Transcript: Episode #142: You Down with NUG?
Following is the full transcript for the interview with Philipp Annawitt. This transcript was made possible by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and has not been checked by any human reader. Because of this, many of the words may not be accurate in this text. This is particularly true of speakers who have a stronger accent, as AI will make more mistakes interpreting and transcribing their words. For that reason, this transcript should not be cited in any article or document without checking the timestamp to confirm the exact words that the guest has really said.
Host 00:08
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00:40
a lack of conscience is all it takes to diagnose yourself with ignorance. The
Host 01:27
way that
Brad 01:29
our way is good day. Welcome back, my guest tonight is someone who has done quite a bit of research on the new gene has recently had an article published, posing and answering the question is the N ug ready to govern? So, I'd like to thank you very much for coming to speak to us about this topic. I know it's going to be a little bit controversial, but I think it's a very important topic to discuss it, I'm very pleased that you're here to discuss it with us, I'd like to give you an opportunity to to explain to the audience who you are and what it is that you do.
Philip Annawitt 02:31
Happy to be here. Thank you for the invitation. My name is Philip Armitage, and as you said, I've published his article in the diplomat I have been working on Myanmar in Myanmar for for a number of years for the UN first. Now I work independently since the coup in 2021. That's been an advisor to a number of development partners on their programming, and have been in touch with many stakeholder insights, the new G, also the CRP, H. And that was that experience was the basis of the article that you've you've read and on the basis of which you've invited me to be with you today.
Brad 03:22
Okay, so let's let's just jump straight into this. So the article itself, and I've got the article in front of me, and it is, it's not particularly long, we will link it below this episode so that people can read through it. But the ultimate conclusion that you come to, is that the national unity government fundamentally is in a position to be ready to govern, and that the national unity government has met most or all of the requirements that under conventional circumstances would be applied to an organization claiming to be a legitimate government and claiming to be a functional government. So can you just take us through the basic arguments that you're making for why you think the UG meets the criteria for validity, why it meets the criteria for functionality, and why on the whole, you think you can confidently state that the national unity government is ready to govern?
Philip Annawitt 04:24
Right. So when we when we think about governments, from from a functional perspective, not not from a legal perspective now, there's certain expectations that we and also the international community has had of governments of what they need to do. And many of these functions is I would argue, are being performed by the energy as we speak. So the energy has certain capacities to act. There is what we call Our center of government meaning the energy has an established center that coordinates its activities across its different portfolios, be it health, be it, education support. And that center exercises a modicum of control. It has a decision making mechanism, it has a cabinet that functions and there's reporting on activities by the individual ministry is going on. So all this is in place, there's a financial control framework that's in place, while rudimentary all of that is in place. And then, of course, there's the there's the big question of control of presence on the ground of loyalty on the ground. And I don't think we have to discuss the political loyalties, the support that the energy as an institution, and as a member of a much broader Democratic coalition in Myanmar enjoys from the people. That's not something we have to discuss in much detail, I assume, because it's plenty documented. And then you want it to come in.
Brad 06:13
So you note that there is a distinction to be made between the national unity government as the cabinet entity, which is a comparatively small body, I think it has some 22 cabinet members, something along those lines, versus the much broader sort of trappings of state. So we have this organization, the CRP h, we have this organization, the N UCC, there is a much larger political entity at play, which is larger than the the cabinet itself. And then of course, we you know, we have a much broader pro democracy, let's say, context, the pro democracy movement, pro democracy forces in general across the country. So the, for the benefit of specificity, what exactly is it that you're talking about when you're talking about the services that the new GE, provide the control that it has, and so on?
Philip Annawitt 07:13
Right, so we're talking really about the functions of an executive government. And those are, if we want, if we should list them, maybe in the beginning, you have the central coordination that we've already discussed. The idea that there is control of resources, public financial management, money going in public money going in public money being spent is controlled, and coordinated to degree, public administration, meaning that there is a certain control of a planning of service that services that are delivered and be How is the state administered, in the case of Myanmar, in very important local administration and service delivery and local administration, of course, is the most dynamic. And I think we'll talk about it later. But it's the most demand dynamic field of of invention. In Myanmar, where there's there's strong contestation between the energy and its allies, supported structures, visa vie, the atrophying, I would say, local administration of the State Administrative Council, the junta government, then there is international relations, and also how aid is being managed, usually is a criteria, right, so that you have a coordination as a government, on how the international community acts with you, and how aid is being used. And then there is the, of course, the security sector, especially the civilian security sector, the question of providing security on the ground police forces and the provision of justice. And you know, across these functions, of course, the performance of the energy varies, but the energy is active across all these functions and the X its activities are expanding visa vie, the FCC, whereas the FCC is activities are actually receding across these functions. And so you have a government that is an executive government, and that is capable of acting as an executive government.
Brad 09:37
And so, an important sort of result of this. And I know that this may be a little bit outside of your wheelhouse, you know, I respect it if it's not something that you can really comment on. But I'd be curious to hear your insights. Normally, when we have a government that meets these pragmatic standards, of legitimacy and of efficacy, we would begin to see II international recognition and acceptance and to date, the N ug has received very limited recognition and acceptance. Can you think of, of any reasons with regard to the nujs actual functions, the enemy's actual performance to date, that foreign countries would be hesitant to recognize them as a legitimate government?
Philip Annawitt 10:25
I think, well, there's there's a number of reasons that you can think about. I would suggest, of course, there are some related to the functions and the degree of control of the energy, which is very fluid in terms of how much territory is controlled to which degree territories controlled. The matter of the fact is, if you look at the administration of the of the energy that is, and I think that's the only example that I can think of, at least then, in what history I know, of a Volunteer Administration. So the energy is powered by the CDM. So the civil disobedience movement, which are striking civil servants that are aligned with it, where the energy provides support to them. But these are not across the country, people who are officially providing their services and in many areas, security still contested, so it's missing, right? There's competing claims on on who controls which territory? So that's one reason, right? The second reason, I would think is, and that's my very private view, is geopolitics. The fact that Nehemiah is on the frontlines of a geopolitical conflict. That is that is building up. And we have in China, somebody who has to disappoint, being a bit invested or being invested with the junta makes it more difficult to take sides openly for for any foreign powers, I think. And then there's also I think, the history of pre mature recognitions that we've had. Yeah.
Brad 12:35
And I absolutely agree, I think this is something that seems to come in very often. And it's something that is just a thorn in the side of progress. And I know this is a little bit off topic. But when we look at things like the PDF, when we look at the n ug when we look at the movement in your mind, general, it's it's very difficult to it feels like cognitive dissonance almost on the sight of major powers when they say we want progress. And we want to support progressive movements and organizations and governments. While simultaneously. Politicians are aware of the fact that 10 years down the line 20 years down the line, if they were associated with the support for XYZ organization, and it later came to light that that organization was embezzling or was connected to unsavory organizations or was connected to crimes, then they will lose political capital in their home countries. And that that seems to be hamstringing, from my perspective, anyway, hamstringing the will, among parliamentarians and among political movers and shakers in many Western countries who don't want to be caught supporting someone when that may turn. Very so I'm in the United States, selling weapons to Iran, in order to raise capital to fund the Contras in Nicaragua is a very good example of just how much things can blow up in your face. So what, what, if anything, can the NUJ be doing to overcome these things? I think we could say that these are not necessarily the national unity government's fault. But is there anything that they should be doing or could be doing to overcome these barriers?
Philip Annawitt 14:31
Well, two things I guess, I guess to say here, one is that while recognition needs to be, of course, an is a major objective by the energy non recognition on the part of potential sympathetic countries, Western countries, democracies in Asia, and so on. isn't really an excuse anymore for lack of support. So I think we have to we can talk about both things. What the energy can do to get closer to the eventual goal of recognition would be to maybe use a bit better with limited resources. They have resources are limited. Of course, there's there's the diaspora that that that is very much linked into what the energy does in many countries. And mobilizing the diaspora has been has been a success story for the energy, both in terms of fundraising and also in terms of, of advocacy, and, and relations with the media in in different countries abroad. And so the energy has these representative offices. And these representative offices, I know that from from the ones that are that are relevant to whether they are active in my home region. And these are very, very active, right, there's a lot of communication going out of these offices, they're usually forwarding messaging that comes from the center. But I believe that investment in the capacity of these offices to do more, and to be more strategic in communication, to observe maybe better, what would would consider diplomatic protocol would go a long way. So that's, that's an area where investment could help, I think, because, you know, all these meetings, they're very good and sustained engagement is good, and especially the, in the US with the ambassador to the UN. There's a very strong representation in that, that I think is showing success. But apart from that these one off meetings by ministers, beat the foreign minister beat the Minister of human rights or other ministers. They're good in creating goodwill, but in terms of, you know, seeing progress and sustained engage, and seeing progress and support and incorporation, you need more sustained engagement. And that is usually done by somebody who's on the ground in the country, and can really, you know, try and reach out to the government institutions of the partner country on an in a sustained manner, and can also try to try to influence influence how media report on the issue, because let's face it, Myanmar is not on the radar of many countries that are potentially sympathetic, and even where it's on the radar. It's not a top priority, outside maybe of Southeast Asia.
Brad 17:41
Yeah, absolutely. And definitely, you know, the war in Ukraine has drawn a lot of attention and goodwill. Iran now is on the rise, although, as as a counterpoint to that, I think, the outpouring of aid, and so on in how should I put this, just unilateral decisions to send aid and support by individual countries, to Ukraine, as it defends itself against Russian aggression, shows that it is very much within the remit of Western powers to say we will unilaterally recognize this government, and we will assist this government in establishing order and democracy and peace. The money is clearly there, the political will to do these things is clearly there, they don't need the approval of their fellow states. And yet, when the context is Myanmar, they don't seem to be particularly willing to act. There isn't as much eagerness. Even though with with the outpouring that happened for the Ukrainian cause, I think with with a 10th of that huge strides could have been made in your mother, the war might already have been brought to an end. But yes, that is international politics. Unfortunately, that's just what we have to deal with.
Philip Annawitt 19:04
It is just just the one thing that actually brings us maybe back to what I said before, which is so if you leave aside the question of recognition, the limited support that the energy has been has been getting from international partners is really to me, you know, not not defensible. So there is you're right there is outpouring of support and you see it in official statements from everybody who's basically been involved in the west the EU is very strong with their statements. They've been parliamentary resolutions in a number of Parliament's some Asian democracies are very strong. In Southeast Asia Malaysia has been has been very supportive. And yet, actual support has been very, very limited. And you don't need recognition to support. Yeah, there are other ways of doing it that are below the threshold of recognition. And that is something or the lack of that is something that is actually, I find more in my, in my personal view more infuriating than the lack of progress on recognition, per se.
Brad 20:26
Absolutely, and at the end of the day, any opportunity that we are not taking to to help the victims of war crimes is reprehensible. Right, when we have the chance to help we should be now I want to take it back a little bit. Because you you made comments when we were talking about the foreign policy and the messaging, you made comment that the resources of the national unity government are very limited. And that I think is an objective truth. But people I think don't really understand so much how the finances work here, you also alluded to the fact that this is a a volunteer force of volunteer government and by government in this case, I mean, not only cabinet, but also effectively a volunteer civil service, which in any administration is, is going to be large, and we are talking about a country of of some 54 million people, you know, larger than than any European country except Russia, obviously. And the administration required to run something of that scale, particularly in a time of conflict is is enormous. So can you shed a little bit more light on what the finances are? Like when you say volunteer force? Exactly what, what does that mean? How much is volunteer? How much is compensated? What what's sort of going on there?
Philip Annawitt 21:55
So the way it currently works is that whatever resources that are mobilized by the energy go either into the support of the CDM, meaning of those striking civil servants, whether they're actually used for active service delivery, or not, you know, somewhere not not everybody's being used. It's a question of voluntary, right. So people are comfortable, because you know, a CDM CDM staff that performs services in areas that aren't under full control, they do that at significant personal risk and risk to their families. So a lot of resources that that are incoming, are spent on supporting the physical needs and livelihoods of these people. And it's by no means is that adequate, what's incoming is not adequate. It's for it's currently the prerogative of each ministry or the to the switch ministry to care about their CDM staff. Right. So it's their role to do that. In terms of what that is, that is the administration, that's, if you will, that's the public administration, that is the civil service of the of the energy, there is not yet a regulatory framework around that civil service. And it may be too early to do that, but in the future, as they progress, that is probably also a priority that needs to be tackled. But beyond or above that civil service, there is of course, the cabinet and then there's people that work with and around the ministers there's if you if you want the head office of the ministries and these vary in size can be a few people can be can be larger can be dozens of people, and also these people are all volunteers. There are no salaries, there are no living allowances, because what money comes in, in really, I have to say a a spirit of self sacrifice is used to support CDMS. And to a certain degree, of course, what resources come in are being used to support the military and defense effort against the Myanmar military. And that is currently the situation and apart from that, whatever resources are available are used for for service delivery. And that means running schools providing health services, sometimes mobile health services, sometimes these these famous Bush clinics and to support the livelihood of the large numbers of internally displaced people
Brad 25:01
So a lot of calls on the on the purse strings of the national unity government. Certainly, and I mean, the fact that this is coming from the people themselves from the communities themselves is, I mean, it's very difficult to imagine people who are already facing such hardship, being able to make those types of contributions and regularly making those those types of contributions. But one then would have to surmise that the amount of money that the Myanmar people themselves can raise for the support of the National Unity government would be very limited. Indeed, it does not
Philip Annawitt 25:41
a lot of which comes also from the diaspora. So you can't underestimate the the impact that funding from the diaspora MP as per the Myanmar the Aspera, is in many countries around the world, as you know, has, but also, you know, diaspora, many, many of these people are also people that live on modest incomes. So let's not forget that. So whatever it is, everybody sacrifices.
Brad 26:07
And so, like with regards to money, that there's one thing that that does stand out to me, and I don't know whether you'd be able to shed light on what's going on there. But the Ministry of Planning and finance and investment has run a series of these. I don't know how to describe them, they their investments into the future. So they will take land or they will take property, we saw the end of dictatorship initiative. So they would take you know, timings mentioned, which he acquired quite, you know, questionably anyway, on ER Lake, and they split that into into a series of shares, and they were selling shares in the mansion. And now they've announced investment projects, and they're selling of shares and investment opportunities in Mandalay? Who is it? Who's actually buying that? Like? Are they are they a Western sort of investment companies? who are who are leaping at these opportunities? Or is that also Myanmar people and Myanmar, the Aspera?
Philip Annawitt 27:14
I don't have that information, IP. I honestly would be surprised if it wasn't the same, the same sort of people buying that the diaspora and Myanmar people. I think it's a very smart strategy. The legal claims, of course, will be I mean, it'd be very risky for any Western company to buy that. In terms of investment strategy, that's probably that's probably not what Western companies would do. But what we, we have to say is that the Ministry of Planning, finance, investment has been very generous in, in identifying opportunities and modalities for raising investment. And it's not only then right, so there is a number of people around that are not part of the energy, but advising that around the energy that develop other forms. For instance, they raise money through apps, right? Anything from programming of computer games, through other apps, through where advertisement can then be sold. So all of that is going on, and that's that's a great, that's a great way to raise money. And for the for the ministry itself. You're aware, of course of the revolution bonds, which are bonds that have just don't don't have any coupon. But it's just a promise of repayment without without interest. And these have been largely successful. But there is, of course, limits in in how much you can raise through these means. And these limits may be enough to sustain the revolution as it is, but is not enough to put the administration on a sustainable footing in terms of being able to make sure that you know, people who currently volunteer, in whichever form for the for the energy, also at the center of government will be able to continue doing that. And that's a problem in the medium term. And it's also a problem for a movement and the government that is currently still expanding what they do and expanding their services at some point that needs to be addressed. And there is we're actually partners that would be interested in the six Seeing could come in.
Brad 30:04
Okay, so when you say partners, what are we talking? Are we talking about foreign governments? Are we talking about NGOs? Are we talking about private companies,
Philip Annawitt 30:14
all of them, all of your classical neoclassical development partners. So for instance, if you, if you're a development partner, and you fund humanitarian effort in the country, or a lot of development partners have now gone back to, you know, the one thing to do if you if you're in a difficult situation, you just start funding NGOs, and CBOs. With and the question is, what what is the absorption capacity there, and to which degree does that make sense? It's a different conversation, I don't want to, I don't want to go into that in much detail. But what you could do is, for instance, if you fund some of the service delivery, that is being done by the energy, there are ways of setting up your funding in such a way that you ensure also that you're funding the the structures that deliver the services. So and that's usually done in a development context. Now, if you have a development project, you fund the delivery of a service, and that includes certain costs that are associated with it. And the cost for the energy of of, of delivering would be anything from central coordination to the actual delivery of the services on the ground. So that to my knowledge is not happening. And, and that's a problem. So you can always approach the energy and you can say, you know, what, my have we can we can give you an advisor to help you draft this, this, this this piece of policy. And that's happening, and that's fine. But ultimately, that's not enough. Ultimately, if you are interested in supporting service delivery in certain areas of the country. And you're interested in the success of the democratic movement in the country. And you're interested in the building of government structures? Yeah, because let's face it, if you don't build the government structures of the energy, the other structures of the regime, the current regime are atrophying so good luck there. You should do this, and you can do this. And it's not impossible to do it even in a in a conventional development logic.
Brad 32:49
Interesting, and so this is just a new sort of area. For me, I'm not familiar with how any of this would work like is there a way for the new G to start sort of marketing itself to to development partners actively?
Philip Annawitt 33:07
There could be there could be you there are in the world of development, there are certain there are certain ways of you know, let's put it this way. development partners in in in the last decades have realized that it's not always easy to fund or product or even productive to fund just what is the the previously recognized structure or the previously effective structure in these in these situations of fragility, there have been instruments that have been used by by development partners to to fund a plan for transformation. And post conflict compacts these kinds of things, where funding of non recognized entities against certain a certain framework or a certain commitments for delivery would be possible. So, for instance, if you if you said as a niugini, you would produce an aid policy for the for the N ug, and you would lay out a framework where you would say, you know, we are committed to meet certain certain benchmarks and these could be negotiated with with interested partners. For instance, we would commit to reform of the security sector, post conflict, or we would commit to certain targets in terms of human rights, independence of justice sector institutions when they were built, and you would agree on on a roadmap and a framework, then this could be an effective tool maybe to attract more research So it can be encouraged. But I see the really right now I see the major responsibility on development partners to do better. Because, you know, we're not talking about huge amounts to start with snot about, I don't know, the EU re investing all that direct budget support for the education sector, that hundreds of millions that have been spent there in the energy schools, run schools, that that's not what we're talking about. We're talking about pilot things where, where you can explore with lower amount, how joint service delivery could happen. And you can do that in a project framework. And it's simple, just just start.
Brad 35:54
And so this, again, we're going into like sort of strange territory. I know, the topic is the nujs capacity. But I think this is a very fascinating direction to look at when these money is given when development partners come in. And the value that they add is, I mean, it's significant, right? If you if you suddenly have access to money, if you have access to resources, if you have access to expertise, and the ability to do things. That is huge. And I think, and I hope you would agree, Myanmar, will need not conditional will need some sort of external assistance, post conflict. Because we've seen large scale devastation and destruction of agricultural land, we've seen the destruction of food stores, food shortage is not going to go away. It's going to take a while to refill the petrol pumps, petrol wells, for example, like the the shortages of resources currently existing in that state, are not going to disappear from one day to the next. The question that I want to pose though, is what is the risk associated with this because there are certain actors within certain even state actors within international development, who have been noted for leading smaller poorer countries into effectively debt traps and an endless cycle of of repayments and and using aid as just a way to funnel money back to their own people and their own companies. Is this something that Myanmar might be subject to and does the NUJ have the wherewithal to to navigate that?
Philip Annawitt 37:35
I don't know that that will be will be a concern at this point in time. I don't think you will have large investments in infrastructure that are then not being done by multilateral development banks, but by large national banks, as has been the case in some countries that have found themselves recently being have their their infrastructure expropriated. I don't think that's that's a, that's a big issue. It's more it's more about how to mobilize interest and how to mobilize the support. And less about, I think, any any sort of debt trap, because I mean, the needs, as you say, are just staggering. You have students in BMR. Right now they're losing years worth of education, this is going to have an impact on the productivity in the future. That may be enormous. Yeah. So as you say, there will be need for long term support and long term. As you see rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, but even beyond that the investment in in education, investment in health, you know, the progress that has been made in nutrition in the country, surely, is is also receding or is also being lost now. So right now, it's just about mobilizing the support that you can get. And I think that should be the priority of or is the priority of the NUJ I don't think I have to tell them what their priority is. But that is the priority. I wouldn't worry too much about these phenomenon to be to be quite frank.
Brad 39:21
Okay, well, that's comforting at least. So I want to sort of look at the flip side of the coin. And going into this interview, I said that it might be somewhat controversial. You've made a very strong case for the legitimacy of the national unity government and the efficacy of the national unity government. But I want to talk about the limitations on the national unity government and and the flaws associated with it. Certainly the national unity government has not been immune from criticism domestically. And the criticism from from Pro military factions is it should not be surprising to us. It should also not be be of any interest to us. But criticism from pro democracy groups and pro democracy, individuals is something to note. And my initial question is just, you know, I want to compare the national unity government to similar cases to similar examples around the world. And, and I know that we've, we've discussed this previously. And I still have not been able to find an example of any, any government that has formed under similar circumstances. And I just want to ask you again, Have you have you been able to think of any government in history in any country that has formed under these circumstances?
Philip Annawitt 40:44
No, I haven't, we've had this conversation. Nobody can. And it's quite remarkable what is being done in the circumstances. Also the the idea of a? Well, you have the CDM, which used to be 400,000, strong, nobody knows exactly what the numbers are now. The N ug, presumably knows they have a registry. And, but So, of those 100 1000s, at least in 1000s, are mobilized to you have a volunteer bureaucracy of 10s of 1000s of people, where does that exist? Or has that existed in history. So that's, that's, that's clear, when we talk about the limitations that you mentioned, or the criticism of the energy, I think, you have to divide between the criticisms that criticize the efficacy of the energy in getting to consensus and delivering. And then there's the other criticism of the NUJ maybe overstepping their boundaries, and encroaching on other actors in the coalition. And so both of those criticisms are actually the same, more different sides of the same coin, and they're somewhat somewhat in conflict or contradicting each other, because to be more effective, the energy has to go ahead and do things and deliver services. And they are, especially when it comes to local government, of course, in some cases, in some areas of the country, when you do that, and when you start delivering and you start establishing local structures, you may not know all the actors on the ground that are sympathetic to the general democratic movement. And we all know how broad the democratic movement is, that is also its strength. May not be happy with that. So you know, it's a bit of a situation of damned if you do and damned if you don't, but we need to remember that the energy is a national unity government. And that is the situation that any national unity government finds itself in. And some of the criticisms, I find a bit too harsh, because some of the criticism is actually not about the capacity of the energy to do things. But it goes more to the fact that consensus is not easily to be had. And when we talk about finding consensus, on say, proposed policy, then there are other actors involved. And there's certainly the parliament involved the CRP H, on the interim, federal union parliament, if you want to call it that. And there's also the National Unity consultative Council involved. And there have been really strong efforts on all sides, we have to say, to make this coordination work, when it comes on, say, developing a common approach to what education should look like, delivered in delivered by different systems, right delivered by the ethnic revolutionary organization systems delivered in in schools that are that are run by the Ministry of Education, and so on and so forth. So, this coordination is very, very difficult. And it's, it will be extremely difficult in a national unity government in peacetime. This is very fluid, it's a conflict, situation pressure on all sides. Not everybody has been friends before they have found themselves to be allies. So I think it is to be expected. And I think one of the key priorities in the future for the energy also as an executive government, but also the democratic movement more widely to be successful is to work on it. simplifying this conversation, work on developing structures that allow decision making while still being inclusive, allow some sort of delegation, right? If you have a committee, have rules for the committee, have rules for membership on the committee established secure reporting lines, have a procedural framework on how things is done. I think the energy internally is further in terms of developing that procedural framework. In the end UCC I have my doubts. But that is what's needed.
Brad 45:42
Okay, so you've just touched on a lot of different things that, and I'm very glad that you have, but let's let's sort of take them sort of one step at a time. Because there, there are problems in the national unity government, I don't think anybody is seriously suggesting there aren't. But there's always a very big difference between problems of individual members versus problems of the actual structure of an organization versus problems of the infrastructure available to the organization. These are all very different types of issues. So let's first examine like, what what is even at play here. So we, the national unity government cabinet, is made up of, you know, a few dozen people. But you mentioned the, the CRP h, which is the the de facto parliament, so the legislature and also the UCC, how many people are we talking about here?
Philip Annawitt 46:38
In the seer, well, in the end, UCC is made up of organizations, right? So they're delegates of different organizations that take that participate in the meetings, but in the end, UCC will have well, you will always have well over 100 people in the CRP, ah, you have a bit over 20 people in any in any type of meeting, right? So if you want if you want to have a decision body, a decision making body that that needs to come to a decision with, I don't know, 120 150 people, and you don't have a procedural framework, you're in trouble.
Brad 47:19
Yeah. And so and this is another question. And with these meetings, and meetings are a hot button issue. We've seen memes being made on Burmese Facebook, seemingly pointing out and laughing at these these endless stream of meetings and these promotional videos and footage that members of various democratic government entities are releasing on their social media to say, well, look at all these meetings, we're attending, look at all the work that we're doing these meetings, when you say, CRP, ah, you've got about 20 people in a meeting, do those 20 people have the authority within the system to actually come to a conclusion at the end of their meeting, decide on a course of action, and have that implemented or is that meeting supposed to come to a resolution which is then presented to yet another meeting, to be reevaluated by a different group of people.
Philip Annawitt 48:17
We talk specifically about the CRP H, then you can think of the CRP H is being and this is a this is an arrangement that is that is only in place that interim, you have that in other Parliament's as well around the world, you have the CDPH being and a manifestation of the wider parliament. So what happens is if the bill say is coordinated between the energy and the end UCC then comes to the legislature CDPH will see your pages committees, their committees in place, parliamentary committees will meet and review the bill and then it goes to CRP h and then it is approved until an interim it's then approved. And then there is the whole P down sumoto Like all the MPs that have been elected they come together once every quarter two, sometimes once every half year, and they go through these these decisions and validate them. That's how it currently works. As said, that's not how our Parliament would would always work in peacetime but it is the closest you can that you can get at the in the current situation to a parliamentary process. They also by the way, um received the reports from the N ug and look at those reports. So the energy you actually report on their performance to this year Ph. So there is this basic legitimacy that is there from the 2020 election, right. So we sometimes forget in all this debate that we actually have an elected parliament in Myanmar. And interestingly, I also think development partners have a bit moved on from that conversation, if you think if you look at what what some of some of the resolutions that have come out recently, everybody's talking about, you know, the Democratic organizations that are their support to, to civil society, and so on. But as a matter of fact, we still have a clear, legitimate basis for CRP H as a as a parliament, and the N ug is a responsible government, and then the N UCC as sort of a, a society wide Council, you could even think of it as the nucleus of a Constituent Assembly for, you know, for the future for designing the state of the future. And that's a way if you read the federal democracy Charter, the, the UCC is supposed to, to give guidance on the broad outlines of where the democratic movement and the Democratic camp wants to go what the future or the interim as they, as they say, Now, the interim, or the transitional interim is now transitional, as the future, the transitional state of Myanmar, the federal state of Myanmar will look like, whereas policy and bills will come from the energy and the review and approval would be by the CEO page, and then the federal union parliament, meaning the bigger body of all the elected MPs. So that's what it should be. In fact, the coordination between all these actors is is is challenging it, as you've said, or as we've discussed before, and the lack of sometimes lack of procedures that is in place, makes it harder to come to consensus between, say, cabinet, and sometimes the UCC, or makes it take longer to process policy and process bills.
Brad 52:27
So I mean, this is a this is a substantial framework. I mean, yes, obviously, governance is a very complicated, complicated thing. But there are a lot of people involved. And you're saying to me that legislation, that legislature itself will only meet and validate decisions quarterly, at best, that that seems to be a reasonably slow pace of legislation, is legislation actually important under the current situation? Like, is that really as relevant as it would be in a peacetime administration? Or is it something that we can afford to delay for three months or six months?
Philip Annawitt 53:07
Well, it's the way it's being it's being now is that it comes into the legislation is considered to be in effect, as soon as it's approved by CRP, h, which is the core group that meets more regularly. Right. And then the validation comes later. But it's a good point, to ask whether legislation has the same effect as it has in peacetime I would suggest policies is indeed at this point, more important than then legislation, which is an implementing tool for policy. The question right now is to get the overall policy right, for the current interim framework. Sometimes, you know, the aim of that policy is also to look forward to the transitional period. But by no means should there be an understanding that whatever transitional or interim, for instance, education policy should be the final solution for the future of Myanmar, because it's not it's not the current period will come to an end. And if the revolution is successful, then a whole new situation will open up a new actors will be in the next iteration of the energy because presumably, other other entities in the country, other arrows, other political entities, maybe in the future, other political parties will then have want to have a say. So what is now is a bit short term, and it needs to serve the interests of now.
Brad 54:53
Yeah. And moving for I definitely do want to move on at some point to asking about the future and the transition from the current state of affairs into a more stable state of affairs, but in the interest of genuinely sort of understanding what is going on right now, and what the limitations are of the current system, I want to take it back to to the comment you just made saying that policies is more important than legislation in the current context. So, policy comes from the national unity government, the cabinet of the national unity government is is reasonably small. In terms of actual number of ministries, I think there are probably only about a dozen or so, maybe a little bit more than that, in terms of the actual number of ministries and cabinet meets as per usual and then the ministers and deputy ministers go back to their ministries and they will have many meetings with their their staff to implement that policy, I mean, that is the mechanism within the national unity government, it is the mechanism that we see in most countries, this is not an unusual system is the national unity government effective in this workflow, however
Philip Annawitt 56:10
internally reasonably, I would say there is So, what you have normally in a in a government in a central coordination framework, there is as you say, there is cabinet what is what is missing is a very well developed cabinet office that is not not currently in place, and that's just for lack of resources and lack of staff. So, the preparation of cabinet decisions is not as elaborate as you would have it in a established government in peacetime, you know, the rules for how a policy should look like, when it comes to cabinet the rules for or for what is the state of preparation of a topic when it comes to cabinet because you know, in general cabinet is an ultimate decision making body cabinet is not a binding for discussing. So, in theory or in general in general practice of practice actually anything that is not ready for decision should not come to cabinet. So, in terms of how the preparation of matters that come before cabinet, the structures are not yet fully there in terms of the fact that a policy is developed by a ministry and then there are rules in place for how this is disgusting cabinet and then how this is on decided on by cabinet that is in place. So, the basic structures are there. Importantly also there are reporting frameworks in place meaning the center of government has the the ability to know what what is being implemented of that policy, right. So, the ministries have reporting frameworks in place that go down to township level write things are usually implemented on the ground township level, the information come back comes back up and is then sent to the central government and analyzed now, this is not perfect, but the basic process of a policymaking and then be the instruments for policy implementation and see the reporting on both the policy so the narrative side and also the financial side, all of that is in place.
Brad 58:51
Okay. So that sounds reasonably good. But, you So you mentioned in previously in this interview, that there is criticism regarding the new G's ability to to implement policy. So the way you explain it, I mean, it sounds very reasonable, you would say the workflow is basically generally correct. People are not acting as efficiently as they could be acting. But the basic principles there, there are layers of sort of verification and accountability built into the system to ensure that nobody goes sort of off the rails. And yet, even if, if that's the case, and even if we can look at the national unity government say, Well, okay, you're doing the best that you can under the circumstances that that you have to deal with. If there is criticism from within Myanmar, from within the pro democracy faction of the national unity government, whether real or perceived, lack of ability to deliver on promises being made lack of ability to to act quickly, and and certainly We've seen a lot of sort of chatter, it's become part of the the online culture in a sense, to sort of understand that bad things will happen. And the national unity government will not act on those things. Or if they act, it will be very, very delayed, or it will very muted. And basically the sense of well, yeah, asking the national unity government to fix these problems is sort of an inside joke. Is there a threat that they can start losing the support of, of the people if they don't make an effort to appear more effective and more decisive in the implementation of policy?
Philip Annawitt 1:00:43
I mean, that's right. It's always there. Right? You are, you're absolutely right, you're in a situation that's very difficult for all the actors involved, including the top political level, so the ministers of the of the energy, but also the volunteers, advisors, and everybody else working with them. I think that danger is absolutely there. One of the problems that I see is, is again, one of resources. So I think I mentioned before epic, this culture of sacrifice, the idea that whatever resources incoming is only invested into the things that I've mentioned CDM service delivery, mostly humanitarian assistance. And the the defense effort, which is understandable, but it goes to such a degree that whatever funds that are being centrally carry, created and used by, say, the Ministry of have collected and used by the Ministry of Planning, finance and investment that are then transferred to the individual ministries are also used exclusively for these purposes, there's no investment in building further and institutionalizing these coordination structures that we've just discussed. And the culture of sacrifice also prevents that I've had conversations with with people working inside the ministries, where I've asked them, Okay, so you're spending all your time with this, but what about your livelihood? And they will say, No, no, no, I don't want to discuss this. This is not this is not something we all need to make sacrifices. I said, but will you be able to sustain yourself? You know, I don't, I don't want to discuss this. So there is this culture of sacrifice, that may actually be inhibiting institutional progress because resources into the ability to administer and become more effective or not allocate. And that's where I see a big role also for development partners to come in with resources, and I mean, financial resources, but I also mean, technical assistance, to, you know, what makes this government run as a government. And that will help the effectiveness, it can solve the political issues. The political issues need to be solved by the by the actors on the ground. And if the political issues, as you've alluded to, are not solved by the actors on the ground. Yes, ultimately, any government will lose support. But at least on the institutional side, much can be improved with improved with a little bit of support.
Brad 1:03:43
And this is something that you just mentioned a couple of times that the sacrifice element, and I want to read, I mean, notionally back to you but for the benefit of the audience, I want to read from an article that you published that you also sent me, Myanmar NLD at 33, which we will also link below this podcast. And these these two paragraphs here that you've written, I think, really do help contextualize the NLD and Host, two decades in the underground because it was able to develop the structures of a mass political party. These included a strong central administration, topping a pyramid structure of party branches in states and regions, districts, townships, all the way down to ward and village tracts, Myanmar's lowest tier of public administration, and an unrivaled internal coherence based on a culture of sacrifice. Quote, we gathered some people who were really active and they decided through semi democratic voting, electing the people with the most prominent history of activism and the most sacrifices and quote loungey new NLD central executive committee member and now CLP ah, chair. Now, this is something that you've mentioned in this interview is something that you've written about before this this call Culture of, of sacrifice and it seems like this is something that is not just part of the political reality of Myanmar, but is part of every or many Myanmar people's view of the world and view of what they have to do in order to achieve progress in in order to liberate themselves from the military, they have to make sacrifices, they have to give whatever they can to support the PDF to support the, the CDM to support the Energy Support, whatever the case may be. And I know this is not a topic that you want to delve into too deeply. But I do want to just touch on it. Do you feel that the culture of sacrifice? Is a net beneficial? Or is the is the focus on sacrifice getting in the way a little bit of of planning more efficiently?
Philip Annawitt 1:05:54
Both? Okay. I, you know, without that culture of sacrifice, there wouldn't be a CDN. There wouldn't be and I'm not talking about you specifically quoted the article about the NLD. I think that applies to political culture in Myanmar in general, and, you know, the culture that underpins the democratic aspirations of the country, and that's lived experience, we don't have to go into the history of Myanmar, I mean, your listeners will know. So without that culture, I don't think any of this would have happened, I don't think the CDM would have been as strong, definitely the city and would not have endured, because look at what happens in other countries, when repression hits, you know, things just go away. And it's entirely normal to go away. And the fact that it's still there is a volunteer basis of the energy as an administrative apparatus, and as the government is still there is because of that culture. The fact that you know, seniority is very much valued, and the track record of suffering or the track record of sacrifice is then a political factor in determining career chances, and in determining a seniority and the rise to a position of power. And whether that gets in the way of, you know, getting the the people who will be most suited to the current situation or to the to the role in question. I'm sure that's a factor. I'm sure that's a factor across all the all the organizations in the country. But it's also quite normal. It's just an extreme way of selecting people for higher political offense that is very normal in all other countries in the world as well. I mean, people don't usually get to be the minister, because they're the best tutor, they get to be the minister, because they've invested a significant time in working inside their party. And yes, they may be smart, and yes, they may be suited. But that's how it works. And in in Myanmar's history of extreme politics, it is this culture of sacrifice, I think that that gives you the street cred to to rise up and gives you also the respect of the people.
Brad 1:08:33
Fair enough. And so, with that, let's move to another sort of topic that you touched upon, you said that the fundamental criticisms on the national unity government are divided into basically, the perceived failure to deliver on policy. And the perception of the the energy is overreach. Now, that largely from from my perception, I may be wrong, but that seems to largely occur within the debate around federalism and the role that a central Myanmar government will now and we'll post coup or post conflict play in the administration of non ethnic Burma regions and the expectations that a lot of these border regions have both currently and in the future of autonomy. Can you can you provide a little bit of context for what the conflict is not not conflict, but the the disagreements and the criticisms are with regard to this perceived overreach?
Philip Annawitt 1:09:45
I don't think we should overdramatize this on just to just as a qualifier. I think these are things that are these are concerns that are being raised on the ground. When when when speak into people that, that they feel that sometimes. For instance, especially, he came in when I, when I spoke to people who came from some of the these state interim consultative councils, right the the nucleus for the future state governments, some factions in that not all factions. That said, you know, we want to be federal in the future, but at the same time, the NL the energy just goes ahead and does things. But they shouldn't they should let us do it. And that may be a fair aspiration to have. But the counterparts that have noted this to me, were all at the same time saying, Yes, we're in the in the process of establishing our state government, but we can't agree among each other at this point. So we'll stay as a committee. And so and we also don't have staff to support the committee. So at one point, many people say, Look, they're going ahead. And they're not consulting us. And at the same time, the question is, if they don't go ahead, then will they be criticized for not being affected? And if they consulted that faction? Would it be the same outcome? My my vote, would it be as effective as it could be? So my point is, yes, there are these criticisms, and yes, some of them may be justified, very often, the energies in a situation where we're damned if you do damned if you don't, right. So if you consult everybody, you're not going to get things done. If you get things done, you will alienate some people. And I think in the in the short term, it's pretty clear anyway, where the energy local administration's are strongest, that's in the central countries, and then in the country, in the central part of the country. And then in the States, in further informal chaos state or in chaos state. And in Chin State, where the local structures are of odd, the the ethnic, and and ethnic political party and er row, lead political structures are not as consolidated and that there's a bit of overlap in terms of the administration. There it needs to be resolved. But I think these these issues are not so much in, in those areas where it's clear, who is in control infrastructure. So I don't think these issues are the same when we talked about the Qur'an, the ethnic Korean structures, right, versus the energy structures. So it's more a question of at the fringes in the longer run goal. And that's something that has to be resolved in a transition to question needs to be resolved of, you know, who's administration. And that should be resolved, based on what service is delivered by what level of government to the best way. And that is a debate that's not not been had at this point in time and needs to be had more so more and more debate about less debate about aspirations and more debate about getting things done would probably be useful. And then maybe the criticism would, would be more valid, in my view, and it's my very personal view.
Brad 1:14:02
And definitely, I don't want to sort of make it sound as though you're necessarily speaking for entire organizations. So I just want to clarify, with with these problems that arise the conflict that the NUJ is faced with, you know, implement a policy but then upset some people that whose toes you stood on, versus John, implement the policy, engage with these people, but then face the backlash for inaction
Philip Annawitt 1:14:32
to a certain degree. Those are those are normal issues, right. As you say, and as you alluded to in your question, but of course, in peacetime state, you have institutions and you have polities where things are already done in a certain way and sometimes, you know, in some of the more mature federal states that we all know the problem is actually reforming a system because it has been He has ossified and nobody can reform it anymore. can give you an example from my country, this is really weird that protection of youth is the mandate of nine states, and not a federal mandate in my country, that's been a huge issue. But you can't change it anymore. So in embarr, the coordination is always an issue. And fighting between the federal unit and the National unit, or and in the union is always an issue. And they're usually also constitutional courts or tribunals to resolve this. So that's normal, as you as you say, but it's of course, harder in the current situation, because A, the pressures they're constantly pressure for survival, security, pressure, and communication is really difficult. And the the, the demands, physically, health, psychologically, on all the actors are overwhelming. So I think these are just very, very difficult issues that can be easily resolved. Now, my if you ask what my opinion is, my opinion is, at this point in time, it's more important to do. But definitely in the in the medium run. These things need to be resolved. And it's not gonna, it's not gonna happen overnight. I also don't think we should expect that any transition, that results is going to happen and be done overnight. This will take time.
Brad 1:16:44
So that really sort of neatly segues into the sort of last lost focus that I wanted to have in this interview, which is looking to the future. And I know, inherently that this calls very heavily for speculation. And we cannot make any firm statement on what the future holds. I I don't know. Maybe you would agree, maybe you disagree. I don't think that many of the stakeholders involved in Myanmar right now have really started firmly considering what is going to happen post conflict, the focus really is just on getting to the end of the conflict and trying to defeat the military. But what what do you think, assuming victory comes? Unfortunately, that is increasingly looking more likely? What do you think is going to be the next step? Will the new G simply stand down and say, All right, now we are going to have a fresh wave of elections? Or will they implement their own transition period? What do you think would happen?
Philip Annawitt 1:17:51
Well, there is in the federal democracy charter, a roadmap towards transition. And the roadmap isn't very, in a sense, it is very detailed, because it has many steps. But it isn't very clear on, on what exactly will happen. But there is an understanding, I think, among all actors, that once this is one, there has to be a transition phase that has to accommodate more interest than are currently being accommodated inside that coalition. So the interim Unity Government will make way for a transitional unity government. And in my mind, that will actually be an expansion of the cabinet and maybe reshuffle members of the cabinet. But it won't probably change the structures that are being built now in the practices that are being built now. So even with a view to a transitional situation, it's important to strengthen the structures that are in place now for administration, you will not have the whole energy based on 10s of 1000s of cdmos being tossed aside and replaced with something entirely new that is just not practical, practical, and it's not not possible. So you have created you're creating institutions and these institutions will remain now, the way these institutions may be structured, or who controls politically which aspect and which mandate will be devolved to which policy or will be devolved to which level of administration that is up up for discussion, but these institutions are now the institutions and I think they will remain to a certain degree. You have of course, then the situation of the structures that are still in place, the part of the civil service that is still in place. I'm now controlled by the SEC. So, you will see a need to accommodate many of the civil servants, you will need to see a pragmatic approach to integration, right? The thing is, or the good thing is that, you know, the CDM, essentially still organized by the in the institutional boundaries that are there. So they haven't torn everything up and reorganize know, the networks that were there before inside the CDM. So, for instance, for the Ministry of Education, still the same networks. There's a new culture of working as a more democratic culture. But there is continuity. It's not out of out of thin air that this that his administration has failed, there is a certain continuity, that is a good thing. For the for the transition.
Brad 1:21:05
Absolutely. But it will, inevitably, it is going to be a difficult transition like the amalgamation as you alluded to of, of the government departments that are under the control of the SAIC, and the government departments that are being run by the National Unity government. Sorted like there appears to be. And this is an issue that has been sort of flagged multiple times, by by certain ministries, like the Ministry of Home Affairs and anti immigration, that they will be penalties for civil servants who refused to join the civil disobedience movement. Now, do you feel that that is going to to happen? Do you feel that those people are going to be completely disenfranchised as the threats have been made? And if so, is that going to strip the civil structures, the civil infrastructure of Myanmar, of of people who maybe have indispensable organizational knowledge?
Philip Annawitt 1:22:11
Look? No. It's too many people. look at an example. I can give you an example. I'm, I'm Austrian, we've had a Nazi regime, as you know, in Austria, many collaborators with the Nazi regime, and we had the same issue, we then had a democratic republic, and we had so many collaborators. So what happened was these people were disenfranchised for one election, in the civil service, nobody lost their job. And they have been reordered and reintegrated in society. And the same will happen also. Also, we we shouldn't forget that not everybody who's still in the Civil Services is an absolute partisan of the junta. In fact, most people, most likely aren't. They all used to vote NLD anyway, in the past, so a can most people be integrated and be for political reasons. And for for sheer numbers, you have to integrate these people. And and that will will be done, or will need to be done. And it will be done. Because there's no way around it.
Brad 1:23:23
Yeah, I think it's, it's something that that makes sense is quite evident when you when you think about the logistics that would be involved. And the threats that are made are very high level threats of having to repay all of the salary that they received during during the coup period. And, and being barred from from civil service being barred from having a passport being barred from entering universities and educational institutions for five years, 10 years and so on. The just the paperwork around the implementation of these threats is, would alone, you know, be it'd be a huge draw on the administrative capabilities of the system. And and on top of that, the fact that many people who have not joined the CDM have not joined the CDM because they cannot afford to go to jail because their families would would starve if they did. So it's a very difficult system. So so so you're saying that you you see a roadmap forward to reintegration and to steal from from the South African system truth and reconciliation? Would that be an accurate description? Yeah. Yeah. Excellent. And so moving on to the bigger issue, which we discussed before the specifically the issue of federalism. So you've mentioned the roadmap in, in the federal democracy charter, how clear of an idea does it give us? What is the scope for disagreement over what the federal democracy charter actually says between different stakeholders?
Philip Annawitt 1:24:59
You mean implied in the way it's phrased itself. It's quite open. It's quite specific on on steps, but it's quite unspecific on certain areas. So for instance, anytime something is not clearly stated as a union member union prerogative in the federal democracy charter or federal government prerogative, it is said they will be resolved at the state level through state autonomy. So it's actually quite open, what that will mean. And I think it has to be open at this point in time, because as we as we just noted, currently, what do you what do you need to legislate for or make policy for is the interim and the beginning of the transition period, once the if once the regime is defeated, you will have have so many actors that need to be accommodated all of Rakhine needs to be accommodated, you have a lot of organizations in in the in the northeast, that are de facto independent already that at least you need to try to accommodate. There are political parties that are maybe sympathetic but haven't come forward. There are parties that are may not be sympathetic, and are quietly sitting on their hands. So you need to leave certain flexibility as to what the future will look like in terms of what is at the Union level, what is at the at the level of the of the states. And then the debate that hasn't been had enough, I think is wonderful local governance. Because if you look at the weakest part, I think in BMS government governance system was always local governance, Myanmar always had local administration and never a local government. I mean, he had community level representation through the board and the track administrators. And that's, that's fine. But there was never local government, and some of the some of the big questions around who, who has nominal control of what and what what what would flow? What will future boundaries of the countries of the internal boundaries and administrative divisions and so look like probably best results at a local level. So these are the things that you cannot discuss right now. Because you're not you can't make that decision. It is something that, yes, you can plan for having the conversation, you can SQL, you can sort out basic guiding lines, and basic points of agreement. But it would be, in my mind detrimental to have it all worked out by now because you have to rip it up anyway. And you know, once you have it worked, and once you have it all worked out, you're very reluctant to rip it up for somebody else you need to accommodate.
Brad 1:28:10
And so the, the million dollar question here is because everyone's going to have their own version, everyone has their own idea of, of what should happen. And some people will say, well, we want you know, very strong state administration. Some people say no, we want one devolution of power, you know, as as low down to the community level as possible. This is this has to come out like this has to be put on the table, and there are going to be some very heated debates. And no matter what you do like to borrow a phrase that you've used quite a few times tonight, damned if you do damned if you don't like no one is is going to come up with a plan that's going to keep everybody happy. So Is there potential for the disagreements over exactly what federalism would mean the disagreement between state level administration federal administration, local administration, to to stymie the efforts to actually successfully transition into a new government whatever government that might be
Philip Annawitt 1:29:12
can hear you now? I have no idea how to answer this. Be quite frank. That is a very good question.
Brad 1:29:44
A lot of speculation.
Philip Annawitt 1:29:45
So I is very speculative. I don't know. The question is, and let me read Let me paraphrase it maybe so that that I'm sure I understand the correct If the question is whether the current infighting that's there about what is the future of federalism, whether that will be problematic in terms of the transition, and how to how to get to consensus to find the new form of transitional institutional arrangements, etc. That's
Brad 1:30:21
more to the point. I'm not quite asking about the current infighting. Rather, I'm asking about whether the fact that nobody has actually written it down in black and white in firm and certain terms, is going to lead to infighting once, once the military has been taken out of the picture.
Philip Annawitt 1:30:40
Well, there is already to certain degree, there are problems over the understanding of federalism, Myanmar's history is riddled with conflict about what federalism actually means even between those actors that have committed to federalism. There is an I'm not an expert on this. But there is a sense that all the states that will be forming out of these these interim councils that are in place in the different states, they are also all working away on their own constitutions. And many of those actors that are working away on these constitutions already have developed constitutions in the early 2000s. And so they want to draw heavily on dots. And then the question is, if you have these state constitutions as a nucleus, to which degree are these state constitutions that are being developed, compatible with each other? And what do they imply for the federal level? Right? So it's actually quite an organic way of building a building a federal union, when you do it from from the bottom up? I think whatever the final form of an agreement would be, we'll probably see. And I think that's consensus. Very, very limited, and very, very, very, very light touch federal government that does what only meet only what needs to be done. Meaning. Defense, meaning monetary policy, meaning policy. Yeah, I mean, the coordinating development assistance, all of that, and probably not much more.
Brad 1:32:54
Did you think environmental policy and protection would be federal?
Philip Annawitt 1:33:00
Well, it should be, but I'm not sure. I think everything's on the table. That's that's the thing, everything and then in the tradition, when more actors come to to the table, then everything will have to be in the table, you will probably have a a very federalized future.
Brad 1:33:23
Okay. That's interesting.
Philip Annawitt 1:33:25
At least that is the aspiration. What did that fly, whether that will work in a country with that has a history of very centralized institutions is another matter. But that is the that is I think the aspiration.
Brad 1:33:42
Fair enough. And so we've actually gone pretty, pretty far afield in some of these, the initial topic is just is the energy in a position to be able to effectively govern? And I think we've covered a lot with with regard to their internal structures. And with regard to a view to the future of Myanmar post conflict and how that might turn out. Obviously, nobody knows for sure. But But I definitely think we've covered a lot of very valuable ground. But as is our custom here, I want to finish off with any thoughts that you might have, that you want to leave the audience with anything that you want the audience to go away, mulling over in their minds, or any message that you think, is a very important takeaway from the discussion that we've had today, or from the work that you've done previously.
Philip Annawitt 1:34:37
I think there's one thing that I've continuously tried to highlight in the work that I've done, and it is all the criticism that can be labeled apt, and I'm not only talking about the energy but all the other actors that are there in the Democratic coalition any but the criticisms of the UCC. On the criticism of the CRP H, what we should do is think about the alternatives to this, what is the alternative to this succeeding you will not have elections in 2023 that will produce another transition you will not have a stake in that is my my honest assessment, you will not have a state that's anywhere close to the boundaries of of Myanmar right now, you will not have regional stability. So, whenever we judge what the democratic actors do with their limited resources, we should also look at what the junta regime doesn't do, and is incapable of doing, you know, they're not just bad because they're evil, they're bad because they're incompetent. And, and that is something that I think should be more worrying to countries that, frankly, don't really care as much about, you know, the rights of of the people, or that are less liberally minded and more interested in economic stability. Just think about how spectacularly bad this whole day is at governing. And then with that in mind, I think any body in a position of decision making and in a sympathetic country can can maybe make a better case about why support to the energy and the coalition partners of the energy is a good thing.
Host 1:36:48
I know for a lot of podcast listeners, as soon as the fundraising request startup, you kind of just zone out and skip ahead till it's over. But I ask that if you've taken the time to listen to her full podcast that you also take the time to consider our spiel. Some may assume that producing a two hour episode wouldn't take much more time than the conversation itself. But so much goes into it. In advance of the interview, our content team reviews the biography and relevant works of the upcoming guest. And we discussed the best way to use our limited time together. After the interview is complete, the raw audio file is sent to our sound engineer who shapes it into working order. A single episode can take several full days of solid production work in the studio, which is then carefully coordinated with our content team to ensure smooth listening. further edits and post production magic bring the eventual episode to your ears, along with extensive written descriptions of each interview, which we publish on our blog and on social media as well. Many of these steps require an outlay of funds in some way or another. We hope that each episode helps to inform you about the ongoing crisis. And if you find it a value we also hope that you can consider supporting our mission. If you would like to join in our mission to support those in Myanmar who are being impacted by the military coup. We welcome your contribution in any form, currency or transfer method. Your donation will go to support a wide range of humanitarian missions, aiding those local communities who need it most. Donations are directed to such causes as the Civil Disobedience movement and CDM families of deceased victims, internally displaced person IDP camps, food for impoverished communities, military defection campaigns, undercover journalists, monasteries and nunneries education initiatives, the purchasing of protective equipment and medical supplies COVID relief and much more. We also make sure that our donation Fund supports a diverse range of religious and ethnic groups across the country. We invite you to visit our website to learn more about past projects as well as upcoming needs. You can give a general donation or earmark your contribution for a specific activity or project you would like to support. Perhaps even something you heard about in this very episode. All of this humanitarian aid work is carried out by a nonprofit mission that or Burma. Any donation you give on our insight Myanmar website is directed towards this fund. Alternatively, you can also visit the better Burma website better burma.org That's b e t t e r b urma.org and donate directly there. In either case, your donation goes to the same cause, and both websites accept credit cards. You can also give via PayPal by going to paypal.me/better Burma. Additionally, we take donations through Patreon Venmo GoFundMe and Cash App. Simply search better Burma on each platform and you'll find our account. You can also visit either the Insight Myanmar better Burma websites for specific links to those respective accounts or email us at info at better burma.org. If you'd like to give it another way, please contact us. Thank you so much for your kind consideration and support
1:40:00
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