Transcript: Episode #240: Beyond Impunity
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Host 0:10
Thank you for joining us for the next hour or two in this episode of insight Myanmar podcast. In an age of nearly limitless content, we appreciate that you're choosing to take valuable time out of your day. To learn more about what is happening in Myanmar, it's vital for the story to be heard by people around the world and that starts right now with you.
Host 1:28
We want to alert listeners that the following interview was recorded on February 14, and has been delayed due to technical difficulties. We apologize for the delayed release. And please keep in mind that some of the topics being discussed here have changed since the time of recording.
Brad 1:46
Welcome back. Today I'm joined by Isabel Todd on behalf of the special Advisory Council for Myanmar as it's often abbreviated SEC M. And we're going to be covering a variety of different things. We're gonna be looking at the international legal system and the ramifications that it has for Myanmar and potential future Justice in Myanmar, as well as a very influential, very significant report that was released by sec and hopefully talk about a future report that is on the horizon. But before we get into that, ism, I'd like to thank you very much for coming on. And I'd like to give you just the chance to introduce yourself for our audience and also to introduce the special Advisory Council for Myanmar.
Isabel Todd 2:27
Great. Well, thank you so much for having me. I'm so grateful to be here. I'm a regular listener. So yeah, hoping that I can do the usual standard of the show. Justice. But yeah, so about me, Isabelle Todd, as you say, I'm from London. And my background is in human rights and human rights law, international law. And for the better part of the past 10 years, my work in human rights has focused directly on on Myanmar. So going back to 2015 2016. Remember those days I was working on. I was on the Thai Myanmar border, working with the Myanmar civil society organization. Very exciting time. I mean, for me, it was incredibly formative, actually in terms of shaping who I then hope to be as a human rights person going forward. So it was a really, really important experience for me. I then left in 2016 and went to pursue some further study, I worked in London and Malaysia. But in 2018, a friend of mine, who I'd actually met on the border, she contacted me and said, hey, the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar is looking for a research assistant. And for any in case people don't know so the UN Special Rapporteurs are independent experts that are mandated by the UN Human Rights Council, to report to the council on issues of concern to human rights. So that might be a country situation. There are also thematic mandates as well on for example, on torture or freedom of association. But anyway, I was told that the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar was looking for a research assistant in our office encouraged to apply which I did, and I got the job and that's how I started working with Jung Hee Lee, who was the Special Rapporteur at the time she had been since 2014. So in those two years that I'd been away, I guess from Myanmar 2016 to 2018. A lot had happened, and foremost being the genocidal atrocities that the military committed against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine in 2016. first and then the much larger wave in 2017. So I really came on board sort of in the aftermath of that. And it was very much kind of shaping what was happening in terms of the Human Rights response from the UN. So Yang here at that point had been banned from Myanmar, because she was reporting on what she had seen and what was happening and really trying to ring the alarm bell. And the government banned her from having access the the NLD led government. So of course, that affected what we were doing, we couldn't go into Myanmar. So we were traveling to countries in the region to meet with people to receive the information that we needed to obtain, to compile the reports, or we went to the refugee camps in Bangladesh several times to meet with people living there. We also went to ascend SHA the island where Bangladesh is actually now started relocating refugees. But anyway, so that's what we were doing. But at the same time, the Human Rights Council had also established a another mandate on Myanmar, because of the severity of what was happening in the country. And that other mandate was for an independent fact finding mission. So that's slightly different from the Special Rapporteurs. But it's what it was, was an investigative body, headed by a panel of three international experts Marzuki Lucemon, Christa Doughty, and radica carova Swami. And they had a mandate for two years from 2017 to 2019. To investigate and report on human rights in Myanmar, generally it was quite general mandate, but they focused on the gravest violations that they that they were seeing. And they produced several reports. But I think among their most significant findings with that, war crimes and crimes against humanity, had been committed in Myanmar perpetrated against ethnic minorities primarily by the military across Myanmar. But also that possible genocide had taken place in the context of the military's operations against the Rohingya. So this was really significant. And from then, I mean, we all coordinated closely from them, really the top recommendations that the fact finding mission and the Special Rapporteur were making was for the international community to ensure that the leaders of the military were investigated, and prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, without delay, because it was felt that the impunity that the military had enjoyed for so long, that as long as that was allowed to continue, these utterly devastating cycles of violence would not only continue, but likely get worse. So that was the really key recommendation. The fact finding missions mandate ended in 2019, as I said, and then at the beginning of 2020, Yang, he completed her term as Special Rapporteur, because individuals can only hold the mandate for six years. The mandate itself continues, I'm sure your listeners will know that. Tom Andrews from the US, he is the current Special Rapporteur doing that work of reporting to the council, etc. But going back to that period, 2019, the end of 2019. I mean, there was a real sense among us and our civil society colleagues and partners that if that recommendation for the leaders of the military, to be prosecuted was going to be taken forward, then they really needed to be sustained pressure. And we had several consultations about how could we How could we achieve that? How can we maintain this pressure? And that's actually where the idea of for seichim originally came from, from those discussions. So it predated the coup by a few years. With the mandates ended and second didn't materialize right away. Several reasons for that, I think, mainly COVID To be honest, but they In the first of February 2021, happened, everything changed. And Yang, he immediately got in touch with the experts from the fact finding mission. Radical wasn't able to join. Second, because she had other work but Marzuki. And Chris said, Yeah, we're game. Let's do it. Now's the time. So that was the, the composition of the council confirmed. Yang, He then got in touch with me and said, Would I come on board and kind of coordinate the group? I said, Yeah, I'm game I'm in. Let's do it. And then we sort of had a bit of a mad scramble over the next few weeks to do what we needed to do to make ourselves look as legit as we needed to, to launch. And, you know, I sounds like a cliche, but we really couldn't have done it without our colleagues and partners and civil society, they really helped to get us over the line. And yeah, we launched a few weeks later, we held a press conference on the fourth of March, announcing ourselves and second was born.
Brad 11:11
I mean, it's quite a long journey there. But I think I want to just sort of touch on the work that you were doing sort of pre second, right, the work on on the range of genocide, the, the significance of that, I think, gets forgotten by a lot of people because the, the Rohingya genocide is something that as a phrase, I think, has become normalized. In English Language Media. And for a lot of people, they don't know who the range are, they don't really care to be completely honest. And those of us who do know, I mean, we know that this was a genocide, because obviously, it was. And this, this then led to Antony Blinken, the United States, Secretary of State at the time, actually declaring it to be a genocide, and I think is not often recognized, not recognized enough. That that is a phenomenally rare event, for a power like the United States to formally and officially recognize an event as a genocide is is incredibly significant. And consequently, the burden of proof has to be incredibly high. So the work that that you must have done, although I'm sure you were working in concert with with other groups, but the work collectively that must have been done to to establish the evidence, and present the case, to the United States thoroughly enough, and convincingly enough for the United States to declare this genocide to be a genocide is is a phenomenal effort, especially when the military were doing absolutely everything in their power to hide their tracks and burn down the villages and stop any of us to get us from going to the region. So I think the accomplishment really needs to be recognized for the significance that he genuinely has.
Isabel Todd 13:05
And I mean, there's more that needs to be done in terms of criminal accountability, and criminal justice for the individuals that were behind what happened. I mean, it's one thing for the US to make a declaration and they had a law firm of theirs that went and did an investigation, and they, you know, they worked with them. But as I say, the recommendation that the individuals behind what happened, those most responsible for those events, be investigated and prosecuted for genocide. Not only has that not happened, but there's also not a jurisdiction where wear that can happen yet. That's been that's been identified. So there are still many steps that need to be taken. And exactly, as you say, I mean, the enormity of those events, and the gravity of those events should compel the international system to mobilize very quickly, in response, and to take these steps to ensure that people are held to account and that justice is done. But we're not there yet. And absolutely, it shouldn't be normalized and shouldn't be forgotten, because people who survived are still waiting for justice. And yeah, and this is this is, this is a big reason. Behind Well, you know, one of the key motivating reasons behind behind second justice for the Rohingya and justice for all the victims of grave violations committed by the military in Myanmar, for which there still has not been justice. So yeah, that's that's that's where we are.
Brad 15:05
And so I think that segues us very effectively into talking about the structures that do and do not exist for for justice. Now, of course, if the conflict ends within the coming months, as some have predicted and as many hope, then in theory, Myanmar will be in a position to establish its own courts and to apply justice domestically. But if that is not going to happen, in the near future, or even speaking prior to the end of the conflict, the international community as it currently exists, let's look at mechanisms that may or may not actually exist. And I think the one that's on the forefront of most people's minds is the International Court of Justice, because there is currently a case against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice. What what is the International Court of Justice realistically able to do for the victims of the military's atrocities?
Isabel Todd 16:07
On the first point about domestic justice, or justice being delivered through domestic courts, this would be the the sort of the first the first and preferable option. seconds assessment is that the system the justice system, and Myanmar, is nowhere near a position where it would be capable of holding those proceedings. I mean, the courts under the military are not independent and haven't been independent or operating to international standards, perhaps ever. There are other justice systems in other parts of the country. But again, I mean, the capacity that will be required to to process the cases. Is, is enormous. And it's it's, it's, it's really not there. And we don't think we'll be there for some time, just because of the amount of work that would be involved in establishing a system like that. So our position is that the international community does need to take this responsibility and has needed to take the responsibility since we've been making these recommendations. So that's the first thing to say. The International Court of Justice is slightly different, because it's not a court that is tasked with establishing individual criminal responsibility. It hears disputes between states. And so the case that you're referring to at the ICJ is the case that was brought against Myanmar the state by the Gambia, the state and the Gambia brought the case alleging that Myanmar was in breach of its obligations under the Genocide Convention, which Myanmar has signed for acts that were committed against the Rohingya for its treatment of the Rohingya and Myanmar, at the time, and it denied that it was in breach of its obligations. And so that's the basis of the dispute. And so the case is before the court and the court has to make a decision on on the Gambia, its claims. So, in terms of what it can deliver, it can potentially deliver an extremely important judgment as to those events in 2016, and 2017. And Myanmar's responsibility as a state in relation to its obligations under the Genocide Convention. But it won't find individuals criminally responsible necessarily for their role in those events.
Brad 19:15
I mean, just just on that one, one thing that I do remember about the ICJ case, is that a, I don't know what the legal term is, I believe it might have been a petition or a motion was put forth by the Myanmar side. And I say Myanmar because of course, it is the state of Myanmar. That is before the court not not the military itself. The argument being that the court the ICJ does not actually have jurisdiction, in in this particular case, and I remember that one of the judges was actually dissenting and and agreed that that actually no, the court does not have A comment again, I'm forgetting all the legal terminology, but it doesn't sort of have native jurisdiction in this in this particular instance. Of course, the court is up to its own decision, like the court was able to decide that it itself has the jurisdiction. But was that decision? Significant was this is this particular case unusual in regards to the ICJ taking an interest?
Isabel Todd 20:24
It? It's, it's fairly unusual. I mean, I wouldn't say unusual, it's certainly significant. And that it established a very strong precedent for one state bringing a case against another under this incredibly powerful and important international treaty, the Genocide Convention, when that state was not sort of directly, I say directly affected in that it's not a neighboring states, etc. But what you're referring to, I think of the preliminary objections that Myanmar submitted, which I don't think ever really had a very good chance of abstracting the case or having the case dismissed. They argued on the grounds that the Gambia itself didn't have standing to bring the case. For that reason that I've said that the Gambia is not connected, but that was dismissed by the court because the Genocide Convention has such a status that if you harm the rights of anyone under the convention, you harm the rights of everyone under the convention. So that's the basis for the Gambia bringing this claim. Then Myanmar said, well, actually, it's not the Gambia bringing the claim. It's the NYC, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Gambia has just accident acting as a proxy. That was something else that they argued, again, that was dismissed by the court. So the jurisdictional basis is is is is sound is solid, and the court found that it does have jurisdiction. It dismissed Myanmar's attempts to really delay and and sort of frustrate the case, is my interpretation of what that was because I'm not sure they were ever really confident that they would be able to argue conclusively that the court doesn't have jurisdiction, because because it's it's pretty clear that it does. And that's been reaffirmed. I mean, that basis for jurisdiction has been used again by South Africa and bringing the case against Israel, which is before the ICJ at the moment in South Africa is actually even expanded further. But that's that's a different, that's a different conversation.
Brad 22:53
Okay, that's very interesting stuff. But so the important point, then, is that the ICJ itself, cannot hold any individual accountable, and cannot hold an organization accountable. The most, if I'm understanding you correctly, that we can hope from this particular case, is that the ICJ declares, or finds that the state of Myanmar was collectively guilty of violating the Genocide Convention, it wasn't so much pointing fingers at the military. So there's still the possibility that the military would try to do what they did at the time, and hide behind the pseudo civilian government and say, Well, you know, we weren't in power at the time it was it was the government and therefore, it's the NLD. Who is who is responsible? Is that door still open?
Isabel Todd 23:42
To some extent, I suppose. Yeah. I mean, what the Gambia is saying is that there are certain obligations within the Genocide Convention, that Myanmar as a state, as you rightly say, has has failed to uphold. And those are preventing genocide, punishing genocide, punishing individuals for incitement to genocide. So there's there's a list under the convention. And so the role of individuals and institutions like the military are important and will very much come into the judgment. I presume that the court that the court makes, but you're right in saying that this is not a criminal process. These are not criminal proceedings. So that's not the focus of the court. The court is looking to establish whether those quite limited obligations in terms of what's written in the convention, whether the state of Myanmar has upheld them, essentially.
Brad 24:57
Okay, so then focusing on the criminality Let's turn to the International Criminal Court. The violations that we are often speaking of here, the war crimes and the crimes against humanity for very, very, very clearly under the remit of the International Criminal Court. So very simple black and white question. Does the International Criminal Court have the authority to initiate a suit against the military as an entity or against individuals within the military?
Isabel Todd 25:30
I'm laughing because none of it's a laughing matter. But a black and white question, which there's probably not a black and white answer when it comes to the ICC jurisdiction, but a black and white answer to the question of whether or not it can bring proceedings against individuals is yes, that's what the International Criminal Court does, it has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute individuals alleged to have committed crimes that are listed in the Rome Statute. So it's, again, a specific list of crimes that are articulated in the treaty that established the ICC. And those are, as you say, war crimes crimes against humanity, genocide, and also the crimes of aggression as well.
Brad 26:21
But so can they can they can they bring suit against the military tomorrow?
Isabel Todd 26:27
Somewhat. There is an investigation undergoing at the ICC at the moment. The difficulty is, is that Myanmar hasn't ratified that that treaty that I referred to the Rome Statute. And so how the ICC generally works is that states that sign the Rome Statute, except that the court has jurisdiction over those crimes listed in the Rome Statute, when they may have been committed in that state. So Myanmar, never signed the Rome Statute. The government, the government from 2016, the NLD led government could have done so they didn't. If they had the ICC would have jurisdiction in Myanmar now. But they didn't. So the ICC essentially doesn't have jurisdiction over crimes committed in Myanmar. However, after the events of 2016 and 2017, there was some quite interesting work that was done by the court by the by the prosecutor. And what they found is that the crimes that were committed against the Rohingya some of those crimes had a cross border element to them because the crimes began in Myanmar. But they ended when Ranga refugees crossed the border into Bangladesh. For example, one of the elements of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute is the crime of deportation or forcible transfer of populations. Now, Bangladesh is a party to the Rome Statute, so the ICC has jurisdiction in Bangladesh. And so I think it was the one of the pre trial chambers of the court had to consider whether or not that was a legal basis for the court having jurisdiction over those crimes that are involved, or were partially partially took place. Within the state part, a state party where the court has jurisdiction, and it found that it does. So the ICC does have an extremely limited jurisdiction over those quite specific crimes that were committed against the Rohingya, which, again, is is a good thing, and it's another step forward in terms of accountability and justice. But it's very, very limited. It doesn't cover the full extent of the crimes that were committed against the Rohingya, and it does not cover Myanmar as a whole crimes that have been committed in the post coup context, or indeed, were committed in the years and decades preceding 2016 and 2017.
Brad 29:35
So, a couple of questions that come up, then, based on what you've, you've said, and the first one that I want to get clarification on. You said that there is an investigation happening at the ICC. In in the terms of the ICC, what does that word mean? Like what is an investigation? In the ICA? Are they trying to gather evidence for the purposes of deciding whether or not they can have a trial or are they is this them signaling that they're going to try and prosecute certain people like what? What can we take away from the knowledge that in the investigation is taking place? Yeah,
Isabel Todd 30:08
exactly that they are gathering and collecting evidence and trying to put together a case that they can take to prosecution essentially. So yeah, exactly, as you say. I mean, they wouldn't have embarked on the investigation. If, if, if there wasn't a good reason to do so. But But that's where it's at at the moment.
Brad 30:32
So, so this is, so the investigation, is this, like sua sponte? Like the court itself has decided to hold this investigation? Or did some external organization or entity have to bring this to the ICC?
Isabel Todd 30:48
It was the officer. So the office of the prosecutor is conducting the investigation. And I mean, I actually I should say, and thank you for for prompting. But, you know, a key reason that this investigation is taking place is because of the efforts of refugees, Rohingya refugees and victims and survivors of of the atrocities, their efforts in petitioning the court to the prosecutor to initiate this investigation, there was a lot of organization that took place. There was a group of women survivors, in particular, they they, they, they did a lot of work in bringing this forward and making this happen. And as I say, petitioning the prosecutor. So the role of victims in bringing this about is is absolutely fundamental.
Brad 31:47
And we're very grateful for for all of the work that they have done and continue to do, despite all of the many obstacles that life and the military have thrown at them quite deliberately. But then the other question becomes with the Rome Statute, but you know, we're talking about the Rome Statute, if Myanmar is party to the Rome Statute. How How does retroactive jurisdiction work at that point, like does it does the court get to decide cases of crimes that existed prior to the ratification of the Rome Statute? Or is everything null and void until the ink is dry?
Isabel Todd 32:26
The court can have retroactive jurisdiction? No, that's a good point. And it only as far back as 2002. Because that's when the treaty came into force. And when the court was established, so the court doesn't have jurisdiction over anything that happened pre 2002. But when states ratify, yes, they can retroactively except the jurisdiction of the court all the way back to them. But I would say in Myanmar's case, Myanmar hasn't ratified the Rome Statute. But what has happened is that the new G has used another mechanism to grant the court jurisdiction. And it has done that by filing a declaration with the court under Article 12, three of the statute which accepts the court's jurisdiction, and can be used by states that aren't party to the Rome Statute. So the NUJ did this in 2021, in mid 2021, if I remember correctly. So on that basis, the prosecutor could expand that very, very limited investigation that I've already mentioned, to cover the post coup events, the odd, it did backdate all the way to 2002 when it filed that declaration, so the prosecutor could expand the investigation to cover the full extent of the crimes committed against the Rohingya, the post coup crimes etc. But that hasn't been done. I assume on the basis that the N ug the new G the ICC, the prosecutor and the court generally are not clear about whether or not the N ug has the authority to make that declaration on behalf of Myanmar. Does the N ug represent the state of Myanmar position at sag M is that it very clearly does. But it this hasn't been taken up by the court which is extremely disappointing.
Brad 34:41
So, okay, we're a million dollar question time here. You know, how does this work because the situation as it currently stands, is that Representative Joe Morton continues to be the the ambassador of Myanmar and he's pro democracy and he's been doing a phenomenal job. advocating for the Democratic cause in the United Nations in the General Assembly, the military have challenged this and the United Nations Credentials Committee has not rendered a decision on who the government of Myanmar is. simultaneously. The iCj rejected the new G's plea to be able to appoint the representatives off in your mind that case, accepting representatives who are appointed by the military, although they note that this is not a an acceptance of the military as the jus government, it was it was simply made for for other administrative purposes. So it seems that different organs can move independently. What what does the ICC a have to do? Right? How what how much lateral ality does the ICC have in autonomously making the decision that someone's article 12, three declaration is valid? And what traditions conventions customs actually guide the ICC in these types of decision making processes?
Isabel Todd 36:10
Right. So, I mean, it's a bit of a mess, isn't it in the international system, in terms of who different bodies are engaging with? I mean, the first thing to say is that these decisions on whether or not a government is a government and recognizing governments is one that is made by states, not international bodies. And then secondly, that decision that is made by states is generally not made by states. I mean, they can and they take actions that demonstrate where they stand. But the general practice in the international community is not to recognize governments, but to recognize states, which is is not really helpful in this situation, but the reason that, I suppose governments retain that level of leeway is for complicated situations, so that, you know, they can decide or act and be flexible based on their political considerations. And so, when it comes to the new GE, they haven't been formally recognized as the government of Myanmar by any state, but states have certainly indicated a level of recognition to some degree or another, it more or less day is one there are others, many accept and ug representation etc. And then on the other side, I mean, the hunter really hasn't been formally recognized by states either. But then again, there are some that send ambassadors and do certain things, which again, indicates a degree of recognition. But as far as international bodies are concerned, they they have been in a situation where it's it's a bit vague. The General Assembly, as you say, has not really gone as far as sort of fully accepting and ug representation but it's deferred a decision on trauma tunes rep representation, Ambassador trauma return, which allows him to effectively remain well allows him to remain in place as the representative Myanmar and effectively is sort of effective recognition by the General Assembly of the new GE as representing Myanmar in in that body. And that's really important because the General Assembly represents every UN member states. So that's that's very significant, that sort of tacit recognition of the energy from the international community and at the same time, while it, you know, hasn't quite been a positive decision in terms of, you know, accepting a new G representation as it's submitted to the General Assembly, more of a deferral. What has happened is that the General Assembly Credentials Committee has rejected definitively and repeatedly the attempts by the junta to obtain credentials for its representative and to essentially remove two or more tone from the seat and have the junta represent Myanmar in the General Assembly.
Brad 39:43
So that leans very strongly towards the NUJ really clarify that because the other understanding that I had, which may be incorrect, but the understanding that I had was simply that the Credentials Committee, which obviously keeps changing different countries are on it, but that the Credentials Committee had simply taken Myanmar and additional The Afghanistan after the Taliban reestablished control, and had simply been kicking the can down the road, saying we don't make decisions until we're ready to make the decisions. And in the meantime, under the principle of incumbency, whoever is currently in the seat continues to sit in that seat, you're saying that they have affirmatively rejected, the entreaties of the military is like, is that? Is that different than what I said? Is it the case that they have actually taken the military's request? And said firmly? No, or is it that they took the military's request and they have thus far refused to make any decision on it?
Isabel Todd 40:42
Well, they haven't even acknowledged it. Because as you say, the decision has been what you described to defer but leaving the incumbent in place. But the military has actively submitted articles of credential to the Credentials Committee and to the General Assembly, and those have been rejected and that they simply haven't been taken on board. And so that decision to defer leaving Joe Morton in place as the incumbent is also not a given, because the Credentials Committee makes that decision. But then it has to go to the General Assembly. And if members of the General Assembly disagree, they can raise that and it can go to a vote. So it was very much a possibility that the seat could have been vacant, vacated completely, that the General Assembly members of the General Assembly or indeed the Credentials Committee could have said, Look, we can't make a decision on this. But Joe Morton doesn't represent Myanmar, the military doesn't represent Myanmar. It wasn't a sort of concrete given that he would have remained in place. So overall, the decision, they say leans much more positively in favor of the N UG.
Brad 42:11
Okay, that's a very, I mean, it's a very positive thing to do here. But like when the international community repeats this mantra of well, we don't recognize governments, we recognize states, considering the way that international politics actually works. It's very akin to a democratic government saying we recognize our citizens, we just don't recognize their ballots, like, but you need to the ballot is how the citizen communicates to the government what it wants. If you're not recognizing the government, you're not making affirmative decisions on who the government is, then there can't really be that formal interaction between the member and the overarching organization. And it feels like this is just throwing a spanner in the works to say, well, no one's really confident, like the impression that I get is it especially in in international politics, the impression that I've been getting within the Myanmar system is that every country is looking at every other country. It's, it's like a bunch of people sort of getting into a brawl. And everyone's just looking at the next guy, because nobody wants to be the first one to do anything. But they're happy to jump in when someone else is doing it. And everyone's still in that phase of looking around. And we don't know, we don't know, we don't know. And so the status quo stands. But the end result of that is everything that the energy can do to make the ICC welcome, and provide jurisdiction for the actual crimes for which the ICC was ostensibly created, like we are talking about the highest tier of, of crimes that we as a species globally recognized the like, this is the weaponization of rape and starvation. This is terrorism on a national scale, this is genocide. And yet the ICC appears to be even if not necessarily hamstrung, perhaps reticent to unilaterally make a decision on this front and and to go into Myanmar and try to go about different justice for victims. Like maybe I'm being a little bit harsh on the ICC, but it just sort of feels to me like the international community has this tendency to seize up and resist making declarations and statements preferring to sort of sit and watch the situation or wait for someone else to act first. But I don't know if you'd agree with that.
Isabel Todd 44:38
No, I would agree with that. I would agree with that. And I think you know the the sort of the weariness on the part of the international community to to recognize the N ug for what it is is the most legitimate representative of the Myanmar people It denies me and my people a voice on the international stage when they need it the most. I mean is as far as the ICC is concerned, as I say, no one wants to sort of break cover and make a decision first. And if I'm being generous to the ICC, which I, you know, I don't know, if I would, you know, want to be but but if I'm being generous to the ICC, I guess any decision that they make has to have standing. Because if they move forward on something that is seen by the international community as being on pretty shaky ground, then, you know, it's it's not going to be meaningful. But I mean, one thing you asked actually, about, what what are the criteria for the ICC and these international, international bodies, and it's slightly different than it is, is for governments, I mean, they really just say, Look, we deal with, you know, who, who we're in contact with it, who our contact point is, and whether that's an embassy or an individual at a particular, you know, government office, or whatever it might be. And that was the basis of the IC J's decision, which was to accept the military representative to represent Myanmar in the case of the ICJ, which was opposition to sack admits that that was a disastrous decision for many reasons. You know, most importantly, we think it's disastrous for the case. Well, maybe not disastrous, but it's not. It's not good for the case. But it also affected what the ICC can do, because at that point, our understanding is that the ICC was waiting to see what the ICJ would do in terms of representation. And, of course, if there was democratic representation in the ICJ, then you would have democratic representation in the ICJ, you'd have democratic representation in the General Assembly, and then that would make the basis for the ICC moving forward much stronger. But of course, the ICJ went the other way. And, yeah, it's very disappointing.
Brad 47:19
So let's move to another very important element of of the international structures that exist here. And this is not quite as powerful, but I think is a very significant piece of the puzzle that we should speak about. And that's the IMM, which is not a court, but is doing very important work to gather information and to intercalate evidence, can you can you talk us a little bit through what the I M M, or W LM is doing. Another important piece of the puzzle, which is not a court in and of itself, but is a body that is working to gather information, gather evidence that can later be used by court bodies, is the independent investigative mechanism for Myanmar, the IMM, or double IWM. And the W WM is doing a lot of really important work, but it is limited in what it can actually hope to accomplish. So can you talk us a little bit through about what the IMM does, and where it sits within the scope of the International sort of mechanisms for justice?
Isabel Todd 48:25
Yeah. So the double IWM, was established in 2019, by the Human Rights Council, and it actually came out of the recommendations that were made by Yang here Special Rapporteur, and Chris Marzuki, and radica, as the fact finding mission, those recommendations that I mentioned at the beginning, that leaders of the military needed to be investigated, and not just the military, but you know, anyone with criminal responsibility, but but, you know, primarily leaders for the military to be investigated, and prosecuted for international crimes. But the first stage of that is investigation, and they recommended that an investigative body be established, that would be collecting evidence on an ongoing basis, and preparing case files for prosecution in lieu of a jurisdiction being identified where those prosecutions could could take place. And so that's essentially what the double IWM is and what it is doing. There had been a model that was quite similar. There was established by the UN General Assembly on Syria. But this was the first time that the human Rights Council had established something like this. So it was really seen as pushing the boundaries of international law in a way and and certainly what the UN Human Rights Council could do. But it's been operational now for coming up for five years. And is collecting evidence, preparing case files, they report annually, the head of the mechanism states, these huge amounts of evidence that they have collected. They say that they are seeing patterns of war crimes and crimes against humanity being committed and I think escalating. But where is it all going there's there's we're still in a situation where there is really no jurisdiction, where those case files can can can be used. So it's hugely important and significant that the W WM is there. But that's not where the work stops.
Brad 51:06
And so, so the W WM is sort of under the Human Rights Council, by the Human Rights Council is, if I'm remembering correctly from previous conversations we've had the Human Rights Council is a political body, a rotating body made up of UN member states. So it's it's not in the same way that the ICC or the ICJ would be understood to be independent and apolitical, or at least my understanding is that's what they strive to be. The Human Rights Council is not a political, does that have any impact on the WWE has operations?
Isabel Todd 51:51
Yeah, I mean, the ICC in the ICJ judicial bodies, their court. The Human Rights Council, as you say it, yeah, it's a political body. So it was created by the General Assembly, the UN General Assembly, which is represented by every UN member state, the Human Rights Council is a subsidiary of the General Assembly, it's located in Geneva. And it has 47 Member States on the council at any one time. They're elected to the council and serve for a period of time. They you can't permanently be on the Human Rights Council states do have to take breaks away from it, if they serve successive terms, and the membership shifts. But yeah, it essentially is a political body being represented by states. But its its purpose is the promotion and protection of human rights.
Brad 53:01
Okay, but I mean it because it is a rotating body. I mean, how often does it rotate? Can we expect that we might have countries that are sympathetic to Myanmar coming onto that council? Or is the council large enough that they wouldn't really be able to sway it?
Isabel Todd 53:20
So there are blocks of memberships. So you always have to have a certain number of members that are from from Europe that are from Africa, that are from Asia. So the membership is generally pretty spread. I mean, you do get times when the membership is favorable to certain situations or certain causes. But I mean, overall, it's fairly balanced. In that sense. What I should add, is that the Human Rights Council, like the General Assembly, it doesn't have the power to enforce its decisions. So it does pass resolutions. It can establish mandates and mechanisms, like the ones that we've been talking about the Special Rapporteur factfinding mission WwM. But it is not like the Security Council, which as I say, I mean, that does have the power to enforce its decisions. So we're talking about people describe it as soft law, essentially, what the count what the Human Rights Council is able to do.
Brad 54:28
So on the whole thing, it doesn't look like there's a huge amount going on in the international legal space that could actually deliver results in the immediate future. And one mechanism that does hypothetically, from my understanding, offer this opportunity and one thing that was being called for very widely in the early days of the protest movement after the coup is the is the responsibility to protect this, if I understand it correctly, is a a document agreed to by the member nations which said says that all member nations have a responsibility to protect people in even in foreign jurisdictions, and that if you are acting under the guise of or their responsibility to protect you are you are getting involved physically boots on the ground in a foreign state, you're violating their sovereignty for the purpose of protecting people, then the United Nations, in theory deems that to be an acceptable immoral use of force. Is that a mechanism that I've described correctly? Number one, and number two, is that a mechanism that anyone would be interested in using Myanmar?
Isabel Todd 55:36
A bit? Yeah. Yes, what you describe is, is is right, a very sort of far end of the scale of what the Responsibility to Protect enables RTP RTP itself. This, this principle, this doctrine, it doesn't actually create any new obligations or duties or powers for the international community, what it did was affirm obligations that already existed. Which is to say that in a situation where people or peoples are at grave risk of severe human rights violations by their own governments, and their governments are unwilling or unable to act. The international community can take action that may otherwise encroach on the sovereignty of that state, on the basis that the international community has an obligation to protect human rights. And at the far end of the scale, that action can involve direct intervention in a state boots on the ground, as you described, but that's rarely rarely desirable. Actually, I would say, there are other actions that can be taken, as well, and and should be taken in those situations under the principle of RTP. For example, the Security Council, which is really the body that is mainly tasked with these sort of actions can impose, for example, global arms embargoes, sanctions. The Security Council, we haven't spoken about this also has the power to refer a situation to the International Criminal Court, even if that country hasn't ratified the Rome Statute or filed a declaration under Article 12. Three. So the Security Council also has the power to refer what's happening in Myanmar to the ICC, and that would grant the ICC jurisdiction. And these are all actions that are considered part of the RTP framework, because their intention is to protect populations. So absolutely, as you say, I mean, we we, we actually published a paper last year, reviewing the UN's response to the crisis since 2022, or 2020 21, and Myanmar. And we started by recalling the protests that emerged in immediate response to the coup and the signs that were being held up by people for RTP, saying we want the international community to come and help us to come and protect us. And, you know, we concluded that those hopes had been completely betrayed, because the actions that have been taken are completely insufficient. And the international community hasn't upheld its obligation at all. Some individual states have imposed sanctions. And that's important, and that's good. There have been some attempts to restrict arms transfers, that's important. That's good. There are some efforts being taken to advance accountability, but it's nowhere near enough.
Brad 59:06
I mean, this puts us in a very strange situation, I don't want to put you in an awkward position. But the feeling that I get, and let's be completely frank, that this is not the feeling that I get this is the feeling that millions and millions of people in Myanmar get 10s of millions, in fact, not to mention 10s of millions of people in other war torn crisis ridden countries around the world, that the international community, the concept of an international community and the various supranational organizations like the United Nations, the European Union, ASEAN and so on, that exist, have presented lofty goals. They have drafted reams of treaties and agreements and conventions and international legislation. And they've brought into existence various bodies, to investigate crimes to try crimes to apprehend criminals and so on. And yet, in these cases where we have such a phenomenally clear, so clear that history very, very rarely provides us with so neat, a division between good and evil. Not perfect, let's, let's be honest, not perfect, but a very, very clear argument of who is in the right to the international community fails and has failed in Myanmar, to take real substantive action. Like, what conclusion? Can we really come to based on this? Like, what does this tell us about the United Nations if they exist, presumably to prevent these types of crises. And when they come about, they're either hamstrung or they're afraid, or they have such a political minefield to navigate that they just wind up taking no real action?
Isabel Todd 1:01:03
Well, I mean, you know, I, yeah, I completely recognize and agree that that
Brad 1:01:09
I don't want to put you in like, an awkward position to have to criticize you're,
Isabel Todd 1:01:14
you're absolutely right. That people in Myanmar should feel incredibly disappointed with the international system. I mean, we it second, I mean, we've we've been very critical of the UN doesn't put me in an awkward position to say that at all. I mean, the paper I mentioned, the word we used was, was betrayed. And we think that's, that's right, that people should feel betrayed, because the promise of the international system, and what it stands for, has been betrayed in Myanmar. I mean, what what I would also say is that you refer to the UN, I think, as a supranational body, I think it would be, it would be more accurate to say International, because it's not above the international system, it is just a forum of the International, it's sorry, it's not above the international community. It's not above governments. It's a forum for those governments. And so as much as it stands on certain principles, it still simply just reflects the power dynamics that exist globally. And that's, that's the constant tension in the international system is that, you know, you're constantly up against those, those power dynamics and the sort of the movements of, of sort of global politics and where they stand and where they lie and what's happening. But those principles are there. And as a global community, there are people that believe in them and want to see them realized, and so that's why we keep pushing, and and we keep trying, I mean, as sack em. I mean, what what we do, is it I mean, we're quite limited and what we can do, I mean, what, what we say we do, and what what we do is sort of pool the collective experience of the advisors is how we refer to the members of the council to sack him Yang, he, Chris and Marzuki, we pull their collective experience of the international system of its quirks and dynamics and how it works, and particularly their experience of working within the international system on Myanmar. And we use that experience to try and find as many ways as we can to mobilize the international system to work in the way that it's supposed to, and to take action that will a put pressure on the military, so that it will stop the violations and atrocities and be take action to support the democratic movement. But that's that's all we can do. But that is what we do. And yeah, we hope that we can make progress over time.
Brad 1:04:31
Hopefully, I think it's not even so much hopefully we can make progress over time. I think I think that we can say that SEC M has made progress and and in sort of turning to second itself and what Sam has done let's let's look at the report because I've I've said this in other interviews as well. The briefing paper that you that you released, it's a little bit dated by now because they It was the release on the fifth of September 2022. But even what like a year and a half on give or take, it's, it's still a document that I find myself going back to. It's a document that I have used in multiple other interviews. The document is entitled briefing paper effective controlling Myanmar, we will link it below so that people can can see it and it is well worth looking at. It's a very short document 32 pages long but you you have done in this document, what I have seen, experts come in and say, in the Myanmar space is phenomenally and and unbelievably difficult to do. In a world where we have live updated conflict maps of conflict such as Ukraine, Russia, Ukraine, Myanmar seems to resist this, this traditional type of visualizing mapping, graphing hard numbers, saying this is the border between the military and the resistance forces. This is where the military uncontrolled, this is where the resistance forces are in control. And despite the difficulties that I've heard from people who are getting their information, direct on the ground from PDFs, people who are getting their information from satellite imagery, and people are getting the information from everything in between, in the difficulties and the obstacles that they face in trying to present the Myanmar crisis in a way that is visually easy to process. You've done it very elegantly in a in a very short and to the point, report, and one of the most important things that you've done in this report is address something that most people really gloss over. And that is, we don't have a clear understanding of what it means for a piece of territory to be quote unquote, controlled by pro democracy forces, or controlled by the military. So in starting the discussion on this document, let's let's focus on this question. How did you approach the question of what does it mean, to control territory? And how does your paper break that down?
Isabel Todd 1:07:18
Well, I mean, let me first of all, just to say, I mean, you're completely right, and your other guests and people you speak to are right, in saying that this is an extremely complicated thing to try and do. And essentially, we tried to take a snapshot of a situation that is fluid, and incredibly complex. But we felt it was something that was absolutely essential that we do. And the reason that we felt that is because we, we had quite a jarring experience. If I go back to 2021, we weren't traveling, there was still COVID restrictions in place at that time. But we were some following the resistance. And and, you know, obviously, every day we weren't, we were seeing what was happening in Myanmar, we were in touch with our colleagues and partners and seeing all the developments that were taking place with the different protest groups and PDF that were forming and local administrative bodies, and that this was building throughout 2021 and into 2022. And we could see that something really significant was happening. 22 and then travel restrictions were lifted. So we sort of got back to work going to UN meetings in Geneva, and in New York, and we were sort of seized with this sense of urgency and, and and, you know, a real motivation to say look, you know, look at what's happening, you know, what, what can we do to support this democratic movement? And, yeah, but what we were met with, which really floored us, actually was this real sense of just inertia and complacency from the international community. Basically, when we tried to understand it, it seemed to be based on this completely, frankly, lazy assumption, that, okay, there was a coup. There were some protests. But now the military has quashed those. And it is, essentially, it may not be legitimate, but you don't have to be legitimate to be considered a government. It's the de facto government on the basis that it is in effective control of the country. There's not a lot we can do about it. We're back to you know, the 1990s and the 2000s in Myanmar, military dictatorship. You know, we'll just not engage with it. Don't worry Actually for a few years, and then just hope that things change in in a decade or so. And, you know, we were really, really worried when we when we picked up on that, and we thought, you know, the huge risk was that relations with the hunter were going to be normalized pretty quickly, which is exactly what the hunter was banking on. They don't care if they're not seen as legitimate. I think they feel that would be nice. But they don't have to be seen as legitimate in order to reap the benefits of being essentially the government of Myanmar, from the international system is a monopoly over development assistance, humanitarian assistance, all of the other things that go with it. So that was our real concern was that there was going to be this normalization based on false assumptions that the military was in control as a government. And we also, were just so frustrated, that the resistance itself, which was so remarkable already at that point, was just completely dismissed, hadn't even been seen. And we thought, this cannot happen, this, this this, this cannot be expressed, this cannot be known this, this, this cannot not be known, I should say, sorry. And so, we thought, it's going to be complicated, it's going to be difficult, but we need to set about trying to communicate to the international community, the fact that it is far more complicated than they are giving it credit to. And first and foremost that the military is not the de facto government, because the basis for being a de facto government is that you have effective control of the country, as the government. And we were confident that it did not, but we had to set about showing that. So yes, as you say, how did we do that? Well, the first thing we had to do was determine what the criteria are, and what we're going to use to test for effective control. So we went back and looked back at the case law on this. And what does the international system mean when it says effective control in the context of an entity claiming to be the de facto government of a state. And the most explanatory case goes back to 1923. And it's an arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica. And this is really cited as the precedent in terms of determining what effective control means. So in that case, Great Britain had bought a case against the government of Costa Rica, on behalf of two oil companies, British oil companies, of course, saying that Costa Rica had to honor an oil concession or oil concessions that were granted to those oil companies, by the previous government of Costa Rica. Costa Rica, the government of Costa Rica said no, we don't, because that previous government was not the legitimate government, it seized power in a coup. Oh, and by the way, Great Britain, even you didn't recognize that government as a legitimate government. So Great Britain, responded that, that's all well and good. But actually, for our purposes, that doesn't matter, because it was the de facto government on the basis that it was in effective control. And so the court had to determine whether or not that regime was an effective control. And to do that it had to work out how to test for effective control. And we used those tests, those criteria. And they're, they're interesting, and I think, really relevant, actually, to the to understanding and really useful to understanding what's happening in Myanmar. So the first criteria for establishing effective control as an entity claiming to be a government is that you have control of territory. That doesn't mean you have control of all of the territory. You don't even have to control a lot of territory, but you have to control some you can't be completely outside of the country. The second, and for me, I think this is the most the most important is that you have to control the population. Now, what does that mean? What the Court said it means is that the population by and large, has to accept that you are the governor meant. Now, that's not the same as a democratic mandate, it doesn't mean that the population have to like you, they can hate you, they can despise you. But they essentially have to accept even unwillingly, that you are the government. And you, you know, there are authoritarian regimes around the world that are hated, but people have had to accept that they are the government for the time being, and essentially get on with their lives. I mean, at the very extreme end, this can be achieved by force by the entity, forcing people to submit to it. But if you look at Myanmar, I mean, that that has not happened hardly anywhere in the country. In fact, almost the extreme opposite, people are actively resisting and rejecting that's not been a period of time at all, since the coup, where the population on the whole has just said, Okay, we don't like that this has happened. But, you know, we just have to accept it. So that was the second criteria. The third criteria is the capacity to administer the functions of government. So this is where you get into what it means to have effective control as a government beyond being just an occupying military force. So this is really important. And again, this is very relevant to the situation in Myanmar, because, you know, we could see that beyond presenting a facade of being able to act like a government, you know, in Napier door or wherever else, actually, the military's capacity to act like a government in much of the country, particularly rural areas, was limited to non existent even by that time, in 2022. In many places, I mean, we'd seen that the hunters, administrators at the village and township level had been sort of forced out, people refusing to engage with the GID apparatus at that level.
And then, on the flip side, you also had people then establishing their own administrative bodies at the community level. And I should also say, in many areas, the military has never had the capacity to administer government functions, because areas of Myanmar have long been under the administrative departments of er, Rose. And we could see that the service provision of those er Oh, governance departments were expanding. So that's another very important aspect to it. And then finally, the final criteria is a degree of permanency. So it's not enough to just have control of territory population, the capacity to administer government functions, if it's simply a flash in the pan, a hand looks like it could all crumble within days, weeks or months, you have to be able to demonstrate some degree of stability to be considered in effective control as a government. So what we did is we took those criteria, and then acknowledging that the situation across Myanmar was dynamic and not uniform. We apply those tests to each of Myanmar's townships. And then based on that assigned each Township with a category on a scale from full junta control at one end, to full resistance control at the other. And that's how we came up with this heat map. That really was our best effort to capture this, this snapshot and this this very fluid and dynamic picture, as I say, but what we were able to say conclusively is that the military could not be considered a de facto government because it did not meet those criteria across enough of the country.
Brad 1:19:18
And I think that it's really interesting, because if you look at the report need on page 10 is interesting. It provides a heat map of conflict incidents per township in Myanmar. And that paints us an interesting picture of where is their active ongoing conflict and where is their stability? And we want this map and we might say, Oh, well, like Shan State, surprisingly stable. Obviously, that's no longer the case. But at the time it was, but and you know, North cucina in places like that, but that's when we roll down. And we go to page 14, where you've got this heat map of control. And what's interesting is the way you've you've categorized that so Reading from the legend, you have regions that are labeled as stable junta control, you have regions that are labeled for resistance control and local administration or strong resistance control and local administration. But in between, we have some interesting categories you have junta dependent on local proxy militias for control, or under forces under regular attack, or ER O's that maintain ceasefires with the hunter. And especially when we look at Shan State, the regions that are labeled as full Hunter control is like, basically Donji, that is basically it. Everything else is controlled. And again, this is 2022 controlled through a proxy or controlled through an era, or as is the case in some townships in the border with Thailand, or Laos completely under resistance control. So it really delves into this thing, that it's not a spectrum, between junta control, and revolutionary control. It's actually a bit more of a complex space, where you also have the self interested ethnic organizations coming in, who are maybe allied to the military, or they may not be allied, they have ceasefire agreements, or you have the border guard forces acting as proxy agents, for the military, and so on and so forth. So you, you have a lot of stakeholders. And when you actually look at the map, yeah, like you your own statistics that you provide on page 13, indicate that well, the military have stable control and 72 townships. And there are only six townships with full resistance control. Clearly the military is is, you know, on top. But when we look at the actual breakdown, and we actually put it in words and say no, no, no, no, no, no, the military is not on top of this, the military is desperately clinging to its relationships with proxy organizations, proxy organizations that are increasingly getting sick of what the military is doing, how the military is not actually bringing any benefit to them. And increasingly coming around to saying, You know what, like, maybe the revolution is a better deal for us, that really corrects the record. Because back in 2022, a lot of people were saying, Oh, the military is going to win, the military is going to win the revolution doesn't really have a chance. This, this graphic representation I love so much, because it kind of captures like, no, you've missed all of the nuance, and all of the reality. So I don't know, I just really, when I first read it, I really enjoyed reading it, I really enjoyed the information in here. And just this, the nuance and and the breadth of understanding of the underground situation in this document really helps to sort of undermine these very simplistic surface level analyses of military big resistance small therefore military wins, like, No, that is not how this works.
Isabel Todd 1:22:53
And I think I mean, that's great. And yeah, and thank you. And we, you know, we were really lucky to work with some excellent consultants on this as well. But I think what the paper also did, and, I mean, I'm casting my mind back, I think we do say this. It also, it tried to capture a, a trajectory. So if you look at the scale, I think, you know, there's a sense of movement, even in the legend, and the categories that we give, you know, where we say Hunter control is receding, or resistance administration is becoming more formalized, because even at that point, there was a trajectory that was in favor of the resistance. And I think by looking across the country as a whole, that was apparent, but it's sort of difficult to get otherwise when you're just looking at sort of individual situations. I mean, if you look to Naypyidaw, Yangon or some central sort of southern Myanmar, you know, you wouldn't, you wouldn't get that sense of, of movement. But, you know, overall, it was there. And again, it's, it's, you know, we break it down by township because, and had to put it on a scale because it's a very difficult thing to say, one way or another, when you have all this movement, you have sort of rural areas in the township that are essentially controlled by PDF. But, you know, you have a junta base in the town, you know, how do you where do you place that on the scale of control, but, again, this is why I think the criteria are so important and that we have to factor in, you know, what, who people see as being the government and what people want and what people are willing to accept and the other acts of resistance beyond just armed resistance. Is because in a situation like this, yes, you might have a Literally based in town, but actually in terms of the population, they're completely isolated. And people are coordinate, you know, there's there's organization happening, etc. So I think that that was an important element of it to grasp, which is complicated to do. But yeah, I mean, this, this was, you know, this, this was what we this was what we came up with.
Brad 1:25:25
And that's really interesting point that you raised there, because, really, I'm reading from the legend directly. And so you have one category, resistance controls growing territory, but cannot consolidate full control, asterisk due to lack of resistance, access to modern weapons, and so on. And you have under control receding. And so it's interesting that you raise it because I presumed when I was first reading it, the reason for that, that which is to say the reason we do not see a category of junta control increasing is because you are operating on the principle of incumbency, you assume that by default, the military is in control of all of the townships. And the only change that can really be tracked is the military losing control of townships. But you seem to be indicating that that is not the attitude that you approach this with at all. And it simply was the case that even in 2022, there was space and potential for the military to be re establishing control in townships. And it simply did not appear in your data set anywhere, that the military was actually improving its control in any of these regions.
Isabel Todd 1:26:38
Yeah, that's, that's, that's right. That's right. That was the trajectory that was coming through. And it was, it's quite a clear trajectory. And just want to pick up on another point that you made, which was about the resistance, access to arms and sort of sophisticated weaponry. That's, that's a huge reason why it's so difficult for anywhere to be placed under full resistance control, because everywhere is essentially still subject to aerial attack by the hunter. So do you have kind of stable control of the territory in that sense, when there's always that risk? And you we do for resistance control? Those areas are essentially the wah controlled areas. And the reason that they are the only ones is because from our understanding, the hunter needs permission to enter those areas. So yeah, it's very dynamic. And but the Yeah, the discrepancy between the levels of firepower is important. But even despite that, even despite all of that, the military still had only stable control in the sense that it met all of those criteria that I mentioned, in a very, you know, a small percentage of the country. But that's why again, it's so important to look at this beyond purely military terms, because this isn't a civil war. This is an uprising. It's a revolution to rebuild what Myanmar is, and that's already happening. You know, these, the sort of foundations of the federal democracy that will be established in the future, are already being built at that sort of community and township level. This is an uprising that people are willing to happen. And there are acts of resistance that are taking place every day that aren't necessarily seen, but what's very clear as people are actively opposed to the junta. So this captures that it's it's not, it's not a sort of, you know, looking at territory, and I don't know, I'm imagining like a map of, you know, World War Two and, and where the sort of lines are drawn in the trenches. I mean, that's not what's happening here. And by incorporating those different criteria, that's that's what we're trying to convey.
Brad 1:29:30
I think that's a really salient thing, because the US had to go through this a couple of different times. And I think a lot of people have to have to go through this if you if you keep an eye on the discourse around militaries in general. There is a tendency for a lot of commentators and a lot of journalists to view the military to view military operations and needs and so on, in as you as you say, World War Two and Even World War One trench warfare terms because those are easy to understand. We've seen them in movies, we grasp the concept that a little lines on the map and the colored circles move forwards and backwards. But that was 75 years ago. That's no longer the reality. Warfare is often asymmetrical as it is in Myanmar. And in those cases where you have strong resistance movements, even the US had to figure this out in Vietnam. You can't count square miles. It doesn't work that way. Military operations cannot keep thinking in that way. But unfortunately, the media are often slow to pick this up and continue to obsess over well, but the military controls Yangon, the military controls Mandalay, the military controls Naypyidaw, the military controls all of the central economic hubs. And they ignore these things like, Yeah, but the industries in the cities depend on raw materials that are not coming into the cities, because the rural areas they've lost control of. And even if they haven't lost control of them, ain't nobody going to work in those fields and work in those mines. If they're going to get shelled on their way to work. And it just fails to capture just how interconnected and intricate this is. It's not just lines on a map. And yeah, we conquered the city and we put the flag up and then everyone applauds. It's it. Yeah. It's childish. But unfortunately, I think there are a lot of people who, who still want to think in that in that way. And that leads to negative and poor understandings of the ongoing conflict.
Isabel Todd 1:31:30
Yeah, I agree. And poor policy decisions as well.
Brad 1:31:35
I mean, yeah, that's, that's even worse. But so, so the big thing about this, why the big thing about this, like when when this report came out, 2022 You know, I was really excited. I know, a lot of people were very excited about this. But the sad truth, or I should say, the happy truth, the happy truth is that this report is now significantly out of date. Especially the little thing about Shan State era is that maintain ceasefires with the junta that's, yeah, that that went out the window. So as wonderful as the research has been as painstaking and time consuming, as I am certain the research into this was the the the question is, can we expect an updated version of this that reflects the many, many, many, many changes to effective control and the the increase across the board of resistance control. And even I would say, the the increased unity among the opponents of the military, that has taken place since since this was released. I mean, when when this was released, you were saying lack of access to arms for the resistance. They still have a lack of access to arms, but the resistance has since actually established weapons manufacturing, with the Myanmar the scale of the operation has leaped up. So what what can we expect as far as as the future of this type of reporting?
Isabel Todd 1:33:09
I mean, yeah, you're right to say it's, it's out of date. I mean, one, you know, we speak about Shawn state. But actually, in the original paper, I think we have most of Rakhine as being an area where there's ceasefire between the arrows and the hunter. And I think, almost a month later that that changed. And the ceasefire broke down towards the end of 2022. So yeah, it was sort of dated pretty quickly in that sense. But the trajectory holds, and actually has increased in speed. And so we will be doing an update, yes. That should hopefully come out pretty soon, that will, again, try to capture in the same way. The the sort of the heat map, the degrees of control and contestation across the country. You know, there are various other things to look at, in terms of towns now that's that's become something that people are talking about a lot since operation 1027 And who controls towns. So that may be something that we we, you know, tried to capture but something that we didn't we I think we spoke about it in the narrative of the report and the ability of the hunter troops to be able to kind of move and redeploy themselves or you know, move out of sort of conflict areas and then regroup and etc, resupply all of those sorts of things. That really depends on freedom of movement and the ability of troops to move supplies ammunition etc around the world. Tree, you need roads to do that. You need maybe rivers. So that'll, you know, I don't want to. I don't want to say too much. But yeah, I mean that that that'll be some of the other criteria that we might try to try to capture in a in a follow up in an update to this,
Brad 1:35:19
I'd be very excited for that, because that that's another thing that's come up in a couple of the interviews, that that I've conducted with the more military analysts, where they're saying that it's, it's not even a question of how many men the military still have, although it is a fraction of what they claim. But it is also the fact that they don't have, they can't move them around, because the aerial assets are increasingly not working, some are even being shot down, they don't have as many as they claim that they have in the jet fuel is difficult to get. And then the roads themselves have been mined, the bridges have been blown up, ambushes along roads are frequent. And so you will have these situations where you have you know, two camps, two military camps in you know, reasonable proximity to one another. And so you might think, Okay, well, these these two camps collectively, controller a reasonable radius of territory, and then you find out no, because you could not move from one of those camps to the other of those camps, without a very serious risk of hitting an IED right roadblock and ambush being shot at something along those lines. And so the actual ability, the infrastructure necessary for the military to be able to mobilize and respond to threats that appear on the on the various fronts, are just rapidly being cut out from under them. So even compared with 2020, to 2021, even if the military's numbers had stayed completely static, and we know that they haven't, their ability to move those numbers around in a in a meaningful and impactful way, strategically speaking, has been completely undermined. So if if that could also be brought into the picture, and that could also be made clear to people that it doesn't help if the military can say we have X number of men under arms, if they can't move them to places where they're needed, that again, I think can help cut through that, that fog of war that that everyone is is dealing with.
Isabel Todd 1:37:27
Right, right. Yeah, if they can't move them, and also supply them with the arms and munition munitions that they need, I mean, these things are heavy, and to supply them in any significant number. I mean, that's that's going to be pretty difficult to do by air, airlifting things into sort of remote areas. So So yeah, absolutely, as you say, you know, I guess slightly separate, but that's that's one reason why the military is relying so much on airborne munitions and bombing now, and I think there's been some research come out, which just tracks the number of airstrikes in the last quarter of 2024. And it's, it's something like an average of 70 a day. The hunt is launching airstrikes set. Yeah, on average of 70 airstrikes a day, which is just mind boggling numbers. So yeah, you alluded to the, the sanctions on jet fuel. I mean, that's really, really important. We're also looking at the military's capacity to manufacture all of its airborne munitions, and where the kind of supply chain vulnerabilities are there, because this is yeah, I mean, without that, they're, they're really stuffed. I
Brad 1:39:00
mean, not to be the cynical, uncritical, but then, you know, we have been, we are very fortunate on insight Myanmar, to be able to talk to some some incredibly informed, and, and insightful people like it genuinely is a privilege. And so we have been able to have a number of discussions on the topic of jet fuel. And one of the issues that keeps popping up is that the quirks of the international system and you can label jet fuel as a dual use good and you can argue that this is being transported for the supply of civilian aviation and, and it just keeps sneaking under the radar. It's abandoned upon. And it's one of those those failures of the international community to actually look at the situation and say, This is a non violent way in which we can prevent deaths. We don't have to violate sovereignty. We don't have to invade anyone. We don't have to kill anyone. We can simply make it illegal to supply the people While doing the killing, and even something seemingly simple as that is, is apparently proving, too difficult for for countries to agree on. So, again, I don't I don't like getting sort of upset and depressed, but it just keeps coming up that action could be taken. It would be a slam dunk, it would save lives, and the action is not being taken. I don't know why.
Isabel Todd 1:40:27
No, I mean, you're you're absolutely right. I mean, I suppose, you know, one thing we can say is that if we just take off the pressure, then we can be almost certain that that action might be taken. If we keep the pressure on, then, you know, then we increase the chances of it being done.
Brad 1:40:49
Absolutely. And I think that's why it's so important that we that we push on this, especially these days now now, at the time that we're recording, it's it's been made public by the military that they're enacting forced conscription. The desperation is, is growing not so much because the military is likely to win, they can't. And this conscription measure is not going to bring them victory any more than the, you know, German measure of the Folkestone, successfully stopped the invasion of Germany and World War Two, it just is a mechanism to throw civilians who don't want to be part of this mess into the meat grinder and maximize casualties, which is the death throes of a of a moribund dictatorship. But unfortunately, like any wounded animal, that is when they're most dangerous. So. So to that end, I really appreciate you coming on and, and sharing all of this with us. And helping to to put that pressure out there helping to get that information out there. And we wish second, all the best and great speed in, in coming out with a follow up so that we can, we can talk about that and bring the pressure back.
Isabel Todd 1:42:07
I suppose what I would like to say is when I explained about what we do at second, and that we tried to find ways for the international community, to be mobilized to put pressure on the military and support the democratic movement. We do, we go and we we do that advocacy. But we do also want to communicate those positions in our thinking to people in Myanmar, to Myanmar public, to civil society, to activists, to to anybody interested to support their work, as well. And if people are interested to, you know, take up these causes themselves if they want to. So, I mean, everything that I've spoken about today, everything that we've spoken about the ICC, iCj etc. We've, we've, we've written about those processes and mechanisms. And those are all on our website in English and Burmese. So, yeah, those are available, and we just we just hope that they're useful. Yeah, I mean, what I would say, would be a message to the international community, which is that this revolution is happening, whether they like it or not, it is happening. It's here to stay. It's it's not going away. And it's long past time to get off the fence and get behind the Myanmar people. Thanks.
Host 1:43:51
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