Transcript: Call It A Revolution (Emergency Edition)
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Host 0:05
Thank you for joining us for the next hour to in this episode of Inside Myanmar podcast. In an age of nearly limitless content, we appreciate that you're choosing to take valuable time out of your day. To learn more about what is happening in Myanmar, it's vital for the story to be heard by people around the world. And that starts right now with you.
For this episode of insight, Myanmar podcast, we are in the office of Anthony Davis interview that we have very much been looking forward to. Anthony, can you introduce our listeners to yourself and your background? Yes,
Anthony Davis 1:34
I mean, first of all, let me say thank you very much for the opportunity to be on this podcast and talk to your listeners. I've been based in Bangkok for many years, since the late 70s. So during that time, I've been looking at insurgencies around the region, primarily in Afghanistan, during much of the 80s and 90s, but also in Myanmar, in Indonesia, in the southern Philippines, and actually not least in southern Thailand. So over the years, I have had a significant amount of what I would call on the ground experience with both insurgent groups, but also with government forces, countering insurgent groups. So looking at insurgency and low level, low intensity conflict from both sides of the ledger, as it were. And for much of that period since the early 90s. I've been writing for the Jains group of defence and security publications, who are based in London, but now have a pretty substantial presence in Bangalore, in India, and who cover defence and security issues globally. What I've been doing for them has been very much based on my experience in festival in Afghanistan for many years. But more recently, in southern Thailand, Southern Philippines and in Myanmar. So that's pretty much my background. And yeah, I been looking at the Myanmar conflict as most of your listeners also have probably been doing. Well, my own experience with Myanmar goes back to time that I spent with the Korean national liberation army in the early 80s. And then, more recently, with the flare up of conflict in kokang, and then in northern Shan state, in the teens, right? So kokang blew up in 2015. And then conflict in northern across northern Shan State, where the tnla followed in 2016 2017. So I was looking at all that spending time up there, I spent some time visiting both the tnla and also the sspp at one high back in 2015. And then, of course, we had the coup in February of 2021. And I haven't been back on the ground since then, which I should make very clear to your readers. Primarily not because I have any disinclination tend to be on the ground, but primarily because the pressure of my work has been on producing analysis, which obviously is very difficult to do if you are on the ground, and as your listeners will be fully aware, being on the ground and Myanmar, there's no point in popping across the border for a couple of days and saying hello. And then coming back, again, to gain any real insights into dynamics that have taken place inside the country. One needs to do what I did in other times in my career, which is to spend significant periods of time on the ground with ideally more than one conflict actor. So I mean, it was a different period. But in the 1980s, I would go into Afghanistan for three or four months at a time, mainly on foot and on horseback and move around the country from different group to group. So by the time I got back, at the end of the fighting season in Afghanistan, which was, once the snows came down in late October, early November, I would have seen a lot across a substantial part of northern Afghanistan or northeastern Afghanistan, wherever it might have been, and then would be able to draw on that and make intelligent analysis of what's happening. Myanmar today is very different, in so far as everything is happening much faster, right? The war in Afghanistan went on for 10 years, what was happening in 1982, didn't change dramatically by 1983, or 1984. It was part of an ongoing insurgency, counterinsurgency continuum. What's been happening in Myanmar over the last three years, as you're very much aware, has been a much more accelerated conflict. And that acceleration is only speeding up right now. So I found it very difficult to, well, not difficult impossible, to basically take off for a month or two months, even if that were possible. Moving around among different groups in Myanmar is not what I experienced with different groups in Afghanistan, and a different period. But even if it were possible, I don't have the leisure, of being able to take two months away from the desk, I'm sitting at now, and come back and try and pull a lot of things together. After that period of time, the pressure on me is to be absorbing information, which is coming out of Afghan out of Myanmar, courtesy of a lot of amazing Burmese journalists from all communities who are risking their lives on a daily basis, and producing really good information. So my job as I see it, at least right now is to be looking at that information, absorbing it thinking about it, and trying to put forward some sort of analysis. So that's where I am today.
Host 8:33
Thank you. Thank you for that introduction. And I think I want to segue by going right into that mass of analysis that you're making sense of as well as the speed with which it's coming from those on the ground that are providing it to us. And to go back to the beginning in the early days. Immediately after the coup. In February 2021. You famously wrote an article entitled Why Myanmar's military will win in the end, yet, as the conflict has stretched on your views have gone through this dramatic transformation in real time as you have absorbed more information with the fast changing conflict. So can you walk us through what led to this primary analysis in this initial article? And then what factors led to you changing your opinion?
Anthony Davis 9:22
Yes, I think there are two important things to make clear with regard to that article. For first because of the pressure of events, the coup and what followed in terms of mass peaceful demonstrations against it, across the country. There was a demand for analysis, right. And yeah, we learn lessons in life as As we get older and have more experience, and what I realized, looking back, were two things. First of all, that I jumped into that analysis within, I think less than three weeks from the coup it was in February, as you just pointed out. So the coup was on the first. So this would have been, I think, mid February. So within two weeks, I jumped into making an analysis, which was, if you like, I had my face further rubbed in the mud by the fact that I didn't choose the title of that piece, right? Yeah, I wrote the piece. Titles are chosen by editors. Yeah, in this case, the editor of age times, editors, in this day and age, are driven by clickbait. So they want as many clicks as they can get on that article. And if they're going to say that the military is going to win, they're going to get a lot of clicks. So I was sort of pulled out there a lot further than I might have been, if it had just been the article. And I, myself had been able to choose a more measured title for it. But that was a luxury I didn't have. So then when it comes to the article itself, this article, as I've just said, was written under pressure to produce right, early on in the game, when what we were looking at, and I can remember this very clearly, there was a lot of expectation that the military, we're going to jump straight into a repeat of 1988. In other words, they were going to go in, essentially guns blazing. And during February, that did not happen. And I was looking along with a lot of other people, I'm looking at a situation where you got massive protests across the country, right. And essentially, the guys on the front line, there were some military, but primarily, they were police. And they were taking a very sort of, I wouldn't say relaxed, but they weren't leaning forward into crowd suppression. Right. They were trying to contain crowds in certain areas, particularly around the suele pagoda area, behind barricades behind barriers, right. But they were very much on the backfoot. And I was looking at this situation. And I was talking to various sources in Yang gone, various military sources of my own. And the conclusion that I arrived that prematurely was, this is really interesting, they're not going to go back to the 1988 model, and of just massive over overreaction, and massive immediate suppression. And what I wrote in the article was that it appears that they may have actually learned something, this isn't the same military as 1988. Clearly, I mean, that that's a fact whatever they've done since it's a different generation, right, at leadership level, and in terms of the guys on the ground, so it is a different military. And what I what I thought in terms of my analysis at that time, was that they are trying to wait this out. What they're going to do is use a lot of modern technology. They're going to be intercepting mobile phones, which everybody was using, which didn't exist in 1988. They're going to be using drones. And they're going to try and slowly two things. One, wait out the kids, right? I mean, how long are you going to sit on the street for a week? Fine, two weeks, getting a little hot? Three or four weeks? Maybe not? So they're going to wait it out. And they're going to decapitated? Right using a whole range of technologies in a much more sophisticated way than what happened in 1988 1990. So eventually, and when You go back and you look at it through the lens of the first two to three weeks of February. That analysis, I don't think was off the wall. It wasn't playing stupid, right? It was ultimately wrong, because finally, they lost patience. And then it was water cannon. And then it was bullets to the head, right? Tried to decapitate the crowds in the way that comes easiest to the tap Madore namely, killing people. And then finally, come mid March, and the end of March. mass killing on the streets, particularly in I'm trying to remember the date, I think it might actually have been the same day as army as Armed Forces, the 27th of March, the massacre in Boggo. Where you had infantry, with RPGs, and machine guns, basically slaughtering young people with whatever they were using. I mean, does spinland dustbin lids? What do you call them? catapults? I mean, you know, basic stuff, right? And they were slaughtered. And then basically, we're into the military doing what the military have learned in other in other times in their history, and what comes easiest to them. So that was basically the background of how I got that story. Wrong, if you like. And as I say, it was a factor of two things being pushed into analysis, probably too early. And also falling victim to a clickbait header.
Host 17:03
Right. So thanks for the background on that article. It's nice to know the behind the scenes as a reader, you just see the fully formed article, or headline, everything you backstory, I think it's very valuable for our listeners to know how this came to be. But then the next part of the question that I'm very intrigued and I think many would be is, I think as you as you started to get more analysis and process that and write more articles, you responded genuinely to the information you were getting in your opinion started to change with us. So can you walk us through how your analysis and opinions started to change? In the months after that article? What were you seeing that led to a new analysis?
Anthony Davis 17:46
Well, what I was seeing was what everybody else was seeing there was nothing different there. What happened from March onwards, late March, I think it started up in Calais up in Saigon, and also in a southern Qin state in mindat. was the beginning of popular a popular uprising. I mean, that's essentially, the story of the last three years is that the Burmese people, finally, whether they're from a Bomar background, or from ethnic minority areas, in different parts of the country, they subconsciously or consciously made a decision that we've had enough. And it is now time to stand up to this regime, which has been suppressing the Burmese people in suppressing their their instincts for democracy since 1962. And arguably even before that, so that essentially, that process that uprising, which then began to spread like wildfire, to use a term which multi tool was used a prairie fire. I mean, once that, once that took off, then basically everything is, is in a whole new isn't a whole new context because you're dealing with what, even then, but increasingly since then, has taken on a revolutionary flavor. This is a flight as the wrong word. It's too trite. This is a profoundly revolutionary metamorphoses of Burmese society at all. All levels, political, most obviously, economic, social, and perhaps most important, generational. This is a revolution driven by young people from their teens through until their mid 30s 40s, and whatever, who have decided that we are not going to put up with what our parents were willing to put up with, for all those decades. And once I'd realized that, and it's always, it's always irritated me that, I believe, not enough. Not enough foreigners, particularly in the regional setting in Southeast Asia. Not enough of the diplomatic community in the region, but also beyond in the broader Western Community, they do not fully understand that this is a revolutionary transformation of Myanmar society. And if they did understand that, they would adopt a much a very different attitude. It's because they believe that it's essentially perhaps driven by Bhama, elites, military, political, whatever, and has essentially spread from that basis. Because they believe that they overlook or dismiss the much more fundamental driver behind this whole conflict, which is a revolution, which, once a revolution has begun, you don't just wrap it up in a series of negotiations between a bunch of old people and put it back in the box, this is, it's gonna, it's going to move forward one way or another, we don't know how it's going to move forward. But there is no way that this is going to be put back in the box and dusted up tidally. And we all move on or go back to the status quo ante and the military survives in some form. And the NLD comes back in some form, whatever, whatever, whatever, that's not going to happen. Basically, the marbles are not loose on the table. And nobody can say exactly how this ends, but it is a revolutionary process. Give
Host 22:44
it that's very interesting, that you're describing that you're seeing this as fitting the definition of a framework of a revolution, which you're then also saying, other analysts and diplomats are not catching that. And so the the analysis and the response they're making this perhaps misinformed or uncorrect, incorrect in, in understanding it, that's, uh,
Anthony Davis 23:07
I think, I think if I'm gonna interrupt you, I think it's less analysts. I think most analysts now if they're serious analyst, right? Certainly, if they're me, so you get it because they're living it right. And even if they're foreign, they get it because they can see what's happening. But I think when you when you're looking at this from the corridors of power, right, if you're in Bangkok, or you're in Singapore, Jakarta or London, Paris, Berlin, wherever, right? There is an instinctive reluctance to accept the fact that this is a revolution, which cannot be contained and resolved by rational negotiations between elite P elite groups, there is a fundamental reluctance to accept that. I think it's essentially subconscious, that these sorts of things can be sorted out, if there is enough goodwill, rationality, etc, etc, which is where the Famous Five point consensus came from in April of 2021, in Jakarta. That's that that mindset, and admittedly, that was early on in the game. So there might have been a more realistic hope, even then, of basically containing this thing and shutting it down. There wasn't that there wasn't that level of awareness, which there certainly is now, that this is a revolutionary process, which cannot be shut down. Right. But even even, you know, given that mindset in among diplom At among politicians in the corridors of power around the world, there is a an unwillingness to accept that. Why do you think that is? Because people like that live in a world of rationality of air conditioned offices of tidiness of they have a mindset, which necessarily depends. I mean, diplomacy is all about bringing people together to avoid precisely what we're seeing. And to that extent, this unwillingness to accept the revolutionary nature of what's happening in Myanmar, it's a fundamental, it's a fundamental problem. I mean, it goes against all their, quote, better instincts, all their training, right? If you're a diplomat, your training is about avoiding this sort of thing. And if you say, Well, ultimately, we are actually looking at a revolution here. And we don't know how it's going to end. I guess you turn to another problem, we'll go home. I mean, you don't have a lot really to offer? Well, there's a lot that can be done in Myanmar within the context of a revolution. But that's another story. But in terms of the big picture, how do we, how do we as the international community as international diplomats? How do we resolve this? How do we put it back in the box? That's pretty much gone.
Host 26:36
So given the stakes that you plot out and your analysis of what this conflict actually is, in revolutionary terms, and what it is not, and perhaps the logical, more rational way that you see diplomats responding to it, what historical precedents, would you would you compare it to what we're seeing now in Myanmar?
Anthony Davis 26:58
That's a good question, because I don't think there are any historical precedents. I mean, there have been no shortage of revolutionary upheavals in this region and beyond. In recent decades, right. Since? Well, the beginning of the last century, at least. But I think one would struggle to find a precedent in terms of a national uprising, a spontaneous national uprising that clearly had been brewing for a long time, right, going back decades, going back to the repression of the 1960s, and the 70s. And the 80s, in particular, right. And this had been brewing. But come the coup. I mean, the coup was the catastrophic mistake on the part of mineral line that set the whole thing in motion. Right. And once it had been set in motion, there was no going back. So in terms of a revolution that developed from a mass spontaneous uprising, I don't I can't see any other precedents. Really. Yeah. I mean, normally, in terms of, you know, in terms of my own, my own educational background, at university, I studied for many years, revolutionary struggles, before I was actually in a position to move around the region and see some of them succeeding, and some of them failing, right. So I have an academic background in the study of particularly communist revolutions, because I spent time in China at the end of the Cultural Revolution, looking at the Communist revolution in China, in particular, the military side of that. So there are precedents, obviously, of revolutionary struggles. But typically, in terms of those revolutionary struggles, whether they were explicitly communist, as in China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines, which never succeeded, right. And in the latter case, or whether they were wars of national liberation, as in Algeria, classically or Mozambique or wherever, Angola, and they were not explicitly communist. What you always had, was a revolutionary party, right? There was a revolution couldn't recall, which basically ignited and organized the revolutionary process, politically and military. So it was that marriage of revolutionary politics that Marxist Leninist or liberation politics, it was the marriage of politics and the military, that in many cases made those revolutions successful. In other words, they succeeded in overthrowing an incumbent regime. So that was, if you like, the strength of a traditional revolution in over the last century, right? That's what you always saw. And Myanmar is a very different situation, obviously, because the revolution emerged from an encode hate, spontaneous popular uprising. And you could argue that the CRP h, and then the end, you g, emerged in April and May of 2021, as the core but the problem is, well, I use the word problem coming at it from the perspective of what's happened in other revolutionary struggles. The problem is the CRP H, the N ug and the NLD. behind both of those, largely behind both of those organizations is anything but a revolutionary party, right? This is a classically Aung San su chi was not a revolutionary, she believed in peaceful politics in the military slowly returning to the barracks and democracy becoming embedded in Myanmar politics. And there were reasons that she must have thought that that could work, that project would work. And the military would essentially see that they were on the losing end of history of your life, and that it made good sense to return to the barracks to reform the military into a professional organization. And Burma, Myanmar would be had been a very different place. But they were that was clearly beyond their capabilities. Beyond their vision, their vision was, as always been exerting total control or largely total control over this society that would protect their economic and social privileges. So yeah, I mean, we have now a revolutionary the spring revolution, it's a revolutionary struggle, which and people need to fundamentally understand that, but the problem is, there is no revolutionary core at the center, which can direct and organize that struggle. So I mean, that is very much an issue when you're looking at as I do military organization, because what we see in the ethnic periphery of Myanmar today is military organizations, be they the a the tnla, the K ay ay, etc, etc, etc. These are the not communist revolutionaries, but they are revolutionary organizations which are capable of organizing politically and militarily. And this is a military struggle. So the latter is as important as the former. What we have in the center of Myanmar in the Braemar areas is a an organization, namely the end you g, which is not a revolutionary Vanguard party, having to learn on the job, how to organize how to basically herd all these PDF cats loose across the center of the country, how to herd them into something resembling an army, which sooner or later, we'll need to confront the military on a on a conventional or semi conventional basis in order to defeat them, and if they are unable to take that organizational process through to its necessary conclusion. Then This this entire project could go badly wrong. So yeah, it's a revolution, but without a single revolutionary call, and that is a fundamental impediment to its success. And
Host 35:19
so is it fair to say that you can't really think of a historical precedent that would in any way be comparable? And what we're seeing now is Myanmar plays out?
Anthony Davis 35:27
No, I can't. But I'm for two reasons. And I think I've alluded to both of them. One is the, the fact that as we're all aware, Myanmar is so complex in terms of its ethnic makeup. So that's one thing, which almost, I mean, that militates against any one revolutionary call, right? And then you have the spontaneous nature of the uprising. And the fact that the CRP H, which morphed into the new G is clearly emerging from a non total non revolutionary background. They're not revolutionaries, right? They want to go they initially, the idea was, well, let's go back to the status quo, right? That's not a revolutionary. So I mean, there is a disjuncture even there between the older generation who are running the N ug, and the and the CRP age and younger people who, without knowing exactly what they're looking for, because they're not, you know, picking up Marx, Lenin and Motzei total, right? They don't know what the revolution is going to be beyond federal and democratic, those are good words. But the younger generation, which is the real impetus behind the revolution, the spring revolution, don't really know where they are going in in specific terms, or they are, it would probably be fair to say they are struggling to muddle through what is necessarily going to be an exceedingly complex process. So if by some divine intervention, the military could collapse tomorrow, and essentially, lay down its weapons returned to the barracks, right, you would still have a hugely complex process of figuring out the way forward, and how does a nation have this complexity, this ethnic complexity and political differences? How do they arrive at a definition of workable federal democracy?
Host 37:50
It also makes me think of your job as an analyst. And if you are trying to understand this fastly moving situation, as you're getting data on the ground as it happens, and there's not a historical precedent to look at, or to fall back on, it must the job of an analyst and this must be really, really complex and trying to figure out which way the wind is gonna blow.
Anthony Davis 38:12
Yes, I mean, I, I've learned my lesson, I don't rush to I don't rush to produce in the same way that I did in February in February of 2021. But I suppose two things I mean, I, my work also involves my work for James involves reporting, right? With an analytical overlay, right, for a global audience who are not, unfortunately, that focused on Myanmar. Right. So to that extent, I'm not called upon to make Luckily, I'm not called upon to make sweeping judgments on a regular basis. But that said, I have over I suppose in in the last two to three years, every few months. As I see a trend emerging, or something that worries me and then I'll let it sort of gestate in my head for a while and then I will try and put together something that anybody can have access to because unfortunately, Jane's content is behind a very high paywall. So basically, if you're writing for Jane's you're writing for people in you know, military, organizations and government in Big corporations and intelligence services this out in the other, right. So it's not popular. And I think that's unfortunate. So if I, if I think I have some something to offer in terms of a broader analysis of where this thing might be going, or what might improve prospects in any specific area, then I will write that for me, typically, Asia Times, which is not behind a paywall. And anybody can click on it. And I now make very sure that I see the title of the article before it goes to print. And I work with a great editor who facilitates all of that. So yeah, I mean, to produce an article like that takes a lot of time, because I'm very careful of getting pretty much each sentence, right? I don't just sort of dash it off and hope for the best. I want it to say exactly what I think, for better or for worse, right, like, it could be wrong. But I don't think given the amount of of thought that I put into it. And given the fact that I don't do it under pressure any more. I think that some of these articles can be quite helpful in at least getting other people if they don't necessarily agree with what I'm saying, then they've got to stop and think why don't I agree with what he's saying? And where's he getting it wrong, and then push back, and then the dialectic moves forward? Right? It's it's its argument counter argument, and then it moves forward to a new level. So that's pretty much what I'm doing now. And, and as I say, I'll only write one of those articles, if I feel there's something which is actually worth saying.
Host 42:13
So I want to go back to what you were saying about the international community largely missing, due to avoidance or wishful thinking or whatever or bad out analysis or whatever be air conditioned rooms, whatever the reason is missing that this is a revolution taking place. And were they to acknowledge where were some diplomat, some country to acknowledge this is actually a revolution, a revolution, by definition taking place that would fundamentally change the way that they would want to respond to it. But that then brings up a new question, how how do you can you respond to a revolutionary movement taking place? How would that shift? How could that shift? Or should that shift the international response if they come around us to acknowledging this is a revolution? Yeah,
Anthony Davis 43:03
I mean, that's an excellent question. And because it's an excellent question, it has no easy answer. If you accept the premise that this is a revolutionary process, and I'm not saying that all diplomats are incapable of making that sort of conceptual leap, I think there are a lot of very smart diplomats who do understand this. Ironically, probably all of them come from countries, which haven't themselves been through a revolutionary process. So I think the Laos, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, that diplomats are the least likely to accept the fact that there is a bottom up popular revolution going on in Myanmar. Right. Whereas probably diplomats from other parts of the world might be more open to that idea. But if you accept the premise that there is a revolution going on, then sort of by definition, well, you either you either stand with revolutionary forces or you stand against them. Or more typically, you stand back from the whole, incoherent, unpredictable mess, right? And you know, because there is no Revolutionary Party in Myanmar, right. You've got ethnic groups, which have a revolutionary background, I'm using the word revolution in the widest sense. thright And you have what's happening in central Myanmar. But there is no clearly one revolutionary party with a revolutionary agenda that it's looking to advise the world about, right. So the end you g does a lot of good work in offices around the world and in moving around the world. Madam Xin ma O is pretty tireless and getting out there and moving around the world. But it's all basically about federal democracy, right? There's nothing wrong with federal democracy, but it's not a she the way she approaches her job is very different from how the the called the liberal axial national, the NFL in the Algerians did it, or the Vietnamese did it in another era, right, where they're getting out there. And they have a specific, and they have countries which in the age of the Cold War was sort of, by definition on side, what we have now is a much more complicated international situation, where you can agree that there's a revolution, you can agree that the military is a brutal, often mindless force for ongoing conflict, and the spread of that conflict, the repercussions of that conflict beyond Myanmar, in terms of refugees, and crime, and etc, etc, you can you can, you can buy all that, but at the end of the day, you're in a very complicated international environment, where this is not the cold war anymore, right? Where you're not on one side or the other. Right. So even those countries, which instinctively support the military, and I'm not thinking of Russia, who, obviously very open in their support for the military. But I'm thinking more of the likes of India, or the ASEAN countries, the more authoritarian ASEAN countries, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, to a degree Thailand, countries like this, even they are, they're not coming out openly, and saying, we're on the side of the military. And we're going to basically stand behind these guys all the way, whatever they do, it's no longer the Cold War. So whether whether you accept the premise of a revolution, or you don't, any countries, reaction to what is happening in Myanmar is going to be constrained significantly by wider international factors in terms of the increasingly fraught, international environment that we now live in, so I'm not going to name specific countries and how they might be constrained. But I mean, there has been a general sort of consensus that ASEAN as given that Myanmar as a member of ASEAN, given the ASEAN as a regional body, that ASEAN should basically be the point organization for the regional grouping best able to deal with this problem in some shape or form. So far, it's failed magnificently. Not through anyone to have conferences and getting together and talking about it. But in terms of actually doing anything, there's been minimal progress. And, well, let's not prejudged what we see on the border, in terms of humanitarian aid in recent days, but I think it would be remarkable if that took off and became something much, much bigger in keeping with the incredible demands of having 2.7 million displaced people across the country, right. So I don't think ASEAN is going to be able to to step up to that degree, but basically, ASEAN has been defined by the international community as the point organization for dealing with this and therefore that allows a lot of other countries, the space not to have to get involved in the nitty gritty of what's happening, because all those other countries are dealing with much, much bigger fish, whether they're in Europe, and they're confronting Ukraine, whether they're in this region, and they're confronting what's happening in the South China Sea, or the East Sea, etc, etc. I mean, everybody is dealing with much bigger fish. So the point is that there is a rationale behind just leaving it to ASEAN, and trying to follow through, as far as one can follow through on the humanitarian side. And, you know, going back to your original question, maybe that's the best that we can expect. Insofar as this is a revolutionary process, it's incredibly messy. It's incredibly complicated. It follows its own dynamics, which are very difficult to predict. So it doesn't make much sense to try and get too tied down into the weeds. But what everybody can agree on, and should be acting on, arguably, at much greater speed than what is happening now. Is the need to push in humanitarian aid one way or another, whether it's whether it's ideally through CROs, ethnic resistance organizations, or ultimately, yeah, there is a dilemma Do you want? Do you want to give the SEC the credit of handing out aid? No, we don't. But if people are going to die, because that isn't happening, then? Well, that's a whole different argument. We can talk about that later, if you want. But the need for humanitarian assistance is great. So that should be the focus, in my humble opinion of the international community's efforts beyond what ASEAN can or cannot do at the diplomatic level. And then on top of that, there are sanctions. A lot of talk about arms embargoes, a lot of talk about jet fuel. Yeah, I mean, there's nothing wrong with pointing to those issues, again, and again and again.
And a guy like Tom Andrews, does sterling work, moving around the globe the whole time, banging on tables, metaphorically speaking, and maybe sometimes actually trying to focus people's attention on the importance of those issues. So that's all to the good weather, it's going to make any difference in terms of the number of jet sorties that the Myanmar Air Force is capable of putting up in any given day or week, given the fact that Russia and to a lesser degree, India, China, and some other big players are prepared to assist it at whatever level, you know, whether the sanctions are going to have any significant impact on the level of conflict is another question. But, you know, I think tragically, as I've suggested recently, I mean, we may to expect that, you know, we're three years into this, and in three years time, hopefully, it'll be over, that will be very optimistic. So having guys like Tom Andrews doing the work that he does, and he's not alone. There are other human rights organizations that also bang on the table. And that's great. They should.
Host 54:23
So looking at the range of possible responses you've addressed mostly, yeah. ACN and other neighbors of Myanmar, and I want to get into possible responses from the Americans and other actors in the West. And this is quite a hot button sensitive topic. But, you know, there was discussion in the early days, would they invoke RTP. There were very naive and optimistic, idealistic hopes of military intervention. But as the conflict has dragged on, there has been discussion not probably not in a serious level, but but at least raised in various articles of should the US and other countries be looking at a greater intervention or providing lethal aid or something along the lines of what we're seeing in Ukraine MANPADS, early defense systems, something that they're not doing now, what is your thought of what the Americans and others in the West could or should be doing? And in light of, again, going back to your definition, that or sorry, not your definition, going back to the analysis that this fits a definition of a revolution, given that context? What could or should Western countries but the US leading the way be doing?
Anthony Davis 55:41
My take on this is actually fairly straightforward. First of all, the United States right now, simply does not have the bandwidth to get involved in another conflict, right. That bandwidth is entirely preoccupied with what's happening in East Asia, the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits, in particular, with what's happening in Gaza, with what's happening in Ukraine, not least, where a disaster is unfolding. And, of course, Gaza is another disaster. So no bandwidth. And at the end of the day, great powers move according to their interests, right. And even a great pass such as the United States, which espouses democracy and the rule of law, etc, etc, will ultimately move according to its interests. And the sad fact of the situation is that the United States has no burning interests in Myanmar. The only possible link interest that I can see that it might have is to complicate life for China, which has very real interests and Myanmar as a neighbor, and as a country, which needs a degree of stability in Myanmar, to push forward. Its legitimate economic aspirations, provided the government of Myanmar is prepared to accommodate that. So yeah, the United States has neither to put it boldly, the bandwidth or the interest to get involved. And you could argue, and there are people who do argue that, you know, a little bit of covert this or covert that would go a very long way, the requirements are not massive. A little aid could make a big difference. And I think that's true. But if a little aid were, I mean, first of all, no programs like this remain covert for long, right. So if there were a covert aid operation that the United States government was prepared to prosecute, first of all, it would have to necessarily win the compliance of the government in Bangkok, which will be extremely difficult. But let's leave that aside. Even assuming that could happen, then. Essentially, that would be setting on fire. And already significant level of Chinese paranoia. The Chinese are already more than a little bit concerned about what the West and that means led by the United States might be able to do or interested to do in Myanmar. And yeah, these are concerns which given history, and we don't, we only have to go back the 1950s to a very well known CIA program back in the KMT and Shan State, running forays into eunan to destabilize China's southwest Those memories don't die fast in Beijing. So there is a historical historical precedent there. And beyond that. Yeah, I mean, China has interests in Myanmar, if you like, best, best? What's the word best represented in terms of the pipelines across the country? Right. Which are, to a degree, very vulnerable. So Chinese paranoia is sort of built into the cake right now. It's very much a part of what's happening. And I think, for the United States to fan that paranoia out of essentially, you know, I think, as I, as I suggested earlier, where that to happen, and I don't believe it will, as things stand today, but where that to happen, I think this will be much more about making life very complicated for China in Myanmar. Right. Rather than standing behind democratic forces in Myanmar, right. I mean, if if the Federal Democratic Revolution in Myanmar has strong legs, those legs are not going to be changed significantly by a small American aid. Unless, you know, we're talking about surface to air missiles are Afghanistan 1986, which then the that's not Koba, that's going to be out in the open within days. And the fact is, China is going to respond to that. And that doesn't help. It complicates life for China, does it improve the prospects for a good outcome for the people of Myanmar? No, it doesn't, it just pours gasoline on a fire. So I think for the various reasons that I've touched on. There's a lot of folks in Washington, DC, who get all this and have no interest. I mean, they can read the op eds in the Washington Post, same as we can, right. And that's not going to change their attitude to what the United States should or could be doing. So yeah, essentially, we've got the Burma aid Act, which is pretty small beer. But even that has found a degree of Chinese paranoia that I've been talking about. There's the office of the new GE, in Washington, as in other other other capitals around the world, that's found the paranoia, the Chinese. So yeah, to follow through on that with night vision goggles, or non lethal military stuff, you're just pushing the envelope to into a place which I don't think helps anybody. And, you know, the success or otherwise of the military struggle in Myanmar now would certainly be changed by surface to air missiles, which would move the conflict into a whole higher level, not good for anybody, right? It's not going to be changed by night vision goggles, right? Or, for that matter, by, I don't know, better encrypted radio communication devices, maybe that could be helpful. But at the at the end of the day, these are not strategic assets. They're not going to change the trajectory of this conflict one way or another. So yeah, I think over the last two, three years, folks in in Washington who are looking at this issue, amid everything else that's going on, so we're not talking to a lot of people, right. They can see the dangers of getting sucked into something, which at the end of the day, doesn't do anybody any good.
Host 1:04:48
Right, okay. Let's go to looking at the conflict on the ground. This is a non conventional conflict that is can be confusing for a lot of people to make sense of and you might hear about battles that are taking place here or there or airstrikes, or this number of outposts that have been taken down or, and but then to, to try to understand you use the word that and Yugi kind of herding cats as in the PDF forces. And then of course, you have the ER O's, and you have the military itself, that's there. So, I wonder if you can, if you can give a kind of explainer overview as challenging as that is for something as messy and non conventional as this, but for some, for those that are listening, that have been trying to make any sense out of what's happening through these smattering of articles where they read about some battle or some skirmish or some outcome, and just trying to understand what does this mean, as opposed to Ukraine that might follow more conventional lines? In Myanmar? It is it is incredibly complicated and messy for the lay reader to try to make sense of what exactly has been going on for three years. So can you try to give an overview, fleshing that out?
Anthony Davis 1:06:04
Yeah, I'll make a few comments, which I think, to anybody who's sort of familiar, to a degree with Burma will not come as any news at all. And then if you like we can. So yeah, I mean, what I suggest is I can, you know, set out for the lay reader something that he or she already understands, which are the main actors on the ground. And then if you like we can get into the weeds a little in terms of how they interact and what they do. So, yeah, I mean, as has been pointed out, in virtually every article written about Myanmar over the last, certainly two and maybe even three years, you have a starting from March of 2021, you have a popular upsurge across primarily across the heartland, the Braemar, ethnic heartland of the country, a popular revolt against military suppression of peaceful demonstrations, which then morphed into this plethora of people's Defense Forces PDFs. So there were and still are some PDFs, which operate in some ethnic parts of the country around the periphery. But basically, for the sake of simplicity, let's think of PDFs and then even less organized local defense forces LDS as essentially a central Bomar phenomenon. And then around the periphery of the country. We have in Raqqa Rakhine in chin in Kachin state, in Shan State in currently state and current state in mon state. We have pre existing so called E A O's ethnic armed organizations, which some of them like the Korean was set up in the late 40s, almost immediately after independence, currently the same to a degree. Some of them like the Cochin came later in the 60s, schauen in more in the 70s, et cetera, et cetera. Two of the most important the Rakhine, and the the American army in Rakhine, and the tnla, in northwestern Shan state, are late comers to the party. And were set up only in 2009, with the assistance of the chin. But basically all of these are in distinction to PDFs. These are well established political and military organizations that control territory, and that over decades have built up military infrastructure military capabilities from different sources. So you have in essence, these two blocks of revolutionary pushback against the SAIC regime. Then you have a situation where the several of the EI owes the ethnic groups decided it was in their interests to support the revolutionary upsurge in Obama heartland and provide assistance in the form of training weapons and monitoring to PDF groups, either that came from the heartland and then went back to the heartland or sprang up even in their own states. So, in Cocina state for example, there are PDFs which operate very much under Cochin PDFs which, which operate under the command and control and alongside the K ay ay, the daddy organization if you like. So, that's basically the sort of the, then then there is a more complex element to this, where the ethnic groups have been using PDFs, which they have helped stand up, they've trained them, they've provided a degree of weaponry for them, they then use those groups to essentially form buffer areas around their own states. So, this is something you can see very clearly with the Chi a operating in us again, region, right, you can see it with the tnla in northwestern Shan State, operating with PDFs, ba Ma, or ethnically mixed PDFs in Mandalay region. So, in this manner, these these ethnic groups essentially set up buffer forces around their territory, which then can very clearly be used to project power and resistance, well organized resistance, this time into the heartland if they so choose. So, that basically is a very crude overview of the relationship between the Bomar PDFs, which the N ug has been struggling to organize, because a lot of these PDFs in the heartland do not have direct support from an ethnic group. So they basically either are winging it and doing it on their own under their own steam learning on the job, or they are looking to the end ug to provide finance, weapons, etc, etc, which places places a big burden, obviously, on the new G, which has limited resources. So yeah, as you said, it is complicated. But pretty much any news story or any rule report on a military incident, it will fit into one of those areas, it'll either be. And we've seen this very much, obviously, over the last dry season, the last five months since 1027, the end of October, we've seen EA OHS ethnic groups conducting semi conventional and conventional operations against the military in their own areas with great success. And then at the same time, we've seen PDFs in the heartland, also conducting operations, but a very different level, essentially, ongoing guerrilla operations, which for the military a big problem. But these are ongoing guerrilla operations which are not going to do what the ethnic groups are capable of doing, namely, overrunning battalion headquarters, capturing towns, etc, etc, simply because PDFs are still essentially in guerilla mode. They're not in semi conventional or fully conventional mode yet. So yeah, it is complicated. It is messy, but things tend to fall within the parameters of what I've just described.
Host 1:14:48
Can you tell us how important 1027 was and really changing the landscape and the flow of this conflict?
Anthony Davis 1:14:54
Yeah, I mean, there's a lot that can be said about 1027 But I'll try and answer your Question very specifically, I mean 1027 If you like we can we can circle back and discuss what actually sort of happened on the ground. Feel free to take it from there if you want to. Well, no, I what I'm what I'm going to do is make a broader point first. I mean, 1027 was an operation by three ethnic armed groups, right? The tongue, the kokang, Chinese and the Rakhine, who sense 2014, at least, have been operating together in northern Shan state. These are groups which know each other very well. They've been operating together for one decade. And in 2019, they came out with this cute term, the Brotherhood, the Brotherhood Alliance, so we can call them the Brotherhood 1027 which began on the 27th of the 10th month, October last year was a extremely well planned, well provisioned, great logistics operation that was coordinated across northern Shan State. And each group had its own particular interests its own particular area of operations. So the cocoa and Chinese, the MNDA were essentially focused on their turf, which was winning back the cocoa area, which they'd lost in 2009. The tnla was focused on more on Northwestern Shan State, rather than the north east of Shan State. And they also made significant advances. The American army the AAA the Rakhine have a contingent in in Shan State, which took part in both of those assisting both of their brothers, but also extended 1027 into a fully fledged offensive campaign in their own home state of Rakhine down on the western seaboard of Myanmar, a totally different area 600 kilometers away. So basically, you had this coordinated, well coordinated operation launched by the Brotherhood. And you know, we kind of you want discuss the ins and outs, but I'm not sure it's particularly useful. Suffice to say that these campaigns in these different areas were all remarkably successful, because they were well coordinated. Initially, there was the element of surprise, they use drones very effectively. And they were extremely well planned. The big takeaway, what, what is the big takeaway of 1027? Essentially, it burst the balloon of military invincibility. The idea that this is a military, which is so central to governance in Burma, is so ubiquitous in terms of its deployments across the country, is so well integrated into society everywhere that their defeat is impossible. 1027 burst that balloon. So if you're sitting in Beijing, or New Delhi, or Bangkok, and you've been counting all this time, on the basic premise that these guys are not going down, they can't go down. They're too big to fail. Whatever happens, they've got to be included. And then you see this invincible army getting rolled over like a bunch of school boys. I mean, this is this is remarkable stuff. really remarkable. So the big takeaway from 1027, and it's only continued. This last month, we're talking on the first of April, but in March, that could chin the Chi a kicked in to do their own 1027 their own campaign across their own state with largely similar results. So suddenly, this is a military which seems to be collapsing on on all ethnic fronts. And if you have I've had that fundamental premise that they're too big to fail, he's better, you better rethink that. They're not necessarily defeated. That would be in my assessment, wildly optimistic. But this is an organization which has taken heavy blows, not just to its manpower and its material capabilities, but most importantly to its morale. And its this has been a big shock to everybody looking at Myanmar, I mean, six months ago, nobody whichever side of the divide, you're on, whether you're insight Myanmar, whether you're outside Myanmar, whether you're pro, pro military, pro revolutionary, nobody could have conceived of this. And I sort of wonder whether the Brotherhood themselves realize that they were going to be as successful as they were. I mean, it's worth noting that in 2019, when they first called themselves, the Brotherhood, they did actually conduct a coordinated campaign in August that year, in northern Shan State, operating all three of them together. At a much lesser level, they weren't looking to take turns, or storm battalion headquarters, but they cut roads, they cut trade, they overran out line posts. They showed themselves what could be done. So in terms of what I just said about did they realize how successful it was going to be given the amount of given that experience in 2019. They knew they could operate together. They trust each other on the ground, which is a big plus. And given the at least, I would argue one year of planning, and then many months of logistical preparation, which went into turn 27. Maybe they did no. And also going one step beyond that. I think and this is particularly it was it's true, all of them. They were prepared to take losses, right, you can read a lot of reports about 1020. Several, you can read how many turns the military lost, how many battalions were overrun, how many men surrendered, how many men were killed, you will read nothing about the losses of the Brotherhood. But I believe simply in terms of looking at the operations that they conducted over the period of time, that at any given place, they were conducting those operations and getting hit by daily airstrikes, etc, etc. All three brothers would have lost hundreds of men. No question. Particularly the Rakhine, particularly in the AAA campaign in Rakhine state where they were attacking, well fortified bases held, not sometimes not just by battalions, but by so called Tactical operation commands to seize. And, you know, I've looked at these in detail on thanks to Google Earth, these are significant places, right? You don't just wander in one morning, right? You need to plan very carefully. And even so even given all that planning and preparation, some of these places took two weeks to overrun, getting hit by airstrikes every day. So the Rakhine Yeah, I would imagine, the American army probably lost at least 800, maybe 1000 men dead in this campaign, which is largely succeeded in recap in taking the north and center of the state, and then now knocking on the doors of Township, the headquarters of the regional military command. So they would argue those lives were not wasted. But this wasn't a walk in the park. As you know, if you read a lot of the media out there, as I said, You'll read all about what the military lost nothing about what the Brotherhood lost, they took losses.
Host 1:24:41
So I guess what I'm wondering is if this really did flip the script and change the narrative of this military in command, suddenly, in your words, running away, like schoolboys, going back to the earlier definition of a revolution that's taking place and, and and the the nature of the unconventional conflict that is also taking shape. One of the things I've been confused about since in the months after 1027 is that, at least as far as I've seen, I haven't I haven't seen or read of other countries changing their policy to look as if the momentum is changing, you're still seeing, or at least correct me if I'm wrong, I'm still seeing that there's there in regionally speaking, there is still a sense of the of the military being the strong man, they've always they've always been, you would think that if the momentum was really shifting, and I know that this it's premature to say that the military is on its last legs, or it's collapsing, that's wildly optimistic, but it was also a vast and bold change and dynamic in your words, as well. So have there been changes in the way that other countries have started to approach or look at the revolutionary efforts and, and groups and wanting to kind of be at the ground level of what could be new leadership in the country? Or have they been slow to the party?
Anthony Davis 1:26:06
Another good question, and I think it's complicated. I mean, essentially, what 1027 did, or let's go beyond 1027, what the ethnic offensives during the past was not yet finished, but the dry season have achieved is puncturing as I said, the balloon of military of tatmadaw, or invincibility, right. That is a very different. So in capitals around the world, to the extent they're focused on Myanmar, which as we have agreed is not a lot of their working day. But to the extent they are looking at this, the seeds of doubt have been well implanted, right? They realize now, if they didn't already realize before, what do they realize they realize that these ethnic groups are major players? Right? They're major players. So you have Derek Shawlette, flying into town, was it three days ago, and meeting the k three C, like a chin, the current E, the Korean, and the chin. Right, those groups. So why? Because America now understands in a way that maybe it was not prepared to make public before that these ethnic groups matter now in a way that they didn't before, or weren't perceived as being that capable before. So whether you're looking at this, essentially, from a western point of view, which broadly wants to see a democratic, federal Myanmar emerge, or whether you're looking at it from the point of view of let's just say, more conservative powers, such as India, China, some ASEAN countries, who are largely happy to go on working with the military, the seeds of doubt, are now there. Right? They can't, they can't deny this has happened. But to translate that, for anybody to translate that into a victory lap, would be would be wildly premature. I mean, nobody, nobody, you know, including somebody like myself, to the extent that I have any, you know, any understanding or any bearing on things in a more broader sense. I'm not saying that this is time for a victory lap at all, my concern is that things are gonna get a lot worse. So, basically, you may well see a dynamic where countries such as I mean, India is a good example, because India, sort of It's a democratic country. Right. And it, it's not Russia, in terms of its all away support for the military. But to expect that may What I'm suggesting is there may be a dynamic where countries like that, who are now aware that the military is in deep trouble, or actually They're more likely to step up their support for the military. So again, two or three days ago, you had the Mr. Kumar, the Indian ambassador to to Myanmar, going home after completing his tour, meeting men online and Napi. Door. And the headlines were all about more support. Right. More More backing economic backing military backing, a delegation from a young men from the Indian Air Forces and Naypyidaw being shown around, I mean, if anything, there is a sense of, now's the time, we got to dig in and help these guys. Right, because their backs are now to the wall. Nobody can deny that. So that is a dynamic. So basically, I think everybody what I said about the balloon of invincibility being burst. That's that's a fact, how people react to it is going to be different. But we're not going to see. We're not going to see any significant sort of changes that your question was sort of implied that we might hope to see. Right? Yes, I see.
Host 1:31:23
Right. So I'm conscious of your time. I have one more question for you. And anything else you'd like to add? after that? I, I come back to what you would said earlier in the conversation where it would not be unreasonable to think that this could go at least three more years. And we've spoken to a number of analysts in the last several months who have suggested that we could be looking at six months or so that's a much more optimistic take on it. But I'd like to have you flesh out your thinking and understanding that so much. There's black swan events that can change things. There's so many unpredictable factors that can go into this. So I'm not holding you to any prediction or timeframe. But you You did float the three years. So there must be some thinking behind that. So the first part of the question is looking at that at at where that three years came from that you think that this will continue to play out in that timeframe. And then the follow up question added on to that is that in the ensuing conflict that could be going on months and years in the future. So far the cities have and the urban centers have been relatively in comparison spared some of the real violence and pillaging and horror that the countryside has seen. And we can get more into why that's so But if, as this as this conflict continues, to what degree do you think we could start to see a change in the urban centers starting to be impacted in a way they've they've not been so far?
Anthony Davis 1:32:57
Okay, let's go back to your first question, which is about why three years. And I must say that my own thinking about this has changed in so far as going back a few months. I towards the end of last year or maybe the beginning of this year. I was of the opinion that if if the military lost Rakhine state that the impact of that defeat after everything that's happened in Shan stage, after the 1027 from October, late October through to early January. If Rakhine State were then to collapse the same way the political repercussions in AP door would be such particularly on Army leadership within the Army leadership and on men on lying as a less than popular I mean, less than popular within the military leader would be such that this second major defeat the loss of an a whole state, not talking nor than, I mean, chan state was northern Shan state. Right. The military still has a significant presence in Tong G and the triangle and katoen the set and the other right. Rakhine, we're talking the whole state. This is massive right now, this hasn't happened yet. Right? Segue is still in regime control under regime control. Chart View is under regime control and is is being fought over probably, as we're speaking now. So it's not as if the A has wrapped it all up. But it's conceivable that, but perhaps with the exception of sit way, the state capitol that could wrap it all up by the rains in May, June, right. My thinking earlier in January was perhaps January, February was that, again, such a defeat would have significant political impact in Myanmar, in sorry in Labrador, and perhaps see a change of leadership at the top of the Army, right? In other words, a group of officers go to MIT online and say, Sir, this really ain't working. You need to take a three month holiday in Moscow. And we'll see if we can sort this out. So basically, change your leadership. What we're seeing now, even without that total loss of Rakhine, but a loss, which is nonetheless looking increasingly likely by the day, I don't think that's going to happen anymore. So basically, I think the military is going to dig in behind me online. Right. There's, there's a raft of reasons for that, which we probably don't have time to get into. But I don't think it's like it's conceivable, but I don't think it's likely that there's going to be a regime change within right, let alone a coup as in implying some degree of violence within that's in my opinion, that's very, very unlikely right now. So basically, we see the military now, having lost in Sham lost in Rakhine losing in Cochin, currently state is largely gone. The Koran are on the warpath as they always are. And just took Putin the other day. Chin State is a few isolated military, Garrison's dotted around which, you know, given a push could go pretty much rapidly. So the military is basically sort of backs to the wall in the heartland. Now, I think any expectation that this is there for because the situation is geo, strategically, so dire, any expectation that this is all going to be wrapped up by the end of the year, and we can be looking at federal democracy for Christmas? I think that's, that's not grounded. In reality, these guys are going to fight. And for the reasons we've already discussed in terms of the disparity between what the ethnic armies have, organizationally and have achieved on the ground, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the lack of strategic unity, in strategic cohesion among PDFs across central Myanmar, because of that disparity, what we're looking at is a continued struggle for the heartland, which I think in a best case scenario, could very, very likely go through until the end of next year, maybe into 2026. And in a worst case scenario, could go beyond that. To no happy conclusion. Right, in so far, by a happy conclusion. I mean, somehow the military steps back realizes that there is no there are losses in the heartland, which force the sort of scenario that I already said I don't think is going to happen right now. Namely men are lying takes a flight to Moscow and general step in essentially to say, Okay, there's no point in going on anymore. We don't need to fight in Naypyidaw or in Yangon gone and therefore, we'll go back to the barracks and and we can have a national ceasefire. So that's not going to happen in the in the coming two to three years. In my opinion, this struggle for the Heartland will, in a best case scenario be a two year affair. And in a worst case scenario, God knows how it ends. So I think that's the first thing. Your second question was about urban areas. And I believe, because essentially it's military common sense. And you can you can look at this in terms of numerous historical precedents. If the amid the struggle for the Heartland will essentially be about the countryside, you know, it's classic Maoism, by definition in terms of what we're looking at. Right? You don't have to be a communist or a Maoist, intellectual to see this. It's about the country countryside surrounding the cities, right. That's how this is going to play out. And as I said, I think this is likely to go on for way more than a year, maybe more than two years. Within that context, within that basic strategic focus of revolutionary forces, PDF forces becoming better organized, better equipped, and more effective in the hinterland. What you will see because as I say, it is basic common sense is you distract and divert your enemy by making life difficult for him in his zone of comfort, namely, major urban areas, right. So as the struggle in rural areas becomes more intense, as I believe it will, what you're going to see from the new G and PDFs under the command and control is very deliberate, targeted attacks inside urban areas to divert and distract, they won't, if they have any sense, they won't be looking to overrun those areas, but diversion and distraction is the name of the game. So the military is essentially focused on what's happening in the hinterland, but is always being confused by what could happen or what just did happen in Yangon, in mine in Mandalay, etc, etc.
Host 1:42:19
And you don't see the ER O's leaving the ground to come to support that battle in the heartland?
Anthony Davis 1:42:26
That's, that's a hugely important question. Because if er O's were to do that, and some of them are, right on the edge of that, and I'm thinking, the tnla, which has a very intimate relationship with the Mandalay PDF, right. And they're on the edge of Mandalay region, if you look at the Korean who have also PDFs under their command and control, now operating in eastern Bargo, around town goo, not that far from Navy door, right? Or you look at what's happened in recent days of the American army moving across the American Yoma into my greater vision, right Maguey region rather. The operation in RP is what I'm talking about. It doesn't necessarily imply the A is going to push into magway region in any in any significant sense. But what you're asking about is very much on the cards, whether those EEO commands will want to pursue that, either separately or in concert, is a hugely important question, because if they were to pursue that, the conflict would probably come to an end a lot quicker than otherwise. However, there are obvious political concerns in pursuing such a strategy. And certainly I find it very difficult to, to conceive of a situation where you would have ethnic force units, ethnic groups actually moving into largely Bomar cities. So I don't think we're going to see the current LA, doing what they did in the 1950s, which is walking into town goo or or Tonga is actually an interesting possibility because then that is one city where they do feel it's in their zone of operations, but I'm making a broader point that the big Heartland cities I doubt if though those ethnic armed organizations would want to get mixed up in that. And and for that matter, I doubt the end ug would want them mixed up in it either. So it makes a lot of sense to call the point there. But in terms of hinterland operations in essentially rural areas, would they? Could they would they come in, in support of PDFs, that they are already in operational relationships with entirely possible, but a decision needs to be made, and don't ask me what that decision will be.
Host 1:45:40
I thank you so much for your time, I have so many more questions that could be asked, I appreciate the ones that were and this is every minute of this has been so valuable. Before we take leave, is there any last statement you would like to leave with our listeners to continue reflecting about or something that we didn't address that you'd like to make sure to get in there? Not
Anthony Davis 1:46:00
in terms of anything sort of specific or detail? I mean, to the extent that listeners are a Burmese whether that Burma or from ethnic communities, I mean, what I would say is I and I know I speak in this regard for a lot of foreign observers of the conflict and Myanmar, I think all of us have been humbled by the amazing resilience and strength of spirit that citizens across Myanmar have displayed over the last three years. It's been without, in my opinion, without precedent. And so many people have lost so much. And that's been really humbling. And I would simply say that this is a struggle, which given the losses to date, and given what's been achieved to date, is worth prosecuting to the end, it's worth pushing on. It's not in the short term gonna get any easier. I fear, it's gonna get tougher, bloodier, harder. But I think the nature of this revolution is underscored for everybody who's looking at it, whether you're Burmese, whether you're inside the country, whether you're foreign, or whether you're Burmese outside the country, it doesn't matter. Everybody realizes that this revolution is about putting an end to a morally bankrupt regime. And this is a regime which needs to be shown the backdoor of history. And I just hope and pray that the courage and resilience that the population the vast majority of the population in Myanmar has displayed over the last three years can be sustained in the years to come.
Host 1:48:38
Many of you know that in addition to running the Insight Myanmar podcast platform, we also formed a nonprofit, better Burma to respond to the terror that the Burmese military has been inflicting on the country and its people. We encourage listeners to check out our blog to see what work better Burma has been carrying out, along with the upcoming projects we hope to support. Right now, as I'm sure you all know, and today's interview only reinforced that the ongoing need is overwhelming. A donation of any amount goes towards those vulnerable communities who need it post. It will be so greatly appreciated. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup. We welcome your contribution in a form currency or transfer method. Your donation will go on to support a wide range of humanitarian and media missions, aiding those local communities you need to post donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, refugee camps, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution to a specific activity or project you would like to support, perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian work is carried out by our nonprofit mission that are Burma. And your donation you give on our insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fun. Alternatively, you can also visit the better Burma website better burma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause in both websites except credit card. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/better Burma. Additionally, we can take donations through Patreon Venmo, GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either website for specific links to these respective accounts or email us at info@betterburma.org. That's betterburma. One word, spelled b e t t e r b u r m a.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. We also invite you to check out our range of handicrafts that are sourced from vulnerable artists and communities across Myanmar. Available at alokacrafts.com. Any purchase will not only support these artists and communities, but also our nonprofits wider mission. That's aloka crafts spelled A L O K A C R A F T S one word alokacrafts.com Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support.