Episode #227: Above the Fray
“I've worked on conflict and human rights tracking, especially using satellite imagery for a while now,” explains Nathan Ruser. “I've looked at Syria, and I've looked at Shenzhen… But now considering the situation in Myanmar, the human rights emergency there, and the ever-changing military realities on the ground, I've been focusing a lot a lot more of my time on Myanmar.”
Ruser, who works at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), brings his background in geo-mapping to attempt to make sense of the unconventional warfare raging across Myanmar since the 2021 coup. “Internal conflict is ecology, in the way that these actors interact and compete, and Myanmar is a proving ground for that strategy,” he says. Due to the complex interplay of geographic and ethnic diversity, combined with the absence of clear battle lines, he found that trying to understand the Myanmar crisis through a framework that did not take into account the country’s peculiarities was all but impossible. Indeed, Ruser can’t find any contemporary conflict that is in any way similar to what’s been happening in Myanmar; he points to maybe the longstanding conflict in Afghanistan, or the Vietnam War, as more apt comparisons.
“Understanding the tone of the conflict is one of the most important parts of mapping it,” he explains. Ruser describes how the initial stages of the coup saw the military holed up in fortified bases while sending out marauding bands of soldiers, as had traditionally been the military’s strategy; faced with superior force, the resistance usually melted away to avoid engagement. Today, however, the situation has changed, and is far more complicated. Resistance forces often patrol right up to the military bases, while military convoys assault villages many miles away, and because of this, it’s nearly impossible to define regional control in binary terms. Drawing on Stathis Kalyvas’s The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Ruser created a nuanced mapping technique that relies on a sliding numerical scale. This approach allows him to map out the degree of relative control across a region— which has become so complex that at times he has to proceed village by village! This is also quite different than the typical media approach, which tends to paint with a very broad and simplistic— and often inaccurate— brush.
Ruser also stresses that to really get a more comprehensive understanding of the situation as it unfolds, ground reporting is needed alongside satellite data. Where the latter gives a valuable overview— for example, helping to distinguish which outposts are manned by which group— the former fleshes out important human details and nuance that satellite data cannot, such as the specific leadership structure in an area, or the general morale of troops in the field. Interestingly, he finds that junta bases are particularly easy to distinguish in a satellite view, because they all have helicopter landing pads nearby. This highlights the regime’s reliance on air support, and thereby shows how their forces are viewed as little more than an occupying army; in other words, they are so hated by the local population that their only lifeline to supplies and reinforcements is via the air. Ruser also maps out military-installed roadblocks because it helps him determine where nearby soldiers are probably located, which then informs his analyses when he incorporates data regarding recent skirmishes.
Ruser’s recent study of satellite imagery indicates that the junta’s military bases are becoming even more fortified and increasingly confined to “shrinking zones of control;” in line with this, he notes that military patrols go out less frequently and cover less ground… all of which paint a picture of a military becoming less mobile, and more defensive. That said, he feels they maintain a clear advantage in urban centers, so he doesn’t expect Burmese cities to see conflict anytime soon. He references a similarity in how Assad developed his “Syria Strategy,” in which the regime’s forces pulled back from the countryside where the resistance was stronger, and consolidated its control in and around the major cities.
At the same time, Ruser believes that Operation 1027 has dramatically changed the trajectory of conflict throughout Myanmar. Now, much of the country, including major roads and key thoroughfares, have been wrested from military control, leaving open, he says, “the possibility of a pretty rapid junta collapse.” He does add one qualifier, though, that even while the resistance has been particularly effective at overtaking bases with fewer natural defenses (a topic addressed by Enze Han in a recent episode), the military is still quite competent at defending high ground.
Ruser also explains that for now, the military’s air superiority remains a major factor in the conflict. Not only can they easily resupply their bases, but they can also launch attacks on nearby villages with impunity— which underscores the urgency of preventing further imports of jet fuel (a topic that Montse Ferrer discussed in a recent podcast interview). Historically, the military has consolidated its air power in one region by arranging for a ceasefire in others; however, he notes that they have never before been forced to fight simultaneously in every region of the country. The conflict is thus entering uncharted territory. “There's certainly less air power than is required throughout the country, and that's one of the reasons that we're seeing large areas fall,” he notes. “But I don't think the air power is about to collapse.”
Looking more closely at Operation 1027, Ruser describes a situation so dynamic that it’s hard to predict exactly how things will turn out. Of particular importance in making sense of such a rapidly changing situation is determining when the pattern of local conflicts begins to signal a country-wide, strategic plan. Nonetheless, he says that “more broadly, it's hard to overestimate how much of a change Operation 1027 has been to the battlefield.” As outpost after outpost is captured, much of the map has been flipped in the favor of the resistance, and Ruser can only wonder how this dramatic change is being viewed in Nay Pyi Daw.
The lack of attention that the conflict has received generally in the West, particularly in his own country, concerns Ruser. “Myanmar is a perfect opportunity for Australia to fulfill its desired role as a middle power in the region, and how it can start to resolve these emergencies.” He attributes Australia’s disengagement to a general lack of knowledge about the crisis, along with the fear that, however well-intentioned a policy, there still may be unintended and calamitous consequences, such as Reagan providing missiles to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan which eventually morphed into the September 11th attacks. This is also why Ruser hopes that his work at ASPI will prove vital in educating stakeholders. “It's difficult to fault what [the NUG] is doing in building confidence with the EAOs and EROs,” he says. “But there is also a general idea that insurgency and violence is part of Myanmar, and we don't want to provide things that will fuel the next round of that, even if it helps resolve this one…” This is a view that Ruser ascribes to international actors who have been hesitant to engage, but is not one he shares. “It's a missed opportunity for sure,” he continues. “Beyond just Australia, it's a missed opportunity in the West, and the parts of the world that generally care about human rights. There is a very easy victory to be had in more meaningful support for the democratic revolution in Myanmar that isn't forthcoming. The lack of interest in policy is a huge cost! It's definitely a missed opportunity in Australia and in Europe, and in the US and the UN.”
Tracking worldwide trends, he sees Western powers being much more reticent to intervene in civil unrest beyond their borders after the Libya intervention in 2011. Ruser describes this as a “statist” approach, which avoids intervention in internal conflicts, and is different than “state on state” conflict, such as Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine. Ruser explains that R2P— or “Right to Protect,” the international norm by which nations pledge to never again sanction war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or genocide (a topic that was taken up by Liam Scott in an earlier podcast episode)— was invoked to justify the bombing of Libya by NATO. At least on the surface, some were concerned that this action did not seem to be connected to any of the triggers in the R2P framework. This heightened China’s and Russia’s fears that R2P was merely a cover for US and NATO political and military aggression, which left it toothless as a framework that could be relied on for bringin a united, international intervention in Myanmar after the coup. This helps explain why, despite the fact that many Burmese pleaded for R2P to be invoked, it never was. However, Ruser does see a silver lining in that, despite the material support that Russia continues to provide to Min Aung Hlaing, there hasn’t been the same outspoken Russian support of Myanmar today as there was when it came to Assad’s defense and actively propped up that regime, for instance (though Ruser also allows that this reluctance might be attributable to the prolonged conflict in Ukraine).
Staying on a geopolitical analysis, Ruser looks at China's role in the region, noting how their policy towards Myanmar is not ideologically driven as in such theaters as Hong Kong and Taiwan, but rather by pragmatism, prioritizing stability and economic interests over allegiance to any particular Burmese leader, or group. This pragmatism is evident in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its strategic interest in bypassing the Strait of Malacca through investments in Myanmar. Moving then to India, he describes how Modi is “leading the front to contest Chinese influence, and Indian policy is as much if not more than the Chinese policy in its bizarre support of the junta.” He points out the porous border in which insurgents from either country have historically crossed when seeking safety, as well as the close ties between the respective militaries— so much so that recently, the Burmese regime actually allowed Indian soldiers to root out rebel groups on Myanmar soil! Even so, the number of Burmese refugees continue to add up in northeast India, where they are welcomed by the local populace, even as New Delhi has tried to chart a different policy.
In closing, Ruser wants to stress that we are now witnessing a sea change in the crisis shaping before our eyes. “Thousands of kilometers in the sky, on a satellite looking down, you can see the change in tone of this conflict,” he says. “A lot of observers on the ground are also acknowledging this change of tone. This is pushing towards resistance gains and resistance victories that even months ago, I didn't really think were likely!” To him, this is all the more reason why it’s an opportune time for the international community to get on board. “The idea that you can turn a country that has historically been a violent dictatorship into… a flourishing, progressive, great democracy; I think that's an opportunity!” Yet he points out this won’t follow a conventional trajectory. “There's not going to be a movement where there's a slow democratization of the country, where the military enables the country to become more democratic… It's a matter of the military winning or the military losing. Not putting your foot on either side is definitely a hindrance rather than a help.”
And still, even without this greater help, he sees the Burmese people pulling off their own miracle, because “On the ground, [they] are proving that they can write their own future! It’s definitely pointing the right direction. One of the more positive outlooks [is that] even with the International abandonment that we've seen, and even in spite of all these obstacles, the resistance is moving the needle the right way.”