Transcript: Episode #345: The Art of Doing Nothing
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Host 00:00
First off, thanks for choosing to spend your time with us. I know that we're living in a time of limitless Content Options, all of which are competing for your attention, and so we're so humbled that you're choosing to invest your next hour or two with us. After all, you could be binging a Netflix show, listening to your favorite songs on a Spotify playlist or watching a live sporting event, yet you've chosen to be here engaging with the stories and voices about Myanmar. And that choice means so much to us, and it speaks to your desire to understand, connect and stand in solidarity. So as we begin the story that follows, we are deeply grateful to your attention and Support. It's what keeps this platform alive and meaningful.
Moe Thuzar 02:00
Well, hello, I am Moe Thuzar. I am a senior fellow at the ICS Yusuf Ishaq Institute, which is an autonomous research institute located in Singapore, and has been around since 1968 focusing exclusively on understanding development events in Southeast Asia. Now at that Institute, I coordinate the Myanmar Studies Program, which was established in 2012 to really pay attention to the developments and events that are going on in Myanmar. And of course, since 2021 we have paid a lot of our focus. In fact, the main focus since 2021 has been on sharing with the audiences for ISIS, what's important to know about the coup that happened in Myanmar, and what are the consequences of that coup, the implications for the communities in Myanmar and the people and of course, as the the years after 2021 have worn on up to the present. Much of what we do produce at ICs, whether in written or in webinar or event form, has been more and morefocused on emphasizing why it is important for anyone and everyone interested in Myanmar to continue caring about Myanmar.
Host 03:45
That's quite a heavy load being independent Myanmar focused research institution from 2012 until now, certainly that it feels like these, these 15 years or so that have less than 15 that have passed from then until now, I think other countries have gone through less eventful centuries. It almost feels and then after 2021 yet again, another massive, critically important amount of information that you're having to process and make sense of.
Moe Thuzar 04:16
Yes, in a way, it's a heavy load, but it's also a very interesting, I think load, if I could use that word again, because not many countries in Southeast Asia have, I think that that benefit or privilege, I would say, in having a Dedicated Country Studies program under the umbrella of a regional Research Institute. And of course, you know, in Southeast Asia, in a country like Singapore, there will be certain countries within the Southeast Asian region that will be more salient for policy and research and business audiences. In. Singapore and of course, countries like like like Indonesia and Malaysia come to mind. So for the rest of the countries in Southeast Asia, the other countries that have dedicated or separate country studies programs, in addition to Myanmar, would also be Thailand and Vietnam and Philippines recently. So at least, I think these are the countries where the developments, events that are taking place, the leadership changes, and what it portends, particularly as it relates to the region. I think it's something that I feel it's important for for me, in my present responsibility, to actually help share the story and what's important, the context and so on. Of course, these country studies programs are in addition to what has traditionally been the broader regional assessment. So there's the strategic and Political Studies Research Program. There is the Economic Studies Research Program, then there is the socio cultural studies research program, that actually look at the region trends and emerging patterns and trends in the region overall.
Host 06:17
So you're sitting on top of such a mountain of critical research and topics and so many directions that that one can go in being able to glean your insights. But perhaps the best direction to look at now is you've recently delivered a talk focusing on three critical points that you wanted to express. So let's hear those points now. Thank you.
Moe Thuzar 06:41
This the three points that that I made in the talk that you refer to, of course, are also points that I remind myself to bear in mind, and when I frame or try to, you know, look at and analyze what's happening in Myanmar and also presenting it to different external interlocutors and audiences to help them in their understanding and appreciation of what are the critical points to know about what what is happening in Myanmar with relation to the Myanmar crisis and all of that. And I also, I think, bring the nexus of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and what it does, what its response has been, regionally, collectively, as well as the individual ASEAN members response. And this is, this is something else that I bring also as part of my research interest. Because before I took up full time coordinatorship of the Myanmar Studies program at ICIS Yusuf Institute, I was a lead researcher in the ASEAN Studies Center also housed in the institute. And you know before that, before I joined ISIS before I became, I guess, you know, a full time researcher. I spent about close to 10 years at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. So that's, that's, I think, the kind of the nexus of what I what I know and understand and want to share, in terms of connecting the dots, which is one of the points that I raised yesterday. So, and the first point is something that in recent years I've noticed, in terms of the response, if you will, of the world at large, particularly the region, the Southeast Asian region, and, you know, capitals, governments, countries in this region, to the coup that happened in in 2021 in Myanmar, and how these different external interlocutors, different governments, different capitals, view what happened and how they understand it, and how sometimes some of the positions that you know these respective governments have with regard to the positionality of, say, the military regime, the junta, the state administration Council in Myanmar and the different groups opposing the military, resisting the coup and and, of course, you know, the broader ethnic armed organizations, the eaos. So I've seen this, this, this, this pattern, shall I say, for lack of a better word that comes to mind right now of what I call outside in and inside out kind of understandings. And of course, looking at Myanmar from the outside in what people in, say, a capital in a country, see. Is, of course, the capital of the country. So the intergovernmental nature of, I think, interacting with a state or between countries. And, of course, if we're speaking in the ASEAN context, that becomes interstate, intergovernmental kind of interactions and relations in the regional context and that outside in tendency. Just you know, in the formal language of regional documents ASEAN statements declarations, you do see references to Myanmar, but the Myanmar that they are looking at is the Myanmar that they understand as in, represented in the past, of course, by Nabi dot. And of course, we all know that currently, naibi dot doesn't really represent the whole of Myanmar. And there are multiple Myanmar. There's Myanmar as people understand, in naibi dot, there's Myanmar outside naibi.in the peri urban and, of course, you know, the more the central areas, the delta, then there's Myanmar and the periphery. And now, of course, the resistance. And there's Myanmar and the diaspora. There's Myanmar in the rural areas. So I think the thing about the you know this, this reality of the multiple Myanmar that, of course, have existed even before 2021 so on, but particularly since 2021 due to the nature of that spontaneous reaction against this seizure of power. I think that's something that I try to remind the external interlocutors to bear in mind when they talk about or refer to Myanmar, to be clear of what they're talking about. And of course, the Myanmar that they view through the lens of naibi.is not the soul or the primary Myanmar. So that's the kind of outside in perspective that I differentiate. What I meant by inside out is, of course, yes, the Myanmar people, people in Myanmar, they're also, of course, you know, viewing how the world engages, how the region engages, how, all you know, the external actors and interlocutors interact with different individuals, entities and so on. And of course, since 2021 particularly, I think the expectations of these external interactions, the external actors and interlocutors. I think view and perceptions of Myanmar looking from the inside out, I think the expectation, expectations from the, you know, the very real on ground experiences that many communities in Myanmar are going through. That also is, I think, how I think people in the country, the Myanmar, people, by and large, widely, I think, have as that that frame or the lens through which they view how people are viewing them and, of course, their expectations on the attention that that needs to be paid on the very, I think, sad and tragic realities that have been visited upon The people, particularly with the mounting, intensifying atrocities that the armed forces of the state administration council have been visiting on many innocent communities so that outside in, inside out, framing for me, I think helps me to continue sharing and explaining the context of why it's important to understand what's happening in Myanmar and caring about what's happening in Myanmar to the people who really are interested to and who want to assist The people of Myanmar really find their path back to the kind of, I think, hopes and aspirations that all of us had around the time when we cast our votes in November 2020, and of course, you know, returning the mandate to continue the journey of reform as a task that the NLD needed to the National League for Democracy needed to complete in the second term.
Host 14:47
So this inside out, outside in perspective, this is trying to bring the reality of the multiple Myanmar's to to to better understand the country. It's not and. And not only are there different stories, but you know, the estimates vary, but recent estimate I saw was the military actually physically controls 30% of the land or less. And so it's not just the different peoples and stories that are in there, but it's current. You know, today, it's the actual amount of control that napida exerts, and this gets into this wider issue of sovereignty and legitimacy and how that's determined?
Moe Thuzar 15:27
Well, yes, a part of that, of course, that outside and inside out, I guess framing analysis or explanation also relates to this reality about legitimacy or engagement or recognition. Call it what you will. Because I think both sides of the political divide definitely, of course, the Myanmar military, but of course, also the forces resisting the military rejecting the coup, broadly representing the aspirations of the different communities and people in Myanmar for change, for for democratization, for a more federal system of government, all of that, I think, are also asserting the, you know, the importance of recognizing, accepting and continuing with The outcome of the 2020 elections, which is, of course, one of the points that the Myanmar military seized upon to to assert why they they did the coup on the first of February, 2021 so a large part of that is also to to clarify, what Does it mean when they talk about engaging with Myanmar and why it's important to not have just one, you know, a soul or a primary interlocutor, but really the need to talk to everyone to understand the very important and valid aspirations and hopes, and, of course, the criticisms that these people have for, you know, the future that they cast their vote for but were denied. And I think that's, that's one of the things as well. And the other point that you were raised about control, I think that's an important point also that I try to clarify about the situation. As you know, a lot of people tend to refer to the conflict that's going on as the Civil War. We all know, I think we all, all of us who are familiar with Myanmar, who you know, who know the country and all its history, of course, know that. You know, it's not just something that sprung up after 2021 I mean, there's, there's been decades of civil war going on, and so, I mean, I would even put thought, put, you know, posit, this, this, this, this view I have that the military really hasn't been in control of the whole Country. Talk about the center and the periphery. There's always been, I think, that pushback against this, you know, centralized, you know, very, you know, center Burma Buddhist type of centric assertion of control over what has always been. You know, plural, multi, ethnic, kind of, you know, interactive society that's been going on, and to have something that's imposed upon, you know, what's, what has been, the actual situation in reality, without, I think, considering consulting, inputs, desires and aspirations, I think has been, always been there since, you know, the time of independence, yeah, well, and that's what we're seeing as well.
Host 18:51
Right? I mean, famously, at the parliamentary democracy period of who knew they controlled So, and this was really the genesis and birth of what would become the Myanmar military, but, but the central government controlled so much that they jokingly called it the the federal government of Rangoon or something, because, you know, their jurisdiction spread very little outside of, actually, the capital city of Rangoon, and as it was known at the time therein, as Mary Callahan shows in Her book, was the origins of why, how the military was built up to constantly be, you know, to extend their influence. But as you point out, you know, it's been very, very far from total in their history. And as other guests on our podcast have pointed out, you know, how much have it for as much as they've been recognized in history and in the region for being this powerhouse. How much have they actually won? You know, how many battles or how many, how much have they actually conquered and occupied of the country? Because these battles have just been ongoing and ongoing and ongoing until present day.
Moe Thuzar 20:00
And of course, you know that relates back to the the federal aspirations, and what we've seen since 2021 of course, is a much more, I think, firm voicing of this, this political roadmap towards more federal democratic system and and it's there in the Federal Democratic Charter that was announced in march 2021 onwards. But you know, you, you, you mentioned Mary Callahan's book making enemies. It's been really consequential for me, also in my own research journey. Because if we actually go back and look at the, you know, look back at the parliamentary democracy era, as you mentioned, the whole, you know, the origins of this, this what we see today as a very entrenched narrative of the military as the provider of security or the guardian or the protector of the state, started since then, and, you know, the narrative started when there were these, you know, multiple pushbacks by different ethnic armed groups at the time to really, I think, assert what they felt were, were the gaps that should have been pursued and filled in addressing those agreements reached in February 1947 among consultations that were made with certain of the ethnic nationality groups. So there's this whole point about, in a situation of instability, the military is the sole provider or guarantor of of stability, of, you know, protecting people's security. I think those narratives started back then in the in the late 50s, and, of course, with that you know the the period of what some researchers and analyzes, analysts call the constitutional coup, which was basically the request of the civilian government at that time to the military to be a caretaker government For two years to create conditions conducive for multi party elections and then transferring power back. So when we look back to that, we do see that, you know, the origins, if you will, of the playbook that the military in its present iteration, under its present leadership, is going back to in trying to justify certain things. So for those of us, I guess, in Myanmar, who've lived long enough through at least two coups, we can see and trace the origin of such narratives and this continuous entrenching of of this, you know, this security language that the military uses and, and I think that's, that's something that, of course, Mary describes very, very well indeed, in a very detailed way, as also, I think, making enemies, or finding an enemy and basically placing people, whether they are aware of it or Not, into this constant kind of we are under siege mentality, and, of course, on the other side, controlling access to information and learning and so on, was the other way of also, I think, making that scenario of enemies very real to people. And really that awakening from all of that, that realization that we're actually all in this together, and there have been communities across the country that have been subjected to the kind of atrocities that some communities after 2021 have experienced. I think that was, you know, it took such a sad tragedy for that awakening to happen. But that has happened, you know, and there's no, there's no turning back from that.
Host 24:09
Which then leads and segues into your second point.
Moe Thuzar 24:12
Yes, the second point, of course, is something that's really related to, to these principles that you know, are part of ASEAN Regional diplomacy, and we do see that in a lot of the media analysis and so on, not just about, you know, ASEAN and Myanmar, but if it comes to ASEAN dealing with regional tensions, such as those arising From territorial claims in the South China Sea, for example, we do see references to non interference, and also since at least from the 2010 onwards, this notion of ASEAN centrality, which tries to assert. That ASEAN is taking the lead role in setting the agenda, not just as organizer extraordinaire, but actually leading and setting the agenda. And, you know, asserting the relevance, the importance and the salience of ASEAN. And of course, you know that that harks back to even when ASEAN, when it was first formed in 1967 the founders at that time did have this commitment or understanding that we need to stick together as a region, if and if we don't. I think it was the then Singapore Foreign Minister, s Raja Ratnam, who said, If we don't hang together, we'll be hanged separately. So it's the point of, I think, you know, a group of smaller nations, maybe with not that much of voice or clout, if individual states having a stronger voice, if they stuck together to stand the, I guess, the geopolitical currents and tide of those times in the 1960s which was, of course, you know, the height of the Cold War and all that. So, so we see now the ASEAN founding principles and, of course, the theassertion of ASEAN centrality in later years, always in relation to discussions when it comes to ASEAN response to the Myanmar crisis since 2021 and you know, for some it could be principles or points that they could hide behind, or it could also become points on which certain, I think, members of the grouping might have differing views, and therefore, you know, give rise to the interpretation, or, I think, commentaries that ASEAN differing views, or the, you know, the different national interests or domestic interests of individual ASEAN member countries also affect how the regional response is being steered, or, you know, navigated. So I brought that up as my second point in the talk, mainly to to, I think, remind the audience at the talk, and also, also to keep reminding myself, of course, that you know, these are not cast in stone, stone, so to speak. Of course, they are principles, and they are foundational principles. But ASEAN has always been practical in the sense that if regional interests, if regional stability, if regional security, is going to be affected by spillover from, say, the situation in one particular member state, then that is cause for ASEAN to consider intervening. And of course, half ASEAN intervenes has taken many forms, and I guess with the experience of Myanmar as an ASEAN member since 1997 I would even go so far as to say that Myanmar has been the most interfered with under that ASEAN framework. Because, you know, there's been a lot of statements and issue, you know, statements being issued by ASEAN on Myanmar, with regard to any kind of situation. The most memorable beginning would be the Tibetan incident of 2003 so that was when the situation in Myanmar, as the ASEAN styles, it was put on the regional agenda and stayed on the regional agenda until, I think, 2015 so ASEAN was always monitoring what was going on in Myanmar, and whoever attended ASEAN meetings would be in for a difficult time answering hard questions. And that was the thing about ASEAN membership. You don't get a free pass. You don't get to use ASEAN as a shield. You have to answer questions. You have to you have to satisfy why ASEAN, you know, is assisting you with your development and your you know, membership participation, when you yourself as a member, are not considering, what is it in you know, the larger regional interest, and particularly, of course, contributing to to the regional project, if you will, development, peace, prosperity, stability, and then that's the that's kind of gap that you know, we've seen it through all these years of Myanmar membership in ASEAN. Yes, of course. The diplomats will emphasize that joining ASEAN, seeking ASEAN membership, was so that we would be able we, as in Myanmar, would be able to contribute, but at that time, but at the same time, you know, there's this other point that I'd like to make, which is, you know, commitments may be regional, but implementation is national, and it's something that former ASEAN Secretaries General have also mentioned in the context of why it's important for ASEAN to move forward is if when the member states actually take back what they agreed to at The Regional table and give it effect at the national level, because there's no automatic implementation of an agreement. Each of the countries have to bring it back, put it through different legislative processes or executive orders, and then, you know, implement it at the country level. And that's how the different agreements, be it movement for, you know, professionals across borders, be it trying to ensure more seamless trade flows and so on. Anyway. So that's that, you know, the implementation commitment, or the compliance commitment. And I think that's one thing that has become even more important post 2021 from Myanmar, because it's all been about not complying with or not implementing five broad points that were discussed and negotiated and agreed With the coup leader, state administration Council chief, senior general. So I think that these are the points that I in the talk I was giving as my second point I was highlighting, you know, they're not points to, to to kind of refer to as, you know, because of that, ASEAN can't move or because of this, ASEAN is not in a position to do this or that, but really to take it and look at how the flexibility of interpreting those principles have been in the past. And really look at it instead of non interference. Look at it as not being indifferent, non indifference. And of course, you know when you talk about ASEAN centrality, then take ownership, lead it, own it, and coordinate it. Yes, you can lament it, but you can also try to see how you know in the past responses have been and how to build on that experience.
Host 32:45
So with that background in mind, a really wonderful background of going into the institutional history of ASEAN itself, its principles, its engagement, and then particularly with Myanmar in ASEAN, with all of that in mind, and then looking at five point consensus in the last four plus years of ASEAN engagement, or we could say non engagement with Myanmar too. This time, there has been a lot of talk, I think, as there always is, when the seat moves, when the seat moved to Indonesia, there was a lot of talk there, and the seat having moved to Malaysia, now there's a focus here, and it always feels like something, I guess, on one hand, it has a feeling of being the possibility of a new beginning, which always brings a certain kind of optimism. But then there also comes with that, as well balanced with that is because these seats are moving so fast and a year is so short, or year goes by so quickly, there's also this, this sense of how much has to be done to even get anywhere close to speed to, you know, without that, that big institutional memory of of continuity. And so with all of this in mind, both where, how the the seed is moving and and where it currently stands, and with this institutional background that you provided Since 2021 and then since 1967 where does that fit in to both on one hand, what you would like to see with ASEAN, with the seat where it is moving forward. But then, in looking realistically, there might be things we like to see that we think are, you know, we don't want to just offer empty platitudes here of this should have, this should happen. This should happen. We want to see this. And, you know, okay, well, we can wish that all we want, but we know how the world works beyond what it is, we just like to see what is actually possible. In your estimation, that that that could be an achievable reality, given the complexities and the conditions that we find ourselves in now.
Moe Thuzar 34:44
Yes, well, you know, I think sometimes, when it comes to to Myanmar, right, sometimes I think it's all been about timing and and, of course, the current times that we are on we are in now doesn't really lend to, I think, the kind of a. Situation, solution, settlement, that we'd all like to see. And of course, for the suffering and the atrocities to end. So this, this, you know, the annual rotation of the ASEAN chairs, as you were referring to. It rotates each year. And of course, in 2021 Brunei had just taken up ASEAN chairmanship, and just barely a month into its chairmanship, the coup happened. So the first statement issued say by an ASEAN chair on the coup was by Brunei. What was interesting, of course, was this reference to the ASEAN Charter, which came into force in late 2008 and there's reference there to good governance, democracy and respect for human rights, which was specifically mentioned in the chairman statement issued under Brunei watch, which I thought was interesting, because that was yes, it was still diplomatic speak, but it was a reminder that, look, you know, as an ASEAN member, under the ASEAN subscribe to the ASEAN Charter, which you know, all the ASEAN Member States, of course, have to ratify and accept and abide by they are these principles, good governance, democracy, respect for human rights. And that, I think, was a subtle reminder of how staging this kind of power grab at this junta in time was just simply not on. If I could, you know, use that colonialism. And, of course, the usual thing about hoping things would get back to normal and and the people's aspirations would be addressed. So Brunei, I think, in 2021 also as ASEAN chair had the the really challenging task of getting you know, things, moving the response you know, or formulating the response, consulting people and so on. So when the five point consensus was negotiated, discussed, agreed to in april 2021, then, you know, Brunei also had that task of appointing the special envoy representing the ASEAN chair. And that also was, I think, a point of negotiation. Because I initially the interest was to have a special envoy of ASEAN, but then again, that would mean who, from which country and the different interests of you know who, whose candidate would be broadly acceptable and be able to deal with it. And of course, all of this happens with the say of Myanmar at that time, represented by the state administration, councils, officials, Foreign Minister, that was also there. The input was also there. So I think one way of ASEAN trying to get around with it, to get work done, with Okay, fine. Let's have the special envoy as the Special Envoy of the ASEAN chair. So the ASEAN chair is responsible to steer things through. Then the special envoy then should be responsible to the chair, and then, you know, report to the rest of the ASEAN member states. And so that was the kind of modus operandi, modus vivendi that was agreed upon, and the foreign minister of Brunei the second foreign minister, as they call it, because the Sultan also holds Foreign Affairs portfolio. Well anyway, Foreign Minister of Brunei became the first special envoy, and then the task of going to to Myanmar, to meet and talk to all stakeholders, which was also part of the five point consensus. The Special Envoys mandate is to meet and talk to everyone, all stakeholders, regardless, to really try to find where they could mediate, or find a way to bring people to discuss the future for Myanmar. So that was all happening, but what was becoming clear also is that after having not objected to the five point consensus in April, very soon after the state administration Council issued a statement that basically indicated that they turned to the five point consensus only after dealing with their five point roadmap. And for ASEAN, that was not on again, you can't conflate something that was regionally discussed and agreed and impressed upon by, you know, with with your own domestic roadmap. In that sense. So ASEAN made it clear and and because of this, you know again, the ASEAN speakers lack of progress in implementing the five point consensus. There was an emergency meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in October 2021 where they agreed that, because of this lack of progress, Myanmar's participation, Myanmar's attendance at the ASEAN summit would be restricted to a non political representative, which basically meant the senior general or his nominated ministers or the foreign minister of the state administration council would not be invited to this, this high level meeting, it would be someone at the senior officials level, and that, that decision happened in the presence of UVA naman, the SEC foreign minister over zoom. So you know, you can talk about consensus and blah, blah, blah, but that was an instance of, actually, you know, the sentiments in ASEAN, broadly, the foreign ministers indicating that you, you, you know, you do not get away with not complying to something you have agreed to. And that was, of course, the what happened during Brunei championship. He had that decision. And interestingly, there was a special Commemorative Summit for ASEAN in China that same year. And the Chinese respected that. And we would see the US also upholding the ASEAN decision for the special us ASEAN Summit in May, in 2022 and even, I think, for some of the high level meetings and summits for the ASEAN India, dialog relations in 2022 as well. So anyway, 2021 moving into 2022 that was Cambodia's chairmanship year. And of course, we saw a different application of the ASEAN chair for that year, Cambodia the approach and Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia at that time wanted to do his personal diplomacy, so he announced very early on his intention to visit nay PID or talk to the senior general and all of that. And he very early on, also realized, of you know, what that move did or did not achieve. And so what we saw, of course, in February 2022 was Cambodia extending that non political representative criterion to the foreign ministers meeting. So in Brunei chairmanship year, it was the summit. Then in Cambodia's chairmanship year that got extended to the foreign ministers meeting, and that criterion to those two high level political meetings has held to this day. And the special envoy of the 2022 ASEAN chair Cambodia, again, was the foreign minister, and of course, he did his de rigueur visit to nepi doll. But you know when, when the special envoy visits Myanmar and tries to meet with all stakeholders, there are certain limitations that would be, I think, set on who the special envoy could meet and, you know, and all of that. So I think there was this, I guess, a natural frustration on the part of the Myanmar stakeholders, particularly those who were in, who were in resistance to the coup and to military rule on what does this engagement mean? So I think that was what the, I think Cambodia's chairmanship year experience, but nevertheless, I do, do see these little blips of Cambodia actually exercising the chair's right to apply the non political representative criterion, as as I just mentioned to the Foreign Ministers Meeting. But in November of that year, also to the defense ministers meeting, plus, not the defense ministers meeting, where just the ASEAN Defense Ministers were meeting, but the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting with counterparts from dialog partner countries, including, say, the defense secretary from the United States and other Defense Secretaries from other ASEAN dialog partners. So that was in November and Cambodia. I think as ASEAN chair took that as its prerogative to disinvite the SAC defense minister. So, so we see things like that. I mean, of course, you know. I mean, it's looking back, you see those kinds of moves. Then 2022 was also the first year that the ASEAN leaders instituted this review of the five point consensus, mainly as a mechanism to express how much or how little progress was made, and there was no progress. And that was. Actually just repeat that. Look, there's no progress. We would like to see progress. We hear of these atrocities, and, you know, we know that the Myanmar armed forces are responsible for this and that, and so the language of the reviews, also, I've noted that, you know, there were nuances that really pointed to placing the main responsibility of the violence that was going on at that time in Myanmar, on the shoulders of the Myanmar armed forces. And so in coming into 2023 you mentioned, expectations were high, because this was Indonesia that was going to take up the chairmanship, one of the stronger voices that had stood on principle since the coup, with regard to respecting the 2020 election results and so on. So there were expectations that, okay, maybe in Indonesia's championship year would see some progress. Maybe we'd see this, the emergence of a specific implementation plan for, you know, the five point consensus, which still remains as the broad framework and all of that. And of course, because you know, if you have high expectations, then if your expectations are not met, then of course, there will be some frustration and some disappointment. But what was interesting in Indonesia's year was really taking to heart this sentiment that was being expressed in the annual surveys that my Institute does on the state of Southeast Asia. And we had introduced this question about, you know, the ASEAN response to the Myanmar crisis, and to move, to move forward, what needs to be done. And there was this option about, you know, you need to talk to everyone. And Indonesia really took that sentiment that was really shared quite regionally across all the respondents from the 10 countries in Southeast Asia. And tried to start then organizing what I think the Indonesians call engagements with different stakeholders. And they did it, I guess, bilaterally, in the sense that they met with many of the political actors and stakeholders separately, because they were aware in Indonesia, as ASEAN chair and the conveners were aware that, I think, sentiments, and of course, you know, the very real feelings of trust or distrust were simply there was simply no parity, shall we say, for the intention or the interest to actually convene, say, a dialog around the table. And for, of course, if you talk about dialog, there has to be parity. And up to now, we're probably seeing in 2025 something that approaches, is approaching more parity for dialog. But definitely, you know, there are these, the surrounding atmosphere of, I think the lack of trust based on previous experiences of broken trust, I think, has prevented that kind of step that, I guess ASEAN would like to see in terms of helping the Myanmar stakeholders convene a dialog. So that was the move in Indonesia's championship year that okay, come 2024 there we were all again concerned it's going to be Laos chairmanship. Oh, my goodness, will what Indonesia has done be continued? Will there be continuity? And for the sake of keeping the conversations going and building trust on the part of ASEAN with the different Myanmar actors, there needs to be that process of building trust so that the Myanmar stakeholders can also see ASEAN as a responsible actor, convener and coordinator, acting for the interests of Myanmar as a member state, but also the Myanmar people. And so the concerns were there about whether Laos could continue what Indonesia had done, and how could there be a continuity of effort across chairmanships? Because we'd already seen from 21 to 22 to 23 the chopping and changing. It takes time to get up to speed, as you had observed, and championship is only one year. So if you take a few three or four months to get up to speed, then how much time do you have to actually meet and talk to people? And then comes the handover of chairmanship towards the end of the year, and then there you go into, you know, handover mode. So the importance, I think, of having continuity really started, I think, sinking in and the concerns around the 2024 Laos championship. But Laos did continue the engagements, maybe not at the same scale and frequency as the Indonesians did. I mean, I think during Indonesia's championship year, there were over 160 type of those kinds of meetings. Yes. So what we know about during Laos championship was that they continued, but I guess, you know, Laos preferred to keep it, I guess, out of the media spotlight and and that's what I guess the rest of ASEAN had to live with at the same time, the interesting twist in 2024 was the state administration Council started sending a non political representative to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, meetings, retreats and the ASEAN summit before that. Um, the state administration Council's response was, if you don't invite us, we won't go. So there was, you know, no representative at those meetings, starting 2024 the Myanmar seat at those meetings was filled by that non political representative. But that's not to say that at the senior officials meeting, the seat was empty. At the senior officials meeting, the seat has always been the naanmar seat has always been filled by the, you know, say, someone like the Permanent Secretary, for example, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at other sectoral meetings, whether administer real senior official or working level, Myanmar seat is not empty. So anyway, so we saw that happening and and, of course, it was important to nuance that sending a non political representative does not constitute complying with the five point consensus, partial humanitarian assistance. Yes, it's good that there's partial, but that's not also a full, you know, implementation, and there needs to be, I think, facilitation of humanitarian assistance to all communities in need, and not just to selected communities through, you know, the SAC approved channels, so to speak. So I think that was the situation that was happening in 2024 what was interesting, of course, is that, breaking with past practice of appointing the foreign minister as the Special Envoy, Laos actually appointed a separate Special Envoy to free it up. Interestingly enough, of course, Indonesia, even though it was understood that the foreign minister was the special envoy, she didn't act as such, and instead appointed an office of the special envoy, and the head of that office was the one that was the kind of main interlocutor during Indonesia's chairmanship. So the continuity of whether there will continue to be this kind of, you know, dedicated office for the special envoy didn't, didn't sort of materialize beyond Indonesia's championship year. And so after Laos chairmanship, 2025 present day is Malaysia's turn. And again, expectations are high, also because Malaysia was one of the countries that also had a very strong, principled voice in reaction to the 2021 coup, and also because the administration, the government of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, of course, came into office on on the reform platform, and Anwar Ibrahim himself has been a strong advocate for democracy and change, and, you know, he has also, I think, experienced the consequences of what it meant to, you know, advocate for reform and change and so on in the past. So, so expectations are high. And what we've seen, of course, is this rather clever diplomatic calibration of engagement. Yes, the special envoy, again, someone separate from the foreign minister, made his de rigueur trip to Ney P DAW but also after that trip, met with members of the resistance and ethnic armed organizations here in Bangkok. So it was, it was, you know, kind of like a continuum, if you will. Yes, I will meet who I need to meet in Myanmar, and I'll also meet, meet who I need to meet from members of the opposition and the resistance and the eaos. So I think that's the kind of I think the principles, the actions that we're seeing and at the foreign ministers retreat earlier this year, the Malaysian foreign minister actually mentioned to the to the press. In the briefing that he gave to the press that whatever the SAC non political representative said about elections, the response from ASEAN was, you know, don't talk about elections. You know, peace or. The end of violence in Myanmar is the priority. So I think that's the kind of, I think position stand and action that we'll have to, you know, we'll see, or we hope to see, continuing in Malaysia's chairmanship. It's been four years going into five. We really need to look at it in a more medium term view. And because of this, you know, the annual rotation disrupting what needs to be a continuity of effort will probably need to have a multi year strategy that each ASEAN chair can take on as a continuity, rather than having to come up with a new approach during each chairmanship year, there needs to be a consistent approach so that ASEAN can really be in that central seat that coordinates the different efforts. And certainly, what we don't want to see, of course, is competing efforts. What we want to see is more coordination by ASEAN dialog partners, countries in this region, countries that bore them, Myanmar, ASEAN member countries. And each have strengths. Some countries have strengths that other countries don't. Some countries have communication channels that other countries don't. And I think with that, I think coordination of the different capacities and strengths, then that multi year, multi track strategy can accommodate many champions that want to help Myanmar. And, you know, help the Myanmar people get back to to pursuing the hopes and dreams and aspirations that they all wanted very much before this disruption to that trajectory happened in 2021 because, you know, if we go back to the outside in, inside out, framing. It's not just you know happening in silos in one country. We also need to see what are the broader regional interests, if we are expecting certain things of ASEAN What are ASEAN interests? And what are the individual member states different interests based on domestic developments, and of course, the domestic political developments in some of the ASEAN countries now have changed since 2021 we've seen new leaders take take office, especially in the three countries that have had Stronger, principled voices on on what happened in 2021 so I think it's important to connect the dots even more so, because there are these geopolitical uncertainties and how that will play out in this region, which I think we all need to be aware of, and we have our different expectations on what we want to see as an end to the suffering and the conflict.
Host 58:01
Thank you for that wonderful exposition going year by year into that level of detail. I've never heard that such a detailed analysis of a history going back from from from one chair to the next, and it was very educational. So I very much appreciate that. And there's there's so much information that you've shared, and I want to try to boil it down to the takeaways as we close here, would would I be correct in saying, or how would you modify my suggestion that what you where you seem to be going now is one of cautious optimism, where ASEAN sits?
Moe Thuzar 58:40
Well, I would be cautiously optimistic if I can see in this year a more medium term, multi year strategy being entrenched that will provide the continuity. Of course, we hope very much that Malaysia with its leadership. And also, let's not forget, way back in 1997 it was under Malaysia's watch that Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN. And so, you know, with that and Malaysia chairmanship in 2005 also saw the appointment of the then Foreign Minister of Malaysia as an envoy. You know, the foreign ministers asked the Malaysian foreign minister to be their envoy, to go and talk to the senior General of the State Peace and Development Council, military regime in Myanmar at that time, on ASEAN concerns. So with all that as history and context to what Malaysia has tried to do in the past, and, of course, the concerns that it raised during the 2016 2017 Rohingya crisis and the aftermath of the exodus in 2017 I think, with all of that, of course, the expectations, I think, are quite high, if you will, on what Malaysia can can bring and do. Suu, and also entrench as a kind of mechanism for continuity into the future, because 2026 is going to be Philippines. 2027 which is also the 60th anniversary of ASEAN founding, is going to be presided over by Singapore as ASEAN chair. So we've got Malaysia this year, then Philippines in 2026 2027 is Singapore. Then the ASEAN championship rotation will come back to the mainland. 2028 will be Thailand. 2029 will be Vietnam. And so I think, you know, we do need that multi year type of strategy for that element of continuity and for the different ASEAN chairs, not to have that, you know, the added responsibility of coming up with something and only to Have it change again in the future. So I think that's, that's, that's what I hope to see. And I that that's what I would like to be optimistic, cautiously optimistic for. So, you know, it's, it's March about a quarter into the year, and you know, the first summit of of Malaysia's chairmanship year is coming up in May. So let's, let's see what, what that comes about, and if this process somehow can be, can be, I guess, introduced and entrenched. What we need to see is, I think, this kind of continuity of effort by ASEAN for Myanmar, because whatever the sentiments are in this region, outside this region, Myanmar is in Southeast Asia. Myanmar has identified itself as part of Southeast Asia and as a member of ASEAN. I think it is going to be a question, a situation, an issue that ASEAN has to address in the context of this ongoing conflict and crisis that we're seeing well.
Host 1:02:14
Thank you so much for your time sharing these incredibly detailed points going back through the history up to today, it's really so privileged for myself and listeners to be able to make use and benefit from your study and involvement in bringing this to us.
Moe Thuzar 1:02:31
Well, so much of my research has been on, you know, the making of Burma's foreign policy during the Cold War years, and also that nexus of ASEAN and Myanmar, which has also, you know, been being a large part of my formative years in the in the Myanmar Foreign Service, before I left, left The service in in the year 2000 there's there's one, one point that came to mind, and that has to do with chairmanship, particularly Myanmar's ASEAN chairmanship. So in 2005 ASEAN was quite concerned about the 2006 ASEAN chair rotating to Myanmar under military leadership, and ASEAN exercised regional diplomacy to impress upon the generals at that time that maybe it might be in the interest of all if Myanmar chairmanship turn could be deferred. And the generals at that time, I guess, responded to that suggestion, and they agreed to defer it, for which, at that time, ASEAN was quite appreciative. So because it's asking something that is, you know, that rotates, and it's kind of like every member's turn to expect the ASEAN Foreign Ministers basically said, you know, when you want to take back your chairmanship turn, just let us know. And guess what? The administration of President Thein San union solidarity Development Party administration wanted that turn because, I guess they knew that Myanmar term was coming up in 2016 but then, of course, the elections would happen in 2015 and they probably knew about the writing on the wall, and so they wanted to have that term. The USDP administration probably wanted to have that turn at the ASEAN chair in 2014 and this is really an ASEAN factoid. You know, you can swap chairmanship terms, and guess who agreed to swap? It was Laos. So Laos agreed to take the 2016 and gave up its 2014 turn to Myanmar so that Myanmar would have its first time at sharing ASEAN. But ASEAN didn't give in, just because they had said, you know, anytime you want to take it up, we'll let you. You know. Take it up Indonesia in its chairmanship year, and that was 2011 actually sent its foreign minister, Martin Aung, to Myanmar, to assess whether Myanmar was indeed in a you know position, ready to take up chairmanship, before agreeing that Myanmar could take up that championship. Why am I bringing this up? Because the state administration council did a similar thing. They offered to defer their chairmanship turn in 2026 but they said they'd like to take it back up in 2027 ASEAN clearly told them, it's not up to you to decide, okay, we accept that the chairmanship turn for 2026 will be deferred, and Philippines then will take it up, and then it will continue along the alphabetical rotation until such time it's decided. So you know, just, I kind of like was thinking, Well, you know, 2027 it's ASEAN 60th anniversary year. Chairmanship is not going to be something that's likely decided on. Who takes it up anyway. So now it's Singapore, who's going to be ASEAN chair in 2027 and the rotation will continue until such time it is decided otherwise, and the review of the five Point consensus implementation or lack thereof, will also continue.
Host 1:06:51
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