Transcript: Episode #103: A Delicate Balance
Following is the full transcript for the interview with Kenton Clymer, which appeared on May 12, 2022. This transcript was made possible by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and has not been checked by any human reader. Because of this, many of the words may not be accurate in this text. This is particularly true of speakers who have a stronger accent, as AI will make more mistakes interpreting and transcribing their words. For that reason, this transcript should not be cited in any article or document without checking the timestamp to confirm the exact words that the guest has really said.
00:17
Today on Vietnam, Burma, Buddhism and the sections having to do with Buddhism will be narrated by Guna, the former prime minister.
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speaking to you from the control room of studio 41 is Edward armour. Good afternoon. My last day there are many new small nations around the world, which we know we know but
Host 00:48
welcome to the Insight Myanmar podcast. Before we get into today's show, I wanted to let you know that we have a lot more written and video content on our website. If you haven't visited yet, we invite you to take a look at WWW dot insight myanmar.org In addition to complete information about all of our past podcasts, there's also a variety of blogs books and videos to check out and you can sign up for our regular newsletter as well. But for now enjoy what follows and remember sharing is caring.
01:49
In my way that are they? Are they good? Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, I mean, and it was it was it was.
Host 02:21
I'm happy to be joined here at insight Myanmar podcast by Kevin climber, he is the author of a delicate relationship, the United States and Burma, Myanmar since 1945. Kevin, thanks so much for taking the time to join us here today.
Kenton Clymer 02:36
My pleasure. Thank you for inviting me.
Host 02:39
Yeah, so before we get into the history that you uncover in the book, one of the things I found interesting was just how you reported on that history. And more specifically, you you give a kind of real time analysis of what people are actually thinking and the embassy from the American side and the embassy, State Department, Department of Defense, the CIA, the White House, etc. So you get these real time views that are being reported from 45 on to almost present day of their evaluation of what happened and who was doing it their their critique of the particular leader. And so you get to see their their real, their their real time analysis, limited by what they know and what their concerns are. So I'm just curious, how did you go about documenting the getting access to information of what so many people are writing and thinking and corresponding to that in the moment of making decisions?
Kenton Clymer 03:38
Well, like all historians, so we are interested in historical documents. And, and to a lesser extent, interviews, I did some interviews. But the the documentation is largely found in various public and private archives. From in the United States, the place that historians looking for international relations history go is primarily to the National Archives in Washington, DC, and there are a number of record groups there, which have kept, you know, much of the correspondence that went on between the State Department and and the embassies, in this case, the embassy and Rangoon, Burma. There are also CIA records available at the National Archives. There's a whole raft of them that until recently, were a little more difficult to get to because you actually had to go to Washington DC, to see these records, which are, which are in the case of the CIA are computerized, and you had to go there. The National Archives does not like to have anything but the actual records of the CIA doesn't like to give them actual records. So they reached a compromise whereby they would to digitalize the number of their records. And so you could see them in digital form. And then they would pay for researchers to simply copy them and print them out. But the bulk of the research anyway is actually in State Department documents. And then there are all of the Presidents for that period of time have their own libraries, which often contain materials that are not in the archives, in the National Archives, and then records of certain individuals, as well. So that's, that's how it how it's done. And, you know, it's really quite interesting. You could be looking through these piles of papers, never quite sure what you're going to find. And sometimes you find really unexpected stuff. And so it's, it's sort of fun to do that.
Host 05:45
Was there something unexpected that stands out in your mind that you found while researching this book?
Kenton Clymer 05:51
Well, the one thing which is I have a chapter in the book on Gordon Seagrave, who was the famous Burma surgeon, he was the most well known American in Burma, from the 1930s. Up until his death in 1965. He was a fourth generation a Baptist, a medical missionary, he later broke with a Baptist after World War Two, had this hospital up there on the Chinese border. And I was just looking through the papers in the National Archives and, and discovered that he had been put on trial by the Government of Burma in 1950, for high treason. And lo and behold, there was a whole transcript of the trial. You know, I didn't even know about the trial much less than I'd come across the transcript. And so that was the kind of exciting thing that you occasionally run across.
Host 06:40
Yeah, that was a fun chapter to read about, I'd read his his books that he had wrote during his lifetime. And getting to know about some of the background of the role he played was, the context he was in was definitely quite, quite interesting. As we go ahead and look at this conversation, where we're going to be examining what you uncovered about Burmese US relations, which I think it's quite important to understand today in the current context, we're going to go through the different periods of world history that influenced those relations, the starting with World War Two and the need to defeat the Japanese going towards the independence movement, into the scare of communism, and especially Red China, the Vietnam War was happening, of course, during this time to transition to the war on drugs in Burma was central there, and then to the current generation, you can say, characterized by democracy and human rights. But let's start first looking at the early days I, I know that your book starts off post World War Two, but you do mention the first US Burma relations taking place with trade ships to India that are stopping over in Burma. And the role of teak the role of missionaries, US missionaries going over there came in then and James Buchanan being the first official correspondence of heads instead of as a state of that early relationship with the US pre World War Two, anything that that stands out that that would be important that went on to later characterize the relations between the countries.
Kenton Clymer 08:12
Well, and to start in the beginning, in a sense, after American independence, why the Americans began their own trade with China, which had be begun, of course, back when they were colonies, there was trade with with, with the Asian countries. Some some people will remember the Boston Tea Party in 1773, when they threw the Patriots through chests of taste of tea into the harbor. And you know, that tea didn't wasn't grown in South Carolina. It's grown in China. So there were these connections. And I guess what I was kind of surprised to discover was that, I mean, we started know about the China trade that's very famous. But people know less about the trade with India, which began about same time. And actually, in the earlier days, probably there was more trade with India than there was with China. And some of those ships didn't stop along the way to places like Burma. And so in One famous example, the Burmese Minister before Burma was taken over by the Bertie so as independent kingdom, and at one point with the king, commandeered one of the American Merkin ships and used it in his war with a neighboring kingdom and, and imprison the crew until the war was over with. So things like that. Were very interesting. And then, but but it is certainly true that the most important American interests in Burma in the 19th century were the missionaries. Because although the Americans had very few, if any, where they had, I should say that before the 20th century, they had very few of any missionaries, Protestant missionaries anywhere else in Southeast Asia until the 20th century, and then there were more but the the Baptists ended up going to Burma in 1813. quite by chance, the original Baptist missionaries were supposed to go to India, and did go to India in 1812. But they weren't like there and found they had best leave. And so they left and got on the first ship, which was going to Burma, quite by chance. And so they started their missionary work there at a time when Burma was still an independent country. So following their episodes, at least, a little bit is important in the 19 century, since there were almost no other Americans around in that time. Except for an occasional ship ship stopping there and so forth. Merchants there may have been some merchants, but that the missionaries were by far the most important American community well into the 20th century there.
Host 10:49
That's interesting. And I, of course, there's entire communities of ethnics and Myanmar that trace their conversion back to the American missionaries. And last year, I happened to be reading a book about early Colorado, it was like, you know, the wild west and Colorado and some some memoirs like the mid 18th century. And out in the middle of the book, they referenced Judson, you know, the famous really American missionary who went on to Burma and they, it was a Christian family that was talking and it was a think of a visitor and stopped by a pioneer family and the young boy was saying he wanted to grow up to be like Jetson, and I was like, wow, this is, you know, he's really kind of a celebrity among the Christian communities. And here I am reading a book, a 19th century memoir of in Colorado, when referencing Jetson it blew my mind.
Kenton Clymer 11:36
Oh, that is really interesting. Yeah. Justin was the Jetsons were the first missionaries. There was a Cuban 1813. Yeah. And then I I taught it to Northern Illinois University and in Rockford, Illinois. No, in I think Elgin, Illinois nearby. There is a Judson college and part of that heritage.
Host 11:57
Right, right. And then just speeding along until we get to the post world war two era that your book focuses on. We have world war two we have the Burma Road, the ledo Road, Flying Tigers, OSS, department 101, the Secret Service there, the kitchen Rangers, coordination with different ethnic groups just going at at warp speed all the different parts of American involvement in World War Two. Again, I know your book picks up from postwar period. So we don't want to spend too much time here that Burma theater would be an entire podcast or series of podcasts on its own. But the question I want to leave you with here concerning World War Two is, what legacy Do you feel the American involvement in Burma and World War Two had going forward? That's important for us to know about.
Kenton Clymer 12:48
Of course, Burma was was hardly the central point of the war for the United States. But it did serve the purpose that the Americans didn't want China to stay in the war. And so when all of the other avenues into China were closed off by the Japanese, Burma was, for a time the only way to get supplies into into China. And then when the Japanese finally conquered Burma altogether, why the only way left was to fly the very difficult trans Himalayan flights of supplies into into China. I think the other thing which came out of it to me, and something I wasn't all that familiar with, is the split between the ethnics as you mentioned before the various minority groups in Burma, of which there are many. And the Burman population, that they were, they had quite different perspectives on things very often. The missionaries were were active more mostly among the ethnic peoples, the hill peoples tribal groups, as they were called. And in World War Two, they were, many of them were quite valiantly supportive of the Allied cause. Whereas the Berman's were ambivalent, and, indeed, sometimes favored the Japanese as a way of getting the British out. In fact, on Zion, the leader of the most important of the nationalist leaders, for independence, had led an army which fought with the Japanese until he changed his sights toward the end of the war. So I found all of that quite, quite interesting. It did, the war did for those people who were interested in including the State Department, it did educate them about Burmese conditions. And the Americans generally came out of the war, supportive of Burmese independence. And so I think the war was was fairly significant in terms of the future.
Host 14:55
Right and as far as the British background went, the British of course had a broom was a colony. And as the war ended, there was definitely a split among different British departments of those that that that had seen the Berman's and seen general long song, something of a trader and someone that did not want to work with and really aligned themselves with the ethnics who they, they felt
Kenton Clymer 15:20
some of them on it, whether or not with any of them wanted to arrest Him for treason.
Host 15:24
That's right. So that's right. So there's this real split among the British about which direction to support and who to align with and whether, who, who sees allies and how to see the nation going forward. With the Americans at the time of the post war period and the strive for independence and the Burman ethnic split, what was the American views on what they wanted? Or what they saw the years after the war?
Kenton Clymer 15:50
Well, I would say from during the war Franklin Roosevelt's I think you can quite characters do quite well as an anti colonialist about as advanced and anti colonialist as the President could could probably be, he did express some kind of straight, stereotypical negative views of the Burmese, some famous ones, but those were directed at Churchill. So maybe he was just playing up to Churchill's, you know, sentiments about the Burmese. But after the war, my sense is that the Americans were quite open to any of the Southeast Asian independence movements, as long as they were not communist. The communist issue, you know, grew up was growing soon after the war. And as long as they could be defined as non communist, why the Americans were, were supportive of of that, even if a little bit ambivalent, because of their connections with the British, of course, over time the Americans had, they met me, we do have an anti colonial past, going back to the revolution. But at the same time, that was an heavily compromised 20th century since the British, which was the largest and most important colonial country was also our ally. But yeah, the war was born with that the Americans, I think we're quite pleased when Burma did get its independence, although fearful of the future, because Burma was having so many problems.
Host 17:18
Right, of course, and we'll get into those once Burma got its independence. And American established America establish relations with them. I noticed from reading your book a few aspects of that the Americans were prioritizing and their relations with with Burma at that time. One were growing economic goals and, and cooperation on that sphere. Another was education. And were a Fulbright program there as well as educating Burmese in the US. And then a third was the ongoing legacy of the missionaries. What are your thoughts on this period? If I left anything out? Or how would you highlight these priorities that they had at the time?
Kenton Clymer 18:00
Well, the Americans wanted to, I mean, they welcome Burma's independence. But they were concerned about the Chinese having undue influence in Burma, as you know, the this is the end period for the Chinese revolution with mouths a tongue dry driving, driving towards towards victory. And so the Americans were were concerned and hope to hope that the Burmese would, would essentially, if not be exactly on our side, at least be anti communist. And that was a problem in a sense, because as I noted in the book, actually, the American perception of, of the early Burmese government under who knew was that? Well, one, the American ambassador thought that he was essentially a communist in terms of his philosophy. And yet, despite all of that, the Americans, I think, made the shrewd decision that that they ought to support Burmese independence and support the Central Government of Burma, because they did ultimately conclude that that that was the best course of keeping Burma independent, even if they were suspicious of the philosophy of some of the leadership. I don't know if that got exactly the your question that jumped out to me anyway, at the moment. Yeah, well,
Host 19:23
we can go in that direction. So looking at who knew that that was something I wanted to inquire about was what the evaluation was of him at the time. And this is another of those cases where I think it's just so valuable reading how you're documenting the view at the time, because when we look back today, in Burmese history, it's very tempting to see who was kind of the last decent man who was trying to leave Burma and he was, he was, he believed in democracy. And he was, it was the coup that took democracy from him and it's disappeared ever since until the 2000 10s. And so we have a different view based on what we knew happened at the time, but yeah, At the moment, as you catalog, there was some concerns that he was a good man. But he was, he was weak, he was sympathetic to the communists. There was some concerns about him and of course, different departments of the US government, depending on what their perspective was, looked at him and they win. And they went, of course, being the dictator who took over in 1962, that looked at them in different ways, according to their perspective. So how would you characterize the American Evaluation of Ooh noon, knowing that it's not a blanket statement that it changed over the years, according to departments and people? With that kind of that kind of difference? depending on who's looking and when they're looking at how would you characterize how he was saying?
Kenton Clymer 20:44
Well, I think it's, first of all, maybe we ought to point out that he was not intended to be the prime minister. Of course, everyone assumed that on thong would be the first prime minister. But as you most of your listeners would know, Anton was assassinated, six months before Burma was scheduled to become independent, and so who knew kind of inherited that, and then he came in, you know, and, and Burma was in such a such bad shape. And soon after he came in, he was beset by revolutions, including to Communist revolutions. And various the Korean rebellion, the kitchens, other ethnic groups going into resistance or rebellion, Oakland rebellion. And so one has to be sort of sympathetic with the situation that Who knew Who knew faced. So I think that the Americans, as you said, they thought they saw who knew as a very good person, a very religious person. But they did think that he was not a very good administrator. Aside from his possible, his philosophy, which was definitely socialist, and in the view is all Americans was was a he couldn't tell much of the communists. But they did admire the fact that he did take on the local communists, the Burmese Communist Party, and their rebellion, which began soon after independence, he went after them. And he, he, for a time, I believe, if I'm not mistaken about this, he kicked them out of the governing party, although did not rule out, some of them might be able to come back into it. And so they sort of admired that. But they, they, they, you know, in the early Cold War years, why there was concern about weak leaders in these third world countries, not being able to stand up to, to communism, and there was concern about whether who knew was strong enough to, to do that. And so they looked at me when, who actually in 1950, or 51, had gone so far as to convey to the Americans, his willingness to have the Americans to to to aside essentially, with the Americans in the Cold War, as long as they would retain a sustaining financing for for the military, and sending trainers over and that kind of thing. And then he eventually backed away from that. But here, he was showing that, you know, he was truly anti communist and favorable to the United States. And here's who knew, who is much more appears to be much more genuine, genuinely neutral. I do think in terms of just have a slight to side side mark here, that the United States in the Cold War, especially the Euro card is seen, he has seen often is looking at things very black and white, you know, you either for us or you're against us. And yet, despite their concerns with who knew. And also one might say, despite the fact that the people who are resisting who knew the Koreans and some of the other ethnic people have been strong supporters of the United States, strong supporters of the West and the British. And yet, in the end, the United States decided that it ought to throw its weight behind the Government of Burma, despite its its, you know, sympathies, there's kind of a real politic, judgment, which made made a lot of sense. But anyway, then, when, when they when decided to take over in 1958, in a kind of coup, which the American ambassador called a polite coup. You know, the Americans were not at all unhappy about that. And that the Americans had nothing to do with the origins of it, as far as I know. But they, they they saw advantages here, here is a win, more reliably anti communist, and a good administrator who will bring military military judgments toward how to run the society. And so it'll be run more easily and Burma will be safe. I mean, Rangoon will be safe and the streets cleaned up and this kind of thing. And so they were not unhappy with him taking over, but then he kept kept in power for too long.
Host 24:53
Right, right. Going back to your earlier point, I think it's really insightful and interesting going back to look at it that who they decided to support and seeing that you have these ethnic groups that are that were the Christian missionaries lived among. So there was a lot of experience in previous generations and contacts with Americans going there. Of course, these were the closer allies during World War Two who they fought alongside. And then you had a in the period of the 1950s. That was such a period of conflict and Myanmar, Burma at the time. You had, you mentioned the communists, but the Krenn really had a very serious rebellion that they knew had to confront. So what can you tell us about what the aims of the Koreans were and the threat they posed and the American decision of how they wanted to respond to it?
Kenton Clymer 25:45
Well, I think the larger point is that the Koreans in particular, but also many of the other ethnic groups, were very suspicious of the union of Burma, which would have a Berman majority and Berman control, because for a long time, they had not been getting along particularly well, with the Berman's. It's sometimes said that the British had encouraged this with a kind of divide and conquer rule. And there may be something to that, but I think there there were other reasons as well, why they were suspicious of each other. And so so the, the Koreans wanted, either in autonomous area of Burma that they would essentially control or an independent Korean state. And, you know, they weren't negotiations about that. But they never ultimately, came to anything they win was very much opposed to this, incidentally, you know, he was opposed to making concessions to these minority groups. But there were efforts to do it, but they never, they never came to anything. And so, you know, the rebellion continued. I guess it's still going on in some respects. And so it's the longest lasting civil war in the world or something like that. So they want to they want an autonomous area or an independent state, as I understand it.
Host 27:11
Right, right. And it's really remarkable to look back today and to realize that American policy actually had the choice of supporting the claims of what some of these ethnic areas wanted that America that the Americans were more closely aligned with, historically, and yet they supported the strong central Burman government. And this is still a conflict that's playing out today.
Kenton Clymer 27:35
Yep. They made it very explicit that they did not support the Koreans or others.
Host 27:41
Yeah. And there were individual Americans that were quite upset about that you chronicle over the next several decades. Various individual missionaries, as well as ex soldiers that are breaking with official American policy by or in some cases, maybe being a part of covert American policy, but they they are living among the ethnics and supporting their own revolution and dependence.
Kenton Clymer 28:03
Great. Yes, there certainly were some like that. The the, I think in the case of the missionary community, which I know the best, I think they they probably everyone was very sympathetic to the Koran. So whether they actually engaged in an activity designed to to help them in against the permits, I think it's questionable, but they certainly sympathize with them.
Host 28:27
Right? Right. So we're talking a bit about the ethnics and some of the conflict that was going on between them and the Berman's. But looking now to the communists and there there was the Burma Communist Party, the BCP. And there was also the civil war in China, which Mao was winning, and the this fear of communism, the domino effect and the specter of China they all weighing really heavy on American policy in the region. Can you tell us what the Americans were doing in Burma at this time to try to prevent the advance of communism from taking hold in Burma and just the importance they saw in Burma at this time?
Kenton Clymer 29:06
The Well, there are a number of things with with respect to the government, again, the Americans are supporting the government. And they they want to have they want to extend assistance, economic assistance, they want to extend military acceptance, military assistance, as well. And they want to encourage the Burmese to, you know, indicate that they don't want to work with the Chinese Communist. Having said that, there is one area where they are not supporting the Government of Burma and that was the covert support that the American government took towards the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist forces had been, had been driven out or escaped into, into northern Burma, several 1000 of them escaping beginning in 1949 and can to you over the next couple of years had built up a, and they're already there. They're run by a General Jim General Lee me who, I guess is quite a competent person in terms of his military skills. And they they were there and the fact that they were there and organized and threatening to invade Yunnan Province, southern province of China, there was something which deeply bothered the Burmese, because this would give the Chinese the new Chinese government an excuse to move into Burma, you know, to, to root out these nationalist soldiers that were were there. And the American and all of the American ambassadors who were there during this period of time, thought sympathized with the Burmese about all of this. But the CIA, with the support, obviously, if the President was secretly supporting the Kuomintang forces, the KMT, forces, the Chinese Nationalist forces there and trying to hims arming them and bringing supplies into them and this kind of thing. And the Burmese knew all about this, but from their own intelligence, but the American ambassadors didn't know about it officially, but were often able to figure it out. And that that caused serious serious rifts between the Burmese Government and the United States government in this period. So the the purpose, you know, obviously, is to stop the spread of communism, but usually, while they're supportive of the Government of Burma, and there's one instance that they were not, perhaps I should put it in context to this is while the Korean war is going on, the Korean War starts in the summer of 1950. And to the extent that there was any strategic thinking about how, why the Americans ought to support the Nationalist Chinese in Burma, it was that the Chinese entered the war and the Korean War in the fall of 1950. And so if you could start a kind of a second front down there in the south, they might have to withdraw some of their troops from the north take some pressure off of the North. This was all very foolish thinking. I think most people think now, certainly, the American ambassador is masters did. But that, in any case, the the very fact that it was there, the very fact that the Burmese figured it all out why it was a terrible, it caused terrible difficulties for the relationship for a number of years.
Host 32:38
And one of the things I was interested to read in your book about that period was the split in the American community of, of that action and of the, the, the wise course of action that one should be pursuing. Because, of course, the the different departments of the United States at that time, we're all aligned and wanting to stop the spread of communism. And yet the CIA is taking this undertaking, this action that it believes is, is undermining communist influence in Burma. And yet, people on the ground as ambassadors, as you mentioned, the people in the embassy are declaring the opposite. They're saying they have the same goals, but they're saying what you're doing is going to make it a powder keg, where communism by supporting the KMT, you're actually giving rise to conditions that are going to make the spread of communism much, much more dangerous. So there's that split in, in in evaluating the course of these actions.
Kenton Clymer 33:33
And in addition to that the nationalist troops in and their families and so forth in Burma are misbehaving at least they reports that there's you know, pillaging villages and so forth. And so the Burmese don't want them walk in there. It's just a bad situation.
Host 33:53
And this is all looking at it from the angle of American fears about China's potential influence on Burma. But what what do we know about Burma's attitude towards this rising Communist China? What are their priorities and interest at this time?
Kenton Clymer 34:07
Well, all along, you mean down to the present time, they have to be concerned and aware of China because they have a very long border with China. What is the 1500 miles or something like that? Very long border with China. And so of course, they are going to have a little different views of it than the Americans might at some distance away. So it's always a factor in their thinking during that time and, and up to the up to the present time. But they, they don't want to be dominated by China. And so even if they have to be aware of China, even if they might sympathize with China, sometimes they don't want to be under the dominating influence of China or anybody else, for that matter. And that's pretty consistent, I think, all through that last part of the 20th century. down to the present time. And that's evident in this period, as well. In terms of well to jump ahead just a little bit, today wins rule two. And a win doesn't like a close connection with China, but during his intact during his term in office, after the Americans and new wind have kind of made up why there are anti Chinese riots in Burma. And I suspect no one is kind of encouraging that maybe, and they almost break diplomatic relations. And the Chinese are calling him all sorts of unpleasant names. So it's a kind of a balancing act, they unnamed, they know China's there, they know they have to deal with China. China can provide certain things for them as well. So that's, that's they're, they're they're ambivalent, but they, they they don't want China, as far as I can tell to dominate in Burma at all, nor the United States nor the British or the Indians.
Host 36:09
Right, so to put a bow on this chapter on the KMT and the CIA covert support, what ends up happening with the American relationships to the KMT. And then once that does start to dissipate what happens to those remnants of KMT in Burma?
Kenton Clymer 36:25
You know, that's an interesting and kind of murky question. Initially, the Americans were, as we've said, supportive of the KMT, the CIA, continued its support since 1952, probably 1953, maybe even part of 1954. But eventually, there was so much pushback on it that they agreed the United States agreed to put pressure on Taiwan to end this, this fiasco, and get out as many troops as it was reasonable to or possible to, to get out of Burma. I mean, this was in Chiang Kai Shek, or was was, you know, initially, very much opposed, opposed to this, and resisted the Americans. But in 1954, under American pressure, they did agree to withdraw some of their troops. It's a complicated story, actually, because initially, Chiang Kai Shek had had agreed to do it. But it was intended as kind of a hoax, a full withdrawal. But then he changed his mind and decided on a real withdrawal, keeping that quite secret because of the fear that the nationalists in Burma would would resist. But in the end, they withdrew a six or 7000 of their troops in 1954. But that still left several 1000 Troops, or our KMT people in in Burma. And, and it kept flaring up from time to time. There was a flare up in in the late 1950s. And then certainly in 1960 61, which caught one of the reasons I think that today when decided he had to come back in power. He was very angry at the United States, because of the KMT situation, they blamed the United States for continuing to support the KMT. So I'm not sure whether the United States was still involved in the 1960s with the KMT. But they were still some of them were still there. Some of them were still causing problems. And one thing which I forgot to mention, at one point, who knew secretly allowed the Chinese Communist to send in troops to drive out the KMT. Yes. And so for a period of time they were they did that. So the KMT is were weakened. And but you know, they're still they're still Chinese villages in the northern part of Burma. They got involved in the opium trade later on. As far as I guess, there's still Chinese villages there.
Host 39:01
So we could move on to 1958, which was where they when initially took over power. You mentioned that the Americans called this a polite coup, and that it was not altogether unwelcome that some sod is bringing stability along order, certainly anti-communism, even though democracy was suspended. And it appears that may when was you couldn't necessarily say it was poorly regarded there. There was a reporter to where they characterize him as temperamental or superstitious. There was quotes, you put emotional and subjective factors. So how did the Americans see this 1950 a takeover and how do they view the winds specifically?
Kenton Clymer 39:43
I think that that comment about the negative comment about Newing goes back to something that Ambassador key might have said in the early 1950s kind of warning against a win. But the Americans were generally happy With what he did in 1958, when he took over from new EU in this kind of constitutional coup, and only, only after he did not quickly turn things back into a democratic state, I guess he was thought he would, he certainly would do six months, it took him 18 months, the Americans became uneasy with new wind. And were not unhappy when he turned to when he did allow a fair election, which who knew one quite easily, much to his distress, and maybe somewhat to the US distress, as well. And the Americans, the wind, then then said that, over time over the next year and a half or so that anyone was in when you knew was in power, again, that the things were really turning to the way they had been, which was not very good in terms of law and order, and stability.
Host 41:02
Of course, a big turning point in the relationship between the United States and knee when particularly was his visit to Walter Reed Hospital. Can you tell us what happened?
Kenton Clymer 41:14
Yeah, that that was another interesting thing to find in the archives for me. In 1960, when he was out of power as Prime Minister, I guess he's still minister of defense, maybe he goes to Washington, DC, he's invited to Washington to see the Americans wanted him to come. And he came in the the, the visit was a disaster for a number of things. And they, when they when was someone who did not like a lot of formal meetings, and so forth, are formal occasions. But the Americans plan some and especially some meetings that he was supposed to attend, and he did attend them. And then the Americans who are going to be there weren't there. And it was all very embarrassing. And that certainly didn't help. But the most egregious thing that happened was when he was in Walter Reed Hospital, he was, I think, a bit of a hydro hypochondriac, although he did have some serious issues. And when he'd go to these England or the United States, he would check into these hospitals to be checked out. And he's, he's in the hospital. And his wife, Kitty is there along with her entourage. And they're going up and down the hall or looking for a nurse or something. And then a screeching voice comes out from one of the neighboring rooms, using a racial epithet and telling him to get out of there. And this is an end the this and the voice, which who said that might have been Mamie Eisenhower, the wife of the wife of the president, which, you know, is kind of is a little unexpected, because maybe Eisenhower had a reputation as being quite moderate on racial issues and so forth. But I, when I found out about that, I was actually in Washington, I was at the Wilson Center for a few months, very kind of them to invite me and work on this book. And one of the perks of being at the Wilson Center is that you get a, an assistant to help you. And I asked my assistant, these are students, mostly graduate students, or undergraduate students actually one case, and I said, you know, this is, this is the day that day when was in the hospital, and this thing happened? And could you check and see if maybe Eisenhower was in the hospital at that particular time? I didn't know how to check. And in two minutes, he found out and I said that she was there. And I said, Well, how did you find that out? And he said, Well, I looked at the White House locks. And Eisenhower, President Eisenhower had gone to visit his wife on that day or something. And so there she was, she was in the hospital, they obviously both would have been in the VIP section. And so it's not at all impossible that had happened. And there was some evidence that it was so she. So the upshot of that was that this, this plus the renewal of the KMT activities about the same time, turned near when bitterly anti American. And when he got back to Burma, he just fumed about what what had happened. He told one, one Burmese informants said that, that he was so angry that he would not eat American corn. You know, he's just any very, very, very angry about what what had happened. And this, the Americans knew this. The Americans in the State Department knew all of this. And they tried desperately to get him to come back to the United States to to make up and eventually, four years later, or no, six years later, really, in 1966, they did persuade him to come back for his state visit. And they pulled out all the stops with President Johnson to, to make make amends for what had happened in 1966. And there is for any of your listeners, which might be interesting, if you look on YouTube, you can find a little public relations. Thing about about this visit that he made to Washington in 1966. It's really very interesting. And it's only about 10 minutes, but it shows all the pomp and circumstance and the parade in Washington and going to Walter Reed Hospital and meeting with President Johnson and, and the State Department people. And it's just all it's a little piece of propaganda, but it's really very interesting. See, that that actually seemed to help actually, with the relationship he after that the relationship was not close, but it was probably better.
Host 45:54
So before we get to 1962, I realized I just want to back up for one final moment, and that was what you you alluded to this early on in the talk, Gordon Seagrave, you have a whole chapter on his life and his trial and the importance of that in Burma US relations. So what was that?
Kenton Clymer 46:13
Well, he was charged with treason, high treason, for allegedly assisting the Korean rebels. The Korean rebels led by not saying who I guess is actually a chin but was in charge of the Korean Army at that point, came to his town of Nam calm near the Chinese border in Shan State, and took it over. And then they were there for a while. And then the Burmese army came in and drove them out and stay in the hospital area for a while. And so, the Burmese charged him with helping the the Koreans by giving them military or giving them medical supplies and and sympathizing with them and so forth. And so they brought him to they arrested him and brought him to Rangoon, and he's to trial. for that. I thought it was quite a fair trial. This is early after Burmese independence. And the court actually throughout the hour did not convict him of high treason that convicted him of a lesser charge of assisting someone who was committing high treason. And this in terms of US relations here, the State Department is very leery about him appealing these things, because they they realize that this is causing the strain and US relations because of Seagraves reputation back in the United States. And here, the saintly surgeon you know is being put on trial by these colonial peoples. And but but Seagrave appeals and then on appeal, they, the appeals court throws out the most important charge. But it continues, there's one other charge which is the left in, but they free him for time served, so to speak, he's free to free free to go. And the State Department is hoping that that'll be the end of it. But Seagrave finally decides to appeal that as well to the Supreme Court of Burma. And the in the end, that court exonerates him, although it warns him and says it's all your fault, you brought it on yourself by actions which an ordinary citizen might well have considered, you know, subversive. So it was very interesting. And then then he went back to, then he got permission to go back to Nam calm, and the wind was very much opposed to this, incidentally, that was what delayed him got going back to NomCom. And thereafter, I'm working on this right now. But thereafter, he doesn't seem to have done anything that would damage his dealings with the government. And in fact, there was certainly a reconciliation within a matter of two or three years. So it's an interesting kind of, kind of case.
Host 49:11
Oh, yes, yes, certainly, it was definitely an interesting chapter. And then moving along to a very significant date in Burmese history in 1962. This is the final takeover by me when that sets in motion, decades and decades of military government with just a slight transition that was attempted by another coup last year, as we all know, but let's look at 1962. So knee when takes over. The American response to this, again, is quite grounded in their view and their concern, their fear, really of a communist takeover. And so through that prism, how do they view the events of 1962?
Kenton Clymer 49:53
Well, I don't know if they are quite as favorable today as they were in 1950. Eight. But they don't like what they win does in the sense of snuffing out civil liberties and, and this kind of thing. But they they do learn. And of course, he's very anti American at that point, this is not so long, you know, after his experiences in Washington, but they do conclude that he is genuinely non aligned. And while he certainly isn't going to be close to the Americans or the West, in general, he's also not going to turn the country over to the Chinese, or the Russians. And so the Americans say that they can live with him. It's not going to be a close relationship. But they can live with that. And so they make their peace essentially, with with a win. And that's how that's how it goes for, you know, the rest of the other decades.
Host 50:56
Yeah, it seems really seems like between 1962 and 1988, aside from maybe 74, which was the funeral of the Secretary General event, and there was a bit of a skirmish there. It's really a pretty dark period, where not much is happening in terms of the relations and you report on various American observers and ambassadors who simply seem to say every few years like Yep, he's still not aligned, he's still not really a threat and things and civil liberties and poverty is, is still getting worse and worse, but there's nothing we could really do. And there's not much concern we really have to have. And that's, that seems to characterize the relationship for those those years.
Kenton Clymer 51:39
Yeah, it's, I mean, it's probably no one's doing in the sense the day when it's isolating his country, and it doesn't want foreign contact. And he kicks out most foreigners. He, the, I guess, the group that suffered the most probably with the Indians. And because they controlled much of them, many of them were merchants and moneylenders, and so forth. And they weren't, they had to return to India. But the Americans also were kicked out, they kicked out the Ford Foundation, they kicked out the Asia, Asia Society, Asia Foundation, the foundation of society. And they, they seized all private property, including all of this several 100 schools that the Baptist missionaries had, and their hospitals and nationalize them. And all the missionaries had to leave. So they win is is you know, drawing, drawing, drawing into his shell or into the shell berm is not friendly with foreign countries, there's a time when tourist visas are only good for 24 hours. And then for a long time, just for seven days. And, and there is there is that, but and all that but but you know, but as the result of that to the American, he's no longer his much of a factor in the Cold War. There was concern there was concerned about his views toward Vietnam. Of course, Vietnam was going on in the 60s. And there was, that was another reason for inviting him to Washington so that he would, hopefully, if not side with the Americans in Vietnam, not not follow the Chinese advice, which was to condemn the Americans in Vietnam. And so when it became apparent that, that he would not attack the Americans, or necessarily take the Chinese side of things, and Vietnam, that that helped remove him remove Burma as a factor in that situation. And then, of course, beginning with Nixon in the 1919 71, the United States begins to change his policy toward China, you know, that's when he fly in 72 in Beijing when he flies to Beijing. And so suddenly, the Americans are cozying up to China as a way of kind of containing the Soviet Union. And so it is in China is Chinese Burma relations are, okay. So there, it's just, it's just no longer that much of an important factor in the, in the Cold War. But as part of that, he for bad Burmese diplomats from talking with American diplomats on most occasions, one of my friends actually was the consulate Mandalay in the late 70s. And, you know, he didn't have a lot to do, he couldn't talk to his Burmese counterparts. And so, you know, they're kind of they're kind of twiddling their thumbs, because there's just not much to do with the one exception, which you're probably going to get to the narcotics. And they're there. That's the one area of connection.
Host 54:43
Yeah, and we'll get to that in just a moment. There was one other thing I wanted to touch on in this period, where not much is going on. One big thing is the Vietnam War, and you touched on that. The other thing that I wanted to get to was there are a couple of attempted coos rebellions, revolutions that are fomenting among the ethnic groups sometimes supported by some measure of support. We're not exactly sure what by former OSS members or missionaries playing some role, there's a new who's also trying to do something. And these different attempts are trying to get us support, and they all just fall flat. So what can you tell us about these attempts to unseat the wind during this period?
Kenton Clymer 55:24
Oh, I think the Americans are kind of curious about it, but I don't think they're they ever were seriously thinking of getting involved in it. You knew and just kind of interesting, he did gather some steam. He was in the United States talking about it. What there was a plane that came over and dropped leaflets over brand goo, which embarrassed the Burmese that they couldn't stop that the pilot was an American. But I don't think the American government was ever involved in anything serious in terms of compromising activity against the government. There's one thing I can think of is that the CIA did run some listening posts up along the border with China, I guess aimed to China in Shan State. And in return, they paid the Shan what is the one of the Shawn armies to protect them? And so that since that was kind of an infringement on promesa sovereignty, I guess,
Host 56:23
what stood out to me that I didn't know was who was involvement, I think I had some inkling that he was trying something but just how far he got that he was actually on the Thai border. I can't quite remember the details. But I think in coordination with some some people in the Thai military authorities who were supported him and there was a training camp and was actually pretty far along the possibility of looking to do something and never materialized. But it wasn't just talk it was actually building up to, to what could have been a encouraging revolution from the Thai side.
Kenton Clymer 56:58
And they had a couple of radio stations, I think, broadcasting into Burma, maybe in Burma, but mostly in Thailand, I think, you knew had political asylum in Thailand. Yeah, the ties, the ties were involved in all of these things. Of course, they were involved with the with the Chinese Nationalist forces as well as the United States, and they were facilitating the CIA and its efforts to supply the Chinese Nationalists. So there's a lot of Thai interest here, the Chinese, the Burmese, and the Thais don't always get along very well, as you probably know.
Host 57:32
Yeah. And definitely seeing how the countries and the peoples are changing the relationship in the decades. I mean, right. Right now the Burmese Thai authorities are really no friends of the Burmese people. By and large, the Thai people are different that Thai people on the border have there are reports of them welcoming refugees these days. But you know, Thailand is not a great democracy either. So it was it was interesting to read back at that point that the Thai side was actually encouraging the news, the tempted rebellion against the Burmese military, because certainly there's they're much more friendlier relations between the militaries today.
Kenton Clymer 58:10
We had the Thai for the Thai foreign minister came out to my university a few years ago, and he was asked about the Thais relationships with Burma. And he was bemoaning the fact he said that the only thing that the Thais know about Burma is that in 1859 1757 the Burmese sakta UTS
Host 58:35
right I remember going to Shwedagon the famous pagoda and Yangon with some Thai friends one time and she smiled and looked at the all the gold on the pagoda and said like how much do you think this is Thai gold? And then she laughed and she's joking. But she laughed. And she said, I guarantee you every type person that comes here, they're gonna make that joke. I don't think that thing. So how much how much of the shredding on gold came from Thailand? Moving on to the the war on drugs, which you would what you would for just before? So Right. This is the other big thing that's happening before 1988 and other Touchstone moment that there becomes a concern with drug.
Kenton Clymer 59:14
Well, this is the be if if I'm not mistaken, this is the beginning of our famous war on drugs. Nixon, President Nixon was concerned about about cheap, heroin, I guess and other opioids that were making their way to Vietnam, which American soldiers who were taking and obviously not hindering their, their military abilities, I guess. And so he's very concerned about that, plus the fact that American cities were beginning to be kind of inundated with drugs or at least reportedly so and as my as I understand it, in the past, most of these drugs had come from Turkey, through France and ultimately came to the United States but beginning in the 60s, the Golden Triangle area where Burma and Thailand and Laos come together. There, there was a drug industry there, which was beginning to become increasingly important. And that was where the drugs were getting to the Americans in, in Vietnam, and then I guess also in the United States as well. So, you know, one reads about heroin. If you've read down McCoy's book, the politics of heroin, heroin and opium from opium was was were coming, I don't know really what other kinds of opiates were being produced. But heroin was the what was the big one I have gathered that was being grown at that time, and it involves different groups in in Burma, the Chinese, I mean, the the Nationalist Chinese, some of the, some of the ethnic groups were also growing opium, it was a lot more profitable and growing other crops. Hand, the Burmese government, in fact, underneath when at least initially was very much opposed to overuse opioids. And that's why there was some cooperation between the United States and his government there on that one issue. He was happy to have American intelligence reports about about this subject, caravans moving and so forth in various areas, which he accepted. Ultimately, he accepted American helicopters and American fixed wing airplanes to suppress the trade. And that was controversial because what they were spraying, among other things, I guess, was the chemical two, four D, which is, I guess, partly the same thing that's an agent orange. And eventually protests grew up about, about that. I don't know how effective it was. I talked with the one of the American ambassadors who had been there in the 1980s. And he seemed to think that it was at least partly effective. Although, although, you know, the the amounts, the amounts, which came out didn't seem to be decreasing over time. So I don't know, from the standpoint of American Burmese relations, I think the the one thing which stood out to me is that this was the only way the only issue about which the Americans could really talk talk to the Burmese. And so American diplomats could actually talk to those in Burma who were involved in, in trying to suppress the drug trade, or with American diplomats, that had some interest in that whole thing. And so that gave them some, some ability to get into what was happening in Burma.
Host 1:02:46
And the they were collaborating with the Americans providing, as you mentioned, different military equipment and chemicals meant purely for the eradication of the crops. But these were then used for different purposes, the the ethnic suffered under the chemicals. And as a side note that you might find interesting I, I mentioned to a mutual friend that I was gonna be talking with you and she referenced a visit that she took to the I don't remember the exact name the armed forces or Tabata Museum in Myanmar, that she went to with David Matheson, who, of course, is a noted writes about humanitarian aid and, and the conflict and Myanmar for some time. And they went to visit this together and referencing your book, David told my friend, as they were walking through there, there were actually exhibits of some of the military helicopters in the museum that had placards that were indicating that they were being used for military missions. And these were some of these some of this equipment, through his through David's knowledge, knew that this was the equipment that was provided for the drug trade and the tatmadaw Museum was openly promoting it being used for military purposes, even though of course it was this went against the design and their promises that that it would be used only for the opium in the eradication of drugs.
Kenton Clymer 1:04:08
Well, they actually it wasn't quite that cut and dried, because the agreements did give them the right to use it for other purposes, if it wasn't being used for, for spraying. And there was a lot of debate about the Burmese six, you know, interpreting that very, very liberally. And the Americans hoping that that wasn't entirely the case. So it was a little bit, but at least they certainly were not intended to be used mostly, you know, for military purposes as the critics claim that they that they were.
Host 1:04:43
Another thing that surprised me about this section was you're referencing a when there's been someone who is so staunchly anti at least at the beginning, anti drug anti corruption not just anti drug in terms of wanting not to see drugs in Burmese society but not even wanting to profit off of them in financially, and knowing what we know now about the close ties between the drug trade and where the top military gets its income among many other revenue sources. It was it was surprising and interesting for me to read how, how anti and not just anti drug but also anti corruption that that may when was regarded, even in contrast to news government not not as not so much who knew of themselves but the the government, the shaky government that he was leading knew when was really seen as someone that was strongly and authentically in the beginning, anti drug anti corruption and having these values.
Kenton Clymer 1:05:37
Well, my sense and it's only a sense is that over time, apparently the drug trade was actually quite important to Burma's economy generally. And that they had to tolerate a certain amount of it. And I guess later on some of the military people were involved in the director, not initially, they wouldn't was really very careful about that. But I think over time, maybe he had to relax his is his views on that. I can't give you any statistics on how many? Yeah,
Host 1:06:09
one last point before we get to 1988. I believe you reference in your book that even during this terrible authoritarian period, where we see the diminished rights going, and the lack of human rights generally in the amount of time, there are members of the top another being that are going to the United States and receiving some kind of training. Is that right?
Kenton Clymer 1:06:32
Yes. Yesterday that was quite common with American relations with Southeast Asian countries that, that if they could train help train the military, then they would, they saw that as the best bastion for close ties and anti communist postures. And so the Americans did have a small training program that in the Burmese had agreed to it. That brought Burmese officers to the US for for a training. Yes. Sometimes it was interrupted, depending if there were bad relations. But yeah, it I don't know when it faded out, but it certainly was there.
Host 1:07:16
Right. That was another thing that surprised me. Moving tonight, nada. This is the second real Touchstone moment in recent Burmese history after 1960 to 88, everything breaks loose, everything comes out in the open with the civil unrest and protests against the authoritarian, increasingly authoritarian nature of NATO wins regime at the time. Can you lay out from 1988 and 89 and 90 as things progressed, what was happening and the American response at this time?
Kenton Clymer 1:07:51
Well, after, you know, after the Burmese government crackdown on people who came out to protest, and on thanks, a chi had begun to take sort of command of everything. The American, those Americans, at least two were aware of what was happening and interesting, interested in what was happening, we're highly critical, of course of, of new when and the and the tabernacle and the Burma government in general, for the atrocities that they had committed to several 1000 people killed. And a lot of people arrested and so forth. What happened and this was kind of a theme in the last part of the book there is that that there does develop a difference in approach between the Congress on the one hand and the administration's on the other about how to respond to it. And the anger found particular expression in the Congress, which wanted to impose the heart sanctions right away on the Government of Burma, try to stop exports and imports and get American firms to withdraw, and that kind of thing. And the response of the administration is beginning with President Reagan since it started when he was still president. And going through George HW Bush and Clinton was not not that strong. They they were reluctant to impose strong sanctions. Partly, I think, because they didn't like Congress telling them what to do. But also because they felt a need to have more flexibility in dealing with these issues than the Congress is more emotional about reflecting the will of the people that were interested in Burmese affairs and the great influence of Han Sang Soo Ji because she was so charismatic and so persuasive. And so So all the way around Reagan was very reluctant justice he had been reluctant to, to support the people powers movement in the Philippines. He's reluctant to, to cut ties with the Burmese Government. And George HW Bush feels somewhat the same way of expressing anger, willing to criticize, but not willing to take strong action. Another thing which Bush wanted to do, was to appoint a new ambassador to to Burma, the former ambassador, Bert Levin, who wrote incidentally, so some very, very moving reflections of what had happened in 1988, involving himself and the American Embassy. And what the what the protesters felt about the Americans at that time, he retired her he and his term ended in 1990. And there's kind of a myth out there that then the United States decided to who was going to punish the Burmese by not sending another ambassador. And there wasn't another Ambassador sent until 2012. But Bush tried to send an ambassador twice. His good friend, Frederic Freeland, he had agreed to appoint as ambassador to Burma, and he was going through the process of getting appointed ambassador and going through the necessary hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And two things happened, I want, first of all, the resume that was presented to these Foreign Relations Committee was fake. And the because the prelims is actually a CIA agent for most of the years before he was nominated to be a head of art to be an ambassador to Irma and the Foreign Relations Committee does not like to be given fake, safe seat resumes. But then they did finally figure out a way that they could get him appointed, there would be a public, a public hearing about it, in which the senators would express their displeasure. And then there would be a private executive meeting, which Freeland would would say how sorry, he was that this had been hit this has happened. But for some reason, by the time it got to that point, the Burmese government had decided that it didn't want him to be a they vetoed his appointment anyway. So he never got to be the ambassador. And then there was another person much more qualified to be an ambassador, Peter bork, who was well qualified, and a senior member of the Foreign Service. And he spent time learning Burmese and preparing to go, but he never got his hearing because of the opposition from important senators, opposition to appointing anybody. So that's just an indication. I mean, on the one hand, the President wants to resume sort of kind of relatively normal relationships, and the Congress refuses to to go along with it. And that continues through through Clinton's administrators through Clinton administration until his second administration, in which point he he finally does agree to the passage of some severe sanctions against Burma 1997 I think
Host 1:13:14
that was really interesting to me. Yeah. I also you reference how there's this myth, that, that it was a reaction to the protests that they had dropped down the status of from ambassadors in Sharjah to fairs. And, and yeah, that was a myth that I, that I had always taught. So that was another really interesting part of this book, a lot of gems in there for for people interested in us Burma relations to discover.
Kenton Clymer 1:13:41
I wouldn't have known about that, except that at that time, I was at the Wilson Center. There was also an analyst there, and he Marva, not, who we may have heard if he writes things from time to time about about Burma and other areas. And he happened to be at the Wilson Center and talking to him and then interviewing him. And he's the one who told me about that, because he was deeply involved in that with a staffer as a staffer. So he told me that whole story, and then that caused me to look up the actual hearings, which unlike most hearings, was not published. And so I had to find it deep in the archive somewhere. Anyway, so it was it was interesting to me to to find out about that.
Host 1:14:21
And this has important things to come back to because when we're we're repeating the same mythology and false history of what we think happened and shaping that to fit present day, how we're viewing things, then we're not living authentically in the past of that moment. And that's also what I appreciate with how you cover 1988 Because what even though I'm well acquainted with Burmese history, I think the thing that really kind of crystallized and reading how you cover 1988 onwards, is realizing that not only was Nike at this moment of Aung San su chi rising and her charisma and the people power and and then of course, what was happening in the world at that time with the Soviet Union. and other countries and that context of, of greater freedoms coming. But what really crisp crystallized in my mind was that it wasn't that 98 was a, a greater push for democracy in Burma, it was really that this changed the nature of the game, that before 1988, the understanding of the wider support of human rights and what an authoritarian regime meant, and the lack of freedoms and poverty and all of this, it was just kind of off the radar of a lot of people, except for maybe a few real ardent activists and advocates here and there that that were paying attention. But for the most part, it wasn't really a flag that was being carried by organizations or parts of Congress or, or anywhere else. And the the way that we look at the situation in Burma, Myanmar today, is, is really born on what happened in 88. And how the world responded. And the reaction to it, this really changed the game of how Burma was seen and how American policy goals towards Burma were oriented after they viewed what happened in 88.
Kenton Clymer 1:16:11
Yeah, no, no, that's mostly put, yeah. All right. So
Host 1:16:14
looking after 1990 90, there's this democracy movement, there's sections that are happening, but really not a lot is changing. This is kind of the tragic, dreadful story of the recent history of Burma that things are just staying the same as the world moves on lack of opportunity, lack of human rights, lack of any safety and security. And it's just kind of dragging on, and we get into George W. Bush's reign. And as you another thing that I didn't know, when I started when I was reading this is because I had always seen George W. And especially Laura as particular Friends of the Burmese people and democracy movement. But this was not how he started his his term there. This was this was a development that happened midway through his term that changed his and especially his wife's orientation towards the country and the people. So tell us about what that incident was in 2003. And how it shifted the Bush's feelings towards Burma at the time?
Kenton Clymer 1:17:22
Yeah, I mean, initially, as you said, they have always had almost no interest in both happening. And Myanmar, initially, then the 2003. That was the deputy in incident for not mistaken in which they're Suchi is one on the outskirts of Mandalay, I think. And her convoy was attacked. And she was maybe the one one of the ASEAN Parliament groups or committee or something. I thought that it was an assassination attempt. It may have been a lot of people died in it. But as a result of that, the there were some new sanctions passed strong ones, which Bush signed off, and maybe I can make the point here that the opposition to the government in Burma in these years, the opposition in the United States was very much bipartisan. I mean, one of the leaders in the opposition was Mitch McConnell. And so sometimes you see, you see it this one on one commentator said that was the leftist left the kind of issue but it really wasn't. The most conservative people in the Congress were very much opposed to it and nontoxic. He had almost universal support. But anyway, as the things got worse in during the second Bush administration, he took some executive actions. And then in 2007, were the was the Saffron Revolution, which is the most serious resistance to movement to the military since 1988. And Laura Bush was particularly angered in this in the very early stages of it, she, she, you know, announced to the world essentially that, that they are to topple the Government of Burma. And so she became something of a hero. She became I call her she's the George Bush's Madeleine Albright because in the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright had been one who was very favorable to thanks, Jean helped turn. She and others I think helped turn the Presidents Clinton's willingness to sign some significant acts against against Burma. So yeah, the Bush administration then did come around and become firmly against the what was happening in Burma.
Host 1:19:54
And after Saffron Revolution was Cyclone Nargis, just less than a year later. that devastated the Delta area. And this was a period where Americans were American aid was ready to come in along with aid from other countries there were actually ships American ships that were were ready to come deliver aid that were just just stationed just in the ocean waiting for the word. And the Burmese military did not allow it they barely even allowed their own people I say this from experience because I was living there at the time. I own my my apartment and in Yangon was destroyed by the cyclone. I barely made it out alive. So I can I can give a lot of personal testimony to to my time there. But my Burmese friends were, were barely able to get from Yangon were barely able to get in themselves getting a little on a tangent here. But that was just an interesting moment for me to live through. Because experientially it was really a and I've seen this document later on, but I was living through it. So I remember what it was feeling like at the time, there was a real growth of Bernie civil society because you had this enormous natural disaster that took place. And and I should actually let me back up because I think this might be interesting for you as well, I was at the time, I was training at the American Center, which was connected to the US Embassy. So I would, I would also spend some time at the embassy and friends there. And on the eve of Cyclone Nargis, the PEO had alerted me about the storm coming and really, like pretty she was the only one and pretty, pretty terrified. Expression, like some Something big is happening. And I was my students that I was teaching at the time, I was training, I told them, like, you know, I don't know if we're gonna have class in a couple days, because we have this big storm coming. So just be safe. I didn't have any idea that it was going to be what it was. They later laughed at me because they saw it was an American's first experience in the monsoon season. And they thought I was just kind of being dramatic about a big, big monsoon coming that they were used to. But you know, the Embassy did have some sense of what what was coming to some extent, I don't think they thought even they realized how big it was. But and I believe if memory serves me, right, they alerted Burmese authorities who didn't do anything, there was no warning whatsoever. And then once it hit the and there the only action the Burmese authorities took was to block the roads and the pads and rivers from people coming to deliver aid, which basically was a death sentence for those that had survived. A lot of my students and their friends. Were finding that had never been politically active or socially engaged in any way. We're we're taking it upon themselves to find ways to get aid in and we're setting up organizations on the fly to be able to get funds and find a way through there. And then once the Nagas period pass those relationships and those organizations and those that social activity that didn't go away that just that that was formed because of Nargis, and because that was they had to find a way through. But then once they realized what they could do, they were like, Hey, we could do something else, we could also do this or we could do that. And that started a new level of social engagement that I had never seen before. And that people that had never been involved in that area, we're now and to this day, have now has become quite socially engaged. And that all was born through just simply having to find a way to deliver aid to regions that the military was trying to block off. So
Kenton Clymer 1:23:40
where was the military trying to do that?
Host 1:23:43
Because it was embarrassing, because the fact that there was a natural disaster that he killed so many people and so many others were in a vulnerable state. And they did not have the means to our needs or the interest to support them. It's it's always better for the military to cover up the stories of poverty and economic collapse and lack of opportunities and human rights than to address them. This I did an interview recently with with someone regarding Bernie's film and cinema. And he was saying that everything had to be romanticized and idealized because if you have a scene that talks about the conditions people actually living in, you have to look at why they're in those conditions. And everything points back to the ineptitude of the government and the military. And so and so they wanted to simply close access and knowledge that this level of devastation and suffering was actually going on. Because then it would it would alert people to the fact that they weren't doing a very good job of, of administering aid to their opportunity to their own people. And so, so this is a normal story of of the military, just not taking care of the problem and trying to cover it up. So any case they the that, that awoken many people, many For me is a civic duty that that remain with them afterwards. But anyway, excuse me for for this tangent, my own writing there. Yeah.
Kenton Clymer 1:25:11
To ask about the about the, about the American, the Americans being denied access. I mean, I was I don't know if I ever saw this as a documentary, but there was some serious concern about the Americans preparing to invade. And that was why they stopped them from stop the chips from coming in.
Host 1:25:34
Oh, yeah. Yeah, definitely. I mean, this is all rumor mill. This is all tea shop gossip, as they say there. But certainly there, there was a fear that and it was strongly negotiated how the Americans would administer the aid. And eventually they ended up as memory serves me, right. They they brought aid in through airplanes, that, and I if memory serves me, right, I think that there was a negotiation, that the designation of that aid saying, you know, from the American government, or USA ID, or whatever it was, they had to agree to strip it off, because the military did not want their own people to know that they could not provide that aid. But that's that it was coming from someone they said, as the enemy. And to make matters worse, that then went on the black market, you know, because I was living there at the time. So I remember as this was developing day, by day, many of those aid kits that came ended up being going to the black market, and instead of distributed freely was was was ripped off for a profit. So it was really just a terrible manmade disaster on top of a natural disaster from start to finish. But, you know, I actually, coincidentally as well, just completely randomly. I had an acquaintance from college, who told me years later, that he was on one of those ships that was docked in the ocean waiting for word if they would be allowed to go to the Delta to administer aid. And they waited there for however long before they had to sail away.
Kenton Clymer 1:27:06
Yeah, so the American Center was still functioning, then
Host 1:27:10
it was thriving, it was a golden period. At that time, it was, in fact, anytime I get together with a student or a appear or administrator that was there, we in you know, this is getting off a little tangent as well. But it's kind of fun to share. That period that I was at the American Center was really one of the most precious of my life for some reasons. And I've always seen it and kind of subjective ways of, you know, what I was doing and involved in and how much I enjoyed it. But a few years ago, when I got together with some of the staff members that were that were involved, that it had some something of an institutional history, they they had said that period, I was at what was truly a golden, golden years, it was a time that there was a synthesis of energy of what the country was going through the kind of students that were coming, the teachers that were present, the support we had from the administration, meaning the the, the involvement in the embassy, that administration, that everything coming together, created this incredible synthesis of a dynamicism of the programming that was offered the cross fertilization of different people working together different programs that were being done in coordination. And so it was interesting to realize that my rosy subjective memory of how wonderful that period was in my life was actually from someone's institutional history, that was actually a very unique moment in the history of what the American Senate was trying to do. So yeah, it's very privileged to be part
Kenton Clymer 1:28:41
of it. So it must have been wonderful to be there.
Host 1:28:44
Oh, yeah. Yeah, it wasn't, it's great. You know, it's so interesting, talking now, a decade later, to people who are involved there from different aspects, because I was a trainer, so I just have my own memory of what I was doing. But in talking, I've since gone back and talk to like 1718 year old kids that just showed up, not speaking a word of English and are now you know, very much involved in the current revolution and, and have gone on to educate themselves in all kinds of ways. And to hear their view of what it was like to step into that place of what it offered them and, and even contrasting with the British Council that was also doing great work, and yet was a bit more formalized in some of their, their offerings, the resistance of color and a potentiality that anyone walking in, no matter who you were, that you could do what you want it, you could follow your passions, and you would have support for it. And you'd have camaraderie and, you know, so every month there was just there were new and exciting things that were happening. And so yeah, it was it was a special time.
Kenton Clymer 1:29:43
Yeah, great.
Host 1:29:46
So moving on past Nargis. We then have President Obama that takes office I was there for the election. I have also have war memories of of many Burmese watching In American election for the first time and seeing democracy in play, and that was quite fascinating to be at that, that ground level view. But Obama takes over and he does what is called what he termed pragmatic engagement. This is also the time that thing saying has taken over the reins. And he's starting to open up into liberalize and different ways. I think one of the essential questions for me, at least I don't know, if you have a read on this is as as the country was opening up more, and we moved to the transition period in those years, right before the transition period, how much would you say was that being caused by what thing saying was doing in the direction that he, for whatever reason, wanted to bring society under and how much was affected by Obama's policy at the time?
Kenton Clymer 1:30:52
I don't know if I can put into any specific, you know, percentages or whatnot. I think the Americans contributed to the change. I don't think the Americans caused the change. But I don't know, you know, how much credit there do I, I say in the book that I think the Americans should not be credited with bringing about change, but at the same time, I don't think their influence should be entirely underestimated. I mean, we were the major power in the world at that time. And Obama took real interest in Southeast Asian affairs. Of course, he's lived in Indonesia for a while. And so I think the influence that he brought was not insignificant. I do say in the book that, well, there's a bigger question about sanctions. But let me go back to Obama, if I could, for just a minute here. When he, when he came into office, the Secretary of State Clinton, Hillary Clinton, realized that, although the sanctions were well intended, and so forth, they hadn't produced any change or any obvious change. And so they had this review of policy, what it what it should be, and they did come up with this idea, as you said, a pragmatic engagement of, of keeping the sanctions in place, but trying to open up avenues of discussion with the governments not not intending to house the government, but to moderate the government or bring about some kind of change. And they ultimately decided on this idea of pragmatic and venture which did not immediately produce any dividends, you know, it took some time to produce some dividends and but eventually did beginning in 2010, and then more so in 2011, when Hillary Clinton went to, went to Burma, and then, of course, Obama goes there after his election in 2012, to kind of a triumphant entry into into Burma and celebrating the changes which have already taken place. And you know, that I think they did come across about with remarkable speed. I talked with who to knew I had a chance to talk with him and Yangon when I was there. And, you know, he says he came across with, we cannot even believe how fast how fast it happened. So it was a euphoric, euphoric period.
Host 1:33:16
Right. And I have a question about that speed before. Just another quick anecdote. When, when Obama came for his visit to Myanmar at that time, I was no longer working at the embassy, I was pursuing meditation, and I was staying at monasteries. And I was in a monastery, studying meditation that time with his visit. But I did not have a meditation visa, which was the proper one to be in a monastery, which usually didn't matter. I had a tourist visa, but the monastery The monastery is all around. We're so concerned about how strict authorities were being and all the security for Obama's visit, that they kicked me out for three days for the day before and the day after Obama's visit. They said you have to leave because we'll get in trouble if they find you there. So I was kicked out of the monastery went to Yangon was was traveling back to Yangon at the time he came. And I literally could not get a room in Yangon. There were no hotel rooms high or low for his visit. And it wasn't just I don't mean to suggest that that was because everyone was coming to Yangon for his visit because it was it was very short. It was more that at that time, the change, the economic change had happened so fast that the hotel infrastructure had not caught up. And so there was a period there where and with Clinton and Obama's visit kind of legitimizing that it was now open for business and open for tourism. There was an entire infrastructure that hadn't that hadn't been completely empty for decades. And then for years after we just had enormous terrible construction everywhere because everyone was trying to catch up and then it went bounce the other way. But there was that period around right around is visited on the day of his visit. There's just literally what weren't any, any rooms at all. But my question was that with the transition Jim was, at this time, I had an interesting perspective because I was so involved prior to the transition, and then right when things started to get exciting, my job finished and I was in monasteries, I wasn't even really following the news I was I was following a spiritual path at that time, and just kind of getting bits and pieces of what was happening. And with my knowledge of Burmese history and hearing the developments that were taking place, I think there was a bit of skepticism of like the, you know, the one step forward, two steps back. And I think that was not unique to me, I think that many followers really didn't feel that it was genuine, because in so many other instances, it wasn't it was just playing games to to try to continue their rules. So is there is there any point beyond which you think that it, people realized it was genuine? Was there any watershed moment where there there became an awareness that well, maybe this is different from before and and that that signified that a change really was in the air?
Kenton Clymer 1:36:02
I think the election so what was it 2011 Was that when they had the election for the byelection? For parliament, there were 45 seats up for grabs, they allowed Han Sang Soo chi to be out and campaigning. And the NLD 143 Out of the 45 seats. And, you know, that was not the full election for parliament. But it was a big one. And I released my sense was that that really marked some feeling that this was actually going to going to happen. There may have been others as well. But that's the one that occurs to me.
Host 1:36:45
And that's right around well, a few years later, when your book leaves off, I think it was 2015 when it was published and 2015 is really the year that the transition in earnest begins. And and so that's not so documented in the book. How would you characterize the years after 2015 and Aung San su chi and the NLD truly takes power?
Kenton Clymer 1:37:04
Yeah, well, and of course, as you say, the the election takes place just after the book was published. So I didn't have that in it, but I had things leading up to it. And that was a tremendous victory for for Unthank Suchi. And, and for the NLD. And we all thought that things were fine, I think we didn't pay enough attention to the, to the privileges that the military still had, you know, they had 25% of the seats in parliament, regardless of the votes. And they still control the military, and they control the home office. And so they had, and because they had 25% of the parliament, they could veto any changes to the Constitution. So I think on sewing su chi and Emily, we felt, at least I felt, you know, this is this is really good. It's, it's going to be going to be a change, maybe a lasting, lasting change. And then, of course, came the election of 2021. And the the the election, which the NLD also won again, overwhelmingly. And then, of course, comes the Exodus 2020. And then then comes the coup in February the year ago, which lead led to all the disasters since then. And so it's it's, it's such a disappointment. And yet in the sense, it's just returning the way it used to be.
Host 1:38:42
And just backing up a little before the military coup, how would because you didn't cover this in the book since the book was printed before this. And I'm quite curious, how would you characterize the relations between as your as you wrote a book on us Burma relations? You know, there's now five years where US Burma relations are NLD and on Santucci. How would you characterize relations during that period?
Kenton Clymer 1:39:04
Oh, I think they were very good except for this, you know, thanks to CHI. I mean, the military, of course, in its atrocities against the Rohingya is that mean that was that was held up even to me by the US Embassy in Burma even as early as 2000. And I wanted to talk to them 2000 And I talked to them in 2000. I talked with Michael Thurston, maybe in 2011. Who was the shark stay there and before the ambassador was appointed, and he said, you know, that this is the one remaining issue that the the problems that the Burmese have with have with the ringers and the other ethnic groups is remaining problem. But then, then, of course on thanks that she lost her luster when she defended the military in the international court, and refused to speak in favor of the ruling us The big question we all had, at least I had was, what does she really believe? You know, she, she's a bourbon. So maybe she shares the the antipathy that many Berman's had towards Muslims than the Rohingyas ameican. Some of the political prisoners who were political prisoners in 1988, you know, didn't love the Rohingya is at all. It's hard to find anybody who did. And so I wondered if she you know, whether she really felt I did the best you can say, and I think this may be the way it was, is that she, she felt that if you could, if you could work with the military long enough, when the elections in 2020, then you could bring about some real changes. And maybe, maybe she felt that the writing is good, good. You know, why didn't recover or be treated more fairly? After that, if that was the if that was the bad, of course, it didn't work out because the coup happened. And even even though on Saturday, he had been defensive of the military. So I think the the American government was, of course, well, I don't know it was Trump went by there. Really? No? Well, I think Trump probably knew nothing at all about Burma. But the American government was, was, I think, expressing some disregard for science achieved, because because of that,
Host 1:41:20
well, Trump really didn't know very little about Burma, and that can be attested in one, one video where he was welcoming. Different, I can't quite remember the context of the video, but there were about a dozen award winners have some freedom or some honor or something, and there's a there's a shot of the Burmese person or maybe come from some ethnicity, but from Myanmar coming to accept the award. And Trump says where are you from? And person gives the answer. And there's an exchange where we're at clearly shows that Trump does not know which country he's referring to wherever where it's located. So I think that as you as you do your, your, your sequel, post 2015, maybe you can find that video clip. But, you know, this is why I think this book is so relevant and interesting for the current moment. Because as we're so many people are concerned and trying to understand the current situation that's going on in Burma, we see the same themes repeated in different ways that you've cataloged in this book, the role of China, the from the American side, who do they support? Who do they who do they support? How do they support them, what will bring greater stability, what will bring greater unrest, and you have the different ethnics and the Aeos that are engaging in one way and and then you have the central Berman authority that they use, as we as we talked about the very start of this this conversation, where they chose to support who they chose to support at the outset, in the post war period, those same dynamics are at play, obviously, human rights democracy that are taking place Aung San su chi is still a central figure in all of this. And when one is looking at the current Burma bill that's trying to be passed, and friends of mine that are involved in that and quite involved in the lobbying and conversations with McConnell's office and just how, how, what the personal feelings of admiration and appreciation that McConnell continues to have to Aung San su chi, specifically, in guiding the overall legislation, how important that personal relationship and feelings continue to be. And then, of course, just the state of revolution that's going on and how whether support is given in, in covertly or with, with any kinds of materials that that that might be given to support that revolution, which is, is really just talk is not happening in any form. But it's the same cycle, just as it did not happen in any form with what new was trying to do. So the fact that it's not happening doesn't mean that it's not relevant and present. It. It was also talked about before and didn't happen before as well. But the same cycles are still occurring in how we're trying to understand the present moment and the US Myanmar relations. So as someone who has studied this for the last half century and more, are there any thoughts or insights or reflections you have when you're watching the present day play out, especially in the last year and a half?
Kenton Clymer 1:44:29
Let me just say on that last point about Americans helping the resistance movement there was it was it an essay that was written by Marvin Haas, whom I mentioned earlier. And he's very well connected with, you know, with intelligence and AI and everything along that line, in which he suggested that the United States should assist militarily I mean, covertly. The Resistance movements in Burma. And I was shocked that he would say that. But if he says that, I mean, I think he's reflecting, as you say scuttle about, it's being talked about in the halls, he would know about that. As if there might be some movement along that line. Yeah, I mean, I don't know. But, but you might, I don't immediately remember where that is, you might look it up it, it just are Marva not. And in a recent essay that he wrote, For at the Wilson Center, I was at the Wilson Center. And so I wrote to him and said, I was glad to see he was back into Burma things and was surprised at that. And he said something to the effect of well, it's sort of, you know, here's these things. So I don't know. I mean, it's But in answer to your general question, I mean, this is, this is just repeating the way Burma has been for most of the time since since 1945. But there is a difference, of course, and that the people had a number of years, especially the younger generation, right, who had a number of years that were quite different than before, they're not necessarily all in for ongoing su chi, they want wider reforms that she was involved with. They've had internet, now they grew up with the internet, they all have cell phones, as you know, when you were there, you can no cell phone unless you paid 1000s of dollars for it, or getting a chip SIM card. And they're just a whole different generation, and they're not going to put up with it. And Marvin also made the point in this essay, incidentally, that the military is fighting for his life, and that they may not control much more than their bases. So in that sense, it was kind of optimistic about the outcome of things in Burma, the new generation is just not going to allow it maybe to go back to the way it was. So kind of hoping that's true.
Host 1:46:57
Yeah, yeah, we all do. And I know your your focus is looking backwards. But in looking backwards, it informs what's happening today and forwards. And so I think this is we learn a lot from understanding things, that incidences that we think because we referenced on today's conversation that we think when a certain way, we're actually a bit different at the time. And I think that's really the value of the book and what you bring out in understanding how things appeared in in that moment, through the prism of whether it was breaking free from colonialism and independence, or fighting communism, or the war on drugs that, that these were the prisms through which things were analyzed and understood. And today's the way so many of us see it today, rightly so it's through this prism of this, this earnest democracy movement to keep their freedoms that the transition provided and through understanding the goal of human view of human rights throughout Romane on the ethnics and marginalized communities and how important that is. But it's so important to go back and realize that in different moments in history, and in that relation, that those did not have the priority they had now and that things that people and things were seeing differently. And I just got enormous value from reading that. And from this discussion, thank
Kenton Clymer 1:48:19
you very much. Yeah, I think we'd like to think that what we write about the past is has some relevance to the present time. So I do appreciate that.
Host 1:48:29
Well, thanks so much for joining us today. And before we go, are there any any other observations or thoughts you wanted to share? Before we close?
Kenton Clymer 1:48:38
I don't know if I have any have any pronouncements or anything. I just be curious about your own experiences in Provo. How long were you there? When did you go and so forth.
Host 1:48:48
I first went in 2003. And actually, I was going to make a just make a little book note of you. You mentioned about the internet and my first memory and going in 2003. There was no internet whatsoever. There wasn't even any cyber cafes and I was there a month for meditation at that time. Before I came back for work. And my between meditation courses, I wanted to send a an email to my mom, that I had arrived. So I had to go to a cyber cafe, I couldn't log into any account, I had to use their official government account, and write just write a message saying, you know, I'm here and blah, blah, and then it cost $1 or something to to send that email. And the next morning, I guess I had told them the guesthouse, I was saying, I don't remember, but the next morning, I get a knock on the door. And I get and there's an envelope and I open it up and it's a printed copy of my mom's reply to that cybercafe that, that that they had to their address that they had printed and sent. So hilarious combination of like, you know, 19th century and 21st century like an email that was delivered as a telegram and I paid another dollar for that for that message that came and and so that was yeah, now I I was there from the time that there was their internet simply didn't exist. And when the smartphone revolution kicked off all of my friends, American and Burmese, we were reading about what smartphones were and how they were affecting the culture. And none of us understood it, you know, because none of us, we were talking about it, like, it was just a parallel universe, we'd have conversations about what are these things, and you know, that none of us had really ever seen one. And, and, and so and then, you know, of course, through Facebook and Wi Fi, and everything else, just seeing the society change at warp speed. From from from where it was before. So so so yeah, a lot of personal experience there. So with that, thank you so much for joining us here. I really encourage listeners to check out this this book, a delicate relationship. If you found the conversation interesting. There's a lot in there. There's a lot more detail from where we went. And thanks so much for joining us some insurance observations.
Kenton Clymer 1:50:59
Thanks, it's been a pleasure to be here. I really enjoyed talking with you. The people need to gay you. Don't need another dog.
Host 1:51:49
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1:54:31
no more YouTube boy Yasmin Allah you're gonna begin our day Mobb Deep God begin man y'all see y'all y'all
1:56:30
You