Episode #346: Burn After Reforming
RELEASE DATE: MAY 20, 2025
“Well, the way we describe it now,” says Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK, “is that this is just the latest coup, and it's going to keep happening. As long as the military are allowed to have any form of power or influence, it's just a question of time before there'll be another one.”
Speaking from his decades of experience—starting in 1988 when he first became aware of Burma’s crisis while involved in the anti-apartheid movement for South Africa—Farmaner explains how his political awakening was shaped by both global solidarity and personal commitment. Early on, his work focused on raising awareness through stunts like street performances and media campaigns. Over time, it developed into policy-driven advocacy with a focus on disrupting military power structures through economic and political means. Through these various forms of engagement, Farmaner came to the firm conclusion that the fundamental flaw in international approaches to engaging with Myanmar is the misguided belief that the military has any interest in reform. Therefore, any attempt at compromise merely preserves military influence and delays meaningful change: “It's like throwing [them] a lifeline.”
As its political sophistication grew, Burma Campaign UK identified two main themes that could be relied on for drawing international attention: Aung San Suu Kyi, and British economic connections to the military. However, Farmaner notes that following Suu Kyi’s fall from grace, most notably after the Rohingya crisis, this caused a dramatic rethinking of the sorts of narratives they were promoting. “Her actions while she was in government have made the international advocacy a lot harder,” he says bluntly. Recently, he notes how Burma Campaign UK put out a media release highlighting the fact that Aung San Suu Kyi had by that point spent a total of 19 years in jail, but “nobody was interested.”
Reflecting on Suu Kyi’s worldview after having met her in 2012, he was surprised to learn that she views Myanmar as a “Bamar Buddhist country with minorities,” as opposed to a multicultural nation. With this perspective firmly in place, Farmaner recounts how she then went on to downplay concerns about military aggression, suggesting all sides were equally culpable. Even her federalism plan, he argues, was a top-down program, and the ethnic politicians complained at the time that she didn’t really understand their situation.
Farmaner connects this deterioration of Aung San Suu Kyi’s standing in the world’s eyes to a broader issue, that international coordination for advocacy in Myanmar has waned, sucked up by the country’s many humanitarian crises. Whereas earlier years saw synchronized efforts between exile groups, border-based civil society, and international human rights organizations, this is no longer the case in the wake of the 2021 coup and especially, the March 28th earthquake.
Despite these challenges, Farmaner notes that for the first time in two decades, people across the country are discussing a post-military future—not just in theory, but in practical terms. Acknowledging that this will be a long process, and that China has asserted more forceful support for the junta, nonetheless, he believes “there is still that hope.”
Imagining this post-junta Myanmar, Farmaner challenges prevailing assumptions that a stable future requires a single authority ruling from a central capitol. He insists, “There isn’t going to be […] a strong central government with authority all over the country.” Instead, he thinks it will entail multiple administrations around the country. Ethnic forces will insist that the regions they fought for remain under their control. He stresses this should not alarm the international community, as he firmly believes that a federated model—born not from ideology but practical resistance—represents the most viable path forward.
Asked whether the National Unity Government (NUG) could play a unifying role, he responds, “I can’t see them being able to form a central government of the kind that there was pre-coup.” For example, when the NUG recently attempted to establish authority in ethnic areas, they quickly got slapped down by ethnic leaders, indicating they were not welcome to administer their communities. He reports that the general lack of access, funds, and diplomatic success has hindered legitimacy, adding that a lot of behind-the-scenes politics by MPs has further fractured the opposition.
In terms of what the international community can do, Farmaner outlines five key areas: 1) deny the military the legitimacy they crave; 2) restrict their sources of revenue; 3) cut off their sources of arms; 4) press for justice and accountability; 5) humanitarian assistance to contested and liberated regions. Regarding sanctions as a remedy, he notes that while they were effective early on, their effectiveness has dissolved because they have not evolved. He stresses that they must be updated regularly in response to the military’s actions and behaviors. He criticizes Western countries’ hesitation to sanction third-party enablers like China and Vietnam.
Farmaner next turns his attention to the country’s domestic situation, which he warns is dire. He argues that the Burmese military is deliberately creating a humanitarian crisis, yet all the while, international aid remains far below need—and far below pre-coup levels. For example, the UK cut aid 73% in 2021; this was aid tied to political reform that did not happen. However, here Farmaner points out that rather than pivot to responding to Myanmar’s massive and expanding humanitarian needs, London just upheld the cuts. This neglect only serves to benefit the Burmese military by weakening the resistance, Farmaner says, adding that his organization has tracked Burmese military social media accounts “gloating” about the diminution of US and UK aid.
The recent earthquake gave the regime an opportunity to regain international legitimacy. Regional governments have resumed contact with the regime, and Western countries don’t want to endanger the new access they’ve got. The junta is putting forward a different public face, but leopards don’t change their spots. He hears from inside sources about the obstructions the junta has thrown up around delivering assistance. Another concern for Farmaner is that earthquake assistance from China has dwarfed that from the U.S.: $136 to $9 million. What is more, he points to a response from some American right-wing think tanks that suggest that the U.S. change policy to actually consider backing the junta, as a way to counter China’s influence.
Grassroots efforts, diaspora action, and local fundraising have been the backbone of Burmese survival. “They’re not waiting for aid agencies or UN or someone to come and help.” He notes how remarkable it was following the earthquake, when local organizations immediately stepped in. This has led to a narrative about “the resilient Burmese people,” but while the international community may romanticize survival, the Burmese people would rather have support! For those interested in becoming allies, Farmaner stresses public action: “The most important thing—write to whoever your local representative is!” Officials tend to respond to public pressure, and personal contact.
He closes with an optimistic yet pragmatic message. “I think it's inevitable that the people of Burma will win their freedom. We just have to make sure the international community does as much as it can to… help the people bring that about sooner rather than later.”