Transcript: The Spring Revolution Will Win (Emergency Edition)
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Host 0:02
Like many of you were closely monitoring the complex crisis now unfolding in the environment, as the destiny of a nation lies in the balance. This episode of insight Myanmar podcast is part of our special release series. Designed to respond quickly to events such as these episodes in this series feature a diverse array of knowledgeable voices offering unique perspectives on the rapidly developing situation. And with a streamline production process, so the interviews can be released as soon as possible. Stay tuned to this platform for continued coverage and analysis.
0:54
Defensive started in Shan state when several armed groups came together under the name The Brotherhood alliance to launch an offensive against government troops that in turn triggered other attacks across the country. Since the 27th of October, different ethnic armed groups have made substantial gains and Shan State Pichon said gang, Qin Rakhine, mon kya, and cayenne states.
Brad 1:33
And welcome back. My guest today is going to be discussing a very recent development in the conflict. Many of you may have heard of operation 1027 It's, it's suddenly taken a lot of media attention. And a lot of people are coming out of the woodwork to give a lot of opinions on this. It is it is a very large and very complicated development. So we're very lucky to have Matthew joining us today. And I want to thank you in particular for for joining us despite the fact that you you have a lung infection I understand this is this is obviously not the easiest thing for you to do, currently. So we really appreciate you taking your time. So I'd like to welcome you and give you the opportunity to introduce yourself and your work for our audience.
Matthew Arnold 2:21
Yeah, thank you for the for the introduction. mean just by background, I've I've mostly been an aid worker and a and an academic. My past experience for a number of years with World Food Program working in refugee camps, and then assorted emergency situations but conflict zones, but also natural disasters. did a PhD at the London School of Economics, Strategic Studies, specifically on on war and post conflict recovery, did a lot of research on militias in different parts of the world. Then wrote a couple books after that on, on post conflict recovery and in South Sudan and how it seceded from Sudan. After that, I worked for the Asia Foundation, largely and in Myanmar. And then after that I was working on economic policy for about a year and then the coup happened. And then ever since the coup I've been doing sort of projects, a lot of which has been analysis on the conflict situation.
Brad 3:48
So that's, there's quite a bit going on there. So let's let's talk about this development Operation 1027. I think most people have heard or at least seen the number 1027. We've probably heard of the Brotherhood Alliance. By there have been a lot of offensives there have been a lot of operations that have been carried out. So can you sort of briefly tell us what, what really is operation? 1027? Who are the Brotherhood alliances? And in brief, why is this different than a lot of the sort of waves and the offensives that we've seen in the past?
Matthew Arnold 4:28
I mean, I think the importance of 1027 is that it's been a it's been an exceptionally well conceived, executed military operation by three of the most competent Helios in the country. When you look at how it was laid out, and then implemented, it was quite remarkable by any standard I think also is really important in terms of how it was messaged, it was very clear from the beginning that The Northern eyes Brotherhood had a very dedicated messaging strategy for the operation and how they wanted to explain what was happening to the, to the, to the Myanmar people. And so I think across all of these levels, Operation 1027 was was remarkable. I think in terms of what it was trying to achieve, it was very clearly focused on taking key crossroad towns, blocking junta access to Northern Shan taking control of the China border. And how it was implemented was remarkably quick, it's obvious that there was a significant effort to pre positioned troops to lay out specific strategies for different locations, and then how they expected things to unfold. I think the overall significance of operation 1027 is also that it a catalyzed and will catalyze the wider resistance within the country. And this is where I think it's important to contextualize 1027 within that wider context, which is one of revolution, which is one of national uprising. And so operation 1027 was possible, because the junta had been under attack by a national uprising for the last 30 or so months. And that over these months through the junta has faced attacks in upwards of 60% of the country's townships every month. And this includes across large parts of the country all the way from chin to cigar and Maguey kitchen all the way down across the southeast. And that fundamentally, it's a it's a misrepresentation to say that there's been a stalemate in Myanmar, there hasn't. There's been a steady escalation of resistance across the country. This is clear by the simple fact that the resistance has been able to take so much of the rural areas across vast parts of the country, and that it's been been able to move to putting pressure on towns. This is an Inuit development in itself, it's been going on for months. My own impression is that, starting by the end of the 2022, dry season, the junta had already lost the ability to collapse the resistance. Since the end of the 2022, dry season, the resistance has had the initiative. And this has been again across large parts of the country. I think the reason why it's a mistake, for many people to have said that this wasn't significant or was a stalemate, or nothing was happened is I mean, factually, it's just incorrect. There's no attempt to nuance, the wider understanding of what's been happening nor give enough emphasis to what's been happening in different locations. I mean, the fact that in Karenni, state, for instance, that they've been that they were already able to take so much of crony state before 1027. The same stands true in Chin State, large parts of northern Maguey, and significant parts of Saigon, especially in the West. But it's also true in places like Qur'an, mon. And then for me, what's been especially significant was the 2023 resistance in the NGO, which put a lot of pressure across both sides of the Bego Yama. And this is particularly important because it needs at the junta, even before 1027 was being increasingly pressed across large parts of the country. So I think the importance of 1027 is that it built off this wider resistance, it was made possible by this wider resistance, but it's also going to catalyze the wider resistance. I think it's a I want to categorize things by saying that 1027 sees a spread of resistance, or resistance attacks in other areas are probing attacks, or opportunistic attacks. This is this is this is misrepresentation of what's happening. So for me, what's important about 1027 is that these Ayios, which previously had said very clearly that they weren't going to engage fully and under resistance against the junta. The best affirmation of what I've just described is the fact that these Aeos at the end of the 2023 rainy season decided to go all in against the junta and surely that was based on an assessment of the wider situation and what they would have been looking at It is, to what extent can the junta reinforce northern Shan to what extent has the junta had to take forces out of northern China to send them elsewhere. And on all these standards, it was pretty obvious that the junta had been greatly weakened, greatly hollowed out, and that this was the right time to launch such an operation. I mean, it gives the example of how the junta had had to take forces out of Northern Shan, around May, June, May, June last year, to send down to karate, I mean, asking a military general to take forces out of Northern Shan is like asking them to cut off an arm. You know, they only do it if they're incredibly desperate. But the fact that they had to do it months ago, just bellies, the fact that they had no choice. And what we've seen overall is that by October 2023, we had a military that was massively over extended, had suffered significant casualties was forced, in large part into a defensive position. Defending urban Garrison's defending the roads connecting them about their only ability to go into rural areas was in force largely to commit atrocities. So this this, this was what was happening in large parts of the country. But the importance of 1027 is that I think ultimately 1027 We'll show it is it is a milestone, because it's shown that, you know, these notions that the resistance can't take towns or larger chunks of territories, is is is not true. And in fact, the resistance can take towns, not just us, but also PDS and ug battalions. Like the other thing that's important about Operation 1027, is it it also pushes back on this notion that there wasn't coordination or cooperation between resistance groups, there's been an over tendency to say that, you know, it's pure chaos. Nothing significant is happening. It's just a lot of little incidents here and there, but they don't add up to anything. I think this is also mistaken. I mean, what 1027 showed is that there was already extensive cooperation between PDS and the tnla that had been going on for multiple months in western Shan. But we know that PDS were involved in Operation 1027. So were other groups that could be POA. We also know that other eh, pos were offering direct support to Operation 1027. We should also see that in those first weeks after 1027 October 27 That other actions were happening outside of Northern Shan that should be seen within the context of that specific operation specifically, ke le ke took some significant outposts on the Pomona dimension a town there was a major push to take TIG iron in Eastern Oregon because it's the northern most it's at the northern most bridge across the Irrawaddy and then we also saw the fall of Collin in Sudan and also the follow conflict and that the taking of those two towns was important because it speaks to the wider logic of what has been happening which is to deny the junta access by taking key crossroad towns in northern Shan this was places like Sydney, which blocked access from Mandalay and Unilin but also places like NomCom, which block access from kitchen. Cullen is important because it's on one of the major roads that goes up the western side of the Irrawaddy from Mandalay city all the way up to mention kompot in western Sudan is important because it's north of the northern most bridge across the Chindwin River and on the border road that goes to Tamu. So in all of this, what we've seen is, is a very effective push to play off the weaknesses of the junta which is that it is massively overextended. It has bled out a lot. It hasn't had the ability to reinforce a lot of small atomized dispersed units. And that it is it is prone to losing towns and wider chunks of territories. I think we should also be clear even before 1027 significant amounts of territory had already been lost. This isn't surprising. It's common in insurgencies rebellions to see large chunks of rural areas happening. The loss of of large chunks of rural areas by the regime. I think this is sometimes forgotten that significant parts of Mandalay a well more northern Maguey and cigar in certain parts of Mandalay, especially the northern townships with a tabby kin Sitagu. And that this is more or less been going on for over a year now, it's been going on for about 15 to 18 months, where the junta has increasingly had less access to rural areas. So I think operation 1027 was was massively important in all of these ways. I think the other thing that's important to think through in terms of Operation 1027, is that one of the biggest challenges for the resistance overall has been the gap and in terms of armaments between resistance groups, and the junta. And one of the kind of more ambiguous stories, but I think it'll become more obvious now is, is the question of, of, it won't be equal, but the resistance will have a much greater access to, to conventional weapons, much more ammo, and also the types of weapons that allow for much more consistent, significant attacks on places like air bases, and military bases. So Operation 1027, basically opens up a huge amount of weaponry to the rest of the resistance, to do the kind of things that need to be done in order to to win the revolution outright, specifically to take more towns take a Seuss and forced the collapse of their hometown.
Brad 17:15
So, right, so there's obviously a lot going on there. And I want to make sure that we're sort of covering all of our bases. So the first thing that I want to focus on is this brotherhood Alliance. So if I'm correct, the Brotherhood alliance is three specific Ayios. From memory, that's the American army, the tnla. And I think the kokang
Matthew Arnold 17:40
is that correct? The MNDA or
Brad 17:44
the MNDA. Now, this is so these guys are interesting to me. So the MNDA, from my understanding, were actually one of the first groups that ever fought the signed the national ceasefire agreement. And until about, if memory serves 2009, when they were pushed back from Coachella, they were actually on good terms with the military, the American Army, for their part, to my knowledge, have not wanted to engage in this conflict at all, to date. With from from an outside perspective, it seems like these are not the most likely Aeos to be the ones leading such as such a powerful surge against the Thermador. Is this something that you as an analyst would have expected to be the people to put their hands up and say, we are going to lead this charge?
Matthew Arnold 18:37
Well, first, I mean, the MNDA. A, then it's when the NCAA, they had been that they had signed a ceasefire with the there had been a ceasefire with the junta up until 2009. And then they had been pushed out and replaced. But I think your point stands that the MNDA, together with the tnla A weren't necessarily the most. They certainly weren't conspicuous supporters of the revolution, nor active supporters of the revolution, at least comparatively to iOS, like the Ka the cane year, the CNF and the camp EP. I think, though, if you look at these three Ayios. They've also been very clear, though, for for several years that they do support the wider aims of the the post coup resistance, which is to get rid of the military once and for all. And I think in different ways, all three of them have provided different types of support to the resistance, but they've all at the same time. They've also they were pretty clear that they didn't want to launch full scale military operations for With an indefinite period of time, as part of that wider revolution, I think what the 1027 messaging has been very clear about is that they do conceive themselves through 1027 As part a, of a national effort to get rid of military dictatorship in the country once and for all. And I think, I think we should believe them when we when they say that I personally find it really not just annoying, but insulting when people so are so adamant about explaining what iOS think, or do that completely contradict the statements of those iOS notions like these IOs are pure proxies of the Chinese and have no agency of their own, or notions that these Ayios like other Aeos don't care about the rest of the country, and they only care about their home areas. I think this is grossly unfair to these Ayios. And to be honest, it just it's it's really shallow analysis that just creates massively oversimplified understandings of what's happened, or what can happen next. I think though, to my previous point, we also have to realize that you know, one of the biggest bellwethers of what's actually happening in the country, is the military perspective of exceptionally competent, seasoned. EAA OHS like these three, and again, not for me, I don't find it that hard to to believe that these three Ayios have been watching the national situation meticulously, since the coup, and that their judgment was that it was worthwhile to go in all in through Operation 1027, precisely because the junta can be defeated. I don't see why these Ayios would have launched such a massive attack. If they thought one, the junta was still incredibly strong, felt no pressure, did it face resistance of significance in other places, had massive reserves that they could immediately deploy. I think these three Ayios made a very deliberate calculated decision that at the end of October 2020 2020 23, that if they launched a major offensive, it would be able to achieve significant gains, and and also help catalyze and strengthen the wider National Resistance so that the junta can be outright defeated. And so for me, I think we also have to look at how, how the operation 1027 unfolded. I mean, I think it was it was interesting that the AAA didn't start operations in Rakhine at the same time as they did in northern SHAN I think they they did that for a very specific reason, which represents the wider situation, namely that there's value to letting the junta bleed in areas and so that you can then build momentum in other areas through conservative pushes. So it was worthwhile to have a good three weeks of operation 1027 where the junta was losing bases, having to use scarce airpower, sending whatever reinforcements they might have, using a lot of their more advanced weaponry to try and change the situation in northern Shan and then they kicked off in Rakhine. And so I think this, you know, this, this is a series of events. I mean, 1027 happened, because the wider situation across the country was conducive to it. I don't see why these three EAS would have done anything if they didn't think the junta was in was in a weakening position. And I think also the the other important thing about Operation 1027 is to see it as a as part of a series of, you know, as part of a wider process that has been ongoing for a long time, which is, again of the junta A progressively being weakened, hollowed out. And then you what you start to see is much more concerted pushes to outright take territory from the junta. I also think we have to contextualize what has happened, that there always really bizarre expectations from the beginning about what was even possible. There was always this this really misguided notion that this was going to turn into a conventional Civil War, if there wasn't a, you know, national leadership of every armed resistance actor that inherently the resistance was fractured. This is this is totally nonsensical. What happened is you had a coup, then you had months of atrocities against peaceful protesters, which then sparked widespread uprising in remote regions, like Maguey, and Skyn. And then you also saw these four e Ayios. Also escalate as well. So, you know, from the end of 2021, we've had fairly coherent resistance between these, the first four years CNF, K, and PP, a Ka KU. And we've had significant armed resistance in the form of PDFs. across large parts of the country, like I said, by my own assessment, it's always been about 60% of the country's townships, it may not always have been in some of those who may not have been outright attacks. But it's certainly been things that should be considered part of resistance, things like sabotage. But my point is that we have to think about Operation 1027 within this wider context, and that what also unfolds after 1027. I mean, for instance, the the Karenni 1111 operation has been significant, but it follows the same logic, the junta is pressed everywhere, it's pressed even further in certain areas. And then that opens up opera, you know, moments where you can push further in your areas. Well, I think it's also important to still really emphasize this point about the the strength of the resistance, it went from a response to atrocities against civilian populations to a national uprising, what I would term a revolution, focused on getting rid of the military and creating an actual federal democracy, a country that is much more inclusive. But in all that all of this process, we've seen a strengthening of the resistance to the point where I mean when we talk about, for instance, the chrony, they have a remarkably cohesive resistance that includes support from an EEO but it also includes an exceptionally strong of coherence between groups like the Candia, F and other, currently PDFs. But that's also true in other areas and chin. And then in Savannah Maguey, there's been a massive oversimplification of what has happened in Sakai. There's been there's been an effort to cherry pick incidents, to over to drop dramatic over drum sensationalized fighting between PDFs, there has been fighting between PDFs. But I mean, find me any country that's been through 30 plus months of war, where you don't have some tension between groups on the ground. The amount of solidarity and cohesion displayed by Myanmar resistance groups has been incredibly remarkable by any comparative standard of what happens in similar types of conflicts. And so, man, there was a report by ACCA the other month that said there's 400 distinct armed actors in Myanmar, this is this is a, this isn't true. There may there may be 400 different units to put to say that they're all distinct, gives the wrong impression that we have 400 Different groups doing whatever they want, whenever they want, with absolutely no coordination. I mean, if you follow the gang very closely, it's it's very hard to find any kind of attack on the military forces that doesn't involve or a wider grouping of PDFs working together? So this whole notion that there's there's been no resistance, that it's that it's basically insignificant because these arguments that it's fractured, and there's no leadership these are these are gross oversimplifications. if not outright, Miss representative is the same what the term still May. And I use I use these justice counterfactuals to make to make a wider argument about what is the what is the narrative of the war, which is that going up from a bottom up uprising bridging between a more majority, that's actively that's fighting in mass across significant parts of major regions, I mean, Skyn, for instance, they have resistance and 25 out of the 37 townships in any given month. But the point about the counterfactual to the stalemate is that throughout this time, the resistance has been able to sustain the level of attacks, but it's also been able to intensify. Its its attacks. So there may have been a roadside bomb and 2021. But compared to what they do in 2023, it's massively different. And then, as I mentioned before, at the same time, the resistance has been able to take significant territory, particularly rural areas. But then also place increasing pressure on towns, the notion that the junta controls towns, it's it's it's not factually correct, the junta does control some towns. But there are also significant numbers of towns where it had only partial control. And that's only escalated over the last 912 months. Now, Operation 1027 is going to escalate that even more. I'd also say we also have to give, we also have to emphasize some of the key factors of the wider resistance. And I think the most important one is that this is a national uprising involving the majority population that is working directly with ethnic minority populations. This has always been a big gap in the past, where the Myanmar population didn't have a significant armed resistance. Now you can go back and talk about the Burmese, the Communist Party of Burma. But certainly in the last 50 years, there hasn't been a large armed resistance by by the Myanmar population. But since the coup, the nature of resistance against the junta has totally changed. This is also one reason I think it's it's empirically correct to call it a revolution because it does represent a society at large, that does want a a, a rupture with the past and a new beginning. That's something that resonates across the country. But I think we have to give credit to just how much political solidarity dialogue, engagement has been going on? Yes, there are tensions, yes, there are challenges, whatever happens next, won't be clinically clean. There's no perfect roadmap to you know, the perfect state of affairs, for whatever happens. So we have to manage our expectations, but again, by any comparative standards. What has happened in Myanmar, is remarkable. I mean, first off, the fact that there was a national resistance at all was remarkable. This is a junta that, for decades has been committing mass violence against civilian populations. This is a junta that committed a genocide against the Rohingya after the coup it was already committing mass atrocities. I mean, the from a strategic perspective, I think, even amongst the hood, they would they would have to look back and say, even if you just look at it from pure military terms, their their blunder was committing so many atrocities across rural parts of Sudan and Maguey because they just lit a massive fire of resistance across across such a massive part of the population. So I think in all of this, we have to manage expectations, particularly from Western countries, there's been unrealistic expectations of what can happen, which is also why there has been this, this kind of fall back into these kind of unfortunate perspectives that the the there was a, there is a stalemate, there was a stalemate, the significance isn't significant, it wasn't capable of doing anything. There's also been a tendency to underlying tendency to talk about, you know, the only possible outcome is getting, getting to the point where the military negotiates. And I mean, just look at Sudan. Why would anybody want to get back to a position where a population that has been brutalized for decades by an exceptionally violent entity? Why do we want to get back to a place where we're telling these, we're asking these people to negotiate with what is in fact, a genocidal entity? I mean, we did that in Sudan. The whole reason there's still mass violence, ethnic cleansing in Sudan, is because there was so much pressure to sign ceasefires, and then negotiate with the very actors that committed the Darfur genocide over 2003. So I think in all of this, we have to take a step back and acknowledge that, since the coup, there has been a revolution, that is fundamentally about getting rid of this military, it's nobody wants another transition. Nobody wants another transition with a military design peace process, that actually has no intention of ever concluding. Because it's, it's designed to be a perpetual process that that gives the military an incredible amount of sway over the country's politics. It's the same thing. Nobody wants to have a constitution. That is that is premised around accommodating a military in the country's political life. So I think we have to respect what is perfectly clear in terms of what people want, which is a different country that is not burdened by a genocidal military.
I also think and some of some of this, we have to be careful about this is why the framing is so important. There's already this perception or this effort to say, what what is possible is possible only because of iOS. Now, I'm the first to say, Eh, O 's are exceptionally important. They're definitive to what can happen or not. And I especially give credit to the four years that have been so such staunch supporters of the revolution since after the coup. But at the same time, it doesn't serve the the wider politics or prospects or future stability, to make really shallow superficial claims that there's good parts of the revolution, there's or there's bad parts of the revolution, or there's insignificant actors, because all this leads to is is a dead end, which is certain groups saying we want everything and you guys don't matter. But I can see this already happening. And it's largely pushed by by analysts. And it's going to be incredibly divisive. The whole point here is that operation 1027 was made possible, because what was happening already was a national effort. What happens after Operation 1027, in terms of defeating the junta will only be possible because it's a national effort. Any prospects for peace, after the junta is defeated, will only be possible if it's a national effort. It's not a mind blowing concept. So I think in all of this, we have to we have to give credit to what's happened and what's been achieved. We do have to acknowledge it, that there are weaknesses, there are challenges. There are historical grievances that are completely legitimate. It's not my argument that everything's going to be milk and honey going forward and certainly that if the junta is defeated outright, that what transpires after that will be easy or straightforward. It won't, and no country has it done. But it serves nobody by creating these incredibly simplistic, toxic narratives about what has happened in the country, and ignoring what is already happened in the country? Before 1027.
Brad 40:06
So I appreciate that. And I think, again, we're looking at quite a lot of dimensions in there. So I want to roll it back to something that that sort of came up a little bit earlier that the level of cooperation. So this is something that, I think, I mean, I definitely am not 100% clear on, I think a lot of our audience will not be clear on this. There's a general understanding that the CEOs that we understand today, you know, there's various ethnic groups have predominantly been engaged in conflict against the military, sometimes it's a hot conflict, sometimes it's a cold conflict. But that's been their primary issue. And then we understand in a slightly more vague sense that each of these ethnic groups, has relationships with other ethnic groups, sometimes positive, sometimes negative. And then there are falling outs and so on. So there's this sort of vague sense that it's, the border regions of the country are divvied up, you've got a whole bunch of EAs that control certain territory, and they will engage in activities to fight other Ayios to gain more territorial gain more sort of economic sources that they can exploit. And they will, on and off engage in conflict with the with the Dumbledore directly. And I don't know whether or not that's an accurate picture. But what you seem to be portraying today is an image where these CEOs that seemingly had reasonably negative relationship with one another, today actually seem to have very strong levels of communication, very high levels of cooperation and coordination, a shared sort of objective in the removal of the domino from from Yemen, especially from the Myanmar political sphere. What, what does this network of communication look like? Are these iOS or the leadership's of these iOS? Are they in regular contact with each other? Are they coordinating and planning operations together? Or is it more just sort of indirect communication and inferring from one another's actions, what they're doing and sort of loosely moving in the same direction, but not really holding hands and cooperating? What what does it look like?
Matthew Arnold 42:21
Well, first, let me say I mean, overall, I really hate this term, EAA OHS. It's a product of the NCAA process. And I think it was deliberate effort to kind of create a a common term to describe what actually is very hard to just lump all together. The variety of EAA owes is massive, I mean, some of the NCAA signatory Ayios, I don't see why we should consider them ethnic armed groups by any standard, they have no significance politically or in terms of military power. In contrast, we also have, again, we have or stuck with the term, but we have a vast influence of in terms of eh, POS, in terms of social relationships, I mean, we can you it's been a social organization, since that, you know, going back to before independence, groups like the KE, ie the key is to have massive interaction with with their populations. And and so I think, first off, we have to be clear, when we're talking about Aeos that we need to try and nuance Who are we talking about? And then how what makes them significant in their own right. And I think overall, there's a need to stop lumping them all together, because we miss out on the political significance of what is happening. I mean, I don't think it's a coincidence that some, you know, these four EAA shows that were part of the revolution since the beginning, that some of them have the most significant interfaces with their populations, especially, for instance, the key and you, which has been provided administration social services for decades. It's also true for the for the kayo. And I think, also, the Ke Ke in me and the CNF have also had social activities. But I think, you know, we need to be clear about about the differences between Ayios. That'd be the first point. The second point is, I mean, as I understand it, and I think this is true, is that there hasn't been outright secessionist insurgent groups for decades. I mean, yes, it does have particular interests. They do have goals. A lot of that goes back back to before independence. And it's about what is the political settlement in Myanmar and that it can't it can't be a Bomar nationalist country that marginalizes ethnic minority systematically that, fundamentally, it requires a political settlement that allows for autonomy and self determination, ie some kind of federal system. So I think overall, again, I would argue that there's there's more commonalities, then, at least in terms of Aeos, that are strongly interfaced with their populations. I mean, personally, I mean, the Shan EO stand out what happened to the sspp and RCSs. What happened to these groups? Why, why? Why, you know, when when atrocities were being committed, even in Shan State, after the coup, they chose to do nothing. And ever since then they've they've said that none of this adds up to anything. And we're just going to mind her own business and focus on what we want to focus on. But they're they're they're outliers. I think what's been clear, at least in terms of significant details, let's talk about is that actually have political weight and military power, not all these marginal NCAA NCAA signatories that were put into a peace process. So that they're so that the, the military could say that we have all these ethnic armed groups participating just to chalk up numbers, in terms of IOs that carry weight and significance. You know, since the coup, there has been a enough critical mass of resistance to make it viable as a National Resistance, we have resistance all the way from chin down to Qur'an, mom, tonometry, all the way up to the chin, and then all the way over to karate as well, plus, we have resistance across major Bomar regions. This is a critical mass of resistance. Now in terms of of Aeos, you in I hate that term. But I think this is where we have to we have to read and appreciate what the CEOs themselves are see. I mean, that's where I fall back on my earlier point about the 1027 messaging. And none of this messaging have they said we only care about our own areas, and we don't believe in the wider revolution. And our only goal is to kick the military out of our own areas. There has been very clear messaging from the Northern Alliance brotherhood throughout operation tent. I mean, they could have their own Facebook, you know, plot account, they have a Twitter account, all of the messaging from them has been perfectly clear that they see themselves as part of a national effort to get rid of the military. Who is the same with with the with the other EEO is, for instance, the Ka and can you CNF camp EP? I mean, how many times do these groups have to say that they're part of a national effort? before we, before we start believing them? Personally, I believe what they say it's none of my business to say, well, actually, they're all lined. And that if they do anything is because of the Chinese. And actually, they really just care about, you know, their own immediate areas. I think part of this also is that there's there's a litmus test about what is the the political goals of Aeos. I mean, again, I'm particularly skeptical of the RCSs and sspp. I also have grave doubts about the NMSP adding up to anything in the future. Because if you didn't stand up during this period of time, I'm not sure what your value add is to the wider country, in terms of of creating a federal democracy, like this was kind of the Do or do not period of time. So my point is that I think with with EAS we need to be specific about what groups were talking about, and that between the northern lions Brotherhood and the four areas that have been part of the of the National Resistance and after the coup, that there is an exceptional amount of consensus and solidarity, that in the shared goal to get rid of the military and create a different kind of country based on federalism and democracy and we can nuanced that I mean, yes, there is there is a lot of there's going to be have to be a huge amount of negotiation to define what what actually federalism means. Also, that also in terms of democracy, and different emphasis will be placed by different actors on different aspects of what those two terms mean. But in all of this, I think that we have to get away from this point of trying to say negatively stereotype Aeos is all having similar beliefs, and fundamentally being these selfish groups that only care about their immediate areas. And that we also have to give due credit to those that because they do have so much to offer, to getting rid of the military, that do step forward and say, We are part of this national uprising, this this revolution, and we're going to see it through to the end, I mean, that in the 1027, messaging, they've been perfectly clear, they want to get rid of the military completely. They're not pushing for negotiations with it, to come to another transition. They want to get rid of the military, they see it as a national effort.
Brad 51:27
So Alright, so let's, let's talk, then logistically, because you, you've mentioned that the the response from the economic responsibility NLA, the the response from the MDA, these are things that you expect to not have happened previously. Because the things were not looking as though it would be a, you know, a short thing. And now the situation has changed. And now, it makes perfect sense for these organizations to, to do what they've done, because they're there. You know, I hope I'm not putting words in your mouth, but they're clearly backing the winning horse. So what has changed like on the ground, what is the reality on the ground, prior to 1027, which, which would have galvanized these years because what we saw was, you know, from last year from 2022, we saw reporting that basically said that the territory that was controlled for whatever value of control, we're going to use, the territory that was controlled by the N ug, which is, let's say, the ability of the AUG to operate openly have offices that would not be arbitrarily bombed, collect taxes, provide some level of administration, possibly education, forcibly healthcare was a very, very small minority of the country predominantly focused in supplying them away. And that the majority of the country was either directly or de facto under the control of, of the military or their allies. So what what was the situation prior to 1027? That would have made these these organizations look and go? Yes, now was the right time for us to get involved?
Matthew Arnold 53:06
First, I don't think that was how I characterize a perspective that nothing was happening. I mean, my point was, that the AAA and other Aeos, the tnla and MNDA would have been looking at the wider military situation. And I don't think they were concluding that nothing was happening. I think what they were concluding is that the military is being hollowed out through massive resistance. And that there's no point and immediately jumping in because the junta has already been actively weakened, actively hollowed out and suffering. Large casualties. So I don't think the my I didn't say that the AAA was, what was the perspective? I mean, I'm not part of the ACA. I don't know what they think. But my perception is that they weren't thinking that the junta is feeling no pressure that the junta can fight on multiple fronts, that this is a stalemate, that ultimately there's going to be negotiations. I think what they were seeing is that the junta was been weakened, that the junta was still weakening. And that if they, again at the end of the 2023, dry season, or rainy season, that this was the time to launch a larger coordinated offensive, precisely because the wider trajectory was one favoring the resistance. Like as of October 26, the trajectory of the of the conflict was favoring the resistance. This is Belli by the simple facts on the ground, despite all of the atrocities despite the airpower Are despite the imbalance of weapons as of September, October 2023, over the course of the rainy season, the resistance was as strong as it had ever been. The junta was not controlled, couldn't, was not pacifying, the resistance. It was not spreading control. I mean, yeah, the junta was not, you know, strengthening enhanced position, it was still losing strength. And so I think this is incredibly important to be clear about that. Operation 1027 happened precisely because the trajectory was favoring the resistance. And that with concerted pushes, you know, it became it became clear that there was a chance, a good chance of outright defeat of the military. And I mean, this is this is even, you know, when you look at, I mean, even people who said it's a stalemate, which is a complete misnomer of what was happening, conceded that the resistance had control of, you know, large parts of the rural areas of Saigon. And so, I think also, we have to be clear about the AAA as well, I mean, it's a perfectly rational, understandable position to to keep Rakhine calm as much as possible. I mean, there are a kind population and suffered immensely for in the years before the coup. So from from a perspective of the ACA, if the military is being actively actively pushed back across large parts of the country, there's a very logical decision to say look, let it keep happening, let the coup to keep leading. And at the same time, we need to let the Rakhine population have have some some calm so that it can recover from the conflict that had been in Rakhine, and in the previous years, there is also an imperative to say we need to let we need to further the AAA administration, justice, policing to consolidate control that had been achieved in the previous years. But let me push back on the notion and that, that the resistance before 1027 was marginal and weak. This is this is completely untrue. I mean, the again, the fact that Skyn you we've had a saturation of armed resistance that has never declined since basically about September October of 2021. And that this resistance has been remarkably stable. This has also been through in northern Maguey. And then over, as I said before, since the end of the 2022 dry season, the resistance and and regions has greatly expanded, for instance, in the townships North Amanda Lee city, and then the township southwest of Mandalay city along the eastern bank of Irrawaddy. We've also seen expansion of resistance into the more central parts of Maguey. And then if you look at other parts of the country, I mean, the junta in Qin has been confined in urban Garrison sense. Sense. Since the earlier parts of 2022, the same in Kearney, the main the junta long ago lost access to the Thai border and Karenni. And this is also true in the southeast where we've seen we saw a massive escalation of resistance across tamo tree and then also in key parts of Qur'an. Where the I mean, there was a can you affiliated report that was released the other day that showed very clearly that in can you areas they've been able to massively expand the school system. And they've taken dozens and dozens of outposts. I mean, basically, they've recaptured a lot of what was lost in the early 90s. And then the other significant thing is that over the course of the first three quarters of 2023, the cane you was able to to massively expand into into the NGO and this is as I mentioned before both sides of the Boo Yong Yo Ma to the point where there have been attacks directly on the Yangon naypyitaw highway. So all of this is not a stalemate or declining resistance. This is an expansion of resistance. We should be clear about that. I don't think it's, I also think it's a misrepresentation to think that it's just random. I mean that what has been happening has been very strategic. I mean, take what what what happened in Karenni. I mean, there has been a very clear push by chrony, to put pressure on these towns and in Macomb Township, like mobula and cocoon to deny the junta access to currently state, it's the same thing and chin, there's been a very deliberate effort, not just in chin, but across northern Maguey. And in the western Sudan to deny the junta access into chin. This is why there hasn't been any major reinforcements that has reached chin since the end of the dry season and 2022. So I think in all of this, we have to accept that this hasn't been a failing resistance. What we've seen is that a military that has used exceptional amounts of violence against civilians, has been unable to squash the resistance. And that there's a simple counterfactual to all of this, which is if the resistance was so weak, why was it why was it collapsed by the junta in the in the point is that the junta couldn't collapse it, they've tried for years, literally years, and they haven't been successful. The only place where we haven't seen significant resistance is an EOD. And it's also true that the level of resistance has gone down again gone. That's very trackable if you keep data on it, but no other part of the country has had resistance gone down, over 2023. And the other thing that I think we also have to be very, very clear about is the extent of collaboration between different actors. I mean, there has been joint operations between Aeos and PDS since May of 2021, ie since the very start of the PDFs, when they're mandated by the N ug on on five May of 2021. A lot of this was pioneered by the KE, because they saw the value both I think politically normatively and, and in terms of military operations, that it was worthwhile to collaborate because they could extend attacks in disguise and support PDFs to spread resistance across again. But the you know, in a lot of these places, it's it's it's very rare to see where he is don't act and direct partnership with PDS. The the exceptions would be in in kind of historic parts of E Aereos. I mean, for instance, wanting more mile Township and kitchen, or pecan Township and Qur'an. But in all these other areas, we've seen extensive collaboration between new new armed actors, and also the older Aeos. So this has been one of the biggest examples of of strength, that there is this collaboration on the ground. And I think there's, there's too often there's this effort to kind of create a perception that yes, there's some PDFs, they all fight together against each other, and they don't have any significance. But I mean, the simple fact is, if all these PDFs were so useless, why would the CEOs keep investing in them? Why would the CEOs do operations with them? Why would now after through 1027, why would Aeos be working with them? I mean, the Mandalay PDF, and ug battalions have been some of the core participants in Operation 1027, specifically with the tnla across western shot. So and all of this, you know, there's, there's been a lot of things that have been happening already. I think the point about how much did the resistance control earlier on this goes back to this goes back to what were that? What were the expectations after the coup? And I mean, there's always as bizarrely naive, though, I think sometimes very deliberate by certain groups to say that there could be no national resistance. It just won't happen. And it was always because of this inherent desire to say that the the only way forward is to have some kind of negotiated process that goes back to some kind of accommodation with the military. I think so. There's been this huge amount of confirmation bias, saying that there will never be a resistance, it'll never be able to work together. And it'll never be able to do things like take towns, etc, etc, etc. And this is all been proven wrong. Like there has been, there has been a National Resistance. I mean, a lot of the people who have said it's been a stalemate, where the people who are also said, the first people say there won't be a National Resistance, it'll just be a couple Ayios. And it'll and then later say it's a stalemate, despite the fact that the number of townships and have had active resistance has been incredibly high by any standard. And then ultimately, that we have a National Resistance that spans the bombardment the Bomar majority with multiple ethnic minority populations as well. So in all of this, it's about expectations. And what was true a year ago was that true, the resistance didn't have control over towns. But what was true a year plus, I would say that for the last 1518 months, is that the resistance has had significant control over large amounts of rural areas, and that the resistance has been able to increasingly deny access by the junta to large parts of the country, for instance, chin, and increasingly over time to cranny as well. But that's also true. And in terms of things like Western northern Saigon, etc. I mean, I give the example people can say, well, the military has always been using boats. Yeah, no da. But I mean, the point here is that over the the rainy season of 2023, the junta brought up maritime patrol boats from the ocean, to use on the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers, to run flotillas of barges, because they couldn't use the roads. So in all of this, we have to look at, we have to, you know, give credit where credit's due. And doing that doesn't mean we're saying everything's going to be perfectly fine. In the future, there won't be challenges. But we have to give Myanmar credit for what has been achieved. I mean, I also say that the revolution, we should be very clear, this isn't just about armed actors. There, you know, what will always make this revolution, particularly significant, whatever happens is the involvement of the nonviolent revolutionaries. And this starts with the protests that were so large, and scale, it includes the CDM, which is an incredibly rare movement, where you see massive parts of the social service, go on permanent strike, because they don't want to work for junta, to the national boycotts of product products, etc, etc. So I think in all of this, you know, we have to give credit where credit is due, rather than creating these really stove piped narrow narratives of what's happened through this, this through through this revolution, and since the coup.
Brad 1:08:24
So, so, okay, so I take the point that you're making about the resistance collectively. But let's, let's focus a little bit then on the military. So you say that the military are using ocean blood vessels, to to run supplies up through the river systems, because they simply cannot use the roads. So let's even just talk about the road infrastructure, what's going on with the roads? Is it that the roads have been actively destroyed? Or is it that the roads are rife with ambushes? What's what is the fear of the military? Or what is the the obstacle of the military specifically with using like the land, road network to move supplies and people?
Matthew Arnold 1:09:12
Well, the issue for the military is fairly straightforward. I mean, it's, it's, I mean, people quote this number 350,000 personnel in any military, there's a significant chunk of that that is in combat forces. Anyway, it's support personnel. But what has happened since the coup is that the junta had to face its worst nightmare and one that it wasn't actively prepared for, which is that it would have to fight across massive regions like Saigon and Maguey, increasingly across Mandalay, but then it would also have to continue fighting multiple major Aeos at the same time. And so the reality is that the junta has been massively spread out over extended so it's basically been reduced Is to lots of smaller units spread out in checkpoints and outposts trying to reassert some kind of control. And we should be very clear also, before I go further on that point is that when we talk about the junta strategy, we need to be very clear. The junta strategy before the coup since the coup, it's always the same, which is to inflict mass civilian casualties. And that's what it's been doing. I mean, by my by my data analysis, upwards of two thirds of what the military instigates in terms of any type of action is violence against civilians. I mean, for instance, since the guy and these un OSHA IDP numbers are where they say they're just, it's caused by conflict. It's, it's a complete misrepresentation. The junta commits atrocities, raids on villages, airstrikes, on villages, to cause terror, and specifically to cross mass displacement. So any of these notions where there's like, some kind of military conflict, and then there's these atrocities happening on the side is utterly, totally nonsensical. This is a military that primarily commits violence against civilians, that's what it does. But the problem for the military is that it did have to deal with this, this nightmare scenario where it had a fight in kitchen, chin, karate, mon, etc. But then it also had a fight across the vast bulk of skyline, and the upper part, the upper third of Maguey, and then increasing parts of Mandalay pretty much every month, I mean, actually, every month. And this has been very hard to do. And the only way they've, their response has been the only thing that's been possible, which is spread out, try and maintain a force presence, including in rural areas, and commit mass atrocities against the population to try and brutalize them and to putting pressure on resistance to stop. Now, the problem for the military is that the civilian population hasn't, hasn't followed this. This hasn't succumb to this pressure, where they've said very clearly, we want to be rid of you of the military once and for all. And that we do support the resistance. I mean, the support for the resistance is massive amongst the population. Anyway, all of this is to say that the problem for the military in places like Saigon is that it's dispersed atomize spread out in small units amongst a population that hates the military. This is these are populations that used to be some of the major recruiting grounds for the military, but turned into hotbeds of resistance for the military. And that over the last 1218 months, the ability of the junta to maintain a presence in rural areas has collapsed, and that the junta has been forced into defending access along the highways, and then filled increasing pressure and towns to the point where they've lost partial control of quite a number of towns even before 1027. And that the challenge for the military and I mean, I find is telling about the junta leadership is that they've had multiple years to do it, but they've never invested in armored troop transport. You know, they all these soldiers trying to get across the GYN are moving in unprotected trucks, they have no armor, and then they're very susceptible to roadside attacks, and ambushes. And there's also there's no The Pew saw T there was this idea that maybe the PISA tea would form kind of a auxilary force that would spread out across the wider rural population, and basically help pacify the population. That never happened precisely because so much of the population wants to be rid of the military, and then anybody associated with them. And so the use of t have never materialized into a strategically significant force capable of compensating for the lack of the junta's ability to recruit new troops, or compensate for the steady, consistent casualties. And so if you look at a place like Saigon, this is where the expectations have been really weird, where, you know, like, if there's not a conventional civil war going on with conventional forces, like nothing's happening, this is totally totally misconception. Like there has been a uprising from the bottom up from communities forming PDFs and then having an increasing aggregation from there as PDS worked together as groupings to launch attacks, the problem for the military is that they haven't they haven't faced outright defeat, and in a particular Township, but what they have faced is I call it bleeding out, where every week they lose, you know, a man to men on a on a on a trip from an ID or a sniper attack or an ambush. Now, if you have all these small dispersed units here, there and everywhere, that actually really adds up after a while, because the junta doesn't have the ability to rotate troops, it doesn't have the ability to reinforce them. And it doesn't have the ability to consistently resupply them. And this is where I go back to the, you know, what we're seeing in chin and cranny. And we've seen it for quite a while, which is the junta been forced to defending the major towns and highways between them has become true also in McGuane cigar and increasingly over the last 12 plus months, where they've just lost, the junta has just lost control of rural areas. Now, the junta can still, they could still do these really barbaric raids using groups like the ogre calm, where they could send in 200 men, and let them you know, you know, turn into a bunch of psychopaths and go through and burn villages and execute civilians. And they tried that. But the problem is, they still didn't have the strategic depth to do it systematically. And the problem from their perspective, it was a barbaric strategy. Potentially, it could have been very effective. But they weren't able to implement it. One reason was also because these columns were getting traded, or they were getting. They were suffering too many casualties. And so that overall, that's very much been an ongoing pattern that has has been unfolding for quite a while now where the junta has just lost access and control over rural areas. I mean, if you look at specific junta, military attacks, or also atrocity attacks on civilians, it's increasingly been concentrated in the peri urban areas of the namesake towns of the townships, or it's been concentrated along highways and specifically along outpost, or the areas around outposts at the key road junctions.
But what we're seeing in this is this is really emerged after 1027. But it mirrors a pattern that we'd already seen in Chen and Karenni. And also down in Korean, and Mon, which was that, as the junta has lost access to rural areas, what it's increasingly resorted to is using artillery and airstrikes to target civilians. I mean, so for instance, Sky and before 1027, had still had significant amounts of ground raids. Though most of these ground raids as I said, we're focused on Peri urban areas, areas along the major highways and the key junctions. And what we're seeing now again, like currently Crenn, chin is that the junta no longer has such ready access to those rural areas, that the only thing they can do is use artillery, to target villages, and also to call in airstrikes. And so this is what we can also expect going forward is that the junta will do what it it's always done, which is target civilians. And it'll probably escalate that dramatically, because that's the only thing they can think of that that that they think that they can do to stymie the momentum that's been built up against them. And this is where I worry about these reports. We saw it in Rakhine, even over the last couple of days it's true in places like Louie CK ah, it's true and and taking on these these places where basically the junta takes large civilian populations hostage, including those of towns including major towns like loikaw, where they say, people can't leave. And that you know, we're going to actively bomb and use artillery strikes to kill large numbers of civilians in order to defend our urban Garrison's and I mean, this goes back to fondling and chin where they said you can take out laying but if you do, we're gonna burn the whole town and they did. The challenge though, for the military is that they now face concerted attacks. In such a large area, that they don't have enough air assets to respond so many different locations at the same time. And then I think that's going to be very difficult for them. My own impression is that, like we saw with those police outposts up in northern Rakhine, that will start seeing tactical withdrawals of the smaller outposts. Because the junta sees that they simply can't keep all these rural outposts plus keep their towns and that they need to consolidate forces while they still can. And that illuminates a wider point. But it's a point that's been true for a while, which is that if the junta doesn't actively defend an area, it will lose that area. That's not a 1027 threshold. 1027 will escalate that massively. But it's an S, it's a situation that's been going on for a while I II, why is the resistance been able to take so much rural areas because the junta can't defend it, and the junta in the resistance takes control of it. And so this is this has been a massive threshold crossed where the junta is now in, in a zero sum game. They either they either give up a place, and consolidate, but they have to start making these stark black white decisions, the key places or they lose places, but one way or another, they're going to lose, they are going to lose territory. And then my own impression is that that's going to escalate dramatically, once this massive influx of weapons reaches other parts of the resistance from the 1027 operation. I mean, the the dynamics change markedly. I mean, the one of the biggest variables holding back the resistance in places like Saigon and chin has been the lack of ammunition. I mean, this is if you've ever been in a war zone, like you're that's one of the things you're most conscious about is how much ammunition you're carrying is. So I think, in all of these places, we have to look at some of the stark issues on the ground from the junta perspective. It's, can we move between garrison and outpost? strong points? If we do, how much are we going to bleed for it. And then there's also going to be an increasing logistics challenge, which is we have all these outposts spread out here, there and everywhere. But we don't have the logistics to supply them. Because we simply can't move easily on these roads unless there we have 200, truck convoys, and even those take two, three years to get anywhere. I mean, the junta tried to send a large convoy from Coco up to chin, it got as far as power to Northern Maguey, but the blood out too much. And then the remnants have now been called back to Makoku. The same was true in in loikaw, which they had been trying to send a column all the way down to the southeast part of Kearney State since about June, July or so. And they never even got there. That's also been called back I suspect to Lloyd Carr, because they realize they're not going to take back se Karenni the best they can do is try and keep boy cop. So I think a lot of a lot of things will happen because 1020 The other important thing about 1027 is it, it starts to change the military balance in terms of weaponry. And that's that's particularly true and the types of, of, of assets tools that are required to take towns, I mean, nobody can take a town, unless they have significant amounts of small, small arms ammunition, you just can't do it. And you certainly can't defend a town if you don't have sufficient ammunition for it. The other thing is also true of the the problem for the junta is that they're going to be increasingly pressed into their garrison guns and their bases. But through 1027, you start to see the types of weapons that make being concentrated in those Garrison's in those spaces highly problematic. This is when the resistance starts to have things like how it serves, or the MO RS rockets. It's like you don't want to be stuck in a confined area when the resistance starts to have much more conventional firepower that also applies to the air bases when the resistance starts to be able to use much longer distance tools like like actual artillery. So a lot of 1027 is is also massively significant, I think across multiple dimensions like I've talked about the political dimension of national uprising of bridging also bits between the bar and ethnic minority populations in terms of national resistance of ours to in the military, but I think it also has a massive ramification for the military for the military situation, because the resistance has had a positive trajectory. But ahead hasn't been overwhelmingly steep, ie, the resistance wasn't on the imminent verge of any kind of total victory. But it did have a positive overall, at least some, it wasn't positive, positive in terms of overall trajectory. But 1027 starts to change that towards a much, much deeper trajectory, because the junta has lost so much in terms of manpower and assets in northern Shan and then that'll escalate everywhere in the country. Because you'll see this not a full equalization in terms of arm immense but a much greater, a much greater equalization favoring the junta as they have much greater access to, to the tools to escalate further and to being able to take full control of towns, but then also to to have the ability to take heavily heavily Garrison heavily fortified Garrison bases.
Brad 1:26:22
And so you mentioned things like how it says, And you mentioned the sort of escalation of, of weaponry that the revolution can get its hands on. At the same time, do you do you concur with what we've heard from other analysts that as far as the Dumbledore is concerned, their own ability to utilize the the weapons that have given them the advantage, I would categorize them as sort of the three A's of artillery armor and aerial assets, that the military is actually less and less able to take advantage of these as they're simply running out of ammunition? Or they're running out of fuel? They're running out of replacement parts? And so what I guess is there a winding down not just an increase in the resistances capacity to push back, but also a positive decrease in in the assets that the military still has available to them?
Matthew Arnold 1:27:16
Oh, absolutely. And that's been going on for a while. I mean, that's been, like I said, my own perception is, is one of the first major kind of milestones in this conflict was the end of the 2022, dry season. This is when the military stopped being able to move kind of at ease large amounts of of armament supplies, out to all these out across this vast part, the vast parts of the country that have escalating resistance, and that I mean, take take the artillery fire. My own impression, because I tracked us every day is that the the size of the artillery barrages has declined steadily over time. And that speaks to the fact that the junta hasn't been able to consistently resupply these Garrison outposts, with ammunition, artillery shells, etc. And I mean, for instance, in places like Qin Amin, it's not uncommon to see an artillery barrage, I put that in quotes. That's, you know, at most two or three rounds, and this is purely harassment fire, it's her as its artillery barrage is meant to cause terror, and prevent IDPs from coming back to places that they had evacuated. But I think it's it's also true, I mean, helicopters are some of the most maintenance, maintenance intensive, intensive military systems out there. And the hunters ability to use these has diminished. I mean, for instance, if there was ever a place where you wanted to use mobile, helicopter boat, helicopter born troops, it's been in this type of conflict, because you would want to move troops to rapidly reinforced places that are under pressure, and then also be able to then extract those forces and redeploy them somewhere else that also has issues. I mean, this has been going on for a while, again, I get the example of chin wear and chin. They've had these isolated Garrison's that have been that have been, they've been unable to reinforce and that they just haven't, they just haven't been able to use the types of tools that they had in the first kind of 1216 months of the conflict after the coup. And that's just going to increase exponentially after 1027 Because they're being forced to use systems that they still have even more intensively. I mean, some of the some of the helicopters that If they do have, can they maintain them at this rate of use? No, I don't think so. Can they even maintain some of these trainer jets that they use for, for basically close air support when outpost is is under attack or a police station is under attack? I doubt it. This is also where the financial issue comes in, where they just don't have the finances to sustain these systems. So I think overall, the point here is that this hasn't been a stalemate in the sense that both in terms of the consistent loss of men either killed or wounded, but also defections, desertions. But then also the loss of the ability to use or the diminishing ability to use the types of weapon systems that they already had. All of this is meant that the the trajectory has been downhill for the junta for a while. But that's just going to that's just going to kick in because there is such a sprawling resistance across so much of the country. And that operation 1027 escalates that. But then it also makes available a huge amount of ammunition and other systems that were taken from the junta. I mean, if I if I were a junta planner and a Naypyidaw I mean, I would be incredibly worried about all these trophy shots that are coming from Aeos and PDS are often together. I mean, the tnla. And the Mandalay PDF just took four outposts in southwest Shan, a couple of days ago. And one of those had a massive ammunition depot. So all of this starts to add up to there's a logic here of collapse, which is the junta was massively over extended. It doesn't have significant reserves. Personally, I'm not sure it has much, if any. If it does, they're not going to move on because they're going to keep them in Naypyidaw around men on Lang. But there's a there's a fairly obvious logic of collapse, which is the military is a diminishing force. The resistance is an increasingly intense force in terms of what it can do, because has, it has man, it's never suffered from a lack of manpower suffered from a lack of weapons. But although that starts to shift, and then this is where we also have to look at the wider strategic situation. I mean, the other thing that would massively worry me, if I were a junta general who is at least marginally coherent to Naypyidaw would be what what happens next, because they've lost northern Shan they're not going to take it back. They're starting to lose northern Sudan. They're also at the point where they don't have easy access to cut chin. You know, Colin was taken because it sits right on top of the highway on the western side of the, of the Irrawaddy on the eastern side. In theory, you could go up through to gang and get back on too young and get back on that same highway. But to do that, you're going to bleed out, trying to move any kind of force up through the northern Mandalay townships. And then if they try and take that same highway that then curves over on the southern side of the Irrawaddy over bumbo, they face even more intense attacks from PDFs and the Ka in places like swagoo. And then and then they can't move forces anymore from Sean and chin. And they conversely they can't move forces from pigeon and Deshawn. So and on the northern side, yeah, the junta is facing massive issues not just about losing northern Shan about do they can they maintain access to the chin, and then also NC GYN, those townships up in on the eastern side of Saigon that border up against Kitchin all like end up and Mao kata, all the way down to pin the blue and Colin, calm blue, Moon, etc. These are these have been some of the areas that have the most significant resistance control. They've also have some of the strongest collaboration between PPDs and a QA. So if you look at those northern areas, like it's an open question, how long junta can keep key parts? It's again, it's a guide and even Kitchin and then if you look at Northwest, Myanmar, the AAA has now kicked off in Rakhine. To what extent can the junta keep Rakhine? That's an open question. Things are happening every day. They're not Fighting out in the sticks. They're fighting right now, immediately for townships and in the very central part of Rakhine, it's the same in chin, they can't move people or resupply these, these limited numbers of Garrison's and chin and then the southeast The thing about the SE that's so well then crazy, I mean, they're gonna lose Karenni loikaw will be lost. And then with it, the rest of Karenni and then the SE the junta is also in a very weak position. My own impression is the can you hasn't escalated like they can. And personally, I suspect that'll happen. And what this does is that I mean, the KU is exceptionally strategic methodical in what they do, and they've been very deliberately prepping the battlefield to put places on choke points, the hooter This is townships in northern mon like Chuck toe, villain tone. It's places in directly along the the logistics corridor the Naypyidaw, Yangon and highway the railroad to I mean, they've they've, they've asserted extensive amounts of control together with PDFs over large parts of eastern but go all the way up to the bigger Yoma. This means that the viability of the Yangon Naypyidaw logistics corridor for the military can't be taken for granted. The same is true of the Asian highway to milady.
It's not it's not a coinkidink that they've put so much pressure on concrete. It's the town in the middle of the Asian highway. And then further south. I mean, there's a reason that they've put so much pressure on Tama tree, because there's one coastal highway. I mean, it's it's, it's, it's a hard place to defend, because there's no other option but to use that highway. I mean, conceivably they could use boats. But I don't think that's enough to sustain them. Long term, the same as in key places like EAA Township, a town in southern mine, you have these checkpoints, they're not there, they're not new to the conflict, they've been actively under attack for extended periods of time. I don't see all of this is just random happenstance. It's a deliberate effort to collapse the military. The challenge, and all of this is very simple, though, which is that the military will do what the military always does, which is commit mass violence against civilians. And this This is, this is the hardest thing for the resistance to deal with. Both morally but also in terms of military operations is that the junta is willing to kill large numbers of civilians, to to protect itself. And that's, that's what we have to deal with here is a genocidal military that's willing to kill people at will. And they have been doing it for years for decades. But it's just going to escalate as they get even more desperate. And this is this where, where we talked about the junta taking whole town's hostage, that's something that's that's just going to get worse. The other thing is we have to, you know, when you look at what's happening in places like loikaw, we've already seen very clear examples of this. Were also in TIG going where they've conducted massive amounts of aerial bombardment, purely targeting civilian areas, to cause massive civilian casualties. Again, this, this goes, this isn't totally new, but at least it's a coup. We saw this first happened and thought laying, but this is this is a real worry for what what what happens other places too. But this is this is one of the hardest things for the resistance to deal with, because the resistance actually values life and doesn't want to see large numbers of civilians of civilian casualties. But that's that's the leverage that the junta will will play with because they're there. They're very experienced in doing this. And they're very, very willing to do it.
Brad 1:39:35
I mean, just talking about this, like, over the last few days, we've had reports of something even more sinister, although quite common for the military, that young men around the age of 20 of being simply abducted and pressganged into military service. The reports that that I received were approximately Do you think it was 20 men or something per Township and Yangon per day are being abducted? Which is heinous, but it shows the military's desperation. And the question on this whole dimension is, does the military genuinely think that this is going to to help? I mean, everything so far should have shown them. And you've highlighted this as well, that their fundamental misstep was their barbarity and their cruelty after the coup, do they genuinely think that that doubling down on that at this point after two and a half years of revolution is going to achieve anything? Or are they just angry and petulant?
Matthew Arnold 1:40:46
To be honest, it could be a bit of both. I mean, I mean, they've tried this was pure sati. I mean, we have to be honest, some, you know, there are there are significant numbers of pew Sati, that were also pressganged. But the reason why the Pew CLT were never never became a strategically significant force is because even with press ganging, plus all the volunteers, there were plenty of volunteers. But they never became a significant force because there just wasn't popular support for it. And that they can do some of these things, but it just doesn't add up to anything that's going to change the wider situation. If it does anything, it'll probably exacerbate the situation for the junta because it'll just intensify the resentment of the junta for for their violence against civilians and, and violence includes things like Press Ganey and people. But I don't think it's hard to see how how the junta can can generate enough forces to compensate for what they've lost, much less generate enough forces where they can do any kind of significant offensive that would retain territory. I mean, my impression at this point is that the junta is going into full bunker mode. I mean, this is this is both and in areas even where they've had stable control. I mean, if you look at Yangon, there's clearly been an escalation of arrests. And then you also see these things like the press gain in Yangon gone. And other parts of country of the country, we've seen even more kind of overt signs of Bunker mode where they blown up bridges going into the town, for instance, up in homeland and skyline, but even further place itself. We've seen places where they've closed roads on their own, because because they're just going into bunker mode. And I mean, this this is really, really significant. I mean, they're places also where they go into bunker mode. This is where they also it overlaps their bunker mode includes taking large, large numbers of civilians as hostage effectively taking the house towns as hostage because they prevent civilians from leaving the towns ie they take them as hostage. They also have there's been a market increase in the use of artillery shelling. And that's that's that's especially been around areas where they obviously have the larger stockpiles of artillery shells. I mean, places like around some of the major regional commands the longterm official military bases, the MOC commands, etc, where they've, they've massively escalated artillery showing of the peri urban areas around towns, because they're trying to clear out the areas around the town. Now in some areas, like in Saigon that had already been happening. But we've seen more of that and other places where if it hadn't been happening, it's for instance, further south in Maguey, or in central parts of Mandalay or also in parts of Southwest. Shan. So overall, I mean, the junta is very much going into, into bunker mode. And again, this is something that's been ongoing and we've seen this in Chien. We've seen it in cranny. And we've seen it in parts of Saigon, but but it's becoming the norm across much larger parts of the country. And I mean, this is also again, it wasn't surprising when the one junta I don't want to say evacuated these police posts. I think it was ordered withdrawal. Because they said we can't protect all these police posts. We're not even sure if we can keep them in town. And the only thing we can do is concede the territory around those police posts and concentrate forces and towns that we think we can defend as long as possible. And that's that's when we get into you know, how does this thing unfold? And I think I think at this point the junta does have to make these We start black white decisions about what they have to abandon in order to try and defend other areas. But the challenge in all of this is that there's so much resistance in so many different parts of the country. I mean, I remember after 1027, like a week or two weeks somebody asked me, you know, is is the the military saying they're going to use airpower to attack in northern Shan and I said, I don't think that's possible because in to over the next two weeks are going to have to fight escalated battles in other parts of the country. And then we saw Karenni escalate over 1111. And then now we have Rakhine, I expect other parts of the country, especially in places like Wigo, mon and Krenn, also escalate significantly. And then this is this is where the junta does really fall into existential crisis, because they simply don't have the wherewithal to deal with what is in effect, a very strategic, methodical way to collapse them, you know, they're losing access to their borders, they've, they've already in effect lost access to the India border, they because they've lost the main road that goes up to two mu plus the border and inside Qin state, they've lost in effect access to the China border in any meaningful way. The Thailand border is still open, but that couldn't be taken or blocked, is perfectly plausible. So in all of this, the how the junta tries and regain any initiative, that Ns is doubtful, I don't see how they can regain initiative, what they can try to do is hunt, bunker, hunker down and key garrison and try and hold out as long as they can. And hope for some kind of negotiation. Personally, I don't think any negotiation is possible, unless somebody gets rid of men on land. But I think the other the other thing, and this is also the other aspects of the, of the revolution, which we we've also seen an increase of CDM, not just defections by police and military, but also for instance, and it's a guy in town. Last week, something like 20, hospital staff just banned, left the hospital, and they had to close the hospital. I don't think those people were banning the medical duty, I'm sure they were continuing their medical work somewhere else. But the point is that you start to see further collapse of what remained of the junta state apparatus. mean, we've also seen this in for instance, in some of the state owned banks. But but you know, what, what we're left with and so much of the country is, in effect, empty. offices of the of the state apparatus that are that are have been turned into outposts or bunkers, of small junta units. The other thing in all of this, that I think we have to keep in mind is what happens financially because it's, it's very plausible that there could be a bankrupt or a much more significant collapse of the currency. And if that happens, first off, it was it would cause a huge amount of humanitarian suffering for the wider population. But it would also be exceptionally debilitating for the junta because it would show that the junta really has no control over the country. And I think this is where you start to see pictures of people lining up at banks, because they have no faith that the junta is going to survive this. And they're going to try and cash out as much as they can while they can. As this thing escalates, that's increasingly possible to have have a much more significant collapse of the banking system.
Brad 1:49:05
So I definitely want to look forwards into into what you think is going to happen next, but sort of in the immediate future, would you would you be of the view that the states so that's a chain kitchen Shan, current Iranian Rakhine, that these are going to be completely lost to the military? In the near future?
Matthew Arnold 1:49:32
Yes, but I don't think it's just the states. I think it's also true in places like Skyn,
Brad 1:49:36
they would include Sagaing in that, yes, I
Matthew Arnold 1:49:41
would also include townships in Maguey like Ganga till then saw you know, these places, but even places these are Qin foothills, townships, but also further east places like PowerG Yang it These places are all very likely to be taken by the resistance because the junta just doesn't have the bandwidth to keep them because there's already such extensive resistance inside them. I mean, this is this is where we have to where I get frustrated with people say what the significant the resistance wasn't significant before. And there's just opportunistic probing attacks, this is total utter nonsense. There has been significant resistance in all of these areas. The question has been, do they have enough ammunition? Do they have enough momentum to push it into taking towns? So these areas already have resistance control? I mean, even if you go further east and to central Saigon places like in Mervyn go on the other side of the river immediately outside of Manjula, like ADA boodle, and you can do today, etc, etc, etc. The junta does not control these townships, it controls parts of towns. In some places, the town, a lot of that depends on the geography and highways connecting them, they can at least still maintain some movement of military forces. But fundamentally, in all of these places, the junta is not in a position where it can keep them. I mean, all of this will become much more apparent in places like Karenni, and Lloyd Carr, you know, the fact that if if Lloyd goes lost to the resistance, it shows that state capitals can be taken. Personally, I think that's very, very plausible. In fact, I think it's exceptionally likely because the junta is in such a bad position. And the problem for them is their position is just going to worsen and worse and worse, and I don't I don't think we need to see all of this as purely states versus regions, we need to talk about areas. Men, for instance, significant parts of the Go have already been lost to the resistance. Now, that's not just areas that the cane you held at the time of the coup, larger parts of the NGO have already been lost to the resistance, again, particularly the rural areas. Now that again, the challenge for the junta is that when you have an escalation by Can you but can you works extensively with PDS especially in places like well everywhere except certain townships like Papuan that that the ability to escalate significantly or exists, because there has been such strong resistance. And this is where I think it's just hard to conceive how the junta recovers from that. And how they, indeed, how they prevent their their overall situation from deteriorating further.
Brad 1:53:04
So how far do you think this is going to extend? So you're saying like that the states have basically gone and certain territories within the what were were previously called divisions? Will be we'll be gone. Do you foresee just an absolute sort of maintenance of this momentum sweeping across the nation and and just driving up the military? Or do you think the military can withdraw around maybe at all until it sort of can settle in for a protracted, let's say siege around one or two sort of core? Urban territories? And what of places like Mandalay or Yangon, do you think those are going to be liberated alongside these the states? Or are we looking at sort of protracted urban conflict?
Matthew Arnold 1:53:54
All right, I'm not a big proponent of the notion of the the junta lingering and because they can hold key cities. I mean, if you look at comparative examples, what usually happens is that a regime loses so much is so weakened that eventually it just collapses. I mean, take Afghanistan in August of 2021. There is no grand battle to take Kabul. I mean, the the government forces in Kabul already saw the writing on the wall and surrendered to the Taliban. I think. I mean, this isn't to say that the junta will give up I mean, again, by comparative standards, historic standards, the Tomica of the military has been an exceptionally coherent persistent force. I mean, that's, that's just a, I think, a fairly unquestionable observation. I mean, it's a horrible one because it's such a horrible entity, but they are credit Have we determined to persist? I think, though, that in any situation, there's eventually a psychological barrier that's passed, where even the most dogmatic brainwash, people start to see that they will lose. And I think some of these things have already happened. I mean, certainly the loss of access to the China border, the escalation in Rakhine, but then also what had already been unfolding, the fact that even after so many atrocities across again, so much displacement of the Skyn population, including also northern Maguey, that the junta kind of collapse the resistance in these Bomar regions. But then also the fact that there's resistance all the way across Kearney down to the southern tip of commentary. I mean, over November, we've seen escalation. And in all these areas where there's already been resistance, we've also seen new townships also start to have attacks by resistance actors. So how this unfolds is, I mean, I don't have a crystal ball. But my own perception is that the junta will lose. I hope that the international community pushes and lets the junta be defeated outright. If there's any negotiations, it should be only for the full surrender of the junta. It should not be for some kind of negotiated accommodation of the junta. But I do think that the junta will lose. Now, that could happen in different types of scenarios. It could implode very quickly. There's plenty of comparative examples of that, especially if there's a significant escalation in the southeast, especially along these key corridors like the Yangon Naypyidaw highway or the Asian highway to Thailand. We could also see kind of a an ordered withdrawal of junta forces into a much smaller number of bases or Garrison's. But they still try and keep certain and garrison is out and parts of Saigon or even parts of Qin excetera, etc. Personally, I don't think that's very viable, because I just don't think they have the logistics capacity. If they can't, this is. I mean, if you look at the US military in Afghanistan, it had outposts all over the place. But it was utterly dependent. And for a lot of them on its air assets to keep them supplied. The junta has nowhere enough air assets to supply so many different bases in so many different parts of the country. I mean, the fact that in the last week, the junta has been airdropping ammo to their forces and loikaw. I mean, this is desperate, that's only going to get worse for them. But I think I think we do have to acknowledge that, you know that this is incredibly This is an incredibly tenacious force, and that they will continue to fight. But eventually, I think, especially for some of the more smaller isolated units that they they will pass this threshold where they're like, well, what's the point of dying out in the middle of nowhere? Because I, I know with full certitude that I am not going to get reinforcements, I probably won't even get new ammo, and that this is just a losing game. For me. Maybe the junta can hang on and other parts, but they certainly can't hang on where I'm at. And this is this is where you really start to see the collapse of junta morale is in an as a as an institution, because the problem is they've so atomized themselves into small dispersed units that they don't have, they don't have large intact l IDs that are still highly motivated that they can maneuver here and there to conduct counter offensive. They just don't exist anymore. So I think you know what, what does happen is that you know, these, the the existing force, resistance across the country does escalate dramatically. It does succeed and taking towns it does succeed in blocking more highways that then allows for more towns to be taken that there in effect is what I would call rolling waves of collapse. This includes quite plausibly the places I've talked about, but I think we should also talk about kitchen. The main kitchen is increasingly difficult for the junta because they just don't have the access that they did before. By using the highways. Now, you could say they can use the river. But personally, I'm not convinced that compensates enough. So I do see these rolling waves of collapse. But I mean, the biggest variables for me, kind of in terms of, of what happens, or how things transpire is in terms of First off, I would say, like, to what extent do the existing resistance actors escalate? Especially the in the southeast, especially around the can you? And like I said, along these major logistics corridors, I think another big variable is the extent to which a weapons, ammunition etc acquired through Operation 1027 Kind of get dispersed to the wider resistance. That's a massive variable. And then I think the other thing that's that we have to look at is, is this this expected rise of violence, at scale against civilian populations, and how that affects what the, what the resistance is able to do. My own impression is that the resistance will probably they don't have to take every town, they you know, this isn't a conventional war, to win the revolution outright, they don't have to exert control over the full country at the you know, completely what they have to do is take enough parts of the country where the junta collapses. And that's where I think we have to, we have to look at the strategic logic of places like a border, the border crossings, key towns like comfort, that block access to other like, basically, it's the road that goes up to northern sky and places like Collin that are on there both access points for multiple other townships that are very rural in Sudan, but they also sit astride major access points up into Cochin, so I don't see this rolling forward, like, we look at the Ukraine maps where we can say this is the front line, like there's no front line. I mean, that's that's the beauty of a revolution is that it's unfolding across, you know, large, large parts of the country at the same time. And that that, in fact, is the biggest strategic advantage of the resistance is that the junta can't set the pace of battle, they can't decide where to fight, they have to be responsive, they have to be reactive. And their their ability to be reactive is increasingly diminishing, while that of the resistance is only increasing. I think it's fair to say it's increasing exponentially.
Brad 2:02:58
And so I know that you don't want to sort of make clear predictions, as you say, you don't have your your crystal ball. But is there a sort of range like a vague time range in which you think it's most likely, or other times that you think are too soon for the military to collapse? And times that you think are too far in the future for the military to realistically?
Matthew Arnold 2:03:25
I mean, I think currently at the pace of what is happening, I don't think it's unrealistic to see a timeframe of three to six months. I mean, certainly by the end of the dry season, but I think it does, it does depend on some of these variables that are I mean, I also put the the viability of the banking sector as another key variable, like what happens with like, to what extent is the junta going to be able to take civilian populations hostage? And does that force the resistance to to pull back? Or does it just force allow the resistance to target other areas where where there were there isn't such risks to civilian populations? But yeah, I think fundamentally, I've argued in different op eds for again, probably 18 months now that the junta is fundamentally losing. And that's because I've never seen the Myanmar conflict as a conventional civil war. It's always been it's never been about single battles. It's always been about what is the wider trajectory. And the wider trajectory, again, going back to the end of the 2022 dry season has fundamentally favor the resistance. And 1027 has just massively increased the slope of that are the curve of that trajectory. And that it's it's also become exponential in terms of the if the junto loses a little here, it means you're going to lose a lot more there. That's just going to increase in pace. So I mean, I could be wrong, I've been wrong about other stuff. I've been right about other stuff, too. But calling an end date for war is always difficult. But I do think fundamentally, the junta will lose out, right, and that the world should support the resistance to defeat the junta outright. This is a historic opportunity to get rid of a genocidal force, we should, we should support that completely. I think it's not inconceivable to see the junta collapse, fully ie be defeated outright, within three to six months, because the rate of of what they're losing now has gone up so much since Operation 1027. I mean, without 1027, it was more likely to say, well, maybe it would be 1824 months or something, or 36 months. But because of 1027. Again, the rate of junta claps has changed exponentially. And that's, that's primarily because there's so much existing resistance across so much of the country and that resistance is likely going to become much better armed and much better able to escalate attacks on on the types of positions that the junta has taken for granted, like air bases and large bases, key towns, but those are now going to be lost or susceptible to being lost. I think they will be lost. But so a lot of this. I mean, it's still it's still fuzzy. But in terms of the overall perspective, I think it's been a mistake to have called the conflict and Myanmar stalemate, primarily because it's that that the usage of that term has been premised on the notion that the junta can't be defeated in the best outcome as some kind of internationally supported negotiation. This, I think, was factually inaccurate, based on the assessment of the conflict. Morally, it was also pretty dubious, because why should we ask any population to accommodate an armed entity that has committed such mass violence against that population? It is wrong. So I think fundamentally, we should accept that the junta can lose, will lose. And we shouldn't go all in. I mean, for instance, I don't see why we can't cut off aviation fuel. aviation fuel and Myanmar at this point is used to kill civilians. That's what it's used for. Like whatever rationales were justifying it before 1027. It just doesn't like you can't defend aviation fuel in Myanmar. Now, because the junta is just going to increase the rate of of attacks against civilian populations. So it's like this is where the world needs to pick a side to do so decisively to get rid of a an entity that is destroyed the entire country for generations.
Brad 2:08:29
I share your view and I sort of, I share your frustration. Jet fuel is something for example, that we've we've had a guest come on and explain and this whole justification that it is a dual use good, that has both civilian and military applications has kept a lot of, you know, private interests, aloof of of ramifications for their choice to continue supplying this to the military, like we haven't been able to get an arms embargo. We've been asking for a no fly zone to be to be imposed, and no one no one's willing to put their hands up and do anything. And I share that. And I definitely share your your your perspective with regards the military, that the military not only winning, but the military must lose for the good of the nation. My question, though, do you is assuming that the military does collapse and in this glorious turn of events, because you are you are possibly the first guest who has been able to be as decisive and as authoritative on this point that the imminent collapse of the military is what is on the table right now and a complete removal of the military, from from Myanmar politics, assuming that that does happen. You've spoken very positively today about the the motivations and The professionalism and the operations of the various stakeholders. I know you don't like to refer to Aeos, as let's just say, the various stakeholders. And there is a lot of discussion at the moment about the post revolution in fighting the power vacuum. And and just the sort of scramble for power. Do you foresee a continuation of hostilities after the military falls? Where different stakeholders try to establish powerful positions? Or do you foresee a much more peaceful and and nationally focused process of of nation building and negotiation and entry he's signing?
Matthew Arnold 2:10:52
Well, first point, I mean, I would say, I mean, a lot of we have to fall back on this, this this wider narrative that had been so prominent for so long about Myanmar, which was basically it was an unwinnable war, the resistance was weak and fractured. It didn't add up to anything significant. The junta Yeah, it's horrible, but we have no choice, we have to keep engaging with them. And fundamentally, the best outcome is some kind of negotiated settlement. And I think we really have to push back on that and say, well, this narrative first off was wrong. Because it was just factually wrong. It was intellectually lazy, mostly because people didn't want to actually understand nuances and dynamics in different parts of the country, they just wanted to create these kind of headline, meta narratives. But the point is that we've reached this point where you, people have to admit the resistance is taking control of large parts of the country. That's not just a northern Shan. It's it's also starting to happen. And in other parts of the country, it has been happening in terms of rural areas, but people will believe it more if it includes towns. All right, so be it. It's happening, though. So there's, there's kind of a moral imperative, from people who had pushed this notion of stalemates to say, look, it's not a stalemate, it never was, it is rapidly. It is it is, it is something that has been fluid dynamic. And that, fundamentally, it has been favoring the resistance for a while. That's why 1027 happened 1027 One and have happened. If the resistance, we're winning. It's it's the junta felt stronger, more in control, had more reserves, etc, etc, etc, there would not have been an operation 1027 So in all of this, we have, you know, internationals have to say, Look, you guys do control territory, you are controlling more territory that changes things. I mean, it changes also the geopolitics. China's perception of Myanmar changes incredibly, when it doesn't, it doesn't have border access, the junta can't guarantee it. Same for India, it's going to be the same for Thailand. All of this has to has to be a question about if when the junta falls, how do we support a stable, prosperous Myanmar? Now, I'm not naive. I've spent, I spent years of my life working in conflict zones. I've spent years of my life as an academic. I mean, I wrote my PhD on this. I've, you know, I'm not naive about how challenging post conflict peace can be. I mean, I wrote a book called The challenges of post conflict peace. Like there's endless challenges that are predictable. The first thing I would say is that we shouldn't sensationalized these, because they're also normal. I mean, there's no country that has a perfectly clinically clean transition to, you know, to, to, you know, the perfectly negotiated final political settlement. It will be messy at times, there will be probably some violence, but I think we also have to give credit where credit's due, which is there was a an election and 2020. The military then staged a coup. And then massive parts of Myanmar Society said We absolutely do not accept this. And that started with peaceful resistance, but then it moved to armed resistance, plus peaceful resistance. The point being is that we have to give credit that there has been an incredible amount of social solidarity, public goodwill, dialogue, negotiation, new generation stepping up a new relationship. It was formed, that that do put Myanmar in a different position than what it was in before the coup. And so a lot of this analysis that is so apocalyptic about what will happen in Myanmar is also somewhat archaic, because it doesn't give enough emphasis to just how powerful a revolution is, in terms of social change in terms of political change. And that's something that we have to acknowledge and put much more emphasis on. And for me, I say, because you can have endless conversations with people who nothing positive to say about what might happen, they can spend hours and hours, you know, it's like Doom scrolling, just hearing about everything that can go wrong. And I say, Well, why don't you spend a little bit of time to think about what can go right, and figure out how you can maximize it, there's so much that has gone right? With this, there's collaboration between the wider population, including the Bomar committee into armed resistance to finally get rid of the the military, there's been extensive cooperation between armed units between iOS and iOS, but also between PDFs and iOS. I mean, I can't tell you how much solidarity and trust is built through fighting alongside one another, this changes relationships massively. And then we also have to put an emphasis on on the wider population. This has been a resistance that has had exceptional amounts of public support that's included financial support, moral support, the CDM, etc, etc. And then when you look at places like cigar and Maguey, elsewhere, but also in states, I don't think it's possible to say, since independence, has there been any point in Myanmar's history where there's been a stronger sense of community empowerment than there is now. And that means that and that community empowerment is very much conditioned around self defense, but it's also conditioned around this wider project, of getting rid of the military once and for all. So my point isn't that everything is going to be super easy and straightforward. My point is that we should, we shouldn't, we shouldn't already, you know, be so negative about what possibilities will will be much clearer if when the junta falls, and that if we want to be supportive, we should really focus on you know, the positive aspects of what comes out of revolution. And like I said, these are things that should be clear to all of this, the fact that there is an FDC, that there was that there is in UCC, that there are a whole new generation that are involved, that there are, there's a much wider consensus that there needs to be federalism, that relationships have been built across communities across states, and regions, that, you know, there's there's all of these things that can be supported, that are immensely beneficial to future, peace and stability. And again, from what from my from my own experience, I've worked in countries like Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, etc, etc, etc. I can't think of any other country that has had such a difficult modern history with so many cleavages, so many fractures, that has had such a wide scale National Resistance, and a resistance that has been so disciplined. I think this is something we also don't give enough emphasis to I mean, I find it really annoying, where people, cherry pick nitpick about PDFs, and the guy and presenting it as if they're all fighting one another. That's absolutely not the case. If that were the case, they would have all collapsed because they would have lost public support. There's no high end extractives to support them without that public support. But it's true across the country is like there haven't been massacres of civilians. The POWs have been treated. Well, people who have defected have been treated well. This has been a remarkably disciplined resistance. I mean, I would chat I would challenge people who dispute that point. Find me any other resistance that has been confronting a genocidal military that has been so consistently disciplined about following the norms of war. I mean, the exception the only exception to that I can think of is the the Candido massacre in the early days. ants where they were they shot some of the POWs, but that was dealt with by the key and you. But compared to what we've seen in other places, Sudan, I mean, Sudan has math, mass ethnic cleansing right now, if you look at other places where we had violent warlordism erupt, not after the war, but during the war, we haven't seen that. Yes, sir. Tensions. Yes, there are some bad apples. Yes, there will be challenges in the future. But we need to also give credit where credit's due
Brad 2:20:37
appreciate that sentiment a lot. I think we've definitely seen a lot of violations of of the norms of or at least, you know, accusations of them. But you are right, I think in saying that, across the board. And considering the this the starting point of this revolution. And the fact that the PDF like the ethnic organizations, many of them already had established militaries, but the PDF in the non insignificant way had to build up from scratch, the NUJ have to build up from scratch. It's not just a war starting afresh, but one of the sides of that war has to establish itself from pretty much nothing into a competent professional fighting force in a very short space of time. I think the the Myanmar crisis memory revolution, I think is going to be taught in in classes and universities in books for for decades to come as an exemplary of, of successful, grassroots people motivated revolutionary activity. Because there are just so many things that are being done. He has so many parts that are being trolled for the first time here.
Matthew Arnold 2:21:51
So, I mean, I would just add to that, I mean, I'm not saying that there hasn't been war crimes or atrocities committed by resistance forces. What I'm saying is that comparatively, Myanmar has had an a remarkably disciplined resistance. And it should be, it should be given credit for that. There's a lot of kind of tedious I call it paternalistic. You know, skepticism or cynicism. You know, we all there's this desire to always frame the resistance is it has this problem, it has this problem. Everything's a problem. I was like, Okay, give me a break, though. I mean, this has been a remarkably disciplined resistance, especially any other country where you were, you know, if you're a cigar and village, and you've just had a junta continue to come through and decapitate people, or burn people to death by stacking tires around them, dousing them and petrol and lighting them on fire, like most places, that would then lead to more, you know, executions of prisoners, etc, etc. So I think, you know, in the context of a national uprising that was provoked, through a coup by a long history of atrocity, violence against civilians, by then months of atrocity violence against peaceful protesters, and then ongoing atrocities ever since. I mean, the fact that that the resistance has been so disciplined, relatively, and actually in terms of outright this, we need to give credit for this. I mean, I've you read the books about the American Civil War, the American Revolutionary War, like the US can't claim that, you know, even our wars inside our own country, we had as much discipline, as has happened in Myanmar. And I know that's an impasse context. But it's still at a very personal emotional level, that there's been plenty of opportunities where civilians or PDS or Aeos could have done much, much more, at least compared to what happened in other countries, and they didn't. So that should be the starting point of this conversation. This is also where I talk about what might come next. You know, we need to give credit for how disciplined this resistance has been. We also need to give credit for how much this resistance has talked to one another, has compromised, has put forward things like the FTC has brought a new actors and the wider political aspiration of having a peaceful, stable federal democracy. So I personally, I'm willing to give the Myanmar people more than the benefit of the doubt. I'm not willing to start every conversation by saying whatever happens after the junta is going to be disaster. No, we need to give them credit for what's already happened and allow them to build on that. I mean, the the moral lecturing is just toxic. Personally, I mean, the it just comes across as is utterly vacuous, hypocritical and up downright dangerous to actual peace and stability in the country.
Brad 2:25:27
Absolutely, I think we've covered a lot of ground here. And, and again, I want to thank you very much for for enduring this. While while you have a lung infection, this is not making the condition any worse. And I very much hope that we can we can continue this discourse, where as as things move forward as we see changes, so that we can better understand and better analyze, because I think you are right, the toxic discourse is it's making its way to decision makers, whether directly or indirectly, it makes its way to decision makers in other countries who are dissuaded from making moral and right choices, because they've been presented with very false narratives. very hyper simplified. And I agree with your, your, your naming of it as paternalistic, I think it very much is paternalistic. If if we were talking about the resistance in Ukraine, we would not be so dismissive of the motivations, the independence the the intellect, and, and just the reasoning capability of resistance groups. So I do think that there is there's a very strong paternalistic element to this.
Matthew Arnold 2:26:40
The other thing that I would I would add to that point, if I may, it's just that we also have been very dismissive of just how hard it is to get rid of an institution that has had state power for 60 plus years. This is this is near impossible. I mean, that the examples of this, they're very, very limited, because it is so difficult. And it's it's the hardest thing to do is to grow a resistance to the size where it actually is viable. And this is where we also need to give credit to what happened during the the first 612 18 months after the coup, where we did have a very, very deliberate, thoughtful effort across actors that previously hadn't interacted very much to craft a an approach that fundamentally built up consensus and narrative about getting rid of the military once and for all, in pushing for a fundamentally different direction for the country. I mean, the new GE will never get credit for what it does. It's always going to be nitpicked. I think it's a lot of it's completely unfair, there is some, some of the critiques are also fair, but I think in the grand scheme of things, not just the N ug but also the in UCC, the the EEO mechanisms for communicating and collaborating, the mechanisms that have seen in UG partnership with the EU O's in terms of military action, etc, etc. Like in all of this, there's always been this grading, absolutist judgment, against the resistance, that it's also obvious that all of this should just well, but they can't do it. Therefore, they're fatally flawed. They're, they're fractured, they're divided, you know, nothing good can happen. I mean, this is where you see these really horrible policy prescriptions, saying like, well, the AAA should just sign a permanent formal ceasefire with the junta, like, where did we ever get to the point where that makes sense to anybody? You know? So in all of this, we have to think we have to give credit again, where credit's due, there's plenty of examples where a brutal regime has brutally crushed resistance before it could emerge at a scale where it becomes outright viable to see the outright collapse of whatever regime is currently in power. But we've we've never given credit to just how remarkable the Myanmar revolution has been, especially considering what it's had to deal with a genocidal military with 60 years of state power 60 plus years of state power, a very fractured political and social situation within the country. And then little to no tangible international support, but endless amounts of defeatism. And then we haven't given credit for What has happened, which is that the national uprising did emerge, that there were substantive discussions, agreements on a way forward, and that there has been a historic amount of collaboration across the country. So in all of this, I think I think, if anything, there should be a moment of reflection from the international community, not just to say, oh, only because it 1027. You know, now are things possible. That's nonsense. All of this has been unfolding since the coup. If people chose not to see it, it says more about them as individuals or as institutions. It also, again, it gets back to this grading, paternalistic judgment, about seeing that Myanmar is basically a lost cause. And the only good thing that can happen in the country is if there's some kind of internationally supported peace process.
Brad 2:31:01
Absolutely. And, and I think it's, it's an equivocation, because I agree that there's no logic to there's no reason to say that the AAA should should enter into an agreement. I think it's just this vague generic sense of equivocation where no one feels comfortable siding with one side over the other. It's this intuition that comes from not having a genuine familiarity with the context that says, Well, clearly, the wise and morally right thing to do is to immediately seek a compromise between the two different extremes in the situation. But that's not going to work. In a case like this, where it is very clear, that one side is destructive, cannot be trusted, has absolutely no regard for human life, or even for the for the future of the country as a whole. Compromising between people who are fighting for survival, and people who are fighting for the right to destroy is not a good compromise. But you require familiarity with the situation to actually know that and have the spine to say no, these guys are wrong. They don't get anything. These guys are right, we should support them.
Matthew Arnold 2:32:12
Yeah, I mean, I would give I would give two examples. I mean, it was this term confirmation bias, a bias, I think is a particularly appropriate one. Because before the coup, we had already had this heavy international investment involvement in this transition with with a lot of support going to this sham peace process, because it was so so based around the military, so there was already this kind of inertia that existed before the coup, that what we basically need to do is get back to what we had before the coup. And so that's where you start seeing, you know, people armed resistance really started in the start of may, you know, we saw groups, analysts saying even within two or three months after that, that there was already a stalemate. This is ridiculous. You know, how can you say after the resistance is still emerging. And you're already saying it's a stalemate. I'm sorry, that's not an analytical, an objective analytical point, that is a political point, to say that the resistance won't grow, it's not going to be viable. And that fundamentally, the best outcome is to go back to some kind of negotiated process. The other point, I mean, I really appreciated this letter from the CSOs to, to Finland, and Switzerland. I mean, if I may summarize, the point of the letter was was very clear. It's like, how many atrocities does this military have to commit? How many genocides does it have to commit before you stop trying to accommodate it? I mean, is it 10? What is it?
Brad 2:34:00
Did you feel that however, the whether this is something that I've mulled over, do you feel that Western actors feel guilty about their past instances of claiming, whether with genuine intention or whether with outright perfectly claiming to want to get involved in conflict zones for good humanitarian outcomes, and then going there and either being completely ineffective, or themselves contributing to the disaster, or ultimately perpetuating you know, an extended conflict, and we can look at Afghanistan, we can look at Iraq, we can look at the forces in Liberia, we can look at many of these cases. Do you feel that there's because of that, everyone in the West is going look, if I say we have to deploy or support or in any way contribute to this conflict for the greater good, quote, unquote. I'm going to be buried under an assumption that this is just another Neo colonial attempt to get involved in a country that we never should have gotten involved with in the first place. And when Just got to make the situation worse. So better to sit this one out? Do you get that sense?
Matthew Arnold 2:35:05
I mean, but by academic background, I'm not a structuralist, I think there's nuance between different places. But I think there is. My main point is that there is a need for a reflection, about about how we approach situations like Myanmar. And that, I think, to some extent, I would frame it, there's too much of a hesitation in the West to believe in victory anymore. Like, I don't see it as a problem of like, the reason why there's a lot of caution or hesitation or, or kind of path dependency to further things that had happened is because fundamentally, you know, we've lost this belief that one side can win, and that we should just stand on the right side to side decisively, not not kind of hedge our risk, but decisively support the right side. I mean, if we can't make that judgment, when we have a resistance force that has been very clear about his political aspirations that hasn't committed mass atrocities, in contrast to a an entity that has been designated as a genocidal one, that there is a need to reflect on, on the need to act decisively. And also set clear rules like again, if you've committed one genocide, I don't think we should ever push for accommodation with that entity. What in any way? Like, I think it's like one strike and you're out. Like this. This should have been what we learned from, for instance, Sudan. I wrote a wrote a piece about this, because I spent a lot of time in Sudan, and the fact that the Darfur genocide happened in the early 2000s, but it built off decades of similar violence. But the immediate response to the Darfur genocide, largely pushed by a lot of the same actors who are involved in Myanmar is that the best outcome is to have some kind of negotiated process that inherently accepts that that genocidal actor or actors has to be engaged in the politics of the country. And then, unsurprisingly, 20 years later, those same genocidal actors in the Sudan case, it's the two genocidal actors, the militias that had committed a lot of the original violence in Darfur, and the Sudanese armed forces that had supported them to commit that genocidal violence. They're now fighting against each other, not just in in rural areas, but in sent in across all of Khartoum city. And then we've also had massive amounts of ethnic cleansing over the last couple of months. So it's I mean, this is just an example of this whole notion that the best option is always have some kind of negotiated settlement, even if that means that we have to accommodate the military. And, you know, this is what we need to do is think through when we're when we have these types of situations in these in countries like Myanmar, we do have to make black white decisions about not forcing populations or not putting populations in the in the position where they fundamentally feel that they still have to accommodate a an entity that has committed mass violence against them.
Brad 2:38:48
Absolutely. And I think I think that's a good point for us to sort of, conclude on but if you're, if you're familiar with, with the show, you might be aware, we always end the episodes, just inviting the guests to share some thoughts for the audience to mull over as they go on about their day. I know we've covered a lot of ground, and you shared a lot of insights. But if there is anything particularly salient that you want to emphasize that you want people to think about, or soundbite that you want them to be able to tell their friends around the watercooler. I'd like to invite you to share that now.
Matthew Arnold 2:39:25
My main point is that we need to give credit to the Myanmar people. And they really against all the odds. They've they've, they've put they've come together and put up a resistance that is capable of finally getting rid of the military and that is a good thing. The future is not clear. It won't be as as as straightforward as everybody wishes it would be but it will be better than continuing the idea that Myanmar has to accommodate a genocidal military and that we He to support the Myanmar people and what they have been so clear about. This is a revolution to get rid of the military once and for all. It's create a fundamentally different future for the country.
Host 2:40:36
Thank you for taking the time to listen to this episode. As regular listeners are aware, we often remind our audience about our nonprofit mission better Burma at the end of the show. Truth be told, fundraising is hard work. And I can personally attest the fact that it's really no fun to keep asking for contributions. Yet the situation on the ground now in Myanmar so distressing that we continue to do so on behalf of the Burmese people. What is most helpful at this time are recurring donations, which help alleviate both the stress and time involved in fundraising. If you were able to pledge a certain amount per month, our team can plan around having at least a consistent minimum amount to work within each month. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup, we welcome your contribution in any form of currency or transfer method. Your donation will go on to support a wide range of humanitarian and media missions, aiding those local communities who need it most. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, refugee camps, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or your mark your contribution to a specific activity or project you would like to support. Perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian work is carried out by our nonprofit mission that are Burma. Any donation you give on our insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fun. Alternatively, you can also visit the better Burma website better burma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause in both websites except credit card. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/better Burma. Additionally, we can take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either website for specific links to these respective accounts or email us at info at better burma.org. That's better Burma. One word, spelled b e t t e r b u r m a.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. We also invite you to check out our range of handicrafts that are sourced from vulnerable artists and communities across Myanmar available at alokacrafts.com Any purchase will not only support these artists and communities, but also our nonprofits wider mission. That's a local crafts spelled A L O K A C R A F T S one word a alokacrafts.com Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support.