Transcript: Rakhine Roulette (Emergency Edition)
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Host 00:02
Like many of you were closely monitoring the complex crisis now unfolding in Myanmar, as the destiny of a nation lies in the balance. This episode of insight Myanmar podcast is part of our special release series. Designed to respond quickly to events such as these. Episodes in this series feature a diverse array of knowledgeable voices offering unique perspectives on the rapidly developing situation. And with a streamline production process, so the interviews can be released as soon as possible. Stay tuned to this platform for continued coverage and analysis.
00:54
Defensive started in Shan state when several armed groups came together under the name The Brotherhood alliance to launch an offensive against government troops that in turn triggered other attacks across the country. Since the 27th of October, different ethnic armed groups have made substantial gains and Shan State, Kachin, Sagaing, Chin, Rakhine, Mon, Kayah, and Kayin states.
01:34
Alliance of ethnic armed groups in Myanmar has launched coordinated attacks on the country's ruling military.
01:45
The Brotherhood alliance is portraying a grimmer picture for the military. It says it's captured at least 90 military bases with whole battalions of soldiers surrendering.
01:56
Unprecedented coordination between anti military forces are mounting the biggest challenge by the military to the military government in years.
02:06
Speaking in Burmese.
Host 02:26
On this episode of Insight Myanmar podcast, we're really privileged to be speaking to Kyaw San Hlaing, and he's going to go deep into his research and his expertise in Rakhine State. Before we start off, why don't I just give you a chance to introduce yourself, share a bit about your background and work to our audience? Thank you very much for inviting me. I'm really glad to be talking about the situation, my work and my research. Basically, I'm from Rakhine State, I work as a freelance journalist and also researched for many years about the ethnic conflict, political transition and also after the military coup, I work for many news articles, analysing for international media outlet. Yeah, so basically, I'm covering about the Rakhine very intensively and I wrote a lot of Rakhine stuff. Right, thanks for that. We're to give some background for the audience. Originally, we were intending to just do a survey, an overview of how Rakhine and AA are involved in the current operation 1027 and the implications in wider Myanmar. As we got deeper into it, we realized that we really need to have some context and some background of looking at Rakhine society and politics in the last 10 to 15 years to better understand the implications for what's going on today. This is often a question in crises and conflicts, how far back do you go and look no further than ISRAEL-PALESTINE to start to ask the question, how far back do you go to understand and make relevant what's today? That's the question we're also facing here as we have this conversation. This episode, we'll definitely get into 1027, and what it is, why it's so important, the implications, as well as looking specifically from a perspective from Rakhine State, the AA's involvement, and what this means for wider Myanmar. But before we get there, I think we should start by taking a deeper dive into understanding Rakhine State, the political background and people there to build up to today, so we know which groups, parties and individuals we're talking about. There is no better person to talk about this than you. So this is a great chance for our audience to have a real learning experience with this region in this part of the country. Maybe a good place to go back to is the early relationship between Rakhine Democratic leaders and Aung San Su Kyi and the NLD in the years before the transition. Take us back there and tell us the relations that democracy parties and leaders had in Rakhine State with Aung San Su Kyi and the NLD during all those years before the 2010s.
Kyaw San Hlaing 05:31
Oh yeah, thank you very much for this question. I would say we have to look back at three periods before 2010. So, before 2010, the NLD, Aung San Su Kyi and Arakans league for democracy ALD, ALD and NLD are really good relationship and also the Rakhine parties stand with NLD for many years. I can say even in 1990 election, the Rakhine party went and stand with, formally aligned with NLD, and they can say they have a really good relationship at the time. And after Yeah, basically we can say after 2010, the ALD stand with NLD to boycott the junta project election. At the time, the Rakhine politicians, established a new political party, RNDP, Rakhine National Deployment Party, and there is a little bit difference between RNDP and ALD because RNDP is like more nationally, rather than the Democratic Party like ALD, and then I think they still have a good relationship. Rakhine has almost two parties at the time, but they maintain good relationship with NLD. And then, in 2013 to 2014, Rakhine two parties merge into the Arakan National Party, ANP, but still they have a good relationship. And in 2015 election, NLD won the entire country, ANP, Arakan National Party also won a Rakhine state, almost the whole Rakhine state area some rather than NLD. So the NLD ignored the Arakan National Party demand, especially Arakan National Party's demand for the Rakhine state cabinet, Rakhine State Prime Minister, but NLD appointed their own minister, and then they clash after 2015. The whole year you know, from 2015 to until the millitary coup February 2021, the Rakhine political parties and NLD have really huge distrust, and also Rakhine political parties think that NLD is a kind of Burma-majority and also have a good with the military, Tatmadaw. But I think here, we have to also note that in the Rakhine, the Arakan army had conflict with Myanmar military in late 2018, and there was a real intensive fighting. Also until November 10 election, especially until after election and three months before the military coup, we have fighting in Rakhine State very intensively. At the time, we can see that there were three things. First, NLD, the ruling party, shut down the internet for more than a year, so at the time we call it the world longest internet shutdown in Rakhine State, and second, NLD party, the ruling party, collaborate also to use jet-fighters for Rakhine state, and also Aung San Su Kyi is forced to sign that paper to Congress to the military, Tatmadaw soldiers who are fighting in Rakhine state against AA. I mean, she's celebrating for military members. Also, another thing is during COVID-19, there was still fighting in Rakhine State and also [?]. All these things really forced not only Rakhine political party, but also for Rakhine people to push away from the NLD party, Aung San Suu Kyi. So that's why the Rakhine people don't really trust the NLD and also Aung San Suu Kyi. This is reason yeah, especially after fighting between the Arakan army and military in 2018 to 2020.
Host 11:36
Right, there's a lot there and thanks for going into that. I think when we look back at the history, you mentioned how, initially before the transition period that Rakhine was very close to Aung San Su Kyi, the NLD they called their party ALD instead of National League for Democracy, the Arakan League for Democracy. So there was even synchronicity with the names, but as I understand it, the first real split, you mentioned some of these touchstone points of 2018, 2015, 2013, but the real split starting in 2010, correct? That's when there were elections and the NLD decided not to participate, and that left the ALD in a precarious place of deciding what to do. So tell us about that starting point.
Kyaw San Hlaing 12:27
Oh, yes, in 2010. So when the NLD boycott and decide not to participate with the election, the Rakhine Arakan league for democracy(ALD) also decided not to join and not to participate and also boycott alongside the NLD at the time. So that's why the RNDP, the new political party was found by Rakhine National League, Arakan League for democracy to join the election for the Rakhine State.
Host 13:15
Right, I'm trying to speak slowly for our listeners, because these are a lot of acronyms to remember. And if you're not familiar with all these parties, they can all run together. So I'll be repeating some of the names of the groups we're talking about to keep them in mind. The ALD was the pre-2010-NLD-aligned Rakhine party. And then those Rakhine leaders that did not want to boycott the election, they formed the RNDP, which then later merged into the ANP, the Arakan National Party, is that correct? Oh, yes. Correct. Now we have the ANP, and the ANP at this time in the mid 2010s, becomes one of the majority parties in Rakhine State, we can say. So tell us about the ANP, its ideas and activities during this time.
Kyaw San Hlaing 14:15
Oh, yes, thank you very much. At the time the ANP party seems really strong, and especially after 2015 election, NLD ingnored ANP's demand and then ANP decided to be the opposite party. So, you can see very obviously, from 2016, 2017 to the 2018 the whole Year, you see NLD came to power, and the whole time in Rakhine state until 2021 of February, there was non-stop violence in Rakhine State. Yes, but also I'm not blaming NLD, but we can see here the ruling the NLD really lack collaboration with ANP at the time, and this is one reason for what I see ANP working more in favour of other parties, I mean even USDP and even the military, they seemed to have a really good relationship at the time. So that's why after millitary coup, Min Aung Hlaing offered a position for Rakhine State and also a position for the Rakhine political party. This is a very obvious, we can see that after years of the ruling party, NLD having less cooperation with Rakhine political parties in Rakhine State; all these things push them to the other side. This is what I see in Rakhine Parties.
Host 16:38
It should be mentioned that the ANP was the majority party not just in Rakhine, this was the fourth largest party in the country at the time, and to reiterate what you said after the NLD won in 2015, it placed its own [NLD's] parliamentarians as chief ministers in all the regional governments including Rakhine, even though ANP had won a majority of seats. So, this was something that many people in Rakhine saw as unfair, correct? Oh, yes. Right. So, I think now we have something of an understanding of what was going on between 2010 through 2015, looking at some of the implications that it had post coup and where Min Aung Hlaing was able to step in, but as we go closer to the coup, 2017-2018, we have another acronym to throw here the Rakhine Front party AFP. Tell us what the AFP was and why they're important.
Kyaw San Hlaing 17:45
Oh, yes. Especially after 2017, the Rakhine parties split, ANP split into ALD, Eastern ALD and Rakhine Political Party. ANP political leader, Dr. Aye Maung try to stand to form the party AFP or Arakan Front Party, because especially, Dr. Aye Maung has really good relationship with the military and the other groups like Arakan Army AA and so forth, but for some people from the ALD, they maintained good relationship with NLD. So, they have split ideas and that's why in early 2017, ALD is split into the three factions following the structural or professional disagreement actually. Especially the faction leader, Aye Non Sein, U Hla Soe, [?]. So, these remained under ANP and the previous ALD leader established ALD under it's previous name and at the time, Dr. Aye Maung was the [?] person. Dr. Aye Maung also have his followers like it Kyaw Soe Oo and Kyaw Win. So these people, Dr. Aye Maung and these fellows established new political party called Arakan Front Party. So, at the time in 2018, in Rakhine State that we have bi-election. The Arakan Front Party leader, Dr. Aye Maung win the election even over ALD and NLD. So this was so surprising for the political officers, for us, for people from the mainland, seeing Rakhine politics. But after Dr. Aye Maung was released from prison in February, a week after Millitary Coup in 2021, Dr. Aye Maung first spoke and he gave thanks, he showed his gratitude over Min Aung Hlaing and the military group. Then Rakhine People, dramatically change their mind about the AFP and Dr. Aye Maung. Since then AFP has really low support from the people, and also right now, I can say this is only a few hundreds or so members of AFP, and also Dr. Aye Maung is still working with the military and spoke against Rakhine revolution and also against nationwide resistance against military junta. So, he's technically looking pro-military right now. We can see very obviously, this is really disappointing for the people in Rakhine State. He's not the kind of leader like he was previously in 2015 to 2016. In Rakhine, they called him a pro-military person or something.
Host 22:45
Right. So I'll recap some of what you've said for our audience who is still following along, this may be new, because this is just getting a deep dive into the complexity of Rakhine politics. We're looking at three parties before the coup that were dominating the political sphere in Rakhine State, the ALD, which was the original NLD-aligned party, which split after the 2010 elections, because some people felt that they should participate and some didn't. You have the the ANP, which were those that split from the ALD and form their own party, then you have this new AFP, which became military aligned, and you have all these three parties that are competing for space. And again, we're looking before the coup, everything changed so much after the coup, but we're not quite there yet. We're trying to understand the context and history background before getting to that point so we have a better understanding of what's going on today. But if we just take these three parties, the ALD, the ANP, and the AFP that are in this political space, let's say 2017-18, next couple years before the coup, how are these three parties relating to each other? Are they aligned in any way? Are they opposed to each other? What aspirations and what are they seeking? Are they in the same direction or are they at odds? What can you say about the relation of these three Rakhine parties?
Kyaw San Hlaing 24:26
I think we also have to mention here very obvious relationship between the three party, but here we have to talk about another, the key factor in Rakhine State is The Arakan Army (ULA/AA). So, these three parties really rely on what relationship they have with Arakan Army, I mean this is the key factor, because we can see very obviously after military coup, ANP party leaders already joined with the ULA/AA administration. Like Aye Nu Sein, the leaders of ANP Join SAC, but ALD stay with democratic NLD, but AFP, they are in formerly good relationship, but didn't enjoy any positions offered by SAC. So, ULA/AA seemed like a very much good relationship with ANP rather than ALD or AFP in Rakhine State. So, that mean ANP stay very much stronger than ALD and AFP. So, the three parties don't have a good relationship, especially AFP and ANP. So we can say ANP and ALD have somehow good relationship but AFP and ALD seems like really strained relationship ANP and AFP, no relationship at all. This is really depends on how the relationship with ULA/AA. This is why I mentioned earlier to look at the relationships between [the parties]. We can also look at post-coup Rakhine political landscape. ALD, Arakan League for democracy is less valuable compared to ANP than AFP, because ALD is kind of a smaller party. And also they have really good relationships in southern part of Rakhine State, they have some support in the southern part of Rakhine State. Also they have really good relationship with the Democratic Alliance in nationwide like NLD or other like SLD, and they have really good relationships such great parties. ALD is the only the party in Rakhine state that didn't register to contest in junta project election this year. This year or whenever, I don't know. ANP and AFP, both registered for junta project election actually last August, but only ALD didn't register. But in Rakhine State, although ALD doesn't have a strong full standing in Rakhine State, but ALD has a legacy movement, because they are the oldest party since like 1998, so they are the oldest party so they have some legacy and they have really good relationship with the main parties like NLD and SLD, democratic parties especially. But we can also see the AFP and ULA/AA relationship, especially, Dr. Aye Maung, yeah, I just talked previously after Dr. Aye Maung released in February, a week after the military coup, he expressed his gratitude to the coup leader Min Aung Hlaing for his release and also criticized for the first time ULA, a political revolutionary path deputy in Rakhine State. This create a distance from Rakhine People from him, and a week later, AFP registered for junta project election. Also, Dr. Aye Maung all the time mentioned this is the path, the election is the only fix for all the Myanmar crisis, you know, Myanmar crisis solution or something. So right now, basically Dr. Aye Maung is a pro-military politician and also turning to disrupt the party struggle of ULA/AA, nation-wide anti-military-coup movement, but ULA/AA also arrest some AFP key leaders in early 2022. So, to conclude, we can say very obviously AFP, ANP and ALD, so ALD doesn't have a strong people's vote, but ALD has kind of a legacy and also good relationships, and also really stand with Democratic value, working with nationwide Democratic Parties. AFP, very much nationalists, led by Dr. Aye Maung, pro-military party. ANP, also seems to maintain their nationalist values. Also ANP has some relationship with the military junta, and also ANP hasa really good relationship with the ULA/AA.
Host 31:48
Right, thanks for that crash course. And we now turn our attention to the AA, which I think many people will be familiar with. We hear about how strong the Arakan Army is and the ULA, of course, is their political affiliate. We've been talking about the development of all these political parties, their relation to each other, to the military, and to the NLD. And we haven't really addressed head-on the main player in here, the AA which is quite a force and something that we should delve into. So can you take us back to the origins of the AA and then the ULA along with that, and why the AA is so important today and where they came from?
Kyaw San Hlaing 32:36
Oh, yes, thank you very much. So, I think the full reason behind the rise of the ULA/AA in Rakhine State.....basically, so many people know about AA established in 2009. The youngest Rakhine organization, previously Rakhine State has so many groups, ALP, also the previous Arakan Army in Rakhine State. Also especially generation to generation in Rakhine State, there were rebellions against Central Government as well. So yeah, in a decade, we can see very obviously AA had became one of country powerful and also successful organizations like the rest of Myanamr ethic organization groups. Yeah, in early 2022, the general Twan Mrat Naing mentioned that AA has grew to 40,000 soldiers mainly presenting the Rakhine State. Yes, 6000 troops are situated in northern Shan state and like country's North or North East. Historically in Rakhine State, such group or close stands, like military style, military base, never happened. So this is the first time for Rakhine history. I already mentioned that in Rakhine State, AA is not the first revolutionary movement group, there have been so many in generation to generation, but none of the groups grew like AA in Rakhine state right now. So, when I look at the AA, why AA grew like this over the year and why it's important for Rakhine people. So, I give four reasons, first the leadership, so previously group leadership in Rakhine State are like an older people, less educated, less organized, but they have really strong nationalists, it's the same, but the leadership is young, educated, ability to grow the organization. We can see that in a leader through leader General Twan Mrat Naing, Brigadier-General Nyo Twan Awng are educated with a really good network, you know, Southern and northern Rakhine State. What I want to mention here is for Rakhine revolutionary movement, Rakhine politics, and political parties, most of the political leaders are from northern Rakhine State. Less number of political leaders from southern Rakhine State. But in ULA/AA, second deputy leaders are from Kyut Phew township, the key Southern town and he became the favorite for the southern people. That's why in short time, like in a decade the ULA/AA gain real support from the Rakhine people because historically, as I already mentioned already about most of the political leaders are all from northern Rakhine State. That was why it was really hard to influence southern part of Rakhine State, but ULA/AA leadership cover this gap. Also ULA/AA has two leaderships; they have the older generation, also the younger generation. This quality leadership in Rakhine State previously we have not seen actually. The second is the leaders set up like a council of Arakan dream 2020, maybe you may probably familiar with it, such a strategy to politically mobilize moremen in Rakhine State has never happened before. So, after AA leaders, especially General Twan Mrat Naing, immediately talking about Arakan Dream 2020, since 2016, the the people of Rakhine State began to pay attention to the ULA/AA and started supporting and now they have a dream. All the time these Arakan leaders mention, 'we have to dream, we have to move forward and this is the only way that we can work on that. So this is a really huge change for Rakhine public opinion suit to vote for ULA/AA. Another factor is during the NLD government term, we talked previously, they labelled ULA/AA as a terrorist organization, also ordered the military to crush Arakan army and also like the whole Internet shutdown in Rakhine state; all these things push Rakhine people to believe in revolutionary movement rather than electoral politics. Usually ULA has really good relationship, particularly with Myanmar-Shan border people like KIA. Also we can see MNDDA, TNLA, UWSA, all these groups are very strong recruits, you know, very strong or revolutionary groups. These groups have really good relationship with ULA/AA and we can say very obviously ULA/AA gained support and also ULA/AA gained technical weapon support from these groups. Eventhough they [ULA/AA] have people, they have soldiers, but they also need weapons, they also need alliances to be sustainable. So ULA/AA made good relationships. And yeah, definitely formed alliance with broader, the entire country's largest organizations. So these four factors made ULA/AA really grow and also stronger, and successful organization in Rakhine, and even in the country.
Host 42:05
Thanks for that. The landscape is getting even more complex. I hope our listeners are following along with us as they try to track this. So basically, what you're describing is up until the AA's formation or before they have the strength, the political power that they develop through ULA, and through the armed AA, you have this kind of Oldboy network, I might call it, these three parties that are holding the power, which have their different alliances, divisions, splits and everything else. Then it sounds like AA just breaks the mold, they come from a place where these political leaders don't usually come, and their way of thinking is different. They make alliances that have never been made before among those in Rakhine State, and they have this meteoric rise in terms of their importance and what they're doing. As they're doing this, the ground is kind of changing in Rakhine State and in the whole country as well in this new direction that they're charting. So the question would come, how are other people seeing the AA/ULA? The ULA is the political arm of the AA. When we look at the strength and the power that their rise is starting to claim, I'm wondering about the relationships. I guess there are three relationships that come to mind first, how do other traditional Rakhine political parties view what the AA's doing? How are they aligned or opposed to it? Then of course, you have the military and the NLD. So, as the AA is gaining in strength and becoming a force to reckon with how are these three different power centers, the other Rakhine political groups, the military, and the NLD, relating to the undeniable strength and presence of the AA?
Kyaw San Hlaing 44:12
Thank you very much for this question. I mentioned previously, the relationships between three Rakhine political parties, ULA/AA, and the Rakhine political parties, NLD, and the military. Here, we can also think of another possibility that came to my mind is that three Rakhine political Parties are really the parents of the the ULA/AA leaders, because here's the point, after the 2015 election, NLD ignored their demand. We also have to mention in 2018 in Rakhine State, I think around January 18, there was a kind of celebration of Arakan Kingdom, a movement, also like a political literature talk. At the time, the government shutdown and killed at least twelve people and many suffered injuries. So, people were forced to hide these events, you know, it happened in Mrauk U in 2018. So, these kind of events also ignited the people to change their mind. Rakhine political parties working to gain self-determination, for self-rule or self-government in Rakhine State is impossible for the people of the Rakhine state. They changed to the view that only the armed struggle against the central government is the answer, because all these years, Burmese-central-political-party politicians really ignored the Rakhine people's demand, Rakhine public sphere, and also long internet shutdown. Rakhine people are really on their own, especially after a year or more of internt shutdown, Rakhine State people broken themselves from being part of Burma, because most of the other parts of country are using the Internet and also you know, especially during COVID-19. In Rakhine State people are really worried about the COVID-19, also worried about the military. All these things really forced [the Rakhine people] to support the ULA/AA. And that's why ULA/AA become the key factor. Also for the three [Rakhine] political parties, most of them support ULA/AA, even Dr. Aye Maung. Early years Dr. Aye Maung really supported ULA/AA and that changed after he was arrested and was released a week after the military coup, he changed his perspective very strongly, but he maybe supported ULA/AA, because he wanted to gain support from the people of Rakhine state. But after the coup, he was changed and strongly supported the military. Also during t2015-2016 in Rakhine State, Dr. Aye Maung is the leader of Rakhine people. He represented the Rakhine people and he represented the Rakhine political party. The people think Dr. Aye Maung is the key player at the time, but that suddenly change. Especially after Dr. Aye Maung's arrest in 2019 and he was released, he wasn't standing for the people of Rakhine state, and they will felt that and that's why ULA/AA tended to grow stronger.
Host 49:40
That's really interesting, and what you say is pointing to a couple of important factors. One is the loss of faith in the democratic process based on how the NLD responded, 2015-The Bamar-led NLD we should say, that among many Rakhine leaders and peoples, there came a loss of faith in democratic representation, which forced them to look for other ways to guarantee their rights and their safety. That's one issue at play here. Another issue is just the building discrimination, racism, and tensions that are starting to come. I remember we had Rakhine journalist Naw Chat Oo on here as a guest earlier, and he referenced that during this period, there were Bamar celebrities that were speaking up publicly and saying that those Rakhine people that did not stand for the national anthem that they should be imprisoned and killed. That was how strongly these toxic sentiments were becoming and these divisions were forming. One question I have is that, as you say powerfully that people in Rakhine started to feel that they're not a part of this state, that they're not a part of Burma, of the overall governance in the country, and that their rights and their safeties aren't guaranteed. They start to protest against that. This is an interesting thing to say, because 2015 to 2020, it brings to question who is the state that they're protesting against? Who is it that they're feeling antagonistic towards? Because, of course, the NLD is nominally in charge of the government, but as we know, the military is still holding many of the powers that the NLD has no control over and so when you were describing this antagonism and this aversion that Rakhine people start to feel towards the state, were you referring to the NLD leadership at the time or to the Bamar-led military or to both of them together?
Kyaw San Hlaing 51:51
Oh yes, thank you very much. Yeah, so most of the peoples also argued that NLD doesn't have or NLD didn't have power at a time when they were in "power" actually. After the military coup, most of the Burmese political experts or politician and also many of people from central Burma mentioned that point. I don't agree with that, because when NLD came into power, NLD had so many things. You know, in the Rakhine conflict, NLD was involved in so many things. Even Daw Aung San Suu Kyi celebrated the military soldiers who were fighting in the Rakhine state against the Arakan army at the time in around 2019. So many things actually, and also the internet shutdown. Also we can see during the Rohinga Crisis, genocide in 2017 so all these things. They had the power, but not compared to the military, we can say but they had power. They could have something in the purpose of the people, but they didn't do that. The NLD we see the people are from the minority, the prosperity for the Rakhine people, this is what I am speaking. Rakhine people seen that the NLD only working to reconcile with military you know, rather than with ethnic minority group. NLD worked in the purpose of the military rather than ethnic organization or ethnic political party. This is a very obvious. Another thing, the Rakhine people see that both majority Barma-led NLD or majority Barma-led secret military are the same at the time. They are like in a twine like, you know. hey came together to Rakhine and also they fight, they work, and they collaborate in the conflict. This is what Rakhine people see at the time from 2018 to 2020. So this is why after the military coup happened, Rakhine public probably collaborated less with the people. There were less protests in Rakhine State, and also there was no CDM movement in Rakhine State. Also, we can see another fact, after NUG was founded there was really less Rakhine people [supporting]. I can say there was not anyone who represented Rakhine people in the NUG government. Even you know, NUCC, all the rest of the country is obviously participating. Really less participation [from Rakhine people]. Yeah, I would definitely talk to like Ko Aung Kyaw Maung from Rohingya community have the position as Deputy Minister, but for the Rakhine side, there was a thought that during 2018 to 2020, the NLD and military collaborated, they worked against Rakhi public demand, and also they work together again, in Rakhine State.
Host 57:00
I see. So we're getting up to the coup, we're not quite there yet. There's one more important issue to talk about this is just again, underscoring for our audience, how incredibly complicated and nuanced these discussions are, and how important it is to gain some kind of understanding or overview beyond those kind of basic headlines that we get to go deeper into it. And you're the perfect person to do this. So the one issue to go into of course, before we get to the military coup, those listeners that remember the geography of Myanmar, that we have the Rohingya crisis that happens in Rakhine State. So within this already incredibly complicated landscape that you're laying out between these three parties that have different alignments, the growth of the AA and their arm strength and the increasingly antagonistic relations between Rakhine people and the Bamar-lead, whether it's NLD or military, we have the Rohingya crisis, which flares up in the middle of this decade, making things even more tense and even more challenging for all parties and more complicated for all of us to try to understand. So within this landscape you've laid out really brilliantly and this understanding of different individuals, parties and aspirations that we're understanding in Rakhine State, tell us where the Rohingya fits into this. Tell us where ARSA fits into this and tell us where the Rohingya genocide and ongoing crisis that develops that is caught between the Bamar-led NLD and military and the suffering of the Rohingya people. But then, this is happening in Rakhine State in the midst of these political tensions between these Rakhine parties. Where does Rohingya fit into this whole landscape that you've just described?
Kyaw San Hlaing 58:56
Oh, yeah, thank you very much. Yes, I want to clarify that I'm not very much a Rohingya expert. So, international experts study about the Rohingya, so much more than I do, actually. Yeah, I will speak here more broadly, why mostly Rohingya people......first, so, this is the from my analysis. So, Rakhine Rohingya have kind of a good relationship previously, on the grassroot level, but historically, the Rakhine community leaders, Rohingya community leaders, they have really less collaboration and also less speaking to one another. Because it is very obvious you know, historically the Rohingya community leader really tried to communicate with like central Barma political majority party like NLD, like USDP. You can also see in 2010 elections, there was also some member of Rohingya community as like USDP-elected member, members of parliament. So mostly, from the Rohingya side, most of the political party leaders really trying to have a good relationship with NLD and also USDP rather than Rakhine political party. And from Rakhine political party side, they also trying desperately to be more stronger rather than speaking with local people. And because Rakhine political parties are so nationalist, actually, they try to gain votes only from the people of Rakhine actually, because if they did, if they collaborate with Rohingya community, they may be probably gaining less support from Rakhine people. So they are really worried about gaining less votes from the Rakhine public. From the Rohingya side, their community leader historically really try to be in good relationship with you know, central people rather than Rakhine party. We can see very obviously after military coup, so even NUG, Ko Aung Kyaw Moe, also a really good friend of mine as well. SO Ko Aung Kyaw Moe joining the NUG, and also from Rakhine side, Rakhine people stand themself to be something like what they think actually. Here what I will mention, at the ground level, especially after 2012, two days or so, there come a violent break between the Rakhine community and the Rohingya community. This was huge and spreaded all over the community, and also that made two community to distrust and against one another, but around 2018, you know, breaker in Rakhine State, especially, general Twan Mrat Naing, he also mentioned first time speaking and using the term, Rohingya in Coconut media in 2018 and he also saying that they have to support one another, they have to work together, just something. This is first time historically a front of Rakhine politician or political leader speaking, working together with Rohingya people, and also using the term Rohingya. This was very surprising for some nationalists Rakhine people especially in AMP, AFP, and also another group like ASC (Arakan National Council), AA group situated in Karen state. So, those groups started talking, started working with like the Muslim group, so the one I am talking about is technically Bangli Muslims, ULA/AA working with them. The conflict faded you know, after 2018, Rakhine State holders started to communicate, and also Rohingya people communicate with one another, but until today there were less agreement, less communication very strongly, and even from my side, what I see is for Rohingya community, they really want to something, that agreement with ULA/AA. Frequently speaking citizen rights, political participation, equality and also something like a guarantee for their community by ULA/AA.
Host 1:06:00
That's a lot to take in where that all fits together. It's helpful to know where this community and where this crisis is all fitting together and trying to get those pieces to sort it out. You reference how the Rohingya are seeking a conversation and alignment with ULA. From the ULA side, how are they seeing the Rohingya community, the crisis and what role have they played?
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:06:30
Yes, thank you very much. For Rakhine side, the ULA is the key matter for the whole Rakhine state, the key player, the kingmaker. ULA is saying this about themselves, they are the key player for Rakhine people. Yeah, so we have to look at their approach to the Rohingya crisis. They recognized about the process of the Rohingya community in Rakhine state, and the second, they also think the way to gain their confederation without Rohingya people's participation is maybe really hard to gain for them. Because Rohingya population is second largest population in Rakhine State. We also have to note that one. Another thing is we can also see that the Rohingya crisis for the ULA leader is huge and also really challenging for like a revolutionary group. For revolutionary group like ULA [Rohingya Crisis] is challenging, but also an opportunity. But if ULA cannot handle, the crisis may be bigger, if you can handle well the crisis maybe solved. This almost depends on the hand of ULA right now, because historically the people from Rakhine leaders are really aggressive, and less connection with the Rohingya community leader. We can definitely note ULA approach, they used the term Muslim, but didn't officially use the term Rohingya, and also not Bengali. Rakhine media or Rakhine people also start using the Muslim people in Rakhine State or something. It's just a good solution, but they have to work on that. But I mean, here is the relief of thetension, you know. The Rohingya people don't like being called Bengali and Rakhine people are stopping calling Bengli, but they also didn't call them Rohingya, but they call them like in our Rakhine Muslim. This is kind of an improvment, but there needs to be more. The word Rohingya people want to be called is Rohingya. And also, there needs to be a negotiation between the Rakhine leaders and Rohingya community leaders. But I can say that it's still a good development, but needs to be more.
Host 1:10:24
That's really interesting and fascinating. It's also showing the trailblazing and breaking out of the mold that we're seeing with AA and ULA as they continue to do things non-traditionally, out of the convention, and that's really interesting development to watch. I think we've now reached the point where if, hopefully, our audience is still with us and following these complexities, we now come to the coup. You've already referred to a couple of developments post coup. You talk about some of the reactions that the Rakhine people had when the coup took place, and their lack of involvement with protests, CDM, NUG, and things like that. But let's talk more about post-coup Myanmar before we get to the culminating piece we're going to get to, which is Operation 1027, some would say shocking development, and AA's involvement. Before we get to that point, let's understand how everything changed after the coup or perhaps how some things stayed the same. But you touched upon this briefly before of the Rakhine people, parties and organizations, lack of involvement and engagement as we saw in the rest of the country, but fill us in with details. What else stands out in looking after February 1st 2021 and before October 27th 2023? During that, two and a half years or so, what stands out in terms of what's going on in Rakhine State? What's going on with these individuals? These were individuals that you've already talked about these political parties and AA. Give us the scene during this time.
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:12:14
Oh, yeah, thank you very much. So we can say that for the Rakhine majority there was very little participation and interest in joining protests against the coup. They even think that this is the problem between the NLD and the military. Other political parties grew like ANP. I also mentioned ANP deputy leader Aye Nu Sein joined Military Council. After military coup, she became central member of the military council, and Dr. Aye Maung from AFP. They don't join "officially", but they are inofficially they support the leaders of the military. He's become a pro-military politician in Rakhine and all of Myanmar. ALD, Arakan League for Democracy, stands very strongly with the resistance movement, the NLD, and other democratic movement across the country, but they have less influence over Rakhine people, but they have a really good relationship with other democratic parties and movement. And for AA, not just in terms of Rakhine State, but also for the political factor, we have to study their approach to the military coup. It seems very interesting, so earlier years of the coup, a lot of people are criticizing over ULA/AA choosing not to fight in Rakhine and also for AA leaders also talking about not to join the CDM movement in Rakhine State. All these things really make central Burmese majority aggressive, actually. Especially in April, general Twan Mrat Naing said AA was working on implementing the government mechanism with a strong institution for public affairs including an administration, judiciary, and public security. But at the time, there was less attention from the people from the rest of the country what was happening in Rakhine state. Through 2022, we can see the ULA's approach to the nationwide movement, it was very clear. So, we can say that AA's approach in Rakhine State was power competition with the junta in Rakhine state through establishing like a parallel administration and judiciary mechanism in Rakhine State. The second, collaboration with other alliances in fight against the junta, and first assistant to the resistance for after the coup, and we can see [them] establishing relationship with NUG and other key players in the resistance movement. This is a four-pattern because first of all, we can see that ULA is very clearly opposed to the coup to challenge military junat administration in Rakhine state. One year after the coup, this was very obvious. I think it was flawed with COVID-19. At the time, ULA release a statement during COVID-19 to stay at home in response. Rakhine people very much hated to follow the order. After almost one year in house, ULA deputy leader Dr. Noe Tun Aung, also stated AA has control over Rakhine State and trained administration personnel, around 1000 to 1500 personnel, who complemented discourses, other legal matter over almost 18 months. In these things you can see ULA's strategy to establish a strong administration and a judiciary mechanism in Rakhine state against the junta. This is the first approach, and the second, ULA's approach to the national resistance movement is to collaborate with alliance forces in northern and north-east Myanmar. We can see very obviously with MNDAA, TNLA, KIA since after a month after [the coup?], ULA fighting alongside with them. Until today we can see a very obviously, years spent fighting. Also, the default ULA/AA's approach is to train and to support the resistance force in the country. ULA publicly states and people's account say the same thing. This is what I get, when I collect information. How many people does ULA sent out to support [the resistance movement]? So, I see at least eleven resistance forces like in Sagaing, Magwe, Chin, Irrawaddy, all these groups receive military training and technical support from ULA/AA. After the military coup, some groups like BPLA (Burma Pupils Liberation Army) sit by ULA/AA, and also we can see such as People Revolution Alliance Magwe, and Miranda Front Force, all of these groups receive strong technical and military support. In Mandalay, we can see that PDF groups especially, have received a military and technical support from ULA/AA. The third and final approach of ULA is to work with NUG. They have a good relationship with NUG, but until recently, I didn't see that ULA/AA as like an formal Alliance of NUG, and they are really good friends with NUG, because unlike other organization such as KNU and KIA. ULA's approach to NUG in the beginning was very cautious, because of two factors for us. NUG mostly affiliated with NLD members, we already talked about 2018-2020 conflict in Rakhine State. ULA/AA has seen that and NLD members were working against AA at the time. That's why in early years AA was really really cautious of any NLD members of NUG. Early 2022, NUG released media statement that they have a good relationship with AA and also they have regularly spoken or something like you know, they have good relations. But they don't have like a formal alliance like they have with Northern group like TNLA MNDAA, but they have good relationship with NUG. Yes, thank you very much.
Host 1:23:16
Thanks for that. One of the confusing things to follow with this is that on one hand, we hear about this history of coordination and good relations with the democracy movement, the NUG, the PDF groups that are forming, and other EAOs. So, you go into this detail, but on the other hand, we also hear about before the coup and after the coup, that there are many in Rakhine just thought, you know whether we're looking at the military, the NLD, or NUG, that these are all just different Bamar-led institutions that have continually discriminated against the Rakhine people, and they're now fighting each other. So, kind of like this isn't our fight, you know. And you go into how they're not really joining CDM, they're not represented in the NUG. Then the other element, which we haven't touched on yet, and maybe you can also discuss is the truce that the military, the SAC, after the coup sought with the AA and maintained until, I understand, Operation 1027. So, there's this kind of conflicting information that I think we're struggling to understand. On one side, there's this recent history of collaboration, cooperation and all this kinds of support for the democratic resistance movement that you described. But on the other hand, there's consistent mistrust and disengagement with the current resistance movement that's going on as well as some kind of agreements with the military, which is, what that truce allows the military to do is the divide and conquer they've done for so many years, because they don't have to focus so much on that front, they can put more of their resources in other places, which some would argue is strengthening the military's hand. So, how are you able to clarify these apparently contradictory or opposing actions that we're seeing with the AA and ULA?
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:25:41
Firstly, in Rakhine, especially the AA's approach seems very controversial, but almost two years after the military coup to open again warfare in Rakhine state is really a huge damage for the people and also for AA, because they are already tired from fighting for two years. Really intensively fighting for two years. Another thing is that AA's primary goal, which we can see all the time is self determination and confederation; actually, we can say something like greater autonomy rather than confederation. They want greater autonomy in Rakhine State. It was very obvious. So, their approach was obviously a little bit complicated, but we have to look at the context of political landscape in Rakhine State. You can also see in May 2022, Rakhine people also faced Mocha devastation. It was a huge damage, Rakhine townships were partially or completely damaged because of the Mocha cyclone. They faced not only such crisis in Rakhine State, but also Rakhine State has more internally displaced persons, and on the other side, we also have Rohingya crisis in which the Rohingya people had been, more than a decade, in internally displaced camps. All these things ULA/AA has to consider. Rakhine is also kind of isolated, geographically. That's why in 2022, once the conflict's resolved in Rakhine state in early August, the military first shutdown all the roads and also waterway. This made the people in Rakhine State to be more isolated. The commodity prices are really rising, that people faced humanitarian crisis, especially military also restricts NGOs and humanitarian aid going into the conflict areas, and not only those areas, but also the IDP camps. After a military shutdown the road.....only way in Rakhine State, Yangon to Sittwe is the highway. If the military shut that down, Rakhine state is barred from transportation, economy trade, everything in the stores. So, the price suddenly rises. That's why people in Rakhine really hope that formally or even informally the gate to the Rakhine state will be opened through ULA/AA administration. What I want to mention here is there is a lot to think about for the ULA leaders to open the new front in Rakhine state, and then to join the National Resistance, obviously they joined and they approached it very systematically. But it took time, because right now it is very obvious how their approach to the National Resistance is considered here. First, I think AA leaders believe that the common enemy, only the enemy is the military junta in Myanmar, and also the AA leaders never trust the military leaders. But, they have right now we can see the EOIs and NLD members have really good relation to ULA/AA leaders. I want to clarify that the AA believes only enemy is the military, and without overthrowing the military junta, they know they won't achieve their goal for the greater autonomy in Rakhine state. This is very obvious. So all these years, maybe very contridicted, very complicated, but the AA leaders really did say that only two way to get strong points in Rakhine State, military base and administration, and then they will try on the other hand to overthrew the junta, as soon as possible. After the junta came down, they think this will mean for every ethnicity a greater autonomy or to our democratic country.
Host 1:33:34
Right, I understand that. You're describing how they're looking to overthrow the military, and yet to establish a federal democracy they need to work with the NUG or whatever governing democratic body comes after that. But you've just described how so many Rakhine people have lost faith in democracy and have seen that the results of democracy did not result in the returns that they were expecting, they did not see fairness in the way the democratic system was being run by a Bamar majority. So, as they're realizing that any future for their region and their people has to be post-military-regime authority. That also calls into question the degree to which they are talking to and trusting the Bamar leadership based on the difficult period they went through in the 2010s. So looking beyond the military and their distrust of the military, do you see that there is a new era possibly dawning of Rakhine leaders who are trying to work with, now trusting and communicating with Bamar leaders, they're willing to try again to engage beyond their frustrations from last decade?
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:35:14
Yes, thank you very much for the clarification. So, this operation 1027 showed how the AA leaders have good relationship with the rest of the country and also the NLD members, NUG group. They have hand-in-hand working through various areas. Yes, what I see is that AA only wants greater autonomy for the Rakhine State. For that, definitely they have to work with the Bamar majority leaders and also other ethnic minority groups. For Rakhine public, the opinion says, I mentioned that so many times, probably already changed to the leading by movement rather than electoral policies. Definitely, the junta administration, they really want the ULA as the key player, you know, working with the rest of the country, changing the conflict landscape. They have really good relationship right now, they are building trust one year after the coup, good relationship with the NUG leaders and NLD leaders. Yeah, maybe it really matters for the future, what they're going to do next.
Host 1:37:21
And one of the theories that I heard some time after the coup, and people trying to analyze what the AA was doing, was this question of is there ambition to move towards a federal democracy, where they are going to try to trust again, in the process of democratic elections, despite some of the frustrations that happened before? Or another pathway that was talked about at the time was that they might not be trusting the whole process of these federal elections and what that can mean for their loss of autonomy. Instead, they might go the way of the Wa where they might want to have some kind of direct negotiation with the military regime, so their region would have some kind of special status, like we see with the Wa. So that they would have their own administration, military, everything else to be able to administer and protect their own land, and let go of the rest of the country, kind of split apart. If the military would want that or allow that is a whole different question, but that could be an ambition of what they're trying to do. I'm wondering if you heard about that as a possibility and what your thoughts are on it?
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:38:54
Firstly, I want to clarify that you know, the historically and geographically, Wa and Rakhine State are totally different. This is the thing, you know, military junta would never let AA govern in Rakhine State like what Wa does. This is very obvious answer, and the second thing on the ULA side, AA doesn't believe that they will gain like Wa did in negotiation with the military junta, because there have been so many obvious answer for us historically, and also geographically Rakhine is very important for the military junta. So, we have Indian Kaladan Project, we have China's special economy zone, also seaport, so many things actually, right now, Russia project in Thandwe. Also like Rakhine is the only pathway to India ocean for China. So, for junta to maintain good elationship with India, to maintain good relationship with the Chinese government, Rakhine is key, Rakhine is pivotal for junta. So, that's why junta when will never allow ULA to govern in Rakhine State like the United State of Wa. But yeah, I heard from so many people, early years post-coup, international analyzers, observer stated that ULA/AA believe they will take advantages, and they will gain through negotiation with the junta, their greater autonomy in Rakhine State. Yeah, I read a lot of that myself, I never believed that AA will shift that path. Also, geographically and historically military will never let AA go alone to govern, it will never happen. And from AA side, they don't believe and Rakhine people also won't believe that, either.
Host 1:42:17
That's interesting. I think one of the things that played into that fear or the analysis that you're talking about is the nature of this truce, which was signed and was broken on Operation 1027, which we're just about to get to. This is the last point to cover before we talk about what happened and why it's important and where AA is involved. But talk about the nature of the truce that was signed and the thinking behind it and the implications of the truce while it lasted.
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:42:50
I always have to remember that from the AA side. We have a question here, if AA believe they're going gain negotiation through the junta for their greater autonomy in Rakhine state, why train and support so many resistant groups across the country? We have a question right. Also, why is AA fighting in Kachin State, and northern Shan state alongside their alliances? So, if they want like what Wa has, they will acquire and stay in neutrality, they don't take interest about what happened in central Burma and the coup. So, they don't take interest there, and so Wa state has meeting and maintain their relationship with the junta, and the ethnic organizations, especially like the northern group. Also the position of Wa state is totally different, close the China border, geographically landlocked area, and also there was this interest there like special economy or something in the Wa state. For Rakhine state, what I see is that AA really believe to overthrow the junta, they can't do alone Rakhine State. That's why when they had meeting for ceasefire, and during this two years of ceasefire, AA did two very significant things in Rakhine state. First, they established administration and judiciary mechanism across the Rakhine state, and the second, AA established military base. Right now, Rakhine State has eight bigger military base across the Rakhine. A really big military base and also AA trained thousands of Rakhine youth, and also many of the students from central Burma joined in Rakhine State for military training. So, all the sites like the Magwe is closed to the border and Bago is close to the border, sharing border with Rakhine, and Sagaing. All these areas, and Irrawady shares a border with Rakhine. So in all these areas AA tries to establish good relationship and also establish their own groups. Maybe set up the equipment for the the resistance fighters. All these things are because of the distrust over the military, because they don't believe they will gain greater autonomy through negotiation with the junta. This is a very obvious answer. That's why they approached NUG to form a stronger relationship. to make a military operation together. So, right now we can see that in Sagaing after 1027, AA already leaves money for NUG affiliate PDF and local resistant group in Sagaing. So many things because of distrust over the military, because of they think that military is a common enemy. military has to be overthrown. But, they also think Rakhine state alone, or AA fighting to overthrow is impossible, because they already fought for two years in Rakhine State. Past two years, very intensively without stopping anything from 2018 to 2020.
Host 1:47:38
When this was a battle that should be mentioned, between the Sadat, the Burmese military and the AA, in which the NLD was very much on the military side, correct? Yeah, so this is just this is baffling to hold in your mind all these the shifting alliances and, and where we are now. Things have changed so rapidly, and that moves us to Operation 1027. I know that there are some listeners who have been following along or familiar with it, but there are others who don't know. This is not something that has been making international news in the ways that maybe it should. This is an unprecedented moment in Myanmar history, not just since the coup, but overall, it's unprecedented in terms of what came before and the potential of where we're going. This is something that everyone is scrambling to follow, the fast pace and rapid developments of what it means and where we're going from here. But let's just describe what it was for those that are unfamiliar and haven't been following or it hasn't been reported on. Tell us what operation 1027 was and what it's doing.
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:48:50
Thank you very much. The operation 1027 is something initially led by three brother alliance, lcomprising of the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). So, their statement has same operation goals, but I'm see that they have three military goals. First, to cut down the online cyber operation, and also like, you know, fraud operation in Kokang special administration ground that led by in Junta in Kokang ground. And the second, especially for Kokang group to gain territory back, which was lost in 2009. They really want to win back, especially the Laukkai area. So, that's why so many so people sort of speaking the returning home for the Kokang group. This operation is the chance to go home for the t Kokang group. And the third is very clearly stated. The operation is to cut down and overthrow the military junta, you know, this is the final goal. That's why after nearly 20 days of the operation, it moved from North to all across the country. Northern to Eastern, Northern Shan State to the Mandalay region, Sagaing, Magwe, Bago and also in Rakhine State. The operation being like, you know, nationwide operation right now. The operation shows how united the resistant groups are, because they have nationwide operation. They have kind of an operation agreement and to set that up it may really take time, might probably take a year, because right now all across the country. Also in Rangoon region, Rangoon PDF force released a statement two days ago that they will also fight in Yangon so, they warn the people to be careful. So, these operations shows the collective force to overthrow the military and also united amongst resistant groups in Myanmar.
Host 1:53:24
Of course, this operation being launched came as a surprise to many people, this was carefully coordinated and planned for a long time. But I think that nothing was more a surprise, at least from what I saw some of the online reactions and talking to friends offline about what was happening, it was that the AA was involved. And that, as I understand it, this broke the truce that they had had for some time with the military. For many people especially who were under the impression that the AA was looking to achieve different aims and perhaps something on a scale of the of Wa states and having some special zone, the fact that the AA was so involved in this operation came as a surprise. How about for you, for someone that has been closely following Rakhine politics and the armed forces for so long in this region? When you learned that the AA was part of this operation taking place, was there any surprise for you or did you see this as aligned with what you thought they were doing all along?
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:54:42
Actually, for me, this operation, I was surprised for their military strategies, operations, also connecting across the country, but I am not surprised by the ULA/AA's involvment in this process, because ULA/AA have been involved and also becoming key stakeholder since the military coup. Although, a lot of people, especially from central Burma criticized AA, because they don't follow what AA is doing at the time. This is the thing, AA never spoke out very much about what they're doing in the public, and even about the operation you can see very obviously AA's spoke person doesn't speak very much about what they are doing, what they are going to do, especially for military fears. That's why in the early years of the coup, a lot of people criticized about AA's "non involvement" in this process. They were definitely surprised with AA's involvement in Shan state, Sagaing, Magwe, and so many regions. Actually, I was very surprised that, within 20 to 30 days, these three groups, beat....more than the city, which historically has never happened. And also, they are using techniques that are advanced for this war, which is not the same previously. This war is really well prepared, and also making very strategically step by step. This is their real strength for me. And also, they really took their time, at least one year preparing for this operation.
Host 1:57:11
Another question with that, you've talked about the discussions that have been going on between the ULA/AA and the NUG so, to what degree are you aware of where the NUG fits into these discussions and the ongoing operation?
Kyaw San Hlaing 1:57:32
I didn't get any specific information about these things, but my observation is that NUG MOD really have been involved in this operation early time, because it was obvious that they have prepared, and they also have connection, but for the NUG's modus for this operation was not a key factor, because [inintelligible]....in Sagaing and Mandalay they initially had staff attend like eight townships, more than 10 military bases. At the time, what I see is they have connection and strong military cooperation, because many saw that AA was the military operation leader there. Also other groups like KNA, KIA, and also KMDF all these groups were involved in this process. But NUG was not a key player for this 1027 operation. But, NUG did have kind of involvement and participation in this operation.
Host 2:00:08
So, we're talking as the situation is changing day by day, it's impossible to predict what is going to develop with it. But AA involvement is really critical and their engagement with this does change the landscape. How would you describe the importance of AA being involved in this operation? From the military's point of view, how fragile does it make their continued role in fighting a battle on so many fronts?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:00:43
Oh, yeah, thank you. So, AA's strategy is they want to be a key military player for this revolution moment; this is all very obvious. Obviously, another point is AA wants the greater autonomy for Rakhine State. So, they only think fighting in Rakhine state alone doesn't make sense for them, and also newly formed PDF groups like BPLA doesn't have military or experience. So for this groups, AA has a bunch of the military operation experience and that's why AA came to be the leading role for this operation, because of AA's military-operation experience, and also leading. That's why they are coming to join this operation-for leading role.
Host 2:02:23
Looking at the current conflict logistically, and considering the challenge the military's authority that the AA's involvement poses, what are you seeing about how this current resistance plays out from the military's perspective? How precarious a position are they in given not just the Brotherhood Alliance and the ethnic groups that are rising up throughout the country now combined to the PDF but specifically the fact that AA has also joined? How significant is this?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:03:02
So historically, it's [AA's involvement] really important for people of Burma, because even before the coup, there was fighting in Rakhine State where the rest of the country was stable. And you know, it usually goes like this for the military, it's fighting against one state, and ceasefire with another. Historically, military used divide-and-rule strategically, but this time we can see that for Rakhine state, AA break ceasefire in the favour of the nationwide resistance movement. So, this is like collaborative ethnics, PDF, resistance groups, and alliances. This is a huge historical movement united against the military junta. We can also see very obviously the role of AA and its involvement in this movement. So, one of the things that I see is they came to understand that the military is really weak, especially mentally almost, and this is the time to over throw the military junta in Burma. It was very obvious, you know, collaborative approach and also making relationships. All these things are happening in the country right now, which has never been in history of Burma.
Host 2:06:17
Right, I can imagine so, we're living through a new history as it's happening here, which is also why we wanted to rush to talk to you to learn about what's happening through this conflict through a particularly Rakhine perspective. Staying in Rakhine State, this truce gave some degree of relative stability in Rakhine, not entirely but more so than other parts of the country that there was certain kinds of administration and safety that people were able to enjoy. With the AA now joining and leading the Brotherhood Alliance and taking part in this operation, what does this mean for the Rakhine people? Do you think that we're going to see more instability, violence and conflict come to Rakhine communities as a result of this?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:07:07
I'm saying that for the Rakhine community, sure, they expect it to come sooner or later, because most of the people in Rakhine State realized that the negotiation with the military won't achieve AA's goal for the people of Rakhine State. This is a very obvious, and we discussed it in detail. They definitely expect it, but they prefer it to be this way, and on the side of Rakhine, especially in northern Rakhine State, people had been suffering a lot by current cyclone devastation. A huge impact for the peoples' way of being, their livelihood, and so many things. Then after the operation started SHan state that include AA, sure it is coimg to the Rakhine State. So, basically, for the Rakhine people, they want this war to be the final fighting in Rakhine State. This is very obvious, because they don't want the same cycle of violence in Rakhine State.
Host 2:09:06
Before you talked about how Rakhine political parties and even Rakhine political sentiment, as expressed personally that there's a bit of ethnic pride, and that has prevented both at a personal level as well as a party level being able to engage in greater inter-communal relations and look at being part of the solidarity of brotherhood/sisterhood with other ethnic groups, including Bamar as opposed to just the interest of the Rakhine people in Rakhine State. One of the things we're seeing with the spring revolution is that many different groups especially younger generations are coming together and having a certain degree of respect, tolerance, and compassion for the struggles and the safety of other marginalised groups. With Rakhine state, given this particular personality that you described there, are you seeing signs of greater inter-ethnic trust and affinity with the Generation Z in Rakhine state as well as some of the bigger political leaders and parties? Are you seeing a change there?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:10:26
Oh, yes, definitely. So, especially since the conflict started Rakhine State in 2018, the Rakhine generation or a younger generation like Gen Z, most of them are really active in the political side, really adaptable and so, their prespectives are not the same as the older generation or political party leaders or something. So, most of the younger generations are open-minded people, and also they're really willing for the communications of any society and organization. That's why the communication between the Rohingya community and Rakhine communities are increased and also improved, because of this Gen Z generation. You will definitely see that Arakan Student Union is very progressive, very active, and politically correct, and has a really good relationship with All Burma Student Union. The whole country and also many parts of the country, they have really good alliance. The group of the student will also stand up for justice for all the people in Rakhine State, not only just Rakhine, but also for minority for including the Rohingya people. They speak out against the military junta, the government or even the Rakhine politiocal parties so many times. So, these things are really changing the Rakhine society. We can see that the younger generation, especially like Gen Z and student unions are the big factor changing interrelationship between especially Rohingya community and the Rakhine community to be more coexisting, more cohesion, and to be more united.
Host 2:13:48
That's great to hear. I'd like to return to the beginning part of our conversation, we really spent some time laying out the importance of and the differences between these political parties in Rakhine State. We talked about the ANP, the ALD, the AFP, and some of the others that were there, and what they were doing in the 2010s, what their relation was between the military and the NLD, what their aspirations were. It was seemingly so important in the 2010s, and yet, now, suddenly, post-coup, it's ULA/AA that we're talking about mostly. So, going back to looking at these political parties, I'm wondering how you see the political landscape. Do you see any relevance left in these parties or do you think that really the only trajectory that's worth paying attention to at this point is the direction of ULA/AA?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:14:46
Oh yes, even before the coup around late 2018 tp 2019, since then the Rakhine People's attention to the political parties are really low and getting lower day by day. Then after the military coup happened, Rakhine political parties, especially AMP and AFP stood with the military just blaming the NLD and the world or something like that at the time. So, now Gen Z and the student unions also criticized them [Rakhine political parties]. All of these factors make ULA/AA to be the key player and leading role for the Rakhine society. So right now, these three Political Parties, AMP, AFP and ALD, have really less influence and less importance for the Rakhine people compared to ULA/AA. I can say that more than 80 percent of Rakhine people are supporting ULA/AA, and 20 percent who are leaving Rakhine State are from like military family or government officers or something like that. So, more than 80% of the populations follow ULA/AA and also they follow what ULA/AA speak up.
Host 2:16:50
So from here on out, you think it's going to be really ULA leading the way?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:16:56
Yeah, ULA/AA really leading the way.
Host 2:17:00
I'm also curious about the relation with China. What do you know about AA-Chinese relations? And there are these big investment projects that are going on in Rakhine State, particularly Kyaukphyu? And so, in terms of the relation, in terms of stability, and the investments, how are you seeing what connections or communication has happened between the Chinese and AA/ULA?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:17:34
So, I haven't seen any formal communication between the Chinese government and ULA. They will probably have, through like Northern Alliance group or Three Brother Alliance, communication. So, what I can see is that for ULA/AA haven't said or talked about foreign policy, and they haven't shown the Rakhine people what they have in mind for policy, but based on some related statement in media, it seems like they want to maintain like a good relationship with India, Bangladesh, China, because these three countries are really important for their interest, the investment, and also connecting to one another. So, from AA's side, they want to maintain good relationship for their interest. China's also a regionally influential country, and for investment in Rakhine State. China also probably want to push AA for [China's] projects in Rakhine to progress. It's really hard to explain their relationship, but I can say that China wants to commit in good relationship. From AA side, they have a statement through the media that they want to maintain a good relationship and they don't want to make an enemy.
Host 2:20:03
Right. So, how do you think China's observing what's going on? What do you think their role and their thoughts are about operation 1027 taking place? As they're watching how this plays out, it affects them enormously in terms of politically, and stability economically. How do you think they're viewing this ongoing resistance now?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:20:25
Oh, yeah. So, most of the people are talking about how China's role is important, yes definitely Chinese role is important, but their influence and dominance for the resistance movement in Myanmar is also limited. We can say that Three Brother Alliance, so last year, in November, around this time, Saira organize the phys fi store in Manila, they have three days, and almost one 100 And the breaker, you know, the media already added without any, you know, for cars, straw, or like an agreement, they made the end. And they didn't get any agreement. Then China has seen that and even China wants to do these things. If China wants to do something with these three groups, but they just can't go ahead and do that. They have limitation, you know, to one another one. For this operation also the same. China want Laukkai and other, you know, like Chinshwehaw, especially the scam companies, like online games. And also before the operation last few months, there were hundreds of Chinese citizens were killed by BDF, BGF. And the junta is affiliated BGF group in that Area. There are a lot of Chinese citizens are taken as slave labourers in that area. That's why Chinese government has the zero tolerance over these situations. So, this is why the Chinese government's having to talk to the junta for so many times. Also almost a year and a half right now, the military junta didn't do anything in the favour of what China demands. So, right now, China wants to cut down the online scam there and MNDAA want their area back. Such as you know, coexistence, they want also for the broader resistance movement, MNDAA, TNLA and the other group also want to overthrow the hunter. These things are make a corner point that happened, you know, in especially for common interests. So that's why the Chinese haven't said anything about the conflict in northern Shan State. Only little, you know, a day after they launched the operation, Chinese spokesperson in the media said only to be stable and making ceasefire, that is all, not intentionally speaking their agenda. They're speaking like a gentleman, like a diplomatic way, not intentionally. So there's simply no intention in this move.Until today, you can see the China is really silent about the operation. So, that's why people are saying China is giving the green light for this operation.
Host 2:25:08
So, one of the things that you wrote about in your recent article in the diplomat, you're concerned that the military's response in Rakhine state, as we've seen all over the country, the Rakhine people will be the ones to suffer. That there will be arrests, the roads will be blocked again. You referenced this before that a year ago, this was one of the aspects that led to the truce, because these roads were blocked, goods were prevented from getting in. And that was one of the reasons why in settling on this truce was to be able to allow the roads and goods continue to be open. And then airstrikes as well, we haven't seen so many airstrikes in Rakhine State, these could be things that start to to impact the civilian population. So, I imagine for AA/ULA leadership to decide to take part in this offensive is a high stakes procedure. They're realizing that they're sacrificing some of this stability they had enjoyed, even knowing this is limited stability. As you say, there is no future for anyone in the country as long as the military is the one in charge that any clear headed person should realize this, but at the same time, you're sacrificing short term relative stability and safety for if this greater aim, but by doing so you're making a big gamble, a high stakes move that is really putting your population in a vulnerable place of being open to military action. How do you see that?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:26:49
It takes a huge risk. So, it was very obvious that AA took a huge risk, you know, opening a new front. One prospect is that this is another possibility of a turning point for nationwide resistance movement or nationwide conflict landscape. Yes, this is is the reason AA's showing that they wanted the Three Brother Alliance to be nationwide operation. The whole country coordinated against the junta. First, AA leaders think that throwing out the junta is the only answer for the future of Myanmar, this is a very obvious answer. The second, we can see that not only the people of Rakhine state suffering in this war, the rest of the country are suffering as well. Bombings just yesterday. We can see the Karreni and also like Shan state, Kachin state, so many bombing across the country. So, they are thinking this is the time for the country to move forward. They are also setting a time, 2025 or something, to to overthrow this military. Yeah, but we have to see how this is going. So, this is gonna be to early to speak out now for the future.
Host 2:29:24
Right, that's such a high stakes decision to make here. Also from the military side, in the Diplomat, you also wrote that you see this as kind of a litmus test for the military that one way or the other, it could show that it's gone past the breaking point, and this coordinated attack will finally be the nail in the coffin that will see Naypyidaw collapse. On the other hand, there's also a possibility that if they find a way to rally and to confront these attacks throughout the country, it could not only give the military confidence, that they do have the institutional strength to continue to combat this, but it will also alert to the world, especially to those countries that have supported it [the military], that they are still the safe bet for controlling the country. So, what do you see as Naypyidaw and the military's point of view in being able to stand against this or crumble? And notwithstanding, I realized, as I say this, this is the billion dollar question. I mean, this is the thing that all the analysts everywhere are talking about, and that you're reading all these online articles trying to predict when Naypyidaw is going to fall, what factors will lead to it crumbling, and very rightly, you refer to it as this litmus test that will show where they're at and what they're able to do. So, how do you see this playing out?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:31:02
I think that from the junta side, they will definitely try to consolidate their powers by any means. So, the only way they can do that right now is relying on air strikes, particularly targeting civilian population across the country. We can see very obviously, all across the country right now targeting air strickes by junta. You know, this is like a test for the resistance side. They are testing resilence, adaptability of the people of Burma to overthrow the junta. So, the civilians are already suffering right now and also really worried every day. They are sleeping in the bunkers and bomb shelters. All these things, how much they can put up with this, and also risings in commodities and other stuff for the people, They are suffering now, and they want this to be final and this to be shorter and shorter, definitely. For the resistance side, they have to also look at strategically, how to reduce casualties as much as possible and also damage for the civilians. But definitely for military side, they will target the civilian population, because for the resistance groups, without civilians support, they can't stand longer, right. This is why the military target the civilians. This is what I see day by day, the junta's air strikes very much. Yeah, I feel really sad. Looking into the near future, how long this is going to take, we cannot say the exact time when the resistance will win. But for the military, they will definitely consolidate, and they will do it all by any means, by any means.
Host 2:34:30
It's a lot to take in about the whole country going into conflict, a potential end to this crisis and a post-military future, while also looking at the short-term civilian suffering that we're seeing along the way. I know that all of us are going to be closely following this and feeling that things are moving very fast now and moving in many different directions. There are many different puzzle pieces, we don't know which ones are going to fall, and which direction they're going to go. As these updates come, one part is going to affect the rest, because you essentially have the possibility of the military fighting on every front, which is just an insane prospect to imagine. I mean, this is their worst nightmare since 1948, right?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:35:21
We also have to look at another fact that our country has seen civil war since 1948. We have so for entire decades. So, but for this story, we can see that the military junta soldiers surrender, and joined the resistance group, CDM all the way across the country. The military soldiers having surrendered to the resistance force. This is a very nice significant thing, and also this is really effective. If this military soldiers didn't surrender like they are right now, resistance movement is going to take so much more time to overthrow the military junta. So, I only wish, you know, more soilders will surrender day by day, day by day. This is the only way to get out of this crisis. And also, this is the key factor that can overthrow the military junta.
Host 2:36:51
Yeah, exactly. As someone as yourself who has studied Rakhine state, with your expertise, looking at it for so many years and now this is a huge development, obviously, not just in the entire country, but specifically in your area of expertise in Rakhine state.I think it's an understatement to say that this will transform and change Myanmar, and also will completely change the landscape of Rakhine, both in terms of the political parties and militias that are operating there, but as well as the landscape of the society day by day. As you're looking at as this conflict playing out, what are you watching for particularly in Rakhine state specifically and with the AA/ULA, what are you watching for and what have you noticed?
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:37:48
There are some very significant things. So, for me border conflict, border situation like Bangladesh and the Rakhine border. Very interesting, and also very significant for the Rakhine, and the rest of the country. And second, I also look at ULA/AA's administration and the military movement in Rakhine State, and their approach and their strategy, how they're going, what they're going to do. So, it is really interesting to see that, year by year, ULA approach or their Rakhine strategy clearly changing or their primary goal deviating or something. I also look at the AA's movement across the country, like Northern Shan state, Kachin state. Yeah, these interest me very much.
Host 2:39:09
Right, thanks for that. I really appreciate you taking the time to discuss all of this. You've been very generous, I know that you're extremely busy with everything that you're doing now. And you've been very patient in answering many questions going back decades to better understand Rakhine. I have certainly learned so much. I think our audience has as well. There's much to think about and ponder with this discussion.
Kyaw San Hlaing 2:39:31
Thank you very much for inviting me. I'm really glad to be speaking here. Yeah, I hope that I've helped to understand the Rakhine State conflict landscape, broader Myanmar and what's happening right now.
Host 2:40:23
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