Transcript: Episode #329: US AID is MIA
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Host 00:15
Welcome to the Insight Myanmar podcast. Before we get into today's show, I wanted to let you know that we have a lot more written and video content on our website. If you haven't visited it yet, we invite you to take a look at insight myanmar.org in addition to complete information about all of our past podcasts, there's also a variety of blogs, books and videos to check out. And you can also sign up for our regular newsletter. But for now, enjoy what follows And remember sharing is caring.
Chris Milligan 01:40
Hi. My name is Chris Milligan, and I worked for the US, US Agency for International Development, or USAID, you will see, for 31 years, actually, in that time, I had a focus on development, but I also gained significant humanitarian assistance experience. For example, I was in charge of the US government's response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010 as you recall, that was a massive earthquake. One of my first assignments at USAID was running an airlift for just in Rwanda just pre genocide. Also did numerous other humanitarian system assignments. I've worked across the globe. I set up operations in Iraq at the beginning of the Second Gulf War. I worked in Indonesia, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, Madagascar, Mozambique. But of course, I would consider the highlight of my career was reopening the USAID mission in Yangon in 2012 at that time, the military government had some reformers who were opening up to the west. The United States government had a policy called action for action. So if the military government took a reform, the US government would meet it with an action. The military government, for example, released Aung San San Suu Kyi. We restored diplomatic relations. Aung San Suu Kyi ran for parliament. We restored our development program. So I arrived in country at 2012 and I immediately grasped the complexity of the political situation country, because within 72 hours, I was in Rakhine, state, which was undergoing a humanitarian assistance crisis. There, I stayed in Myanmar until 2016 following the 2015 elections and the installation of the Aung San Suu Kyi government, at which point then I went to moe zambe. So that's my I think relevant background for this conversation.
Host 04:03
I would say that's extremely relevant. And I think what really stands out is your experience heading USAID in Burma, not just heading it, but heading it at such a pivotal moment when it literally wasn't allowed in prior to that, you were, you were, you were really coming into new ground, as well as contrasting your involvement in the Haiti earthquake, I think that will also be relevant. So there's a lot there to go into. But I'd like to start with the Burma experience, because I think there's, there's a couple layers to this. I mean, one is just the layer of heading a USAID mission in Burma, because what we're seeing with disaster relief. Now, I think that's going to be highly relevant. But the second is how unusual your experience was in that involvement. Because, as you've said, there was there was this America. This was predicated on American policy where there were certain things expected or waiting to be seen, from the military government. That time, and when those were fulfilled, USAID then chose to have a presence, and that must have been just a very unique and new experience, to not just take over a mission, but to establish one where it wasn't allowed before.
Chris Milligan 05:16
Correct, establish one because we had no staff, I opened the door for offices, it was an empty room. There were one or two people who had maintained a presence and who were very knowledgeable, but really was not even close to a mission. And we're told to get things up and running and hire staff and get programs on the ground, because President Obama was going to come, as you recall, he came for his historic first visit, and he would cut the ribbon to the USAID mission. So we were under a lot of pressure as well. We realized at that time that although we are a development agency, we were not doing development. We were still engaging with the military government, and we didn't want to have a development lens on what we did, what we were doing instead, and this is going to sound very nuanced, was using the tool of development to advance Burma's democratic and economic reforms. We didn't want to use development to justify the military government. We wanted to use the tool of development to continue those reforms. And so we did a numerous amount of work, working on, you know, with civil society, political party development, independent media, and we also, of course, dealt with the election commission, and that was controversy in itself, because it was run by the military government. But there was a there was a level of trust we had to build to make sure that the systems we provided again, would be used in accountable way, and that would go forward to have, you know, free and fair elections, which they had in 2015 so there was an arc there, getting there, getting to the country there. There weren't really many programs being managed inside the country. Stand up new programs, leverage the ones that had been run from Thailand, bring them over, recruit new staff, build the office, and the same time, make sure we didn't empower the military government, but but rather, push forward on economic and political reforms.
Host 07:22
So in that regard, would you say that the particular because you've had such an extensive background in USA, do you have a lot to compare it to in other missions you went? Would you say that your mission in establishing that office in in Burma, that it was, it was quite different or unique, compared to some of the other missions around the world in which he served.
Chris Milligan 07:40
Absolutely, I have served in very complex areas. I established our mission in Iraq during the war, but but the history of Burma is so unique and so complex that one of my frustrations were, you'd have a lot of people come in from the international community, and they wanted to do good work, but they wouldn't understand the situation. So I would call Burma at the time. I said, it's a land of good intentions with unintended consequences. Yeah, who arrived in the country and they thought, well, I did this in Rwanda, and it worked there. Therefore, look here, not realizing who they were working with, who whom they were empowering. And so there was first deep suspicion from the civil society about these international donors, rightly so, because they were one concern that their own mission, civil society, own mission would be corrupted by donor money. And secondly, this, there was a lot going on behind the bamboo curtain before it opened up to the west, and these civil side organizations were doing amazing work in promoting reforms beginning from one sector, say health or another, and then promoting democratic reforms becoming promoting women's empowerment out of that. And they were genuine, legitimate civil society organizations that risk being led astray, if you will, by donor money. What I really mean by that is we want to, we always want to make sure that the organizations we work with don't lose accountability to their people, they and but sometimes when donors come in with a lot of resources, the accountability goes back up to the donor, and then it corrupts the relationship. We were very sensitive about that, and this was, this was also something we wanted to make sure did not occur in in in Burma at the time. So long answer to your question, but the operating environment in Burma was so unique. Burma's history is so unique that it isn't a one cookie cutter model approach to reform. You really had to understand the history of the country, the history of the different ethnic groups where they're coming from. Um, because if you didn't, you would, you could. Not only would you do no harm, you could do harm. And I'll say this final thing before turning the mic back to you, development itself is not good or bad. It's how it's done. Just because you're doing something that you think is good doesn't mean it's good. If you don't understand where you're working and the relationships there and the power dynamics, then you could actually do harmful things. You could end up empowering the elites rather than the people. You could end up reversing the accountability systems. So you really have to understand the unique operating environment, not only nationally, but also within the regions and sub regions of the country.
Host 10:46
That's fascinating. And I want to get a bit more granular in the last thing that you said to get to to have a better understanding of how that was playing out. So you're talking in generalities, that that Burma is this land of of good intentions with unintended consequences. That's a great line, and that you were in a vantage point of seeing people come in without an appreciation for that complexity, trying to implement their own programs or goals, and sometimes having very much the reverse effect and empowering absolutely the wrong people on the end that they were hoping for. I wonder if you can give an example, a concrete example of this happening, without naming names, of course, or or revealing things that might be sensitive, but just an example that allows our listeners to grab, to grasp a little more on how these dynamics might take place, of someone coming in, really, with an intention and a plan, and it just going exactly the wrong way.
Chris Milligan 11:44
This is a very minor example, but it's a good example. It's a very concrete example, but a minor one. In many countries, you want to host a meeting, and you want to bring civil society people together, and you don't want to insult them, so you want to do it a nice hotel, treat them well. So there was this one donor who did try to convene all those civil society organizations, these real grassroots organizations that have been working hard behind the banner curtain and basically rented out a very expensive hotel room. It turned out to be owned by a crony. No shock, but so the civil society said, Well, wait a minute. You're inviting us to this hotel, which is run by the cronies, military cronies, by the way, cronies linked with the military. You You're just by doing this, you're funding the military and their enterprises, and then you expect us to come and so that the trust between civil society and the international community took a step back, and this is the minor example. But if you don't know me, if you don't know the history of the country, then you really could end up in creating a more negative atmosphere. The operating environment in Burma was the most complex I'd ever experienced in my 30 years of working in development. How many ethnic groups exist in Burma? I mean, I know there's the official number of 135 which goes all the way back several days. It's probably far greater than that. How many armed ethnic groups are there in Burma? You know, and knowing the history of the Khin people and their struggle and the longest running civil wars in our in our lifetime, if you don't understand the history and the context and complexity, then, then, then you're then you're not going to be hopeful to the country. So other countries that didn't, don't have, don't begin with that, that level of complexity.
Host 13:46
Right? So that so that was, in your mind, really the defining feature that that made it that challenging to be able to operate.
Chris Milligan 13:53
Right? Right? I mean, the the correct, the fact of the other countries have, certainly many groups in different languages, but the enormity of it in Burma and, of course, the history of the Burmese empire, with, you know, and highly incorporated ethnic states, just the history of the Rakhine State and the independent Rakhine State and and the tension between the Rakhine and the Burmese and, you know, going back to the last war between between them and all. I mean, if you understand that, then you really don't understand the context today of things.
Host 14:39
So you were there four years. And those were four very impactful years of 2012 to 2016 a lot of things happened in that time, and you you had quite a tall order ahead of you, and what you were trying to accomplish. How did you feel at the end of that mission? How do you, how do you, how satisfied do you feel in terms of what you accomplished? And maybe if there are some things you feel you left on the table.
Chris Milligan 15:01
Yeah, I was very satisfied, but not personally satisfied. I was actually very proud of what we together, say ID and the and the Burmese people together, that we all accomplish. Because in many countries I've been to, there's been a long development presence, maybe decades, and their development grants seem to be like an expectation, a given, and you don't really see much progress. The progress I saw in Burma was extraordinary. I saw people who had been held back, who knew that they were a great country, and they wanted to reclaim that and that, anything you any assistance you provided, they gave dividends to just, I was just amazed. I mean, because when I got to Yangon, you know, there were, there were no cars, really. And people said there were more cell phones in North Korea than they were in Burma at the time. And there certainly weren't less cell phones. You know, I left in 2016 and then people tell me after that they had Uber traffic jams. Yeah, I've been in countries that will never get to Uber to Uber level, right? We brought in coffee growers. We went to shine state, and these coffee growers sat down and we talking to the local farmers about what the requirements are to put coffee. And the farmers were like taking notes, and the international buyers will be skeptic, because they say it's really hard to hit these standards. Here's a standard quality. You'll be able to guarantee a certain supply. There should be like, a narrative around it about, you know, empowering women or something like that, because that we can sell it better, blah, blah. And they were skeptical that these local farmers would be able to export coffee, but they did in record time. They did in record time. So I had felt that the assistance we gave was appreciated and that and that and that. It was well used, and that culminated with the democratic election. It was inspiring to all of us. It was completely free, completely fair. There was no violence. It was a celebration, if you will. Those were all the the positive things, my biggest regret is that I wasn't able to make an impact on the situation in Rakhine state that that it became intractable, that there's continued human suffering there, and that it's Terry it tears the country apart. And it, in fact, impacts lives. And so my first trip in country, within 72 hours, was to go to Rakhine, state, because there had been an uptick in violence. And then I would go repeatedly and repeatedly over four years. I don't know how many times I could come. I went. We gave a humanitarian assistance. We tried getting community to work together, but we didn't make any progress. And I continue to see the suffering all across Rakhine state that this violence was was causing, and that's that's my big regret, that I wasn't able to norsee Baal has really been able to make much progress there.
Host 18:21
I think the other side of this question that has to be asked, especially in light of the way that this current US administration has characterized USAID, is is, I'm very curious your take on the flip side of that question, which is, how did those four years of your mission and the US aids mission in Burma benefit America during that time.
Chris Milligan 18:43
Right? USAID is considered a national security agency. We sit on the National Security Council. We help inform foreign policy. We give humanitarian assistance because we're a generous country, and humanitarian assistance is given on a needs basis. The development assistance we give is actually an international interest, because it prevents the spread of pandemics from coming to America. It creates stable democracies overseas that have growing economies that can be trading partners. It creates investment opportunities for US businesses. It it also mitigates conflict and prevents us soldiers from having to be involved in receiving their lives closer to home, a stable country, so we don't have waves of migrants coming into the United States looking for jobs, because they have jobs in stability back home. So development is in our national interest. It benefits us back home, and what I saw with USAID was this deepening connection between. The United States and the people of Myanmar Burma. We, for example, twin US universities with their counterparts in the country. We twin private sector entities with also universities help fund lab biology laboratories and research so we Suu, so USAID was a catalyst that could strengthen the ties between the people of the United States and the people of Burma. And it was very robust at the time, you know. And so I think, I definitely think that the assistance we provided absolutely benefited the people of Burma, but it also paid dividends and benefited the people of the United States.
Host 20:46
Looking at Burma's geo political position, and and and the wider region of where it's located, and looking at American interests in that region. What role was USA playing in serving American interests as the mission was re established there and and really aligning with with American interests, keeping the focus on, you know, US policy and the benefits of the American people.
Chris Milligan 21:13
Well, I think in the sense that it was welcoming Burma into the continent, the Community of Democracies, the community of private sector markets, the community of progress there, you know, there is, there are competing models out there, and perma No, because it's among many of them, right? And so I think having USAID there, having other Western development agencies, not only was enormously helpful for developing the economy and also the Open Society of the country, but it also was good in sort of like increasing the bonds between Burma And, if you will, the Global Community of Democracies.
Host 22:04
That's an interesting line you have, that there are competing philosophies out there, competing foreign missions. And I think this is a good time to go into what those competing Foreign Missions are. What are different models of how would, first of all, how would you define the US model? You've already broken it down a little bit, but how would you define what that is and then contrast it to what those other competing models would be?
Chris Milligan 22:26
Right? I think the US model was formed at the end of World War Two, and, you know, with the standing up these so called liberal Western institutions, I mean, it's based on private sector rights of individuals, freedom of the press, rule of law, participatory government, and I say, empowered private sector. The other competing model now in the world, of course, is the model that China presents. China needs a world that looks like China, and it's investing in that. It's investing it through the Belton Road initiative. It's the largest creditor in the world. China is also the major trading partner for 120 countries around the world. And so it's only natural that countries act in their own self interest. So to further China's own self interest, it is creating a world that looks like China adopts the Chinese model, which is not the western model, if you will. It's not just owned by the United not just promoted by United States, but also the West. So and again, this is not a criticism of anybody. This is what countries do in their own self interests. Yeah, what we had seen was happening in Burma over the decades was that really Burma was becoming more more dependent upon China, almost like a, not a colonial stage, but you could see the raw resources relieving Burma, obviously, the gems and the rubies, the Jade, the pipelines, things like that and and was becoming economically subservient to China, which we don't think would benefit the growth of of Burma. We believe that a for free market where individuals can make their own judgments on what's in their own self interest and how to invest it would be the better way.
Host 24:29
Now you you served in USA, as you said, for several decades. So you served under several very different administrations from two different political parties and different foreign policies, as you would see different presidents and different parties take office, what effect did that have on your mission and the work that you were carrying out.
Chris Milligan 24:54
Honestly up until the current administration? Very little. Um. Serve across six different presidential administrations, but because development is in a national interest and because it's really about national security, the vast majority of what USAID does between different political administrations doesn't really change now. What changes is sometimes the priorities under a Democrat, you may have certain priorities where you invest more in healthcare, more in climate change, right? And under the Republicans, more in the private sector, perhaps. But those really aren't major changes. This is tweaking allotments or resources. The other thing to note is that USAID funding comes from Congress, and Congress generally provides earmarks and directives on what USAID should do. Provide 90 to 98% of USAID budget is directed by Congress. So for example, even under the first Trump administration, we saw our funding for climate change increase, even though it wasn't a presidential priority at that time. Ironically, under the first Tun administration, USAID thrived. The political leadership team came in and they said, What do we need to do to help you do your job better? What are the reforms that have to happen? How do we strengthen the workforce? And so there was an enormous reform effort that was called transformation. Was the largest reorganization, certainly in my time at USAID. And as a result, USAID was more fit for purpose. We were more adapted to meeting the global challenges. What do I mean by that? For example, we stood up a new bureau called the Bureau of humanitarian assistance, whereas before, humanitarian systems was buried under a larger global bureau with democracy and conflict, there was a stand alone, because the understanding is that today's world is quite complex. There's more conflict than ever before. The conflict is protracted. It's difficult, and there's a there's been a huge spike in the need for humanitarian assistance. So we stood up a whole new bureau. We stood up Bureau on conflict prevention and and mitigation, if you will, conflict prevention stabilization, because of the increase in conflict in the world. So we, under the personal administration, we did these incredible reforms that made that strengthened USAID, the advisors the president Ivanka Trump launched a women's entrepreneurship initiative at USAID. Firstly, Melania visited programs in Africa. She praised them. She praised the education efforts. So it was very it was a very positive experience, which contrasts completely with what contrast completely with what's going
Host 27:48
on now, right? So what you're describing is not just a schizophrenic response to really what we've seen under all administrations previous to this one, but even schizophrenic to the first Trump administration, was there anything that was warning you to how extreme of a shift this would be?
Chris Milligan 28:09
I don't think any of us ever anticipated this when I talked to former officials in the first administration. You know, well well established Republicans, well connect Republicans. They said we didn't see this coming and and no one would really believe that anyone would would disassemble the world's largest development humanitarian assistance agency, because everyone understood how important that was, the United States, let alone to other communities around the world, so it was, I think, completely unexpected,
Host 28:51
right? I want to shift focus for just a moment and then, and then come back to this, to bring these, these threads together. Because I want to go now to to USAID response to disasters. Because, of course, everything we're talking about is leading to the disaster of this earthquake and the response to it. And I think a helpful contrast is that you were in Haiti when a massive earthquake struck then, and so you were, you witnessed and were a part of the USAID response at that time. Can you share what happened then? Right?
Chris Milligan 29:27
And let me just I could definitely share what happened then and again. Haiti was so unique given the proximity United States and the military assets we already had in the country. But let me take a step back and say, just generally, what happens when there is a disaster, because USAID is the lead for international disaster assistance with the whole federal government and some we can even tap into other federal government resources that we need. If we need military lift. We have relationships with the military to move things around. For example, we. So generally, what happens if there is a large internet disaster that clearly is going to overwhelm the capacity of the country to respond? Our people in the Bureau of humanitarian systems would already be working on it. They would be contacting people, finding out who's available, who could go and what would be needed. What would be required is for that country itself to request international assistance, and they do that, but they channel that request through the United Nations. At that point, the US ambassador in any country then sends a cable to Washington, saying, I certify the country does not have the capacity to respond to this by itself, that it will allow the assistance to come in, and it would be useful and center interests. And the USA ID would send a disaster assistance response team become darts, fast and nimble disaster response team Dart. Each member of that team has a has a very sophisticated technical specialty. There's one person, for example, would know a lot about shelter, another about hygiene, clean water, access, emergency food relief. And then in the case of an earthquake, there would be search and rescue capabilities. USAID remain keeps connections and actually contracts with two major urban search and rescue groups in America. One's on the west coast in Los Angeles, and the other is on the east coast in Fairfax County. They're on these two coasts, so we can deploy them as quickly as possible to sites. So for example, when there was the major earthquake in Turkey in 2003 we we deployed a dart. The Dart hit the ground within hours, and it eventually grew to be about 200 people, of which 160 were urban search and rescue. And they bring in different dogs, and they bring in all their own equipment, because they can't live on the local economy, because it's in shambles, so they're self sufficient, right? That's sort of the what we do. And the turkey earthquake, or the Nepal earthquake is sort of a better example than the Haiti one given the close anyways, but so then the urban search and rescue, they've got, really 72 hours, or up to four or five days, to find people alive and pull them out of buildings. After that, the possibility of finding someone alive decreases significantly, and that's why we deploy these people as quickly as possible to get them on the ground with their dogs and save lives. Then we, what we also do is we pre position. We have pre positioned around the world, emergency relief supplies in warehouses, and they're a place around the world, so they can be moved immediately to to the areas where necessary. You know, for example, I believe somewhere in Malaysia and Dubai and other places. They include plastic sheeting that can be used into shelter, Jerry colors, preparing water, cooking supplies, pots and pans, things that people need to survive. So we would start deploying those we would also take funding, and we would provide it to those entities that we know are on the ground and can work quickly. We know that when it comes to food distribution, the World Food Program is excellent, and they have deep connections and relationships in many countries around the world, so we'll probably provide them with funding. They would inevitably have launched an appeal, and we'd give them a similar money to to provide emergency food. We would also look at the local NGOs, like, for example, in in Burma, Save the Children's really had grassroots connections, and when we worked during her cycle in August, we worked a lot with Save the Children and others to get funding quickly to them, because they actually had relationships with the local communities. So once we the initial period is called relief. That's when you try to find people, you try to prevent a second wave of death from diseases and lack of healthcare. So you set up clean water systems and shelter and other things to avoid that second wave of death, they start focusing on recovery. What's necessary to reopen the businesses, to clear the rubble, what needs to be repaired, how to get things passed up so services can begin being established and run again. And then finally, you look at reconstruction, which is a much longer window of reconstruction, or, you know, or their key ministry buildings we build, or houses or bridges and things like that, what's required that, and all of this is done by experts in. Uh, who are, who are, who have such technical and career users and decades of expertise in this subject matter. And the final thing you do is you always want to look at the humanitarian to development nexus, because generally what can happen, what we've learned is there's this enormous rush of resources that come quickly humanitarian systems, and takes a longer time to get the development systems going back again. There could be a gap, and progress can drop off, and there can be backsliding, if you will. So you want to make sure that the handoff between humanitarian systems and development is smooth and there isn't that that gap, so that progress can be continued to be made.
Host 35:38
That's an excellent description and overview. And I think, as I hear this, I think what becomes so evident is how much work must have gone in to building these extremely complex systems, pulling on such different individuals to react and respond in the way they do at different times from different places with different skills, and how the dismantling of that how we always hear that some of the things that are being dismantled, they can't just go right back up. And I think this explanation really reveals the complexity of all of these layers that must have taken a long time to by trial and error, to figure out how to build the right way and fit together the right way, and how the sudden and immediate dismantling of them leaves a gap that that can't just be reinstated, and that has this, this enormous vacuum in this place, right?
Chris Milligan 36:31
And let me, let me give you a little back to it. If you wrote that kind of expresses exactly what you're saying. You were saying. There are many different federal departments and agencies of the United States, and some are quite sophisticated, even NASA scientists the US Academy of Sciences. You know, USAID has the highest educational level of any federal agency, more than NASA, and that's because development is a discipline, and there's so many different sectors in it that you really require that level of expertise. The other thing that helps enormously when you have a disaster in a country is the ability to pivot your existing development programs on that need. So in the hours following a disaster before the stuff can come from warehouses. You can talk to the, the people who are running your existing programs and say, okay, look, we know you have this and that. Please focus now on, for example, Mandalay, right? The community work you're doing in, you know, in Yangon. Look, get it up to Mandalay. Who do you know there? What do you have? What do you have anywhere, right? So having a development program with relationships in country gives you the ability to respond more quickly, and then also use those programs as sort of pipelines that you can put your resources through and get to the communities and assure accountability the whole time.
Host 38:06
So that's another massive loss, not just the loss of the enormous expertise and layers of working together, but also the incalculable loss of what it takes to establish local networks. And then again, we're talking about Myanmar, you know, the complexity that you described at the beginning. Now, in all of your 30 years, that Myanmar, the level of complexity and and discord, we could even say there that that you experienced the ability to be able to establish those networks, that's no small thing. And so, you know, that's, that's just, it just sounds like loss on top of loss.
Chris Milligan 38:39
It is the current administration canceled nearly 5400 contracting grants. They would take years and years and years to do over. It takes a long time to, of course, design a program thoughtfully with input from the local communities, then you have to put out to tender a competitive process. It will take, it would take years and years. So USAID has lost the most technically competent people in the US government. They've all been fired. They've been given orders to cleat that they will be let go either, either their their their end date is July or September, depending which letter they got and all the programs. 84% of programs were terminated. Some of those programs were critical humanitarian assistance programs for humanitarian assistance programs that were providing support prior to the earthquake to inside Myanmar Burma were terminated again. So those relationships are gone. The ability to ramp up those programs to provide vendors is gone. And when we. Look at the 5400 programs that were canceled. Some of them were the ones providing logistical support to move relief items from warehouses areas where they're quite young, or to transport the human the humans and dogs and equipment required the Urban Search and Rescue so today we have urban search and rescue teams sitting in Virginia and California, and they should be in Mandalay, they should be in navy, in the areas. They should be pulling people out of buildings, and that window is almost closed to save lives, because I told you after five days, you're really not going to find anybody.
Host 40:46
That's so hard to hear and it's um, and just shifting the focus a bit on Myanmar itself. You know, I'm reminded by a couple days ago, we spoke to theory, and she, she described the dark humor that that the Burmese community is living with now, and she's she, she spoke on the podcast about how Burmese Buddhist believe in eight different hell realms that one passes through, and that the Burmese are now joking in a dark way, that they've entered the ninth, the ninth floor of hell that that no one knew existed until modern Day. Myanmar, she talked about, you know, during COVID, Burmese died during the coup. Moe died during during the long resistance period the collapse economy. Moe died still. And then the earthquake, you know, more deaths and that. And before the earthquake, you know, USAID, obviously the US aid cuts. And even just looking before the earthquake, just for a moment, the cuts that happened to independent media that were operating under extreme circumstances of trying to get the truth out about the about the conflict and the brutality of the military, the support for the Democratic Movement and the various ways that took, as well as the health, you know, that we've talked about health and humanitarian that was even in the last few weeks that's been reported as the devastation that, looking at the USAID cuts, Burma, has been a focus of international media as being especially and cruelly targeted. You know, just literally hours after the dismantling of USA that, as you're describing in all of this detail, had the infrastructure, the setup, the logistics to be able to respond, and everything was just pulled out when the most, the worst, most unimaginable natural disaster would occur. So it's really, you know, just looking at it from that Myanmar perspective, the bad luck. On top of bad luck, it's hard to put words to.
Chris Milligan 42:44
And I would add one more layer to what you've said, and this is what I find difficult to really accept. The American people have stood with the people of Burma through for decades, there during the darkest time. We were there helping with her struggle. We were giving voice to their need. We were we were we were always there and working in partnership at those most difficult times, trying to support the those in Burma who were pushing for Burma. So given this long history of support of trust, how could this happen? Now? I mean that did we? We part of the problem allowing Burma to slip to that nine, nine layer of hell, because we're not there. Now. We have the cat assets, we have the capability, but because we have dismantled a humanitarian development agency, we are not able to provide the support we should to our good friends,
Host 43:59
and let us not forget too, that Burma was one of the rare, very rare, bipartisan issues that was occurring in American politics for decades, even as things became much more divisive leading up to where we are now, let us not forget the very good friends of Burmese democracy of ranging from George W Bush, Laura Bush, of course, MITCH MCCONNELL, there are others that we could put there that that was really not a controversial issue from any side of how important it was for American policy to be on the right side of history here.
Chris Milligan 44:31
That's correct, correct.
Host 44:35
Going back into your history of the way that that you that that the United States and USAID would respond to these disasters taking place. You reference any number of them, you know, Turkey and Haiti and even Cyclone Nargis, some other ones. I think that you threw in there, if we can get a sense of numbers, and I don't know how much you can just pull these numbers off the top of your head or estimates, but. Both numbers in terms of the dollars of aid that was put towards those disasters, as well as the numbers of people that were involved, because this will then give us a contrast of what's going on today.
Chris Milligan 45:12
So with respect to the current situation in Burma, I understand that we are sending a three person team, not a dart under Zach's versus Response Team, three person team, and that we've committed $2 million now, generally, we do a small commitment until the team gets on the ground says they need more, and so hopefully we'll provide more funding. Well, we could compare that to say, Nepal, the Nepal earthquake in 2015 and some people tell me was, significant, but the current situation in Burma really is much graver and a larger disaster. Within the first five days, the US government had committed $12.5 million and within two weeks, it had committed $28 million when we look at Cyclone Nargis, you can go to the Wikipedia page I did, because they've taken down the USAID website. So I can't look into us here files to say we did. But Wikipedia has that we flew in. You know? It was, it was dramatic. The US Air Force flew in planes with relief commodities. And when I mentioned there's that continuum of relief, recovery, reconstruction, well, according to Wikipedia, we was well over $100 million Wikipedia says 196 I think, I don't think all those were related to Nargis, but certainly, well more than $100 million right? The Haiti earthquake, again, was special. A billion dollars in humanitarian assistance, a billion dollars in recovery. We had 20,000 troops to restore law and order. We had, and I mean the mind boggling scale of people on the ground the turkey earthquake, we had a disaster assistance response team of 200 people, 160 of which were urban search and rescue, pulling people out of buildings and determining whether structures were safe to go back into. So that tells you kind of where we are on things now with respect to the current situation in Mandalay, the Chinese are there with multiple I mean, they were over 500 now they've announced more funding, and initially was 14 million. Another more than that. Russia has flown in planes. India has four planes and four ships en route. Vietnam has 100 people on the ground. Now, I would say that the quality of assistance that the United States provides is a great bang, bang for your buck, because, yeah, incredible expertise on fundamental assistance. But the fact that Vietnam can have 100 people on the ground helping, you know, in the search and rescue and we're on the sidelines, that doesn't make sense to me.
Host 48:09
And so just looking at what $2,000,000.03 people gives you from the American side, what can that do in at a time like this, given what we're seeing after the destruction across Maine Moe.
Chris Milligan 48:22
Well, three people will not give you the capability to be operational in saving lives. It doesn't you know. For example, a search and rescue team with different dogs and equipment, 160 people you are, you are now bringing people alive out of buildings. Three people who are humanitarian assistance advisors can't do that. What they can do is talk to other people and say, what are the greatest needs? How can the US help? And how can our $2 million be most effective? And what they'll probably find out. So when there is a disaster, the United Nations sets up a cluster system. A cluster is a sector, right? There'll be the water cluster, the shelter cluster, and then and then everyone sort of meets all this sector experts meet in that cluster and try to figure out what the needs are. So all the information that flows together, and so we could find out, okay, really, where they get the biggest gap could be in emergency food. So give $2 million to the well Food Program. Hopefully what would happen is that these three people would say, Look, we have $2 million but there is a gap of $34 million in needs, and that's what's required, and then there's a gap for recovery, and that's required, etc, etc. So that would be great. Hopefully this $2 million is just seed money, I would hope and that it would grow. Usually, we see that much faster. I gave the example of Nepal, where, you know, within days, within five days, they're already at 12.5 and within two weeks, they're at 28 million.
Host 49:56
So, of course, the one big difference in Burma compared to. All those other places is that this has been an active conflict zone for four years, and that this is a military regime that the estimates now are that they control 20 to 30% of the country. They're craving legitimacy. They've never been to put it lightly, they've never been all that reliable in being able to or willing to want to put aid into the right places and and the right channels, that's not self serving of them. And so there's this extraordinary added complexity of even outside of the the strangeness that's going on in our in our country, in our administration, our current administration, that it's also a very unique operating environment in Burma, that even if things were were set up as they were in previous times this, this is still not a very easy climate to navigate.
Chris Milligan 50:54
That's correct. It's not. USAID has extraordinary experience in working in very difficult to close situations. For example, we were providing enormous amount of emergency assistance in Tigray during the war there, certainly continuing to provide emergency situation, emergency assistance in Sudan, which has now been declared genocide, right inside Syria. And remember, we also provide assistance in 2008 to psychoanas. The Civil War makes it quite difficult, and of course, it is a unique operating environment, and it's not you can't have a national response. You don't have clear communication networks, you don't have transportation networks. Is difficult, but the organization, USAID and the organizations we worked with had the experience of working in very different conflict areas to deliver and very difficult political situations. And if it turns out that the assistance is being co opted by the military government or by anybody, then normally, then we turn it off or find other ways to do with that. I mean, it was several years ago when we found that the Ethiopian government was alleged to have co opted the foods, the food that would be provided by the World Food Program. With you with us, anti funding assistance was turned off until the accountability measures could be taken and so there is there are people with the expertise and know how on how to do this. There are the organizations on the ground that have the direct links to the to these communities I mentioned. Say, Save the Children is one. I know there's many others, and there's many local organizations, and better, Burma has a good network there, where the systems can go directly to those in need, and doesn't have to go through the military, and doesn't, won't get quoted by the military, or even directed by the military.
Host 52:53
So you're talking about more of those, those outside operators, informal networks, local networks, outside the the more formal structures that the international community is want to follow. And you know, one can't help but also look at those that have engaged right away. I'm just recalling your comment earlier in the conversation about how it's natural of states to want to engage in ways that benefit them, in ways that they want to see the world. And so we've seen Russia and China engage. I've in previous podcast conversation we just had, it was referenced that the that there's already indications that the Russian aid has come to military compounds and military areas, which is not surprising Chinese aid. I'm not exactly sure what it's done, but there's been that recent report that they were shot at the military, shot at the Chinese Red Cross and and so what you already referenced the 100 Vietnamese that were there and and noting that however great it may be that there are numbers of some people coming that the level of expertise and ability that you find among USAID and the Americans is is really something that puts it at an elite level. But what looking at these complexities of just the Civil War, the military channels the actors that have engaged the level of expertise that they have is a complex situation. But with the Americans removed, you know, just as of now, three people, $2 million what? What comments or Outlook would you have of those that are there?
Chris Milligan 54:29
So the world has, or similar, parts of the world have mobilized and responded. And I think that although we don't provide humanitarian assistance for political ends, we provide it based on need. There is a balance you get from that. I mean, if you had Americans with search and rescue teams with a logo from the American people and USAID and. Colors on holding people out of the rubble. I think that strong image, and it solidifies again, the relationship between our two countries, and a big contrast with the military as well. Yeah, but that's not there. Instead you see others like China, and I am grateful that China is there, and grateful that they are pulling people, because at times like this, it's not about politics, it's about lives. And the bottom line is, if you can flood the zone and put more resources in to get people out of the rubble, more people will live, and the fact that the US is sitting on the sidelines means people are suck, trapped in rubble, and they're they're going to die in a terrible way.
Host 55:54
We've spoken to other people this week in analyzing how aid can come in, and not looking so much at American engagement here, but just the international community. And that if, when the aid is going through those military channels, not just is it not getting to those people in need, but that very, those very resources that are meant for them are in some ways used against them. So in some ways, the delivery of aid could actually be worse for the people than no weight at all when the military is weaponizing it and using it as a source of harm. And so, you know, we haven't yet seen exactly what the current American administration is going to do, if they're going to do nothing at all, or if, if we, you know, I'm tentative to say this, but I think it's something we have to address. Is there, do you see any possibility or outlook that, intentionally or unintentionally, and again, the complexity of Burma, we have to reference as well, that the current administration would respond to this crisis in a way that could be worse than simply doing nothing at all.
Chris Milligan 57:03
I'm optimistic that that won't happen. We still have an embassy. We have individuals on the ground there. They might not be humanitarian assistance experts, but they can also ensure the accountability. They have relationships with communities. They have communication networks, we would only work with trusted partners who know how to work with communities without benefiting the military. And we have a long, long history of working in the country with trusted partners in a way that doesn't both benefit the military. We've done that, quite frankly, for decades now. We want to retain that expertise, and I know we're starting to lose it because we're letting people go, but we still retain, we still have, I guess, that muscle memory. So I'm and then we would also work, probably closely with the UN agencies, who would be able to actually monitor and make sure that the assistance is not co opted or directed or used to reward or punish communities. But I think what you raise is a genuine concern. It's something that as a humanitarian assistance agency, we take seriously, and we and we work closely on to make sure that doesn't happen. So I would assume that we should we provide more funding than we done, hopefully in this in this conscientious manner.
Host 58:35
Right now, so often, in the case of Burma, other repeated conversations that we've had on this platform have been the the tension and the contrast between the reality that exists in the complexity of Burma and the way that it fits, or in many cases, doesn't fit, into international structures and systems and protocols and and kind of the endless discussions on why, are these protocols so set in, not serving the aims that they have, and not getting outside of being able to respond to what's actually happening? And this, this fits into any number of conversations, from legitimacy to sovereignty to recognition to to operations and everything else, but in as we're talking about it, specifically in terms of aid in military channels, this is, and this is now taking on a wider conversation than just the Americans, also looking at other international bodies and structures in the way that they're engaging in Burma. And that's that, again, this complexity that you have a military that cannot be trusted, that weaponizes and uses what's given mostly to harm, and then you have a lot of informal networks of first responders, of local groups of civic society, to say nothing of all the ethnic organizations and all of their. Background and expertise in what they do, but these often fall outside of the standardization of how international systems like to operate. And so what? What comments would you have about how, how there could be a way to engage that would would be thinking outside of the box to be able to give aid to those who need it most, when, when that that might not be the normal protocols that one likes to follow.
Chris Milligan 1:00:27
Yeah, I think, well, first of all, Miss excellent question, and there's not an easy answer, and we can spend like time on it. But I would also add that the international community and the United States government has been providing humanitarian assistance to Myanmar for decades. You know, if you just even look at the situation Rakhine State, right, and how politically fraught that was, and then the competition between the two communities over assistance and things like that, and whether it be diverted or not. So there's a long history of providing humanitarian assistance in the country context of Myanmar, and we know that's an evolving country context. It's pendulous swung from a democracy to a military government. And you go back decades, it gets swung in many different directions, right? But there is already there, the fact that there's a long history of providing humanitarian assistance in this difficult context. Secondly, it's the it's the connections to the local communities. And whether working through local organizations or working with international organizations that can take the external money and get it to local organizations. It's that's been invaluable as well. I think the challenges, and it goes back to something we said, that they're beginning. The challenge is, if you are a new entity, you're coming in. If you say, also one, I'm a new entity, I'm bringing my resources in, and I want to use it to benefit myself politically, and I'm not going to work for the established structures, and I'm going to give them money the way I feel like I'm going to give, and I want to cozy up with the government. Then you start undermining based on the problem you just pointed out yourself. But I think if you go through the existing structures and processes that have been set up for, quite frankly, decades, then that goes further to safeguarding the funds.
Host 1:02:27
To close out this discussion and I really thank you for your time. I know that you've fielded a lot of media requests lately as there have been a lot of interest in this and your background. We've, again, we've, there's been this debate of this, this kind of fabricated debate, we can say of how USAID is not just a benefit to those that are being held, but to the benefit of those that are giving, in the sense the American people, American security, health policy, etc. And so looking at it again, from that perspective, we've clearly been able to outline the ways in which the Burmese people have suffered from this pooling of US aid, both before and after the crisis, but looking at this crisis specifically and the lack of us engagement there in what you were quoted in another interview you gave recently as saying that this does not make America greater with this lack of engagement with after the earthquake. So in what ways, looking at it from from an American point of view, is this lack of engagement and help in Mandalay and Saginaw also coming, you know, in the long, long term, or more indirectly, perhaps harming America itself, right?
Chris Milligan 1:03:44
So let me take that in two ways, first about the lack of America stepping up now with a specific example of Burma, and then more about what does the world look like without USAID, and how does that impact America? Certainly the fact that the United States government is not a player, or even me, even a minor player, but not the major player as it would have been, means we are a weaker international partner, and that we're ceding global leadership to others and to in this case, to China, that we are creating a political vacuum as well as a humanitarian assistance vacuum that others will fill. And when you think about we've dismantled now the largest bilateral development and humanitarian assistance agency. What does that mean to Americans? Well, it means more pandemics back home, when I was in Madagascar, I saw how USAID was able to snuff out mnemonic play. USAID plays critical roles in ensure that, ensuring that Ebola in West Africa doesn't spread. So I mean, if you think COVID was. Add wait till mnemonic plague or Ebola comes to the United States. And at the same time, we're working on battling tuberculosis around the world, particularly in Burma, and those canceled programs are being canceled. And when we have drug resistant tuberculosis come to the United States, how is that going to impact America? Economically? 11 of America's 15 largest trading partners, 11 were recipients of foreign assistance. USAID procures more than $2 billion in agricultural products, provides it in humanitarian assistance overseas over a billion dollars in pharmaceutical products. We create export markets for us, goods and services, and by creating economic growth in other areas, and we protect American farmers. For example, we're able to prevent the spread of agricultural diseases from wiping out the wheat harvest here in America by making sure that rust, you know, which attacks wheat is controlled and gotten rid of overseas before it comes back to America, it's a world more conflict America. You know, USAID works to mitigate conflict around the world there, as I said, Hell and when there's more conflict, the US military steps in greater cause, larger loss of life. It's a less free world as we withdraw support from human rights advocates for free press. We withdraw support from for free and fair elections. We withdraw support that makes democracies thriving and functioning and strong. So it's, it's, you know, it's, it's not a, it's not a world that is where America is going to benefit. And as I said before, China is the lead economic partner for 120 countries around the world. United States, by dismantling USAID, is creating a political vacuum, because United because USAID, connected the American people to 10s of 1000s of communities overseas, all from communities to local governments to national governments. That's gone, it's a political vacuum, and so others will fill it as they should, to protect their own national interests and to to to create a world that looks and benefits them.
Host 1:07:25
Thank you. That's a somber thought to end on, and I thank you for sharing your depth of background, experience, knowledge. This has been so insightful, I think, for myself and certainly for listeners that have followed I'd like to as we walk away from this conversation, we've spoken of your extensive career and knowledge of USAID and development and how it's operated. I'd like to just close on a personal note, because individually, personally, you lived four years in Burma, I'm sure that you develop many friends, relationships, interactions with the culture, with travels, and so I'd invite you to share any personal reflections or anecdotes or thoughts just on your connection to the people in the country.
Chris Milligan 1:08:07
I don't know where to begin. We have another hour. One of my favorite things to do with biking throughout the country. I got to Bourbon 2012 unfortunately, weren't even allowed to really go out of Yangon without getting permission from the government. But over the months and the years, more and more of the country opened up beyond the normal tourist you know, areas of BA gone. I biked through Chin State. I biked through, you know, I biked all over the not over the country. It's a big country, through huge parts of the country. Me with local communities, and I did it with my Burmese friends. We stopped at tea shops. You know, in the morning we'd have Nangi to and Mohinga. You just there's the sense of community, the generosity. I mean, Burma is known as being one of the generous countries in the world, and you could see it. And then the festivals, right, the communities coming together, whether it's the balloon festival, the light festival, I mean, just such a unique country with its own traditions and foods and languages, with warm people who who are curious about foreigners and wanted to invite you to their homes. It was, it was a magical four years, and it was, that's why it was also inspiring. It made you want to to to work harder, to support them their own things and ambitions, because they saw brighter piece for themselves, and you wanted to help them get there.
Host 1:09:57
We've come to the conclusion of today's episode. And as the conversation you've just heard underscores, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar is dire and demands immediate attention for millions of people, the struggle for survival is an everyday reality, and the need for urgent humanitarian aid cannot be overstated. Through this platform, we aim to raise awareness and keep the focus on these critical issues, but awareness must lead to action, and this is the point where you can come in to make a real difference. By supporting the nonprofit mission of Better Burma, you'll be contributing to our wider effort to bring hope and relief to those who need it most. Your donation can go towards providing much needed support to vulnerable communities in Myanmar and along the border that continue to be impacted by the Military Coup. Visit betterburma.org/donation to join this effort.