Transcript: Episode #255: Decoding the Regime Playbook
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0:23
Myanmar is back in the headlines because of scenes like these. The country is in turmoil after the military swept away the government the people voted for.
0:35
The rise of anti coup forces has left the junta without effective control of the country posing the most significant challenge to the military in decades.
0:49
But in the last 12 months, in Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh, strategic border positions have fallen to ethnic armies, who can now come and go as they please. But General min Aung hlaing lai, who led the coup, has shown no indication he might change direction.
Host 1:14
For any Burmese language speakers tuning in today, we wanted to let you know that our better Burma mission has launched three Burmese language podcasts, Myanmar, revolutionary tales, dark era of Burma and Myanmar, peace, women and security. These programs can be found on our website as well as on any of your preferred podcast platforms. We invite you to take a listen, but For now, let's get on with this episode. Our guest today on insight Myanmar podcast is Roger Lee Huang, and we're going to be talking about his short but I found rather impactful book. It's called The Paradox of Myanmar's regime change, which was written before the coup. So much of this conversation is going to look at the analysis before those fateful events of 2021 and to frame this conversation, I'm one of the things I'm looking forward to is our past podcast conversations have focused on guests who have looked at grassroots efforts or the attempt to build broad coalitions, the opening of the economy, other floodgates, elite personalities that were involved, international community, et cetera. But this is going to take a very different angle, and that's because we're going to look at it as Roger looks at it in his book, from the military point of view as to how they were seeing things. And this is one of the great mysteries of trying to understand is, how is, what is the military view? How are, how are they making sense of the world? And that's what we're going to get into today. So Roger, thanks so much for taking time out of your busy schedule to be able to educate us from this book that we'll be looking at.
Roger Huang 4:06
Well, thanks for inviting me.
Host 4:09
So you studied not just this recent Myanmar history and the military perspective, but also literature on regime change in general. And so I'm wondering if you could tell us a bit about what you found in the field of regime change, and then how this applies to Myanmar, especially as you, as you argue in the book that there were no external forces that actually caused this regime change, or whatever we want to call it, to begin to happen in the 2000 10s.
Roger Huang 4:38
Yeah. So I mean, in the political science literature, there's always been kind of a belief, right, that almost kind of an expectation, that military regimes are the weakest form of authoritarian regimes. So it's always seemed kind of a puzzling question, why has Myanmar's tatmadaw successfully, really? I mean, depends how you. Find a success, but it was able to maintain its kind of dominance over the Myanmar state and society, really, since 1958 right? I mean, you could make an argument that formally really came into power only in 1962 but, you know, it's really established itself as the dominant political force since 1958 up until, really, at least 2016 arguably, even, you know, one would say today, right? There's no other political actor that has the same type of control over the resources of the state and over kind of the kind of the direction of how Myanmar is being transitioning into now in a regime, kind of, you know, ideas of regime change, right? A lot of kind of the more perhaps idealistic, pro democratic kind of theorists have tried to kind of understand when political regimes liberalize as a form of democratization. And a lot of people would kind of go back to thinking of the 1990s when they're thinking of this new wave of democratization going through Asia in particular, starting from Latin America in the 70s and 80s into Asia, with the People's Power movement in the Philippines, with democratization in South Korea, Taiwan, etc, or even Thailand. And they frame it as democratization, and that is the biggest question and kind of an issue for me, because when you frame something as democratization, you're creating kind of a deterministic outcome. You're saying, yes, people are going through this change because they all believe in what we perceive as quote, unquote, democracy. Now that's another discussion we can have. I'm sure that can take hours, so we will go there today. But if we kind of just think of a kind of a working definition of democracy, the general expectation right is that beyond just relatively free and fair elections, there is a legitimate chance for all political actors to share their views, to introduce policies and to at least kind of balance the rights and the interests of different stakeholders, stakeholders in the society. Now, in Myanmar's case, when he finally decided to, just, you know, voluntarily dissolve the ruling junta that has been in place since 1988 I'm sure our least listeners all know the history from you know 8889 90 onwards, up until 2011 there was no real, actual threat that that is forcing the military to take this position, right? The NLD and the LD, all the various ethnic Armed Forces certainly were not friends with tatmadaw, but they did not have legitimate way to basically replace the nepido regime controlled by the military. The military was able to basically do what it like in terms of pushing through its slow development of the Constitution based on what it has said it was always going to do, despite the fact, obviously took a couple of decades to get there, and international linkage, where we think how, during this particular time, since The 19 1990s onwards, the US and other kind of us aligned democratic societies were active, actively isolating the Myanmar regime and this kind of sanctions push, which, unfortunately for some analysts, were seen as the factor to let the military to reconsider its position, I think is inaccurate, right? The Junta itself, those in power, were doing relatively well in the 2000s up until 2011 they're personally getting wealthy, even though, with the kind of the Western led boycott sanction regime, other societies, other countries, were actively trading with Myanmar, and we'll all be aware that this is the period where a number of really prominent civilian business people, the cronies as we know them, really made enormous amount of wealth facilitating these trade linkages between the government, the military Government, and the military kind of individual commanders. And these other countries that had no problem trading with Myanmar. And of course, we're looking at in particular countries like China, and also the within the region, Thailand, India, Singapore, even South Korea, Japan, etc. So this idea that Myanmar was going through democratization Since 2011 until the coup in 2021 in my mind, is always kind of a weak explanation the military always was intended like it said it was going to do in the late 1980s early 19. 90s to introduce its version of democracy, what it calls discipline democracy, right? And if we draw parallel to how the military has always tried to shape Myanmar's politics, this really goes back to how it tried to introduce the Burmese way to socialism. Right? There was an Active Campaign communist insurgency trying to replace the tatmadaw regime. But the tatmadaw itself was also trying to introduce a command type socialist economy, which, of course, spectacularly failed. So the argument in my book is that this was a conscious decision that the military reached the point at the end of the Burmese socialist program party years when they realized that this several decades of command economy was not working, that it too, wanted to introduce its version of a Burmese democracy, its version of A market based economy. And that's why I argue really this discipline, democracy imposed by Lee tatmadaw is kind of like the Burmese way to democracy, its version of democracy, not what we would imagine a free and fair kind of election where the military would not be directly involved in national politics and state administration. That is not what the Tatma one tatmadaw wanted. It wanted its version of democracy, and it was very clear it was forefront about this throughout its entire time developing this constitution, and even during the so called transition to democracy from 2011 to 2021 it's in the Constitution. I welcome anyone to just pick up a version of the Myanmar constitution you'll see prominently right there, where the military declared that it was always going to be an active and prominent actor in the country's politics and governance.
Host 11:51
Yeah, that's a great overview to get us started, and I think, and you also present some of the dynamics of your argument. And I was very interested when I was reading first of all, just because, as I said from the outset, this is trying to understand the military's view, and I think this is often in this conflict. This is what I hear discussed as this great mystery of, what are these people thinking? What's going on inside the bunker? And you're, you're, you're one of the few guests we've had on that has been trying to get an insight into what that military perspective has been over the years, and to be able to test out these theories and have that understanding. But the other thing is that, and we'll get to this as we get into the conversation, I was almost reading your book as almost like a mystery, because you debunk so many theories as to what was going on during this time or challenge them, that I started to wonder, like, well, what's left? What's what is it that you land on then? Because you're saying it's not the elite actors, it's not really democratization, it's not that the floodgates opened and then things just took a life of their own. It's not that it was sanctions, it's not that it was grassroots efforts. It's just one after the other. And I'm reading this thinking like, well, then what did if all of these things are not what you're landing on, then what? What is what was happening? And that's I'll set up. That question is the mystery that we'll get to in this interview to build to and hopefully bring some suspense in the listener's mind. I think maybe before we get to that essential question, which is the thesis of your book, to build up to it as you did in looking at what you started to allude to this and reference this a little bit in the last bit you shared, but to go a bit more into it, to understand this military and to look at the bspp days in their early formation after they took power In 1962 and try to understand, in your estimation, how does the military understand their own role? How do they perceive themselves in who they think they are, what they're trying to accomplish, and what their relationship is to the state in those early years, say 62 to 1990 and then we'll talk after 1990 how and if that evolved?
Roger Huang 14:03
Yeah. I mean, we really need to go even a little bit further back right to the independence of Myanmar itself. As we know, when Myanmar gained its independence from from British rule, that was immediately in the state of conflict, right? People have pointed this out, that Myanmar is basically probably the country with the longest running insurgencies in Civil War anywhere in the world. There has been non stop insurgencies since 1948 Yes, the scale of these conflicts have, kind of have fluctuated, given especially today, it's probably one of the most challenging times, I would say, for the military. But there's always been this active resistance against the Bama dominated state, which, you know, which really, again, is controlled by military. Now, people you know, talk about the parliamentary democratic period in 1948 up until 1958 was uno, you know, you know, afbfl and LDS. But the reality is that you. The Myanmar parliamentary democracy was always very weak because they did not have a control of the entire what we refer to as the state of Myanmar, right? I mean these ethnic, armed insurgencies, the communist rebel communist insurgents groups were controlling different parts of Myanmar since 48 up until even, you know, obviously parts of different parts of Myanmar today. So this allowed the military to see itself as being Lee legitimate and only political actor that could really protect the the unity of the Burmese state, and seeing how the civilians were unable to control these, all these political stakeholders. And from their perspective, they the military's perspective, they've seen civilian politics as being partisan, as being not united, not really looking out for the best interest of state. Again, I'm explaining from a military's perspective, not necessarily myself. So they think that, at least from their public records and how they've presented themselves in all their kind of major documents, the Constitution and whatnot, they presented themselves as the Praetorian guards, asked the leaders right that have the best interests of Burma at heart, and the only one that could rise above partisan politics, rise Above these different ethnic interests and unite all of Myanmar. And that's why the military has consistently put itself front and center of Myanmar politics, because it does not trust the civilians. And if I just sorry, I might be diverging a little bit from the question. But go ahead, just fast for a little bit to try to understand 2021, and the coup, my belief is because the military has built up these systems, right? Because it actively built this constitution. You know, whether we like it or not, this is a constitution that it thinks will resolve all the questions of Myanmar's long term troubles all the way up until, you know, all the way back in 1948 and it perceived the second victory of the LED government as threatening to the system that was trying to build right there. You know, if we think, recall back to the, you know, the 1962 coupe, it was also kind of the threat of the breakdown of the Union. That was one of the reason that was justified for the military to take control of the state. And when you see that NLD was able to once again win the landslide victory, including in areas of of military dominance, right, even in in the parts of napito, they were overwhelming voting for NLD. And NLD have in, you know, in a months leading up to the election itself, actively finally said that they were going to campaign to try to amend the Constitution. Now, I think, in my mind, and based on what I've argued in the book, that is where the red line was. And that kind of pointed this out, that the red line for the military was if they were going to threaten the military's position in the system. They're trying to build this discipline democracy. This Myanmar's way to democracy, then that's where they would step in. Okay? So I honestly think, I do think situation has changed in last few years. So you know, we need to reflect those changes. But I do think the rationale behind all of this leading to the 2021 February coup, is that the military perceive that the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi government would actively change the constitutional system, which would then remove, or at least sideline the military From controlling its major areas of interest, such as national security, such as relationship with the different ethnic groups and the control of the borders and in home affairs.
Host 18:52
Right? So you to unpack one term the military has famously said that has this roadmap to discipline democracy. And I think for those listeners that are tuning in that are not so familiar with a deep dive into Myanmar politics, it's a little challenging to understand what's meant by discipline democracy when you hear that term the first time. So can you describe unpack what you think that means from the military perspective?
Roger Huang 19:17
So I've kind of alluded to this right? I think the military really, they do not trust civilians and partisan politics. They actively said this, right? They've always kind of said, We are the only institution that have the interest of the state everyone else, whether it's the NLD or, you know, ethnic armed, you know, ethnic parties are only looking out for their own partisan or ethnic interests, right? So they want a disciplined society, where society, you know, for any military anyways, it's all about discipline and order. So when they see kind of disorder, when they see kind of infighting and kind of a. Disputes between different groups that cannot reach to a unified position. They see this as anarchy, as a threat to the stability of Myanmar. Now, when they want to build this disciplined democracy, they understand that they do need to incorporate these other stakeholders. But like I said, they also want to ensure that the military will effectively be the final judges, right, the ultimate kind of almost the almost kind of, like the the sovereign above the government, right? Where you have your civilized government, you have Aung San Suu Kyi or any other presidents, for example, Wu tan Sen in 2011 but the military ultimately overseas issues that could prevent partisan politics from, quote, unquote, kind of ruining the state of Myanmar. Okay, so that's why, in the Constitution itself, it was very clear, right, that they've reserved a quarter of the seats in every level of of Parliament, from state, you know, state, all the way to the national government. That's why they have reserved all the critical cabinet seats that is predominantly, you know, national security and defense related, for active appointment by the Commander in Chief. And I think this is one point people also need to remember, especially those who are not familiar with the Myanmar's political system, that the commander in chief in Myanmar, of course, is not the elected president, right? It is the commander in chief kind of appointed within the military system, right? In this case, Min Aung, hlaing and before that, you know, on tan, Sui, etc, right? I mean, the commander in chief does not have to actively, actually listen to the President. That's actually in the Constitution. The commander in chief is the military commander, the Supreme Commander, the senior general who has control over every single kind of defense related agency inside Myanmar, all the way down to the police, right? Always, police officers. And if you recall, even in the early stages of the so called transitional period when 10 Sen was president, he also ran into issues clashing with Min Aung hlaing When he was, when min Allah was the commander in chief over the conflict, and Kachin state, right? So you have all these, and I think this is one other interesting point, and I'm sorry if I'm jumping about a little bit, is that people often perceive these, these kind of civilian parties created by the military, as being it is, to an extent, an adjunct to the military, you know, the USDP in particular. But the reality is, once an individual leaves active office from the military, yes, they might still have respect, and they have that network and that connection, but they do no longer have the type of control and influence over the top model itself. So if it's very clear, the top model today is Myanmar's military, just as was clear when you know Ne Win left, it was no longer ne Win's military. And kind of also explain why he and his family was effectively purged in the early 2000s and similarly, people were kind of assuming tan sui was kind of still pulling strange in the early period. And without a doubt, tunsu probably still had some pull and some influence, but really it was no longer tan sui military after he fell off, you know, after he actively left the military institution. Now I just want to raise one other point, which I'm glad you pointed out one thing I have problems, especially as you often see in the media as portrayal as almost, you know, the importance of elite individual actors. Now, I don't dismiss the importance of elite politics and individuals in my analysis, but my explanation is they're not the determining factor, right? The determining factor is the institution itself. So in this case, the military institution logic. It wasn't just min a lie as a dictator. And I know a lot of people like to blame min alai, and I'm sure he has a lot obviously, he is responsible for what is happening in Myanmar today, but without the backing of the military, he's just one man, and he's merely just manifestating what the military wanted at that stage in time, during the February 2021, coup, which is that they perceived that the NLD would be bad for the fully, fully, you know, from The military's interest and their belief and on that point, not to sound too naive, I do think people need to also appreciate that the military is not simply incentivized by the control of power and obviously the wealth that comes with it. We know that Myanmar, of course, economically, is doing very, very poor. Today, but that, of course, does not really hurt the top military officials, right? So obviously, there are perks and incentives that reinforce the military's continued dominance over the government and politics, but they genuinely believe, I think you know, that they are looking out for the interest and unity of Myanmar, of course, as we know three years on from the coop. And I've said this elsewhere, and happy to repeat this line that I see Lee tatmadaw as the cancer of Myanmar society. And in part, is because they see themselves as a benign but really they are a very dangerous form of cancer, really, Myanmar body politics, if you will.
Host 25:43
I think that as we try to understand the military's motives, I think just as much, just as many hot takes as there are about why the coup was launched, there are also just as many interpretations about what happened in the 2010s I often caught called the transition, although I think you don't call it that, so I don't know what we call those years, but, um, but what happened with the opening up that took place in the 2000 10s? There's a lot of interpretations as to what and how and why that was, in terms of the initiation of it, and then in and then as it progressed, what the benefit or lack thereof, or validity or fakeness, or who benefited, and what these are things that are still hotly debated today, and so looking so let's look at the analysis that you provide of that transition period. And you again, kind of building to this mystery as I was reading it, and trying to seeing as you dismissed certain takes of it. And really being curious what you landed on, you dismiss the take that it's been called a cosmetic attempt to disguise and civilian eyes, that it was actual military rule. And you refute that. You say that that the changes that the SPDC at that time would would go on to create that it led to real, albeit very limited change in during those years. And you asked the question, why then would the military voluntarily dissolve itself when it's in a relatively good position? There are not so many external threats or sanctions aren't really affecting it all that much and go to allow its political adversary to to eventually form a government in 2016 which they allow to happen? I mean, this is really building up, this, this mystery of why in the world would a body in this kind of favorite position, what would they possibly be thinking of wanting to open it up in these ways and often where, you know, at the time, I remember hearing takes like, well, things saying was from the Delta, and he was really affected by how bad Nargis was handled, and kind of opened his heart in that way. Or maybe the military wanted to, they saw that the end was near, and they wanted to have some kind of out plan, or exit plan, or wanted to open up to foreign investment and further build their coffers by moving legitimate. There's some of these theories and hot takes out there, but given your analysis of seeing that they they aren't facing these external challenges, and they're voluntarily opening up and you refute that it is just cosmetic and making it appear this way. It is actual change, although it's very, very limited. Describe your reasoning as to why they did what they did to cause what happened in the 2000 10s to start to develop.
Roger Huang 28:32
So if we go back to why there was this discipline, democratic kind of period, which is effectively a hybrid regime, right? I mean, again, hybrid regime means it has some features democratic politics, but there's, of course, a lot of authoritarian kind of mechanisms still in place. Again, when we think about what happened all the way back in 1988 and I think that's really the story of 2010s it's 1988 at this stage in time, obviously the Myanmar economy and society was in complete disarray, right? There was, you know, the economy was bankrupt. There were mass uprisings. Of course, the 88 generations were merged out of that process. And it was during this period, actually, naewin, the former dictator, and kind of, the the, you know, the main individual responsible to have produced or created the system of the socialist economy, up until 1988 recognized the failure, right? He actually recognized the failure of the bspp years. He recognized the failure of the their attempt to create a socialist economy, and actually suggested this transition eventually, to some sort of multi party political system, and also suggested this opening of the economy. So there is all this trace where I think again, going to the heart of it, understanding the military, the military honesty itself as the prime state builder of Myanmar. Now they are responsible to build the state. They tried the social system for over 20 years. It failed, so now it wants to try something else, and that's why they're marching in unity, but in the opposite direction, is how I phrase it, right. So they were, up until 1988 marching unity towards creating this socialist economy. Once they realized it's felt fine, will turn reverse, but walk in the other direction towards so called democratization, but their version, rather Burmese way to democratization, according to the military, their version of a multi party political system, which with all these features of what, again, the discipline democracy, again, a phrase that's actually used right in the Constitution itself. So this is where I say that we can't always dismiss what the military says. Yes, they're not saints. Yes, they are benefiting a lot of the opening of the economy. And I think that's what threw some people off thinking about 2010 and 2011 is that in fact, really, since the 1990s onwards, despite the brutality of the sorsd and SPDC, despite the cracking down, cracking down with opposition and censorship and all this, the military was actually actively trying to engage with the international community. It was trying to actively engage with the US and other countries, but it was ironically, the US and other societies and the Burmese democratic activists diaspora movement that was isolating Myanmar from the broader international economy, and which then allowed other countries with less kind of concern For issues of, you know, human rights and democracy, such as China, Thailand and other countries, to then actively engage with Myanmar. So if you actually look at the Myanmar economy in the 90s, 1990s and early 2000s Yes, it was a slow, growing economy, but it was a growing economy, and it was really enriching a lot of people. It was making multi relatively wealthy. It was making a lot of these cronies, you know, Zozo taser, you know, all the only usual suspects. This is where they got their wealth, right. So they understand that there is an incentive to open up this economy, that this is the right path. You know, I think the military was convinced they were doing the right thing. Look, we're now finding getting richer.
We can see some of these benefits. And at the same time, if you recall the 1990s all the way up until 2011 that it was also one of the longest period of relative peace for Myanmar, right? Because there were these series of, you know, de facto ceasefire agreements with a number of ethnic insurgence groups, where they allow, you know, prominent groups such as such as the UW SA and others, to actively participate in the economy by basically not fighting each other. And everyone benefit from this, including especially the military. Because military's presence was not really felt in the ethnic peripheral areas in the past. But because of these ceasefires, they were able to expand its control, you know, expand the Burma state, if you will, expand the Myanmar state into these parts that were used to be kept out from from the regime in Yangon and then nepido. So when you when they actively said they were doing this, and they see the benefit of this kind of slightly the opening of this economy. It was built in this discussion of in their discussion about writing the Constitution, right? If you look at the the development constitution in the early 1990s again, I'm not, you know, I'm not victim blaming anyone, obviously here, but it was because of actions taken at a time where the opposition does not want to compromise, right? They see themselves as the real, legitimate winners of the election, so they refuse to play the military's game, saying, oh, you know, the military changed its mind saying the election wasn't really for a government, it was for the Constitution, you know, drafting convention, blah, blah, blah. And initially, NLT participated in that, of course, but then gradually they refused to play along, and effectively got kicked out. And even then, even then, the military didn't, the NLD was technically still a legal party up until 2010 right? So even during the worst crackdowns, you know, during the long periods of, you know, house arrest were Aung San Suu Kyi and all the other prominent activists. It was still legal party because the military said it was going to build its version of a multi party democracy, right? And the only reason the NLD got the register, if I remember correctly, was in 2010 in a lead up to the elections, you know, the 2010, elections, because the military said, hey, you know, we've taken this long period of writing this constitution. We think this is a perfect constitutional system that will allow the country to grow. You basically have to, you know, pledge and say you play within the constitutional framework, and then you're allowed to compete. So. Back in 2010 the NLD refused to participate in that process and was the registered. Of course, we know after this transition to civilized version of the government under Tencent with the USDP, we saw real changes. I think yes, there were limitations, but I think we also need to remember, for those who have lived in Myanmar, you know, of course, the Myanmar people themselves, prior to 2011 this was not a cosmopolitan, you know, a cosmetic change. This was real. Suddenly, you can actually have almost full access to internet. This is astounding. For a lot of Myanmar people, you know, you have access to everything. Finally, you can actually, you know, talk about democracy and human rights and all these things you know. I'm sure you remember in your days Myanmar, you know, up until the election, there are seminars and news conferences about democracy, about corruption, about human rights, all these things that was unimaginable during the height of the so or csptc period. Again, they did not have to do this, but they did this because, I think, honestly, they thought they were doing the people a favor by building this version of discipline democracy. And I know it sounds a bit contradictory, saying, Well, then why 2021 because they've refilled the system. That never seems to be working. Aung San Suu Kyi hasn't rocked about too much. In fact, the NLD was protecting the military in many ways, right? Especially, for example, the treatment of the Rohingya populace. You know, she actively defending the military's action in a Hague, right? So that's, I think a lot of people's greatest mystery is, then, why 2021 and I think Lazi response. And I'm sorry, I'm not trying to offend anyone, but lazy response is like, okay, Min Aung hlaing, personal ambition. Blah, blah, blah. Now, of course, that is one of many reasons, and I don't dismiss min Aung hlaing, agency needs to be accounted for. Yes, he obviously has ambitions to be president himself. Yes, it's also about personal prestige and power for himself.
But honestly, going back to it, I know I'm sounding a bit like a broken record now, but back to it, I do think it started to perceive, like NLD as being potentially sight, moving away from that disciplined, democratic system that has built. As you know, it's starting to wonder when the when the end of these actively campaigning to change the parts of the Constitution where they want to lower the military's involvement or military's representation in a different level of Parliament. For example, I think these were all seen by the military as potentially leading to this incoherence in the Myanmar body politics potentially also leading to the weakness of the military's own cohesion. Right? I talk a lot about how the Myanmar military is one of the unique military regimes anywhere in the world that has remained relatively united. Yes, they're factions. Yes, we have seen in fighting and whatnot, but has never led to the type of regime failure we've seen elsewhere. Right? The military has been able to actively purge whole branches of itself. Right? When he got rid of key new and intelligence back in 2006 or 2005, I think, oh 506, sorry, I can't remember a year later, but it was able to, you know, completely remove this powerful branch of the military itself without leading to the fail of military itself, because they they stand united. I mean, there are all these different systems where they have different domains of, kind of, almost, kind of like fifth terms, where all different commanders and different branches, knows which lines not to cross. So when an individual commander or military, you know when they cross that line, I think a military stands united to purge those who were seen as being challenged into the cohesion of the military. And I think that really kind of explains what happened in 2021 where one they see the NLD and other opposition powers as being moving away from this discipline, democratic constitutional system that it built from, you know, from 2008 constitution at the same time, if we look at those electoral results now, when you see traditional military strongholds also voting overwhelmingly for NLD, Of course, they'll be concerned. They'll be concerned that, if this further comes, this could lead to, you know, military not being disciplined themselves. And if you just need a few percent of the elite military legislators not listening to their commander in chief and voted, you know, in line with the NLT or another, another civilian party, then that could effectively remove the military's privileges and the military's kind of agenda, right? So I think that explains, you know, why min Aung hlaing was able to, you know, enact this coup attempt without sufficient pushback from within the middle. Military, because the military, as I said, Stand united on this front.
Host 40:04
That's fascinating. And looking at this period of the 2010s you describe in the book, that they were hoping they could move towards liberalization, without democratization, and that this could be a kind of form of soft authoritarianism and and you how it's usually described, or described by many people, as being a transition. And transition is a is a very interesting word, because the connotation is obviously something of a flow, something of a movement. It's often a positive connotation. You're often transitioning to something better when you when you use that word, and you challenge the notion that a transition was taking place, or that that was intended, or that there's any evidence of that happening, you reference instead, and you've you've used this term already before, so it might be a good time to return to an unpack that you say what was happening was a hybrid regime, and that The this was all going according to a military plan. Maybe it went off the rails at some point, but it was going very slowly, very meticulously, and was faced some bumps in terms of maybe depien and Nargis and saffron and some of the other incidences that happened, but that they were continuing in your words, trial and error. You say that a lot that it was this trial and error of regime maintenance to want to move to a hybrid regime, where you had, with that 2008 Constitution, that the military had the things that they cared about the most, that were purely in their domain, and that you had, as you say again, the liberalization, without the democratization, to open up some of these other sectors that where you could kind of let people play there, but we still get to keep this thing that we care about. And I think that also opens up the question, which other guests have spoken to on the podcast before, of the usual sense of governance, how has the military ever seen that. How has the military ever seen their responsibility to provide goods and services as other governments do, and guests have pointed out in all kinds of ways, from health sector to education, energy, et cetera, on and on, that this has never been something that the military has really cared about. There's also been this theory that perhaps they wanted to open things up a little bit, and then things just got open too much, partly because the US dropped the sanctions and was encouraging in all kinds of ways. This, this greater flow. We've had Scott Marcial on here, and he spoke to this directly, saying that, yes, what we wanted to do is we felt that really taking these levers off and kind of letting this natural flow happen without us really controlling and dictating everything, that eventually the momentum of what was happening would just be, would just extend far enough that it would that there'd be no turning back and be past the point of no return. And you seem to also refute that this was what was going on. And really look at that. No, no, this was a hybrid regime, regime maintenance, trial and error.
Roger Huang 43:03
So hybrid regime itself is something that is discussed in the political science literature. Unfortunately, I think you're right that not enough people point this out in the Myanmar context, and so I refer to the tensing years, right? This is when almost kind of like the successful years of the discipline democracy, in some ways, especially from the military perspective, which is, again, this is all very clearly stipulated in the actual constitution. Right, we are Myanmar, or rather right according to constitution, is a discipline democracy. We will have these features of elections. We have these features of civilian process and politics, but end of the day, the military continues to be the ultimate kind of protector, right? National protector, okay? And that's why, you know, and I've repeated this point, right? They have special privileges and controls over certain aspects of government that segregated from electoral politics, right? Doesn't matter who was voted in. Doesn't matter what the electorates want. When it comes to matters of national security, those are independently decided by the military. So that's why I meant right when we say it's not a transition to democracy, because this is what the military wanted. It says that in a constitution, it is not a transition to a full on democracy where 100% of the parliaments will be elected by people. It is not democracy when in a way that they will allow the civilian elected officials to decide on the direction of military to decide over issues of national security and border control and ethnic relationship, etc, right? That's why I didn't. Like this idea of a democratic transition. As you've pointed out, the idea of democratic transitions suggests that the tension years, and even the Aung San Suu Kyi years, was transitioning to a full on democracy. And that's not something the military ever wanted, and they've pretty much said it as much again in the Constitution, which, of course, is the most important legal document in Myanmar. Now, I know there's a few contradictions when the military itself is technically disregarding some classes in the Constitution, such as the current control now, when they carry out the coup, though, let's just remember a little bit backtrack, a little bit backtrack a little bit in February 2021, they were still justifying it from constitutional terms, right? Because there are provisions in the national security Defense Council right to have an emergency kind of decree, to have a temporary kind of military caretaker government. Now what they have ignored is that I believe they've extended the maximum period allowed under constitution. So there is irony there, of course, that even though the military claims that they're the protector of the nation and the Constitution being the most important kind of legal document, they will, of course, pick and choose. And this goes back to that idea of trial and error, right? This is something if we ever see the next stages of constitution, amendment and elections, I'm sure the military will probably address right? So probably insert something now, which will be indefinite state of emergency, if the status is in, you know, state of collapse or something, right? Of course, I'm not saying the military will indefinitely prevail. We know things are fast changing in Myanmar, but, but I will go back to your question without the, you know, diverging too much now, with the trial and error kind of evolution, like I've kind of discussed in the past, all the way back in 1988 there was already recognition that the socialist economy that they were trying to build, this one party state, the bspp, single party state system they were going to build, did not succeed. So they move towards this. Okay? We are going to now to do a step by step building of our version of democracy. So this started, of course, by with the Constitution, kind of drafting, the Constitution drafting, and also with discussions with the ethnic armed groups, as I've discussed with the long ceasefire periods and also testing the waters, right? It started to allow some diversity within society. And as you've pointed out, the tatmadaw dominant state has really not cared too much as as a state, right? Individual, there's obviously individuals that might have behaved differently and whatnot, but as a state, they were really not on top of providing welfare for its citizens. That was not their priority. Their priority was to build and unify a strong state, right preventing insurgencies, independent, breakdown of society, independence. So they just want a strong control, and that's where they allowed relative diversity within society, especially by the early 2000s all these community organizations and NGOs independently, basically running the day to Day welfare and the health of society with relatively little intervention from the state. And this goes on to the other point I made in a Chapter my book where the military needed to have a disciplined society before it can introduce this disciplined democracy. Right? It needed the society, the individuals, the citizens, to understand that we will give you these space to operate, whether it's providing health, food security to your neighbors, whether it's you know, providing free funeral service, whether it's you know, you know, whatever You know you need, right prevention, or, you know, education in, you know, health aids, etc, you can do all this as long as you do not touch on issues that are seem political at the stage right, because the discipline democracy hasn't been implemented yet right up until 20, you know, 2012 and eight with the Constitution passing, and then when it finally transitioned right in, 2010 2011 so up on this stage, you can be a disciplined society as soon as you remain at least formally not involved in politics, not the politics that the government cares, right? Welfare. Sure, you can do that. But if you're going to start talking about, you know, being, you know, kicking the military out of politics. You know, issues about partisan politics, all of this, or especially issues on ethnic relationship, and that's key, right? Very little, if you look back in that period, very little organizations were allowed to work on the peace. Issue, yes, providing welfare. You know, you can have all your minor, you know, chain, chain, Karen, whatever ethnic group creating, you know, cultural or health or another stuff is susceptible to an extent, but only those with permission. And here I draw to reference the shalom Foundation, which for many years was kind of one of the leading NGOs that was built was working on peace issue. Only these groups that were authorized of military were able to touch on these issues of nationwide significance. Everyone else. Yes, you're allowed to work on kind of your local community issues and welfare, as long as you stay out of national politics, as long as you stay out of national security. So you have this period of building up this discipline society. And then, of course, you had the so called Saffron Revolution, which, of course, was an actual revolution. Now that, again, I think, demonstrates a couple of things right? One, the state really doesn't care about its welfare, right? If people recall it wasn't initially the the uprising wasn't anything to do about regime change or democracy, any other stuff. Was a protest against a sudden removal of fuel subsidies, right? So it was economic driven, really. People were not able to go home after after the day, because suddenly bus prices have gone up, you know, by several times and two it demonstrated. And here, you know, I can't speak this with authority, but here some people, if we believe in some of them, more of a the conspiracy theory side of it. This was a test battle regime to flush out these potential challenges, this potential disruptors to the Democratic discipline, democracy that they wanted to introduce. Some people do argue, you know, you know, I don't have the facts here. But some people have argued that the 2007 they were allowed to go to this extent because the military wanted to flush out the potential disruptors. You know, you get, obviously, 88 generation leaders coming out again to prevent them being disruptors when they introduced the Constitution referendum in 2008 right? If you look at the events the Constitution 2008 referendum was already in discussion. It wasn't driven because of saffron. They were always going to do it, and even after the fact of psycho Nargis, right, the one of the most disastrous humanitarian disaster Myanmar has ever faced. Even after that disaster, you know, took place, the military was set to carry out the referendum, right? This was all in the books.
In the plan they were going to do it, irrespective of what else was happening, as long as they can see that society has been maintained to its perception of discipline. One right, only potential challenges are out. Psycho Nargis was terrible, but the regime was still in place. Look, civil society. We you know, I know there were a lot of negotiations and different both between international and domestic stakeholders to allow kind of humanitarian relief to come in, and nothing was involved. But ultimately, none of that threatened the regime stability right, and it was able to still carry it on with its referendum, even after all that. So it really kind of continued its path because it did not see at this stage in time society as posing a problem to to implement, finally, after several years of planning of this discipline democracy, and to further ensure the stable kind of and I hesitate to support transition, but a stable kind of move to a disciplined democracy of its imagination it has built for years, right? The USDP, you know, a severe, nice version, right, where it has allowed only military officers to retire and move into USDP. And this is key too, right? The USDP, two things here. The USDP is not merely an adjunct, an extension of the military. Sure, it's supposed to represent the civilian kind of aspect to align with military interests, but it is also used to transition older military officers to have a post military career, right? That's why 10 cent and three months, all of them retired, you know, all the older generation, last generation of the sptc leaders, so they can take over that, that period of signalized version of the first administration of discipline democracy. Now this is also where I'm convinced of my own arguments, where one, once you're out of the military, you do not have the type of pull that you used to have, just by what people are saying, right? Newayn tunsui, whatever. Right? So when Sriman became the Chair of USDP and started, if you remember he under his chairmanship, he rejected. It several, I think the number is 80. But to call me all that, I can't remember. It's few years ago now, but I think it rejected something like 80 retired officers from running under the USDP banner in a 2016 elections. Right, that partially explained that midnight episode right, where Sriman was, you know, basically, ungracefully disposed athlete, head of the USDP, because he was singing to one, falling away from the military's agenda, and that he was getting too close to the with, with Aung San Suu Kyi. And you'll see this even, you know, since 2016 onwards, that stigma has, you know, effectively be ostracized by the military community, is now being seen, kind of as trader to the top model and to their cause, even though he was, of course, at one time, one of the most prominent men in the military, and it was because of his actions, Right again, moving away from military agenda potentially creating tension within the military, and once it's outside the military, he no longer has that network. Once he sees the threat, he's effectively purged. And I think that's all very clear of what happened there.
Host 56:15
So you bring up the existence of civil society, and that's where I'd like to go next that's really fascinating, and looking at examining civil society. And so much of the pre 2010 period was focused on looking at capacity building and strengthening civil society. These were terms you hear over and over and over in the development community. And I was living there at the time, the expat community was very, very small. And these are things you heard sometimes whispered as kind of the critical features to look at in terms of possibly reforming and being able to find a glimmer of hope and light in Burmese society at that time, as resting in civil society. And you also kind of somewhat debunk and refute this, noting that civil society in some form, you can trace back to the BSP, the bspp days, and even before that, in the colonial era, the presence of especially religious civil societies, I think Lady Sayadaw, I know for one during the colonial period, did much to whether he knew what those Words were at the time, definitely did much to what we could see as civil society today in terms of the groups and networks he was forming. And you referenced this in the response you just gave it to just to underscore and repeat it that in the context of Myanmar, civil society, you argue, developed not so much as an oppositional force to the state, but rather to supplement the shortcomings of what the regime was not providing, and what the regime was not providing was really a tremendous amount. They've never really seen themselves as, as governing in the way we look at at other state authorities in other countries. So the civil society has come in to be able to provide, to look at those, those cracks in the system and those gaps, and do what they can, health, education and other sectors and and so when looking at where the the civil society organizations are coming in and the services they're providing, you're saying that as long as they were not stepping into other areas that they were not just tolerated, but perhaps even in some cases there was, there could be some encouragement, because they're providing things to a very impoverished community that the state is not and that might keep give them a bit of bread or rice, that might keep them a bit at bay. I really liked how Eliot presse Freeman described these. You can call them somewhat non political, or really engaged just in the services that they're providing. He described them as gateway drugs, you know as these kind of like the free funeral services or the providing food or education or whatnot, these things that aren't, aren't directly and distinctly political that he described them in the research he was doing for many years with grassroots organizers as examples of of a gateway drug, where you hope that people would come in through the doorway of these kind of easier and safer ways to engage in that through the process of doing more critical thinking and going through education, learning what how bad their military was, and kind of opening their eyes that they would get further and further down that Revolutionary Road. And in referencing the conversation with Scott Marcial, he describes how he describes how, in his position as US Ambassador to he was making the argument that, hey, we need to look as the US mission here with which wants to encourage a transition, a democratization at every level. We need to define civil society differently than perhaps the models that we're bringing in, because the way that it. Works here is that it's entering through these gaps in the system that don't look political. You know, narg and Nargis was really that was like the the the instigator, the incubator of all of these, of so much that happened there, really put it to the next level, in terms of the people having to realize they needed to come together to help those in the Delta that the military was not going to and many of those connections then that were formed in Nargis then continued on to to build and create more things afterwards, once they were created and kind of forged in that fire. And so he was arguing that the US mission needed to expand how it looked at funding and supporting civil society actors to not just be those in the traditional kind of political revolutionary model, but those that were doing things that might not look at the outset as really like, you know, meeting the goals that they wanted to see for the change they wanted in Myanmar. But this is how it starts. They're really describing a transition, a process, a movement of starting here and hopefully ending there. And you seem to be describing that okay, if you just stay in this lane, if you just stay in the sector, then we're all good. But in looking at the way that you trace the development and emergence of civil society and the historical precedents, you give of how it occurred before, and the religious manifestations that happened, and especially more in bamarre than the ethnic territories and communities where it was a bit more strict and what they were allowed to do where the military had control. Where do you look at that question of these civil society actors kind of staying in their own lane and being safe, or being this gateway drug and this transition where they can start somewhere safe, but then use those cracks in the system to continue developing internally, as well as organization wise.
Roger Huang 1:01:50
I think probably problem is even the term civil society, right? I think it's more of an associational life. I think it's one of the terms that some of us use, or, you know, non state groups, because when we apply civil society, it takes that kind of liberal normative lens. This democratization goes all the way back to turkaval and kind of civil society, you know, America's democracy, etc, and others to point out, I mean a NEO fascist, neo civil society, right? You know, some of you say, Well, how can you, you know, it's a subject that kind of normative definition of what civil society is. So this is kind of the non state, non state public actors, you know, association, life, whatever you want to call it. And I think that's probably the problem, and especially in some the policy circles, when they immediately think civil society equates good civil society equates move towards democratization, which is kind of the issue I have with that kind of reductionist kind of thinking. We only have to look at mapata to think about how they are not a pro liberal, progressive, democratic human rights, whatever you want to call it society, and they are basically a type of civil society, if we want to use that terminology. Now, what I think, though, is that, yes, I don't disagree with anything that you've said, Really, and I, you know, I think there is however we need to consider looking at actual cases. Where has civil society, quote, unquote, right? Civil society really always been this great force that pushes towards democratization of a society. Where have we actually seen societies or successful cases where countries have democratized, where civil society was the determinant variable. And I think there are very few cases I can think on top of my head. And again, those goes to the question of how you define a democracy. But if you think about, you know, I think there are studies of, you know, 1920s the Weimar Republic in Germany and whatnot, how there were very rich kind of associational life, quote, unquote, civil society groups. And what that has actually allowed us, of course, is the the construct of the regime for several decades. And then, if you look at again, just in, just in the region, in Southeast Asia, we have seen so called civil society creating more, not less polarizing conflict, pushing for more, not less democratic values. Right? The red and yellow shirts in Thailand is a good example where the conservative, pro royal yellows portray themselves as the sensible, pro democratic types, but rarely were just conservative types that did not like the populist choice of the red and its taxing kind of electromagnet. You can look at Afghans, which I just briefly, of course, mentioned mabota in Myanmar, etc, whether or not. Not really pushing for this, this kind of ideal version of gateway drug to greater democracy. Greater drug for state, sorry for civilian involvement in politics. Now, what I try to actually say in the book is rather kind of arguing whether the society can have a productive role, not towards democratization, is just to explain things as they are, right? My point is to say, you know these associational life which has roots all the way for criminal period, and we, of course, know the religious orders in in Myanmar, and especially just in a lot of Asian societies in general, have always been providing kind of the social, cultural, educational, health center of many communities. And that has really kind of continued in Myanmar, even during the worst of times when Lee bspp tried to purge any kind of non state, non state endorsed space, right? So sorry, so any space that has to be endorsed by a state. So there were kind of this perception that there was lack of this associational life in Myanmar, and that's just, frankly, not true, that this has always survived in some form or the other. And my point really was to say these associational group, associational groups, or, you know, life existed, whether, if it's during the PSP, PP, Birch, whether it's during the military junta of the you know, 90s through 2010s they exist almost in parallel, right in parallel, to the state you and I both kind of discuss. And pointed out, I still want to say, keep to your lane. Address their communal needs. It supplements to the the weakness, the gap of what the military can or is willing to provide. So in some ways, it worked well to military's benefit, for the society to continue to flourish. And I drawn I remember this case, which I did briefly discuss in my book, during August, right where you have complete different positions taken on by by the officially, illegal government and individual commanders, where they're like, yes, we'll support you to go and help the relief effort, as long as you don't kind of, you know, wink, wink, nudge, nudge. But get on with it. Because I know I can't do much as a, you know, one in the government, but I know you have the capacity and resources to do so. All you need to do is for us to wave you through and we're happy to do that kind of thing, right? So there is that recognition, whether it's it's, whether it's a capacity or or willingness issue for the military to address this gap, and I think the military is happy to allow the space to thrive as someone does not again, touch on those core interests.
Host 1:07:43
Your angle is the military's side. So I don't know to what degree you're able to answer this and how much you've studied, or if you just if you've come across an opinion in in looking through it, but it does make me wonder, Where is the agency of the activists and the civil actors and the grassroots and everything on the ground in the model that you've presented of the this discipline, democracy, the military, is trying to achieve the hybrid regime, the trial and error. It does leave open the question of, well, then where is the where, if at all, do you see the agency or activity of of these civil actors?
Roger Huang 1:08:23
Yeah, that's a good question. You know, the problem with with political scientists is that you could just over the definition of terminology itself. Could you can write a book, right? Overly, what is civil society? What is democratization? What is democracy? And, like I said, I hesitate to use the word civil society, given that it gives kind of a theological, normative kind of understanding of what is happening in this kind of non state space. There are obviously a lot of political scientists that argue the importance of a strong civil society in promoting and checking the balance of the state, I think to an extent, Myanmar society is already doing that a little bit. I know that sounds a bit controversial, but only to the extent, as I kind of said, it's checking the state's inability to address the most basic needs of society. So it's already trying to do that, right? It is already trying to address that gap of the state. Now, if you want to push further to say how this can transition into a political force. Now, again, I, you know, based on my own kind of observations, I don't think that was ever really happening into a kind of coherent, anyway, a coherent political force, and in parts, because there's such mirror out and diversity of interests and ideologies, right? And two, and I can't really comment on what has happened in the last two years, because I think a lot has changed in Myanmar, in many ways. And I do think, if I just get a second comment on this. I know the book almost suggested otherwise, but I do believe this is probably a critical stage today, that the military is probably in one of its weakest position, relatively speaking, anyways, compared to the last several decades, doesn't mean the military will necessarily collapse. I do hope the military does get out of politics at some stage, turn around later, but, but I do think this is the most legitimate kind of challenge that the military state is facing in its kind of more contemporary times. Now, going back to civil society or associational life, like I said, I think it's already doing some of the stuff that it is addressing checking the power of the state by addressing these issues the state is unable or unwilling to provide. But we also got to remember, if we look at just 2016 to you know 2021 I know this doesn't exactly answer your question, but based my own understanding and conversations, even when we had the nominally NLD led Aung San Suu Kyi led government when there were greater opportunities for the NLD kind of led coalition government to work with civil society, I believe they did not do that right. My understanding was that the NLT really didn't like to consult and share information and power with those perceived to be outside of the inner circle of the for sure. So sorry, it's not really answering your question, but I think, unfortunately, I'm bit of a pessimist and a downer, and I just don't see any immediate term greater cohesion within the civil the so called civil society space to produce this kind of positive, liberal, democratic kind of narrative that might serve as a genuine counterweight to the authoritarian practices of the military in a systematic kind of nationwide manner. Again, I know a lot has changed the last two years. I know since the operation 1026, and 27 Sorry, I forgot the actual date. Now that, I mean, the situation has changed a lot with the insurgencies in the civil war in Myanmar. But even then, right and now I'm pushing my luck a little bit now by commenting on more current events, I do think we have to be careful of the very positive narrative we're getting of these different in search insurgent groups capturing, you know, villages and towns and command and post, right? You know, last news is, you know, Arakan army capture base, you know, etc. We just have to be very careful, because even if we want to extend this conversation, this discussion about non state actors promoting democratic values, trying to replace the military in Myanmar, I'm not sure the opposition is united on this even today, right with the different interests, the various ethnic armed militia groups, with the nug itself, you know, and I don't want to talk too much about the energy, because that's not something I have followed as closely as I should have in the last three years. But how much coherence there is even within the nug and their relationship with other potential opposition forces, including civil society, remains a big question mark.
Host 1:13:27
You quote betrayal litner, noting that the he noted that the drive for democracy in 1988 he felt was irreversible, and that you challenged that notion, saying that the military was not only able to deflect the popular rejection to their rule, but also to build and strengthen and consolidate their own powers since 1988 1990 and this, I find this contrary to an argument you hear a lot these days that from 1988 it was the debaaki movement has gathered steam that these have all been different iterations, pushing forward in different ways and becoming stronger, learning their own trial and error, learning what works and doesn't. You definitely see within the activist movement the previous generations being tutors for the younger ones that come along. You see that all the way going back to, you know, 1974 uthans funeral and those people that were involved in that then, then overseeing or being kind of elders, uncles in 1988 and you see it up till today. It's interesting hearing your argument with it, because I take it one of two ways. When I first was absorbing it, you know, obviously it was a bit depressing in the sense that it's, looking that whatever is happening on the ground through these efforts to try to make changes, that there is still this cold, iron grip of the military that is in your analysis, at least, is more or less controlling things their own way. But I one of the things I thought also in reading this is that you have this silver lining that. That perhaps these last three years could be something that is finally changing that trajectory. I know that your analysis is not so much based on what's been happening in detail the last few years, so I won't ask a question on that. But, and again, you're looking primarily from this military side. And so I wonder if, as pessimistic as the analysis could be, that that this has really been within the military grips this whole time, and that's contrary to this kind of democracy movement, gathering force, gathering steam and making progress, that there could be this silver lining, that if up to the 2021, coup, there was this sense of working with the military, tolerating them. So there was this accommodation. And so I wonder if there could be a sign of hope, or a glimmer of hope, that if the opposition, the resistance, democratic movement, whatever we want to call them, the ethnic coalitions, the nug, if they can get it right, and we won't talk about whether they are getting it right or not, because I know that's not where your analysis is, but if they can get it right, if they could figure things out and come together that this is actually flipping the tables on your pessimism, because this is actually the one thing that is is able to really dramatically, for the First time in generations, make a movement to that trajectory that the military has long been on.
Roger Huang 1:16:27
The first point that you're kind of discussing was this kind of growth and expansion and strengthening of the democratic movement in Myanmar, right? That this learning from a past. And, you know, I'm not disputing the fact, right? I do think there is a growing politicized and mobilized population that is more aware and conscious and demand, right, whether it's just a demand for change, for the military, or if you want to package that as a demand for democracy, which I'm sure is a genuine demand by a large, or a good majority, of the Myanmar populace, but you know, but then, how do we define what you mean by strength? If you define strength merely by saying, yes, there's more and more people aware and demanding for this change, I have no disagreement. There none at all. I think it's very clear that the demand to replace the military, demand for more political participation by civilians and by civilian political parties have been growing right the last several decades, and the the the kind of boldness and strengths of the Myanmar people coming out To demand for these changes. So again, I have all respect for all those people and activists who are making these demands and sacrificing their life and liberty and health. But then when, again, coming in really up, at least until, you know, 2020, 2021, I didn't really think this democratization movement was gaining an upper hand, right vis a vis the military's friends. And I think that kind of has been proven in some ways, or maybe it hasn't. Maybe, maybe I am, maybe they have, maybe they were gaining this upper hand, and that's why the military fell threatened, right, to carry this group, which is kind of a point I tried to make earlier, right, that the military must have seen in some ways that an overwhelming second victory for Aung San Suu Kyi could potentially lead to the actual changes to their disciplined democratic system. But I just don't see genuinely that this democratic opposition, at least up to the publication of my book, was in the upper hand where it could force the military to take further actions to lead to become this genuine democratization and a removal of military in politics. Now if we want to look at more how military regimes have allowed greater power sharing and eventually actual withdrawal and exit from politics, then I think more really needs to be done by addressing the military itself, now in more successful democratic movements, and here I can comment more confidently by drawing a comparison here to Taiwan, which wasn't exactly a military regime, but it was Also under a long kind of, you know, with the Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party, establishing its political regime in Taiwan since 1949 onwards. Right? It was at one stage the longest martial law regime anywhere in the world, when you finally got rid of martial law in 1988 right, where the Taiwan is now seen as a genuine case of successful democratization anywhere in the world, right, especially in Asia. I can't really think of a more successful democratization case. You know, you can talk about the Philippines Indonesia, and I can point all of these problems, right? Philippine and Indonesia. Or even Thailand, you know, their transition to again has this word transition, but the supposedly democratization of these different Southeast Asian countries, and in the Taiwan Taiwanese case, it was because of infighting within the ruling party. But within the KMT, the different factions have actively different ideology and vision for Taiwan that it allowed the more kind of pro democratic faction to introduce genuine democratization of the Taiwanese political system. Allowed the then KMT to work with civil society and opposition parties, whereas in the Myanmar case, you just haven't really had that opportunity. One you need to have a genuine incohesion and serious infighting within the tatmadaw institution itself, within the military itself, to allow that opening, I think, to then have whoever can legitimately say they represent different sectors of the opposition to work together to implement this if you want a more democratic, fair society. In Myanmar, and that's just hasn't really ever happened, right? You could make the point saying that was what was happening during the Aung San Suu Kyi period, when she was in government and State Counselor. But I don't think that really happened. What you did see was Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD, like government tendering, protecting the military. Yeah, never real compromise, no real discussion. Of course, I think because Aung San Suu Kyi realized she didn't have that power. And I think again, you know, I think this will require future scholars analysis to look at more closely. But I think in part, it was because Aung San Suu Kyi and I raised this point earlier. Didn't use civil society or non state space to help strengthen her hands. She excluded these other potential allies by working with saying the framework that the military wanted.
Host 1:22:17
Why do you think she did that, and why did the NLD in general adapt these liberal policies when they were when, when they had more the reins of control.
Roger Huang 1:22:27
So here, you know, I might contradict myself a little bit. I'm hoping my response now will sound intelligent enough to not sound too contradictory. One, yes, I think unsung, they realized, of course, how the constitutional framework worked right for many, many years. They were very uncompromising, right. Even up until 2010, elections, they refused to endorse the Constitution. They refused to play the military scape right. They refused to play their game of disciplined democracy, until obviously, some sort of elite negotiation students happen when you have that now infamous photo, or famous photo of Tencent, meaning Aung San Suu Kyi, that portrait under the portrait of Olatunji stat online, of course, then, which led to NLD Suchi saying they are willing to now endorse the Constitution and work within the framework and risks. Of course, its history with the 2016 election. So when it did gain some position of power. I think Aung San Suu Kyi and LD realized that it was not in a position of strength, right? I think they were pandering, thinking, if they were showing this goodwill, they could convince the military that they were reliable partners that could eventually lead to negotiations and compromise, and that's why Aung San Suu Kyi went out of the way. I remember, you know, very clearly when she actually spoke very, very endearing of her three military cabinet offices. I don't know if you can recall that when she was talking to, I think, with reporters for international media actually spoken very favorably of the three military appointed cabinet ministers in the government. And then, of course, when you had these cases of civil society actors or even the media journalists being arrested and harassed over a number of issues, from 6060, political commission law to, of course, the treatment those two Reuters journalists, you know, again, Aung San Suu Kyi might as well, has just taken a line from the SPDC days, which making a place that this was a matter of law and security, right? And I think all of this was her attempt to demonstrate that she used a reliable partner to the military, thinking that this would allow that eventual compromise and negotiations in her second term. And I think she probably realized this was not happening in the lead up to the elections, and that's why, if you recall the NLD at the stage, she would then finally, after several. Years in government, did not really say or do much on the constitutional issue. Finally started talking about making constitutional amendments and changes, because I think they realize that the military wasn't basically didn't buy into her trauma fence, right? And that's where, again, as I discussed earlier, that this is the red line, once Aung San Suu Kyi actively campaigned on this issue, and once the electoral outcome demonstrated that there were people, especially at the grassroots level, within the military strongholds, voting for NLD, that's when the government, sorry, that's when the the military saw that its discipline, democratic system is under threat, and that they had to, you know, get back into in a direct front line of command.
Host 1:25:56
And I want to get at the more the nuance of when we describe the military vision, or their their aim of discipline, democracy, and dig into just how monolithic we're talking about, and you've already broken down a little bit some of these military figures that during the 2010 period started to to to distance themselves, or to show their own personality or their their own predilection in different directions that they were, they then became somewhat ostracized. But there is, there is that question of when, of when the opening started was, and even at the time, I remember hearing as as we were looking, you know, month by month and and cycle by cycle, that more and more was opening up and wondering, are we going to get to this point where you really can't roll the clocks back? And I remember in real time being in those moments and people wondering like, well, is are are the more conservative generals that are not at the forefront of making these changes? Are they really happy with this, or are they thinking that it's going too far, and reference this point earlier as well, that there is a theory that that they that there was an intention to want to open up to some degree, but then the flood just happened, and that that's also been, that's been used as an explanation as to why The resistance is as as strong and as resilient and as connected as it's been where we haven't seen in previous years, because they for them, democracy was not just a theory. I mean, we've had people on that have said that have been democracy activists in different different iterations, and they said, Look, when we were trying to get democracy before, we had no idea what the hell democracy was. We just knew that it wasn't this, and anything other than this has to be better. So we just wanted something that seemed like the other world had that we didn't have. And we want to try to bring it here, even though we had no idea what it actually was. And then saying, then these same people saying, you know when, when 2021, came along, we knew what tomorrow. We knew what we were losing. And not just us, but the younger generation knew what we were using, which has kind of been used as evidence that this flow went too far, because it it, it brought this, this, this understanding and this firsthand experience to people that then were willing to fight and sacrifice in ways that we haven't seen before. And so I wonder your thoughts on because as you describe this discipline democracy that the military is trying to implement. And this kind of stay in your lane of, okay, we're going to, we're going to keep this, but we're going to give you that we're going to have liberalization without democratization to and you do reference the clicks you do. You don't go into detail in the book, but you do reference that in the USDP, there were different cliques that were, were pushing in different directions. And yet, you also talk about the remarkable, to use that word again, the resilience, the remarkable resilience that the military has shown in loyalty and in preventing factionalism over these years.
Roger Huang 1:28:49
One of the main point I try to make is that once the military decides on their end goal, their end game, they will march in unity. And that's why just this trial and error. And I think this coupe is that still going back to that same routine of trial and error to trial this discipline democracy during 10 cent 2011 to 2016 and they saw that as successful, right? That was a successful period for them, until the election results kicked them out. You know, it's like head on success of what we're kicked out. But, you know, you know, this is a system we built. We still have the control leverage over the core issues that we care about. So, so they'll, you know, basically allow this. You know, smooth and peaceful transition, relatively smooth and peaceful transition of power. Now, one of the first immediate thing still that Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD did, of course, was create this position of State Counselor. And I think that was really one first mistake, personally, again, not victim blaming here. And you know, I guess Hindsight is 2020, but even then, and I, I believe I made this point, if you look at when they voted to create this position of the State Counselor. None of the military MPs obviously voted for it. And I think they, I believe they stood up in unison as a protest or something. But, you know, they do. I think see these things seriously, that if you go things outside of the Constitution, right? This is, this is an error from their system. We're trying this. You're creating errors. This needs to be addressed. And of course, if you remember that there was that infamous assassination of the Muslim lawyer that was helping Aung San Suu Kyi look at constitutional amendment. And the Yangon airport itself, again demonstrates all of this, where any action taken by the civilians to try to change the system was seen as an error, right? So your question was, more, was this democratization and transition happening too fast to the liking the civilization to the more conservative generals? Well, maybe, but I don't think that's the right question, because they've decided this was the position that they were going to go, and they've seen, even during that period between 2011 2016 that, yes, allow all this internet, allow these foreigners to come in to preach about democracy, human rights, but it didn't actually threaten the military's control and their key interests, right? But again, if you actually see when crackdowns did happen, and it did happen during tensions period. It was still always on cases that threatened the military's idea of security and defense. So when you had a nationwide kind of discussion about, I think, was the education, there were crackdowns. When you have journalists and others touching on issues of ethnic affairs and security, they were arrested. And this also happened during Aung San Suu Kyi Suji, I was gonna say, yeah, right, so that pattern remains. So, you know, it wasn't really an issue of opening too fast and too quickly and allowing all this, because none of that that's great and that's real change. But I think that didn't threaten the military. They don't care when people are able to watch the latest, you know, movies and music and talk about democracy and numerous and all this and that, as long as it did not touch on issues they really care about. So this is mirrors, even how they behave during the SL or the SPDC period, with the exception of obviously genuine greater liberty and, you know, public spaces for all this stuff, but they draw a line when it comes to issues. So, you know, there is that before introduction for discipline democracy, and after introduced, introduction of discipline democracy before you're able to do all this stuff, as long as you don't touch on national politics after, you're able to touch all the stuff that's only civilian, partisan side of politics, as long as you don't touch on the military side of state Governance and politics. And this is one point, and I'm sorry I don't think I've actually emphasized enough in our discussions, which I briefly talk about is this discipline democracy, this hybrid system, is also talking about segregated politics, right? You have clear delineation, where one big chunk of governance is reserved for civilians, elected parliamentarians, and partisan politics. And then you have the other side of politics, where the military has control, dominance, monopoly of power, where they don't think civilians and partisan politics and citizens and individuals should touch on and I think that has not changed, whether it's pre disciplined democracy, discipline democracy in 2011, and post, where there are certain things that will draw a red line. Of course, there are more red lines prior to the introduction of the discipline democracy, but at the heart of it those key issues, touching on the Union of Myanmar, touching on relationship between the different ethnic groups, touching on the prominence of the military dominance in certain aspect of the politics that has not changed.
Host 1:33:57
Looking at today and looking at the past few years from the military perspective, what would you wage? What would you guess how they're looking at the current conflict? Do you think they see it as an existential battle, that that that their their entire apparatus may be destroyed, and and and a new Myanmar would come out of that. Do you think they still have a vision for a disciplined democracy, as crazy as that sounds with what they're facing? Do you think they're looking at a return to a kind of totalitarian rule and a harsher dictatorship, or do you think they're looking for an exit strategy that they that some way to get out of the the mess that they're in. What? What would you given your analysis before and where they find themselves in this conflict now? How would you characterize how they're seeing it, what they're thinking?
Roger Huang 1:34:52
Well, I do think the military was unaware, right? I think this is where you're definitely right, that this opening which I didn't think they have a problem necessary, again, I don't stay in touch on the key issues, but they didn't realize how strong the resistance was going to be. I this was definitely not something to expect. It's kind of like the Russians going going to Ukraine, right? This is not what they imagined. So this is where the military definitely, I think, was cut surprised. Now that's kind of what I was discussed in the past, right? I think a military remains united, despite all these, all these, well depends how you define it, but very dramatic developments of where the ethnic peripheral groups and the PDS have expanded its presence, right? Where I believe the nug declared I had 50% control of the territories, which, you know, I think it's hard to quantify, right? Yeah, for sure, but it is, it is true. And I've just made this point earlier. I do think this is the, probably the most challenging time for the military where it does not have the same type of dominance and control that it once has privilege over for several, several decades. I haven't said that you've seen, I think, recently, and I can't remember exactly the chain of events and the personalities involved, but I think there were some recent reshuffling and even purchase a few military personnel, right? But at the moment, we have not seen that in that crack. I do think if the military together as unit sees the current direction as ultimately going to lead to the collapse of the military cohesion, they might change directions. What direction they'll change. I can't possibly comment on that, but I don't think we've reached that stage. Okay? So, until there is a genuine discussion within the military itself, until there's, you know, real kind of consensus that their current direction is a wrong one. I don't think we'll see much change in the in a short, near future, right? I think it will just be a long, drawn out Civil War. Now, again, anything could still happen, right? I mean, min a lie might have poor health for all we know, you know, simply don't know that much, but any good thing could happen. I do think again, elite individual actors and their agency is important. It's not the determinant factor, but it is important. So if something happens within an elite level, right, or even something within the opposition, right, what happens if Aung San Suu Kyi, you know, and I don't wish this on her or anyone else, right? Is poor health in detention. We don't know what's exactly happening there, because there's so little news about her actual kind of general wearability. I mean, what if something happens there to her health and otherwise? What does this mean? You know? And we do know. We do know that there were warming up of military personnel, especially those who again retired from military that became quite friendly with Anna Suji, right? We know this, even like like previously discussed, so you might right, or even some of the cabinet ministers, including the State Counselor office and presidential office, many of them were former military offices, right? What happens if you have something dramatic like that happens to these elite actors that could create another critical juncture, that could change an error? So my only point, really is that at the moment, as things stand, I don't see a crack within the military that would change things dramatically. I think, unfortunately, this might be a long, drawn out conflict, but obviously, I wouldn't want to comment too much on that, because anything could still potentially happen me online. Might, you know, have four house, get covid or something, and have a really poor response to that, there could be Young Turks. I mean, we've had attempts in the past of Young Turks. You know, discussions of coop within the coop. You know, if enough military, you know people in the military sees the current direction as the wrong one. Maybe they'll have a united front and give some sort of an excuse to remove me online and take a different direction. But even that direction, I don't see it as going to be something like, okay, we're just gonna, you know, return to things as they were prior to 2021 right? That's not gonna happen. But if there's any silver lining is that we have seen again, when the military is united and sees its current direction as being a disastrous one, they can change a full 180 right from socialist to a democratic movement and even a. Uh, the past purges, right? So, you know, if you remember, I can't remember the top my head. Now, the leader before tan Sui, 1988 you know, the coup and the subsequent election, the first leader wasn't tan Sui, right, Sao, Mao, right. Somehow, was the the coup leader that took over after the collapse of the bspp, and he was removed ostensibly, I think, for mental alcohol reasons, but because the military saw him as being the wild factor that could lead to lead to the kind of collapse of the military regime. So if min Aung hlaing does go a step too far where the military no longer has trust in Him, they could create some sort of, you know, agreement right to gracefully retire min Aung hlaing. Again. This is just a hypothetical. It could happen. I'm not banking on it in the near future, but that's if we want to try to be more optimistic. I think that would be the most realistic way for the military to change its direction, which is that one there's going to be a rethinking within the military and reconfirmation that they need to do something differently, right?
Host 1:41:25
So your answer is looking more at kind of the top leadership and the top brass, and how they're seeing things and what direction they might make. So let's look in the other direction now. And there have since the February 1 2021 there's been a big push. There are many groups that are that have been organized and leading this effort to defections and to trying to encourage and there's there's whole YouTube channels and publicity and dialogs and forums and panels, everything that you see that is at every level trying to encourage military defections to take place, which is, is also for those that are still hoping for some kind of less bloody or less violent solution. This is having soldiers just simply refuse to fire their weapons on civilians. This is about the best you can hope for, but how what likelihood Do you see of and what challenges are present if you're looking at the lower rungs and given the military conditioning, as well as their families virtually being hostages and and and growing up within that military family and apparatus, what what do you see as the the challenges that are being faced for these defection efforts?
Roger Huang 1:42:38
So just one first thing, not directly answer your question. Is that, just to be clear, I still think it's the institutions and structures that has broader kind of determinant factor, rather than the elite individuals, right? Sure, yeah, allowing for this possible change. Now, about this discussion about, I know there's been this active, this active, uh, movement, right, trying to convince people to defect from the military. And I, I think there's been all these different figures that 1000s are leaving. You know, it's one of those things that there's no way I can obviously verify any of these numbers. I think it's a great initiative. But as a pessimist, again, I just don't see this as at the moment, in any ways, to to have a determinant factor to kind of change that tide. We know that, yes, the grassroots are suffering, but the grassroots always suffer, right? Whether it's it's the opposition or in the military, it's always a frontline that it suffers the most. But at the same time, like you've pointed out, there are these. Are a lot of these. Military families are really inbuilt in the system for generations, and this is so many of them. I mean, their families could, as you've alluded to, could be held hostage if they defect, and also those who remain the military, at least the middle and the top class, but even even those in the grassroot, at least their family in metropolitan centers in particular, still have parallel and more privileged access to resources denied to the general civilian population. Right? I can remember, you know, discussions with some friends during the height of covid pandemic, where, you know, the military provided really decent, you know, for Myanmar standards, really decent quarantine standards for military families that had covid, right? And we, of course, Myanmar, like many other places during the height of it, was a very miserable place with the pandemic. And I think that still has, you know, there is, one, the incentive, right? There's still incentive to think, if you stick with the military eventually. One, you still, in general, have better privilege to your counterparts in the civilian life. Two, there is that potential. If you rise to the top, you have this. Wealth and prestige. Three, it is such an indoctrinated institution, right? All militaries are, and especially military like the one in Myanmar, with such a long history of building this myth and narrative of the 30 comrades building on some building the modern Myanmar military, the military being the state builder, and the ultimate kind of the most objective and, you know, respectful institution, all that I know that's changed right now, I think there's also an active movement of not referring to them as the tatmadaw, as the Saddam, right? But again, I think this is a great effort. I think there's something to this. I don't know all the facts and actual movements, whether this will lead to a massive defection. That's hard to say, right? It's just hard to say. And when you have such a dream, height of propaganda warfare. I mean, all warfare requires a lot of propaganda and myth making, and, you know, an information, disinformation. I just, I just hesitate to, you know, the numbers that are shown to us until we have active evidence. You know, we haven't seen, for example, a whole, say, battilian, just fight. You know, you know, fights, fights, fights there. You know, former comrades in arms. We just haven't seen that level yet. Now we've seen some encouraging footage of a few, you know, officers working line. I remember early on in the in the civil disobedient movement, where police officers have, like, you know, put down their but, you know, Patel, their their stakes and stuff. I've seen loans, but you've seen a bit of that in 1988 right? Even back in 98 you've seen a bit of that. I'm sure there's more in absolute numbers today than it was back in 1988 pretty much. But are we going to actually reach that critical juncture where we have such massive defection that the military is, you know, becomes obsolete. It's I ponder on that point. I wish, I wish I could say with greater optimism that the defection movement is making a real difference immediately. I just don't know Sure. Well,
Host 1:47:14
I so appreciate the time that you've taken with us. These are really dense topics, although the time is certainly flown by. It's quite interesting getting into this. And there's a lot in your book, which, again, will highlight for our listeners, the paradox of Myanmar's regime change. And definitely recommend people to read that to get some kind of insights into the military's thinking. And before we go, is there any other parts of this conversation or your work that we haven't touched upon that you might like to mention here.
Roger Huang 1:47:43
I do think if you follow kind of my logic and my argument, you would see that the military has consistently, right, stayed on this path, right. There are this back and forth, this trial and error, but every time they see this challenge, they haven't changed its position, that it's made right? So, yes, it changed from socialist, single party state to this version of discipline, democracy. But it kept on at it. It didn't waver. It didn't modify its position, even when you had soft front, even when you had Nagas, if you look at the basic principles of the Constitution, that was, quote, unquote, passed referendum in 2008 they were exactly the same principles the slrc declared back in the 1990s it was the exact same principle. So they held on since the 1990s that they forced upon the citizens to step in 2008 and then implement it in 2011 right? So I think they're remarkably it sounds ironic, but I think they're remarkably consistent. Once they've once they've kind of set up its kind of objective. Now, how they get there is one thing, and whether they will get there is another thing. But I think, unfortunately, for the time being there, they will maintain the myth, right from our perspective anyway, perhaps the myth that the discipline democracy worked, and that it was unsunilty that was trying to change the system, and that they're trying to merely resort to back to that system. I think they will maintain that as long as they can, whether they will prevail or not, obviously, is something for you know, we will find out in.
Host 1:49:33
Hopefully in the near future, which is really so ironic to say, because, as we've established and mentioned in this conversation, the Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD had such illiberal principles on so many levels that were disappointing to many. And I don't say that as a privileged outsider being critical and judgmental of this difficult time. I say that of grassroots Burmese activists who've been in the game for. For years, if not decades, and looking at how, looking at as they came to power, and wanting to have patience with them, and wanting to having some consideration that these things would take time, and yet still, the end result being such extraordinary, illiberal practices on in many cases, and that's obviously not as nuanced. Never everything is. There's also, there were also, there's also good that they were doing. There was opening, there were opportunities that were provided and and that also doesn't dismiss your core argument, that your belief that that the military was fearful, that Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD was moving towards looking to go outside their lane, color outside their lines, and start to take the one sacred bit that that they just did not want to give up. But it there. There still just has to be some irony there, in terms of, you know, this was this. This was not the the change that many people were hoping for in 2015 or expected to see, I would say.
Roger Huang 1:50:59
Right on that note, though, I would just like to say that even during other such as time as opposition, in the first kind of period with 10 cents demonstration, I recover very vividly even then that a lot of opposition activists was already grumbling that NLD was excluding them even when they were out of power. So I'm afraid that, yeah, yeah, it's, it's just going to be a difficult path for Myanmar. And I wish Myanmar and, oh, it's people all the best. And hopefully my pessimism will be proven inaccurate. I hope to be wrong, and that will be a much more positive outcome, much sooner than I am expecting or predicting rather.
Host 1:52:00
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