Episode #105: The Hope of R2P
The days turned dark in March 2021 when the Burmese military began poisoning, abducting, torturing, and killing nonviolent protesters. Some were shot in the head on live television, others beaten to death in broad daylight. Soon after the crackdown, those activists still courageous enough to take to the streets began holding signs that read: “We Need R2P.”
This was the first time many people had ever heard of that term. But not so Liam Scott of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Global R2P), who has spent his career advocating for this cause. (Please note that this conversation was recorded in February, and events in Myanmar have changed since we spoke. Liam will be contributing an upcoming essay for the Insight Myanmar blog, and we will be scheduling another conversation later this year to further update the situation)
So what is R2P?
“R2P, or the Responsibility to Protect, is an international norm that the UN unanimously adopted in 2005. It seeks to protect populations around the world from atrocity crimes, which are genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing,” Scott explains.
The groundwork for R2P was laid in the 1990s, following the conflicts in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, in response to “the indifference and inaction that had characterized the international community's response to atrocity crimes for quite some time,” according to Scott. There are three main pillars: first, that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from the above four crimes; second, the international community must remind states as needed of their obligations in this regard; and third, intervention must be considered when states fail to uphold this basic responsibility.
Scott emphasizes that R2P is not a legal doctrine, and so it can only be enforced when there is the political will to do so. In line with the second pillar, Global R2P’s mission is to encourage international actors not to neglect R2P where needed… and according to Scott, it is most certainly needed now in Myanmar.
“First and foremost, the international community really has failed to uphold their responsibility to protect the people of Myanmar following the coup,” he states unequivocally. He feels that much of the blame should go to the United Nations Security Council—in particular, that the UNSC should have instituted an arms embargo from the outset, limiting the Tatmadaw’s access to lethal weapons which it could use against their own people. China and Russia would most certainly have used their veto power, and in that case Myanmar's military would likely have interpreted that action as tacit support; but nonetheless, Scott still wishes that the United Kingdom had honored its role as “penholder” and at least tabled a resolution calling for a vote.
Scott shares the exasperation of Burmese activists who have been calling for R2P to be employed for over a year now. And while R2P “will only ever be as good as the actors that implement it,” in Scott’s words, he also believes that it is “increasingly clear that bilateral action in response to the ongoing atrocities in Myanmar is increasingly necessary, and increasingly urgent.” Scott implores those who might be so inclined to not direct their criticism at the R2P doctrine itself for failing to be implemented in Myanmar; rather it should be aimed at those international bodies who refuse to do so, for whatever reason.
Scott has been impressed by how the National Unity Government has expressed a clear intent for how they would like R2P to be enacted. “I think the NUG has been specific in what particular tools of R2P they want the international community to employ, like with arms embargoes, with sanctions on oil and gas, and with depriving the military of the legitimacy that it craves on the international stage.” Still, Scott acknowledges that despite the NUG as well as his own Global R2P doing all that they can to sound the alarm, there remains little more they can do when countries and organization simply fail to respond.
This failure of R2P to be employed in a clearly tangible way has left many in Myanmar feeling as though it is a worthless principle. But in spite of his own frustration, Scott suggests a more nuanced perspective. “If we abandon the Responsibility to Protect when it comes to Myanmar, then in some ways that would be letting the Tatmadaw win. It would be a concession to the military!” Additionally, Scott encourages taking a more nuanced view of R2P, and not seeing it purely in black and white terms, in which “boots on the ground intervention” is the only sign of effectiveness. For example, he attributes Chevron’s recent decision to leave the country as a sign of R2P’s success. In this way, he hopes that there can be a string of smaller successes like this, gradually developing into something larger.
Still, Scott admits this is far from ideal, and confesses he simply doesn’t know what more beyond the horrible things the Tatmadaw is already doing that might push international organizations to action. “I really don't know what the line is, I mean, I feel like the Tatmadaw has already crossed every line!” Sadly, he wonders if countries won’t be motivated to act until the atrocities begin to spill over into neighboring countries. But even then, Scott notes the hundreds of thousands of Myanmar refugees and IDPs in neighboring countries… which hasn’t yet precipitated any new R2P response.
From here Scott shares the background of the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), which was formed in 2017 to investigate the Rohingya genocide. Since then, and through the dark days of the coup, IIMM has meticulously collected piles of evidence proving the ongoing crimes of the Tatmadaw. Their work is also related to his own mission: “Justice and accountability is an integral part of the Responsibility to Protect… If perpetrators are held accountable, then they realize there are actually consequences if they commit these crimes.” Indeed, Scott points to the fact that the Burmese military has never been successfully prosecuted for any past crimes as evidence for their present inhumane behavior, so they believe they can continue to act with impunity. He admits that the wheels of justice move slowly… though perhaps far too slowly for those victims still being persecuted. So he encourages patience.
Scott next moves on to ASEAN, taking up the Five Point Consensus. This was supposed to “guide the UN's response to the crisis, but it has not been implemented effectively at all. That's an understatement!” he says. He does credit ASEAN with preventing the Tatmadaw from sending an official representative to recent summits, saying it was a small but effective action which prevents the military from getting the legitimacy it so desperately craves. But Scott isn’t holding his breath for stronger ASEAN action, however helpful it would be, as “historically the body has not operated in that way.”
As democratic activists in Myanmar saw that the military would only respond with violence, and that R2P would not be enforced by any outside agency, the people began to organize their own resistance movement. “The call among protesters in Myanmar for the international community to uphold the Responsibility to Protect has really opened up to something that even the individual can call for, and can work toward. And I think perhaps the formation of a PDFs could be another example of that,” he notes. Similarly, the development of local PDF units can be understood as a necessary response to the failure of any R2P action.
“I completely recognize and empathize with the fact that so many of these questions are coming from a place of pure desperation and frustration with an international community that has done so little in response,” Scott concludes.