Transcript: Episode #241: Promises Unfulfilled
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0:17
Myanmar is at risk of collapse. The long civil war has taken a major turn, and Thailand is in the final.
0:31
Myanmar as rebel forces have claimed another victory against a military run government as declare control of Romeo Wati. A key town you're the Thai border around 200 Myanmar military personnel have withdrawn tow a bridge connecting the trade hub to Thailand.
0:50
More than 300 Myanmar security force personnel are now in the custody of Bangladesh a lot of dots.
Host 1:01
During the current crisis unfolding in Myanmar, events are happening so fast, it can feel challenging just to keep up with them. And we're working to increase our podcast production to stay abreast of this ever changing crisis. And besides our podcasts, we encourage you to check out the blogs on our website insight myanmar.org where you can also sign up for our regular newsletter. And you can follow our social media sites just look for insight Myanmar on your preferred social media platform. With that, let's head into our show.
Brad 2:39
Today, I'm joined by Tim McLaughlin is going to be giving us a bit of a journalistic perspective on issues such as user engagement. And we've actually got an article here from Tim published in The Atlantic, if I remember correctly, that we'll be referencing throughout which we will link below possibly alongside some other pieces. But before we get into that, Tim, I'd like to thank you very much for joining us. And I'd like to give you the opportunity to introduce yourself for our listeners.
Timothy McLaughlin 3:05
Yeah, thanks. Thanks so much for having me. Appreciate it. Yep, my name is Tim McLaughlin. I'm a journalist. I currently based in Singapore. But previously before Singapore, it's been a number of years in, in Myanmar working for the Myanmar Times and then freelancing for a while and then working for Reuters when they opened the bureau there first. So I was based there from around 2012 to 2016. And then now in the region, and have kind of been, you know, dipping in and out of Myanmar since since since 2012, although not recently.
Brad 3:43
It's interesting just before we delve into the into the the actual articles themselves 2012 to 2016. That's a fascinating time to be there. And I'm really interested to hear your perspective, because 2016 was actually the year that I started living in Myanmar. And so I feel that I caught the tail end of that sort of faux democracy period. But looking at that 2012 2016 period, what was what was it like? Did you see a lot of progress in the country during that period of time? Do you see any sort of how should I say this any optimism among the people because if I remember correctly, a lot of that time was was still dominated by the things and government which was one step removed from from the military. But it was notionally a time of broadening and opening the country like what what was it like living there during that time? Yeah.
Timothy McLaughlin 4:41
So I had first gone to Yangon in 2010. Before the by before the elections. And then I was only there for a little bit and then I was trying to figure out how to move back there permanently and find a job, which was a bit of a challenge at the time in journalism. But I ended up where Give me a hard time starting in Yeah. 2012. Right before, I think I got there probably think there's by elections that you're yes, certainly, I think a lot of excitement. And and I think now looking back, it's easy to kind of right off the period is kind of that it was a sham or the changes weren't what people anticipated. But I think it's important remember that at the time, there were a lot of changes happening that were perhaps not like in the direct political sense. But also, you know, economic, I think, you know, there was the the breakup of the telecoms monopoly, which made it much much cheaper for people to have, you know, cell phones, internet SIM cards, the banking system started to shift. You know, when I arrived there, were still going giving out FEC foreign exchange notes. You know, they started to float the chat. There were some other changes, kind of with the central bank. So, yeah, I mean, all that stuff. The economic stuff was was certainly happening. I think now, when we look back people, it's easier to kind of look at that period darkly, and dismiss it and say it was kind of a mirage. I do think there was there was real, you know, there were some real things happening definitely benefits for people were was it sort of like, equal across the board? Right? Of course not. You know? And was it halting? Yes, for sure. Because, also, in that time period, some really bad stuff happened, right. There was the breakdown, the year before of the peace agreement, or the ceasefire, rather with the AIA. There was in 2012 and 2013, of course, anti Muslim violence in various places. There were some things with the Rohingya so yeah, I mean, I think it wasn't all sort of amazing in, in, in great, but it also wasn't, you know, all, you know, terrible, there was some, some, some benefits for people living there, and some tangible things happening. And again, I think it these things, development and openings of countries, they happen at different levels for different people, you know, people that were already in positions of power, and the economy did get fantastically wealth, wealthy, you know, some, some people certainly didn't, you know, see the benefits in the same way. So I, when I write about it now, or describe it now, I often say was kind of like halting and uneven. And I think that's kind of a good way to think about it. But I think when we look at halting and uneven, the general projection, and general feeling was one of, you know, positivity, especially leading into probably the 2015 election. Right. I mean, that was gibberish, just like huge amount of excitement and kind of hype around that, you know, many, many people getting to vote for the first time and certainly getting to vote for the NLD. And in a, you know, you know, election that was that was open and free in that in that way. So yeah, I mean, I think, though, that that are that those years were certainly a lot of, of, you know, at least you know, optimism about the general, again, the general direction of the country, it's never trend lines, never like directly straight, there was ups and downs there.
Brad 7:59
And I think that definitely captures a lot of the history of, of Myanmar, in effect a lot of the history of many troubled countries, where you, you write the history books, and you try to write them in a very linear fashion of like, well, things were bad, and then things got better. And this is what happened. But you're right. It's it's it's very sort of forward and back and forward and back in. Sometimes it moves to the side. It's a bit it's a bit difficult to to predict what's going to happen. But your article he'll the great democratic success story that wasn't which I like the title, by the way, you're talking a lot about the US policy towards Myanmar. And and you talk quite heavily here about Campbell, as well as the Assistant Secretary of State, a previous Assistant Secretary of State. So you're focusing on the us a lot? How would you characterize categorize the US as response to the Myanmar crisis? To date? Has the US in your view, done effectively? Nothing but lip service? Or has the US done things that are significant? Because the thrust of your article sounds like the US has done a lot, it just hasn't done? What needs to be done?
Timothy McLaughlin 9:14
Yeah. So I think if we, it's important to kind of start off back then, you know, post when when when Obama was elected the first time in 2009, there was this idea that circulated around DC that many people would credit, you know, Kurt Campbell and a few other people with is that there needs to be a change in policy towards Myanmar, right that this Bush era stuff, just kind of like cutting the place off and smashing it with sanctions, like wasn't working. And this is obviously part of the broader kind of Obama Openhand you know, reaching out to sort of pariah states right like there was trying to get engagement obviously with the Iran deal is the one that gets the most coverage. But then there was obviously Cuba and Myanmar. It was kind of this, like, let's see if there's a new way and I generally I think that that was probably The, you know, again, the overarching idea behind it was pretty was probably smartly there US policy towards Myanmar, you know, it wasn't accomplishing much, right, like the country was just saddled with sanctions, it was incredibly, you know, the poverty levels, all this stuff, you know, it was just kind of sitting there and in the US wasn't really doing much it's aside from kind of just like, every once in a while, reopening the kind of crushing financial burdens that have been put on the place. So I think it was smart to kind of like, or at least I understand the idea behind kind of reengagement and kind of looking back at the country and trying to figure out a new path forward, because obviously, the old path was working. So I think that's what led us to, you know, 2010 to 2012, where there was this huge kind of burst of us, you know, interest in the country. And I think that that was genuine, I think it came from from the top, I think people like Hillary Clinton and Obama and Jake Sullivan. You know, these were people who were were genuinely interested in, you know, in Myanmar, I don't think they would spend so much time going there and stuff. If that wasn't the case. They're busy people, obviously. So I think that that is kind of leads us up to a little bit, you know, and then obviously, I think the complicating factor with with Myanmar is in 2016 2017, what happened with the with the Rohingya the civilian side of the government's response to that, I think, you know, it didn't totally soured Dc, on on on sushi, but certainly turned off some people and I think, had people thinking like, Okay, we've invested a lot of time and energy in here, and like, what, what, what's the, you know, what's, what's sort of the the end goal, or what's the what's the development? So then, you know, and that's a very fast way of putting this all out there. There's obviously a lot more writing and reporting and books about this. But But yeah, I think, you know, then it gets to the, to the coup. And I think the general sense that I get is that the United States along with a lot of other people thought that the coup happened, and that would pretty much be a few months of kind of protests, and maybe some small skirmishes, and then the military would just kind of crush the, you know, resistance, as they have often done in the past. Right. I don't think the US or many other people foresaw sort of the protracted, you know, fighting and, you know, resistance to the, to the hunted that we've seen for the past couple years. And so I think initially, the US and a few other countries didn't really do all that much. Or, you know, also, I think they were probably surprised by this. I can't say that definitively. But I think most people were surprised by the fact that the military, which, you know, had a great deal for itself, right, it had amazing control of three ministries, it had, you know, still had his hand and all this economic stuff. I mean, the coup from from many, many ways, just makes no sense. If you think about it, you know, as a logical, like, rational actor, which I don't think then online, can be, you know, described as that. So. So I think I think the initial kind of response in the US is a bit of a scramble, you know, they there were some sanctions early on and stuff, but I think those were very sort of like performative. And I think there's a bigger, broader question to be had about kind of, like, what can sanctions accomplish? And what can they not accomplish? You know, are we trying to sort of like, change people's actions or trying to, you know, punish people? You know, in this case, it seems like punishment is, is the goal, because I'm not sure people believe that sanctions would actually make the junta kind of revert course, it certainly, you know, in the past had not they had weathered these things, you know, for many, many years, and much worse ones than than what they're seeing now. And so, you know, I think the, you know, the, the thrust or what I wanted to kind of point out in this story is that a lot of these people from the Obama administration are back in very high ranking places of power. Now, with Biden, some of them higher up than they were before. These were the people who apparently, you know, crafted this policy towards Myanmar and had, you know, they give themselves a lot of credit, probably way too much credit, if you look back at their own writings about kind of shifting the mindset of the generals, I don't think they really, you know, I think at the end of the day, the generals are the ones who make these decisions. But I do think there was this high level of, you know, interest and engagement on on Myanmar, that we just after the coup, it certainly seems like the US would rather just kind of like, I don't want to say walk away, but maybe not pay so much attention to kind of, you know, the situation that's unfolding. And and I should say that nobody, I don't think anybody's happy with what's going on. I don't think you know, early on, there's this narrative like Beijing is really pleased about this. It's not, you know, the situation Myanmar is a mess for everybody, not just the countries on its borders, but the countries that are two or three ones removed. I mean, this has become essentially Like a global issue, when you take into account cyber scams and drug trade and human trafficking and all the issues that are emanating from from Myanmar, they just kind of radiates out across the region, right. And so my main thing was just to kind of call attention, I think, to this i to these people who, you know, were these great champions, they claim that they changed everything in Myanmar that they had, they forged this new US policy. And now they pretty much just like, you know, have walked away from this issue. I feel like they wanted to say that they had done it, and it was they tick the box, and it was a, you know, gold star for the US. And now that things are difficult, like where is that high level of attention? Where's that high level of talking about the problems? You know, where is that sort of interest that we saw before? And it certainly doesn't seem to be there at the moment. The second piece of the of maybe what I wanted to say in the back into the story was that it's probably time, and I know, this is happening on some levels, but for a rethink of sort of like what, you know, it's been 20 years, essentially 2003 Really 20 ish years, since since, you know, the really harsh financial sanctions were put on Myanmar. You know, it's been about like, 15 years or so since we started since the US started. This sort of, you know, change in position. And I think it's probably time to look at another sort of, you know, way forward here, because, obviously, the situation has changed dramatically on the ground. You know, one of the things I pointed out as the US keeps talking about, you know, returning Burma to a path to democracy, like that path in my mind was already at a dead end, before the coup, there was no changes to the to the Constitution. The military still had, its unelected MPs, they still have control of the three ministries. I mean, we were heading into a second, there was already right, a second election where there hadn't been, you know, that path had had stopped, right. And so I think there's, you know, the other like I said, the back end was just that there might need to be a rethink here of kind of like what the future of Myanmar looks like, who the actors will be, you know, what that path, quote, unquote, path to democracy, if it exists, what it what it looks like.
Brad 17:20
And so, I want to focus on the sanctions as well. But before we do that, I want to just touch on what you said about China, because I completely agree with you, there was a lot of discourse around China being happy about this. And in fact, early on 2021 2022, I was exposed to content on YouTube, by by English language shills of the CCP effectively arguing that the coup is a good thing, that the people of Myanmar do not want their democratically elected leaders that in fact, the NLD puppets of the US, you know, whatever is Department of State. And, and that essentially, the coup is the the opportunity for the military representing the real people of Myanmar to restore like genuine Myanmar control over their own country. And all of this sort of narrative. So it was it was clear that the Chinese very early on when they thought that the military would have a relatively easy time of establishing a dictatorship again, we're keen because of course, like the trade opportunities were there, but then the country devolved into civil war, as, as we've seen with the scamsters, that you mentioned, as well, the Chinese have very, very, very much cooled their attitudes towards this. They're not happy about chaos. Now, I'm just wondering, does the Chinese role within Myanmar, actually get people in the United States administration, sort of alert and focused because it, it feels like it's pretty obvious that China is very interested in your minds, it's obviously economically it has massive potential strategically, it's very important. It's right on their border, it allows them to flank India, it allows them to flank Thailand, which the US ally gives them sea access west of the Strait of Malacca, and so on. It seems like this would be something that the US would be interested in far beyond just the intrinsic humanitarian and political value of Myanmar itself, but rather as it as a key chess piece in a much larger larger geostrategic game. But we don't seem to see the same amount of urgency and pressure when it comes to Myanmar that we might see, for example, when we're looking at at conflicts in the South China Sea. So is there a reason for that discrepancy?
Timothy McLaughlin 19:42
Yeah, so yeah, I mean, I think back to your original point, right, when when a coup, you know, first having these these kind of narrative that unschooled, you know, it makes it sound like sushi and ELD were really acrimonious to China. I mean, they were not right. I mean, they were very, very, very accommodating of China. even before she was in power, she's very accommodating to China when you look at the Lepidium project and the commission that she ran it down that there was really kind of no wrongdoing there. You know, NLD people had been going to China for years now on these trips, some of them on lots and lots and lots of these junkets you know, Tim Shaw went there, and we, you know, reaffirm that the US or sorry reaffirm that that Myanmar and the NLD, you know, agreed with China's position on Xinjiang on Tibet, on Hong Kong and Taiwan. Right. So I mean, the NLD was very close to China, right. I mean, I think that's kind of the first misnomer is that they were kind of pushing back or something like that. I mean, they weren't right. And so there was certainly an attempt to kind of undo some of these kind of perhaps bad economic deals that the Tanzanian government had gone into. But but but on the economic front, but politically, you know, I think they were very much, you know, getting along just fine. And so the coup, obviously, up ended all of that, right, it puts a huge amount of uncertainty at the beginning, which then turned into outright, you know, massive, you know, fighting and displacement and war that we see now. And you're right, right. I mean, Myanmar can't change its neighbors. And they're on the border, there is like, you know, the, obviously, the pipeline, there's child view, there are a lot of projects that China has invested a lot of time and interest in, that are in Myanmar that I'm sure that they would like to see protected, and to see those in return on investment and kind of return on the goods there. So that's certainly certainly part of it. And you're right as well, right? The I don't want to flatten the kind of the Myanmar's kind of existence to between, you know, China and the US as this kind of football. But but it would be also naive to say that that doesn't play a role in it. And we saw that, you know, when the US decided to say that the military, they had found grounds that they had, you know, carried out the operations against the Rohingya in genocidal intent, or however, they phrase it the genocide declaration that Blinken made, we know that the US didn't do that before and the Trump administration because they were afraid that it would push Myanmar closer towards China. So that decision to kind of to kind of slow play and softball a little bit, the the voicing of issues and in certainly the genocide declaration from the Trump admin, we know that that comes from, you know, people I saw on the record and in stories that I've written with name sources of people saying that the administration didn't want to do that, because they were afraid that we, you know, push Myanmar even further into China's hands. So there's definitely a, you know, thought process here about about, you know, China and China's position. Yes, I mean, to your point, I do find it a bit, I guess, I guess, maybe there's an argument to be made. And one that I haven't fleshed out totally myself, but I think it's a little bit in the, in the recent ICG report, and some other you know, academic writing is it is that, you know, the US and China on Myanmar, you know, they have very different sort of, I think, probably kind of visions and wants from the country, but they're both in the boat right now and having to deal with this with with the hunter with the instability, right. So at least for the moment, they're both have the same kind of problems on their hand. Obviously, it's different for both countries, given their proximity and their relationship and their investments in the country. So there might be some a little bit of sort of, you know, shared unhappiness. And we saw that we saw blinking did speak to Wang Yi, about, you know, about Myanmar, when he met him in Bangkok, I believe, a couple months ago, I think that was in January. And it was at the bottom of the readout way down at the bottom. So so maybe there have been a little bit of chat about it. But yes, ultimately, like you said, I do find it kind of interesting. That the situation certainly if you if your belief, what the government is saying the US government that they're kind of trying to reorient itself, obviously, there's been an update and up ended a bit by the situation in Gaza. But the reorient back to, you know, to Asia to focus there that the US is greatest competitor and perhaps existential threat, according to some is China, you would certainly think that a country that's in Asia, that is kind of at the nexus of of China, at least geographically would be getting sort of more attention from from the US admin, if if only in a sort of self serving, you know, kind of kind of way there. I mean,
Brad 24:39
I recognize what you're saying with regards to self serving approach, and that kind of underlies all international politics at the end of the day. Everything that we're doing, even when we're doing good, we are doing first and foremost for ourselves and our constituents, but but that's, you know, that's to be expected. But there is a I think a lot of value to be had, and and you yourself in the article like you, you you're hinting at it but you're not necessarily outright saying that Myanmar will be the first domino to fall and, and start a wave of democracy in the region? Because that's, that's not quite, you know, it's not an easy statement to make. And I think George Bush made that mistake of believing that an invasion in Iraq was going to trigger a wave of democratic reforms throughout throughout the Middle East. But you seem to be implying that there is great potential if Myanmar becomes a democratic success story. There is great potential for this to have deep ramifications across the Southeast Asian sphere. And suddenly Thailand is is I mean, a sort of kind of military dictatorship that trying to dress it up real nice, but let's be honest, we can see what's going on. You know, Singapore is is a is a police state controlled by by a small group of very wealthy people. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, military dictatorships. Is this something, you know, separate from the China angle? Is this an angle that is exciting people within the administration, this possibility of, of the dominoes starting to fall, and the message being sent to these people that like, hey, even without Western intervention, even without Western help, and money and weapons and boots on the ground, you can just rise up and overthrow a military dictatorship. If you don't like it, you can just have democracy by yourself, you can do that. Is that making people sort of ears prick up?
Timothy McLaughlin 26:45
No, I think I think like, like I think I think that the the US, you know, at the moment, certainly the US has main focus on on China is. And also you see this probably with India is as well, in the interest of us interested in Yeah, that they're kind of willing to let a lot of other places slide on their own issues, as long as you take the position that the US wants on China, which is against China. Right. You know, I think if if there would be a lot more criticism of a lot more places, in from the way that they're acting domestically from the US if they are, you know, seen as kind of not going with the US on its current kind of way against China, right, I think us is, like, totally fine with with the situation in they were in Thailand. I mean, we heard it the other day on a call that I was on from someone at the State Department, saying that, you know, relations with Thailand have never been better, this is as strong as they've ever been for the US. So I think they don't really care about that, I think the overarching issue seems to be sort of like, where countries in this region fall on, on China. And that kind of seems to be where the tally is kept. And that certainly kind of jives with this, again, thought that China is this, you know, competitor, and in certainly is this, you know, massive threat to the United States and threat to kind of like the way of life and kind of global order. So that seems to be the main, you know, issue right now. And I think to your point about, you know, democracy in the region, I think that there's sometimes it's people saying like, Oh, democracy is in decline. You know, I think when we look around Southeast Asia, it's not really in decline. It's just being suppressed. You know, I think in Thailand, obviously, the prime minister, who now is the prime minister shouldn't be you know, he's not the guy, anybody, you know, that people voted for, would move forward, kind of maybe being dissolved at some point. Obviously, the situation in Myanmar, you know, is not what, you know, what people want it to be the will of the people that are not being kind of respected. So I think when you look around an Asian the region, you know, you could, if you want to go further, you can look at, you know, the situation in Hong Kong, where you have these massive protests, which were ignored, and then there was this massive crackdown. So yeah, I think that there is, you know, again, this, this idea of like democracy decline, or backsliding, but that's not really how I see it. I see it is like the people at top just forcing people, you know, to Accept to accept the powers that be, which is, unfortunately, what's what's happening in a couple places right now.
Brad 29:10
Fair enough. And so let's, let's actually look at what has been done. So the sanctions and aid are two very interesting sides of one coin, it seems like there's it's almost a binary when it comes to foreign policy that there's, on the one hand, you've got cutting someone off, like let's isolate them, let's let's not recognize them, let's not let them visit the country, let's sanction them and you know, all that sort of stuff. And then the other end of the spectrum you've got, well, let's give them opportunities and prestige and meet with them on the world stage and give them aid and give them you know, financial benefits and special deals and free trade or what have you. And it's kind of it's kind of weird because you don't really have many situations where you just use one or the other. I think I may be wrong, but I believe the United states even gave North Korea significant amounts of relief aid, while simultaneously putting the country under very heavy sanctions that the two seem to play together. And in Myanmar's case, you have heavy sanctions being re imposed on the country. And you also have aid being given to the country. And we've seen, you know, acquisitions in the, in the scope of hundreds of millions of dollars through through the NDAA in the Burma act. So it seems that both is going on. So let's let's focus on the sanctions. First, you're talking about these crippling sanctions. But one thing that consistently stood out, even since the coup of 2021, it took years and years and years and years for the US to get over this is carving out special exemptions for things like the Myanmar oil and gas enterprise when it came to doling out those sanctions or sanctioning very specific enterprises, and very specific individuals within those enterprises, in ways that were relatively easy to circumvent. So was, was the US really serious about the sanctions for the first few years of the coup? Or was that more of just a performative sort of message?
Timothy McLaughlin 31:09
Yeah, so I think there's a difference here. When I talk about crippling sanctions, I think, you know, that's certainly the sort of I getting Bush error when like the entire country was being designated and was under sanctions. What they're doing now, I guess, is in, you know, diplomacy speak is targeted sanctions is the way that the US likes to frame it. Right. Yeah. And I would, I would largely agree, I think at the beginning of the situation, you know, post coup? Yeah, there was some sort of, you know, let's like, throw some names on the list, put out a press release, like they'll write stories about it, say they're kind of tried to tighten the screws on on on Myanmar? Yeah, that's just in and I think at the beginning, a lot of these decisions were like, fairly performative. They were kind of, you know, people maybe have like, not that much importance that we sort of like, whose names are kind of widely known. You know, I don't think that they were really sort of meant to like, immediately and as certainly as fast as possible, kind of, like, cut off the economic lifeline to the to the junta, or to really punish the people that were kind of like, obviously, you know, helping him out. Yeah, I think the oil and gas situation, you know, as another one that I know, has gotten a lot of focus. I haven't written about it specifically. But I think, you know, the oil and gas industry in Myanmar, going back to the, you know, even 90s, early 2000s, mid 2000s has been contentious, in terms of like whether people should be operating there or not operating there. You know, obviously, we saw Chevron has been trying to exit for a long time. And the sanctions on mo G. You know, and the gas enterprise, I think, you know, the issue that I see there with that stuff is that, you know, Thailand is a major US ally, they're right next door, a lot of their gas is coming from from Myanmar. So it becomes an international kind of issue. It's not just kind of internal to Myanmar, when you start, I think tinkering with that stuff. And so I think that certainly is part of perhaps what of what is kind of weighing on, you know, on us decisions a little bit is kind of the neighbors there and kind of what impact it would have if they really unleashed this stuff on them. And then I think, look, overall, there's a question of kind of, like, Can sanctions work in the way that they are intended to, you know, in the current environment, look at the situation in Russia, and in the US really threw everything they had at them, and people were saying, Oh, it's gonna crater the economy, it's gonna be like, you know, 1992 their post breakup of the USSR? You know, they're doing all right, you know, because there's a lot of actors who don't abide by these. Right. And so, you know, I think the situation with sanctions is sort of globally evolving. And there's probably a bigger questions and discussions to be had about their overall effectiveness, not just you know, in Myanmar, but other countries, right. When When, when Myanmar was first facing these, you know, the really kind of tough sanctions back in 2003, whether you agree with them or not, and you thought they were effective, the country was certainly less integrated into the global economy than it is now. And now they're more integrated. They are certainly have more connections to the outside world. There's more big businesses there. You know, I think we haven't seen a lot of the big companies kind of like, bailout of Myanmar, like they had in the past. Right, Coke is still there. Carlsberg still there? You know, these companies, like, you know, back in the early 2000s, again, when there was a huge Burma interest in push, you know, those those companies all, you know, left left the country, which is why in 2012, we had all these kind of Homecoming ceremonies for them. So yeah, it's just a different you know, it's a different economy. Now, it's a different country. Now. You know, that 10 years of sort of liberalisation, openness, quasi democracy, whatever people want to use to phrase it, you know, the economic changes We're big right. And so I think there's a bigger question to be had about the discussions we had globally about kind of, like, do sanctions can can they do what they want to do? You know, are they for punishment? Are they for behavioral change? Again, like I said, in this situation, it seems like it's just for punishment and for trying to kind of cut off some of the monetary funds. You know, and then in terms of monetary, like, you know, the money, I think, you know, Myanmar has, obviously, liquidity and cash crunch, you know, how much of that can be ascribed to to, you know, the sanctions, I'm not sure if we can put like a figure on that. I mean, I think that, you know, the junta has been very good at running its own economy terribly as they have before, right. And so, you know, part of the part of the blame on kind of what's going on there in the Forex issues is the fact that they have no idea what they're doing. And there, they put a lot of the, you know, people who knew how the economy ran in jail, and now they have a bunch of generals doing it. So I think it's kind of an amalgamation of these things, too.
Brad 35:58
Okay, fair enough. So So let's then flip to the other side. And this is the the aid side, which may be a little bit more controversial. I think it's kind of ironic, in a sense, because you can you can get sanctions through the people who may it may be difficult to get sanctions through the establishment and Congress, but you can get sanctions through to the people and say, Well, we're going to not do business with this country, we're going to sanction these people, we're going to sanction these individuals. And and people, I think, generally seem to accept that as like, Well, okay, that makes sense. Like, we don't want to be giving money to people who are bad. Yeah. When it comes to aid, you're saying, Well, we're going to be we're going to be giving resources to people who are good. I think all of a sudden, questions start getting asked like, Well, how do you know that they're good? Or how do you know that the money is not going to get intercepted and all this sort of stuff? So So what is what does USAID policy look like, because it's very contentious, no one is even willing to breathe the phrase lethal aid, no one is willing to actually put boots on the ground, you know, whether that would be military boots on the ground, whether that would be, you know, even like peacekeepers or whether it would just be aid workers. You know, nobody wants to engage in in those serious ways. But there is quite a substantial amount of aid going through because we've got 10s of millions of people suffering from acute food shortage, we don't have shelter, and so on, and so on, so forth. So what is the aid situation? Like? And more importantly, what is the discourse around aid? Like?
Timothy McLaughlin 37:27
Yeah, so I mean, I think I, you might have had an on here, Tom, Tom Anders, right at the UN, you know, he's talked a lot about this about how, you know, there's a lot of you know, humanitarian aid and stuff for Myanmar, and the crisis is coming, because the, the junta is either unwilling or unable or, or doesn't want to deliver it to the areas that it needs to get to, which is not, you know, frankly, surprising, you know, we've seen for even again, going back to 2012, and the kind of mirage that was happening there, the that the military and has, for decades in Myanmar used humanitarian aid as a tool, you know, against the people that it doesn't want to get it, to hold it over the heads of, you know, diplomats and international organizations, whether that's through kind of denying them, you know, travel permits to certain places, you know, not letting them bring certain things to certain places, you know, this is a kind of a long running battle of kind of, like how to get stuff from from A to B. You know, I think the conversation happening now, and, you know, frankly, not to be down on my own piece, but But what I said about the US aid, aid from the United States humanitarian aid sort of goes through actors, you know, local partners in it, or sorry, I should say, partners in Myanmar, you know, through the UN World Food Programme. You know, for many years now, even before the coup, because the aid situation in Myanmar, I think was so complicated and very contentious. There was discussions on on a multitude of things, one of the topics that I think it was covered and caught up brought up a lot by people was engaging local actors, local organizations to handle kind of aid distribution or be the facilitators of aid delivery, rather than going through the big international organizations who are kind of beholden, you know, now, not then the powers that be which is now the military. Right. And so, you know, these are things that people in the aid world, you know, have been talking about for a long time. It seems like that discussion, you know, should Well, the discussion is happening more now, it seems like now would be probably a time when people would all agree that that would be a good thing to do, right? Because right now, again, a lot of humanitarian aid. It's dictated where it can go and how it can go and when it can go by the military, right, because it's coming through international organizations that are still like working through those formal channels in the EU. In a Myanmar, so I guess, you know, again, wasn't anything kind of like revolutionary what I pointed out in the piece in which other people from aid organizations have have pointed out in much more detail is that maybe it's time to start thinking about kind of like how to get these aid to places through local actors cross border, not through the formal channels that have been obviously controlled by the military and disrupted by the military and kind of used as a weapon by the military in some ways. And I think that's probably a good discussion to be having. You know, some people reacted to my piece saying I wanted like white messiahs to return to Myanmar. You know, that's I don't think localizing vocalizing humanitarian aid is not calling for white Messiah is to return to Myanmar, or wherever they are to begin with. It's, you know, it was about trying to get, you know, thinking, I think thinking more creatively about the situation on the ground and how you can get desperately needed food aid and medical aid to people who are in positions that are very precarious, and then are seen as kind of enemies of of the junta.
Brad 41:06
And I think you've touched on an issue that's, that's really prescient, it's alien. Because the issue with aid has been this, the official channels are controlled by the hunter. And this is something that we saw ASEAN definitely falling prey to, when they would say, well, we'll give aid and so the aid that you're giving is being seized by the military and is then being sold in markets to raise money to continue perpetuating the violence for which you were giving the aid in the first place. You know, the iron again, it's
Timothy McLaughlin 41:38
not it's not I don't think anyone should be shocked by this. That's the part that I find kind of befuddling, because it's like, this has been their MO for years. Right. Even in the good times, if you talk to and you've probably had them on the podcast, various people who've worked in you know, Rakhine, in particular Gichin. Always facing restrictions from from the military controlled, you know, bits of the even even the kind of quasi civilian government, right, of where they can go needing for for travel permits of, you know, all of this stuff, right. So the fact that they're doing it worse now, I'm surprised that people are surprised by that, because they have been kind of weaponizing and using aid in the way that they want for a very long time. Yes.
Brad 42:21
And, and I think that's, that's the issue. And so it comes down to a larger topic that that I also want to cover, which is the concept of legitimacy. And the recognition, there's a very strong hesitance that I have perceived, and this has just been the consistent theme. There's a very strong hesitancy to do anything that is perceived as illegitimate, or is perceived as being completely unilateral. You know, everyone wants to appeal to a higher order a higher authority, a higher system, because I mean, when things went sideways in various military engagements, and various peacekeeping engagements over the last, say, half century, the blame falls on the politicians and the policymakers who decided to go in in the first place, and they want to avoid that negative blame, you can't be blamed for a war that you didn't get involved in. You can't be blamed for the life that you didn't save, but you can't be blamed for the life that you objectively made worse. So that seems to be the thing. And everyone's like, well, but we don't want to bypass the military, because that would be illegitimate, that would not be the correct and appropriate way to go about this. We don't want to be accused of favoritism. And we don't want to be accused of recognizing the revolutionary forces as legitimate actors and all this sort of stuff. But the alternative to that is to basically just dump aid in the hands of, of the military, like, how our policymakers navigating this this little quagmire they find themselves in.
Timothy McLaughlin 43:53
Yeah, certainly, certainly. And I think, you know, Myanmar presents a challenge because of the kind of fractured nature of things. You know, obviously, I think probably listening to the podcast here are more engaged in most people kind of on the country or on the topics that we're discussing. But, you know, certainly from an outsider looking in, or even someone that knows a little bit about the country looking in, there are this plethora of kind of of groups, right, there's the energy right now then there's the PDFs, and there's the Ayios. And then there's militias, and then there's, you know, all this stuff kind of piles up, right. And so, I think that there sort of tends to be and we discussed this in the pre interview, I did this a little bit this when it comes to Myanmar to kind of throw up people throw up their hands and say odd so it's really tough. It's really complicated. And like, yes, it is. Most places that are in the state that Myanmar is in are tough and are complicated. If these solutions were super easy, someone would have done it already. And so yeah, so I think that is kind of what what we're seeing a little bit you know, as someone when I was doing interviews for the story said that everyone from Beijing to DC to Bangkok just wants to As to go away. And like, in like, I understand that feeling. But I also don't think that that's a way to kind of approach the country and in policy and kind of trying to at least, you know, I don't think any of these countries are going to bring a big, you know, ultimate fix to me anymore. But I think to to kind of improve the situation, you know, having that that mindset that you really hope it just kind of quite vanishes. It's kind of self defeating from the start.
Brad 45:27
Yeah, absolutely. And I think I agree, that seems to be the feeling that everyone has, we want it to go away. Yeah.
Timothy McLaughlin 45:34
I mean, I think it's getting in the way, people just getting in the way of the other stuff that they're doing. You know, and the thing is, like, and I think, you know, if we had one was kind of, yeah, I mean, I really, and I, and I think, you know, when we look at the situation, now, maybe there's probably an argument to be made that, like, it's spiraling so much, and becoming this even bigger regional issue, because people for the first three years didn't really want to try to solve things, right. I mean, maybe that's, you know, something that people should delve into and look at, because it's like, could more, you know, have been done early on, to prevent kind of the current situation now, right? I mean, when you look at the situation in Myanmar, and Thailand, you know, Thailand was okay, for a long time, sort of just kind of, you know, going along with what was happening in Myanmar, I think they kind of wanted to, they were all kind of fingers crossed, and online would just hold these elections, and then they could just move on. Right. And now it's spilling over your border. So, you know, I think there's definitely some, you know, interesting discussions and probing to be done on kind of looking at, you know, had some things been done earlier, had people taking this more seriously, had people not spent the first six months or a year thinking, Oh, well, there's no chance these guys are going to be able to hold out a resistance, you know, you know, would the situation be as bad, you know, as it is now? Maybe it would be? But I think that's an interesting question to kind of, like grapple with and look at and think about now.
Brad 47:05
And I think it is a super important thing, because it's not even the question to my mind. Would the coup have gone differently? I would have subsequent revolution have gone differently, had we taken action sooner? I think there's an even much, much bigger, much more important question to ask, if the precedent had been established much earlier, that you do not get to overthrow a democratically elected government, and then just be recognized and continue to do trade in weapons. But rather, you are going to find yourself fighting against rebels who are openly and overtly backed by foreign governments, would the coup even have happened in the first instance, I think this is a really big thing. dictatorships know how the game is played. And I've said this many times. One of my big takeaways from the coup is the realization that isolationist regimes, ironically, do more to support one another than democracies do. And they know that you'll get letters from the UN, they know that you can get dragged in front of the criminal court or unlikely, but maybe the ICJ, they know that their names can be dragged through the mud, but they also know that none of these things are actually at the end of the day, going to stop them from being able to exert control over their people and their territory. And being able to pocket the wealth of the nation for themselves and for their families. The outcome is the same. So they don't feel reproach, because why would say, a piece of paper is not relevant to you, it's not going to stop someone from cashing your checks. Yeah. Yeah,
Timothy McLaughlin 48:44
I think, to your point, and I brought this up before us. You know, it's not the most massive thing, but I often find it's symbolic of, of kind of where people are, are thinking about this, you know, winman is the president of Myanmar. Right. I mean, he's listed as the head of state at the UN still, you know, he's in jail, and nobody talks about it. Like, there's not even like the US statements, the Ossian statements, he's got to be the most forgotten president that ever lived. I mean, like, how many heads of states elected heads of states right now are currently you know, have been overthrown or in prison. Right. And people can grapple with, you know, and quibble over Suchi and the state councilor position, okay, set her aside. This guy, again, according to the United Nations is still the head of the country. And he's been, you know, he's vanished. Right? And there just seems to be no, I mean, I don't mean to laugh, but it's just kind of crazy to me that, that, that it's so little, you know, speaking out about him, or kind of where he's at. And I think that I find that it kind of was like probably illustrative of some of the other issues. And it
Brad 49:49
goes even though that actually goes a little bit deeper, because when you like, the whole premise of the coup and early on like this would have been back in like March already. Bill 2021 I think it was March 2021. The military trotted out on reality TV, the constitutional lawyers, yeah, to basically read their lines and say, Well, you know, technically under the Constitution, everything was done lawfully power was ceded by the acting president to the military. And, you know, there's no actual constitutional issue to this. So there should be no backlash to this. There should be no legal proceedings against this, because everything was done within the scope of the 2008 constitution, corrupted and broken as that constitution is. But all of that, all of that argumentation collapses. The moment you ask the question, why was it the acting president and not the actual president who signed the state of emergency? So? Oh, yeah. Because we arrested him. Right? Well, yeah. Yeah, the rest of your argument is now irrelevant. Like if, you know, honestly, this would be like the US. You know, having having a situation where someone in the Secret Service shoots the President in the back of the head. And then the Vice President's first act as president is to pardon that individual. Right? Everyone would say, we should probably be investigating this because it feels sauce like. And that's exactly what happened in Yama. And you're right, we're not talking about it enough. And it's not just emblematic of how corrupted and broken the Myanmar system is. But it's also emblematic of how weak and and pure aisle, the military's claims of legitimacy are. And yet, we are afraid of treading on their toes of legitimacy where we're afraid of saying, well, we're not going to recognize your legitimacy, we're going to recognize the legitimacy of people who actually have popular support and don't make a sport of committing war crimes. It boggles the mind to
Timothy McLaughlin 51:57
it. Yeah, no, no, I think it's, yeah, and I think like you're saying, like, you know, and all of this, like, I spoke to you before about this is, I think, a reason why you see such intense frustration. And, you know, from from people in Myanmar, you know, kind of, you know, about all of this right, and me, I think it was early on, and you can see it, I think it's just festered, right, you know, disappointment and kind of anger at international actors at the UN, various countries. And I think that's all understandable, right, when your country is kind of like, the flavor of the day for five years, and you get two visits from Obama, and you get, you know, and everyone's coming there to write magazine profiles and all this stuff. And then in your time of need, you know, all of that seems to kind of just vanish, you can certainly see why people are angry and are and why people are upset. And you and you look around and kind of the more regional actors, and you look at Azerbaijan, which is kind of like, filled with people who seem like kind of okay with the coup, you know, if not outright sort of fine with it. And you understand, I think, why people, you know, in Myanmar, why young people why everybody there is is kind of angry, and feels, you know, that they've kind of been jettisoned by by, by the Greater kind of international community here that they were supposed to be kind of this torchbearer for not that long ago.
Brad 53:30
And I think that's, that's a particularly relevant issue. But it goes, I think, two ways. On the one hand, I remember any, like, you broke my heart, you know, I, because I lived there, I worked there, I had students there. And I had students contacting me I was I was in the West, you know, I left just before COVID, close the borders. So I wasn't in the country when the coup happened. But obviously, you know, Friends, I had students and co workers and so and a lot of people were reaching out to me, and there were people who were legitimately asking, like, is the US going to conduct a drone strike and assassinate me online? So that democracy can be restored? Is the United Nations? Or is the United States are going to put boots on the ground? Will there be an invasion? Are they going to help resolve this problem? Because obviously, Hollywood media have relatively deep penetration in these places. And the image that the US spends a lot of time and money and care, projecting about itself is as a bastion of democracy and a global defender of democracy and democratic causes and in Myanmar, specifically, with regards to the US as you know, support for intensity throughout the junta, the dictatorship era. The image that a lot of the Burmese have is this that the US wants to do these things and the US is willing to do these things. And then when nothing happened, and we got you know, silence effectively from the US people got really down hard and they got it They are heartbroken, really like they they felt betrayed. And they felt abandoned. But the flip sides of the coin. And I think this is an incredibly important point is one of the reasons that that as you said, as a lot of people say books are going to be written about this. This this revolution is that the message is now getting through to people that you don't need Western benefactors, you don't need the support of the West, you don't need the approval of the West. Right? You can stand up on your own two feet. Yes. And you can do this. And I think that is a more like, honestly, as far as the dictatorships in the region are concerned, the prospect of a popular revolution succeeding is much more terrifying than the prospect of a US backed revolution succeeding because they can keep the US at bay with lucrative trade deals and strategic agreement. You can't keep the people at bay with that.
Timothy McLaughlin 55:50
Yeah, yeah, no. And I think again, like that goes back to sort of, you know, what I again, to kind of the piece that I wrote is that, yeah, again, like, I don't think that you were going to see any of that, that, you know, that the US should just be an all the international, you know, kind of actors involved here, just, you know, support for the people, right of Myanmar is kind of, I think, kind of what, what I was kind of saying, and just, you know, looking for is just, you know, engagement and support for the people, because like you said, this is sort of the kind of a ground up, you know, grassroots movement now that has kind of overtaken, of course, what people, you know, I think originally thought was going to happen, and I think you're right, I think the, you know, the people back, you know, popular part of it. You know, it's it's certainly from from an outside tragic that it's had to happen, but also, you know, as you say, kind of a new dynamic and something kind of, you know, interesting to watch unfold.
Brad 56:49
Absolutely. So, looking down to the what's the future, now that we have this situation, I'm sure that the policymakers in the United States and all the analysts are aware of what's going on they have they have an accurate picture and a better understanding than than we do even what what the US wants to really do, and what tools they have disposable at their disposal to be able to achieve that because clearly, the US is still interested in there being a democracy and the US is just teetering. It's just, it feels like it's just teetering on the edge of recognizing the new GE recognizing the revolutionary forces they're just waiting for, I don't know, some magical sign to say now is the time to officially throw away the UN, I don't know whether they're waiting for our CM to take that first step because I don't think that's going to happen. I don't know what they're waiting on the UN Credentials Committee, because I strongly suspect the UN Credentials Committee is kind of waiting on the US. You know, it's like a bar fight where like, instead of looking at the dude, you're trying to attack, everyone's just looking at the guy next to them to make sure that they're not the first one in line. And, yeah, it's just a standoff. So the US gonna do?
Timothy McLaughlin 58:04
I mean, it's hard to say, I mean, I think, look, I think there's some domestic things that are sort of outside of Myanmar things that are plate right. Now, the situation in Israel and Gaza taking up obviously, a lot of sort of the engagement and oxygen in DC, behind that probably Ukraine and Russia thing, I will say, just as an aside, people like to point to those two things and say, Oh, the US is so you know, busy with this other stuff. There's too much things going on in the world. Both the coop predates both of those things by a year. So they're certainly, you know, time for us to be kind of more, you know, focused and interested in Myanmar before those two things kicked off, that's just like I said, an aside. But I think those two things certainly are issues that are kind of hanging there. I think more kind of in the weeds, you have, you know, the the election coming up, and then personnel in the United States, you know, Derrick chalet, who's kind of been, I guess, kind of like, taking over this role, sort of in doing kind of Myanmar stuff, meeting with the NUJ you know, he's not supposed to be in his job anymore. He's supposed to be at the Pentagon, because of the US dysfunction, you know, his job has not shifted yet. I'm not sure if it will, or if it will be held up. And he'll never kind of make it there. You know, the question then becomes if he did leave the State Department and go to the Pentagon, you know, when anyone replace him, you know, there's questions about, of course, now that Campbell's in an even bigger position, and the situation in Myanmar has deteriorated even more, maybe we'll see some, you know, more kind of engagement or interest in the country. I'm not, you know, sure that that's going to happen. And then of course, hanging over all of this is the US election, and what happens in November, and if it's a Biden win, or if we see Trump come back, and kind of, you know what those two respective policies He's towards the country would look like because we're gonna get sucked into this, you know, election time soon, right? You know, it's kind of descending on us. So in terms of kind of like what the future looks like, I'm not sure I do think that, you know, the Burma act, you know, there were so much like hype behind that I feel like no, I don't wanna say hype, because I know a lot of people worked very hard on it. I know, it's, it took a tremendous amount of effort from from people on the ground in DC and civil society groups and activists, who maybe not always see eye to eye on on Myanmar stuff and ethnic groups to kind of get that through, I do think there was a huge amount of internally Myanmar of Hope pinned on that that it was going to be and you saw that kind of hope, inflated by bad actors by people saying like, Oh, the US is going to send weapons and gunships and all this stuff. And that's not what it said at all. That's just people kind of stirring the pot. And so So, you know, it's it that got caught up in the funding fight, and then the money finally came through for that. So it seems like there is a little bit of, you know, hopefully kind of a tad bit of momentum. And then also, like I said earlier is that the situation is just getting so bad, you know, externally, right. I mean, Myanmar has always, you know, again, it's people with podcasts know better than I probably claim that this is these are, you know, intent, this is internal issues, this is, you know, to be settled by the time at all the only people that can keep the nation together, yada yada, yada. Right now, I mean, that's always been false. And Myanmar is always been a bad neighbor. Now, they're terrible, right? You see the the the meth shipments getting, you know, into Australia, you see, I mean, this is becoming a transnational kind of criminal state, essentially. And I think that that maybe it's just reached this point where like, look, it's so bad. I think the Milani situation like, whether that develops into like a bigger game for the can you and KLA or how that everything plays out whether it goes one way or the other, just the act of what happened there, I think got a lot of people to be like, Oh, okay. This is like, you know, you know, fighting in the jungle, unfortunately, you know, between the KDU, in the Myanmar militaries, it's been going on for almost seven decades, right. So I think that's not super kind of new and enough to kind of grab people for looking at, like, you know, media and policymakers and kind of the international community at large. But when you start seeing those images from from Hawaii, and right on the border, and used to have rumors of the of the Thai military, you know, putting up their own jets incursions into airspace, I mean, this is getting, you know, the borders and their inability to kind of convey the Myanmar military's inability to control its country in that way is becoming hugely, you know, problematic for like I said, not beyond just the five countries that border Myanmar. I mean, you look at the situation in India, it's like, what who does the Indian government work with now? You know, do you deal with the Army and Army in them? And in kind of on the border, or Bangladesh? I guess, you know, are they the kind of actors that you go to? Or do you go to, to Myanmar military, you know, so I mean, I think that all of this is just seems like the past, I'd say, the past month or so. Not so much, you know, 1027, that operation like a, you know, I think there's a lot more to dig into there, and kind of what the actors wanted for themselves, the last to me, the last few weeks and month, so feel like there's more kind of churning than there than there was before. And, you know, maybe we'll see some sort of kind of more cohesive response. And I shouldn't say that I have very little faith, I think probably most people listening this podcast would at this point, and kind of Ozzy on and where they're at, I think, you know, they have the chairmanship with Laos this year, you know, has a whole host of of issues that it's dealing with in terms of internally, you know, how focused they can be on this. You know, the South China Sea is kind of the overriding big concern for the group. You know, how does Myanmar kind of rank there. And to give some perspective, I went to a talk the other day here in Singapore, of the ASEAN, Secretary General that then, you know, the head of ASEAN at the moment, gave a speech here in Singapore, and I went, and, you know, he kind of briefly mentioned Myanmar and said that, you know, needs to be a Myanmar own Myanmar led process, I might have that reverse, but that's kind of the phrase now. And then, you know, right when you finish with that, the Russian ambassador got up and asked him about, you know, increasing tourism to the region, and he was super happy to talk about it. And to me, that's kind of like where Ozzy is at. It's like, we want to maybe solve this problem, but also like Russia, who is funding and giving a bunch of weapons to the Myanmar military is like one of our kind of one of our good friends too. Right. And so there's this just kind of crazy, I think, disconnect. And I think you'll see more and more discussion and questions now about, you know, from the unexpected quarters of audience relevancy, not just Regarding Myanmar, but regarding the South China Sea and the greater kind of competition, you know, with China, you know, I think for a long time, media and people have been critical of ASEAN policymakers kind of held out more hope for it. Now, I think you're seeing even some people in Southeast Asia and policy walks and people saying, yeah, like, this is not the strong, kind of robust institution that it that it was, if it ever was it certainly isn't in that state now. So yeah, that's kind of a long way of saying I'm not 100% Sure. You know, I don't think anyone if anyone tells you 100% sure about anything, you'd be no more. I think they're lying. But, but yeah, I mean, it certainly feels like this, this, you know, this internationalizing, I guess of a way of kind of what's happening there might change some people's thoughts or perspective on stuff.
Brad 1:05:50
I mean, I agree with your point. And I say on the question of ASEAN relevance is a fascinating question that we've been discussing for quite some time, I've certainly made the argument that if ASEAN drops the ball on this, then it's kind of going to make ICNC relevance clear, because it's all well and good to have have an entity that exists for for greater trade cooperation, greater dialogue. But people, people have a sort of expectation in the back of their minds that when things go sideways, the leaders of our countries are supposed to be able to put everything on pause, put the trade on pause, put the diplomatic, you know, handshaking and photographs on pause, and actually sit down and say, Hey, hang on, like You crossed the line, like, you can't be doing that. Let's resolve this. And they can't, and they don't. And, you know, the European Union gets a lot of criticism for being too integrated into the internal affairs of the constituent member states, I've certainly given a lot of criticism for that. However, it is undeniable that Europe is not in a state of civil war. Myanmar is, and the European Union would have a much stronger and a much faster reaction. I would even argue that the European Union, in some ways had a much stronger, much faster reaction to Myanmar, than us sounded to Myanmar. And I think that it's something that we need to keep an eye on. It's something that I think ASEAN needs to be made aware of, particularly because you mentioned Operation 1027. But and that operation, you know, made a lot of headway. But the Cochin the Ka launched Operation seven, three, on the third of March to coincide with the anniversary of I think their founding, we've now got, you know, obviously, this liberation in Myanmar the, we've got an interview coming up, it's on the docket somewhere, I don't know when it's going to be published, though, from someone who was actually inside Karenni state is saying that half of current state has already been liberated, and the other half of the state is gradually being you know, base by base by base being emptied out, we're looking at actually having a swathe of territory that is free of Myanmar military, Myanmar de was was not insignificant, and you the thing when melodies a city, you can't bomb a city into your sphere of control. You can't roll tanks into cities, they're very vulnerable in urban environments, you need to fight on the ground. And they, the hunter sucks at that. If current northern current and current state, both fall under rebel control, Thailand has got to deal with the fact that you now have a humanitarian corridor whether you like it or not on your doorstep, and you are going to have people flooding across that border in one direction. And you're going to have a lot of interest in goods and and relief supplies, and possibly even weapons at arms, flooding in the opposite direction over that border. The you can't plug your fingers into your ears and pretend that it's not happening anymore. So I don't know the clock's ticking, and I'm just not seeing please guys take ownership of the situation.
Timothy McLaughlin 1:09:12
That's another area when I when I that I mentioned briefly in the story is that, you know, looking at these these self governing areas or kind of govern areas under the control, you know, I know, again, those are complicated in terms of kind of like the the structure and who's running them and things like that. But I think that's probably another kind of unconventional way, where irrational actors could be looking to kind of like provide support or aid or kind of, you know, capacity building. I know that's a buzzword that people hate, but that kind of kind of stuff. Yeah. And then also, you know, with Thailand, I think we should have mentioned it earlier and I mentioned briefly that, you know, had moved forward, you know, taking up the premiership and being kind of in control there. You know, maybe that's another another kind of what if right, if I think that they had kind of varied For an idea of Myanmar policy, it seemed to be something that I met with our foreign policy people right after the election that they were very, very, you know, interested in, you know, obviously, that's a different situation now in in Thailand, given who's currently in control. So yeah, another kind of what if there, but But yeah, I think you make good points all around there.
Brad 1:10:20
I mean, the question then ultimately is going to come down to like, what is going to be the tipping point? This, I think, is ultimately what everything is leading to. Because we've got, you know, new maps are being produced of effective control, they do not show a rosy picture for the military. I know that the special Advisory Council for Myanmar is is currently working on a report. I don't know exactly when it's going to be released. But I know that they're currently working on an updated report of effective control across the country. And in collaboration with with some pretty, pretty heavy hitters within the Myanmar space. And all signs point to the fact that the military has no path to victory. We've had people coming on to the podcast for months and months and months now explaining that even even if the revolution fumbles the ball, the military is too far gone to be able to establish any sort of control, we can't move back to the pre pre 2021 status quo, we can't even move back to the pre democratization status quo. That's done. But no one seems to be reacting to this, nobody seems to be saying, hey, I want to jump off the sinking ship. And either just completely, you know, throw the military under the bus and stay aggressively neutral, or even potentially say, hey, maybe a democracy, a functioning stable, economically flourishing, democracy is not a bad thing. And maybe I want to start reaching out and partnering. We're just not seeing that. I'm just wondering, what is the tipping point what, what is going to make it finally happen? Or is it going to be a situation where Myanmar is fully liberated, it is under energy control. And you still have Southeast Asian Nations stubbornly refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the democratic government? Yeah,
Timothy McLaughlin 1:12:04
yeah. Yeah. Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, it's, yeah, it's an A for Southeast Asian for ASEAN, right. It's a, like I said, uh, you know, it's tried these quiet diplomacy things for a while with Indonesia, which seem to actually give it a try. Yeah, I mean, I think people just generally have much less faith in Laos to kind of carry that on or kind of make headway there. Yeah, so I think it's kind of like you said, I think it's gonna be kind of internal. And I also agree with what you said that, and I think that's part of what I was trying to say in the story, too, is that the US approach and everybody's approach is not, you know, you have to start thinking differently, because like, what you said is Myanmar is not going back to what it was, what it is, in the future. I don't think we obviously don't know. But I don't think it's going back to what it was in 2012, or I don't think it's going back to what it was in the 2003 era, you know, something fundamentally is changing here. And I think it's probably going to take a while for that all to kind of be seen and be sorted. And unfortunately, it's probably going to mean more kind of, you know, lost lives and destruction and stuff. But I do think that something different is going to emerge from from all of this.
Brad 1:13:18
Once again, so your article, I want readers to be able to find it. Well, we'll link it down below. It's called the great democratic, democratic success story that wasn't subtitle, by the way, America can't deliver Myanmar from its dictatorship, but he can do more than shift the burden and look away, which. Yep, I have absolutely no comments on that. That is a very, very true statement, and something that I wish people within the administration were taking much more to heart. Yeah,
Timothy McLaughlin 1:13:47
well, I mean, I'll just do I'll say that, you know, Thanks for Thanks for, you know, first for, for having me on. And, you know, and for the podcast, I think, you know, despite what kind of drove into this, and all the interesting guests that you've had, you know, because of the situation and the coup, but I think that, you know, it's good for places like yours, and you know, other places for for so many new voices to kind of be recognized and to be kind of come out of, you know, of what's happening again, it's unfortunate that that's kind of what had to drive it. But, you know, it's great to see the platforms like yours and you know, others that are out there thriving and kind of giving new ideas and new voices and new thoughts about about Myanmar, you know, to kind of a bigger audience, again, unfortunate that it had to come from from the coup, but glad to see that you guys are doing well. And I hope that you guys continue to kind of put up, you know, people that know a lot about the place that are kind of working in different areas and kind of again, just kind of new and diverse kind of thoughts. Sometimes I think, you know, sometimes Myanmar has been kind of held talking points of a select few kind of people here and there and it's good to see more kind of people being platformed and being able to kind of you know, share their thoughts about the country. So yeah,
Host 1:15:35
I know for a lot of podcast listeners, as soon as the fundraising request startup, you just kind of zone out or skip ahead till it's over. But I ask that if you're taking the time to listen to our full podcast that you also take the time to consider our spiel. Some may assume that producing a two hour episode wouldn't take much more than the conversation itself, but so much more goes into it. In advance of the interview, our content team reviews the biography and relevant works of the upcoming guests, and we discussed the best way to use our limited time together. After the interview is completed, the raw audio file is sent to our sound engineer who shapes it into working order. A single episode can take several full days of solid production work in the studio, which is carefully coordinated with our content team to ensure smooth listening. further edits and post production magic bring the eventual episode into your ears. Along with extensive written descriptions of each interview, which we publish on our blog and social media. Many of these steps require an outlay of funds in some way or another. We hope that each episode informs you about the ongoing crisis. And if you find it a value, we also hope that you might consider supporting our mission. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup, we welcome your contribution in any form, currency or transfer method. Your donation will go on to support a wide range of humanitarian immediate missions, aiding those local communities who need post. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, refugee camps, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution to a specific activity or project you would like to support, perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian work is carried out by a nonprofit mission that are Burma. And the donation you give on our insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fun. Alternatively, you can also visit the better Burma website better burma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause in both websites except credit card. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/better Burma. Additionally, we can take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either website for specific links to these respective accounts or email us at info@betterburma.org. That's betterburma. One word, spelled b e t t e r b u r m a.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. We also invite you to check out our range of handicrafts that are sourced from vulnerable artists and communities across Myanmar. Available at alokacrafts.com Any purchase will not only support these artists and communities, but also our nonprofits wider mission. That's aloka crafts spelled A L O K A C R A F T S one word alokacrafts.com Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support.