Transcript: Episode #276: America Decides, How the US Election Could Reshape Burma Policy
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Kamala Harris 0:09
The United States remains deeply alarmed by the military coup in Burma. We condemn the campaign of violent repression, and we are committed to supporting the people there as they work to return their nation to the path of democracy. The United States will continue to press the regime to end the horrific violence, to release all those unjustly detained and to re establish Myanmar's path to inclusive democracy
Donald Trump 0:49
Camp, so most of the refugee rohanga refugees are willing to go to go back home as quickly as possible. So what? What is a plan to help us? Where is that? Exactly where,
Joe Biden 1:07
Right next to Burma, last week, the United States, helped bring together the UN Security Council, which issued a strong statement in support of Burmese democracy, and this week, we will use our renewed engagement on the Human Rights Council to strengthen the world's commitment to human rights in Burma. Today, I again call on the Burmese military to immediately release the democratic political leaders and activists and that they're now detained, including Aung San Suu Kyi and she is and also win mint the president the military must relinquish power it's seized and demonstrate respect for the will of the people of Burma, as expressed in their November 8 election. The Music.
Host 2:08
Welcome to the Insight Myanmar podcast. Before we get into today's show, I wanted to let you know that we have a lot more written and video content on our website. If you haven't visited it yet, we invite you to take a look@www.insightmyanmar.org in addition to complete information about all of our past episodes, there's also a variety of blogs, books and videos to check out, and you can also sign up for our regular newsletter. But for now, enjoy what follows And remember sharing is Caring you.
I'd like to welcome everyone to today's panel discussion entitled America decides how the US election could reshape Burma policy, and allow me to say a few words here about this important topic before introducing our four esteemed guess. First of all, it's essential to recognize the gravity of this moment, not just for the United States, but for Burma. And as we all know, the 2024 US election holds significant implications for American foreign policy. This is especially true in Southeast Asia, where Burma's ongoing crisis continues to demand global attention, even if it doesn't always receive it, the decisions made by us voters could influence the future direction of diplomatic relations, sanctions, humanitarian aid and support for the democracy movement in Burma. And so the stakes for Burma could not be higher as the US undergoes its own political transition now, so too does its role in shaping global responses to authoritarianism and human rights abuses. So today we will explore the potential shifts in policy depending on the election outcome, and considering how a potential Harris or Trump administration might approach Burma's current political. Economic and humanitarian challenges. So let's discuss how US leadership post election might engage with Burma's fight for democracy and freedom. And with that, I would like to invite the panelists to introduce themselves and a bit of their background.
Scot Marciel 5:18
I'm Scott Marciel. I was a US diplomat for a very long time, and finished my diplomatic career as US ambassador to Myanmar from 2016 to 2020 since then, I've mostly been at Stanford University and also doing some work with our group Asia.
Michael Haack 5:38
Hi, I'm Mike. I basically spent the two years after the coup, like building grassroots pressure to pass the Burma act, and then the year after that, kind of running between the State Department and other federal agencies and the hill trying to get the appropriation as high as possible for Burma. And so that brought me all over the country, to Kentucky, to Indiana, like getting people to call their members of Congress and pressure. And because I like thankless and grueling work, I'm now in Philadelphia with the Harris campaign, just to put all my cards on the table, so doing a lot of door knocking here as well. So
Yun Sen 6:21
Thank you, Joe. My name is Yun sun. I'm the director of China program and co director of East Asia program at Stimson Center. We're Washington based security thinking. So my work on Burma started in 2008 when I was the China analyst for International Crisis Group. That's also when I first visited this country and I follow Burma's foreign relations, especially the China Myanmar relations. I also follow very closely what the eski groups in northern Myanmar, especially those along the China border, has been, what is their strategy, what is their their plans and their activities. So I always say that China is my, is my, is my work, and Burma is my hobby, and is is a, is a great country to study. Thank you.
Jack Myint 7:14
Thank you. Joah, thanks for having me here. And really, I must say, it's a true honor and privilege to appear alongside the likes of Ambassador, Marciel, of course, Hyun and Mike, who have done so much and continue to do so much from Myanmar. My name is Jack min. I'm from Myanmar, born and raised and I came to Washington in 2011 when, as you know, say critical point of turning point, I would say, of change for my country, and got to witness firsthand the country's opening and engagement to the outside world. But from a Washington perspective, right? I was fortunate to be part of that initial group of investments, US companies, big American brands, heading out to enter the Myanmar market for the first time, and to live in that excitement and at some point unmanaged expectations of this frenzy, pace of excitement. One would even say right, going into Myanmar and then working through the thing saying administration, followed by the NLD administration, all the way to the coup. Currently, I hold a non resident fellowship at the Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS.
Host 8:41
I'd like to begin with a question for Ambassador Marcial, and I would like to ask as someone who has advocated for inclusive diplomacy and dialog with Myanmar's ethnic armed groups, the national unity government, civil society, how do you foresee us policy towards Myanmar changing under a potential Trump or Harris administration in 2024 and more specifically, how might each administration differ in their approach to recognizing or engaging with the nug, negotiating with ethnic actors and handling the military regime, given their different Foreign Policy philosophies and priorities?
Scot Marciel 9:20
Yeah, it's always a difficult question, particularly ahead of an election where candidates, and I would say, particularly in this election cycle, it strikes me that there's been really limited discussion of foreign policy topics in the campaign so far, other than Ukraine and Israel, Palestine Middle East, little bit of China. So it's hard to know based on what's been said publicly, my expectation would be that a Harris administration would broadly follow what Biden has done. There'll be different people. Well, and I'm sure there'll be some changes, but I would expect it would be in the same general framework of caring about democracy and human rights, and in that respect, I would think probably more continuity than anything else with Trump administration. It's harder to know. The one thing about Donald Trump on foreign policy is it's very unpredictable. He himself has minimal knowledge of the world, and it's also that nobody, at least I don't, have a clue who would serve for him. And I think the reality is, honestly, neither one of these presidents are going to take up Burma Myanmar as a cause themselves. I think that would be very unlikely, same for the vice presidents. They could prove me wrong, but I think that's unlikely. It's probably going to be at the secretary of state, national security advisor, or even lower levels, and there, again, it depends so much on on who would be put in place. I understand that Vice President Harris has has, it's been reported at least that she's planning to replace the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. I would assume that Tony Blinken and Jake Sullivan are exhausted anyway and looking to to move on. So a lot will depend on who they put in place. As I said, with with Donald Trump, it's, it's very unclear to me what, not only who, but what kind of people would be willing to serve in a Trump administration on foreign policy. And I think what's key to understand is that it all depends whether there's a champion. Is there going to be a Burma slash Myanmar champion in either a Trump administration or a Harris administration, and that we just don't know yet, would Kurt Campbell stay on in some role in a Harris administration? I don't know. Kurt has, I think, kind of had the lead on on Burma policy, probably more than anyone else. So that's a question. In the past, you had Mitch McConnell as a big champion, others on the hill, you had Laura Bush during the George W Bush administration, who was a huge champion. So I think absent a champion, you're going to probably get more of the same from Harris and less predictability with Trump. I think the Trump administration would probably care less about human rights and democracy. So it'd be a matter of whether their concern about China would trigger any any kind of shift in policy. So beyond that, in terms of engagement with the nug and ethnic armed groups, I would expect a Harris administration would continue that. I think initially a Trump administration would as well, just based on inertia, but after that, it would depend on who's playing the key roles.
Host 12:45
Thank you for that answer, and you this also offers a segue into our next question of looking more specifically at China and Chinese relations. And so the next question is, Yun, considering your extensive research on China Myanmar relations. How do you think a 2024 election victory for either Trump or Harris could impact China's approach to Myanmar, and specifically, how would each administration's policies towards China and Southeast Asian as a whole, in general, alter Beijing's engagement with Myanmar, especially given the current geopolitical tensions and China's interest in maintaining influence in the region.
Yun Sen 13:27
Thank you, Joe, that's a great question. And just to build upon what Ambassador Marciel has discussed, I think it primarily depends on how much attention and policy priority that the new administration will assign to Myanmar, because for for China, there is some independent variable in China's policy towards Myanmar that does not change, regardless of who is who is in the in the White House, China's top priority is border security. Second priority is connectivity, is through Myanmar, and the third priority, I call it, should deter Western influence, was the expansion of Western influence in Myanmar. So if you think about it, the US factor really plays into the third category, but it largely depends on how much policy initiative Washington would demonstrate towards towards Myanmar and like Ambassador Marciel said, I think that I expect, and I think the Chinese also expect, the heart of a Harris administration to continue the current policy of the Biden administration. There will be a lot of continuity, the persistent pursuit of Democracy, Human Rights, and support of a new G but if we look at China's policy, seems so cool, the most interest, the most consequential interaction, has not happened between US and China, I would say, on the on Myanmar, after the after. As a coup. It's more between. We could say that between China and ASEAN among ASEAN countries themselves, US has played a major role trying to pull together an international coalition. But I would say that in the Chinese assessment, us, ability to influence the domestic development in Myanmar currently is limited, now that China has a deterministic ability to influence the domestic politics in Myanmar, either. But I think without a more interventionist US policy, China is willing to set aside and watch how things evolve organically inside, uh, inside Myanmar. Um, if Trump is elected president, I think there people anticipate more volatility between US and China. Maybe not a free fall from the very beginning, but deterioration of bilateral relations is, is indeed expected. Um, I would be very surprised if Trump starts to use Myanmar as a leverage or as a as a issue to leverage against against China, because currently us does not have tremendous influence over Myanmar domestic politics. And I think if Trump wants to use, well any issue, I think North Korea will be more likely to be that potential opening, because he has had an experience with engaging North Korean top leader and currently, engagement with the military government in Myanmar will carry significant diplomatic and political costs, so I don't anticipate that Trump will see Myanmar as a priority in the foreseeable future. Remember, Trump loves transactions, right? He loves deals. So if he is to engage Myanmar, there has to be a deal to be made, and the payoff will have to be significant enough for him to pursue the issue. Well, we know that Myanmar, as of now, is no longer a low hanging fruit. Is not easy. Is is going to be diplomatically, extremely difficult. And it's hard to see how the result of any engagement will be glorifying or satisfactory for a for Trump administration. So I don't anticipate that to be the to be the to be the direction that Trump will pursue. Thank you.
Host 17:20
Thank you very much for that. And I'd like to turn next to Jack, and based on your business background and research focused on Myanmar economic affairs, you have insight into how business across the globe has long navigated the complex landscape of Myanmar, which has only gotten more complicated following the coup. And so how do you think the outcome of a 2024 US presidential election could impact international business engagement in Myanmar, especially in light of sanctions and the broader political and humanitarian crisis?
Jack Myint 17:52
Certainly. Thank you. Joah, I think you know, no matter which administration comes to power, right? They will be, continue to be champions, outspoken champions, for Myanmar in the policy circuit in Washington, we have a very active advocacy base, thanks to individuals like Mike and others who consistently and fervently push the Myanmar costs, day in and day out, and I think that receives support from and traction with members in Congress and the broader policy community alike. So I think that that will continue, and that will continue in the manner and form that fits the frame of whichever administration comes in. That's my first point, right? So the issue is not going to be completely wiped off the map. Now, the degree in which level of priority it receives that will vary. But since you asked an economic question, I'll answer the economic question, whichever administration comes to power, sanctions are going to remain a one of the major, if not the major, tool in the toolkit, in US overall policy towards them and sanctions. Currently, the name of the game with sanctions is targeted and coordinated, which means the administration is not keen to go to in the model of, say, late 90s, early 2000s approach where sanctioning the broader economy as a whole that is likely under a Harris administration going to stand that made it very clear that the intent of US sanctions does not hurt the average Myanmar citizen. It's not to make lives difficult for the average neuroscience whose lives, by the way, are already made incredibly difficult as it is and but you know, the fact of the matter is, no matter how well intentioned they may be, right, these sanctions have unintended repercussive consequences to the. Broader economy. Say, for instance, the action taken by some private banks who look at recent sanctions on Myanmar, who look at the reports such as the UN Special Rapporteurs reports, and, of course, the FATF blacklisting, and say, Well, you know what? It simply does not make sense for us to conduct transactions when it comes to Myanmar anymore. It's not worth it, right? The cost benefit analysis just doesn't pan out so without sanctions being in existence. I mean, you'll notice several international financial institutions taking their own institutional initiative to sort of cut Myanmar out of their own systems, right? Sort of as a way to preempt sanctions, even so, that's happening across the board and and I think in if you look at Singapore and some now, it's starting in some banks within Thailand, that is, that is starting to happen. So that's one factor. Another, of course, is the obvious and glaring security situation, right? I mean, businesses like stability has secure environments to operate in, where from any side really, their staff and their customers can operate safely. Currently, the ongoing conflict in Myanmar does not present a situation that you can where you can check that box, so to speak. And the next, I would say, is the which has always been a challenge, but one that was considered high potential in the long run is the the human resource capital, right? Myanmar has a very young, eager population who is keen to learn, who is keen to grow, develop and compete regionally and globally. That has always been, and I think Ambassador, Marciel, would agree with me, given all the time he spent on educational and leadership initiatives for these youth that has always been Myanmar's one of Myanmar's biggest and best selling points is the power of our youth now. Joah, you look at the situation today, and what do we have? We have the biggest mass exodus of Burmese youth leaving the country because of fear of conscription, because of a lack of proper education system, because of opportunities to access quality jobs. I mean, without that, there is really no incentive for businesses to look at this market and say, Well, we have a labor force that can be trained, that can grow, that is young, that doesn't exist anymore, as far as we're concerned, right? So I'm not saying that is entirely gone, but the fact of the matter is going in that trajectory. So that is another big factor in the overall overall assessment.
Host 23:04
Thank you for that Jack. And now turning to Mike, given your insights into us, foreign policy towards Myanmar. How do you think the 2024 election could impact us? Strategy on sanctions, human rights and the recognition of Myanmar's government If Trump were to win. What changes do you foresee in these areas based on his previous policies? And conversely, how might Harris, if she were to become president, approach these issues differently, considering her role in shaping us policy during the Biden administration? And lastly, Mike, how do you think the outcomes of both the 2024 presidential and congressional elections could impact the future of the Burma act and US recognition of the nug
Michael Haack 23:46
cool, yeah, great question. So I think, like, just to echo what a few people said, like, one question is, like, who's driving the boat right now? And I think Congress does play an outside size role in this. I mean, they're, they're often calling people from the State Department in front of them, both publicly and privately, to ask, how is the Burma going? Like, what are you doing? Are you implementing what we told you to do? And I think that will continue no matter what administration it is. And you know, as Jack says, I think that that means there will be a certain continuity the and I think then it's like, okay to what ends is that currently happening? I was recently in Chiang Mai like as you are, Joah right now, and it does seem there has been a shift in the way that the US is giving aid. There's a lot more focus on local governance and questions of local governance, and I expect that will continue, definitely with the Harris administration, I think likely with the Trump administration. I think one thing that has also been highlighted by Ambassador Marciel and others is the chaos that. Trump puts into the system. And I think, as we all know, cooperation is very important for all of these issues, like for, as Jack pointed out, for the sanctions, like the US does not want to go it alone, which I think is very smart. They want to cooperate with allies. You know, if we're in some kind of bizarre trade war where we're we have huge tariffs on Singapore for something. I mean, nothing to with Burma you know, or what you know. Who knows you know? That's not going to help cooperation in other realms and and so I think that that that's a serious issue. I mean, even humanitarian aid given over the Thai border depends on cooperation from the Thai government. And so I think that's a serious risk with Trump, and I think it's something that we can anticipate. Just to go into a few realms which are related to foreign policy, but haven't been mentioned, temporary protective status, which a lot of Burmese people are currently in the United States on has recently been put under threat by the Trump administration, which is really callous statements about Haitian refugees who are here on the temporary protected status. So I think that's something to worry about. And the refugee resettlement program, I mean, it is kicking back into gear as as we know last year the Trump administration, I think that the number was zero that we took so, you know, all of that, I think you those are relatively predictable changes in a negative way, and I think just the chaos, especially because all the foreign policy goals we've Been talking about do depend on some degree of cooperation. I imagine that being harder under a Trump administration, I think it's very likely to be harder under a Trump administration, whereas Harris, I think you'll, you'll see a lot of continuity.
Host 26:57
All right, thanks for that. And we're now moving into our portion of the discussion where I will be asking some general questions and feel free to respond naturally as conversation and discussion progresses. And the first question I would like to pose to the group is, how do you think the US might respond to a likely sham election in Burma under the military regime? How would that response be different under a Trump or a Harris administration? What factors might influence the direction of their respective policies, and how might their approaches shape the broader international community's reaction to such a sham election?
Scot Marciel 27:35
I would think and hope that under a Harris administration, there would not be that. They would be deeply skeptical, as they should be, of any election that's particularly managed by the by the military, by the junta, because there's no question that it would not be a legitimate or credible election. And I think a Harris team would see that with Trump, it's, it's hard to say. It's really hard to say. I think again, I this is in politic of me. My guess is Donald Trump has no idea that there's a country of Myanmar, and so it all you know, who's going to be in charge of this, and we have no idea. But as Jun pointed out, I mean, the Trump team tends to follow fairly transactional approaches, so it would be all you know, is there some benefit that they see of maybe not supporting, but at least tolerating or accepting election maybe I don't know, really hard to predict.
Jack Myint 28:51
Yeah, so I'm, I'm on the same page with Ambassador Marcia on this one. I think because of a degree of continuity in the Paris administration, any attempt of a of an election of any kind. I at this point, I find it quite skeptical, right, that a nationwide election can be conducted, especially in this security environment, seems pretty unlikely. But even if something were to be constructed to enable that to happen, it will receive skepticism and resistance from mostly Western nations. I think it's also a matter of how the elections are framed and pitched to begin with, right? You You have now the if you look at the meetings between Wang Yi and you know, sec leaders, current and former SBDC leader, you get a sense of the junta proactively seeking China's help and support in their election. Efforts China also seems to, at least from, you know, all the open source data I can gather, seems to look at elections as a possible, potential, credible way out, or, as some are saying, face saving exit for this junta, right? Because they they see okay, as some central institutional degree of authority, this military as an institution, cannot fail beyond repair, right? That? That is something that I think the Chinese leadership think, and so what can be done in a way that gives them some degree of respectable exit, and really, there's no other option. So, so what we need to be really looking at is, if China were, in fact, going to be, quote, unquote, helping the junta with its elections, is not so much the electoral process. I mean, it's laughable, right? China conduct, helping the conduct of elections. I mean, let's, let's be real here by help, what we're really talking about is, Can China sell this or convince this among ASEAN? If they can pitch it and sell it to ASEAN, many of ASEAN members, if I may say, are quite already, already quite fed up and tired with the situation in Myanmar, not to mention the the behavior of the junta leaders, what bringing down what they believe to be ASEAN collective progress, right? Why do we? Why do we keep having to deal with this matter? There's a general sense of exhaustion within ASEAN on this. So if China were to successfully convince several ASEAN states to go along, or if some ASEAN member states within themselves convince themselves to go along with this, I think you know in terms of regional support, pretty quickly, the likes of Korea, Japan, will tag on that bandwagon, and while the West initially resisted, depending right, depending on how it pans out. I mean, does the electoral exit as I said, electoral exit strategy lead to actual reduction or stop the senseless killings of Burmese citizens? Does it stop the aerial bombardment of our people? Does it stop the conscription of our youth against their will, if those real, pragmatic, positive outcomes do become a result, I think that initial resistance, even from the West, will wane, and that is, you know, in the scope of continuity under Harris administration, we're talking About, right? If we were to look at Trump administration again, I think we're a broken record here. The unpredictability factor goes off the roof, right? It's just you don't know, right? And because I believe that personnel is policy, and I don't know who is going to be around Trump in making these decisions, anyone in the previous Trump administration who were who even had a modicum of institutional degree of operational competence are now on CNN and Fox speaking out against the guy. So you know, we don't know who's coming into this policy fray, and so unlike North Korea, I don't think Trump is going to be interested in making a deal with the military leadership. And although I've been hearing from the that on the ground, the military leadership were looking forward to a Trump election because they thought they could make a deal. But Trump sees no value in them. Trump doesn't see them as a credible threat or an ally. I mean, Kim Jong Un has nuclear weapons, sure that that that is, in Trump terms, a real power politic mechanism or reason to justify talking one on one with What does Neil line and his cohort of military men have to offer that, you know, Spike Trump's interest? Literally nothing, right? So I think the likelihood of them getting that is slim to none. That said, depending on how far and long Trump pushes his or looks at Myanmar in the frame of his overall China policy. We'll have to see. We'll have to see how far China put. The conflict with China gets pushed, and then how Myanmar gets used. But outside of that frame, I don't see any. Independent interaction.
Yun Sen 35:04
I appreciate what Jack just shared about about China and the election I was I was just in Yunnan last months, trying to understand where they are. So I think here's a challenge. It's not just the election, it's also what happens after the election, right? We know that the election will be manipulated. We know that the military supported the political party most likely will prevail. But it still does not answer the question, Who will be the president? And across the board, you hear the speculation, at least among among Chinese observers, that, well, Mia lie has this? Has this obsession, that he has this obsession, a presidential dream, that he will aim to become the top leader of the country, and if that is indeed, well, let's look at just, just esthetically. Let's, let's say there is a manipulative election, and the election in the end, well, let's say that by some chance, produced a government like the one in in 2011 and it was not led by senior general Dan Shea. Instead, it was led by by General Vincent, who took off his uniform and became a civilian politician. So I think if that is the case, meaning there's someone else, whether that someone else will be reformed oriented, but someone else from within the military that will be leading the country. I think that will be one scenario. But if indeed, like what the speculations have, have have said that Mia lying, has this obsession about being President, in the end, he maneuvered his way to become the top leader of the country. So I think that result is not only going to be difficult for the West to accept. I think the Chinese are also going to have a very difficult time explaining why this is anything new, that why this new government is different from the previous SAC and for ASEAN, I think mainland ASEAN countries are very like unlikely to post a strong opposition of the result of the election. They might wrong, they might shrug, they might they might express their disapproval, but I don't expect them to come out and say that directly or publicly. And that's very, very ASEAN, especially very mainland ASEAN. So I don't think that ASEAN, especially mainland Southeast Asia, will require a lot of persuasion from China to adopt that position. But again, I think it very much depends on what the election will render, not just the result of the election, but also what the new government will look like and who will be, who will be leading it. Then, since the question is also about how the US administration will, will will respond to that potential election, let's recall Ambassador you were you were in Myanmar during the first Trump administration pretty much overlapped the whole, whole duration. I remember that we call the Trump's policy towards Myanmar a benign neglect, but this was Aung San Suu Kyi. This was NLD government. So it was a completely different era. But I think there was a secret happiness in among some of us, Myanmar observers that Myanmar was not a priority for Trump, and he did not spend too much time or resources, to quote, mess up the country. I don't know if we are going to continue to see that. If there's going to be a second Trump administration, I agree with Jack and Scott. I think the chances that Trump does not see enough pay off, that Myanmar is simply not that consequential. Is not a nuclear proliferator, is not a well, there's human rights issues, but a lot of other countries do do too, and Myanmar, I doubt that it will be significant enough piece of leverage to make a deal with China either. First, you will have to convince the Burmese military to align with with United States, which is a very big task. And secondly, even if you're able to convince the Burmese military to align with the United States, China still has significant, if not critical, influence over the ethnic groups in the north, right? Which means that the Myanmar military's position by default is vulnerable, is going to be operating from a position of weakness, not strengths. So based on these factors, I feel that even if Trump wants to somehow treat Myanmar as a strategic leverage vis a vis China, the chances that is not going to be the ideal target to to to to process. Thank you.
Host 39:44
Great. So let's move to our next question for the panelists, and I would like to ask, Given Russia's expanding influence in Myanmar, particularly in military and economic cooperation, how might a Trump or Harris administration respond differently? To increased Russian support and influence to the military regime, and considering, in particular, Trump's past connections with Russia as we all know, how do you think that might influence us engagement in Myanmar and on the other hand, how might a Harris administration address Russia's growing involvement in the region, and what implications could this have for greater us strategy in Southeast Asia?
Michael Haack 40:26
You know, this is something that people I was around over the past three years would mention a lot on the hill. I never saw it get a ton of traction, and I never saw much evidence that that state or NSC, or any of the other bodies that I try and meet with as regularly as possible. We're making decisions based on that, you know, relationship. My feeling is that it's it's generally much like the idea of using Burma to counter China. Using Burma to counter Russia is also seen as just too unpredictable, and so I wouldn't imagine, like a really big picture shift around that particular issue, whatever small things they do to counter Russia in the region. That's that's not something I'm particularly aware of. I mean, I'm sure it's being done, but I don't, I don't understand those what, what exactly is happening in that way.
Yun Sen 41:27
I'd love to hear what, what Ambassador has to say about this topic. But observing the interaction between China and Myanmar and Russia in Myanmar, which has been a big talking point that people would question that while Russia is developing more influence in Myanmar, what does it mean for China? Is this going to be an issue of of diverging interest? Is, is? Is Russia upstaging China? I think the interpretation of that, what we have seen in from Russia, the pattern with modus operandi since the beginning of the war in Ukraine is that Russia has been trying to develop alternative sources of leverage, and that plays a big part into Russia's engagement with my online Russia's, for example, supply of fuel and food to Taliban in the winter of 2022 when nobody else was willing. And also explains the extra promotion between Russia and DPRK. So we're seeing this, this repeated effort from Russia to engage the pariahs. Basically, I think there is a big element in Russia's calculus that while these pariahs are what really gas the West. So potentially, Russia's influence over these countries could potentially turn into Russia's leverage in dealing with with Western countries. But unfortunately, what we have seen is that none of the three countries is really on the US radar. On North Korea, we have strategic patience. 2.0 on Afghan Taliban, we basically want to sweep it under the floor, under the carpet, and never talk about it. And same thing on Myanmar, I don't see a lot of active initiative, even from the Biden administration, in terms of how to how to change things, mobilizing internal and external resources to to influence the country. So I think Russia's primary goal is to develop policy leverages on these issues vis a vis the West. I don't think it has been successful so far. I don't think it will be successful down the road, unless there's a significant interest somehow from the next administration on Myanmar, on North Korea. Otherwise, there's no leverage to begin with. Thank you.
Scot Marciel 43:51
Yeah, I agree. I think you know, looking at how the US government actually operates, there'll be some the Russia Ukraine people are focused on Russia Ukraine. They might, if they're to the extent they're focused on third countries. It's Iran or China. Myanmar is, you know, number 28 on the list, if, if, if that. And then for the people working on Myanmar, on Asia, if I were there still, I would try to use the fact of what Russia is doing to try to generate a little bit more interest at higher levels in the government. And probably that's being done. And, you know, and here's one more reason why we should pay more attention to Myanmar, um, but that that's about it, I think. And it doesn't sound like it's become, it's really gained much traction. As Mike said,
Jack Myint 44:45
Yeah, I Yes, I'm in the same boat here in terms of thinking. I think there is that angle has been played, and Mike can offer more insight into that, but that angle has been played, but it received. No traction, right? Because at the at the core of it, folks realize that the Russia Myanmar relationship, in the broader strategic sense, is really just a paper tiger at best. If you think about it, you know the SAC junta's current relationship with Russia will exist as long as the SEC has the money to keep putting into Russia's coffers in purchase of weapons and others, many of which overpriced, if I may add. But that that's besides the point, right? As soon as that that burns out, or that is no longer a case, that you know, it won't have strategic long term or even relationship based continuity on that front, whereas China, with China, that's not the case, right with China, you know, if you if you want to look at it from a more security landscape, we have a proactive modernization of Japan's military offensive capabilities. Allies, partners, South Korea. You look at Philippines, we're throwing in more money and resources into Philippines military modernization. So if you look at every angle, and us, Ally, partner in the region. From a security perspective, China will see Myanmar as its one point where, if they would like, or if they in the potential face of a blockade. I don't know what Yuan would think about it. The Myanmar as the one point of entry with its job, you seaport to be able to access the resources that it brings in from, say, Africa with a point I'll stop over in Sri Lanka, through Chao Phu into Mainland China. That's the only port point of entry that that they can when we call it, what is it? We call it the Malacca dilemma, right? So there is a profound, broad strategic interest and geographic interest, historical affiliation with the China, with Russia, that there is no angle, right? So it's all it's all spoken mirrors as far as I'm concerned.
Host 47:25
Thank you. And the last question I'd like to offer for the roundtable discussion in this panel is, what do you think could happen if the Burmese military is soundly defeated on the battlefield by the resistance? How might a Trump or Harris administration respond to such a scenario, and what challenges or opportunities do you think could arise for US policy in the region?
Scot Marciel 47:48
I think a defeat, whether it's on the battlefield or, you know, a political defeat of the military, and presumably some transition government, at least, for the US would would create an opportunity for a leadership role, not in terms of shaping the future of Myanmar, but in terms of trying to organize a major international effort on humanitarian relief, helping to rebuild the economy. Those sorts of things that's much more likely to happen, in my opinion, under a Harris administration, just because it's kind of normal what the US would do then under a Trump administration, where, again, it's going to be that, well, what's in it for us? Kind of situation, again, with the with the huge caveat that it'll depend so much on who a Trump administration would have, a secretary of state, national security advisor, those sorts of things, if you get some reasonably competent, rational person, maybe, but I think much more likely with with Harris. I don't think it's a problem for stability in Southeast Asia. I mean short term, yes, there'll be probably more displaced people and these sorts of things. But my argument would be the current situation, brought about by the coup and the military disaster is actually much more disruptive of Southeast Asia than a transition.
Michael Haack 49:17
Yeah, those are great points. I'll just weigh in with some more ideas and then keep going. I think it really depends on what form this transition takes. I mean, if you have, I think what we all want and what would be ideal like the military stepping down, or at least stepping back and allowing for the sort of institutions of at least central Myanmar to be democratically elected, and then some kind of agreement that brings all the different, at least many of the different ethnic armed organizations like into that, that government in a way that's democratic. And I think the US like a. As Ambassador Marcio said, like, we've played a role in those sort of transitions in a lot of places, and I think that we would, can we would do that, or well equipped to do that, and not not only US government, but a lot of foundations that are located here in the United States. I mean, I if you have a situation where you have like little sort of cantons or little small statelets, and they're the level of cooperation is low, the conflict between them is high. The tension remains for a long time. I mean, and you don't have to look far to see something like that. Like northeast India has been like that for 70 years, you know. And recently, the conflict has increased there. And, you know, literally the same governance institutions that they came out of under the British Raj. And I think, I mean, I obviously am supportive of transition and whatever form it looks like, but it does worry me, and I've said it publicly a lot of places like the degree to which, when I've met with lots of different groups, the concern often is in the future of Burma, but the future of their ethnic Group and the ability of their ethnic group to govern what they consider to be their ancestral territories, which, like all sort of nationalist movements like, the problem with that is like, you know, ancestral territories overlap, right? And that people don't easily divide into neat, little ethnically based territories, and the history of doing that is quite terrifying, like in South Asia, like, you know, in India. Just look at India across the across the border. So you know that my fear, I guess, is that that that sort of outcome prevails, and then I think that makes this the question of, how does the US interact with that polity? Really sticky. Um, I think if you have a cleaner transition where there's more cooperation, then it's much easier for the US to know what to do in that situation. So, and I think the US can a little bit, you know, we're already having a lot of advising on local governance and helping in that direction. And there's small roles we can play, but, but a lot of that, I think, as Eun said, is is out of the United States hands and so, yeah. So I think that there's just that sort of wait and see, unfortunately. I mean, yeah,
Jack Myint 52:48
yeah, I, I would, I would question the premise of your question. That's that would be my response, in that, you know, what, what? What does an outright defeat of the military even mean? Right? We talking about, you know, a complete annihilation of, what, 250,000 300,000 strong troops, or are we talking about, what does that mean, even right? And the second, when you say, defeated by the resistance forces. Which resistance forces? I mean, it's not like there's one neat little banner under which all resistance forces fall under. Is it the Northern Alliance? Is it the UW sa with its multiple faceted interests, and not to mention hand in the world's biggest methamphetamine and now heroin production capability. Is the US going to be partnering with them in seek of proper local governance, right? Or is it the MND or the AA with its extreme ethno nationalist tendencies, and all of whom, by the way, while we are affiliated with this drug trade. So, you know, in a quote, unquote post military future, which, again, I find hard to imagine, not saying it's impossible, I find hard to imagine, are these are new partners in waiting. Like, what's the, what's the play of premise here, right? So I think it's, you know, it's very complicated. I think it will create more problems to disagree on, more entities and individuals to pick apart because they, you know now under the common one common enemy, it's, it's tempting to look at every military loss as a pro democracy, pro resistance win, but is it really? Right? If we, if we go and really dissect, are they pro democratic? What is the what, you know, I'm looking at after mmdaa takes over certain territories, how do they treat the Bama Myanmar as a Bama Myanmar, right, in those territories who have lived there for centuries and generations? Right? A systematic moving out of Myanmar citizens, or targeting of those who hold certain national cards or identification, right? This is, this is consistent in many of these areas that that have fallen to as you, as some may have put it, resistance control now. So you know, we're just barely scratching the surface here. I don't think there is any clear answer or simplified answer to a quote unquote military defeat or, quote unquote a resistance win, period, or none. And there is nobody who can say with any degree of certainty what that looks or will look like.
Yun Sen 56:08
Well, the Myanmar problem, as everyone on this panel understands very well, it's so complicated it defies any singular solution, right? Is problems overlapping with problems. Problems intersect with problems, and they're intricate. They're interconnected. Intertwined is ethnic grievances, is historical grievances, is emotional factors, territorial. So I don't think there's a simple solution as saying there will military defeat of the of the Burmese military, which has not really happened since the funding of this country. So I think a lot of people, well, I would have a difficult time imagining what that looks like. But I think a more interesting question is, well, since we're talking about US election, how US assistance to the resistance could potentially change, regardless of whether they can defeat the military. Some will say that while if US is Yin is fully supporting the resistance, and we're seeing the end of the tunnel, I would question that that hypothesis. But I think it is fair to say that US position, or US willingness to provide assistance resistant to the resistance is, is a critical factor for the continuation or for the future of the movement, right? And then maybe a more viable and relevant question is, how is that going to change? And the Trump administration or Harris administration? I think Mike knows the best answer to this, to this question, I suspect he's going to say that, given the consistent congressional reports that we have seen, there's a bottom line as for what the US government will have to have to deliver, right? Mike,
Michael Haack 57:51
oh, I wish there was a bottom line. Uh, there at least is, uh, intense, uh, encouragement from the Congress to spend a certain amount the and you know, we have consistently spent a lot more than is appropriated. So I, I think that you know that that That effort has been worth it, unfortunately, the way that USAID records the spending in Burma, it used to be grouped with Bangladesh until this fiscal year, and now they're separating them. And I, I can't figure out, for the life of me, like how, how this recording is happening, and why it's different than last year, but, you know, give me a couple hours and like a coffee as a scholarship. And maybe I can, I can, I can sort that out a little bit, but, but, no, there's no bottom but, but, but there is. There's strong encouragement from the Congress to spend more, which I think is a good thing.
Yun Sen 58:51
So do you think that if there's a there's a Trump administration, Trump says, well, there's very little return for this investment. I don't get anything out of it, so we might as well just, just mitigate our contribution. Do you see that happening? Or is too small a piece for the for the for the whole portfolio anyway, so it's not going to be touched
Michael Haack 59:13
totally like he could, but you'd have to notice,
Jack Myint 59:15
yeah, I think generally foreign aid, it will take a cut of some kind under under Trump, and just drawing from some of his comments, you know, around Ukraine, right? Blatant, blatant criticism and even Margaret towards some of the supporters of and engagements during President zelenskyy visit foreshadow a scenario where the US is going to be taking a less of a leadership role, especially when it comes to putting its money where it's. About this, so to speak, on the global stage,
Scot Marciel 1:00:06
I would just add two quick thoughts if I could. One, the election is an opportunity for the nug and the ethnic armed groups to come and present their case. I mean, you know, who's really good at this in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Vietnam, that not quite democracy. They're really good at knowing how to engage early and heavily. And so this is an opportunity for the resistance. I whether it's a Trump administration or Harris administration to come in senior leadership from ideally, from not just the nug, but from some of the ethnic armed groups coming to Washington, making a strong pitch, both on the hill and to the new administration. And second, in terms of the aid numbers, in my experience, I want to be careful how I say this. It may it has, to a certain extent, mattered less, and may, in the future, matter less who's in the White House, and more whether certain key staffers on the Hill are still in the same positions. Because it's not the level of money that gets debated at a Mac a super high level. And so there's some people who care about Myanmar who have been critical. And so that may be as important as
Jack Myint 1:01:36
anything else. Do you foresee, Mr. Ambassador, the nature of the aid changing in a another administration. So you know, from I mean, is it, do you think it's more likely to stay non lethal and more focused towards capacity building initiatives, or do you think it will go a little further in on some of the other requirements of the energy and its ethnic armed group allies.
Scot Marciel 1:02:09
It's hard to say I don't see this rising to the level where there's, you know, sort of a deputies interagency meeting to go over this. I just don't expect that to happen. So I think it will be more within the USAID family, with some people that stayed in NSC at mid level weighing in, and a lot of it will be here's what we're learning because right, they're learning as this process has happened over the last few years, and they're adjusting their aid based on what they're seeing and realizing that, you know, support for local governance may actually be more useful and helpful than something that sounds more like a big headline. So I think I would expect it probably will depend a lot more. At the highest level would be sort of the USAID Administrator, maybe not even that high, but just based on sort of feedback about what's working, what's not, what's helpful, what's not, barring some dramatic change in the overall environment. I wouldn't expect it to get up to a political level where this is seen as sort of, you know, 1980s backing the freedom fighters under Ronald Reagan. I'd be very surprised.
Jack Myint 1:03:21
Wishful thinking on my part, sorry.
Host 1:03:31
So I'd like to thank you all for taking this time to talk about and share your very informed perspectives and background on this important topic. It's been a very fruitful conversation, and I would like to invite each of you to share one final thought with our audience that they can walk away with.
Scot Marciel 1:03:50
Thanks. It's been a good discussion. I've learned a lot. I would, I would just close with, I think two thoughts. One, just to reiterate, whether it's a Trump administration or Harris administration, I would emphasize the importance of one or more champions on Myanmar, somebody who's Senior enough, influential enough to sort of push the issue onto the agenda, or higher on the agenda than it's been. And again, these things are very unpredictable. And the second point going, I just want to go back to the election. We talked about how the US might react to an election, how China might react, whether China could convince the aseans and I agree with everything that was said on that, I would just note, though, that key if there's an election, to me, will be how people in Myanmar react. Because if China and Japan and some ASEAN countries decide that the elections are okay, if it doesn't change the calculus of people in Myanmar, particularly in the. Distance, then I'm not sure it changes all that much. It sure it might be a little bit of a boost of legitimacy to a new Myanmar government, but if the people of Myanmar see it as not credible at all, in other words, they keep fighting, then that's really what's much more important than how foreign governments react.
Yun Sen 1:05:20
I fully agree with with what Ambassador just said. But on the Myanmar issue itself, one thing that I want to emphasize is is the importance of awareness. Right since the beginning of the cool what we have seen is this deterioration of attention, of resources. It's like the importance of Myanmar suddenly just dropped 40 degrees, that it from from like the most studied issue in Southeast Asia for about five to 10 years to suddenly an issue that people have lost hope that, oh god, there's another military coup. Myanmar will be in this stalemate for God knows how long. So it's no longer a low hanging fruit. People don't see the hope for immediate change. So therefore people move on. People move on from the issue. And I see this deficiency, or this lack, or this very sudden and very dramatic change of attention and of awareness of resources being devoted to Myanmar, especially in the US policy community, right that Myanmar is no longer the half issue. Is no longer the baby. So everyone has dropped it. Everyone moves on to the next countries that will generate more attention from the government and also more attention from private sector, VNN, for example. So I feel that that's not healthy, and that's not constructive for the cause that people like us we still work on Myanmar, that we still want people to care. We still want people to be aware that there is a military government, and it does deserve your attention. It does deserve the policy attention and the resources from from the policy makers. So I just want to emphasize that, well, we're trying to keep the issue alive. We're trying to keep the issue still alive and being discussed, actively debated, and keeping keeping people informed that this is what's happening, the resistance has not prevailed. So I feel that moving forward, if we anticipate this stalemate or with even with the election and the contested result, I think it is even more important for us to keep the issue alive. Thanks.
Jack Myint 1:07:41
First and foremost, it is that friends of Myanmar in Washington, London, Brussels and beyond, are consistent and committed to the cause. Right? It is because of their fervent advocacy, championing of the issue that the issue has stayed on the map for this long despite political interests or lack thereof. And so I just wanted to take a moment to acknowledge that individuals like Ambassador Marciel, Mike yon, many others in the Washington circuit. I mean, it's I only have joke, but once you've done work on Myanmar, it will always pull you back in. And I think that has proven true and true. And you know, Joah, of course, you are an example of that, right? Once you get involved in the issue, it draws you in, and that consistent and vehement support from our friends and partners keep us on the map. And for that, we're grateful that as long as that base is there, I think that is a solid mechanism and base to upon which to build real political capital and champions at the highest level of governments who can go out there and make a difference. So I wanted to make that, make that first point second point, in the same manner that we cannot let perfection be the enemy of good. We have to adapt and adjust to the needs and demands of the Myanmar people on the ground in how best to determine their futures, as you see from the initial weeks, days, weeks, months of the coup, millions out on the streets protesting. This is the call of an entire nation, the voice of multiple generations of Burmese who are expressing their voices, who are expressing their desire for their own governance, for the freedom, for basic human dignity that. The bottom line, right? We respect that. We stand by that, but at the same time, we cannot let the momentum and the thinking of that time to dictate all our thinking. At every time there are real, real circumstances for basic human survival, including access to food, especially after the recent typhoon Yagi, which not only impacted entire communities, uprooted our people, but also facing a looming major food security crisis. You cannot be ideologically strong on an empty stomach, I'm sorry to say, right? And those basic needs, those immediate interests, need to must be addressed. And when, after three and a half years, the people on the ground seek a solution that is something that we need to respect, and there may be entities, individuals in within every right of their emotion, within our diaspora communities, or in CSOs, in the border and elsewhere, who are insistent of the perfect idea or notion of what they consider success in revolution. And I respect that. I think that's an incredibly important element in the rebuilding of our nation. But like I said, the people on the ground in Myanmar are going to determine their future, not those outside. And the people on the ground will do what, what they need based on their needs for survival, their needs for continuity and the future that they want themselves and their children to live in. And last but not least, when we speak of our people, I just wanted to end on the note of never, ever underestimate the persistence of the Myanmar people, especially our youth. You know, we may be in various countries, in various cities, or in hiding, in in throughout the country, or in other countries, doing things that have nothing to do with the resistance and the cause and whatnot. But when given the chance, if given the chance, our people always come back home. You see with the rush of Myanmar youth leaving their high earning jobs and their promising career trajectories to be part of the rebuilding of their nation in the initial opening of 2011 I still believe in that mentality. I still have faith in the the promise of my generation of Myanmar youth, who will come back, who will come together to build a better Myanmar for all Thank you.
Michael Haack 1:12:54
Cool. Thanks. And I'll just wrap it up. I mean, I think that, as everyone said, the importance of champions, and particularly like within the US government context, like the importance of the Congress and the role that it's played in shaping Myanmar policy. And I would just say, we do have a lot of friends in the Congress, and they have been built over the past three years, three and a half years, and new faces and people on both sides of the aisle. I mean, as somebody who remembers like the old days of advocacy around Myanmar. When it was all it was very much focused on particular ideals and on Sanji and things like that. These days it's focused on, like, very genuine relationships that people have with the now large Myanmar diaspora in the United States that go to their churches, or maybe like Joah, you interact with people who meditate in the use of Burmese form of meditation and other like very I think genuine relationships that can sustain a movement can sustain people. I mean Senator Todd Young, Jeff Merkley in the Senate, you had Gregory Meeks, and now you have the Burma caucus with both Zanga and Betty McCall. And I mean, all these people are new to the scene, and it's in large part due to, like, very small efforts of churches and people in their and their districts and their states like calling. So I guess I'll just end with an appeal that you know, if you do care about us, Myanmar policy, and you do want to see it be robust, you know, call your member of Congress. They will, you will get their attention. They don't get many calls about Burma. They don't get many calls that aren't angry, aren't angry, or somebody trying to sell them, like some kind of thing that benefits their company, right? So, so it really helps, like, you know, and it really, I thought, make a huge difference over the past three years. So, so, yeah, so I'll end on on that pitch, I suppose you.
Host 1:15:01
Many of you know that in addition to running the Insight Myanmar podcast platform, we also formed a nonprofit, Better Burma to respond to the terror that the Burmese military has been inflicting on the country and its people. We encourage listeners to check out our blog to see what work better Burma has been carrying out along with the upcoming projects we hope to support right now, as I'm sure you all know, and today's interview only reinforced that the ongoing need is overwhelming. A donation of any amount goes towards those vulnerable communities who need it most, and it will be so greatly appreciated. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup, we welcome your contribution in any form, currency or transfer method, Your donation will go on to support a wide range of humanitarian and media missions, aiding those local communities who need it. Most. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement, CDM, families of deceased victims, internally displaced person, IDP, camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, refugee camps, monasteries and nunneries, education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies, covid relief and more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution to a specific activity or project you would like to support, perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian work is carried out by our nonprofit mission Better Burma. Any donation you give on our Insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fund. Alternatively, you can also visit the Better Burma website, betterburma.org, and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause, and both websites accept credit card. You can also give via PayPal, by going to paypal.me/betterburma. Additionally, we can take donations through Patreon, Venmo, GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search Better Burma on each platform, and you'll find our account. You can also visit either website for specific links to these respective accounts, or email us at info@betterburma.org. That's Better Burma one word spelled B, E T, T, E R, B, u r, M, A.org. If you would like to give it another way, please contact us. We also invite you to check out our range of handicrafts that are sourced from vulnerable artisan communities across Myanmar, available at alokacrafts.com any purchase will not only support these artisan communities, but also our nonprofit's wider mission that's Aloka crafts spelled, A, L, O, K, A, C, R, A, F, T, S, one word, alokacrafts.com thank You so much for your kind consideration and support.