uncertainties in terms of how this will play out in the long term, then to really be able to say for sure how it's going to unfold? I wouldn't I wouldn't rule anything out at this point.

Brad  1:19:04

Okay, so I want to I want to just know, move to the final sort of broad area that I want to explore. And that is the reasons that we're viewing these conflicts so differently. I mean, that, throughout this, we've seen so many similarities between the two conflict, so many similarities in terms of their political histories and ongoing armed conflicts within the nations. So with regard to Myanmar, we're just not seeing as much outrage. We're not seeing the outcry. We're not seeing the passion. With regard to Ukraine. We've seen as you said, Emily Channell-Justice, was it you said 2 million refugees have now gone into Poland alone? That's right. That's, I mean, that is absolutely obscene. You know, those are refugee numbers we saw from the Iraq invasion fleeing into Syria. We're talking about massive and Massive, massive movements of people and they're being welcomed largely by the Polish people, correct?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:20:04

That's right. That's right for the and, you know, I've heard a lot of a lot of people who have studied both humanitarian situations and Poland before, show a lot of surprise about this and suggest or suspect that there this, this hospitality is going to run out. So, you know, we'll see how long it goes, we'll see, we'll see. There's also a lot of indication that Ukrainians who have left don't don't intend to stay for very long, they would like to return back to Ukraine. So again, we're in one of those situations where there's so many moving pieces that it's hard to say, what the long term response is going to be and whether or not what's happening that was really sustainable.

Brad  1:20:44

Okay, and so, that, notwithstanding that issue, you know, most most of the European Union, most of Europe itself, up to an including the United Kingdom, all the way at the far end of the continent, seem to be very welcoming, but with the possible exception, obviously, of Hungary, and Audubon has been called the traitor of Central Europe by Poland, traditionally a longtime ally, of Hungary. But fortunately, Hungary is a reasonably small player in all of this. So the impact is not huge. By contrast, though, refugees coming out of Myanmar, are having a very difficult time obtaining refugee status. The prospect of return is not great at the moment, and many of those refugees have to cross the border into predominantly Thailand illegally, where they have to pay massive bribes to be given any form of documentation and or they run the consistent risk of being arrested and being forcibly repatriated. So, again, we're seeing a huge difference in the international response. Does this come down to handle a difference in how clear the evidence is for crimes and atrocities in Ukraine versus the evidence for crimes and atrocities in Myanmar?

Hunter Marsten  1:21:59

That's possible I think, by and large conflicts and humanitarian crises in Southeast Asia still don't really trickle outwards, to the mainstream media and general international awareness. Like a European conflict will. And you know, this coup caught me by surprised and gained international headlines from for weeks and perhaps months, but slowly faded from the radar as the American disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan gained headlines and other world crises now Ukraine have cropped up. Personally, you know, to compare Ukraine and Myanmar, I'm heartened by the international support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russia's invasion, but surprised actually at the sort of pathos and how much passion it's aroused around the international community. And I'm disappointed but not surprised by the lack of attention sustained attention on Myanmar's crisis. Because it's extremely dire, the country's taking a giant leap backwards economically, you know, people are starving and the World Food Programs unable to deliver food and emergency relief supplies to places like Qin state where the conflict is raging. And the military is essentially holding people hostage to start. And it's an incredibly sad situation. But then again, you know, the the likes of The New York Times and Washington Post The mainstream media in the United States, and even in Australia, where I am much closer to Southeast Asia. It's just never really featured prominently, or shone a spotlight on Asians conflicts. I mean, around the time of the Rohingya crisis, and the genocide that was taking place, there was some great investigative reporting being done with photos and documentary evidence of the military's crimes against humanity. But when it comes to the coup, I think you see, you know, Myanmar has been Myanmar netizens have been very engaged online, using Twitter and Facebook to promote their promote awareness of their cause and suffering in the country. But I think with Ukraine, you just have a level of digital activism that far surpasses that you have, for instance, a signal which was created by two Russian expatriates. And Ukrainians really selling their cars online, or at least connecting with the international community in a different way. I think. Partly that's just because geographically Southeast Asia is relatively I don't think isolated is the right word to describe its applications geography, given how central it is to sort of global flow of commerce and the connection of the Pacific Ocean, but at the same time, For some reason, Western audiences just aren't as concerned or preoccupied with these sort of faraway conflicts taking place in Southeast Asia. And you know, maybe they're exotic sized a bit. We hear about drug lords and, you know, trafficking and rare species and people fighting in the jungle. And it's just sort of more along the lines of the Vietnam War, distant conflicts and not connected to as viscerally perhaps as the frontlines of Europe and which bears all the hallmarks of a world war, or World War histories. But I don't really have a good way to explain why people have not taken up Myanmar cars to the same extent.

Brad  1:25:51

So we'll look at a couple of things. So one thing I want to look at here is Emily Channell-Justice, how is the information coming out of Ukraine? Are we looking at like what would be the split between state media, foreign media who are operating within Ukraine, and private citizens who are just recording things on their phones and uploading it?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:26:12

I'm not, I'm not sure what the official split would look like. There's, I think there's a distinctive split in terms of Ukrainian language sources, of which there are some that are, you know, public, you know, like, the sort of public radio. And then there's also the Ukrainian government sources that are reporting a lot. And they're, they're translating a lot into English. And then there's independent media sources in Ukraine that are doing a lot of reporting in Ukrainian. And then in addition to that, there's independent sources within Ukraine that publish in English, and namely, here, the cube independent, that's a crowdfunded independent source that has had reporters on the ground, that they're the reporters who used to write for cave post, who split off from that. And so they already have a great infrastructure information sharing. And that's also in addition to large numbers of foreign journalists who are covering things on the ground as well. And I would say, it's important that they're an obviously, you know, I don't know enough about Myanmar to be able to say if there's a parallel here or not, but there already were many English language journalists in Ukraine, who are now doing two things. They're in Ukraine covering what's happening, and they're amplifying the voices of their Ukrainian journalist colleagues who may or may not be publishing in English to make sure their coverage gets heard. So I think it's kind of a it's a combination of factors here, where you have a really savvy media infrastructure that was developed in the wake of the Euro Maidan protests in 2014, where Ukrainians really reinforced the functionality of independent media. And I would really, as per Natalia guanyu, who was one of one of the most important journalists in Ukraine these days, who kind of cautions us against thinking about citizen journalists, because it's really trained journalists, professional journalists who are doing the coverage, and they're, they're getting their, their their stories out, not just in the traditional platforms of publications. But on Twitter, you know, if you follow Ukrainian journalists on Twitter, they're sharing even more than what they're publishing in stories. So there's this element of kind of Ukrainians learn from those protests, how to use not just the actual existing media institutions, but also social media to get the word out. And Twitter and Facebook have been really active in terms of those protests. And now telegram is also a really important part of that story. But all of those things already existed in Ukraine, those infrastructures already existed, Ukrainians did a lot of work to, to build those to make sure that independent journalism was institutionalized after you're on my dime. So for them, right now, it's not necessarily so much about build, you know, building new networks, they've already got the networks, and they already know how to get this information out. So they're just really taking advantage of that. And people are obviously listening.

Brad  1:29:15

So just as a curiosity, like on that point, I know you've mentioned that the story broke recently, of the evidence that we're seeing in in Bucha, in and in and around Keith. And, you know, I saw the headline of, you know, a torture chamber was located underneath. I believe it was a was it an asylum?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:29:35

It was like a children's sanatorium like a health health retreat. Yeah.

Brad  1:29:41

So I mean, horrific stuff. But so where did that information like Who put that information into the ether? Was that a Ukrainian government publication? Or was it people who just went in and said, Oh, my God, what is going on and posted that to the Internet?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:29:57

In that case, I believe and in some of these cases, is what has happened. And I'm not 100% Sure the actual origin point of that particular story. But in a lot of these cases in Bucha, we have seen people, people posting, or sharing photos, sharing videos of acquaintances or inhabitants of these villages, those that footage has gotten confirmed by the Ukrainian military. And so that's the sources that are being put out by the Ukrainian government as the kind of official acknowledgement of what's happening. And then we have seen the response of open source Open Access investigators, not just we've seen the report from New York Times, but also belling cat. So these other institutional, these other media infrastructures that know how to verify information, they've gone in and use satellite imagery and crowdsourcing of footage and information and confirmation. And we also know that these stories are being verified by eyewitnesses. So we actually have this kind of multi vector verification of things that are happening. And the Ukrainian government right now, I would really give them you know, really commend them on really doing their due diligence as much as they can to make sure the information they release has been verified. So that they're, you know, taken seriously, because they understand the stakes, when they're claiming that something has happened, it is essential that that thing that they're claiming is true, because any holes that can be poked in their story are going to absolutely be exploited by Russia profit, you know, propaganda narratives are Russian state media. So I think they're really doing an important job here by kind of confirming what they see. So for example, we know that with the Bucha claims, the Russian media was claiming, oh, they the Ukrainian soldiers did this in less these bodies in their wake. But because there was so much footage, you could actually identify how far back bodies had been sitting in the street for weeks at a time, that sort of thing. I mean, these are horrible things that people are being asked to confirm. But but the Ukrainian government is doing a good job of making sure that those claims can be confirmed.

Brad  1:32:04

I mean, you know, that's brilliant work. And I think this is a really important question like Hunter. Are there any lessons here for the Myanmar people and more importantly, for the new G, I think there's a general feeling that the new G is not doing as well as it could be with regard to information flow with regard to accountability to the people with regard to spreading the message internationally? Is there anything that they should be doing differently?

Hunter Marsten  1:32:28

Well, it's hard for me to say I mean, I'm not really positioned to offer advice somehow to spread their message and best leverage the international community's resources and attention. But that said, I think perhaps, you know, based on what Emily Channell-Justice was just saying, if anything, the documentation and sort of spread of Myanmar's the crimes and just atrocities taking place across the country has been a bit more grassroots and decentralized. Much of the footage on cell phones, for instance, some of this is authenticated by independent reporters in Myanmar. But the military's attacks on those credible institutions of the press has really debilitated the ability of journalists and reporters to fact check and document these in real time. It's persecuted countless journalists and prison them for incitement, for instance. And that that's just to say that anything emerging online is primarily from sort of citizens uses of smartphones and less from the journalistic side. And then it's immediately taken up and reshard, retweeted countless times to amplify that message on Twitter, which is great. But I think that sort of overwhelming wall of noise at some point, loses the sort of fine tooth documentation aspect that you might see coming out of the Ukraine conflict. And that's, that's speaking in very general terms, I don't want to say that it's not credible, what you're seeing in Myanmar, but both sides, and both sides is an oversimplification here, you see, you know, the military, for instance, reusing old footage to sort of say, you know, the resistance groups and PDFs are terrorists and doing this and that, and you know, that muddies the waters to a certain extent, because then you don't know how much footage is real or what's not coming out of this conflict. And I wouldn't say that the PDFs and people in Myanmar doing the same thing. But when everyone's sort of shouting and posting photos and videos to try to say the other groups committing mass atrocities but it's really difficult to separate out what's authentic and what's sort of doctored. But it's also just not curated in a way that's immediately legible to international observers.

Brad  1:35:17

I mean, I think that's a very fair criticism. I think it's something that needs to be looked at, it seems to be much more well organized and centralized, at least on the Ukrainian half. So let's let, let's turn to this big question. And that will probably be the last thing that we that we delve deeply into, because I am conscious of everybody's time. And this is not to not to, to make allegations of racism. But the fundamental emotional difference. We're looking at a situation right now, where we've had coos in so many countries, I think 2021 saw coos in five different countries, including the AMA. And we don't speak about them very often. And it seems to be that the Western world, which is to say, Europe and the Anglosphere, don't really focus on Myanmar. And yet there's a massive outpouring for Ukrainians. And I want to pose this to Emily Channell-Justice first, when did Ukrainians stop being us and stop being them? Because nobody was all that passionate back in 2014, when they were literally invaded?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:36:30

Yeah, this is a question I've been asking myself as well, because I, I was outraged in 2014. I was in Ukraine at the time that Russia invaded. And it was truly appalling to experience that and to have, you know, it downplayed by most of the world. So I don't I really, I really don't know. I mean, I think it's fair to say that we can both use this experience as a, you know, seeing the response to Ukraine. We can remain compassionate and empathetic and support the Ukrainian claims for their sovereignty and independence and really feel for what's happening, at the same time that we can be critical of how we responded in the past. I mean, there isn't absolutely an element, I think of racism there of hierarchies of what we think a democracy really looks like, you know, Ukrainians are largely and certainly not universally, but the perception of Ukrainians is that they're largely white and Christian. The refugees streaming across the border are mostly women and children. There's a certain, I think, likeness that people can feel. And you can, you can feel that feeling and also recognize that that past responses to crises have been inadequate. So we can think, you know, hold both of those feelings at the same time. It's odd, you know, over the past eight years, it's been difficult to get people to care about this war that has been happening, and it hasn't, there's a perception that it's a civil war, or or that that it's a cold, you know, frozen conflict or something. That's not true. I mean, this war has been going on in Ukraine for eight years. There were casualties all the time, soldiers being killed all the time. And yet, it's much more obviously dramatic at this point. Certainly the invasion that that happened on February 24, is at a different scale than the previous one. I don't want to downplay that. But I also think, to be honest with you, the the perception and image of Vladimir Putin as a person plays into this as well, because we have been, this guy has been in power for 20 years, we have known him as the significant and sometimes villainous figure throughout history, and now he's done something that completely crosses a line, but also completely confirms what Ukrainians have been saying about him for so long. And what a lot of us have been saying about him for so long. So some of the empathy I think also comes from, it's very easy to point out who the bad guy is, in this scenario. You know, Russia invaded Ukraine, that is a that is absolutely supposed to be unacceptable in the 21st century, in the post war, post World War Two era in the post cold war era. And so to some extent, I think it's also just a kind of clear, you know, knowing knowing who has has done the violation that makes people more sympathetic to Ukrainians, whether they're, they'll continue to see them as us after this. You know, again, I don't know. I certainly have have felt that there was always a hierarchy, a kind of European hierarchy, where Ukraine was kind of not considered quite Europe. You know, no matter how European people identified themselves as So, so that's, that, to me was has certainly been kind of a surprise.

Brad  1:39:46

And so, by contrast, obviously, Hunter you've spent the majority of your time looking at Myanmar. Have you seen any change or any shift both with regard to the way that the West views Myanmar or or Asian people in general, or a shift with regard to the way that the Asian community views Myanmar?

Hunter Marsten  1:40:09

Well, for the Asian community, the ASEAN family so to speak, I think I'll start there. Myanmar has sort of always been a headache for all Xeon. Back in the 90s, oz Yan was really one of the main vehicles for criticizing and encouraging the military to reform and in the 2000s, that saw an opening to do so. When the military put forward its roadmap to discipline flourishing democracy and sort of had started hinting at the possibility of democratic change to come, Xian was really at the forefront of these efforts to push Myanmar to follow through on that path. But now we see sort of the relapse to the familiar, you know, coup, internal violence, just the military, letting the floodgates open as far as its own troops committing violence against civilians. And as Yan has either refused to look closely at this and turn to TED or, you know, vocally supported the junta, or you know, for those countries that have been critical of Myanmar, and the militaries atrocities, they find themselves unable to hold the military to account due to Ozzy ons, lack of enforcement mechanism. But Asia more widely. I mean, you have the likes of you know, China's a whole lot more powerful now than it was a couple of decades ago. And with Chinese backing, and India's implicit support for the military, Myanmar is actually in a much more favorable, sorry, Myanmar's military is in a much more favorable position now than it was previously when it chose to democratize to an extent in order to alleviate economic sanctions and improve its positioning on the world stage back in 2010. It's all doing so as you know, for what one reason was to escape the sort of Chinese dominance of its economy and reliance on Beijing for patronage. But as far as the West goes, I, I'm not sure if there's been a fundamental shift, because for so long, Myanmar has been a very faraway problem. And that's both been a blessing and a curse for us policy. For example, Myanmar, has, by and large been a cause for human rights and democracy concerns, and democracy proponents within Congress to advocate for, you know, outright regime change to see a democratic opening and Myanmar. Rather than the sort of real politic you see tied to mostly to countries like Thailand and US allies that the United States doesn't want to support, and especially in the Middle East, who's oil and military bases that relies on Saudi Arabia comes comes to mind, although that there's been a sea change in perceptions within Washington, towards Saudi Arabia since the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. But that said, with Myanmar, the US doesn't have a lot of influence, given that it's so far away, there's not a lot of trade and investment. There are a few people that people ties. And so I think the perception is this is not our problem to deal with. And that's why you've seen the likes of United States, China, the European Union backing the ASEAN five point consensus as the best means for a diplomatic solution going forward.

Brad  1:43:58

And so just just on that, I'm wondering, would this be different if Myanmar had been invaded externally? If let's say it had been, you know, China, pushing to capture the north of the country, would that have shifted the dialogue? Do you think would people suddenly be super sympathetic to Myanmar as opposed to viewing it as a just internal political conflict?

Hunter Marsten  1:44:20

Yeah. That's an interesting hypothetical, I think, absolutely. At least in Washington in this in this era of great power competition and overwhelming focus on China as sort of the preeminent national rival. You know, for instance, there's a lot of attention on Taiwan as a potential. You know, next Ukraine. There's a lot of speculation on whether China will draw lessons on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and decided that they can, indeed launch an armed invasion of Taiwan to reclaim what they see as part of their country. Much like Russia and Putin see Ukraine. You know, I'm not going to really touch on whether that's a viable scenario I don't personally think it is. I think if anything, China's probably seen the fierce international response to confront Russia over this and probably drawn the opposite conclusions. But that said, I think this simplicity of a scenario like another state, such as China, invading Myanmar, would probably be an easier message to sell domestically. And, you know, there's been a lot of support for Vietnam, for instance, is as far as US partnerships in Asia go, blossoming because of the fear of the China threat. And that's an easier story to tell that China poses a threat to this little country on its doorstep. Then there's this military, we don't really understand. It's got all sorts of nefarious business interests, and it's once again taken over political power, but it already sort of had political control. And it's just so complicated. It's impossible sort of sell it in an elevator type speech.

Brad  1:46:11

So it really speaks to the value of narratives and good guy versus bad guy stories. unfortunate, but true. So look, I'm I'm very conscious of everybody's time. So we'll, we'll probably start wrapping it up here. I want to thank both of you for coming on. This has been fascinating for me. And I hope it will be for our audience as well. And thank you for bearing with me as we sort of navigate this new format. This is not something that we usually do, but I think it was fruitful. But when we and we like to hear the thoughts that you want to leave the audience with something that you think the audience should know, or should at least ponder going forward. So I want to start with Emily Channell-Justice, if you have any final thoughts on this discussion?

Emily Channell-Justice  1:46:59

Yeah. i Well, thanks. First of all, I This has been so enlightening for me to just think about, you know, think through the questions that you've been asking. And I don't know, thinking about how little we all know, once we are so focused on our own context. So I think this comparison is really fruitful. Yeah, I think, just in general, this, unfortunately, I think it's gonna be a long or somewhat prolonged, you know, hard to see what's happening. I think the main, the main thing for for people who are listening who are unfamiliar with the context of Ukraine, to just keep in mind is make sure that you are reading verified sources, you know, there's so there's such a deep infiltration of Russian Kremlin propaganda, not just narratives, but tactics that are designed to draw people's attention away from things that are actually happening. And it's really important to to not you know, not get taken in by this alternative way of basically this this Kremlin Kremlin tactic of trying to turn you it's a kind of dividing technique, right? There's there's so much support for Ukraine. So Kremlin, Kremlin tactics are to amplify stories, for example of racism at the border to for African students who are fleeing Ukraine, for instance, you know, amplify those stories so that we all start to question whose side we should be on. It's not to say that those things didn't happen. It's just to say, think about how stories are getting told in which narratives are being prioritized and why. And I think it's, you know, that information war is a real front of this of this war that's happening, and all of us can make individual choices to find good and correct information. And I just, I really commend the Ukrainian journalists who are who are covering the stories, the international journalists who are covering the stories, you know, correctly and compassionately and with the help of Ukrainian colleagues, I think we're in a really unique situation in terms of the information sphere, what we can know what we can know for sure. And what narratives we are sharing ourselves from our comfortable chairs and in in the United States, or in Australia, and Europe, I think we all have to kind of think about where we're positioning ourselves and how we're contributing. But honestly, fighting the information war is something that all of us can do. And so I think I would encourage anyone who's listening to just make sure that you are fighting that on the right side.

Brad  1:49:35

Okay, thank you for that. And Hunter, turning to you now, do you have any thoughts that you would like the audience to consider going forward?

Hunter Marsten  1:49:43

Well, I think Emily Channell-Justice's points were very cogent, and eloquently expressed, and I think they apply in many ways to me, Mrs. case as well. But I don't want to repeat what she said. So I would just say with regard to Myanmar And I hope that listeners don't forget the tragic situation that is unfolding continuing to unfold there. Things are not improving. In fact, they're getting worse. And don't look away. You know, there are numerous other crises in the world. And the Russian invasion of Ukraine has impacted global food supplies around the world. But that also affects Myanmar and actually makes me and most crisis even worse. And so how can we support that look, look for international organizations, nonprofits to give to, but also, you know, for policymakers in the likes of Washington, I would say there is no reason to continue to avoid sanctioning the Myanmar oil and gas enterprise. And I think anyone who cares about what's going on in Myanmar and wants to stop the military, from continuing to commit crimes against its own people should be pressing their legislatures to advocate for sanctions against Myanmar oil and gas enterprise, which makes up nearly half of the contos foreign exchange income at this point over a billion per year, is an important source of revenue for the military to continue doing what it does. I've already expressed how I don't hold out much hope for a UN Security Council action or UN action in the first place. But so that's that's why I'm calling for sort of unilateral, how to support United States legislation. And on that note, there is the 2021. Burma bill or the protect democracy in Burma act of 2021, which is currently stalled before the US Senate, among other things that calls on the US to recognize sorry to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations more, we could see the position of a special US Special Envoy for Myanmar, I think that would lend some momentum to any action to come would be one important way of getting the ball moving. And I think that people should be writing their Congress persons to advocate for that bill's passage. And another sort of technical point. But the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021 also includes language on recognizing the national unity government and seeing that body as the legitimate representative of Myanmar working to support Myanmar's democracy. So I think the tools are in place there for a stiffer US response. And there's more that Western governments could do to have a more active role beyond purely economic sanctions.

Host  1:53:48

knew for a lot of podcast listeners. As soon as the fundraising request startup, you kind of just zone out and skip ahead till it's over. But I asked that if you've taken the time to listen to our full podcast that you also take the time to consider our spiel. Some may assume that producing a two hour episode wouldn't take much more time than the conversation itself. But so much goes into it. In advance of the interview, our content team reviews the biography and relevant works of the upcoming guest. And we discussed the best way to use our limited time together. After the interview is complete, the raw audio file is sent to our sound engineer who shapes it into working order. A single episode can take several full days of solid production work in the studio, which is then carefully coordinated with our content team to ensure smooth listening. further edits and post production magic bring the eventual episode to your ears, along with extensive written descriptions of each interview, which we publish on our blog and on social media as well. Many of these steps require an outlay of funds in some way or another. We hope that each episode helps to inform you about the ongoing crisis. And if you find it a value we also hope that you can consider supporting our mission. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who We're being impacted by the military coup, we welcome your contribution in any form, currency or transfer method. Your donation will go to support a wide range of humanitarian missions, aiding those local communities who need it most. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CVM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person, IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and much more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution for a specific activity or project you would like to support. Perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian aid work is carried out by a nonprofit mission that or Burma. Any donation you give on our insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fund. Alternatively, you can also visit the better Burma website better burma.org That's b e t t e r b urma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause, and both websites accept credit cards. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/better Burma Additionally, we take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App simply search better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account you can also visit either the Insight Myanmar better Burma websites for specific links to those respective accounts or email us at info at better burma.org If you'd like to give it another way please contact us thank you so much for your kind consideration and support right off the bat whoa show horse Nasza love no Graden. To you gentlemen you lose your horse gentleman you're losing? You ready who you gentlemen

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