Transcript: Episode #293: The Land Stand

Below is the complete transcript for this podcast episode. This transcript was generated using an AI transcription service and has not been reviewed by a human editor. As a result, certain words in the text may not accurately reflect the speaker's actual words. This is especially noticeable when speakers have strong accents, as AI transcription may introduce more errors in interpreting and transcribing their speech. Therefore, it is advisable not to reference this transcript in any article or document without cross-referencing the timestamp to ensure the accuracy of the guest's precise words.

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Thomas van Linge 0:10

Months and years, the people of Karani have suffered many retaliatory attacks by the junta. Almost every village we traveled to most either abandons partially destroyed or in most cases completely burned down by the troops to regime which drove to this completely abandoned refugee camp. It used to house like 10,000 refugees but from one day to the other the Thai border guards to showed up and said they told everyone picketing sure going back and people simply do not have the the protection against the mosquitoes it's also really frustrating when you enter such an area that you see that there's no international organization presence you know, there's no United Nations no major organization organizations supporting the IDPs for people.

Host 1:27

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Brad 3:03

Welcome back my guest today. Thomas van Linge is another person who went on a trip that we've already had an episode about we we spoke to Michael about a trip to Karenni state. And he made mention of a Dutch journalist who accompany teams currently state to document the situation the conflict and the nature of of a junta occupation. And we're lucky enough to be joined by aforementioned Dutch journalist. So Thomas, thank you very much for joining us. And I'd like to give you the chance to introduce yourself and your work to our audience.

Thomas van Linge 3:45

I thank you for having me. Yeah, so my name is Thomas van Linge. I'm a Dutch journalist, and conflict researcher based in Amsterdam. And I follow armed conflicts, civil uprisings, protest movements around the world, including countries like Venezuela, Sudan, Ukraine, and of course, since 2021, the spring revolution and armed rebellion in in Myanmar.

Brad 4:19

And so let's let's talk them because we we've heard one perspective on this this trip in in currently state. And I want to talk about what you saw and what you experienced. But before that, I want to sort of understand the the journey because it's Myanmar, as I'm sure we're going to discuss doesn't get the focus in international media, particularly Western media that it really deserves. This is not the sort of place where we really have journalists just lining up for the opportunity to come and report on the ongoing crisis. So what was your journey as a journalist to decide You know what, I want to go into Myanmar? I think it's worthwhile doing this. I think I can I can find an audience for, for what I'm going to see what I'm going to report on. And and just getting to that point when you're sitting in Thailand, ready to take that that step, how did you get there?

Thomas van Linge 5:22

Well, I'd say there are multiple factors. First, there is the personal interest that I had a Myanmar not being someone that's specialized in civil uprisings in rebellions, protest movements, such general struggle for like a dem democracy against a autocracy. Myanmar was right up that alley. And I was following the protests in Myanmar, from like day one, from the moment that a coup took place in February of 2021. I was really at awe with the bravery of the Burmese protesters with their persistence as they continue to take to the streets into resist. And I was also fascinated by how they successfully transformed that civil street resistance into a armed rebellion. And so already, I think two years ago, in 2022, I took it upon myself to be the first one to map out the conflict in Myanmar, to identify the different resistance territories, and to distinguish where the fault lines are, and to sort of, you know, get a broader map or situation. I've done such work before in Syria and Iraq. And I've always noticed that once you're able to map out a specific conflicts, that the interests of others towards a conflict will also increase, because a map makes it more believable. So that was one of the things I was already doing around Myanmar. And, you know, being a journalist working in media. Of course, I also worked around other conflicts this past few years. But I've noticed that especially as of the past six months, that there are a lot of wars going on, you know, there's a conflict in Ukraine, there's war Gaza. And because those two wars get back to back coverage, they sort of take up all the space is sort of smother any, because those conflicts get back to that coverage. And they take up so much space, you've got so much airtime, so much space in the newspapers, this sort of push out any other conflicts that take place new rules, like Sudan, or like Myanmar, a bit like a cuckoo birds, you know, that sort of bushes, everything, anything else over the nest. And, of course, as a conference room, I'm very happy that Ukraine and Gaza get all the coverage that they deserve. But it's disheartening. See, it's not constantly at the expense of what's happening in Myanmar. And because of that, that's, that made me feel even more called for or like made me feel even more inspired Sudan actually do focus on a conflict like Myanmar and try to, you know, get that back in to, into the papers to get it back onto the attention of the people. Because, you know, it's very popular term in Western media to talk about forgotten wars, forgotten conflicts, which I always find very frustrating term. Especially when, you know, when ministers people on the streets talk saying like, Oh, Sudan or Myanmar, it's committed with forgotten conflict, I'd forgotten those take place. And and that's understandable. But when you know, the BBC or CNN or the New York Times, refer to Myanmar as a forgotten conflicts, that's I've always found that very frustrating, because, you know, it's up, it's their responsibility as a global publication, to make sure that it's not ever gotten conflicts and Sudan already sort of address it as it is in regard to conflict that sort of takes away the responsibility from them to give it consistent coverage.

Brad 9:43

I think you opened up a lot of very interesting points here that the first one I want to touch on, is what you said about mapping the conflict. And I agree with you that maps are incredibly, incredibly important. Being able to visualize a conflict being able to paint a territory in different colors. It's it's not just important for explaining the severity of a situation to an audience. But I think it's also very important from the perspective of showing change over time. And, of course, at the time of recording, we were very close to the special advisory council from UML, releasing an updated what effective control map following on from that 2022 release. So that's that's hoping to do exactly what you're talking about. But what makes it tricky is that whenever we speak to, for example, the special Advisory Council when Myanmar whenever we speak to people who are using satellite imagery, or who are using local media reports, or who are aggregating information, a variety of different ways to try and map out the territory, they always tell us how difficult it is. Because this is not like a conventional war, such as we understood them in World War One World War Two, where you have a clearly demarcated front line, and this is their territory, this is our territory. And, you know, this is how far their artillery can reach. And that's that this is much, much, much more complex. Were you finding any? Did you find that you had to compromise in trying to map out the conflict? Or you had to just limit the scope of what you were trying to map out? Or did you just find a way to be able to to draw a line that could meaningfully differentiate military controlled territory from liberated territory?

Thomas van Linge 11:40

Yeah, I definitely agree that it's, it was a huge challenge to map on Myanmar, because in a lot of regions in the country, you know, be it Sekine, McWay. Korean, there was not very clear, distinguished frontlines, World War one style, but there were a lot of gray areas, you know, sort of areas where both parties could operate, where both could move through. But sort of still in the style of my map, it's distinguishing different territories for different colors. So how do you map that out? I decided that's for my own mapping, it would be I would distinguish different territories based on permanent presence, in a way. Now mean, like if there will be the taken example, as a couple of villages near money, why in the second region, where PDF groups were active, and there was like, no permanent wounds or presence like no military base, no pro, the militia, no police station, then I would still mark it as a PDF territory. Even if you know, junta columns could still sort of move to the territory to attack resistance forces to burn villages, as long as they would leave afterwards. And I think they'd like the fluidity and the freedom of movement for boats for all sides in the Myanmar conflict. So it's really a distinguishing feature of Myanmar compared to other conflicts like Sudan, Syria, and what have you. And that does require a bit of a different methodology in how to distinguish different territories in that way. But definitely, when I first tried to set up my Myanmar map, in February of 2020, to think of publish it around, like the first anniversary of the coup, I had to really start from scratch and build a map from just a blank shape. And that was definitely one of the most challenging conflicts I've mapped out so far.

Brad 13:59

I mean, I can imagine and focusing on currently, which is, which is where you went up going, as you were mapping out currently, what was your What was your overall picture of Karenni? Like, did you did you have currency as as partially military control posture liberated? Did you see it as fully military controlled, fully liberated? What was it looking like? Because historically, as it was called, at the time, chaos state, was was under heavy military control, more so than most of the rest of the country, in fact, and so I'm just wondering, at the time that you were looking at it post coup, how did you how did you assess it in your matchmaking process?

Thomas van Linge 14:44

I think Karenni was definitely one of the volunteer states that early on I had marked about the countryside as already being with the resistance. Because you know, in Karenni, it was the first state where The armed clashes broke out again, I think if I remember correctly, it was in May or June of 2021. Already, and fighting in loikaw. And I'm also decaying DF was founded, the first PDF groups were mobilizing there. So it was very clear, it was very clear early on that karate was a strongholds of armed rebellion of armed activities. So especially in the dense jungle areas, or it's already met those out as being resistance dominated territories, asides from the occasional junta outpost. But yeah, it was definitely hard to distinguish the exact frontline in the area. And you know, it's funny. You know, fast forward three years later, and I'm actually going to Kearney, Evan mapped out situation, which I thought was much more detailed. And it turned out I'd actually overestimated how much territory and how much freedom movements. The hunters, two heads are looking at a map and with information available, I thought, you know, junta force is still controlled Brousseau. They control bola K, they control bass sound, the major township centers in in karate. So I thought they will naturally also control the main roads, cutting through the states, you know, going from local, down to pass on, because they go through all those major towns. When it actually came to karate, it turned out to that was not the case. And as in each of those towns, during the forces are basically surrounded, isolated and cut off from each other. Which the difference Caronia PDF resistance groups having freedom of movements around the towns in Barcelona actually controlling the vast majority of the town. So in that sense, I've even even though beforehand, I was thinking or worrying that I might have offered estimated the resistance, control of CareOne and freedom of movement. When I came there, it turned out that actually underestimated it.

Brad 17:27

That's incredible. And I wonder if that applies to to the rest of the country, as well, although it would be very difficult to verify this without actually going there and, and observing it yourself. But I'm very glad to hear that the military have even less freedom than then you had anticipated. So then that would that would still imply though, that you're sitting there in Thailand, preparing to travel into territory, which you believe still has a reasonable amount of freedom of movement for the military. So can you walk us through what's going on? In your head? This This seems to be different for each individual. As you're the dates coming closer, you're preparing to cross into a conflict zone. What is it like for you? Are you getting nervous? Or are you getting hyperfocused? Well, what's your process here?

Thomas van Linge 18:27

You know, fun thing is nervous. I wasn't nervous at all going in. Neither about like a crossing itself that we could be called or something. Neither about being insides of, of Korea, any of Myanmar. I think it was because I was fully trusting the judgments of the people I was traveling with, you know, Michael, who you've talked to before, our other travel companions, I don't know how much detail he went about who traveled with and just the the PDF members who you were traveling with on the roads, of course, you know, like you're in a warzone. Anything can and does happen at any time. But at least I felt you know, when we're when we will be traveling around with PDF, they will consider themselves responsible for us and our well being they will handle that in a very secure, responsible manner. And so we won't be taking unnecessary risk and when making such a trip. That's the best thing. Actually the only thing you can hope for that you will that you will conduct the trip in the most responsible way possible. And anything else that happens you know, be it's error rates, shootings, whatever it It's out of our control. And it can happen. In my experience, it hasn't happened so far. So yeah, I was just generally feeling good about our plan about the people we were traveling with. And that's really the sort of the solid foundation which you need in order to date to set up such a such a trip.

Brad 20:27

I mean, that's, that's probably the best condition that you that you can be in preparing for something like this. But then, if I remember correctly, things, think things took a strange turn, and you weren't able to cross I believe it was airstrikes along the border that prevented your your initial plans.

Thomas van Linge 20:45

Yeah, you know, it's like when I say anything can end up happening. And that then turns out to be the truth. Like, imagine we were planning to travel up to the border from Thailand and cross into Korean state on a Friday. We drove all the way up to May Saudi on its own in north of Thailand's close to the border, where we were waiting for to get in contact with the PDF, guys. So they could give us an extra instructions on where to go next. But we didn't hear anything else, like around noon. So we just decided, Well wait an hour later, still nothing. Two hours later, still nothing. No, today, progress, progress. It was getting late, we're starting to lose sunlight. And then we'll finally heard from them at the end of the day. And they were explaining like how there were some airstrikes in the border area. And it's almost it's too dangerous to come right now. You know, the situation is very precarious. We don't know, if they'll come back to strike again. It's best that you guys wait, it's okay to smoke up on the roads. But, you know, we we sort of reserved enough dates for these hiccups to arise and for us to be able to take our time and let it pass. So we just ended up the remainder of the weekends, you know, for Friday until Sunday, just sort of hanging around snorting silence, and just waiting until we're finally able to cross went off to Chiang Mai spent a couple of days there. Went back to my Saturday on a Monday, Monday morning, we finally got the green light, we finally got to go ahead to cross. So we met up with our dry for the guy who will take us across the border with regard them to is cheap. He drove us through the mountains into the family. And after a very bumpy roads of like, dragging for hours. We crossed the border. And we suddenly found ourselves in a messy in South Africa many states, right? So we thought we made it we're in everything's good. But then the next problem starts to arise. That's our our context where they're the guys from the PDF units, which we were supposed to meet with. We were supposed to meet up with the guys from the Naypyidaw PDF. And they will take us all the way up to the front in loikaw, and the most so up in the north of grand Estates at the regional capital. But they weren't there, and we didn't hear from them. So we're just sort of, we're standing around the mess. And that's pretty sure what to do. Went to a local internet cafe. And after some time, we finally got in touch with them. And as it turned out that you know, they were waiting for us. But there had been a mis communication because they were waiting for us at a totally different border checkpoints. And Edward checkpoint was not like the next one over it was really far away. It was like a day's travel two days travel away. So it would really take them one or two days to even get from there to us. And you know, having already lost a whole weekend, waiting to cross into me and Murdo. Our time was very limited. So for us to wait for them to pick us up to travel all the way with them to loikaw spent some time there and then to travel all the way back. There was too too, too much for the limited time that we have like arrived four or five days remaining for we had to go back into Thailand. So you know, it was not feasible anymore. And we were suddenly dare like, Okay, well, our current plan just sort of fell true because of time issues. What now? We were sort of staying at this house, where a PDF member was saying with his wife and child and he heard about our situation are predicaments. And as sort of he that night called in all his comrades, like his squad leader, and all the guys from his his units. They were all from different PDF units, the boiler K, PDF, or like, it's one of the towns and counties, it's more in the center of the state, and that we explained the situation. And these guys, they were very understanding, and they were like, well, you guys can all this way here to correct me to see what's the worst, like, you know, we don't want you to leave empty handed. So why don't we why don't we just take you along to our section of the front, you know, to our camps and our region, you can just, you know, speak to our guys and cover the conflicts on where we're staying. And, you know, there was a small miracle that's solid, this alternative plan arose. And it turned out to be actually a very good trip. Of course, I don't know how the trip was named up, EDF would have gone. But I would even say with some confidence that this might might have been a more interesting turnout of events from the gods, you know, being a journalist and looking at all of this from a media perspective. You know, I would say that when looking at all the different states of Myanmar, it's a guy in Cochin Shan Karenni. Karani has definitely relatively received most coverage from Western international media. It's also a reason why we're we went there, it's still relatively easy to get from Thailand, compared to you know, a guy or a Rakhine region, which is next to impossible to reach. There's still the place where most international journalist Western journalists go to if they want to come from Myanmar if they want to write a report about the country. But you do see that like, almost all the press where the ads are currently go to the places where we're supposed to, to go to initially to the mall so and to local. In the end, we ended up going to the southern part of Karachi to Bala K, and to pass on to different parts of the front line, where almost no Western press has made it's because there's simply smaller towns, you know, Western media preferably wants to cover the biggest the biggest city around. Well, you could notice that the how little Western coverage there was a displaces. Because sometimes when we would arrive like a PDF cam, or meet some of the resistance fighters, they would end up you know, wanting to take more pictures with us that we that we would be ending up taking pictures of them as like a small anecdote. So you could really sense that they were not used to having Western journalist route around, they're part of the frontline.

Brad 28:12

And it's very strange that you that you say that we recently conducted an interview with Elena was working with the the German national broadcaster, and in the story that she related of going to Korean and, and covering the conflict, there was very much that she and her colleagues were asked not to leave the vehicle to avoid leaving the PDF camp. Because that the sight of foreigners, very obvious Europeans would attract too much attention would would get back the military would know we would cause problems for a lot of people. So it's very interesting that you're saying that in currently, the level of confidence is so high, that not only are you able to walk around civilian sort of settlements, apparently uncovered with your faces out, but also that that people are happy and willing to take photographs. With you. It's a really stark contrast. And I want to ask what, it seems that they were very happy to see you but but I am curious, did you? I don't know. Did you perceive that there is any frustration on the part of the locals towards foreigners or any any suspicion towards foreigners? Did you did you encounter any hesitation from the locals? Or was it all just very positive and very happy to see you

Thomas van Linge 29:45

know, it was like, I would say generally positive and happy to see us and I think if we were to compare then the situation in Korean and Korean at the picture I could just describe. I think there's The difference can be explained by multiple factors. I would say first of all, Karani, it's a very tight knit community, you know, the grainy day, they're all know each other. It's all small, small towns, small villages, farming communities. So that's very, excuse me, a very, like tight knit community where everyone knows each other. On top of that, there's also no at least from from what I saw, or tendency, there's no major displacement, few flows or refugee flows into Karanja from other parts of the country, which I know is a very different story in Korea, you know, where in the getting the lay, okay, new territories. There's also been an influx of people from, you know, Mandalay, Naypyidaw, Yangon, from the center of the country. And I think, you know, having these IDPs enter a ethnic minority area, then that's going to also cause some distrust between people, because suddenly, you know, there's all these strangers in your midst. And you don't know if they're all if they are, who they say they are, or if some of them are possible. Regime informants, regime spies, you know, loyalists, what have you. So, you know, incorrectly everyone really knows everyone. So there's little reason to be distrusting of each other. And I think also, asides from we all see there is that there is a difference dynamic among all the different armed groups in every region. You know, Myanmar is such a huge country. And every region, especially since the arts Bellion, has become a bit of a world on its own. And it's a bit like a spectrum. You know, on the one hand, you really have to do the regions where there's one group giving a diet late on the team on things for at least one group really dominating and managing the region like a one party state, like Rakhine, you know, with Eric an army, or Gokhan, with MNDA. In the middle, you have like, the regions where there is one dominant ethnic organization, and probably has been since the 1940s. And there are also resistance groups, PDF groups, but to in a sort of a hierarchical reality, are in a submissive position below the ethnic authorization. And I think Correct, that's very obvious with decay and you are indicating delay. And then below them in the hierarchal structure, they are sort of the Qur'an banner, PDF groups like Colbert column, Black Panther column or vinyl column. And these are groups which are the operates in the region, they are even to an extent, arms and supported by the cane lay, but they can't go against the cane you authority. And I think correctly was really on the other end of the spectrum in the sense that there is no dominance, armed group in the region, you know, like the most the most prominent or most well known scorers KDF, but they're not the ones calling the shots because really no one is. And that's really created a whole mix of different resistance groups, you know, karate, better resistance groups, PDF banner resistance groups. iOS, like Korean army can be a lesson and such. But it's all a very horizontally structured resistance there, there is no one giving orders to the other, or the groups work independently, but in unison. And I think that has really been a distinguishing feature of how the resistance is being done incorrectly is very grassroots based and organized struggle. And that says, it also then gives groups like, you know, the ball like a PDF, then the liberty to say, if we want to take these journalists to our section on the front line, there's no one in sort of a higher up position that can prevent it from doing so because like, they don't answer to anyone except to to the AUG itself.

Brad 34:31

That's interesting, and it does mirror what what Michael was saying about the cooperation he was he was telling us about the checkpoints being simultaneously manned by you know, four or five different resistance groups and everyone everyone cooperating and collaborating and there wasn't this sort of, you know, posturing and and power struggle within within caronian You You seem to be confirming that that that your impression is very much that they've managed to have a system not not strictly hierarchical, either. But a system of sort of, how would you describe it the sort of CO equal cooperation? What would it be like?

Thomas van Linge 35:18

Yeah, I would say, you know, exactly that. That's, that's except like you mentioned, the border crossing where we went to, as we entered, granny, was meant by four guys from four different resistance units, you know, and it's something I'd never even heard about in any of the conflicts I'd ever studied before. That was really a unique feature. And I think that's really shows how incorrectly the different groups are not interested in carving out territories, you know, in the, in the finding of spoils in, like politics, even if there are no, there's no, no major political movement, sort of trying to ride the waves of revolution. And also, like no revolutionary, like major revolutionary leaders. That's good that all people could rally behind, you know, there's no karate Che Guevara. So to say, I think it's really a societal or like, a collective communal struggle in in Karenni, where everyone does their part, everyone contributes everyone, you know, just fights or tries to support the fighters in every way. And it's a very egalitarian base resistance in that sense. And you do really feel that the Caroni also not really interested in doing politics already, you know, for better philosophical about how they want to run their own things afterwards, they really just want to get rid of the regime. They want to go home in most cases, because you know, almost all the guys from like a PDF, the guys we hung out with, we're from Molokai, but we're sort of in exile, because their homes were occupied by the regime. So it all just wants to go home and rebuild their lives. And they say, you know, if Aug orders us to, we will march on to nape EDA, because we do answer to today, Yugi. And we do consider ourselves, you know, part of the national struggle for liberation of Myanmar nots, we don't consider us as a correnti liberation movements about a Burmese like a general member Murray's resistance movements. And I think that that's really distinguishes them from other regions of the country, where sort of those regional politics and, you know, just to also autonomy, or no territorial ambitions do come more into play.

Brad 38:10

That's interesting. I just want to clarify, are you saying that that mentality applies to the Ayios as well, or just to the PDF that are operating in currently?

Thomas van Linge 38:24

In this case, I could only speak for the PDF units.

Brad 38:29

Okay. Interesting. That is very interesting, though. So So I want to focus then on on the civilian element of it, if you will, you were fortunate enough to be able to go out and and see civilians, see what life is like in in currently. And, and I think this is, this is one of those things that kind of gets lost a little bit in in conflict reporting, because of course, we want to see changing battle lines, we want to see combat we want to see, you know, soldiers and guns and things like this, because they're interesting, and they're exciting, and we can understand them. And then the day to day difficulties of civilians who struggle with food struggle with shelter struggle with medicine, this sort of falls a little bit behind when it comes to reportage. But I'm very curious to understand what is the sort of what is the physical situation of the civilians? Right, what what difficulties are they dealing with? How are they coping, but also what is in your opinion, if you can speak to the morale of the civilians and their and their outlook?

Thomas van Linge 39:36

I think first of all, the situation for the civilians is very hard. So over the past months, and years, the people of Karani have suffered many retaliatory attacks by the junta. Almost every village we traveled to most either with abandons partially destroyed or in most cases completely burns down by the troops to regime. And many people will have no option but to stay in, you know, makeshift huts in IDP camps somewhere in Kearney State because also since the resistance to commence in June of last year and sort of secured the better parts of the east bank of the soul in river. The few refugees, a couple of 1000s that were staying in camps, just across the border in Thailand, had been pushed back. Now the Thai authorities are not letting anyone true. When we drove actually, to Granny, the last stretch of the roads before the border, we drove to this completely abandoned refugee camp. It used to house like 10,000 refugees, but from one day to the other, the Thai border guards to showed up and said they told everyone backwards things are gone back. So people are really stuck in incorrectly with no opportunity to, to flee to the islands. And it could just incur any hope for the best. And build a camps under sort of coverage of leaves sorted to wounds a workplace and drones when spotted. And, you know, they really have very little when we visited an IDP camp, they offered us foods, but all they could offer us was like a rice soup, you know, because it seems we had much more than rice to serve to guests. And, you know, now that the rain season will start the situation will become even more difficult because almost basically all the outs that we saw, are not waterproof. So rain will flood in the camp themselves will turn into this big mudslides where you wind up with a walk through the mud to get anywhere. And you know, the most concerning thing, the thing that concerns me the most is the prospect of malaria. You know, with with the monsoon rains come the mosquitoes and the mosquitoes bring malaria. And people simply do not have the the protection against mosquitoes. It's also really frustrating. When you're in such an area that you see that there's no international organization precedent, you know, there's no United Nations, no major organizations supporting the IDPs or people. Because, you know, as I was told later by a former UN staffer, the UN, they have their office in Yangon. And they want to maintain keep their office in Yangon, which means that they're at the mercy of the junta. So they only really go to the areas where the regime allows them to go to, which is never like the areas where they're needed the most. So incorrectly, it really feels like people are sort of can only rely on themselves and under generous donations, that's their family abroad or other sympathizers or people from from the Burmese diaspora or abroad can bring them in since like donations, and stuff. But, you know, despite all these all these hardships, all these difficulties, I've never sends like any despair or sort of dip in morale among the people, maybe just to sort of the face they put up when they talk to a foreigner, I don't know. But to me, it didn't really feel like they're all keeping their spirits up. They all believed that you know it, how difficult the situation is only temporary. And that's Qureshi, at least have started could be liberated soon and they will be able to to return to their homes, especially around the areas of basan and baleka. Where we visited most of the villages have been abandoned because they are within the artillery range of the regime. But the regime itself is now isolated in the hilltop camps and could be you know could be eliminated from those bases in different perceivable future. So when those errors could be declared then the people could leave their the IDP camps and come back to their villages to start rebuilding.

Brad 44:58

So I just want to say circle back to something that you mentioned there, the NGOs. I think this is a very interesting point, a very important point. We know, of course, that it will because we've had, we've had this issue for years, where NGOs or even foreign governments want to send aid. And the military says, Okay, you can send the aid, but the aid has to come through these ports, it has to be processed, it has to be catalogued, it has to be distributed and manage the by these entities that are, of course, going to control. And naturally, we know that, you know, the goods are going to be sold for cash, and the cash is then going to be used to buy weapons and ammunition for the military to continue creating these problems. But you say you're saying that the the workers themselves, workers have NGOs, who wants to come into the country, not not products, not goods, not boxes of aid, but even individuals themselves are still operating under the military's control only operating in the spaces that the military allows them to, to operate in, because maybe I'm very naive, it was just my impression that, that it was actually the other way that like the journalists, like yourself, NGOs would be would be sneaking across the border, bringing, you know what supplies they could and operating in liberated areas. But so you're saying that that's, that's not a thing that is occurring?

Thomas van Linge 46:28

Okay. Well, let's the small NGOs. Of course they can, you know, and really did the NGOs that have been set up by philanthropists by religious organizations like church Alliance organizations, or just initiatives that have been set up by people, like, for example, free Burma Rangers, they are completely independent, to operate. So please, so of course, they can sneak into a resistance territory and help out there and they do, you know, they help is really vital. I was really talking about the major organizations, you know, like the UN, Oxfam Novib. Like these global organizations that have presence in multiple countries, including in Myanmar, and, for instance of the UN. I was told that by a former UN staffer that they have their, their offices in Yangon. So they are sort of forced to operate at the whims of the the, the regime. And then you know, you of course, the next logical thought you have is well, why are they even in Yangon, if they can do anything from there. But I was told that that's actually motivated by by funding, like if they have an office in Yangon, then they can add Myanmar on their list of countries where they're active, they can show that list to Western governments, international institutions. And you know, with that list, they can then get more funding, because there are more countries on that list. So by being in, by having an office in Yangon, and not doing anything, they're just staying in their air conditioned office building, again, to help the people Myanmar, but again, mother, again, gets more funding from governments, for which they think the day that they can be helping more people globally end to end today. You know, of course, to us that that makes very little sense. But in their minds, like the funding takes priority over actually the help helping off of people in that specific country.

Brad 48:51

It's good to understand, it's good to see this distinction, because I think we often have this habit of, of not looking at the smaller NGOs, as much we think of these heavy hitters, the big groups like the Red Cross, the United Nations, one vision, so on. But it seems, then from what you're saying that small NGOs actually have the power to to help people much more significantly meaningfully, because they are small.

Thomas van Linge 49:20

I would say, the small NGOs are really the unsung heroes in in Myanmar. You know, they're the only ones really helping the people and really getting there where no one else is really sort of still being the representatives of the outside world and showing the Burmese people that they have not been forgotten and that there's still people on the outside, doing their best to help them.

Brad 49:48

That's brilliant. It's really good to hear that there are people who are doing the work and were able to do the work. But turning them back a little bit just to that civilian situation as you were talking about I I find it fascinating that and I know you, you recognize that it might just be a face that they put on to be brave, or that maybe they're very conscious of the fact that what you as a foreigner, and as a journalist see, is going to be what the international community sees. But I mean, you, I presume, you would have seen a variety of different people like old and young, and children, men and women and everything in every type of condition. And it is, it is really fascinating to me that we have the situation where you say that the life is so difficult, I mean, you're even saying that these poor people have even those who have managed to flee into Thailand to try to escape, you know, bombing, or then being turned back by the Thai, and have to have to cross into effectively a warzone and have to try and survive after their homes have been destroyed. And yet, you're saying that they remain determined. And I don't know whether you said they were optimistic, but you seem to be saying that they're not pessimistic. And it's just it, I think it speaks volumes, turning back to, you know, World War Two, which, which I think both of us have have a stronger cultural connection to it's one of those cases where, you know, among the civilian population, deep down where the moral right is, because even when times were tough in the countries that were trying to resist the German expansion, the German conquest, the civilians, were still consistently willing to risk it all. To fight against this to do work in the resistance groups to, to try to sneak information out of the country to try to support you know, soldiers with with one little food that they that they had, I think it speaks volumes for the, if I can use the word righteousness of the conflict, when the civilian population is is injuring such hardship, and their morale is still high. They're not calling for people to lay down their arms and sue for peace, they're not calling for compromise. They're not calling for just just let it end any which way I don't can bring the military back. And, you know, as long as as long as I can rebuild my house, I'm happy. You seem to be saying there's absolutely no question of that among the civilian.

Thomas van Linge 52:33

And that's fine. You know, that's fine, I can really think that I can say that's, you know, the groups in Korea are not political, even though they're fighting a an armed conflict. Because it's not a political conflict. It's really a popular rebellion against the Myanmar regime. And you can really sense that incorrectly. It's really the effort is really carried by all the people, you know, by the fighters, by the villagers by the refugees by the the, the the community leaders like priests and monks. Everyone seems to be on board and doing their arts to expel the junta forces, you know, and it's almost as if you are maybe reminds a little bit of Ukraine, you know, we're also the entirety of society is contributing to expelled the Russian invasion for us almost guess the junta force has a bit of a sense of being this alien outside force, who does not belong at all in in the region has no, no roots? No, no, no, no place there. And that's why almost everyone that I spoke to is still optimistic about the ultimate resistance and still fully supportive of their, their efforts to expel the regime and like, you know, the IDPs the way I sense it's, they're not necessarily waiting for peace, they're just waiting for for victory. And they will already go back to their, to their homes if the war still ongoing, but at least their region is is free. And they can just rebuild their their lives there.

Brad 54:30

I think it's, it's such an important element of conflict that the military minded often don't think about, or they don't remember how important it is that you, you cannot easily take over a territory when the population is going to reject you. They're not they're not magically going to lay down and just accept the military even if the military rolls in and recaptures all of the main city. And I think I think this is endemic thinking on the part of the military generals, among the junta that that's all they have to do. If they win a series of battles, and they take over a series of towns, then deep down, I suspect, they think that victory will somehow magically happen. And they're not counting and they've never really respected the power of civilian resistance and civilian rejection of the regime. And and I think this time, it's coming to a head.

Thomas van Linge 55:33

Yeah, definitely, I've always been amazed by the inability of the regime to, to learn anything. You know, we're now three years into this into the arms rebellion into the conflict. And the regime is still using the same failing tactics, failing strategy sets that have led to all these resistance victories in the first place, you know, gather to get a lot of troops and hunkered down in the hilltop camp down to stick it out for as long as possible without giving them substantial support. And then, you know, these games get taken one after the other. Thinking that, you know, you can really reverse the course of battle by the bombing almost surrounding villages and just retaliating against civilians, or that you can maintain your grip on power by sending your columns around the countryside and burning one town after the next as if that's is really what specifies the country. And in that sentence is also obvious, you know, how the, the, the regime has not been a student of history. I mean, if there's one, if there was, there's like a very distinguishing feature about the recent history of Southeast Asia, it sets almost any instance to the resistance groups to the rebellion, one in the ends, whether it be you know, in Vietnam, in Cambodia, in Laos, as in a sitting regime, we just highly unpopular and dependent on conventional war tactics, you know, with deployments of troops, heavy armory, or planes. But but but that does not enjoy the support of the people, especially in the countries in the peripheries and does not have the know how that's resistance fights have, and ends up losing out. And I think also, that's a bit of a miscalculation, not just on the regime, but also just on the international community. Were because we were when the conflict and Myanmar returns an archer Bellion. That's most diplomats in, be it the West's or India or China or whatever, you know, they probably saw it's happening. But they figured it's probably going to go down the same way as all the other popular uprisings for the past decades, you know, probably going to go down same way as in Syria, as in Belarus, as in Sudan, as in Venezuela, there will be an uptick in resistance activities, there will be unrest, there will even be war. But at the end of the day, the regime will, will stick it out. And we'll win, because that's what all the other regimes have, have done, as well. And there was a very big underestimation of the capabilities and the persistence of the Burmese people to sustain this resistance and also, of the region, Southeast Asia itself, where geographical societal, communal military factors, also heavily favor air resistance movements over a conventional military force.

Brad 59:08

And I wanted to circle around to this, and I'm glad that you, you've brought the conversation here, because you do have that familiarity, that experience with other conflicts elsewhere. And one of the things that keeps coming up as we do this podcast and we talked to more and more analysts and experts and, you know, historians, and just different people with different perspectives, is just how fundamentally different the spring revolution has been. When contrasted with the revolutions that we've seen through I mean, a lot of different places you've listed you don't be on the roof. So looking at a lot of places throughout the broader Middle East as part and and also, you know, outside of the Arab Spring Are you looking at various uprisings throughout throughout Africa, a lot of these uprisings as you say, they, they either sort of rise up, there's a there's almost it feels like an expression of the rage of the public, this manifestation of the anger and frustration, but then that peters out, people are hungry, they have to go home, they have to go back to their jobs, you can't, you know, keep striking if if you don't have any food, to feed your family. Parents don't want to see their children get arrested them don't want to see them get shot. And of course, the government comes out the police or the military, and they start using more and more suppressive tactics. And eventually resistance dies down and pressure builds up pressure builds and pressure builds, and it explodes. Again, I think Iran is a good example of a country that has gone through a cycle of this, where the stress builds, it explodes into protest movements, and then it is quelled slowly, and the pressure builds again, or, alternatively, we could look at cases like Egypt, where you overthrow a dictatorship, but you sort of wind up with the military taking over, over again. Or we could look at Syria, which has devolved into, you know, just endless, endless conflict. Myanmar consistently, comes across as being fundamentally different whether it's because there is this roadmap towards democracy, whether it's because there is strong charismatic leadership, whether it's because there is such a degree of collaboration and cooperation against the communal enemy. In every interview, it seems that someone notes the seeming uniqueness of this conflict. And I'm wondering what, from your perspective, having seen it from the inside and also having examined and studied so many other conflicts? How do you see the Myanmar conflict as as compared to other popular uprisings against dictatorial regimes that we've seen in modern history?

Thomas van Linge 1:02:02

I, there's so many things to mention. I think I'll try to limit it to three that just came into my mind. I would say first of all, what if you compare it, for example, to countries where there were some limited F like attempts to transform an at Buffalo uprising into more of an arms rebellion, sustainable arms rebellion where it's failed? There are examples in Venezuela, in Belarus, and in Iran, it never works out. It's because, you know, the regime still has a full monopoly on power, the weapons, the territory, and in Myanmar, there was already the existence of the ethnic armed organizations. No one could argue that that's these organizations like the Qin Yu de Ke. You know, what else the the the CNA Korean army had those rotation that already existed, there would have been no refuge for the many students and protesters to head to there would have been no one to arm, this new rebellion to train all these new recruits. And it's it's very likely that that's a anti regime resistance movements would have been much less would have been much less successful, would have been much smaller would have eventually fizzled out, as previous resistance movements had done, you know, the, in the 80s, the Communist Party of Burma and such. So I think definitely already that's the new wave of resistance fighters at the sort of older generation of ethnic armed organizations to call upon and to rely on for support was already a very distinguishing factor in the early developing stage of the rebellion. Another factor, I would say was really distinguishing and the strength of the Myanmar resistance or the spring revolution is the matter of patience. You know, we've been at it for three years and still, there has been no rush towards Mendeley or navy, or money while or any kind of rushed, costly offensives. When you look, for example, at Syria, which is another very successful rebellion in the early stage, you did see that that they switched from guerrilla tactics to conventional war and to like taking entire swaths of territory after already, like a year, 14 months of resistance, which is In the end turned out to be too premature because you know, the regime recovered, managed to fight back managed to inflict devastating losses. The rebellion with its air force, its artillery, its tank units and a Myanmar to still be very patient, you know, it took them two and a half years before some groups would even start Operation 1027. And still a large part of the country's the conflict is mostly filed in a guerilla style manner, you know, in the better part of the McWay region in sedentary in parts of of Saigon, because still, you know, in those regions are resistant sense that they don't have the upper heads in a conventional fight. And they are patient enough to wait it out for another year or so before they really go on to like, cleaning entire territories like pushing the regime, the regime out in large areas. It's also a definitely a contributing factor to the success or the resistance. And I think a turret and there's also effector, which often talks about is that in Myanmar, contrary to other countries, like Syria, which vary from example, or like Belarus, there's really an absence of international involvement. You know, the regime has its allies. Sure, it has Russia, and to some degree, maybe Iran, China and North Korea. But those are only sort of political or symbolic allies. There's no Russian bombing campaign in Myanmar, like there was a Syria, there is no Chinese intervention on behalf of the Burmese regime, like there was lack could have been feasible in other instances. So to me, immersion is really all alone. And it's really has no one to call upon to rely upon. And it's also to the benefit of the of the resistance. Because, you know, in the long run, the resistance does have the upper hands, they have the popular support, they have the motivation, they have the upper hands and the number of fighters. So they can stick it out. And the only benefits that the regime has for the moment is their money flows, their weaponry, and their their their territory. But as that continues to lessen, as the resistance bids by base chips away at either roof of those, so as long as there is no regional power or super power, doing the regime's bidding, they are at a major disadvantage. And this has been a distinguishing factor for the conflict in Myanmar, that there's really this absence of international involvement.

Brad 1:08:15

Which it was just kind of interesting, because we always we lament, the lack of international involvement, we lament the fact that, you know, the Western countries, whether it's the US or the EU, or the United Nations in general, are not taking firm action, and even that ASEAN is not taking firm action on Myanmar. But the flip side of the coin, then is that also Russia, China, and as you say, to a lesser extent, places like Iran, places like North Korea, are also not taking a very strong stance. Is, is a pretty is a pretty crucial factor. So I'm wondering, what would you would you agree, and I know, this is a very big conjecture. But would you say that if a country is isolated left in a vacuum, without external powers, pushing and prodding their own interests? Would you say that a revolutionary movement is more likely to succeed or less likely to succeed?

Thomas van Linge 1:09:20

I think, you know, in that sense, we really can see how the times have have changed 10 years ago, or longer ago, revolutionary movements or rebellions oftentimes could only succeed with some international sports, you know, and that was, of course, in the unipolar world where we lived before the US. We just have to remember the example of Libya where the people rose up against Qaddafi, they lost out rebellion, they were on the verge of losing their Altobelli and, and then there was a NATO fly zone and the West intervened and basically served as the rebels Air Force until they took the Capitol and they killed Qaddafi. But with Syria, then the situation already changed, you know, and the West supported the rebellion, at least in a political France, and also they supplied some arms, they wouldn't go as far as the no fly zone. And but, you know, the West's political and geopolitical support for the Rebellion, I think really provoked the Russian counter response. And the reality was that, you know, a regime like Russia was willing to go much further in supporting insights than the West was in supporting the rebellion. And, you know, just like you and everyone else, I'm just as frustrated about the lack of debates about Myanmar, the lack of awareness about Myanmar, the lack of action on behalf of Western governments for Myanmar, especially when you can compare it to countries like Ukraine. But another part of me, then can't help but think, you know, maybe this is also for the best, at least looking at how the situation the current trajectory in Myanmar's already going. I can imagine that, you know, imagine a world where Myanmar would get support, it's just like Ukraine was that's, you know, we do have already the the Burma act best and US Congress. But that would actually be followed by a different Act, which will allow for weapons transfers, and for substantial support for different resistance groups. Don't you think it will be likely that a if the Chinese would see a Western plots or like a Western backed regime change efforts in Myanmar, that's as much as they distrust and dislike the Burmese regime, that they would still in their Cyril thumb, do political calculation, think Well, if the West is going to turn Myanmar into a pro Western democracy on our borders, then we have no choice but to support the junta to make sure that Myanmar stays in authoritarian country within our sphere of influence, and investigation of China being bordered on Myanmar, and being willing to go much further and cross much more moral boundaries, red lines, in order to achieve its goal, we'll be able to support the Myanmar regime in a way which the West could never do with resistance. And, you know, I think the biggest threats, which it's still it's the biggest threats to the spring revolution into a chance of succeeding is not the regime itself, or what regime could do. It's really what the regional powers India, China and Thailand could be doing. And the fact that they've mostly been sleeping on the situation in Myanmar, has been to, to the benefits of the resistance and, and its freedom to continue its its struggle. And, you know, a dark scenario, which I still consider to be a very likely outcome, I'd hope it will be the outcome, but I think it will be a likely outcome is that, you know, we could already see that debate with the capture of mere Wadi that sto resistance continues to advance, they continue to take more territory, that suddenly these countries will sort of wake up to the spiritual situation. India, China, Thailand, you may be Bangladesh, you know, they will probably do miscalculation, that's the the Myanmar regime is beyond help, that it can be supported militarily. But the goods, maybe really force all the difference versus like the energy, the resistance groups or whatever does work, you know, to advise and conquer tactics, the ethnic armed organizations to for to force them into a shorter shaky peace agreements with military where, you know, nominal governance, nominal civil control will be given back to the people where, you know, where we can, where the military will be allowed to remain intact will be spared a total collapse it also destruction will be allowed to serve as the armed force of the country. And that's what basically then, you know, bring us back to the status quo, which was maintained in Myanmar for, for for for a decades, you know, and we all know how that how that ended. So, it's basically a status quo will be restored, which could only set the grounds for the next military coup in in a decade or so.

Brad 1:14:57

Absolutely, it's, I mean, it's kind of an interesting point that I think you raise a very good point you make a very strong argument that strong Western influence to establish a pro Western democracy literally on China's doorstep could could backfire in a way that pragmatically speaking Western forces would not be willing to, to double down on would not be continued would not be willing to continue to push on. And it could lead to a much worse situation. But let's, let's move down back to the situation in Kearney itself. Because you spoke about the military, not learning at the military, still using the same tactics and setting up all these these bases and using their artillery and using airstrikes. And effectively terrorism tactics is I think, how we can describe what the military's basic operations are. How's that working for the military in in in currently, right now, what does it when we say that currently is not liberated? When we say that boy is still under under military control? When we say that there are still active Hunter bases in currently? What does that actually functionally look like?

Thomas van Linge 1:16:16

Well, if you look at from a military point of view, you could say that the junta is really on its last legs in Korea. Now they maintain a presence in the largest towns, they control parts of low carb, they have a couple hilltop camps remaining. But they're all basically isolated, surrounded, they have no freedom of movement, they can cover in all the areas and all the people have currently are basically governed by themselves. So it's only symbolic military presence that the military has in the stouts, you have to say that they're they're present there. And there's the military would have been completely expelled from the region long ago has not been for the fact that, especially in Graney, the resistance itself is very limited in its arms in its supplies. And when it comes to manpower, you know, the resistance outnumbers the forces of the military easily. But they simply do not have the weapons and ammunition to launch these decisive assaults, at least not without suffering unnecessary loss of themselves, and other wanton suffer unnecessary losses themselves. So in that sense, and currently, there's a bit of a frozen situation right now has been, I think, for the past month or two yourself, where there was the regime force or just ducking into their bases. For were, a couple of times, they will just shoot randomly around him, not even just with the military objective, but just to sort of communicate to the resistance like, we're here, keep your distance. And the resistance is not an unlock place actively trying to smoke them out, you know, the resistance just enjoys the freedom of movement, they can go rounds, they have their downs. And until they have the actual means to take a regime base. And let's go to try it. They're just going to let that soldier stay where they are. And they'll just stay where they are. And, you know, as I said before, the the current trajectory is beneficial to the resistance. And they are in a better position, at least in currently in the long run. So I don't I think it's not the worst idea for them to just weigh that out now, at least with the bit the monsoon seasons coming, and to try to deliver a decisive victory in Kearney in the next dry season, so starting October and onwards.

Brad 1:19:16

But so are you basically saying that the military are besieged, in essence that they that they're stuck in their little bases? And they can't they can't project power from the base, they can't sort it out from the base? Or is there still that risk that they might get in a truck, drive out of the base, machine gun, some village and then drive back to the base? Like how, how dangerous is it in proximity to these to these locations?

Thomas van Linge 1:19:43

In some places, they have tried to sort of get out of their base and not sort of like launch random rates on a finished route and to sort of transfer troops from one base to the next one further down the roads but Oftentimes these these reinforcements have been completely wiped out taken out by the resistance. There was just I think one or two weeks ago reports that a regime column of around 100 Soldiers has been completely neutralized by the resistance as was making its way from bollocky to pasa that resistance completely taken it out said like, killed a lot of my head, but I could be wrong about the exact numbers, kills 40 Soldiers stick another 60 prisoner. So that's really shows how the the resistance does dominate all the territory outside of these, these bases, you know, so when the regime leaves their bases, they are almost assured to be ambushed. And they don't have the that many men to spare to call on such rates. So it's also indexed, looking at the current situation, their best option to just sit in their base and try to stick it out or survive for as long as possible.

Brad 1:21:11

That's really interesting. And so they like in that context, it makes sense, if they are not able to secure sort of regular supplies, food, medicine, ammunition, things of that nature, then eventually, one presumes they would, they would have to leave those bases. And with the rainy season coming, one would, one would assume that it's going to make it even more difficult for them to get resupply under those under those conditions.

Thomas van Linge 1:21:41

We can only hope everyone understands the bases are mostly supplied by by helicopters, okay. So that the regime is still able to fly helicopters intercranial and to fly over the bases. But that's still risky. You know, some of the PDF members showed me videos that be recording true the scope, so their rifles where they had been really watching the helicopters up close, and oftentimes, also it's shooting into helicopters. And in order to have a because the, the bays are small, they're just as this it's just one hilltop one a compound and order for the regime to drop their supplies into the base. And that's, you know, Miss drop them into resistance territory where they can be used by the PDFs of the cops who sells the helicopters do have to fly really low as this over the base. And that's of course then invites a lot of resistance attacks. So even though they're still able to large those to conduct those those supply rates it will definitely be harder as well with the monsoon season because you know, it will be very tricky to fly in the rain wetter. And we've now already seen in Korean, some rocket launchers and it could be a matter of time before the Karenni resist forces get their hands on some of those as well. And that could be a definite cut off of those bases from any kind of supply supply opportunities.

Brad 1:23:18

Ironically, the military would would experience a full cut strategy themselves but but it just raises an interesting point this is not necessarily directly related to our conversation but it's a point that I've I've had in discussions with many other people when we discuss lethal aid and there's there's something to be said for rocket launchers in that they sound very terrifying they sound very serious and there's a big explosion and it's very scary and and everyone feels very hesitant when we talk about or do we do we really want to sell rocket launchers or supply rocket launchers to to a conflict. But when you think about it, rocket launchers can kind of only be used on legitimate military targets you're not going to hear a story 10 years from now of somebody stealing from a from a corner shop with a rocket launcher. It's not it's not applicable for that the rocket launchers are not something that stop helicopters.

Thomas van Linge 1:24:23

I can't remember any incidents like that hearing anywhere in the news. Like you know there's a civilian airplane or normal helicopter something being shoved on the sky but is some guy getting his hands on the rocket launcher is really unheard of.

Brad 1:24:37

Isn't it? Yeah. And like these rocket launchers like they cost like $150,000 A piece. It's not something that you would be cavalier with like, oh, I can just get another one big no, no, you can't. But if you can spend $150,000 to shoot down you know, let's say a 30 3045. million dollar helicopter, well, then you do that, because that's that's your value.

Thomas van Linge 1:25:06

And the Syriana did have a program sort of Ford it, it was not necessarily with with Stinger missiles for like helicopters, but eventually the CIA had this program where they would supply t o w, anti tank missiles to the rebels. And these like huge things, you know, it's like a big pipe on like this try faults, it's not something you can just carry on your shoulder, it's really has to be set up. And the way they did it, and also how they managed to keep their their, their their oversight on it is that the rebels were very clearly instructed, like you get this rocket launcher will give you these six is this picking, like for example, figuratively, like the six missiles, each missile has its own ID goes its own identification number. And we want you to record every Michelle, before you fire it to sort of record the identification number on the missile, then to film yourself firing it, and then to film the targets that you hit. And because, you know, because these missiles are super effective, they're like, there is gems and that 10 guided missiles, so they can really lock on the targets, and almost always hit it. The rebels only needed to be supplied with a very low amount. And there was very easy to then no monitor how every rocket was being was being used in that in that sense?

Brad 1:26:45

Absolutely. Because, again, it's not like a machine gun, where 90% of more than 90% of the bullets that are fired, do not intend even to hit a target. It could be just suppressing fire, it could just be hopeful file. But with something like a TOW missile launcher, as you say, or whether it's a stinger missile, or whether it's an 84, whatever the case may be, you're you are definitely targeting something, and you know what you are targeting and you know that it's a legitimate military target. So the the civilian risk, the the collateral risk is is actually much lower, I would argue when it comes to to giving people access to these type of weaponry than it would be if we were talking about machine guns and bullets. But for some reason, the public and the political establishment both seem to feel naturally more comfortable with the idea of supplying small arms to conflict zones than with the idea of supplying something like a rocket launcher. And I just think this is very misplaced. Thinking, yeah, that definitely.

Thomas van Linge 1:27:51

You could say with certainty that, you know, the bullets from from a ak 47 have killed millions more people than the Miss off from a stinger from a an ad, GM or something. But still those weapons are preceded the less dangerous ones.

Brad 1:28:16

Yeah, is it? It's a very strange, strange world we live in. But turning to the other side of currently then right? So we we said, okay, they've got these bases, they're in the bases, everybody knows how far you can be from the base to be safe. And the military doesn't really get to leave the bases very often. Now, does that mean that in the rest of current estate, there is opportunity to pursue economic activities, agricultural activities, natural exploitation activities, is other opportunities in currently for people to do things that generate, you know, vital resources that generate wealth and that generally allow people to access the things that they need to access? Or is there kind of a stagnation on all of these funds?

Thomas van Linge 1:29:06

Well, up to a certain extent, you know, in a sense, and so we also know this when we tried to enter the karate. There, the warplanes still operate over the entire territory. Villages can still be bombed at at a given moment. From their hilltop bases, the regime's artillery can still have a bit of further range. And even if that wasn't there, you know, level five was more economic opportunity. But Karenni can't exist as an island on its own. It also needs to be able to trade its goods and services with no either to the the territories who Myanmar around it, or what's islands and air surrounded are still either controlled by the regime, x or frontline air He asked like a pack of bacon, for example, or down in current state. And Thailand is really keeping a tight lid on things that some fairly limited supplies are true or less true. But it's not enough to actually sustain a local economy in karate itself. So, in order for you know, I think currently will first have to be liberated from a military point of view. And only after debt as the resistance territory also expense outside of the state boards of Karenni. Can a sustainable economical situation be created?

Brad 1:30:42

Hmm. Good to know. Good to know. So because it because it's just so strange, because we've seen these videos lately coming out on YouTube, of foreigners, who often don't understand anything about the Myanmar context and just, you know, various flavors of travel vloggers and YouTube backpackers and things of that like, traveling into Django and traveling into Mandalay, and possibly even Naypyidaw. And whether they're aware of the situation whether they have just a very vague concept. What's interesting to me is that in these large cities that are still largely military controlled, there is substantial economic activity, there are people going to cafes, tea houses, all these all these sorts of things like life seems to be continuing in these places, I'll be it under the sort of auspices of a military dictatorship. But life life and economic activity continue nonetheless. But it seems that in in these places that are fighting so hard for the for their freedom, they don't have even the basic luxury of being able to go to the tea house or going to a corner store and finding food that they could buy or finding a way to try and make a living finding some sort of economic opportunity, it's it seems that the situation there is much more for lack of a better term just survival oriented than, than anything higher order than than that. Do you think that this is likely to change anytime? Do you do see signs that maybe there was a bit of progress that things are not as dire as they, as they might have been previously? Or is it likely to stay this way until the state is entirely liberated?

Thomas van Linge 1:32:37

I think that's very hard to say, I don't, I don't think it will be fooled into thinking that because there's a lot of economic opportunity in major cities, that means it's it life is just normal there, you know, that's, that or that the people even would not be opposed to the military, either, like the people in the peripheral regions are. But I think you know, it's also very important for the regime to maintain a bit of that sense of normality. And that's why they're always so happy with, you know, these these YouTubers fly against Myanmar, like making their, their, their their video about this exotic place where everything is so so beautiful stuff. And it also then makes it more immoral of these these, these YouTubers actually go there and to know sort of, do a regime is bidding to spread the narrative F just for their own their own visibility online, like for their own view guns and stuff. And that's something that you also saw really material. It's like, you know, these YouTubers were also completely clueless about the actual cause of the conflicts about the country itself. But they hear like, Oh, it's a dangerous place. There's a war going on. Or, like the most important thing, very few people come here so then they think I'll be the unique adventures one by going and then they go to Myanmar. And you know that they take their exotic shots on like the 16 lane highway in Naypyidaw. They mesmerized as being like this beautiful five star hotel and being the only guests here. And then, you know, the thing you always hear, especially when not even when they respond to criticism, that's when they're trying to sort of be ahead of the criticism. If they say, well, like, well, the media is always so negative about this country. And for us, it's a war and there's, there's fighting, but you know, I want to focus on the positive sides because there's almost also so much positive things to say about the country as if you know, we and the culture video that we all do it. That's because we want to spread awareness about Myanmar because we just want to be negative about the country all the time. We just want to be constantly Like stressing how bad of a place it is, because it was a sort of Speights with with memory. And it actually, they're the ones who appreciate the place and will do it as a big surface by focusing on positive stories. And, you know, showing the beauty of it all, which, in a sense, is it's just completely clueless. And, you know, they're just there for their own interest into while doing it are spreading a narrative or regime, because that's basically the one that has opened the door for them. To them. It's that sort of the political quo that then takes place, I spoke with British Coco, where, you know, they're allowed access into a country get to film all these exotic unique things, and have these big hotels to themselves. And then they project a sense of normality, which is not there, which is shown to them, too, which then in the end benefits, the regime's narrative debts, you know, they're mentioned becomes recovered quite well, and everything is just relatively normal.

Brad 1:36:00

It's, I think, it's, I would very much like to reach out to some of these YouTubers and be able to speak to them and be able to sort of have a discussion about this, because it ultimately comes down to propaganda that you are, whether you know it or not, you are pushing their propaganda, I would say, it's a little bit even, it's a little bit better, if you go to North Korea, for the reason that no one or very few people watching that in the West are going to think, oh, North Korea must be such a wonderful, lovely place, I should plan my next vacation there, everybody understands that what you're saying has been very heavily filtered, it has been very heavily controlled, and that you you need to spread a certain level of propaganda in order to make it out of the country safely. But when it comes to Myanmar, people don't know this. And an undercurrent I've seen in a few videos is is almost conspiratorial, you know, you say, Oh, the media always painted negatively. But sometimes it gets a little bit darker than that it starts to go into territory of all the media wants to say this country is, you know, poor and oppressed and unsafe. But, but that's because the media are all part of the, whatever the enemy this week is. And they're all spreading the lies, and they're all trying to scare you and terrify you. And you know, military dictatorships are wonderful, you know, beautiful places that we should all be so lucky to live under them. And it sort of reminds me of Tucker Carlson's trip to Russia, that took place not too long ago, where he was just going on about how wonderful his experiences in Russia and everyone in America is so critical of Russia and the Russian government that the Russian regime at a time when Russia has invaded a foreign state, it's, it's, I would say it's insidious. But in the case of these YouTubers, it's mostly just ignorant.

Thomas van Linge 1:37:57

Yeah, but it's, you know, but how long can you just sort of sheltered them with saying, it's, it's just ignorance, because that, at some point, it also has to be willful ignorance, especially when it's like a huge reverse for sort of, you know, it when I really like this travel YouTubers are they're really taking the battle among themselves, for example, to visit every country in the world, you will think that like when once you have visited enough places, like once you have been to 50 or 60 countries, that should have taught you something about the world, you know, or at least giving you some sense of sensitivity and about some sense of, you know, that not everything is sort of some touristic playground where you can just, you know, live your best life, but there's also a place with which people are really struggling where the government is not operating in a in a moral immoral manner. And so then still be sort of used as food to spread a certain narrative, and, you know, in exchange be allowed to shoot your video there. I feel at some point, it's also just really a willful, willful ignorance that you're that you're signing up to.

Brad 1:39:17

Absolutely. And I think this is sort of where I want to sort of finish our discussion here on the much bigger picture, the global picture, and that is the media landscape and the information war, because, you know, we can talk about these YouTubers and we can say, well, you know, they're not doing the right thing. But they are posting videos and those videos are getting views. And it doesn't seem that Western established media houses are as keen to do the same thing to invest in getting people to go to the country, film content, talk to people because one thing that these YouTubers do demonstrate is that they're is a possibility to get into the country, either into the military controlled areas or, as is your case into the liberated areas. But you can get into the military controlled area, you can talk to people, you can film footage, you would have to do it very carefully and ethically, because those people can disappear as a result of things that they say, on camera. And we saw that when when Clarissa waters visited Yangon. But you know, a professional journalist, I believe, should know how to navigate these things. Ethically, the possibility exists to bring this message to the outside world in a way that is that is ethical and also informative. But it doesn't seem to be happening for some reason, when it's on YouTube. And the title is something like I was I visited a war zone, or no one ever travels to this country, or I was the only white person that or whatever. People click on that it's clickbait, it's interesting, and you're watching them, it's a 10 minute video, of which five minutes are spent either in the airport or in the hotel. But then, if you go to a media house, and you say, I want to put together a 2030 minute documentary, or a one hour documentary, on what's actually happening in this country, and how people are trying to survive under a military dictatorship, it seems that a lot of media houses are like, Well, sure, maybe maybe when Israel's not so interesting, maybe when Ukraine's not so interesting, maybe when no one's is concerned about China, Taiwan, what can we be doing? Do you think in the more professional journalistic media landscape, to try to drive interest and to try to create content that is going to inform audiences, inform audiences ethically?

Thomas van Linge 1:41:44

You know, I think what we should be doing as it's already being done, is keep spreading the awareness. And, you know, just bring the conflict in Myanmar and the millions of stories of the Burmese people to cover their stories and to bring them close to close to the audience in the western audience, though, you know, and it's a very difficult situation now for Myanmar, because you're right, it's a bit of a it's, sadly has to compete for, for airtime and for coverage with Ukraine and Gaza. And that's, you know, that's that's not a fault of those conflicts, I'm very happy with any coverage that people Ukraine, people of Gaza can get. I think it's really a fault on just the general media logic that we have in in the West, where we think like, Okay, we have our news broadcast, we want to have a political item, a foreign conflict item and a multimedia item, or something where it's really sort of this symmetrically structured, and there's only in any broadcasts or any paper room for one conflict. One country, you know, even if there's, there's news to cover anymore. And I think, you know, if there will be more substantial Western coverage from like, correspondents heading into Myanmar very regularly, that would already go a long way. Because, you know, it was increased awareness of the conflict among Western audience it was from familiarize people with what's going on there with the people they're with will struggle what they're going through. But to also, then, you know, I'll speak on behalf of the press a little bit. I do know that there are many journalists, especially the western correspondents in Southeast Asia, like in Thailand and stuff, who are very eager to go to Myanmar who really want to get across the border and cover the conflict. Like, for example, a friend of mine is works for a Dutch TV network, if Southeast Asia correspondent and he lives in Thailand, because he lives in Thailand is basically prevented from covering the conflict from Myanmar, because Thailand officially still has closed its borders with the resisters, territories. And he listened to islands which is how he has his home there. He lives there with his girlfriends, she goes to university there. If he goes if he sneaks across the border to Myanmar as it is, and he and he will be on the eight o'clock newscast reporting from local or something. And Thai authorities would find out about it, then he would be expelled from the country. And he could not continue his his his his job as a Southeast Asia correspondent, you know, being responsible to cover all those different countries. So it's also definitely a limiting factor. That's the countries bordering Myanmar are really not sympathetic towards the resistance, and really keeping a closed door policy on foreigners entering these territories. And that's austerity. Since from, for example, the situation in Syria where Turkey was largely sympathetic towards the rebels, and allows the foreign press to cross the border into rebel territories as they placed.

Brad 1:45:16

I mean, it's it's certainly not being made easy as you say, particularly, it seems on the Thai side, but we've we've spoken to Indian analysts, you're on and off the record. And the news from from the western side, as in as in western border of Myanmar also doesn't seem to be particularly good. There's a lot of political pressure to, to stay quiet, I am confident that the Chinese state would also have their own official position on the Myanmar crisis, and they would not particularly enjoy people challenging that official position if they were sneaking across the border into into kitchen state and reporting and coming back. So suddenly, the EDI is very, very difficult. I understand that. But it's it's sort of gratifying to know that at the very least we are in terms of ethical and effective reporting. As you say, the work is being done. It just needs to, it needs to continue being done. And that, I think that's a pretty important point to make. I know it's a it's a thing that I've referenced in other interviews in the past, but it stays with me the the Jon Stewart comment recently saying that the job of of changing the world is a lunch pail job, it's a boring day in day out nine to five, repetitive slog Yeah, it's, it's not sexy and exciting. It's not like an action hero movie, but it has to be done. If you want to make improvements in the world.

Thomas van Linge 1:46:49

Exactly, I think it's, it's, it's not really appreciate a job or a well paid job either. And, you know, you really have to get your your, your, your, your job satisfaction out of the, the idea that you're doing it for a greater a greater, greater purpose.

Brad 1:47:08

Absolutely. So anyway, I really appreciate your time, and I really appreciate your insights, I think having these opportunities to talk to media and to talk to people who've been there, it's, it's so it's definitely exciting for me, it can be a little bit emotionally frustrating as well, because I sort of part of me wishes that I could also have been there and could also have have, have seen it. But being able to at least vicariously, to to get a glimpse of what is real and happening in the country is, I think absolutely essential to me and to our audience. So we really appreciate the work that you've done in the in the insights that you've given. But before we finish, you may or may not be aware by by tradition, we always end our episodes by inviting our guests to share some final thoughts on on anything, it could be directly related to what we've spoken about today. It could be much more broad. But anything that you think that the audience would benefit from knowing about thinking about considering as they go about their day, I would invite you to just share anything you have on your mind now.

Thomas van Linge 1:48:21

Thank you. Well, let me first of all, thank you for for having me on. I really enjoyed our conversation because you know, with with the little knowledge that there is in general about Myanmar, oftentimes when I when I go on, like a podcast or a show to talk about situation, I need like half of my time to even just introduce the conflict to explain to people what it's all about, before I can even get to you know, what I want to talk about. And I really enjoys were there we could just jump straight into the details here and just have a very thorough discussion about on the line currents and everything. And now I really appreciate that you guys put such great efforts into consistently reporting on Myanmar to really you know, having this next level discussions about its which really don't see in any established media so that really makes you guys unique and really want to thank you for that in in the first place. And yeah, you know, I think it's like closing statements. I think that's what Myanmar shows us or people Myanmar shows us is that we have no right to be cynical about, about the state of the world, about our own lives about just general events in the world. Because people and not just news consumers but also diplomats and journalists, seasoned journalists also have a tendency of being as negative as possible about world defense, you know, also, I Ukraine, like in the beginning to the invasion, they said Ukraine will probably lose the war in a few days or so. They said, you know, things like that are saying things like, oh, Donald Trump is probably going to win the election. This revolution will feel that uprising will fill this day dictator will stay in power. And I think really mean they said all the same things about Myanmar were after the Buddha said, Well, it's gonna be protest, but the military is gonna crack down and it's gonna go back to normal. And so far, the various people have really proven the cynics, the cynics wrong. And they really show us that, you know, it's okay. And it's sometimes even the better option to be optimistic and to be hopeful about events that you're seeing, instead of being a cynic. So that's, you know, you'll be as negative as possible with the prospects of being able to say, I told you so in a few years or so.

Host 1:51:16

One of the most tragic aspects of the current crisis in Myanmar, is how isolated Burmese protesters feel, and in fact our thankfully, through our nonprofit organization, better Burma, we are able to ensure that all donations successfully reach their intended target. So if you found yourself moved by today's discussion and want to do what you can to help, please consider giving to our fund, which is 100% directed towards supporting the movement. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup, we welcome your contribution in a form currency or transfer method. Your donation will go on to support a wide range of humanitarian and media missions, aiding those local communities who need it most. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person, IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, refugee camps, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution to a specific activity or project you would like to support, perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian work is carried out by a nonprofit mission Better Burma. And the donation you give on our Insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fund. Alternatively, you can also visit the Better Burma website betterburma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause in both websites except credit card. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/betterburma. Additionally, we can take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search Better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either website for specific links to these respective accounts or email us at info@betterburma.org. That's Better Burma. One word, spelled b e t t e r b u r m a.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. We also invite you to check out our range of handicrafts that are sourced from vulnerable artists and communities across Myanmar. Available at Aloka Crafts.com Any purchase will not only support these artists and communities, but also our nonprofits wider mission. That's a local crafts spelled A L O K A C R A F T S one word alokacrafts.com Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support.