Transcript: Episode #119: Wading Through a Burmese Haze

Following is the full transcript for the interview with Erin Murphy, which appeared on August 26th, 2022. This transcript was made possible by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and has not been checked by any human reader. Because of this, many of the words may not be accurate in this text. This is particularly true of speakers who have a stronger accent, as AI will make more mistakes interpreting and transcribing their words. For that reason, this transcript should not be cited in any article or document without checking the timestamp to confirm the exact words that the guest has really said.

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Host  00:15

Thank you for joining us for the next hour or two in this episode of insight Myanmar podcast. In an age of nearly limitless content, we appreciate that you're choosing to take valuable time out of your day to learn more about what is happening in the environment. It is vital for this story to continue to be heard by people around the world. And that starts right now with you

Sai  00:50

I had a dream of bullets flying across fields as Bond shooting down the sky of children in flames. And the charred remains then we eyes from open and I realized the nightmare was not over

01:33

he really had a good day. Today Yeah, maybe that is bizarre.

Host  02:05

I'm really pleased on this episode of insight Myanmar podcast to be speaking to Aaron Murphy, who just released a book called Burmese haze, which we'll talk about. So Aaron, thanks so much for joining us on this episode.

Erin Murphy  02:17

Thanks so much for having me. I appreciate it.

Host  02:20

Right. So we have a lot to get through with your book. It's, it's really chock full of a lot of stuff that's really relevant to the current moment and trying to understand that a bit better. Before we get to your actual book, I want to talk just a moment about your background. A couple of things that stand out. First is a similarity that we share that almost share you were a jet English teacher in Japan, I was almost a jet. I had a sister city program with my small liberal arts school in Oregon that had me associated with the Jets. But we both had our introduction to Asia, through teaching English in Japan. So that that was the first thing that brought you over the region. Eventually you came over to to Myanmar, you also worked as a CIA analyst for some time. So just before we get into Myanmar, if you could just touch upon your experiences with jet and Japan and how that made you perhaps more aware of the area. And then I think probably a lot of people are curious about what one does as a CIA analyst.

Erin Murphy  03:25

I'm sure. You know, I think they would say the easiest way to find out is to join but that's not an option for everyone, of course. But yeah, you know, I jet was my first foray into Asia. Jet stands for Japan exchange and teaching. And I had always wanted a career in international relations. I wanted a career where I could travel and really see the world. So I initially started off as you know, really focused on Europe, which you know, East Coast American isn't I majored in Spanish. It was a language I started studying in middle school, or, you know, sixth grade on through college, and I was like, I'm gonna go to Europe and it's gonna be fantastic. But that was before the Euro days. So that that dates me a bit but but there really weren't going to be any jobs for Americans. So the JET Program and the Peace Corps they they really recruited heavily from my undergrad so I was like, you know, I'm going to do this Japan thing. Everyone's you seems to be focused on China. I'll do Japan this will be my my introduction to Asia and boy was it and I'm sure you were also in a very rural area. I was in the south. And it was really fascinating. I really highly recommend for any listeners who are are on the younger side especially you know, get out there. You know, your your tolerance level for traveling and bizarre things happening to you is so much higher than And when you get older, but from there, definitely got the bug for Asia saw it as a really strategic area for the US but also for international relations writ large economically, militarily, diplomatically. So, went to grad school, went to the school for Advanced International Studies for econ is a big, heavy focus for everyone and did Japan studies and then joined the CIA as an analyst, thinking I'd be working on Alliance issues. And instead I got put on, like a very tiny account that no one paid attention to still in the region. But being an analyst is really interesting. It's excellent training, I think for almost any career that you get into because you are trained on briefing techniques and writing skills, analytic skills, all of which are, I think, really important. So as an analyst, you look at all sources. Unclassified, which could be your newspapers, Think Tank reports, stuff like that classified information, which I think everyone thinks is the most exciting, and it's just putting together a story, just kind of understanding what happens. And I think you know, what also helps make you a good analyst is having experience in the field, so you understand what happens in countries how they make decisions. And, you know, because obviously, Americans make decisions different ways. So trying to bridge that gap of understanding, so that the US makes good decisions, and that the decisions that the US policymakers make, are received the way that is intended on the other side, whether that's positive or negative. So while I was an analyst, I got pulled on to the Myanmar issue, just weeks before Cyclone Nargis, and that's what really kind of got me hooked on Myanmar, and I've been working on it ever since. So for those that aren't familiar with cyclone Argus happened in May 2008, which seems like a lifetime ago. And I've been working on Myanmar in some capacity or another ever since.

Host  07:06

Thanks for that. So that brings us to Myanmar. And you start your book off before getting into the last 10 years of history by recognizing that Myanmar holds a certain kind of fascination for people from a number of different groups and you go on to list the different audiences and what Myanmar means to them and their imagination and kind of exoticism, I would actually even go further back than the snort short snapshot you gave of like the Orientalism of the last 150 years or so just reading old British colonial writings and whatnot. I as we talked about before the call, I came to Myanmar, from Japan from starting Burmese meditation practice that I found in Japan, the passionate movement of Sn Blanca, and it definitely among meditators among that crowd, which was my initial entry, and then it expanded into so much more. It was definitely held as this kind of spiritual homeland, this special golden land that very conveniently removed of politics, one can say, was unchanging with the, with the way the practice was carried down, and the tradition of Buddhism and monkhood. But getting back to your excerpt and what you wrote, why was it important to frame your work by recognizing and highlighting this kind of exotic feeling that many different groups had when they looked at Myanmar, which is kind of more as you read that it's kind of more of a symptom of how one feels about something and the role it has in one's mind and imagination than the thing itself. So why was that important to frame the pages in the book that followed?

Erin Murphy  08:45

Well, I want to highlight the exoticism and the Orientalism that tends to happen in Myanmar, because I wanted to get that out of the way, and make sure that people just didn't see this as some sort of Shangri La that everything is so magical there that you miss what's in front of you, which was also magical and very interesting, but that there's real pain here and real history. And, you know, it's been the sight of so many important events and that need to kind of see beyond these odd exoticism because when you look at that, then it doesn't make Myanmar real, it doesn't make the people real, and then it makes it very easy to gloss over what's in front of your face. You know, you see that in Cuba to some extent, as well, where, you know, folks really wanted to go there when it started opening up to Americans. And they're so fascinated by you know, these cars from the 1950s and things frozen in time. And it's like, Well, why is it frozen in time? It's because we put it there. That's not exciting for the Cubans. Nor is you know, being objectified this way and Myanmar, great for them. Either shirt brings attention, but then you don't really scratch the surface to see what you're doing, or what you're seeing and when you do scratch the surface. It just makes it so much better, I think so I wanted to make sure that I wasn't tributing to the literature of saying, oh, exotic Myanmar, I went in there and I was like, you know, some sort of white Saint years and magical What a beautiful land. You have to get beyond that can't objectify this country. And, you know, you see that a lot. So it was important for me to kind of say, Yeah, this is super interesting. But there's so much more beyond and it deserves a better treatment from that.

Host  10:24

Yeah. And I think it's also it was also good just to acknowledge that reality to name the thing that's there as something that contributes to understanding what that is, it's kind of like the old physics thing that you as you get deeper into physics, the just simply by observing something, you change the nature of what it is you're observing. So looking at who the observer is, I think is important in that regard. And through this conversation, we're going to talk about the factors and conditions from the previous decade that led to the coup taking place, how this informs us as we navigate through this ongoing coup and resistance to the military regime. But before starting at the beginning of the book, I actually want to focus at the end. In your acknowledgments that struck me that you mentioned now SAIC, Foreign Minister, one among Lewin and Vice Admiral so thin. And tonight, man, you noted that it was a different time when you spoke to them. And when you interviewed and reminded them of the progress that was achieved during the transition years, while calling on them to prevent Myanmar from sliding deeper into darkness. What was it like to hold these men in mind when you were writing this historical account from another time another era, even though it was a couple of years ago, while realizing that they're also now involved in this current terrible state of affairs?

Erin Murphy  11:47

Yeah, I did it. In part, because, you know, they were ultimately good soldiers. And when I say good soldiers is that they follow orders. And, you know, I, if you read the book, and you see what, you know, the foreign minister one among Lewin was doing during the time of Secretary Clinton's visit, and increasingly positive relationships between Myanmar and the US. It was partly under duress, I think, for him, and mostly under orders, because that's what they told him to do. And I was hoping to speak to at least some part of them, that saw what the benefit of this was. I mean, I think there were parts of them that really appreciated not being a pariah anymore, to be celebrated, to be invited to things, not to be yelled at, but to be praised for what they were doing. And, you know, whether they were doing it out of the goodness of their hearts, I don't think that should matter as much. But that it was being done. And you know, we certainly weren't. And when I say we, I'm kind of referencing my time in the US government and also for the policymakers. I mean, certainly there were those folks that I think were a little too optimistic about where this was gonna go. And, you know, as soon as one among one was like, Okay, we're gonna release a couple of political prisoners. Some folks were like, Okay, ready, let's fully normalize relationships, where as others were a lot more cautious, didn't build in that trust knew that these guys were part of a military apparatus and a governing structure. That was ultimately a problem. And so, you know, I spent a lot of time with all three of them. Both while I was in government, when I was a consultant, and then, you know, as I was reading this book, I spent hours with them, interviewing them. For this book. I remember going to Naypyidaw to meet with one among the when about this. And I mean, he was a US DP apparatchiks through and through, you know, wants to see the military and strengths. So I didn't hold that much help from him. And I wasn't surprised at all that he joined the SABC. It's, but so thing is a bit more of a disappointment and turn on man. I mean, this is a guy who almost ended up in jail during a USDP party purge, when his father schwimmen was lost his role within the party. And they were surrounded by, you know, military police and whatnot. So I think there's also a sense of self preservation, which is, you know, I can understand from a certain level and, you know, we're not, we're not experiencing what they are, where we could be thrown in jail, as well as being taken away from us. So I think that there should be a certain amount of sympathy there, or empathy. Not too much, but, you know, so I called on them because they know influential people, they know what it was like to be Hurayrah to praise back again. And was there any part of them? I mean, they they could have, they could have a legacy as well. So you know, where do you want to be in history and I think, everything that's happened since the coup really erases any power positive momentum or acknowledgement that they had. So I felt it's such a small thing for me to do. I don't expect that they're going to pick up this book. But if in the hopes that they do that they see that.

Host  15:14

Right, let's, let's hope so for sure. One of the things that stands out in reading your book was just how well researched the American side was and as an American who was living through these years, and sometimes side by side, or, or under, some of the people that you talk about, it was really amazing to see some of these details come to light that I had lived through and never seen in print. And then other details that I didn't know were actually happening while I was living through it. And in it, we had a talk with the story in Kenton climber a couple months ago with his book studying the history of us Burma relations. And he kind of leaves off right around where you pick up, which was really I think, interesting for me and interesting for readers that this, these two books together can can form a pretty good timeline from World War Two. And, and there's a lot of small details you include in yours. I mean, you talk about things that, that just put some puzzle pieces together that were that I didn't know, or maybe I knew one time and I forgot, you know, just little things like Hillary Clinton had a Burmese roommate in law school, and that put it on the radar for her or Derek Mitchell got introduced through an aide and senator said and Senator Kennedy's office in 1992. And he read Aung San su chi, his book, freedom from fear, even little things like when they were flying urgently, suddenly from Korea to to Myanmar having to somehow find a dog treat or a dog snack, because on Santucci, like dogs, and they wanted to find a gift and all the shops in Korea were closed, those those kinds of stuff are really great to be able to, to get that level of detail. So I'm wondering, in your process of gathering that the interviews that you did, you were and I should mention in juxtaposition to Kevin and the research he did, he was having to go through archives, and he was dealing with a history that had been long past people were no longer living in many cases and had to go through. And he also did an excellent job of being able to show how different American officials were seeing things at different times at different moments of Burmese history and of their relations. And you're doing something similar in the last decades. So you're actually being able, unlike him, you actually are able to go and talk to people who live through that period and get many more of those small details that maybe wouldn't even have been written down in documents. So what was the process like and being able to conduct those interviews? How open willing were people to talk and how did you get that kind of access? Yeah, it

Erin Murphy  17:44

was. I mean, it was deliberate and intentional. And seeing the books that had already come out, there was no need for my book to retread. And I think that because I had such a unique front row seat to what was happening, that I could tell those stories and get those details. So someone doesn't have to go into dusty old archives later and actually get this and why I sourced it so carefully as well. So you know, that you can see I there was content and context behind it. I think, the interviews, my idea when I first started writing the book, because I mean to, to decide you're going to write a book, one is a heady, borderline narcissistic thing. If you're not like a PhD, or an academia, so you know, I had to get around the ego thing. I thought it was an important story that could be told again, I have the time to be able to do it, and the resources to be able to do it as well. And I thought, you know, Derek, national, I'm sure could write an incredible book, but he's a very busy guy. And, you know, I don't Clinton did dedicate a chapter in her book, hard choices to it. To the Burma issue, but you know, is she going to go out and start interviewing folks for it? I don't think so. So what started is, you know, I had worked with a lot of the folks like the staffers for Senator Webb, with Secretary Clinton's team with Derek Mitchell. And I would tell them, you know, I was thinking about writing this book, I would really like to interview, you know, Senator Webb, if he's interested. You know, let's do it. And everyone kept saying yes. And so as people started saying, yes, you know, it gave me momentum to write this book and to get that encouragement that this is a story that that should be told. I interviewed Secretary Clinton, I was told I had 20 minutes. She sat with me for an hour. We also took a picture together because like, you know, you couldn't get that opportunity. You know, I'd also worked with Mitch McConnell staff for years on this issue. So again, like I was just The worst I could hear was no to my requests, but everyone kept saying yes, I think there were only a handful that didn't less than a handful. And one was because they didn't want to relive that time. It was too sad for them. And others that were just so incredibly busy that, you know, they, they just didn't have the time, but wished me well and pointed me in other directions. So even the folks that said, No, were helpful in directing me to archives, like the Ronald Reagan Library, or the Bush Institute, or to other people who were with him at the time. Like, for example, First Lady, Laura Bush, you know, her office, again, wished me well and pointed me in the direction of folks that worked with the First Lady, or have been covering that time. So you know, everyone was really helpful. And so that was really encouraging. I think for a lot of folks, and you know, if you work on issues like this, it was a bit of a catharsis, to be able to talk. And also just walk notes. And you know, have a lot of folks asked, like, what did they say about this? What happened? Was I crazy and thinking like that was what was happening at the time. And one interview that stood out to me and was really early on was with Admiral Tim Keating, who was a PAYCOM, lead during Cyclone Nargis. And, you know, he just to in his mind, sometimes it's almost like it was a dream or a nightmare, depending on what, what app you're coming from. But I was heading to Myanmar after our interview. And that was when I was going to interview one among when, and so Thane and he's like, Could you ask them questions for me? Because I'd really be interested to know, like, did we make a difference at all? Like, did this matter? Do you remember me? So, you know, I was able also to be a conduit in some ways. The sad part was, they didn't give a shit about what they did, at least in those. Apologies if this is a family friendly

Host  22:06

broadcast? No, go ahead and express yourself.

Erin Murphy  22:10

But yeah, so it's, it was a lot of interviews, I had a wonderful research assistant to loves to do this sort of thing. So she was going through the new light of Myanmar archives, which, you know, like learning about the four causes, and you know, hearing about what stages we were in sky full of lies, and the new dam that gets built? Oh, yes. Oh, yes. And it is learned, and all this other good stuff. But um, but it was, the interviews, were my favorite part. I love engaging with people and hearing their stories. And I think, you know, in some ways, I thought, adding stories into this, rather than being just like a hardcore academic Treatise of what happened, brought the storage device and a little way that added credibility to the people who worked on it so that you could see, their interest went beyond just the surface, that there had always been some spark of a Myanmar within them. And that, you know, they took their own time to learn more about it. So, you know, that's what makes successful policy. I think, if you have people with that experience, I want to show that as well that you didn't have a bunch of amateurs just showing up. Who was like, Oh, what's this Burma Mar? That they have.

Host  23:34

So getting into some of the characters that that are our key players at this time, at least on the American side, if we can just do a quick run through with their bio, just because we'll be saying these names as we go along. And these are people that were important and the decisions that were made during the transition period, and during the years that you cover, so if you can just tell us a bit about the following names, a bit of background, their biography and their perspective. We have Scott Marshall, Derek Mitchell, Derek Mitchell, Mitch McConnell, Jim Webb, and some people might know those names, then a lesser known name that that becomes very important. Tom malinovski Mone offski. Okay, Tom malinovski. If you could just give some background of these people and why they were important.

Erin Murphy  24:19

Sure. So I'll start with the first, Scott Marcel and he was the ambassador after dark metal, who I'll talk about as well. He was there and trying to think of when Derrick laughed, but he had been a long time Burma hand as well. He's was a career Foreign Service officer. During the opening, he was also the ambassador to to Indonesia, which was a key player. During that time of the opening. They were a major player in Ozzy on the Association for Southeast Asian nations. They're very involved in the Cyclone Nargis recovery effort, and so Jakarta was also the place where the ASEAN embassy, our US mission to ASEAN was located. So he was kind of dual hatted and working with our ASEAN representative. And with him, so he had a lot of experience from the ASEAN perspective of working with Myanmar. And during the 80s, he had worked on Southeast Asia desks. So it was also very familiar with Southeast Asia. So all of that led to his experience when he became ambassador, I believe it was in 2016. So he was, as things started to go south, the remaining of this, you know, the kind of stalemate between the NLD and the military, not great governance, etc, etc. So, and he was also there for the ultimate lifting of sanctions as well, which that was in 2016, which was still at that time, fairly controversial. So he played a large role. He is now based in Stanford University, very nice, and is also reading books about Burma. So stay tuned on that. Derek Mitchell. He is a longtime Asia watcher. He used to say that his head was in Northeast Asia, but his heart was in Myanmar. And as you mentioned earlier, you know, he started working on the issue when he was in Ted Kennedy's office. And then he worked for the National Democratic Institute, NDI, which he is now the president of the did a lot of work on prisoners conscious and the ADA uprising. And so he worked on a documentary to bring more attention to the cause. So he started working on that issue in the 80s. So like the first major round of protests is the first coup and in 1962, and so was sort of baptized by fire in that in that era. And then from there, it had focused his career mostly on Asia, again, Northeast Asia, primarily who worked at the Pentagon think tank called the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And then he was eventually tapped to be the first appointed special representative and policy coordinator for Burma. And that he was appointed in 2011. And it was that time that we saw everything change in the country, and he was not just had a front row seat, but was, you know, flying the plane, it seems. He eventually became our first ambassador, fully credentialed ambassador, we downgraded diplomatic ties after the 1990 election was not recognized. And he's been following the issue really, ever since. Some of the other folks I've probably forgotten some of the names Tom Malinowski. He is a congressman right now for the great state of New Jersey. But he's been a longtime activist on Burma has spent a lot of time there as a student in the 80s. He was also working on Capitol Hill and brought attention to the Myanmar issue. He had the I guess the benefit of working with others in that office that knew of the Myanmar issue, so brought it to the attention of Senator Moynihan. So during the ad uprise. Tom will claim that he was he was the one that brought, you know, may have partially attention to the US government, you know, I think others are claiming that as well. But during the ADA uprising, there were people with signs on the streets of Yangon. That said, Thank you, Senator Moynihan. So he was one of the first senators to speak out against prosody is happening in the country. So I'm sure I'm missing other players that you mentioned. Any others? Dr. Campbell is one as well. He was the assistant secretary. He's a he's a personality. He was with the State Department during the opening. He was the Assistant Secretary for East Asia Pacific. There were other luminaries that have held that role, including Richard Holbrook and Paul Wolfowitz. So as storied role, but he started in that role in 2009, and helped lead the former policy review that Secretary Clinton calls for to see the sanctions weren't working. But whatever ASEAN was doing, wasn't working either. What can we do? So he led that and have one of the first high level visits to the country in years and years and years by the State Department. So he played an outsized role during the opening. He's currently now the, at the White House as a Special Coordinator for Indo Pacific issues. So Myanmar is still on his radar, but it's interesting that he started that role about a week before the coup so is there both the opening and the close? So you know, it's certainly come full circle for him as well.

Host  29:58

Right? Yeah. A couple other on They're just McConnell and Webb.

Erin Murphy  30:01

Yes. Senator McConnell has also been working on the issue since the 80s. One of his staffers brought the attention of Aung San su chi, his plight and the protests going on. And he just became enamored with the, with the issue and had been, you know, he was more of a junior senator than which is hard to believe. It's been Senate forever, but he has upped a light shining on the issue, whether through floor statements, legislation trips, has always been a longtime supporter of Aung San su chi, even has her star she started to fade, after the Rohingya crisis. When she came to visit Washington, Washington, DC and the United States in general, I think she went to 10 cities, including Louisville, Kentucky, they have an unsent Suchi, Chair at the University of Kentucky, so he was able to bring her there. But he's been a long, long time watcher of Myanmar. And then finally, Senator Webb. I mean, he's a real interesting person on this, and I think in many ways got lost to history on this. He took a lot of chances very early. And I mean, to say that, you know, when I mentioned these folks that have been working on it since the 80s, it was really on the human rights side, condemning the junta not that web did not. But the idea of engagement was just a third rail, just completely unappealing was a career killer. And, you know, he took his experience from Vietnam, he was a Marine, he is a marine, he's retired, let me before the military comes after me, never leave, you just retire. And, you know, had fought in Vietnam, but was really one of the key people in terms of, of helping normalize that relationship, spent a lot of time with the diaspora community here and want to do something similar with Myanmar, so a lot of similarities. So, you know, had taken some trips out there. I mean, he's like a renaissance man who's a journalist, marine, author, box or senator, presidential candidate. So I think one of his most well known trips was in 2009, when he went and was the first, the most senior US official to have met the junta, the then leader, senior general, thought which way the entire state Peace and Development Council is controversial trip that he felt that was necessary. He also had good timing and that he was there to pick up John, Utah, the American who swam across the lake and got upset Suchi, another two years in prison. I was harassed. So, but from that time, he was very supportive of Derek Mitchell and his efforts, led a lot of hearings on the issue, and basically was very supportive of the opening and do whatever you could to help support that. After 2012. His story sort of gets lost where you hear more about Clinton, McConnell, Obama. So I think that there's some, I mean, he took a lot of a lot of Barb's from the human rights community, and doesn't really give, I think, as much credit as he deserves on what he was able to do.

Host  33:25

Thanks for that rundown of all the people and we'll be returning to their stories as we tell the wider story of Myanmar. And in your book that wider story of Myanmar begins with Nargis with Cyclone Nargis. And as you referenced in May 2008, I believe it was. And you talk about the story of Nargis in one chapter. And the after dedicating this chapter to Nargis in the aftermath and go on to the rest of the story of the transition. Why was it important to begin your book and begin the story that you tell by picking up from north?

Erin Murphy  33:59

Well, I mean, partly for me Narcos was how I got started. But I think it was also an incredibly pivotal moment for the country, for some of the members of the junta for eight and local civil society organizations and just how Myanmar hit rock bottom. Hello, now they seem to be going through a different rock bottom. But I had I was told by my management because I've been poking around for I get from a professional aspects, you know more to do something interesting, an account that had attention. So there was going to be a constitutional referendum, which is one of the states the steps of the roadmap to discipline flourishing democracy that can you the former military intelligence chief, created in the 90s after the failed 1990 election. And so this was supposed to be the constitution that was going to leave the country towards his most disciplined and most flourishing democracy. The vote was baked. We knew what result was going to be it was going to pass with flying colors. I was just watch it in case there was going to be any violence, any voting, Myanmar, which there hadn't been since 1990 was usually a cause for concern, always expected violence, more arrests and whatnot. So I was just basically kind of keeping watch. So two weeks after I'd started looking at things. There was the storm a Brewin out in out in the ocean, and it looked like it was going to be on a normal course to go up, you know, the coast of the west coast of Myanmar upper con state or hit Bangladesh. But it took a hard right turn and stalled all over the Delta, including and gone and just destroyed the place. It erased the Delta. From maps, it killed more than 100,000 people injured, so many others displaced 1000s and 1000s more. And the callousness of the hunters response, I think, reminded everyone of how terrible this regime was. And the previous year at about nine months earlier, there was a 2007. So called saffron uprising, even though Myanmar monks don't wear saffron colored robes, they wear Maroon. But, you know, George Bush, President Bush was watching that had imposed a lot of hardcore sanctions after that. But Nargis kind of brought it to another level where this junta we were offering a the United States was offering aid. Again, I think everyone was clear how devastating this was. NASA have pictures of the devastation that were public. And we just got a sense of what it was. And of course, the Embassy on the ground was was telling us how bad it was just in young gone. So we can only imagine how bad it was in the Delta. Any aid that we offered was denied or rejected. And that was kind of a case for almost any Western country. Any aid that they did allow in had to be dropped off at Yangon airport. And then the military would take it from there, which we knew wasn't going to reach the folks on the Delta. But just the callousness of the junta, I think really drove home, who we were dealing with, I mean, the fact that I don't know if it was sort of thing or others, but he repeated this to me, in that, you know, his sense was all those many years later, the Myanmar people can deal with anything. They could survive on rainwater, and frogs. And I was like, Come on, I'm serious. So they were just letting people starve and die. Yeah, I think the said tested the UN's patients, Azam patients. And I think what it really did was to bring the yuan un and ASEAN together to start working in a in a political way to deal with Myanmar, because what are you going to do? It's, it's, you know, it's a Myanmar problem. You know, the, the cyclone had hit Thailand, but had, you know, not nearly the impact that you saw in the south. So got them to work together. For Thane saying I think it was who was the then Prime Minister and then future president. For him, it hit him in a different way. And that this was his, his hometown, that had been basically wiped off the map. And, you know, just coming off nine months earlier from seeing Buddhist monks murdered in the streets, and this was someone who was devout. And so, you know, he was put in charge of, of the efforts, the in recovery efforts. And I think he saw, you probably saw, you know, kind of sanitized version of what happened, but I'm sure he got a sense of what the actual devastation was, and the callousness of his colleagues what they were doing, but eventually USA was allowed in. We flew him in the huge C 130s, with tons of supplies. And I think the most important thing for the junta is that we did what we said we would, which was, we land, we drop off supplies, and we leave their concern with we land we invade. There was a real concern about that, but we did not do this. This was also a chance for civil society organizations to prove themselves, they had much better connections knew where to go much better than any of the international NGOs. And this was important, I think, you know, again, whether it's racism or bias or whatnot, that no one really trusted their capabilities kind of thought they were rinky dink operations, but in fact, really prove themselves at this time, that they should be included in whatever the UN Azam were doing, and that they could be relied upon. And I think that made a lot of difference going forward. So when the opening started happening, a lot of these, I would say infrastructure or institutions were in place and have been proven that they were able to mobilize and maybe move the opening In a direction of no return a lot faster than would have happened otherwise. So, you know, I think it was just an incredibly credibly pivotal time, and then have done both for myself just personally, but I think also for the country.

Host  40:15

Yeah, yeah. And of all the chapters, this is the one that most closely mirrors my personal lived experience. I remember I was doing, I had an intensive training course at the American Center, before naugus hit and the PIO came to me kind of wide eyed on whatever, I don't remember what day of the week it was, but whatever, whatever day it was, like that afternoon, saying, you know, you might not be able to have class tomorrow, there's this, you know, and I could, I could just tell, by the way she was talking that there was something she knew that she was wrestling with whether or not to tell me or how to tell me. And it was only looking back on it later that I realized that she was having access to certain kinds of satellite or radar imagery and was was was seeing something no one else saw at the time. So I went to my students in the class and said, Well, you know, I hear there's this this big storm coming that that apparently the embassy is, is saying isn't really well known in the country, but you know, we might not have class and after some weeks later, when we eventually did return, my students confided in me that they thought at first they thought it was just really cute that this American had never gone through a monsoon season before and that I was just really kind of being dramatic about my first monsoon. And so they were all kind of like, okay, yeah, you know, we get these monsoons but there was there was simply no, no warning of what was coming and I woke up at like five in the morning to my apartment being literally destroyed i was i was in the corner, the upper corner on the top of the apartment building where the winds hit from two directions. And so I woke up to the the roof starting to come off and the rain seeping through and the walls were literally breathing in and out, I mean, not breathing, they were huffing and puffing, and I opened the door and there's debris, you know, huge debris flying all through the, the, the the lobby area of the apartment where I was staying, and there's loose wires all around and pools of water. It was terrifying, just for me personally, just how I was on the 10th floor, how I possibly get out of there with you know, the apartment being ripped to shreds and, you know, just debris and loose wires inside. I eventually made it downstairs, breathlessly and just with a backpack of my valuables and told the people in the lobby you have to evacuate. You know, it's really this, this whole thing is being torn apart another bit of humor in that time. With complete calmness. The person behind the counter says, Oh, don't worry, as soon as the storm clears, we'll send room service to take care of things. That's in total. That's not what I'm saying. You know this, because it was so much more intense at the top 10th floor than the bottom lobby. I said no, you don't understand there's not going to be any room to do room service in. But as it happened, my my particular apartment was of, you know, 100 rooms or so there was the only one destroyed, it was just right where the winds hit. So downstairs, they didn't really have an understanding how bad it was. But once we walked around, you know, it was it was it was more there were more intense scenes that I witnessed than being in a movie. You know, there were there were massive concrete. signboards, like on the road that had been torn out by the, the roots, whatever you'd call the roots of the of a signpost. There were sidewalks that were torn up, cars lifted over there were as many people know, all these old growth trees they used to live in Yangon. You know, before 2008 Yangon used to be a tropical city. There are pictures I have before Nargis that just there there are as green as far as the eye can see. And once after Nargis, you suddenly started to be able to see shredded, gone from all these different parts of the city that you would never seen it before. Because the trees, it always obstructed the view. But there were these just massive old growth trees that have been there hundreds of years that were torn out by the roots, and not just by the roots, but even the concrete that was that that was around those trees, massive concrete had been uprooted as well. And so as we went out and started to see this devastation, we just it It completely blew our minds what could be happening in the Delta? And, and yes, I mean, as you characterize it at the beginning, part nightmare part dream part, if I were to talk about it at length with I'm just giving a brief for here, but it would definitely be part catharsis part, reliving trauma, and it wasn't you know, when I talked about reliving trauma, it's not so much the trauma I had of nearly dying in my apartment and getting out that I was able to let go a fairly easy it was more of the trauma of of the mass of suffering in front of us and the hopelessness and trying to deal with it and living through knowing that the destruction that had been caused in the Delta and just desperately wanting to get help out there. And living day by day and seeing the roadblocks that were placed and that and seeing for the first few days, the administration When the military regime did nothing, and the first time they were moved to action was when Burmese in the cities and Yangon started to go themselves and deliver aid just just on their own, because they realized what was happening and how much help was needed. And what did the military do. They set up roadblocks. They arrested, confiscated goods prevented from coming, that was the first action they took, which was just just stunning. But then also, as you say, the silver lining that among the work that I was doing, the people that the courses that I was training, we, we were already the courses that I was leading, we were already giving them these tools and trainings of how to work together, how to work with people from diverse communities, how to be able to share resources and knowledge. And we were just doing this in a general way. And Nargis happened right in the middle of this. And so with my own eyes, I saw what you described in the book of so many of my students, and so many the people at the American Center just had their eyes, their their eyes opened by this and realizing that they could do more that they they had an interest and an engagement in society that they hadn't necessarily before, they might have had interest in monastic schools or in, you know, environment in the environment, or street children or something, just something very, very specific and narrow. But this really opened their eyes to something wider. And what I saw happen was that a lot of groups, both the ones I was connected with, and then wider and just in Yangon and through other organizations like British Council or whatnot, started to make like temporary connections to be able to figure out how to deliver aid. And those networks never went away. That's what I observed is that those temporary networks and temporary even temporary organizations, or temporary missions of certain Burmese that were engaged, those were just formed just in immediate urgent response to save lives, because it was really a day by day issue of what you saw this, this prevention trickling in day by day and just wanting to provide access. And then after naugus, that temporary kind of stayed on and groups that nonprofits or civil society organizations that were formed in that moment, then were like, Hey, we have this structure, all of a sudden, we have we know what to do, why don't we look at the next thing, why don't we do this or, or connections between individuals and groups that hadn't existed before, and it only come together to provide that aid? We're like, Okay, well, what do we do next. And so it was really amazing in those following years to see that development of civil society just grow right in front of you both in terms of an individual consciousness, that kind of can do attitude. And then in my mind, what was most exciting, the connections and collaboration with others that because as you know, Myanmar is so diverse with its religions, and ethnicities, and geography and everything else. And to see at least in my circle, at the American Center, and beyond the sea, people coming from such diverse backgrounds, who were then becoming to trust each other and work together and realize, well, you know, this person is has a specialty and I don't know, hygiene or something. And they've done this a lot and I'm and in my in my kitchen community or wherever I am, we need to have these kinds of seminars. And so hey, I can bring this person in on this topic to some community where they haven't been or they could teach me how to do it. And all these networks was what I saw develop from Nargis and then lead towards that so it really did spark not just a mental initiative and thought process but also actually doing things in the world. And and I think that was so in the chapter that was that was captured in what you write and I think that is that does lead to the history as it started to unfold after that point.

Erin Murphy  48:36

Yeah, you know, I, you captured so well, and, you know, the story of of what was happening in your apartment, I heard so many stories like that, like roof spinning in the air. And, you know, recall, you know, the folks that were in the embassy, the US Embassy at the time that they were getting around, you know, they would just see soldiers go and just like, pick up the Fallen wires and just like put them back up on hooks on the telephone poles and like electrocution folks. That sense of desperation, I think, really focused a lot of people and made it a political in some ways, which at that time, you know, I think you needed but yeah, I mean, just watching it from afar, it was it was just incredible. And seeing it before and after photos, I just couldn't believe it. You know, we had Hurricane Katrina, just three years earlier, two and a half years earlier and and that's an a so called developed country, and then to see that it's just the storms aren't getting any better, but that it I just think it was such a pivotal moment.

Host  49:48

Right, switching our focus now we've talked a little bit about the American side and from different angles, looking at the side of the military regime. We know that there were These, these really important moments from 1988 to 1990, which ultimately led to the suppression of democracy. And although they when officially resigned during this period, the time it only became more entrenched in its rule, even though one can say that style of the authority changed. So when looking up till naugus, up to saffron, actually, and looking at the shape of the tatmadaw, from 1990 to 2007, leading on the cusp of the transition, how would you characterize what the military regime was like during those years?

Erin Murphy  50:33

So I think after ADA went when no one stepped down, I mean, he drove the country down the tubes, especially economically. And I think, you know, there was a lot of internal focus of fighting. I mean, some of us do a lot, you have the internal focus on fighting dozens of insurgencies, whether it's ideological, or ethnic base, which, you know, I think it's there's a lot of focus now on on armed ethnic groups fighting, and you know, this is putting the hunter on the ropes, but this is nothing new. They have been fighting for decades. And that's how this military was formed, through guerrilla warfare through, you know, a counterinsurgency counterterrorism, if you want to call that call it that. This is how the military has trained. And they're good at it. But, you know, I think there was always still a strain of intellectualism that was maintained, there were so pride in education and whatnot. And you know, when the state law and order restoration Council, then SPDC, I mean, they just, they just crushed that snuffed it out completely, like health education. Really, you know, forced families rely on their own resources to truly educate and take care of their families. And it was partly because the junta had important money, no one was really dealing with them economically. You know, there was suspension of military exchanges with other countries like the UK and the United States. aid was suspended, Counter Narcotics operations were suspended. And the junta became increasingly more isolated. It wasn't just our own isolation that they were doing. It was now being imposed on them, too. So it was kind of like a double whammy. So you had this junta that was incredibly isolated, that needed money to fight its wars. So they're going to have to take it from somewhere. But you know, they're only dealing with with so many partners, and I think it really shaved their minds that you didn't have anyone that traveled outside of Ozzie on anymore. And even within the junta you only had the same travel. Who, who I think you know, having that experience was really important. Whereas men online, go, Russia, great, that's so great. But it's a military that became more insular, but it was also a military that's, you know, not getting paid a lot and not being supported very well. But still fully indoctrinated with ASP net for MMA supremacy, supremacist sort of view and Buddhist premises sort of view, coupled with this strong nationalism, that they're the only institution that can keep the country together. That's not to say that the military is a mandala. And you're seeing a lot of desertions. Now. Again, that's not new that does not suggest the military is on the ropes. But I think, you know, it does suggest that they've always had trouble with retention, and whether it's through PE or care or whatnot. But um, but it was, once they dismantled Kenyan military intelligence, which was also meant to keep tabs on foreigners. It really became internal and I think that's where human rights abuses started to kind of skyrocket where you had more activities in the in the ethnic areas. And I think that you're seeing that fully play out now too, as well. And it's, it's, it's a beast, certainly is that and I think, you know, the SPDC the old guard, I don't see any ghosts of them in this you know, even during the opening, there was always a question of Where's lunch? Why is he behind all of this? I think, you know, he's just trying to be quiet so he doesn't end up in jail. So I don't think Uncle found Tway has much to do with mental Lang you know, I'm sure he gets a visit when you're supposed to visit your elders. But I think that's

Host  54:53

yeah, yeah. Right. Now looking now we're tracking the trajectory of the time at after 19 years. The aid if we switch over and start looking from the Chinese perspective, this is also around the time in the 90s and 2000s, leading to the transition that China starts to become more of a world power. I've understood China's role in Myanmar before this during the Cold War period, where there's been a lot written about the Chinese Civil War, how the KMT troops on the Burma side and the CIA's involvement there, how that destabilize things and how the American and the West perspective of Burma was so influenced at the time by the domino effect and the fear of communism spreading, but once the transition so 1988 to 1990, is a really important set of years, not just in Burma, but outside you have all of Burma changing with the democratic movement, and then it's unfortunate suppression, but then around the world, you have the fall of the Soviet Union and Berlin Wall and everything else. And so that the the prism with which the West looks at Burma changes completely from being one of the Cold War to being human rights. And that's because of internal and external factors. This is still looking at it from this perspective of the West and even a perspective within Myanmar of what's happening there. But if we're going from a Chinese perspective, looking at 1990, on two to those transition years, how would you characterize that, of course, there's the the PRI that is, is is fueling a lot of Chinese investment. And there's, there's so much more Chinese involvement in Chinese hands in Myanmar, and Myanmar leadership and the economy and such that is going on during those transition years. From from the start of looking at from the start of 1990. And then through what you cover in the book, how would you characterize things from the Chinese perspective and what they're doing? And while they're doing it?

Erin Murphy  56:49

Yeah, I think one one word that summarizes their relationship, if he could do it is complicated. And I think there's always this simplistic idea that oh, Myanmar is practically a proxy state for China, you know, we're gonna get whatever they want. And I'm like, have you met the Myanmar people? I mean, I think this is where you, and I think that this is where if there's any commonality at all, is that Myanmar is very proud, actually, and gets concerned about its sovereignty and internal affairs, and, you know, the whole stooges business, but, but I think that's a sentiment that runs through the blood of everyone there. You don't want to be a puppet for anybody. So China may have very different views about that. But I mean, the the role of China and the relationship between China and Myanmar is incredibly interesting. And there's so many things at play, because you have this, the central communist party of China, and their relationship coming out of Beijing, but then you also have the relationship between eunan and the armed ethnic groups on the eastern side. I mean, there's, they share a very long border, their neighbor, you have to deal with them at any time. There's a lot of familial and cultural ties. But there's also trade and business ties that go back to, you know, before the United States was even a country. So you know, to try to turn that off, but as Myanmar has consistently told, and also believe as they should, it's a very strategically located place. You're between India and China, you could be the, you know, the crossroads between South northeast, Southeast Asia. You know, you're right there you have, you know, airports, ports, trains VRI project, especially as oil and gas pipeline, and the port and chop queue in Rakhine state allows access to been Gaul, the Bay of Bengal, which gives them access to India's backyard, but also to, you know, a massive increase in trade activity, but not just trade, but potentially military engagements as well, that said, again, I think it's very clear on the Myanmar military side that no foreign military can dock there. So, you know, China may be able to do a fuel stop there, but I think that's all they'll be allowed. But, you know, a lot of it has been based on economics, but also diplomatic protection. In 1988, I mean, talk about just a pivotal year globally, talking about communism, and just the utility of Myanmar. I mean, it's again, yeah, Mars, I think very well known for bad timing, but the utility of putting up with Myanmar, the fight against communism is now gone. And if you look at the archives, and you know, the engagement between the Navy wing government and successive US administrations, a lot of it was based on Counter Narcotics. cooperation which directly impacted the United States, but also in the fight against communism, because no one was no fan of communist as one of the largest insurgents was communists, supported by China. And like nevermind, the KMT up in Kachin state, so you have that as well. But that utility disappeared overnight. And now you can really take a human rights example, or human rights focused on the atrocities that they're pulling from 88 to 9090. So after that, I mean, again, there's no love loss between China Myanmar. So I mean, that period between 1990 and 2000, I think, you know, it's still like China's still not what it was or what it is now. It has solidified its gains the Communist Party Burma collapse, created ceasefires with the government and then basically just worked on its own businesses, which was primarily narcotics, which again, is not great for China either. But this is where that Beijing eunan division kind of comes into play where you have these armed ethnic groups are still well armed. You have the United State army, various kokang armies, other Shan based armies, and they're doing their narcotics business, but they're also trafficking in a lot of other things like wildlife, people, other sorts of materials, which can be useful. They also can have casinos, which are illegal in China. So there's a lot of gambling towns on that border. I mean, it's really just like the wild wild west times, gazillions. And so, you know, not necessarily something that Beijing looks on. But then there's also questionable ties between PLA and these armed ethnic groups. When it comes to training. When you look at some of these military arrays on YouTube or or training videos. There are PLA soldiers there. Are they sanctioned by Beijing? Probably not almost certainly not by you not almost certainly not. These are really kind of like, direct people to people ties. I think so that is and will continue to be a source of tension. And even I think Beijing has acknowledged like, they don't fully have a good understanding of what's going on in Yunnan. And that, but it's not certainly something that they officially sanction. After 2000, I think you saw a lot more diplomatic protection. You know, the yuan un started sending envoys writing a lot of angry pieces of it's not legislation, but I'm totally blanking on the word for what it is, but in the UN General Assembly, trying to shield them from sanctions because of their seat on the UN Security Council. So they can protect, like North Korea, Myanmar from more harmful actions by the international community. And they're always a backdrop, this is where sanctions has a weakness, if you can find an alternative, they're not as effective. So yes, you can have the West blockade. But if you have China, you can kind of, you know, get by, it's not not great, since you're going to be almost solely relying on them. But it's not the worst thing either, especially if it's your neighbor. But as China has strengthened economically, militarily, you know, it's it's that much more important, I think, for Myanmar, but still is complicated, because Myanmar never wants to be a proxy state for China, there were a lot of causes for concern. The US Institute for Peace has done some excellent pieces on this. But these somewhat digital annexations of part of Shan State, where there's these companies going into set up, like so called smart cities, but it's offering ie citizenship and its own cryptocurrency and is completely outside the legal and governing structure of the country. The NLD was concerned about it, I'm sure that online isn't super jazzed about it either. And Beijing said that they had no knowledge of what was going on. So there's those things that are starting to happen. Your classic VRI projects, whether it's the Choc port and whatnot, those will continue I'm sure you're going to see the midzone Dam restart, if it hasn't already had been following it that closely. So you know, feel free to correct me on that, but they need these projects. And if not, for point of pride, then should to just get them done. And I think you know, there's a cause for alarm along the major rivers and Myanmar that you know, these mega projects only benefit one country really, and the coffers of just a handful of people. So it's still fairly exploitive. I think in Myanmar, China can get away with a lot more or because the people don't have a say. But if I were China, I'd be looking at Sri Lanka right now as an example of well, you know, maybe not. And we'll just see how long this lasts. No one's exactly thrilled with the sack. But but it's it's complicated. I mean, China, I think, wants to be on the global stage without any of the responsibilities of of these, their side, and, you know, they have their own staff to deal with with COVID. And, you know, these banks failing and their own economy, but so Myanmar can sometimes be a distraction, but it's still an important relationship. I don't see it going anywhere anytime soon. But it's as long as China is there, it really weakens I think, any harsh sanctions or prohibiting weapons sales, because they do have that alternative, as well as Russia and Belarus, you know, other other great friends.

Host  1:05:59

Yeah, yeah. Great. Thanks for that. And just jumping around some more, I really, although we're talking two hours and two hours seems like a lot of time you have such a wealth of knowledge. And Myanmar, as you mentioned, just in the relationship with China is so complicated that, that we're just able to do these little surveys on these areas, jumping around, topical sequentially, and then, hopefully, by the end start to look at where all of these come together. Where are these understandings of these different perspectives, different people different motivations, were how they tell us where we got to now. So jumping to the next topic, the person Aung San su chi. So you had a line in the book that I thought was really profound about her. I've thought this as well myself, but I've never heard it quite expressed so succinctly. So I wanted to read this quote, you wrote, quote, maybe none of us knew her at all, or only heard what we wanted to hear from a caged bird. We were too busy telling the story of a woman who couldn't speak for herself for 25 years. Once she could, we didn't like what we heard, and quote, I thought this was a really powerful summary of the outsize role that she's played when we're looking at the one's perspective, a prism of Myanmar, and perhaps some of the misunderstanding around it. I think it also leads to the crux of the question, which is probably impossible to answer conclusively. But I'll ask you anyway, not that you have magical powers to know things that no one else does. This is something that many people are wondering, there's many different takes on it. So we're, we're getting your take not the authoritative one, because that history is still unfolding. But in other words, that question is what are her real values and objectives? How does she see the world? How does she see Myanmar? What does what does she want? What is she prioritizing? Who is she basically, because I think this quote gets at her silence aloud. And it was really one has to say it really was a noble silence. And as I say that it's it's funny because the word noble silence for those that are in meditation, noble silence refers to Silent retreats where you're not just silent by mouth, but you're also silent by gesture and communication with others. It's a, a noble silence that you're really living within for, for for those Yogi's on a meditation retreat, but there is a sense of 25 years of noble silence on the part of Aung San su chi, where she's, we see this, this this person of dignity, making this enormous sacrifice on so many levels. And we because she can't speak for herself, because she can't act for herself. Because we only have this this past segment in history to draw upon and her father being as significant as he was. And at that time, I think the maybe the more nuanced or complicated history of long song wasn't really as, as talked about as it is now. So it's, and the ethnic views of what the Bomar national movement was at that time. All of these conformed to a lack of a nuanced view of seeing this person making the sacrifice and imbuing in her what we want for this is also going back to your opening quote, of the book where it's the observer is actually changing the nature of the experiment, through observe just through simply observing and watching Aung San su chi is noble silence and her house arrest. As an observer, we are putting values and assumptions into who we think she is. But then when she actually comes to talk and act and take charge, someone of a different person emerges. So getting back to just building up this question and giving some context who Who do you see who is she really what is what is she about? What is she aiming for, as far as you can use your CIA analyst skills to be unable to draw a picture forth?

Erin Murphy  1:10:00

I think the most simple way to put it is She's a human being. And that comes with the flaws and the benefits and whatnot. And, you know, it's not her fault she was made to myth. I mean, the Greeks taught the West about what tragedy is, but they certainly didn't have the monopoly on tragic stories. And I think on some Suchi is a really tragic story. She lost everything has once again lost everything. But, you know, I think the things that make someone survive house arrest, now, I think we all got a taste of that, in like, the nicest of ways during COVID, right. And your place, you know, you get the COVID-19, you kind of lose your mind. So imagine being in that for 10 years at a time, a couple years at a time, without zoom, without internet, without cable, without power, sometimes very little connection to the outside world, and to be able to survive that intact mentally and physically. That is, I think, I mean, I am like a shadow of my former pre COVID self, I have to say, and I and I had all, you know, all I had to do was stay home, I didn't get sick, I was very lucky. But, you know, she was incredibly disciplined and kept focusing on what the ultimate goal was. And I think we kind of missed some of the messaging, you know, as speaking with stopping to who is historian, has written several books himself, his grandfather, and I know, your your, your viewers, and listeners are well aware, you know, his, his grandfather was the Secretary General of the UN. And he was noting that if you read a lot of her earlier works, including and freedom from fear, or any of her earlier, scholarly writings, they're very nationalistic.

Host  1:12:07

Right, and,

Erin Murphy  1:12:08

and, you know, she's Buddhist, and she's Burma. And, you know, she learned a lot about Burma from, you know, very elite individuals. Like, that's not to take anything away from who she is. But do you think that, you know, Warren Buffett can really talk about what the average American is going through now. And it's similar, but she also is imbued with this sense and responsibility of history, and that her father who's also become a math, you know, started the Burma army basically helped gain the country's independence from the British and is just this overwhelming force. And with this, this junta, his former comrades, are trying to, you know, disappear his memory. And then, you know, 1988 happens. She just so happens to be in the country tending to her ailing mother. And here's the call of history and answers it and in the process, loses her family. Again, mother passes away, you know, more than 10 years later, her husband passes away, she never sees her children. Grandchildren, she's never met. I mean, how awful and you don't know what that that does to a person. And frankly, I don't think anyone cared. Who was offering her mental health assistance or anything, you know, and like, I think everyone's Oh, the struggle, the struggle. And those, you know, I think that were so enamored and supportive with her. I mean, they talked about her like she was an otherworldly being. Yeah. And, you know, she's magical, and she's charismatic. But I think, you know, she also had the benefit of being a good looking woman, very well educated, have beautiful English. And she dressed the part and like, again, that that wasn't her, like tricking us. That's who she is. That then I think, for everybody else, when she couldn't speak for herself, oh, was very perfect. We can speak for her. And, you know, this was all trying to get to me like delaying answering your question, because, you know, she's a very, I think she's just a person. She's a human being, who has biases, who doesn't fully understand how ethnic minorities were treated. Nobody did and in fact, even a Mandalay and Yangon and they're only now getting a taste of it as the junta strafes their streets Texan and you know, and the most interesting thing I heard was and I think I included this in the book, but one of the ADA generation students who I hung out with a Quite a lot, but he was saying the best reconciliation, national reconciliation was when they were in prison with all the intelligence folks. Right, right. And that they were able to kind of talk through like, what what were each side fighting for, like, what did they really represent, but then they could also see the difference in treatment with Burma, and Buddhists, and Muslims and ethnic minorities, you know, you get temper March yourself, you got 100 Koran and another you could get beaten bloody and, and to near death. You may not walk out of a torture room, if you're Shawn. And I think it's very easy from your own perspective to see how bad you haven't and you do have it bad. But then you see how badly it is. And I don't think uncensored, she really ever experienced that. And I think she had her own biases as well about Muslims. I think she she bought a line on that. And she was hearing it from her own close advisers as well, not just military. But I think what we'll never get a full story on ever, unfortunately, is how she was trying to negotiate with the military to buy time to keep democracy, the democracy experiment going. And what she felt she had to sacrifice, like her. The Hague, which let me tell you politically, domestically was a big one for her. Not no military, but everybody else. I don't think we'll ever truly know. I know, she had a plan. Whether or not that plan was gonna work. But I think once the international community turned on her for the Rohingya issue, the military realized she wasn't useful to them anymore, and it really didn't matter. And that's, I think, what what also makes me feel sad, because like what she did about the Rohingya, the silence over Coneys assassination, that hurts, you know, it's very sad. And I'm like, you know, I think if you said something, at least the mobs would have attacked the military. That's another thing. Yeah, at least the actual people may have stopped and thought but we'll never know. I and I wish she could have said something she doesn't she's the only person who had the power to do that. But for the swift reaction, like no one wants to talk to her and like and to be fair, she didn't want to listen either. Because again, it went from We must listen to onsen, su chi and all the magical things she said while she was under house and as to that you don't know nothing. And you what we need you to do. And you know what, like, let me tell you mansplaining, it's not fun. And she was getting that from everybody all of the time. And to go from being like built up to this, this, you know, mythic God, to them being criticized all the time like that and told what to do. Yeah, she's going to be a little ornery for sure. And not listen to you, which, you know, again, like, that wasn't the way to do it. But it's, we created a monster, too. And that's Yeah, so I don't know. It's, it's, she's a, I wouldn't even say she's a complicated figure, because we all are. We all have wings and biases and very strong opinions about things. But she has had to deal with things that none of us could even comprehend. So I am, obviously compartmentalize some things, but at this stage, I just feel very sorry, for her.

Host  1:18:40

That's, that's a great, great answer. I really appreciate that. nuance, and that complexity. And I think this also goes into what we were talking about before this interview is just how bromo is usually defined by a lack of nuance by black and white issues of, you know, first it was the Cold War and the domino effect. And then narcotics and the war on drugs played a role. And then it was human rights and Aung San su chi and the whole country was understood by by Western observers, mainly just through these lens through these big black lens of of how, you know, what do we know about Aung San su chi, and what is she saying or whatever the lens happened to be of the moment, there are a couple other these lens to continue looking through that just that that defined American policy and American perspective of trying to understand the country as well as told the story of how the relations in the engagement and the transition were going. So another one of these big block perspectives to look at is that of sanctions, and this is something that you devote a whole chapter to and the development of sanctions in 1988 through the transition period and the and and the debate and discussion around which sanctions and how to begin to let go of and to release. This is a really really complicated and detailed subject, and we don't have the time to be able to, to go into the depth that you do in your writing. So I really encourage listeners to go and read that book and and you do a really excellent job of detailing the arguments for and against sanctions at different periods. And what was interesting to me is not just the arguments of for and against sanctions in terms of policy, but also how the emotion was driving some of those decisions. So what can you tell us about sanctions when they came on the scene in 88? And then their complicated trajectory through the transition period?

Erin Murphy  1:20:39

Yeah, you hit on a key word here, which is emotional. And I think that that's what's really driven this policy. You know, is there some strategic angles to it? Sure. But, you know, and everyone talks about, well, you're trying to this and trying to that, but if if the United States cared so much about China, and taking away all its friends, like, we never have sanctions in the first place, or they would have been lifted a lot sooner. But you know, the first round of punitive actions was mostly to stop like almost any male male contact and not included any exchanges of training, whether it's I met, which is mostly like English language, where they come over here and embed in in the military, and foreign military sales. So that was all Oh, cut Counter Narcotics as well, which, you know, you send them the, the dusters I guess, like the little planes that just the opium plants. And so that was taken, of course, you can also outfit that to like, shoot people. But you know, so that was gone. But the real economic sanction started happening around 1997 when Clinton, President Clinton, imposed the investment ban, and then only grew and it was mostly around Aung San su chi. So she gets released, I think it was in 1996. You know, high jinks ensue, we impose the investment ban with a lot of support from her, she helped drive a lot of the sanctions discussion, as well as a miss sistance are aid dropped to nothing, almost. And, you know, it's it's easy to talk about poverty and emerging economies. And, you know, I think we also have very biased views on where that happens. Myanmar is poor, very poor. There are places that have no access to any, any sense of electricity at all that they're, you know, reading by candlelight, or, you know, fire and whatnot. I mean, you know, most rudimentary of things. So, amen. assistance was half of what we were giving Laos, which was not a whole hell of a lot, and to Bangladesh, which also like there, there were some restrictions there as well around labor and other issues. So in 2003, it also starts ramping up. Congress also played a big role in this Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, which put in an import ban. And the 2008 Tom Lantos, Jade X, junta anti democratic efforts act, everybody loves a good acronym. Senate is very Congress, it's very skilled at these sorts of things, which also put a ban on the import of jade and rubies, it was efforts. Some of them are symbolic, like, you know, you don't see a lot of jade around here. But anything that the junta made money on how can we start targeting these. In 2003, you also started seeing a difference in how the US Treasury issued sanctions or implemented sanctions overall. Previously, you would have like these big bands, things that were just kind of blunt. Tuba I think, is a great example of what we did earlier on sanctions. But the idea here was to get targeted, because there was a growing concern that you're going to start harming the average person, which does two things. First, the people we don't want to, and two gives an argument to whatever government is in charge saying, Oh, my goodness, it's the United States that is doing this to you. We're trying to protect you and everything that we do they sanction, I think, I think that's what Russia is trying to do. Now. Other countries have done this in the past. So the idea of doing targeted sanctions through adding names to the so called specially it's not so called it is called the specially designated unblocked nationals list, which is primarily US based and what I mean by that is that it prohibits dollar denominated transactions. It prohibits US companies or individuals from the US and dealing with any sanction individual or entity on that list. But where it does make things tricky for for other countries is that banks often deal in US dollar transaction Almost every company has some sort of US subsidiary or component. So it gets pretty messy pretty quickly. So the easiest thing to do rather than get fined or sanction yourself, is to just just not deal with it at all. And the US started imposing this creating, I think the the FDA and other executive orders outline criteria, how to add to the sanctions list. So is anyone providing material support to the junta that meant that that can mean anything, really, like, you know, you, you build a hotel and maybe don't have their orders, you give money to a fund, etc, etc. So that's how they targeted the so called cronies, Cesare Zaza, Steven lOn. And quite a few others, and also targeting big entities, big companies, state owned enterprises. There's several types of sanctions targeting Myanmar, or that Myanmar gets caught up in both the drug kingpin act. So a lot of the was pretty well sanctioned on that, and then all the DPRK sanctions, so any military sales, to and from that country and Myanmar, he's violating those and UN Security Council resolutions on that. So they're a mess. But then there became more of a misunderstanding of what sanctions can and cannot do. Now, what was great was the Europeans were all on board with this as well. And Japan, to some extent followed along with it. So it really limited a lot of economic engagement in the country, and we're able to have kind of the United united stand, but around 2011, when the country opened, there was sort of less and less argument to keep it on. And so the Europeans were like, Let's just, you know, let's just get rid of this. Not to say that there wasn't a debate there. But we knew the united states that if the Europeans took away their sanctions, ours would be so much less effective, because not only would would fainting government have new opportunities that have a ton of alternatives to the United States, not just China, I mean, they could finally diversify away from China, from Russia from DPRK, not so much on military sales, you know, Israel, like took up that mantle quite a bit. But they could have French and German, you know, engineering companies, new products, you know, all sorts of things come in there. And that's kind of exactly what happened. So we lost a ton of leverage when the Europeans lifted sanctions in 2012. And the United States was essentially the only ones left. We had an SDN list. We had it made things complicated, but not impossible for foreign companies to go in. But American companies just wouldn't even take the chance. Because, you know, sanction cronies owned hotels, what happens if they stayed in them? Trying to rent any homes or or office space? You didn't know if you're going to run into a crony? And what if you did, where else were you going to go? There was such limited space? If you go to a you know, a shopping mall, who owns it, you buy a car? Who would you get it from? You know, it was just so complicated. That it really, I think, the sanctions easing on the European side really went to the detriment of the United States. But then with everything changing. There's more and more of a question of why do we still have this on? And now I think I'm answering other questions that you didn't ask. No, go ahead. But, um, so in 2012, the US also talks about using sanction, one, lifted the investment ban. So companies that were already there could expand their operations, and new companies could go in, they weren't prevented from doing so. And then the ban on the exploitation of financial services, which was also really important, that meant that they could move money that, you know, they they could actually operate in a country except the problem was, all the banks and Myanmar were on the SDN list. So they basically, you know, gave you a car without wheels. So, the next year, the US had to issue a general license to allow, at least for banks, to work with Americans, which this is where things start getting tricky. And where the sense of sanctions and optics get really confused, is that it was being seen as giving too much too soon. And that everything was seen as a give now as a technical fix that general license in 2013 to work with those banks. That was the technical fix. A couple of years later, a general license to work on, to be able to, you know, open the port in Yangon that was owned by Asia world, which was Steven laws company and the military. That was a technical fix. That wasn't a give to Steven law, it was so that we didn't inadvertently cause a Cuba like embargo. Because the port decided to change paperwork. And then all of a sudden everyone realized that most of the port traffic on loading and offloading, it was going through the Asian world port terminal. Those were technical fixes, not gifts. And then there was a sense of like, okay, well, if we put someone on the SDN list, or if we take someone off the SDN list, we have to put someone on site how it works. The idea is that you want to get a sanctions list down to zero because your policy is working. You're not trying to keep finding bad actors like yes, of course, there are people doing bad things go after him. But you can't. But if there are none, then there are none. So that just made the sanctions easing process that much harder. And of course, there are a lot of people. And I'm sure some of the listeners to that thought that, you know, the US went too far and easing sanctions. But, you know, one, what choice have we to the way that the sanctions were written, and were for a different time, it was talking about putting the NLD and power check, you know, to I don't know, get into X y&z like human rights abuses, they had done quite a few steps that address that. And dealing with the North Koreans, I was trying to take steps to address that as well. So we needed a different policy for different time, if you want to keep sanctions on, but in the country, Aung San su chi had changed her mind. Even though there's a lot of debate about whether or not that she did that it was time for the NLD to make their own foreign policy decisions. And they didn't want sanctions to be an obstacle, they didn't want to run into something where, hey, we'd like to do this and then find out that somehow US sanctions blocked that action from happening. And it would take six months to fix it. So in some ways, it was just much easier to take everything off and deal with the problems as it came. Again, it is much easier to put on sanctions, as we've seen in the Russia is Libya to if everyone can go back that far. And North Korea than it is to take them off. And I think that that was the choice that they made done. Now, of course, we're seeing them all come back on and for good reason. But I think there's a question of efficacy and there always will be 20 that we didn't squeeze hard enough. So we didn't really see how how, how effective they could be. But if if you don't think we squeeze hard enough on Myanmar to make a change, I just point you to the example of Cuba. What have we done there? Nothing.

Host  1:32:30

Yeah, thanks for that. And I think as I was reading your book, one of the things that stood out to me and made the focus a bit clearer and reading these different arguments, both in terms of strategy and emotion of foreign against the sanctions at different times, was that when the transition started in earnest, there was this feeling of in the government of like, what is going to be the more effective strategy to pursue? Is it going to be more effective to keep up hard state sanctions and and really try to regulate this behavior until we get exactly what we want? Or is it better? It's certainly more riskier, but could be it's obviously higher, higher risk, higher reward, but to take the sanctions off almost completely, and just let the free market and access to the wider world be start to bring in things and teach the country things that we can't through our strict regulations. So in other words, which of these strategies is going to have the better long term effect through through our own tightening control or just letting the reins off and just hoping that this thing can stay afloat on its own without our RT strict monitoring of it? And that eventually, that seems like the argument that one out in the transition period?

Erin Murphy  1:33:46

Yeah, because it also came down a question of leverage. How much leverage can we have for sanctions? I don't think anyone fully trusted the government not to start backsliding. I mean, there were troubling things around the Rohingya, even before the NLD, both with the same same government and with the NLD. Of course, these race and religion laws, their flirtation with Buddhist nationalists, like we brought through, ooh, we can't speak at all. So, you know, and also ongoing concerns around the peace process and how you know, things saying one say one thing, like, for example, he ordered a ceasefire on Christmas Eve in 2011. Against the kitchen, Independence army and the military, like that's nice, and just basically still, you know, continued with the conflict, and there was, you know, a lot of concerns about the military's trustworthiness. So, could sanctions have been the leverage that we needed there? And I think that's where the debate really centered on and it's hard to have leverage when you're the only one trying to push for a net Everybody else is going in. So again, this is not the if all our friends jump off the cliff. So will we. Because obviously there's, you know, again, we've talked about this as an emotional issues, and one that was formulated through a human rights lens, but that there's also a moral ground that you can stand on. But are you being morally sound if you're withdrawing any economic development from the people of Burma? You know, it wasn't an easy debate at all. And so, but the thing is that you couldn't keep moving the goalposts either saying, Oh, wait, now there's a new issue, keep the sanctions on. And so I think that goes, you know, to a, an argument I was making earlier and that, then you need a new policy for new issues. And when that makes sense, and again, since this country wasn't super linked to the international financial system, sanctions are aren't going to have the impact that you want it to. And I think there's a lot of magical thinking around sanctions, and also the ability for countries to just suck it up and go through it. Because, you know, the hunter can get by the can the people and who are they going to blame for it? So, you know, I think sanctions can accomplish some things, at least, you know, it was helpful in the opening to show this is a realm of possibility, as we ease or if we ease. You know, I think the US did it correctly at the beginning of, you know, easing it a bit at a time and not fully, but I think that at some point, it should have been fully lifted a little bit earlier than it had. Because I think, you know, our companies were at a real disadvantage, but also our ability to influence as well. So there's all those calculations that you have to make with sanctions. And again, I think there's a big narrative that we just didn't try hard enough for the sanctions and, you know, have to look at the tools that you have, and what sanctions are meant to do.

Host  1:37:02

Right, so sanctions, the easing of sanctions in transition, leads directly into investments. And you have a great quote, To start your chapter on investment or maybe not not to start. But in that chapter talking to I think it was a Japanese worker businessman saying that, if you don't have water or electricity, you can do great business and Myanmar, which definitely is true in my experience at that time. You disagree, you characterize that period, which I was living through and anyone else who was with this would be familiar to is this, this kind of fever pitch excitement of people who are wanting to invest in Myanmar, it's kind of a last final frontier market that is now opening. And yet the challenges they run into i remember when i as i was living to that time, hearing stories of billionaires landing in their own planes on in Yangon to look for investment opportunities. And leaving that evening, just after a day of feeling like this, this is hopeless. And you describe the four L's which I hadn't heard before. Can you describe what the four L's mean? And how this characterizes the challenges of the investment period?

Erin Murphy  1:38:09

Yeah, hopefully I can remember the four L's Listen, look, learn leave. And sometimes I called it the five hours listen, learn, look, leave and laugh. Because, again, I think what the isolation of the country both self imposed and imposed by others and the sanctions, no one went there, they have no idea what it looked like. Very few did I mean, ASEAN countries knew what they were getting into, because they already there, Japan, to some extent, did as well. But Western companies had no clue and they were like, oh, it's gonna be so exciting. This is like a virtual market, we're gonna go and do everything. And it was a shock to the system. Because, you know, nevermind, you no rule of law in a business friendly environment, but just a physical infrastructure. I mean, electricity, internet connectivity. I mean, at that point, when it first opened, it was 1000s of dollars to connect to like, dial up internet and sell phones like nevermind so you just have to show up at a meeting and hope that someone was there. And you know, and I think for anyone flying over there and especially from the US you're just kind of used to like always be closing be done with a deal by the end of the day. Or at least you know, have some deliverables by the end of it and because you're going all that way you just don't have the time but Myanmar operates on a completely different time but I would say the region does as well that you know, it's tea tea lunch lunch. You have you meet and get to know folks before he started talking business and that just didn't happen that and trying to get meetings and Naypyidaw who do you contact you know was better than it was in 2006. When I, the hunter just upped and left for Naypyidaw. And there was only a fax number that you could reach them as fast as even going, but this, like, again, who do you call? Who's going to pick up the phone? How do you schedule and then when you dig it on the schedule, sometimes you'd show up in a video and be like, Oh, we can't meet today, how about next week, and it's like, I'm not here to America, like that sounds, but also just like how ramshackle everything was. And I think that muscle memory for working in frontier markets was, is gone, and a lot of developed countries. And it was risky, like, nevermind, you know, potential sanctions implications, it was just a tough market. And I think there was a lot of miscommunication and mismanaged expectations on both sides were and all sides and facts were, you know, Myanmar was, were expecting, like skyscrapers and jobs and everything to just show up very quickly, not recognizing that the system they had was not, not, you know, investment ready, there was no understanding of why that was the case, because they have been hearing for the entire lives about you know, Myanmar has everything, you know, and I say that story shoe, all the resources, location, or whatnot, but they're not trained. Government doesn't have the capacity to implement and enforce like, important laws. And again, they don't have the infrastructure for it. on the investor side, it was, you know, they had no idea as to how underdeveloped the country was, and I think just were not prepared, they remembered, you know, the country of the 60s that was, you know, a hub for KLM, and pan-am and, you know, best medical care, and I'm like, Oh, I was change. So and then, you know, it was just totally mismanaged.

Host  1:41:56

So there's this really interesting period where that's, you have all these things in the process of evolving and in some cases, not really following a very straight trajectory, two steps forward, one step back, or maybe one step forward, two steps back you in terms of politics, in terms of the ethnic Bomar relations in terms of the the sanctions and the investment that's happening, the elections that are taking place, the role of Aung San su chi, the role of China, all of these things are coming together. And as we talked before the interview, we referenced just how incredible it was that so much was happening in such a short period of time, it feels like this was actually much longer. But then as all of this, this kind of messy soup of possibility and disappointment and potential and all these things are happening, what happens in the middle of that, but the Rohingya, and we we certainly don't have the time to go through the history of the Rohingya crisis. And that's also not your angle. There's authors who have spent much of much time in telling that story. But what's important about the Rohingya for the story we're telling is that it seems to derail everything that's going on. And it as we talked about Myanmar being a place which has extraordinary diversity and nuance and color, and yet ironically, it's seen more one dimensionally and through one lens than any other place, just as before it was seen through the lens of communism, or among Santucci of human rights or whatever. Now, Myanmar is only seen through the lens of the Rohingya crisis. And this becomes what my I guess I might call an irreconcilable difference that you have people looking at it from outside the country that cannot see anything beyond the ring of crisis, which is still true today. I mean, they're they're terrible responses that you read online, of how the Myanmar people deserve what's happening with the coup because of the Rohingya crisis, because they can only see through this prism, and yet this this is not in any way to discount the seriousness of the problem, and that it should be looked at. And I mean, it's been classified as a genocide, this, this should be taken with that level of gravity. And yet at the same time, there's, this is not the only thing happening, there are many other things that are happening concurrently. But you have this kind of perfect storm where the the West is now really unable the rest of the world is really unable to see beyond any engagement or anything and Myanmar beyond this Rohingya crisis, while at the same time the Bomar in Myanmar for the most part, are are not even wanting to take it even to the smallest degree of consideration or of discussion. They simply don't understand at any level. Why people are even talking about this. So what can you say about as in this in this story that we're telling and this this year by year study that you've made in the book and that we're having in this Conversation. Suddenly the Rohingya crisis lights up. And then what does that do to the development process and the conversation and relations around Myanmar?

Erin Murphy  1:45:08

suck the life out of everything? Right. I mean, it was the only prison that anyone was looking at Myanmar shoe. I mean, was it awful? Yes, of course. And this is not to diminish anything about how bad the Rohingya issue was, but again, also not new. The pace of the refugees going to Bangladesh, I mean, that was a fastest movement up until Ukraine of people moving since World War Two. But the the issue against the Rohingya has been going on through this since the 70s. And to say that, you know, I know politico did a piece, you know, the genocide of us didn't see coming, that's not true. We knew, and had always known that this was an issue. You know, you have people who were desk officers in the 90s, trying to reach out to the IOC countries, Islamic organization countries to try to do something on this, could they take refugees? Is there any interest in supporting any resolutions in the UN? no interest whatsoever. It is primarily a Myanmar issue, but it is that they somehow attract regional disgust. You know, no one wanted them in the Middle East. No one wanted them in Southeast Asia, that includes in Indonesia and Malaysia. And it was a great domestic political point. But it had gotten so bad that you know, there have been sparks of violence over the years, 2009 2012 2014 2017 and 2018. And, you know, these purges would would happen, but, you know, obviously, you can't ignore him, especially in the last one. I think again, just to bemoan, Myanmar's awful timing, is that I know I think if we can recall, and at least give her some credit. I mean, I'm not going to be on Sunsoo she's great defend her because I think she fell flat on this, and deserved criticism that she got. But I think, again, Myanmar deserves more nuanced than what I've received, and recognizing that, as you said, there are a lot of issues going on, and sometimes they do not relate. And you don't compartmentalize them, but you deal with them in different ways. And, you know, Mitch McConnell understood this when, you know, I think it was senators, McCain and Cardin tried to push through certain aroma acts. Around this, and then and then even after McCain's death, McConnell refused to put it on the calendar for a vote, because he's like, they don't understand what kind of pressure she's under. And that she needs as much leverage with the military as possible to make sure that she can continue to stay in power. Because she was elected, noted. And I agree with him on that. Or Hinga. I mean, you know, Kofi Annan, you know, does his commission, Aung San su chi told them to be as upfront as possible. And then he delivers a report a year later. So, you know, the Commission starts in 2017, after some violence, and then it's delivered in 2018. And the Arsa tax happened the next day, I mean, my God, Was it planned? I don't know. But it was just so terrible. And the military reacted, and it was a massacre. So what can you do then? And say, let's go back to the Kofi Annan commission report. And then, you know, on so Suchi doesn't say anything. So how do we go from the 27th Aung San su chi to 2018 on su chi, and I think that there, there's an important question there. Unfortunately, I have zero answers. But then this back home and the United States starts conversation if we lifted sanctions too soon, if we had kept them in place, this would have never happened, which I think is the most ridiculous argument and ever because this there was an argument on on keeping sanctions on the two military holding companies Meccano that you know, had its its fingers in some lucrative enterprises including like Ruby and, and Jade sales, those Ruby and Jade sales like didn't happen. The United States they went to Marcus in Hong Kong, Thailand and China are synchronous, can't touch that. And I think the sanctions that are already in place, are not going to spook a military that again, doesn't have like a Visa or MasterCard and looks to go shopping in overseas. They see terror as they see Muslims who they don't like they got permission from a Buddhist monk where some did not like the idea of mowing down innocent, unarmed people, but, you know, their military calls and a monk to tell them, like, cite some really ridiculous eights, or, you know, unknown eighth century sutras saying that anybody who's not Buddhist is not, you know, human or subhuman, which, I don't know, that doesn't sound very Buddhist to me, but but I don't see how sanctions could have had prevented that. And frankly, no one was interested in the issue globally until they were and everybody failed the Rohingya. I mean, you know, I'm not saying the US tried and was once denied. But it was also the victim of bad timing. I mean, some of the bigger ideas. I mean, it takes big thinking, and funding and policy and constant gardening on these issues, to make sure that there's some effect. I mean, no one's been good at preventing a genocide. There's been, you know, case studies as to why but, but to fix the problem, so it doesn't have it again, takes a ton of resources. Well, we have political cycles, and political is going in and out. You have tight budgets, it's very hard to get people enthusiastic for putting in a lot of time into what is pressing, and a hard thing to do. I see that everywhere, though, everything's a hard problem. Look how well we dealt with COVID, inflation, all of these things, it's very easy to make it as black and white as possible, because the hard work is super hard. And it's not rewarding every day, you may not see the rewards in your lifetime. And that's very tough to deal with. But the thing is, oh, Myanmar doesn't have to come up with a solution from scratch. I mean, this is the unfortunate thing we've seen in many, many plays. Perhaps the Balkans is a better example for them to go forward. But you know, any sort of national reconciliation, I think, at least with this national unity government, and also with people who have experienced the brutality of the military that never had before, a lot more sympathy for the Rohingya. So I think there is an understanding that they are part of the national reconciliation discussion. But, you know, sanctions got reimpose very quickly after the Rohingya crisis. Again, wouldn't have prevented anything. very doubtful.

Host  1:52:36

Right. So this brings us up closer to the present day, we're looking at the launch of the military coup in February 2021. And a two part question with that. So the the first part is just looking at the decade of transition or so that you cover in the book and the the different angles and topics that you looked at, wondering which how the confluence of what you studied might have led to the coup being launched. And I liked Aung San su chi question that the question of what is really in Milan Ling's mind, why did he do what he did? This is also an unanswerable question, certainly now when there's so little facts in front of us, but just the first part of the question is looking at in studying these factors that you looked at, and then seeing how the coup was launched, where do you see some of these factors playing a role in the coup taking place? And the second part of the question is, and this is something I've I've asked other people who have been looking at the reasons behind the coup and the coup taking place. Is there anything that could have happened that might have prevented the coup? Interestingly, the Burmese people that I asked this to feel resounding no. And in some way I the quote that really stands out of my mind is a Burmese economist who studied at Oxford. And when I asked him this over a year ago, and still word for word, this answer still rings in my mind is so powerful. He said, first of all, he said, No, I don't think anything could have been done. And then he added, you know, I feel really shitty to say this. But I have to admit that part of me is actually glad that the coup happened, because it exposed these really deep institutional problems in our country that and he's a Mar Buddhists, but he said that among other Bomar Buddhists, and certainly the ethnics who know about this more know about these rotten things that are existing that are just going to keep persisting and that society itself is not really looking at and even brainwashed to. And so he felt that there was nothing that could stop the coup nothing that the that could have been done and that he actually had a bit of a sick relief that it happened just to be able to expose and hopefully root these things out and that that to me that was very telling someone that was on the inside of this and studying this had those kinds of feelings with it. With it as far as your analysis goes and looking At the factors that you were studying, how did those factors lead in your mind? And I understand this might be a premature question. So just more roughly off the top of your head, if you hadn't had the time to really study it and have the material available, how did these factors you look looked at in the book lead to the coup taking place? And is there anything that if it had turned out differently, this might not have happened?

Erin Murphy  1:55:22

Sure, I'm probably going to agree with the academic. But to go back to that first question, I think MIT online saw an opportunity. And he took it. You know, I think there was always a question that the military would try to take power. It was just a question of when not if, and I think the idea, even among us policymakers was to try to strengthen as much the democratic movement as possible to instill that experience. I mean, it sounds like you're setting up lambs for slaughter in some ways. But to get things as solidified as possible, like the economy, education, health, you know, government capacity, so that when needed is taken away. It can't so easily be put back in a box. And that hopefully, this isn't going to be like 1962, where we have just decades of darkness, and that the return can come back faster. You know, once you have a coup in a country, it sets a precedent, no matter how far away it is, is a great example. And I think that's true in Myanmar. I mean, I think we had an understanding. When I say we in this case, I mean, other Burma watchers, that, you know, the military put up with us for 10 years. I mean, they really had five years of being more out of power than than before. I mean, the USDP did its own thing, certainly. But, you know, they still had militaries best interests in mind. Most of them anyway. So how do you There was never a good transition for the military from being out of power for so long. To not being and yes, do they still control, big levers and you know, an outsize role, of course, but it was smaller than before. You know, if you look at the transition from a military government in Indonesia, it took a long time, somewhat, like 30 years or so. And then it took the 1999 protests that ousted Suharto and and it was dicey for a while, but it took Indonesia that long to get there. And, you know, they will say themselves, they breathed a sigh of relief after every election. And when a new government sits, we are 23 years now. It's not long enough for them. And you know, the the high jinks would Prabowo in the last election, I think, really terrified a lot of people. And I think if you look across Southeast Asia, there's there are some concerns there. So you know, Myanmar is part of a trend of backsliding. That's global. And so it's also I mean, maybe they have great timing now, but But you start to see opportunities and minute lines, not the dumbest person so he can see how countries are treated. I think he made some significant miscalculations here, I mean, Thailand can almost get away with a coup because everyone's so damn used to it. They have certain things that are fairly stable, and they also have a much stronger economy than Myanmar could ever hope and dream at this point. So like, no one's gonna be like, oh, good stability. We can still invest. I think he totally miscalculated that really just had no sense. And pre you isn't the most worldly? So you know, what's he going to tell men online? That's of any use. Besides this is how you take power. So, you know, the NLD was taking risks. The State Counselor bill, I think was a huge shot across their bow and they absolutely were not happy with that and felt sideswiped by it. You know, Kony was the basically the the person that got that through whether or not that was how he got killed. You know, I'm sure it was a factor so you start seeing this and you start seeing the allergy you talk a little bit more about constitutional reform. And I think that's also why you saw it on the balance on the other side with onsen su chi going to The Hague to defend the military's actions and doing others saying you know, talking about Her father's connections to the military, trying to be that balance. But perhaps you just focused on the wrong things that didn't matter to the military, in fact, but it had to happen at some time, these constitutional reforms and just these reforms in general civilian control of the military. But like, how do you do that? And I don't think that the NLD government had great tools for it. I don't think any of us had a good answer. And I think would also didn't help there is that talking about any military engagement was a third rail. I mean, Congress would have massacred any politically appointed person, basically, would have ended their career, if they had done something like that, that wasn't predominantly human rights focused. Again, there's a lot of space between a male male, where it doesn't result immediately and making them better killers, there's a gazillion things you can go in. And, and some examples that you can think of is training on disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance, especially with climate change in the storms. You know, similar to what we have here, the Army Corps of Engineers, like there are other things that you can do, rewriting the Army Field Manual that no longer incorporate support cuts, you know, it's things like that, you know, the military has come to the table too. And certainly, they weren't always keen to do so. So there was these little things that, you know, I think may have been on laying angry, and others as well. And you had to look at the calendar himself. Technically, he was supposed to retire at 60. And the only way he was ever going to be elected president. You know, the military still always shocked. And It shocks me that they're shocked that they keep losing elections. It's like, No, good. Thank you. You've lost all the time. So you have that, and then you had an election happening at the same time and a little country called the United States. And Donald J. Trump starts going on and on about rigged elections and, and fraudulent votes in this in that and Democrats were doing this, we all know the story, I highly recommend the January 6, trial. Hearing is fascinating. But I think also a fascinating look into almost a reconciliation process, but you know, democracy and the balance, and who was saying the same thing, MIT online. And he starts rattling his saber in January. And then we have the January 6 debacle, insurrection here. And, you know, Donald Trump pretty much gets away with it. He doesn't overthrow the government successfully, thank goodness, but he's not in jail. He's not being put on trial. We're like almost a year and a half from it. And really only now digging into it. There's a whole political party that's and several others and tons of voters that still like don't see what the big deal is. But that's a very interesting message to men on length. And what three weeks later, I'm not saying anyway, six was the direct line, but it certainly didn't help. And what like, Can the US stand on to condemn them? And the UK is a disaster. You know, you have all these other European countries too, that are dealing with their own far right factions and anti democratic folks, it's a dangerous time. And so in some ways, that's why I say I think that all lives on opportunity, and took it. But I think he miscalculated, like what he was getting into. And I don't think he has the broad support that like Assange, wire Assange. Well, now someone didn't really have laws, but that other leaders did. So I think he's in a lot more trouble. But you know, and some of the steps he's taking I'm like, you really want to get killed in your sleep, don't chew the guns and, and just the callousness. I mean, when you have Cambodia lecturing, you get your human rights abuses. You have a real problem on your hands. I mean, he's pissing off everybody. It's, I really think that the US is partly to blame for for this, whether it's our lack of engagement with the military, which I know is super controversial, but I can spend hours talking about the nuances behind what I mean there. So let me be clear about that. But and I think our own actions, we're not a leader on this. We need to be an example. And we're not and it's just striking that the same people that defended Donald Trump on this, not defend it, but at least let it slide are the same people that are calling for democracy and Myanmar, and you've even had Mike Flynn had a q&a on conferencing, you know, get asked, don't you want what happened and Myanmar happened here. And he's like, yeah, good lord. It's it's very frightening.

Host  2:05:11

Yeah, so I'm being conscious of your time, I just have one question left to leave you with on the coup. And I really appreciate all the time you've taken to dissect your many years of experience and analysis, looking at historically yet, the previous periods of democratic attempts, specifically in 2007, and 1988, to 1991 way to look at these past attempts, attempts, one interpretation is that these failed that these were attempts to try to overthrow a military regime and try to bring democracy and human rights. And they did not succeed. And this current attempt is another opportunity to try to succeed where the others failed. And let's see if they can rewrite the history and to do things differently this time. There are other ways to look at this, however. And that's been and as the resistance has developed, I've been educated to these other different kinds of interpretations. You actually give a different interpretation. In your book, you talk about how not so much seen these past years as failures. And this one is following the pattern, this might be a failure to or maybe it can do things a different way, but you see them as lessons you you write them as they are past experiences to draw upon and to learn from. And this reminds me of, I have a friend who's a Burmese friend who's a documentarian, and his father was very involved in the 9919 88. Period. And he's very involved in this period. And so he he's not only involved themselves, but he has this family institutional history of what they went through. And in talking to him, he was very strong in his belief that it's really inaccurate to say that 1988 or 2007 failed. And that instead, it should be seen as it was an attempt that went as far as it could to that point. And that what happened in those years laid the groundwork for what can happen now, and that it showed what's possible and how to do it, and how to learn from mistakes in the past, as you said, but that he was very adamant that it is very wrong to see ADH and Oh, seven as failures, there are more parts of the history that are leading to this present moment. So I'm wondering your thoughts on trying to discern the meaning and the purpose of 1988 and 2007, looked at in 2022. And, of course, looked at, you know, in 2032, or another year, it's gonna look differently, but looked at in this present moment, as we're trying to understand the, the purpose and the value of these moments, and especially how they're relevant to today, historically, how do you how do you look? And how do you understand what these events mean, towards what we're facing? Now?

Erin Murphy  2:08:02

I don't agree with your friend, I think. I agree with my analysis on the book as well, that these are these are lessons, I don't see them as failures, either. I mean, did they succeed in getting democracy? No. But did they succeed in getting their cause recognized by the world like a Southeast Asian nation that like no one can even pronounce the name, you will know about it. And that's important. laying the groundwork. I mean, if you don't have an opposition to this type of government, like it is 1984, then there's no hope. I haven't really thought of this, this question in a way. So I think I'll be rambling a little bit or speaking to thank you. Nicely. Don't see it. I mean, what you do is you keep getting new generations of people interested in and then they bring in their tools, and their thoughts and their experiences. What we didn't have in 2007, or 1988 is like the milk tea Alliance. You have Hong Kong, Taiwan. I guess India is part of that as well. Myanmar and Thailand and like having them kind of commiserate with each other, but also learn from each other. I mean, the way that the young activists after the coup, were so dazzlingly effective in getting the message out, maintaining the momentum again, it's so easy for me to say as I'm in you know, comfortably sitting in my apartment, the creativity and like the you know, the devastating ways they were able to just run circles around and online now they were out. But, you know, they learned from Hong Kong they learned from her mother's Ukraine is learning from Myanmar and from her Hong Kong and you know, saying this is a great trend, because they're fighting, you know, awful, you know, anti democratic forces and invasions. But if anything, it also focuses, I think getting to your friend's point, it lays bare, what the problems were that you can't kind of kick down the road and say, well, once we fix this, then we can get to the other stuff. Next, we just have to make sure that the NLD stays in power. No, now everybody knows that the sectarian issues are real and problematic and institutional, that ethnic groups dealt with a hell of a lot more than any of them majority Bomar and there's a lot more empathy there. That folks, the new generations don't think that, you know, the ADA generation are old, and you know, they just need to get over it already. You know, this is a new, kind of reminds me of, you know, younger generations here yelling at people, you know, Vietnam that saying, oh, there's no lessons learned. There's a lesson learned there. To the point where hopefully, History doesn't repeat or rhyme, it's, it's it's different. You know, I sincerely hope that we're not having the same conversation 20 years from now saying, Well, you know, if only the military release political prisoners and Aung San su chi and let the 2020 results be recognized. I mean, that's, that's the most depressing part of that. But I don't see that. Hopefully, the days are dark, for sure. And that recent executions of a well known ADA generation student activist, CO, Jimmy, an animal lawmaker, and hip hop artist, she was here at AEI. And the other two that were executed along with them. Boy, that really hurts a lot. And, and then the, the, the saber rattling on executing more. I mean, I just wouldn't be surprised if we see a lot more, folks. And, you know, I think there's a question over what about some of the other folks that we knew that were in government? No. So nothing has failed yet. And I don't see EDA as a failure as well, because look, how we're celebrating the lines of code, Jimmy, and how he's inspiring everybody. I mean, he's a martyr, and all these making ultimate sacrifices that I hope I never have to. So you know, these are dark times. But would that brief, democratic experience in the most recent memories is really hard to put that in the box. And I think, you know, it's our responsibility to help it grow and thrive. I'm not sure if that means arming the opposition or whatnot. But there there are ways. So hopefully, these dark days don't last much longer.

Host  2:12:57

Well, thank you. That was a very full conversation. And thank you for bringing your depth and breadth of analysis to it. And again, your book is Burmese Hayes recommend that to all listeners to check out to go into more depth to these issues. And thanks so much for taking the time to join us for this extended conversation.

Erin Murphy  2:13:13

Thank you so much for having me. I really appreciate it. And thanks to the listeners for tuning in. If you read the book, I hope you enjoy it, but I think we have a lot of work to do going forward.

Host  2:13:24

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2:16:25

Guys, how are Ya?