1988: A watershed year for American policy in Burma
In trying to understand the vagaries and nuances of American policy towards Burma, one need go no further than the brilliant work of historian Kenton Clymer, particularly his book, “A Delicate Balance.” I was lucky enough to get a chance to speak to Kenton about his scholarship on a podcast episode earlier this year, and the conversation provides a fascinating overview on overall US-Burma relations. In the following excerpt, he describes the monumental shift that occurred in 1988.
He first notes how pre-88, the US engaged Burma almost primarily through either the prisms of the Cold War or the War On Drugs. But then, the brutal crackdown that Ne Win led on peaceful protesters in 1988 changed everything. While this fact may already be familiar to some, Kenton goes deeper into this, describing the different reactions that came to characterize Congress on one hand, and the US President on the other. What’s so interesting about this, is that this distinction cut across party lines. In other words, regardless of whether the respective offices were inhabited by Republicans or Democrats, Kenton describes how Congress consistently wanted a harsher and more immediate response, and the President continued to be hesitant and slow to act, and sometimes downright resistant.
“There does develop a difference in approach between the Congress, on the one hand, and the administration, on the other, about how to respond to [the 1988 movement in Burma].”
“After the Burmese government’s crackdown on people who came out to protest [in ‘88], and Aung San Suu Kyi had begun to take sort of command of everything, those Americans, at least those who were aware of what was happening and interested in what was happening, were highly critical of Ne Win and the Tatmadaw and the Burma government in general, for the atrocities that they had committed to several thousand people killed.
A lot of people were arrested and so forth. What happened, and this was kind of a theme in the last part of the book, is that that there does develop a difference in approach between the Congress, on the one hand, and the administration, on the other, about how to respond to it. And the anger found particular expression in the Congress, which wanted to impose hard sanctions right away on the Government of Burma, [to] try to stop exports and imports and get American firms to withdraw, and that kind of thing. And the response of the administrations, beginning with President Reagan, since it started when he was still president, and going through George H.W. Bush and Clinton, was not that strong.
They were reluctant to impose strong sanctions. Partly, I think, because they didn't like Congress telling them what to do. But also because they felt a need to have more flexibility in dealing with these issues. Congress was more emotional about reflecting the will of the people that were interested in Burmese affairs and the great influence of Aung San Suu Kyi, because she was so charismatic and so persuasive. All the way around, Reagan was very reluctant just as he had been reluctant to support the peoples’ power movement in the Philippines. He's reluctant to cut ties with the Burmese Government. And George H.W. Bush feels somewhat the same way, expressing anger, willing to criticize, but not willing to take strong action.”