Episode #345: The Art of Doing Nothing
RELEASE DATE: MAY 16, 2025
Does any engagement with the junta legitimize its brutality? ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s Moe Thuzar analyzes ASEAN’s contentious role and argues diplomacy, rather than condemnation, is the path forward.
Moe Thuzar is a senior fellow coordinating the Myanmar Studies Programme at the research institute and former official at the ASEAN Secretariat’s Human Development Unit. She holds a doctorate from the National University of Singapore, where her research focused on the execution of Burma's foreign policy between 1948 and 1988. She has co-authored and contributed to several books on ASEAN and Myanmar.
Moe Thuzar offers a nuanced viewpoint on the complex and often debated role of ASEAN in addressing the protracted crisis in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup. In this debate, the same questions keep arising. Does engaging with the military junta (SAC) constitute complicity, thereby legitimizing their rule? Or can ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts—such as maintaining communication channels— exert influence, keep the regime in check, and ultimately advocate for the aspirations of the Myanmar people?
Moe Thuzar's analysis suggests that maintaining communication can serve as a strategic tool to navigate Myanmar's complex geopolitical landscape, potentially influencing the SAC while advocating for the broader interests of the Myanmar people. Her analysis is grounded in a deep understanding of the region and Myanmar itself. She points out the unique position of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, noting that “not many countries in Southeast Asia have that benefit or privilege in having a dedicated country studies program under the umbrella of a regional research institute.” Her insights are further informed by her extensive, ten-year experience within the ASEAN framework, and with the Myanmar Foreign Service.
A key point in Moe Thuzar’s argument is the recognition of the fragmented reality within Myanmar. She notes that external perceptions often focus solely on Naypyidaw. Yet, the reality involves the existence of “multiple Myanmars in the peri-urban and central areas, the delta, the periphery. And now the resistances,” she says, referring to the diverse actors, each with their own interests. “There’s also Myanmar in the diaspora. There’s Myanmar in the rural areas.” This complex landscape, with its diverse resistance actors and aspirations, necessitates an “inside-out” approach that prioritizes the needs and desires of the Myanmar people, particularly their democratic will expressed in the 2020 elections and the urgent need to end the junta’s violence.
She underscores the need of addressing the “tragedies of the [Myanmar] people with the mounting atrocities of the armed forces of the SAC.” In contrast, she points out how the “ethnic armed organizations represent the aspirations of different communities and people in Myanmar broadly for change, for democratization, and for a more federal system of government.” This is a view that encompasses these “many Myanmars,” as Moe Thuzar goes on to reminds listeners that “the military really hasn’t ever been in control of the whole country! There’s always been this push back against this centralized, Bamar Buddhist type of centric assertion of control over what has always been a plural, multi-ethnic, interactive society.”
Building on her point about the need to address this reality of fragmentation, Moe Thuzar addresses the foundational ASEAN principle of “non-interference” and the concept of “ASEAN centrality.” Challenging the notion that non-interference" means a complete hands-off approach, she argues that ASEAN has historically intervened when regional stability is threatened. She gives the example of the constant scrutiny Myanmar delegations have faced in the past and continue to face by the regional body. “With Myanmar as an ASEAN Member since 1997, I would even go so far as to say that Myanmar has been the most interfered with under the ASEAN framework,” she says. She suggests reframing “non-interference” as “non-indifference” to better showcase its concern for regional well-being. “ASEAN was always monitoring what was going on in Myanmar,” she explains, “and whoever [from the regime] attended would be in for a difficult time at ASEAN meetings, answering hard questions. That was the thing about ASEAN membership: You don’t get a free pass! You don’t get to see ASEAN as a shield.”
Reflecting on the trajectory of the organization’s engagement following the coup and the subsequent Five-Point Consensus agreed upon in April 2021, she details the differing approaches adopted by successive chairs, each influenced by their national priorities and the evolving dynamics of the crisis. Brunei, as the chair at the time of the coup, issued an initial statement referencing the ASEAN Charter’s principles of “good governance, democracy and respect for human rights,” a subtle but significant reminder of the junta’s obligations as a member, argues Moe Thuzar. Brunei also took on the task of appointing the first special envoy to Myanmar, aiming to facilitate dialogue among all stakeholders. However, progress remained elusive at the time.
She saw Cambodia’s chairmanship in 2022 as a more proactive approach, with Prime Minister Hun Sen engaging directly with general Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw. While this engagement was intended to break the deadlock, it also drew criticism for potentially legitimizing the junta. Despite this direct engagement, Cambodia continued the policy of limiting Myanmar’s representation at ASEAN meetings to a non-political level, a stance originally adopted by Brunei. In response, the SAC chose non-participation, refusing to attend these meetings without full political representation. From the side of the opposition, Moe Thuzar notes the “natural frustration on the part of the Myanmar stakeholders, particularly those who were in resistance to the coup and to military rule on what the engagement means.” This dismay, she says, stemmed from the perception that ASEAN’s engagement, particularly direct talks with the junta, was not yielding tangible results and might be inadvertently bolstering its authority. The year 2022 also marked the first instance of ASEAN leaders instituting a review of the Five-Point Consensus due to the continued atrocities committed by the Myanmar Armed Forces.
For Moe Thuzar, Indonesia’s chairmanship in 2023 marked a significant shift in approach. She mentions that Jakarta “took to heart this sentiment that was being expressed in the annual surveys my institute does on the state of Southeast Asia,” which indicated a regional consensus on the need to engage with all stakeholders. Recognizing the deep-seated “lack of trust based on previous experiences of broken trust,” she says Indonesia focused on bilateral engagements, meeting separately with various stakeholders in an attempt to build a foundation for future dialogue. This pragmatic approach acknowledged the complex and fractured political landscape in Myanmar and the need for a more inclusive engagement strategy.
Laos’s chairmanship in 2024 saw a continuation of engagement, albeit “maybe not at the same scale or frequency as Indonesia did.” Interestingly, Moe Thuzar points out that during Laos’s tenure the SAC departed from its previous stance and “started sending a non-political representative to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, meetings, retreats and the ASEAN Summit.” However, she cautions that this “does not constitute complying with the Five-Point Consensus,” as key aspects like unhindered humanitarian access to all communities remain unmet.
Looking ahead, Moe Thuzar notes high expectations for Malaysia’s 2025 chairmanship, given its principled stance against the coup. She speaks on the “rather clever diplomatic calibration of engagement” witnessed under Malaysia’s leadership, where the ASEAN Special Envoy engaged with both the junta in Naypyidaw and representatives of the resistance and Ethnic Armed Organizations in Bangkok. This balanced approach signals a recognition of the legitimacy of multiple stakeholders and a commitment to broader engagement, she says.
Malaysia is also gearing up to host the 46th ASEAN Summit on May 26th and 27th, an event in the shadow of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s contentious discussions in Bangkok with Myanmar’s junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing, in April. During their meeting, Prime Minister Ibrahim advocated for the continuation of the military’s declared ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of aid to populations affected by the devastating earthquake in late March 2025.
While an extension was subsequently announced, its practical impact remains questionable due to ongoing allegations of the junta’s forces, including aerial bombardments in opposition-controlled territories, flouting the ceasefire they agreed to. This situation may present a significant challenge to Malaysia’s leadership of ASEAN. Yet, Moe Thuzar emphasizes, the current ASEAN priority is focused on peace and an end to the violence in Myanmar, rather than immediate discussions of elections, reflecting on the urgent need to address the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis.
Finally, Moe Thuzar focuses on the need for a long-term framework that can ensure continuity across ASEAN chairs, advocating for a “more medium-term, multi-year strategy that each chair can take on as a continuity, rather than having to come up with a new approach during each chairmanship year.” She expresses “cautious optimism” if such a strategy can be implemented. Drawing parallels to ASEAN’s past diplomatic efforts, such as in 2005 regarding Myanmar’s chairmanship when it was deferred, she highlights the organization’s capacity for strategic action. She also notes the upcoming chair of Singapore in 2027 as a potentially significant moment for a renewed regional approach if the Myanmar crisis continues.
Moe Thuzar’s analysis suggests that ASEAN’s engagement with the Myanmar junta is a complex diplomatic strategy aimed at navigating a deeply challenging situation. She argues that by maintaining communication, ASEAN seeks to exert influence, advocate for an end to violence, facilitate humanitarian aid, and create space for a more inclusive dialogue, without necessarily legitimizing the unconstitutional seizure of power. For ASEAN, she says, “the key lies in a consistent, long-term approach that prioritizes the aspirations of the Myanmar people while pragmatically engaging with all relevant actors, including the SAC, as a necessary, albeit problematic, part of the complex political landscape.”
The question persists: Can dialogue with the architects of upheaval truly pave the path to peace? As Moe Thuzar observes, ASEAN has been “interfering” with the junta’s goals for some time. This intervention, however, walks a tightrope: to engage without anointing, to keep the lines open without supporting tyranny.