Transcript: Episode #270: Revolutionizing Relief

Below is the complete transcript for this podcast episode. This transcript was generated using an AI transcription service and has not been reviewed by a human editor. As a result, certain words in the text may not accurately reflect the speaker's actual words. This is especially noticeable when speakers have strong accents, as AI transcription may introduce more errors in interpreting and transcribing their speech. Therefore, it is advisable not to reference this transcript in any article or document without cross-referencing the timestamp to ensure the accuracy of the guest's precise words.

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0:11

Foreign Ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN meet to discuss ways to resolve the crisis in Myanmar, its military rulers had agreed to a peace plan with other ASEAN member states in April last year to end the unrest the countries faced since they took power in a coup last year, our ASEAN has sought to sharpen its approach to the Myanmar crisis. During this summit, it will tap past at incoming as well as current ASEAN chiefs in consultations, this to smooth over the problem of continuity that is implicit in the bloc's rotating championship.

1:01

Analysts say the move to skip Myanmar's turn as chair in 2026 could also hurt its military government leaders of Southeast Asian Nations met with the Myanmar military junta and reached agreements to help restore peace in that country, but with no clear plan in place, and with more deaths reported, human rights organizations cast their doubts ASEAN five point consensus, the main framework for Myanmar to resolve its crisis has failed to make significant progress to date.

Host 1:26

During the current crisis unfolding in Myanmar, events are happening so fast it can feel challenging just to keep up with them, and we're working to increase our podcast production to stay abreast of this ever changing crisis. And besides our podcast, we encourage you to check out the blogs on our website, Insight myanmar.org where you can also sign up for our regular newsletter and you can follow our social media sites. Just look for insight Myanmar on your preferred social Media platform. With that, let's head into our show you.

Brad 2:20

Kyaw and I and welcome back. My guest today is Adelina Kamal, and this is a a person with so illustrious a career and so expansive a background that I'm I'm afraid that I'm not going to do it justice. Suffice it to say that she has almost unparalleled insight into the nature and the application of humanitarian aid and relief within the ASEAN sphere, and that is what we're going to be discussing today and the political implications behind it. So adalina, I'd like to thank you very much for joining us, and I'd like to give you the opportunity to introduce opportunity to introduce your yourself, your background and the research that you've been conducting.

Adelina Kamal 3:51

Thank you very much for having me again on this podcast. After I left the AHA center at the end of 2021 and serving ASEAN system for almost three decades. I kind of like met the more forced into an independent analyst or researcher, kung independent activist, yeah, and I got this name or title from someone else, from some other people, because I don't know really how to consider myself, but let's say, you know, let's just say that I'm an independent analyst or researcher, come independent activist. I use the word independent because I'm not attached to and paid by one particular organization full time, but rather doing several things that I want and I just to do. I. So this include doing selected short term consultancy or advisory work for international organization or consulting companies which are paid work. Yeah, and teaching coaching and some speaking engagements. But Aung thean na crisis, I have been doing a lot of analysis, writing and advocacy, mostly on a pro bono basis, mostly not paid, and if I get paid or when my expenses are covered, I'm selective of who can be the funding source, because it is important for me to remain critical and independent, and Myanmar crisis has always been a very sensitive crisis, at least for the ASEAN circle and the ASEAN family. Anyway, I I think I have moved from being a thinking practitioner while I was in ASEAN into a practice based and research based thinker. You may think that I am being glorious about myself, but I think that's what I bring to the table, because right now, I'm not only producing analysis, you see, I'm also developing those analysis, but using or based on ground observations, and talking to the front liners, talking to those who are delivering it on the ground, the Myanmar, local resistant humanitarians, and I will talk about it later on, talking also to diplomats and I and then I combine those analysis with my policy and practitioners background. So if you read my article, I always come up with recommendation, not only describing and analyzing the crisis, but also the so what? Yeah, and I think because I do that, because in the past, I I produce not only regional treaties, policy papers, work plans, working with the diplomats, but I was also an executor. I established regional mechanism. I set up a center called the AHA Center. I work in a sector in ASEAN that is known as one of the very few that have been able to move discussion into a collective actions on the ground. I get my feet dirty on the ground by, you know, responding to and leading to catastrophic natural disaster. So definitely, I'm not just an air con diplomat. So I, you know, bring that approach right now. Now, being an independent analyst, researcher, activist, where I produce so far, 10 papers, and some of them are ASEAN centric, meaning that the papers focus on what ASEAN response to the Myanmar crisis and what can be done differently, but always using the human turn angle, because that's my background. And most of this ASEAN centric papers were published either before ASEAN summit or before ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. So definitely I use this papers as the basis for my advocacy. But when I wrote those papers, it was just not using, you know, observation from zoom meetings or from analyzing what people said from my aircon study room. But I had the privilege, and again, we can talk about this of being invited to see how the local, resistant humanitarians on the ground have been doing the work, the real work, that have, I think, been Not seen enough and talk about enough even at the international level. Well, some articles are quite ASEAN centric, but there are also articles that are for international audience, for the International Committee, such as the one that I produced recently for the humanitarian practice network at the ODI of this development institute last April, or for the deacon University Center for humanitarian leadership. Because I think that this is where Myanmar crisis could be also the impetus, or, you know, one of the learning point for the international humanitarian community to rethink and reform on the traditional humanitarian approach and the humanitarian system, but based on what's happening in Myanmar, based on what is being shown by the locally. A locally led, community based heroin actors on the ground.

Brad 10:08

Okay, so just for the benefit of those listeners who have not heard the other interview, you mentioned the AHA center. And I wonder if you can explain a little bit more detail what the AHA center is, because this is not the AHA center. Is not a sort of small local NGO like the AHA Center is a very substantial branch of humanitarian aid distribution within within ASEAN. So I think it might beneficial if you can explain to people what that is.

Adelina Kamal 10:37

Okay, sure, so AHA Center has a long name, and it came out of a negotiation for negotiation session. So it stands for the ASEAN Coordinating Center for humanitarian assistance on disaster management. Such a long name, right? But the original name was actually ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center. Yeah, the original name. But then after some negotiation, member states felt that we need to emphasize the coordinating role of the AHA center, so they added the word coordinating center, because the center should not replace the obligations of the countries to provide protection and assistance to their people. So we, the AHA center, only facilitate ASEAN collective actions on the ground, but the countries remain, you know, the front liners with regard to helping their own people during natural hazard induced disasters. So the work Coordinating Center was put and then, and this is really, you know, an interesting debate, because one country wanted to call it just as ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center, but then some other countries said, No, you have to limit the scope only on disaster management. So therefore the name becomes ASEAN Coordinating Center for humanitarian assistance on disaster management. And you know what the disaster management the D and the M are small and these are not, you know, mistakes, yeah, no, sometimes people correct that the D and M are, you know, big D and big M, small d and small m, you see, because, yeah, because that country who insists that it will only be called ASEAN Coordinating Center for humanitarian assistance doesn't like the word dnm, sorry, doesn't like the words disaster management in The official title. And then some other countries want to retain that, because they can see that there is an intention from these other countries to expand the scope of our center, later on, to beyond natural disasters. So in the end, the D and M are small letters anyway,

Brad 13:22

it's like a joke, though, like, so, so you're saying that even the size of the letter was a compromise between the countries,

Adelina Kamal 13:30

yeah, and I think that that is the I think that that makes it interesting for me as those Because I was with the ASEAN Secretariat. I was one of the drafters, right? And then I had to, like, you know, accommodate, so during the final stage of the negotiation process, this, the name of the center was one of the most contentious issue. There's another contentious issue that that is the funding, but then it was resolved, right? But this was, like, one of the most contentious issue, and that actually already show that the, you know, there is a a division right in terms of thinking on, on what AHA center would be in the future, because some countries do not want AHA center to go beyond natural hazard induced disaster, which I could understand. Because, you know, when it comes to when I when we did, when a SAN Secretariat helped the ASEAN countries, did the research right, the bigger background research. We did feasibility study on on international arrangements, bilateral arrangements and all that right before we came up with the tax of the agreement, it was all based on natural disasters and and a. Agreement that basically became the basis for establishing the AHA center was negotiated with Indian Ocean tsunami. In mind, the tax was already developed before the Indian Ocean tsunami, and then, because the Indian Ocean tsunami, it was such a big, big deal, right? It was a turning point, only for ASEAN, but also for for the international community, for the whole world, a wake up call for everyone, right? And it kind of expedited the development of the agreement, expedited the negotiation process. So, so we had the Indian Ocean tsunami in mind when negotiating that agreement, not conflict in mind. We use the international disaster response law as the background research, right, as the reference documents, not conflicts, not international humanitarian laws, not the international human rights law. So this is where, you know, I mentioned the other podcast. The the context of the agreement that give birth to the AHA center was natural hazard induced disaster. So then I, you know, I got the chance to establish the AHA center, together with the ASEAN countries, and then the first executive director. And then I became the Executive Director. Naturally, all the standard operating procedure right and and the tools, the assessment teams and all that were developed to respond to this kind of natural hazard disasters, and also created with assumption that the government of the affected country, the government of the disaster affected country, will be part of the decision making. Will be part of the decision to accept the assistant, and will be the one who give consent to the assistant, and will be the one who direct the movement of assistant and the control of assistant inside their territories. See so that that is the context where we work with and, and, and therefore, you know, the ASEAN leaders in 2017 when the Rohingya crisis happened in 2017 right, August 1017 I was, I just assume my position as the executive director. Then AHA center got this task to facilitate humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya in Rakhine State. And then another task in 2021 for AHA center to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the conflict affected people following the coup in April, sorry, in February 2021, so that is beyond, actually the mandate. So going back to your question, what is AHA center? So AHA Center was created again with Indian Ocean tsunami in mind, because our region is one of the most disaster prone regions in the world. Yeah, you I think we have everything. We have earthquake, we have tsunami, flood, drought, everything except 4k. No, yeah. Except no avalanche No, yeah. So, so, so I have often joke. We are the the ASEAN region is the 711 of disasters, or the supermarket of disaster. You have one and then you get two, because it's like one after another. And during my term as the executive director in 2018 we experience six or seven large scale catastrophe, disasters, one after another, you know, starting from floods in the Mekong region, including Myanmar, and then flats in Lao, following the dam break uh that affected 13 or 14 out of the seven pin provinces in Lao. And then earthquake, uh, wait earthquake in Lombok, uh, province of Indonesia. And then typhoon man could in the Philippines, and then this triple disaster in central Suu, triple disaster, earthquake, tsunami and liquefaction, I don't know what else. Oh, there was also fire from the largest the largest garbage dump in the. Aung, that's not natural disaster, but we got the call also to help in. So it was like one after another and catastrophic level by the definition of the people affected and also the number of people killed. So it's not really a joke. And therefore, ASEAN countries back in 2004 after Indian Ocean tsunami, right? Decided that we don't want to be reactive anymore. We want to be more proactive, and therefore we came up with the idea of having a regional treaty that will facilitate cross border movement of resources as well as personnel, when it comes to, you know, a natural disaster that would show and bring ASEAN solidarity on the ground, and the AHA center is the full timer, the machine that would facilitate that collective action. So in 2004 the before, and we talk now the after the before. If there was a tsunami in Indonesia like in 2004 what you would see was individual country responding, individual ASEAN country responding. And what you would see would be a Western dominated international humanitarian system responding right now, what you see is a different humanitarian landscape in the case of ASEAN because ASEAN countries have not only choices of responding bilaterally, like, for example, in the case of central SUU Triple disaster in 2018 Philippine could respond to Indonesia battery, but Philippine could also send their, you know, their expert as part of our assessment team, or stockpile, because we have regional stockpiles in place in three countries, and deploy that to Central solarology. So ASEAN countries have have also the choice to respond collectively and as a ha center is the glue that make it happen, is the one that actually brought brought it together. So we came up with the standard operating procedure. Assessment Team, assessment team, like what the UN has? UN has the UN disaster assessment coordination team. ASEAN has the ASEAN era team. And you may ask, why should we do that? Right? Well, the answer is that there will be cases when the UN or the Western, you know, centric international intelligence system will won't be able to deploy to ASEAN countries, because there are other disasters happening in other parts of the group, and also for ASEAN, it is important to be resilient and reliant on ourself and to be able to tackle our own problems in our own backyard. So you could, you could, you know, you could see how proud I am, right with the AHA center. But again, right with, with the context that I gave to you, and I would say, Aha Center has become the victim of our own success.

Because, I must say, if you ask me, How many sector in ASEAN, how many mechanism in ASEAN that have shown that they're able to move discussions, yeah, into collective action on the ground that is actually an expression of regional integration, because you agree together, right? And it's not only a declaration of intent put into declaration or statement or agreement that negotiated word by word, even the capital, right, but translate that into commitment, you have to commit to establish the Art Center. ASEAN countries give money to the Art Center, we also work with the partners. So we have partners behind us who also give a lot of money to the Art Center to establish the art center, but the countries also put money on an equal basis. And then, not only that, we we put that into, you know, operational, operation, into operation that that basically able to show that these are just beyond documents. Because, the way I see it, a mechanism is that tested in the case of ASEAN when it is needed, right, when there is a crisis or when there is a disaster, in our case, so we have actually been able to do that, because in large scale, catastrophic disaster, we have not only brought ASEAN solidarity into. Nation, we have transformed the humanitarian landscape of ASEAN on the ground, whereby, right now, it has now become ASEAN led and UN supporting from behind. So what happened in central I was in 2018 when I was still with the AHA center. We we were at the front, supporting Indonesia as the disaster affected country and the unbihana supporting because in ASEAN, we believe that you have to be country first, and that include the local community. That includes the local communities and the local civil society and so forth. And that's why ASEAN is committed to localization? Well, they should be committed to localization. We can talk about it because that is also where I think the ASEAN is to do more. So the country has to be at the front first, and then the region right, the regional mechanism support them, and then the international s, and when necessary, yeah, as and when necessary and and what I like about, about it is that we bring diversity into the picture. It shows that there is such a thing as ASEAN. It challenged the human tun system because in the past, and I talk about it in the latest podcast with the humanitarian. In the past, it was perhaps competition, considered as competition, and then we move to towards co existent and then collaboration. So yeah, that's, that's the AHA center. And again, as I said in in the on the other podcast with you, I think it has been successful that seven other regional organization, including African Union, decided to learn from the AHA center. Even after I left the center, I was invited in december 2022 Yeah, December 2022 to talk to the African Union countries about my experience establishing the AHA center, because the African countries are in the process of establishing the African Unitarian agency. They call it also Aha, but I said, well, that word is already taken, and then they change it into Aha, but I don't think that it is already up and running anyway, so so that that basically how we have been successful, but success also lead to managing expectation. And because we have been so successful, I think people tend to just use us no because, after all, in other classes too, humanitarian assistance is always thrown as a solution, but it is not a solution unless we address the underlying cause of the crisis, absolutely and so, Oh, such a long explanation about AHA center.

Brad 28:15

It is long, but I think it is important to understand the context, because we, you know, we want to understand, like, the background that you came from, and the perspective of humanitarian aid that you come from is, I think, essential to understanding the perspective that you have now taken on humanitarian aid in the research that you've done post coup. And this is where it gets very important, because let's just jump straight to to the heart of it. In multiple articles that you've published, you seem to be making the fundamental statement that the humanitarian response to the Myanmar crisis is failing the Myanmar people and and I want to understand if it how, how would you frame it? Would you say that the humanitarian response is actually causing harm, or would you say the humanitarian response is simply not doing as much good as it could be doing?

Adelina Kamal 29:14

Yeah, that's number one. Basically, the first point will be that the international community, or the international humanitarian communities, response and approach to the Myanmar crisis, the default approach right of the international humanitarian community to the crisis has been, has been a mismatch. It fails to understand the context. And these people have been talking about contextual analysis, contextual intelligence. I. But they have failed to really understand the context of the crisis and why? Because they fail to listen effectively to the voices of the people. Or perhaps they listen, but they don't do it. And also the humanitarian system, not only the approach, yeah, the system itself has been a misfit, because it has been done in such a vertical, top down approach, including ASEAN, yeah, and very segmented, differentiating between the human rights and humanitarian and the peace and the development sector. But when we ask the local actors on the ground, they think that this rigid sectorization of human rights humanitarian development and peace doesn't exist. So in in one of the interviews that I did with the local human rights organization in Myanmar, who has also been doing unit and assistant on the ground. They said that Adelina Ibu, adalina, I have no choice, because I cannot, just as human human rights organization, a local human rights organization, collecting evidence of human rights abuse and not doing anything about it after the coup especially. And I asked the the women right? Most of these people that I met are women, you know, courageous women, and I followed them. And I, you know, look at how they provide assistance to their communities. Then they said that, before the coup, we were doing, you know, like things related to the welfare of women, right? Education, development, basically, development work and then now, after the coup, we had to get together, work with the PDF and other revolutionary forces, and form a network among us, not only within our ethnic group, but also with others, because we have no choice. We have no choice. So, so that's what I said. That's what I said to external humans out there. You can, you know, you can say that because you are paid, perhaps, to do one work, right? But they don't have a choice. How are we going to support them? And I'm so frustrated to tell you the truth, because when I did advocacy in the big capitals of the world, they said, well, Adelina, what you're doing is basically asking for support for pro democracy movement. That is for another stream of funding, not humanitarian. When it comes to humanitarian, we have to follow the human principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. And these people are not neutral. And that's also the second point, the common thread line in my study that you cannot force neutrality on everyone, because neutrality is an exclusive right for external people like us who can just come and go, or just go out of Myanmar when the saka sa of the military is hunting us down, huh? It's an exclusive, right? It's an it's not, it's not for everyone. So you cannot force a privilege, yeah, privilege for us to choose, but not for everyone. So you cannot force the dunan this approach. Henry Dunant, you know this famous humanitarian principles to everyone. Neutrality is not for everyone and for local actors, those who got affected by the crisis directly, those who are assisting the local communities, right? And people on the ground they they have to take side. They are taking side. So this is where I get drawn into Hugo slims article, which he first wrote not long after the. Coup. And then, because he, you know, he was in 2021, yeah, I listened to him. I knew him before, before the coup, when he was still with ICRC and I was still with the center. So I knew him before, but I listened to him, you know, and I got attracted. And then so also another article by Khin Omar that and about neutrality is not for everyone. And also by another lady, Emily fish bin right, an American who wrote a lot together with local, local actors, and her article also featured in the new humanitarian so these are kind of like, you know, articles drew my attention to this so called humanitarian resistance. But it was really professor, he goes slim, who coined that term human resistance. And it's quite interesting, because he came from ICRC. Was actually in charge of the policy in ICRC, definitely, Aung is right. ICRC is a pure it is the grandchild or or the grand San and grand daughter of Henry Dunant. But then he said that, you know you can be humanitarian, though you are not neutral. We call it humanitarian resistant approach, because neutrality is not for everyone. By taking side, it doesn't mean that you're not doing humanitarian work. And he showed us, through one of his article and papers that there were cases, yeah, of the past, not only Henry Dun, that has been famous humanitarian, Mother Teresa too, right? Many others and those, those wars of the past, when we were all against the Hitler, you know, and the massacre in many other parts of the world, that we were not. Those people were human resistant, resistant humanitarians. They were part of the resistance, right when we were when those people were helping children out of the Nazi camps, they were taking charge. They were taking side. So it's not unique. It's not unique. And and then I told Professor Hugo slay, because he also talk. He also used this human resistance concept, and, and, and he, he observed this phenomenon in Ukraine, yeah. So in some of the webinars I, I listened to him, and I asked prof, I think it will be good that you write more about it and do more comparison about it. So then he came up with the with that article in the humanitarian practice network, right? And then I also talked to him about about it.

At the same time. I was also invited by the local actors to go to the field, right and I went to the Thai Myanmar border. But I also talked to those operating in the India Myanmar border. I talked to the frontliners, the women and all that and and, and they said that, basically the number one principle, Adelina, no junta at all, and not and we not only junta at all, right, that's their first principle, but also not working with anyone working with the junta, and not receiving money from anyone working with the junta, not receiving money, with anyone who got registered with the junta, whatever it is. So it's like a completely disengagement with the junta. Then, then I listen to Professor Hugo right about this human resistance. I look at the paper and blah blah. But Aha, Prof you know, as you said, this is being practiced in Myanmar. This is exactly what I saw on the ground. So after the field visit in Myanmar, after my consultation with the front liners, I came up with this paper that I wrote for the HPn, and the human practice network at the ODI, and got published not long after his paper, not long after Hugo slam us paper called humanitarian resistance. It's ethical and operational importance. So he referred to the Russia invasion. In invasion of Ukraine and the return of military dictation dictatorship in Myanmar that have reminded the world of the importance of humanitarian resistance. So he issued that paper, a longer paper of the article that you mentioned right in September 2022, and then my article, my paper that solely focused on Myanmar, called supporting the people of Myanmar is about political will that basically talk about human resistance in Myanmar. And then I got the chance to do advocacy using using my paper that I wrote for the ODI, as well as the findings that I gathered from the field to some capitals of the world, including New York, where I got joined by two ladies from Myanmar, Kin Omar, the Chair of progressive voice NCC at the time, was leading the women the WLB Women's League of Burma, and then Professor Hugo slim also joined us in some of our meetings with the international community. See so so that's how I got drawn to him, because that's I told him, it's not just, you know, it's not just a concept. I saw that on the ground, right? I got convinced, because I tried to, like, define what, what it is, and that it is, it, it this humanitarian work, after all, out of the four humanitarian principles then I studied for the right the first two humanity and impartiality are the moral compass, right? Humanity, we don't have to explain humanity impartiality. It is based on its and you have to treat the wounded soldiers of the enemy, right? You have to, you cannot torture the population that are favored by the enemy. You have to also provide assistance to the affected people. You know, regardless, regardless of their, you know, political association based on myths. That's impartiality. And then then it comes to neutrality. But again, neutrality, I think, has been interpreted wrongly, and neutrality, together with operational independence, the numbers, random number four are operational guidance, right? And even the ICRC said so. The first two, humanity and impartiality are the moral compass, neutrality and operational independence are operational tools. These are principle used to protect the external humanitarians, the way I see it, you know. So it is okay for iclc to use that, but it cannot be used by for example, and this is what I've seen donors to say that we cannot support local humanitarians because they are taking side. Yes, so that's the second point right about you to resist them, that you cannot force neutrality to everyone, because it can be your privilege, but not the privilege for those who are fighting and helping their own people,

Brad 43:47

absolutely. And I think this, this leads on to something that you, you wrote in one of your articles supporting the people of Myanmar. It's about political will, which you published in humanitarian practice network. And you You made it very simple that there are four options, that humanitarians can either choose to work with the military, they can choose to work with the resistance, they can choose to work with both, or they can choose to leave the country entirely. And what's fascinating to me is two things about this. The first, you make the argument that you strongly advocate your words for engagement solely with what you describe as non state actors, so people who are not recognized as part of the military dictatorship and the government, but also that you say that it is generally considered that leaving Myanmar entirely is a superior choice to working with the military exclusively, or working with both the military and non state actors, that it is more ethical to a. And in the country, than to engage with the military at all. And I'm wondering if you can, if you can talk to us a little bit first about that, like, at what point can a humanitarian, or how does a humanitarian come to this conclusion, to say this situation is so bad, the best thing that I can do is to abandon the entire country. How, how do you how do you come to that conclusion? How do you do that calculation?

Adelina Kamal 45:27

Well, first of all, I got inspired again by Hugo slim, who wrote an article, a paper, but it was not published, and he presented this ethical options, the ethical and operational options, yeah, for humanitarian INGOs, in Myanmar. And then I also had the discussion with this INGOs, including the UN and the donors, as part of my study. And therefore I came up with this four options, and, and, I think number four is considered better than number two and three. Number Four meaning leaving the country and drop, you know, drop, your operation behind is still better and ethical. Then, then working, continue working through the junta, and also then doing both, yeah, both meaning working the through the junta, but also working with the revolutionary forces, with the local humanitarians, because this is where the no harm principle gets in. I think I actually mentioned mention it in the latest paper that I did, but also in this paper that well when, when you decide to continue and stay engaged in the country, meaning that you invest in something right in terms of your time, your work and everything else. And when you are inside the country, and stay engaged and remain engaged to be in inside the country for the sake of staying engaged. But you cannot prove the effectiveness of that decision in terms of how much you are making progress in terms of humanitarian action. To me, the harm is much greater than the benefits and the effectiveness, and that has actually been pointed out by the humanitarian outcomes. Another research that I think I included in one of my recent papers, I think, either beyond the ecosystem, or the second paper for the human practice network, that it is considered fraught right, wrong, that you're not able to basically show the effectiveness of your operation. In fact, the UN itself says that they can only provide a system. Oh, no, they say that more than 70% or I think, more than 76% of areas that can be accessed are not controlled by the junta, meaning that they don't have access to that area. So why? Why do you remain engaged? Now, I know it's very difficult for the UN Yeah, because you know they they perhaps have to maintain their diplomatic engagement, and perhaps very difficult for the embassies, embassies. So for the embassy, they just decided to downgrade their level of representation, and I think also for the UN and they do the same. But this is, I think, where I said, INGOs do have options, then the UN and then the embassies, because it's an operational decision, rather than a diplomatic mission, they don't have a diplomatic reason to stay engaged INGOs. Yeah. So I think the only reason for our NGOs to remain engaged is money. Sorry, I had to say, for the UN and the bilateral embassies, they have diplomatic, you know, reasons like, for example, Indonesian Embassy, they decided to prolong, to prolong the, you know, the ambassador. I'm not sure whether it's been changed, because Indonesia, they don't want to present credential to me online. So, yeah, so they, they play around with this, but they, they need to have their eyes and ears inside the country. Perhaps you end too, but, but they can limit their operation, you know, to a minimum to me, yeah, even if you ask me about the UN operation, they can still do that, because the UN cannot do anything. Even INGOs cannot do anything if they do not get their local partners right to do, to do the delivery of unit assistant on the ground. And this is where I think staying engaged, you know, inside the country, making you complicit, because then you are being instrumentalized by the junta. Who knows about this, and therefore they came up with this amended the registration law right at the end of 2022 whereby you would be put into jail, or you get you would get fine if you're not pre register yourself. And then actually it's extended not only to the NGOs and the UN but also to the local partners so that create a defi and conquer rule situation, and Because the SAC knows that this international partners would need to be in the country and stay engaged and remain engaged. And there is even a document about staying engaged, right, yeah, just to make sure that the window is open, even if this small, you know, small, there's a wind just, you know, little open, but not like live entirely, so that they know what to do when you know the military regime change or the revolution win, or to do something right, to do something to help the people, they always say, and then they will say, Well, we still need to be inside the country, because the other 25% meet our assistance, really, I mean that would that that sounds like that, you are indispensable. Come on, they rely on the local partners to do the work. And then, not only that, it's even worse, they put the local partners in part of my, you know, consultations with the local partners, they put the local partners at the front to make a deal with the saka sa with the military. So they basically put the local partners, the local humanitarian partners, as the shield for them to stay engaged. So I have done some briefings for the NGOs, right? I told them, they asked me, and I said, number four, leave the country. You have right the option. And this approach actually has been taken by some INGOs in other parts of the world, when they decide based on ethical reason to support it doesn't mean that you you leave the population behind and wash your hand. No, you can still work from Thailand or, you know, from the border, and many actually have done it right, and they become the intermediary NGOs from the neighboring countries, you can still do that. This is what I call external humanitarians, becoming turning themselves into back room eight. You don't have to be the main, central actor in the country, like everything depends on you, on your existence. No, you can support from behind. And you know, you guess, you guess what the UN is trying to do with their flagship project. They decided to come up with this so called area humanitarian country team, which is basically getting the local partners, including those unregistered, to come for their coordination meeting, for the sake of coordination, but also at the end of the day, trying to get data out of them. How would you know? Okay, we can trust the UN but there were cases, and these were pointed out to me by local partners, by local actors on the ground, either intentionally or, you know, unintentionally, data got leak to the Myanmar military, and therefore, well, well, I told them, Oh, I do, yeah, we cannot leave the country. So we can only do with option number two, we, we will. I. Allow ourselves to be registered. Still continue with our present, but we will also support the local actors and the human and the revolutionary, and we will make sure that we will, that we build the firewall right. How can you ensure that even last institution like ICRC, I think it was, I think there was a case I don't know, in in the Middle East, or I forgot where they their data got like, it's not because of their fault, right?

It was really because because nu San un intentional. So there were, and you know the sakasa, you know the military. They they'll do anything. They'll do anything. There were cases when you know an intention, yeah, perhaps this external humanitarians provide information to the local authorities under the SEC sac administration. And then after that they came, they came to that settlement, and then some of them got killed. So so it's very dangerous, the way I see it, to play with option number two, that is to do both. And then that actually pushed the local actors into the so called gray area, which I pointed out in my latest article for the humanitarian practice network that I wrote with Rin Fuji mat Suu, the gray area the dilemma, you know, because they don't have the privilege like us, no, some of them perhaps have to stay inside the country because they have to take care their elderly parents, right, their old parents, or they have children, or for whatever reasons, then they have to basically get some money From the UN as part of their day job. But then inside, they're having this dilemma, because they know that the organization they work with registered are registered, is registered with the junta. Okay, they have been, some of them have been able to play around with it very, very cleverly, but there is, there is a risk. So I think humanitarians need to understand this risk. Yeah, and, and for us to basically tell them that, okay, if you take this option right, option number two and option number three, option number two, working with both pushing people into the gray area, the local actors, the Grow area, or working solely with the junta, there's also risk, right? Because your operation will be limited, you will always continue to be under the scrutiny of the junta, and that was the approach taken by ASEAN. That was the approach taken by ASEAN because ASEAN is the regional organization, intergovernmental organization, and they consider, still consider, the SAC department of Disaster Mitigation under the Ministry of Social Welfare relief and resettlement department as their focal point. Yeah, so that is their approach, but there is a consequence to that approach, and that consequence also relate to it effectiveness. It's kind of obvious, right? The Pit. There is a obvious Pitfall, just like the humanitarian corridor initiative of Thailand, where they decided to get to work, to get the Thai Red Cross to work with the Myanmar Red Cross. Well, of course it was started with the bilateral talk between the Thai foreign minister with the SAC foreign minister. And how would you trust that? Right, going back right? This is also the other point in my articles. It's about trust human when it when we talk about humanitarian assistance, the corner of humanitarian assistance is trust who is behind humanitarian assistance in a situation like conflict or crisis, who is behind the unit system is often much more important than the aid itself. And when we talk about crisis like what's happened in Myanmar, it's not even considered as internal conflict. We should not even call it as internal conflict. It's a revolution. It's a war right between the people, the majority of the people, with the Myanmar junta in that context, right? Whoever facilitate the crisis is much more important. I mean, the people are not stupid. They know who's behind the crisis, and there's therefore. Or there is, there's a reason why you, you, you know, right? The first, the first ins, the first tranche, with the humanitarian relief from facilitated by by Thai Red Cross, some people, or there's one village, the people run away because the the military, dead plane hovering up in the sky, and then they got scared. I think there's, there's an article, okay? And you made that statement, right? Could they get scared? How would you trust that assistant being delivered to them? It origin, if it originated from the talks between the one that bomb, you know, yeah, bomb, their people. So trust is important. And I think this is where the international community got it wrong with regard to the context right of the crisis, and also with regard to what actually the people really need protection. And you can only provide effective humanitarian assistance if you close the sky right, if you do not embolden the military junta from being able to bomb people. And then, if you deliver the assistance through the through the through the people, or through the organization, or through the outfits that the people trust. So trust is everything in the Myanmar contracts, in the Myanmar context, is beyond important, I was told by the Myanmar people.

Brad 1:01:50

And so, because I want to go back to what you you mentioned before, not just about the trust element, but more importantly, about NGOs, having to take that step back and working with the local groups and not sort of being in the limelight, not getting all the attention. I think that's that's probably what you were trying to emphasize in your article, beyond the ecosystem, it's for locally led humanitarian resistance. And I didn't quite get it until you put it into those terms, I now, I now see that so I it almost feels like what you're saying is that there is a deep cultural problem within humanitarian assistance, where especially these large international humanitarian groups, not only want To help, but want to be seen as the primary helpers, and are unwilling to recognize if they're in a situation where maybe they are not in the best position to help, maybe they need to let somebody else take the lead. Maybe they need to to just give support, give, give material, give personnel, give money to another group, is that, is that an accurate representation of the world of humanitarian aid?

Adelina Kamal 1:03:06

Yes, definitely. It has become very much professionalized. It has become an industry, and I think it has lost its soul. If you ask those who work for the mutant sector in the beginning, right, like in the 70s, when you know these people were before, were really like pure heart missionaries. Yeah, they they do good things, right? But right now, human system is filled not only by the good and light hearted mission we show missionaries, but also mercenaries and misfit. Misfit meaning that they they become humanitarian, or they become human, professional when they are not accepted in other sectors, that's a misfit mercenaries. They only do it because of money. Yeah. What we need more right now is machineries. You know that they that is, you do it for the cost. So right now, I think the way I say it, it has become such a big industry that is more of survival of the fittest is trying to, you know, to make sure, to prove to the to prove to the donors that they can deliver, that it is more of A donor centric, rather than affected population centric. It's not based on the needs of the population, but it is based on what actually the donors want. Now it is shown, it is shown from actually what the local actors are required to do when it comes to reporting. Yeah, I mean, I'm in this. Humanitarian system. You know, it is good. There are good things about the material system, just like you know when I say good things about ASEAN, but it has become so transnationalized, internationalized, right? Professionalized, professionalized to the extent that only those who can follow the superior standards created by the superior outfits can get that superior money.

Brad 1:05:30

You talk about the money a lot, I'm noticing this like, I think this is a very important point, because we don't think of there being a lot of money in humanitarian aid, like we always hear about humanitarian groups asking for money, needing more money, doing appeals. They advertise on television and radio and social media here, trying to raise money for different causes. So we kind of have this impression of these organizations, even if they are united nations organizations, we always think of them as underfunded, the staff as being underpaid, and all these sorts of things that there's a lot of money flowing through here, so much so that some people in the humanitarian aid world are motivated by that money. So what is the disconnect? Where is this money coming from? And who is making the money, the money is coming from, from the the money is coming from, from the the big donors, right?

Adelina Kamal 1:06:21

The big donors. So these are, you know who they are. And I think, I think, well, perhaps, compared to some other sectors, humanitarian aid sector is, is not that big, perhaps? Yeah, I think it's also, well, I still think that is a big industry. But also because we are competing with the number of crisis around the world, there are so many protected crisis right around the world, and the needs are greater than what is available. So that's one reason. And then right now, what we have been experiencing is the so called poly crisis, when there is not only one disaster, like in the case of ASEAN, there's not only natural disasters, but now natural disasters happening within the context of covid pandemic as well as conflict, and there are also other risks that we have to deal with, and not not to mention The climate crisis. So the poly crisis, so the money get, you know, get squeezed because of this world problems that that tend to become more complex nowadays. Now when it comes to Myanmar, Myanmar has been a forgotten crisis, and the UN has actually pointed out that their humanitarian response plan only get funded, you know, a small portion of what they ask for. But this is where I come. Come to the issue of proportionality. I have a you know, and I've been discussing this quite a lot, you know, with with the UN as well as with the local human actors. Because what actually the local human actors have been asking are small compared to what the human response plan has been asking and still much, still small compared to what actually has been actualized, right, or given by the donors, even, even so, it's, it's, it's a question about proportionality. But when, when it comes to proportionality, is also making use of what is available effectively. So, so this is where I think the the benefit of human resistant, the benefit of supporting actively and more directly, this local actors, because going back through the big actors, they they have a lot of so called, what do you call that indirect cost, in terms of staffing and all that?

Brad 1:09:35

A lot of overhead, overhead, yeah, yeah.

Adelina Kamal 1:09:39

But local actors. They're very efficient, and sometimes they don't have overhead charge. And I ask them why you need to survive as well? No, because all of the money I want, I want to give it to the people. Okay, you know, that's how I idealistic they are. But what they have been asking for, and I did some kind of a comparison in. My latest study for the mission practice network of the ODI is a small percentage. So it's not only the money is channeled through the wrong channel, right? It's a fraud approach, because it is, it is it is done in cooperation with the junta, relying on the consent from the junta, and God knows how much you know, being cut by the junta going through. We don't know, right? We don't know. And then, not only the the big overhead taken by UN and INGOs right and perhaps most of the money also go to international experts. Then what is left for the affected population? What is left for the local actors? That small amount of money could have been used more effectively if we channel that to the community based organization, because that goes directly to the people. It doesn't get instrumentalized and weaponized by the junta, because it disengage the junta, because directly, okay, if it doesn't go directly, it goes to the intermediary. But there is also arrangement that has been practiced between this intermediary, the so called backroom AIDS. There are some of them, and they're doing really good, you know, a good, participatory and partnership approach with the local actors that ensure that you know, that that operation is sustainable. So, so the the cost and benefit is compared to the cost and benefit and the harm right. The harm by going, going through the frog approach, which is actually the number, number one, you know, you take that frog approach to me, it's already wrong. Yeah, it's totally wrong. And then second, not only that, the money, because of so many crisis in the world, is little. And then what is available, right? And the more reason for that little money available individual sector for Myanmar, the more reason that money should be used more effectively. So proportionality is also about using the money the right way, right the right way and more effectively. And that's what the unit resistance is all about and out of the reasons why it is so difficult for human resistance to cover the population that they want to work with, because, because some of the donors have been afraid of supporting them directly, because they're, They're, you know, they're considered as part of the resistance movement. Or they may actually carry weapon. I have seen myself. They don't have weapons in, you know, in the trucks or in the boat, don't they are quite independent from the arm resistance movement.

And we are talking about the women's group, we're talking about, you know the religious groups, the churches, those that the Buddhist network, they don't have weapon. They may be protected by the ethnic resistance organization because they operate within the areas of the ethnic resistance groups, right? But they are independent, operationally independent. They decide, you know, how they actually provide the assistance. So they are the way I say it more humanitarian to me, because they're definitely following the principle of humanity impartiality too, because they are helping not only their own ethnicity, but also other ethnicity. They form network of networks, right? And then when there are defected armies, they are also treating them. We see that, right? The impartiality, and this is the kind of, you know, support that we need to, you know, provide to them, that these are important. Definitely they are not neutral. But non neutrality in this context is, in this context is about disengaging the junta, and we know, and we should understand why they are doing that, and then operational independent. They are operation independent. Now, human assistant is always politicized, and when we talk about human assistant, it's a poly it. This. It is always opera. It is it operates within a politicized environment, including in the case of ASEAN, aha center is under a larger organization called ASEAN when the Supreme decision making body is ASEAN leaders. These are political leaders, right? They are not operational independent, and definitely we are not neutral as AHA center, not neutral. But it doesn't mean that you know you have to be like ICRC and and I talk in another podcast about decolonizing, about equality, about solidarity. Human resistance is all about this. You know, solidarity, equality, about decolonizing, about making yourself resilient. So the way I see it, it should be easier for ASEAN to pivot, rather than the international community, the International in between community, because ASEAN is all about solidarity. Aha, stands for ASEAN. Help ASEAN solidarity at its best. Anyway, going back, going back. So my papers are targeting to ASEAN, targeted to ASEAN circle. And those are for the Jakarta Post or or for the Institutes for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, right. And normally those papers were out just before the ASEAN summit or foreign ministers meeting. So I am also being an advocate at the same time as being a researcher myself. But I also use this, you know, opportunity, Myanmar, to elevate the Myanmar crisis so it is not forgotten. We need to continuously talk about the Myanmar crisis. And in my recent study that got published in April as April with the human practice network, I got the chance to compare what's happening in Myanmar with what's happening in Syria, Sudan and Gaza, I talk, we talk to some Syrians following the you know, did you hear about the Earth earthquake that happened both in Turkey and North Syria and and There is this so called UN Security Council sanction humanitarian corridor initiative, and some countries in the permanent Council be told that the request for extension of that arrangement, and that basically left people dying after the earthquake in Syria, though, actually people were, you know, ready to help on the side of Turkey. So we learned that from the case in Syria, the neutrality trap. We learned, you know, Sudan, what's happened in Sudan is also terrible. What happened was the what happened is the so called mutual aid. So Mutual Aid, or resistant humanism is, is similar. It's about solidarity. Is what happened one another is breaking the barriers between the provider and the recipient. Because what? What is happening in Myanmar. Those providing it are also affected by the crisis, right? But then they also help their fellow, you know, those who are affected by the crisis. So it's not top down. It's not external to internal, which is very, very patronizing, the way I say it, and and I think the world has been the world is moving to that direction when it comes to humanitarianism, that you cannot say that there is an eighth recipient and there is A donor anymore, because everybody now can be a donor. Guys for our groups are the best source when it comes to cross border aid, when it comes to supporting the Rohingya in Rakhine.

Brad 1:19:34

And I think this circling back to to what what came up before, because the concept of neutrality came up. And I really appreciate that you are able to say that the AHA center, for example, is not, is not impartial, neutral. It can't be. It can't afford to be. It doesn't have that luxury. And this is, this seems to be something. Very, very deep to the very fundamental question of humanitarian aid. You know, the principles underlying humanitarian aid might be essentially broken and flawed, because there is there any way in your mind to separate aid from politics, because it seems to me that if the AHA center is engaging with the SAC equivalent in Myanmar, then they are making a political statement that they recognize the legitimacy of the military regime. If the AHA center is to say, No, we do not do business with the junta. We will not engage with the with the military agency. Then that also is a political statement. And I could imagine that ASEAN would be very hesitant for one of its major organs to make such a political statement. Is there any way for humanitarian aid, because all humanitarian organizations exist somewhere. They're registered in some country. Is there any way to separate it from domestic politics?

Adelina Kamal 1:21:12

So I would say that Aha center is not humanitarian organization per se. I would say that is a disaster management organization, yeah, because it's for the reason that I mentioned right is to is to facilitate collective actions on the ground that represent the ASEAN governments, the 10 ASEAN governments, soon to be 11, when timula state is joining. So it provides the so called humanitarian assist assistant, yes, but it's not independent, because it is still part of a political organization that is ASEAN, and because it is not independent, it can, it cannot be neutral. And that there is a reason why, you know those human term principles are not enshrined in the the Disaster Management Agreement. You look at it, there are no there are no statements saying that we adopt the four humanitarian principles, no, because the you know, the main reason is to ensure that there is a collective actions on the ground. And this is not a bad thing, you know, for reasons I so sad before. It's also a way to liberate ourselves, to make our self resilience, but when it comes to human assistance in the context of conflict, right in the context of conflict or crisis, with the political agenda or political motive charged with the political intention and manipulation and so on and so forth. There is no a mechanism in ASEAN that will say, Aha, center, you cannot use a disaster management agreement. So you cannot, you cannot, you cannot operate. You know, in these circumstances, let's use the other mechanism. No, what happened was the other way around. ASEAN leaders chose to use AHA center. So do not blame it on the AHA center. Do not blame it on the AHA center. Aha center was instructed, and I was there few days before that ASEAN leaders meeting, I told you I will tell you a secret a few days, or, yeah, a week or two weeks, I forgot. I gathered my team at the center because I knew that we will be asked again by the ASEAN leaders. I kind of like anticipate. I didn't dare to ask any of the foreign ministers yet, but I gathered, met him, and we were in the covid period at that time, so we had to go through the, you know, vaccine testing, and all of us were distancing ourselves from each other. And I asked them, Okay, if you were given this assignment again, like, what happened after the Rohingya? What? What would we say? Yeah, I asked my colleagues, because they will be part of this, right? And, and then we came up with the scenario, you know, what to say. And, and then we decided to say no. And then, after some discussion, we realized that no, we couldn't say no when the ASEAN leaders asked us to do so. So I think what should be blamed is the ASEAN leaders, and I think it's also because I think they know, they know that it's a political crisis. They know that they are using AHA Center, which is a. That's the management organization created with Indian Ocean tsunami in mind, because there are no other instruments and tools in ASEAN that that can be used to deliver actions on the ground. They are throwing unity and action in the absence of political action right? Because of political importance, political inaction, yeah, uh, human interaction is just one of the points under the five point consensus number one is a session of conflict, which I think is the priority. You have to cease fire. You have to stop the bombing and all that and the killing, right? Because otherwise, humanitarian access will be limited, especially as you are dealing and your focal point, and whoever that the you count in terms of access is the one that is the major source of violence and the main perpetrator of the crisis. So the the one that should be playing is the ASEAN leaders for basically guiding the AHA center to not, while not guiding for tasking the AHA center, and also the absence of mechanism in ASEAN that will create this code of conduct, and we talk about it in another podcast, because what happened is an exception, right? You cannot use the you cannot use the disaster management agreement with that the assumption that the authority is able and willing this authority is is not willing to help their own people, so you can't use that context. And this is where we have ASEAN has been misinterpreting the context of the crisis, or perhaps they know what the context of the crisis, but they don't have any other tool. So they use him with their assistant to be able to show some progress in the five point consensus out of the five, what actually shows certain progress they they could only say number four with their assistant. So so again, play it on the ASEAN leaders and and why they are not providing guidance or mechanism or code of conduct how to deal with that. It should come from them. It cannot be a center that is an organ who who report to a governing board, who report to the ASEAN ministers in charge of his asset management, who eventually talk to the ASEAN leaders. Can the executive director say? Suu, no, it is not within the structure we are, you know, the SOP and everything else is created for different contexts, you know, which work very well, but not for this context. So that what is lacking in ASEAN, that a mechanism, or at least a principle right or a decision, how would you treat? How would you define the context right and what to do about it, including how you deal with the one that created the, you know, the crisis in the first place. Now I think the UN is also doing the same thing. No, so ASEAN is also following the UN. You said in another podcast, the UN has famously consider a country as a country, not government, right? Yeah, has also been the approach of ASEAN. ASEAN is doing a copycat approach, and the UN continue to stay engaged in the country. Aha, center is not a hasta is coming, and it comes and go. No, they don't have a country office inside the country, but the UN has so the UN gives a very bad example already, and then, and then, you know, we human are like ducks, yeah, we like the group thinking approach. So, so this is what I regret about ASEAN. I wasn't able to fight inside the system. That's my biggest disappointment about myself. I tried. No, I tried because I challenged that. And I think it's also kind of like blessing this guy, San, that I ended my tenure before the special envoy was decided. You know, before the approach basically on the Myanmar crisis was decided. I went out in in August, special envoy from Brunei was not, you know, there was still a debate about who could be the special endpoint, whether it is based on rotation or just one special envoy, anyway. So I was kind of like, Safe By The Bell. So I was. Not further drawn into that. You know, that situation, it would have been very difficult for me, inside the system to fight for that, but I did ask. I did ask, what is the main objective? How do you define that? And I really have problems, you know, dealing with an authority working through a focal point, who is not min Aung like no, but under, working under the direction of min Aung Lang, and then ask for their consent. And this is also another issue in, you know, another point that I wrote in my papers about obsession on consent over obsession, we have been overly obsessed, not only ASEAN no the international community on consent. Why have we been so obsessed, obsessed with consent? Because we think we cannot stop thinking that the junta is the only focal point when to for us to to reach the crisis affected people. So then again, it's not only ASEAN, it's the the international community also together, are at fault in this. They have failed. The default approach of obsessing the junta as the as the entry point, obsessing with the access given by the junta is a mismatch, because there is an alternative approach. Right there, there are, there is an alternative approach. So what ASEAN and the international community has been doing through this states and centric approach is just tweaking, tweaking, tweaking, trying to push, trying to push here, you know, trying to find that there is a window out right. Basically working in a very constrained environment and working continuous in a continuous sit trap in this neutrality, the so called neutrality trap. Trap in the dilemma, while there is actually another choice, an alternative choice that could be more effective.

Now, is there any other way? Yes, there is, when it comes to H Yeah, and this is where a guy named Jonathan Glenny wrote a book called The End of eight and the future of eight, that it is time that we dismantle the system. Yeah, the human system has been those who are very vocal about the immune system, right, including me. I've been saying about about this for years, that the immune system has to be dismantled because the eight is based on the concept of the white white men riding White Horse approach you, the cavalry of white men and white horse, white knights. Yeah, yeah, the hero mentality and and the age, yeah, also has been creating the so called victim mentality in the eight recipient countries. So there is also the so called victim mentality, because they have been receiving age, right, all these years and decades, and what has been created is rest. Is not resilience. Is reliance on it? How can you for 50 years feeding the hungry people in Africa. What is the end line here? There has to be a finish line or a graduation point. Why is it all about, you know, continuing the work now, so, so I think the eight, the concept of eight in the beginning was good because it's a mission, but that mission has become a misfit. The eighth mission of the past has become a misfit because of the situation, because of the disparity created between between those receiving aid and those, you know, providing eight, and it has been politicized by those providing the eight, right? It's not only ASEAN the problem. Only ASEAN and the donors there also have some strings attached to the NGOs and the UN we know that in the case of Gaza? No, we know that. So, so there should be the end of it. Jonathan green is said, and the future of eight is a situation when there is equality, when everybody decides, everybody contributes, and everybody. The benefits.

Brad 1:35:03

Does this tie into your horizontal ecosystem?

Adelina Kamal 1:35:06

Yes, that also, that also inspired the horizontal ecosystem. That horizontal ecosystem, first of all, started with this humanitarian, resistant approach, right? Started with what, where I saw on the ground that the local humanitarian breaking the barriers right between the eight recipients and the provider and so on so forth, but also inspired by the nature of the spring revolution itself, which is horizontal Yeah, which is breaking the barrier between the different ethnic groups and religions, because ignited by the Gen Z, supported by the previous uprising and Tai junta movement, moving away from the patriarchal, hierarchical, ba, Mar centric approach to more inclusive approach, right? That's horizontal. So the one that actually fits this horizontal nature of the spring revolution is humanitarian resistance, because human resistance adopts a horizontal approach, and it doesn't mean that we dismiss the role of external humanitarians like me or or ASEAN or the UN or the NGOs, no they can be the back eight and supporting this spider web of resistant humanitarians. I call it spider web, and I love spider web. I don't know why Westerners, sorry to say, are afraid of spider web. But you know that the Burmese, the current is the currents, including Indonesians too. We love spider web because spider web looks fragile, but very strong, and they represent this horizontal nature. I when I research, you know, what I saw on the ground, I asked myself, should there be a coordinator among this local, resistant humanitarians? And I concrete, no, they should not be, because they are governed by network of networks. They work that way. It has to be organic, right? It cannot be forced through a top down, you know, approach. I used to be in that top down approach, and I cannot force that so. So that is actually beautifully shown through the nature of the spring revolution, beautifully shown through the nature of the local resistant humanitarians that are working on the ground. And I see that, you know that these are this, these are like, well connected, and this is the best fit for what's happening in Myanmar in terms of providing human assistance. And again, the humanitarians will still have their job. I mean, we you should not be afraid of losing our job or our offices, and we should not be afraid of moving out and becoming the back room eight from the outside, because many have actually have shown me that they are able to do that. I also talk yeah to some external humanitarians, white, white people told me that I do that. Adelina, I can. So, you know, it's a bullshit that they said that to you, that they can't. I am the living example that we can if we want to, and they're allowed by their parent organization to do so, I respect that and their donor to do so. So there are people in the humanitarian system who are the mafricks, yeah, who are inside the system, but it's so difficult, just like in ASEAN, to work inside the system. And I said on my other podcast that it requires both the mafricks but also those outside the system to pressure the Hamiltonian system so that we go back to the the soul, the, you know, the original soul of humanitarianism, that is to help each other. And also for ASEAN to go back to our own, you know, objective for ASEAN, helping ASEAN so. So it's a challenge for us because, and I think people perhaps will say Adelina is a wishful thinking. How can you expect LA, ASEAN and UN to change their state centric approach? Well, we start from from Okay, and then the donors, LA, the donors. There are donors, yeah, I just saw one from Europe. Then they decide, no, we will go and support the local Unitarians directly. There is one I just saw. I. I forgot from each country it was shown to me so the donors can do something, because they have, they hold the money. Yeah, the UN is another thing. Un is basically at, at the young Chang, LA, I mean is, is proven in the Gaza, right? Unless the UN permanent, sorry, the UN permanent Council, the UN Security Council, basically, is not, is is useless. It's just so how do you expect the UN? You need to change the entire system. If you you you want to change the human system, the UN inter agency, standing committee included. You have to change the Unitarian system. You have to change the whole UN system. And that means you are fighting with the big horses there within, you know, within the international system, that is difficult. But we can start with some Netflix like the donors, some INGOs who have shown the way, and ASEAN too. It is more possible for ASEAN to do so. If ASEAN won, ASEAN can.

Brad 1:41:18

I think that's a very, I mean, that's, it's a very powerful statement, but it's also it raises this question of, but why don't they ever do it like it's not just if ASEAN wants to, ASEAN can it. This statement applies to everyone. It applies to the United Nations. It applies to the European Union. It applies to the United States. Everyone is in this position where they could very easily be making a very significant change in Myanmar, but they never do.

Adelina Kamal 1:41:49

And that is that basically translated into only two words, political will,

Brad 1:41:57

which coincidentally another one of your articles,

Adelina Kamal 1:42:00

but and also what Tom Andrew said, right? Yeah, at the end of the day, it's about political will. It's so easy. But, you know, the the very good recommendation is an easy recommendation that is hard to implement, right? It's so easy. You think that it is so easy, but it is hard to implement. That is a very good recommendation. It's political will, basically, at the end of the day, and also, well, it's political will is really like the will to push the boundaries, the will to push the boundaries and and right now, the Myanmar people have to basically show to the world, and to also ASEAN too, that the they are challenging the system. They are challenging the way we do things, the way they do things. So it's there's an article by U SIP USIP, and I think I mentioned it in in my article for the human practice network. I'm so inspired, because this is also what I saw on the ground that, in a way. Well, okay, this is my work, yeah. And I told this to Myanmar students who who contacted me, and they're, you know, they contacted me because of my study, and I appreciate that, because they said that, why are we so neglected by the international community? They asked me that question, and I said to them, well, it may be good, it may be good that you are not the darling of international assistance, because then, because you're left alone, then you are forced, you know, to fight for your independence. You are fought to fight for your freedom, and you, you are forced to become a resilient on yourself, and you show to the world that you can, and then the others will follow. So I guess you know, it's sad, but there is this article this minute. Yeah. Okay, so it was foreign, and things are tap 2023 I got it from the US IP that even compared to resistant movement in other parts of the world, such as in Iran, Syria and Sudan, the spring revolution, you know, is, is more, is more sustainable, the way, the way they say, because is, I think it set, it's an example of. Others, because it emphasized the horizontal relation accent with social justice, inclusive of all members of society, and has spurred a collective effort whereby the people envisage an inclusive future, federal democracy and so so forth. Yeah, so it's, it's, oh, okay, they they say that it is. It not only that the spring revolution is unprecedented, unprecedented in the country's history, but also unprecedented even compared to other resistant movement in other parts of the world. So, yeah, you can, you can go to that article, which I think is, you know what, what I saw on the ground, we are all humble, right with what we see. I'm not trying to say also that the Myanmar people are better than those in Sudan and Syria and Afghanistan, no, but I think they are things where Can, can show something right, where other grasses cannot, and that is about the strong will of the people, but the People's Power, the people's will and the people's creativity, as I wrote in my paper,

Brad 1:46:22

I think it's not just the question is not whether the Myanmar people are worth more or worth less than the people in Sudan or the other people in any other crisis zone. But unfortunately, it seems to be a very real question in the international political sphere, are the Myanmar people worth as much as white Westerners, because when Ukraine being a very good example, when there is a conflict that affects Europeans or that affects North Americans, it seems that the compassion is very high, the aid money flows, the situation is taken very seriously. Okay, we can say Russia is a traditional enemy. We can say it's an international war. We can, we can point to these differences, but the difference in scale of funding and the openness to give lethal aid, in the case of Ukraine, it shows a staggering contrast. It goes back to what you were saying just before, when you were saying, Well, you know, if they wanted to, they could, I think the international, and by international, I mean Western international response to Ukraine shows that if they wanted to help Myanmar, they wanted to help Sudan, they wanted to help in Tigray, or they wanted to help in any of these areas, they could do it with even 1% of what they gave to Ukraine. They could make enormous impacts and save many lives. But as you say, the political will is not there. I don't think the question is whether Myanmar people are worth less or more than Africans or Asians. But are they worth less than Europeans? This actually seems to be a serious question in international politics.

Adelina Kamal 1:47:55

Well, actually, what happened? What happened this in terms of the support for Ukraine, which is, you know, which shows their solid it seems like it's just solidarity more to the Ukrainian and the white people there, right to me, you know, there's the Western government support to the Myanmar people. It's more of a token, you know, because, after all, it is a political tool. Why do you think that the Western government are supporting Ukraine, Ukrainian more than the Myanmar people? Because of Russia? I'm not going to into that, you know, political debate. Yeah, that's not my background. Also, no, but it Tom Andrews has sum it up quite well. He has suggested, at the end of the day, it's about political will. It's such a simple, you know word political will, and that political will can be translated into action. For example, okay? I mean, he, he mentioned in one of his briefings to the UN that okay, if the UN Security Council cannot be, you know, cannot be relied on to do collective sanctions on Myanmar, then perhaps there should be this coalition of willing countries, Coalition of the Willing right who would collectively put on sanctions on Myanmar and someone not only sanction, but also other other punitive measures. Collectively, have you sent? Have have we seen that it requires a, it requires, you know, a coalition of the willing, Coalition of the Willing, consisting of countries. Now, when I, when I went to New York there, there are countries want to start with this move. I. Thing, right? There are countries. It's not that some countries are not thinking about it, but I think the the push, I don't know why, the push on Myanmar is not that great. Now we see on Gaza who has, what do you call that a cut the ties with the Israel, Colombia recently, right? And I think Irish also, you know, stood up. And then we also see the people's movement, right? So that that represent right, that actually show that is at the end of the day, when it comes to intergovernmental forum like the UN is about political will, but that political will can also be pushed towards the wall by the People's Power. We see this manifestation of people's fires through the climate change right, the climate change movement, there is this new thing called the damage and loss right that basically promotes for an equal treatment. So there is a reparation, right? Reparation for countries like Indonesia, okay, right now, we contribute to a lot of CO two, but then, because we are still developing, but you're also helping us, because we also produce the lung of the world, together with Brazil and so and so forth, so that there's this concept of equality and burden sharing now that actually that push because of the People's Power too, because of the climate movements and all that, and because people feel that we are in it together. Covid 19 too, right? Covid 19 too. So covid, covid 19 should have actually pushed for, you know, stronger movements in terms of a change in traditional system, as well as the multilateral forum, which didn't happen. But I think we should not, we should not consider that we should not diminish the the strength of the people's revolution, of the People's Power. We have seen it in Myanmar, right through the spring revolution, and I think we need to duplicate that and multiply that so, so when it comes to me and my crisis to me, my agenda is not only only helping with Myanmar people, there's a larger agenda that I have, right? It's about it's about changing the immigrant landscape. It's about changing the way ASEAN, you know, works. It's about revamping a lot of things. And again, you may think that many people think that you have a wishful thinking Adelina, you You dream high up in the sky, but I will, okay, this is where I will. I will share a quote, a Burmese quote that I learned from a Rakhine demolishing a mountain with the seed of a palm fruit. That is a Burmese saying, right? I asked, I asked the Rakhine and I asked the Rohingya, do you think that such a social cohesion will happen in Rakhine State? I asked the diaspora, the Rohingya diaspora, do you think that you will be able to return to your homeland? Yes, it may not be in my lifetime, but we will return eventually to our homeland, because we believe in this saying, demolishing a mountain with the seed of a pan foot, that's all we can do, right? Trying to do something in ASEAN, there is a thing, dare to dream, care to share. It's an ASEAN anthem. Have we done that? Care to share. But I think it is also for us to be able to dare to dream. And for me to be able to dream, to have this wishful thinking that we need to, you know, we need to start with this, you know, revolutionary approach for ASEAN and the human community, for them to change because. So every big thing starts with a small step, and we should aim as high as the sky, because if we fall, we will fall among the stars. And that's what first president sukano Said. Can tun, it ber min PIs tingy, langit, Dan jika Aung ja tun, aka akan Jia tun, Indonesian language. Aim as high as the sky. Should you fall? You would fall among the stars. That's my message for you know the young people out there who are now being threatened by the conscription? You know the first conception by the junta I was, I will end that. I have nothing else to say.

Brad 1:55:51

No, I honestly, I think, I think we've covered, we've covered a lot here, and I think, I think you provided it like a fascinating insight into the actual, pragmatic problems behind international aid, like it's, it's, it's something that is so it's meta. We don't think about it. And often we look at AID, we say, well, why are they not giving more aid? How can we give more aid? How can we be more efficient with the aid? But we need to have these moments where we stop, we take a step back, and we look at the structure of international aid itself. And this is why, like that book, The End of aid is so fascinating. Because end of like it doesn't mean the end of support for each other, but it means that maybe the way that we have approached it, and you've been very critical of the historical top down approach. Maybe the way that we've approached aid has brought problems. Maybe we've made aid inherently political. Even though we pretend that aid is apolitical, neutral, disinterested, all these sorts of things, we have to recognize that it is not and if we don't have a difficult conversation about the very concept of our understanding of international aid and the mechanisms through which we try to help people, and we don't question whether we're actually doing more harm, then we have no way to reform. We have no way to change. We have no way to improve. So I think, I think you brought a very powerful insight to to aid and and you've raised a lot of very important questions. And I strongly encourage our listeners to read your articles, and we will link the articles below, and also to read the the other articles that we mentioned, whether from from the US, IP, whether from Hugo slim, but before we before we conclude, I know that you said you had, you had nothing to say, but I do wonder whether you do have some, some final thoughts just for people to think about, just the, you know, concluding, concluding thoughts to finish the episode with, so that the listeners have something that they can really focus On, and something they can talk about with their friends and with their colleagues, and just think about when they're when they're going on about their day. If you do have a message or a or a thought, I would invite you to share that I

Adelina Kamal 1:58:21

have I think I have said what I need to say. Really, I don't know what else to say is just the same as the previous podcast, but perhaps what I should say, thank you. Thank you very much for providing this platform. This is the first time that I spent a lot of time talking in a podcast, on a podcast, even you know, I never, I never did this kind of a podcast or even webinar. It hasn't been this long, but now I understand why you and the other hosts decide to do so, and I listen to your other podcast because you really want to right drill down to the issue, provide, like, a thorough understanding. Yes, two hours, three hours is not is not short. I think we have been talking like more than two hours. So I do hope that I got the feedback. Perhaps, if I want to say, Please provide me with a big feedback. Any listener out there, you can reach out to me through Lincoln or through Twitter. Well, Twitter, I think it's not that good anymore, but perhaps Lincoln, please give me feedback. What do you think, first of all, that will be, you know, that will be my request. You know, give me feedback. What, what do you think I like to I like to also have. Up to listen to those who don't agree with me, right? Because that would enrich the discussion, because perhaps there are other things that we have not covered, and if you like to suggest on other things that I would need to do through my research, because I do have certain platforms, yeah, where I can advocate for, you know, for this hemogen resistant or locally led approach. I'm still connected to my previous networks in ASEAN as well as international community. And and, and I want to use that privilege and the platform, so let me know, if you, you know, if any of the listener want to, want me to, to do either topics or, you know, Chris, to reach, just research or investigate, you know, on other aspects that I have not done in my research in my 10 papers. So that's one, and give me a feedback about this podcast, as well as the other podcast. Second I haven't got I like myself to be vulnerable in this podcast, very open. Would you agree?

Brad 2:01:26

I would, and I appreciate that that that openness and vulnerability, I think it's a good it's a generous thing to do for the benefit of the audience who want to better understand you and your experiences.

Adelina Kamal 2:01:40

So I think that is necessary, yeah. And again, I'm trying not to be self absorbed, as well as as well as self glorifying myself, but I think openness is necessary in this situation, because everyone makes mistake. When it comes to Myanmar, I also made mistake, but it is important not to repeat mistake, right? When I was inside the system, perhaps I could do more, although that, you know, I was one of those who really push for things to change inside the system. And I would say, ah, something will have not been established, and regional disaster management mechanism would have not been operationalized. If you know I and some other people didn't really push hard for it. But I think openness is necessary, because sometimes you know you we tend to shower ourself with self glory. Is that the right word? But and tend to be self self absorbed, and think and think about ourself. I haven't talked about, you know what happened after the Rohingya classes? Yeah, aha. Center was tasked by the ASEAN leaders to do an unbelievably difficult assignment, and that was to conduct needs assessment to facilitate repatriation of the Rohingya back to Rakhine. That's impossible. And, and we were asked not to say the word Rohingya, and we couldn't really address, you know, the underlying cause and the the protection issue. And I tried, well, I couldn't say no. I couldn't say no, because it was tasked by the ASEAN leaders, as discussed in in the podcast. So I added what we were asked to do. Then after that, we made it clear that you know, if there is another needs assessment, we would not do it unless you know, we do it our own way, and we got saved by the covid. And I think other needs assessment in Rakhine has been done because if the objective is to return the Rohingya out of their will, then what's the purpose.

Brad 2:04:02

Bang on. Did you say you were not allowed to mention the Rohingya?

Adelina Kamal 2:04:06

Yes, that. And that was not the well, it was the the NLD, you know, yeah, yeah. It was not the Yeah. We were all well, we put also human rights. We also put human rights in the terms of reference. We wanted to involve not only AHA center, doing you know part of the assessment, but also other sectors in ASEAN, because we know, yeah, that it is political crisis, is genocide and all that. We wanted to put that in the terms of reference, but I was asked to take out that word human rights and protection, and also, not to mention the word Rohingya at all. Wow. It was so difficult and and I sent my team, I sent myself, you know, I went to Rakhine, state, beautiful. Um. I look at the shore, you know, I met some Rohingya in Sita, and my teams went to Bangladesh. We got cornered by the Rohingya in Bangladesh. When our assessment report came out, we got hammered by the international community and human rights activists, some of them, you know, later on, told me that, yeah, I was one of those who hammered you. Ibu adoina. And then when our report came out, we were criticized by the human rights activists because we, we told the government of Myanmar at the time right about we focus more on the operational and technical issues. Of course, we could only do that right because we could, we follow only what the ASEAN leaders wanted us to do. And I still remember the assignment word by word, for AHA center to conduct its assessment, to facilitate a repatriation, to facilitate a system in terms of repatriation, meaning that right, that the end goal will be perpetration, and how we basically work together to support that. So it's very restricted. And it was, it was actually the first dilemma when I went to Rakhine. On my way to Rakhine, I asked my team to read the report by Maru Suu Kyi darusman, you know, the one who led the investigation, yeah, and we, we cried in the plane. I couldn't, I couldn't hook myself. You know, reading all the torture, the the rape on the Rohingya women and all that, you know this fact finding mission, and for us to be able to, you know, to go into that situation. So although we are a disaster management agency, aha center, we we're not independent. We are part of organization that is under a political direction and leadership. But it doesn't stop you being a humanitarian inside the system. It's much more difficult to be able to think independently and to switch on your heart, you know, to tune into your heart, and there's already. There's always a start. For me, it was one of the start. I know that it was, you know, ASEAN didn't have a choice. But to task AHA center, because they were ASEAN leaders, tried to basically tell the Myanmar government at that time what you know, how to deal with this Rohingya crisis, and the only acceptable tool is human assistant. But that is because Myanmar government, back then knew that when they passed AHA center, that they will follow the disaster management agreement that we would have to work with the DGM, the disaster department, and so so forth. So we all made a mistake. I I made that mistake, not intentionally, no, but through, through the process. I saw through the process. I talked to people through the process. I question the system through the process, I got lectured by the humanitarian team, the international team, who thought that, aha, center, couldn't do the job. I told them, it's not an issue of capability or an ability to perform the tax. We could do it. We have responded to catastrophic disasters, and we are at the front, and you guys at the back supporting us. It's not a matter of being an it's not about the IS. The question is not about capability. And during Cyclone Nargis, right, we were at the front, leading the ASEAN led coordinating mechanism. The issue is about the absence of a guidance from the top, from the ASEAN leaders, what to do. Unfortunately, the Rohingya crisis and then the 2021 coup haven't really transformed ASEAN, after so many killed 1000s, you know, but at least they are, I know there are people, you know, anyway, so, so when the report came up, I was so frustrated, because that was really hard. Because. As the report got busted by, you know, got hammered by the human rights activist saying that, ah, Santa, you only focus on the technicality you you focus on how you manage the, you know, the camp and and, and how to basically, you know, but these are based on the disaster management tools. And of course, we are because we were working under the restriction that were given right. And then we got hammered. And then some of those activists got me, and then I told them, You know that, you know, you should not blame it on the center, we are just being the victim of of our own success. We didn't want this assignment. We had we have enough things on our plate. I mean, if we have catastrophic disasters, one after another, and our mothers, grandmothers and grandfathers want us to do another thing without even giving us guidance on how to do it, without even protecting us and giving us enough resources. So don't blame it on us. And then, okay, I was so angry with everyone, basically, and I'm really being honest with you right now. But then I realized that well, and I feel like I I become the victim, right of our system. But then I remember about the women, the women that got the men and the women that got killed and raped after, you know, after the genocide. Who am I? You know, crying because we get victimized because of our own success. Who Am I? So, yeah, so when, when I, when I become, became more convinced that the way to go is to be on the side of the people like what I'm doing right now. One of you know those who have been supporting the pro democracy woman said that Adelina, everyone of us has made a mistake. I mean, we're talking about the external eh, has made a mistake about Myanmar, either from our own analysis that we think the revolutionary forces will not win, either from our way of doing things that we really insist on staying engaged, whatever it is. But I think if we separate that right.

And I'm blessed that I have the privilege now of doing that outside the system, and I think again, that I think, what is God showing me, because I pray to God, right? God in Islam, when we pray, we don't ask for something specific. We ask God, please give the best for me. Who you what you think is the best for me, please. Because what I think is the best for me may not be actually the best for me, right? So I have to entrust it to God, so could be the best for me. I'm not trying to, you know, to sound like a SAN here, right? But that exactly what happened after the Rohingya. Now I can say, well, last year I did a research examining the leaders statement and the foreign minister statement with regard to Rakhine, the word Rohingya has never, ever been mentioned in our official document. As of last year, when I did that research, I have to update that metrics. It's already over 30 pages. So if, as I said last week during the Rohingya webinar. The webinar Rohingya, the webinar on Rohingya. How can even ASEAN deal with the Rohingya crisis if we are not able to say it, say the word Rohingya, acknowledge that Rohingya exists and genocide happen. I know it's difficult, but anyway, and it's not only ASEAN, yeah, who was asked to basically not say the word, they just don't want to admit that.

Brad 2:14:32

I mean, at least the at least the United States, declared that it was a genocide. Eventually, eventually, us too.

Adelina Kamal 2:14:40

US government too, yeah, through the Burma act anyway. That is not a closing statement, but basically, yeah, that's the second message. No, just be open about it, because we make mistake this time. We make a mistake in the past when it comes to Myanmar crisis at the of the day, I think it's, it's again, switch on your heart. No, I have been teaching about this heart intelligence, which should be the case right then, the head intelligence, the brain intelligence, sorry, and the hand intelligence. And for us to apply this context to intelligence, and we cannot apply the same crisis over one another, because it always changes, and we have to, like, always allow ourselves to be confused, sometimes to be in a state of a politic contemplation. There is such a word, you know, the framework, called covid framework, a politic contemplation. This is where you basically figure out where you are, where you tune into your heart and you ask yourself, you activate, you know, your the humanity in you, and how can you claim to be humanitarian if you cannot switch on the heart, because it should be the heart first, and that should be the moral guidance. You know the moral guidance. Are we doing it for the affected population, or for the money, to get more money, or to be able to plan the flag right and to show our relevance,

Host 2:16:33

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