Episode #378: Of Bills and Sanctions
RELEASE DATE: AUGUST 13, 2025
“I think you need to imagine that Burma policy is this tiny little boat on an incredibly stormy ocean that is American politics,” says Simon Billenness, director of Campaign for a New Myanmar. Speaking with urgency and from an informed understanding of historical context, Billenness draws on three decades of advocacy to explain how U.S. policy towards Myanmar has evolved, the political machinery driving current legislation, and why grassroots and congressional pressure remain the decisive forces in shaping Washington’s response to the junta.
Billenness begins by addressing the recent removal of sanctions on several Myanmar-linked individuals and companies— a move that shocked and angered many in the advocacy community. Echoing what previous podcast guests who have addressed this topic (such as Sean Turnell, Derek Mitchell, and Erich Ferrari), Billenness believes the decision reflects intense corporate lobbying rather than any coherent policy shift. “It definitely came at a very discordant moment,” he acknolwedges, noting that the de-listings coincided with major congressional progress on three Myanmar-related bills. The contrast underscores what he describes as the “whipsaw” of U.S. foreign policy under the current administration: unpredictable, transactional, and highly susceptible to lobbying.
Despite this volatility, Billenness insists that congressional action remains the key driver of U.S. policy towards Myanmar. He explains how what he terms the “tiny fishbowl” of Burma-focused advocacy in Washington operates: lobbyists, NGOs, and a small group of congressional offices engage in a constant dialogue with the State Department, Treasury, and White House, with grassroots participation amplifying these efforts. “We have an email list of 19,000 people in the U.S.,” he says, “who, every week, get an online action that lets them contact their members of Congress.” These campaigns are paired with “grass-tops” lobbying in D.C., that is, Billenness and allied groups hold face-to-face meetings with congressional staff. This two-pronged strategy, he argues, is how advocates build the sustained pressure necessary to move policy forward.
Billenness then talks about his years of advocacy and how that intersects with policymaking. He says that since the 1990s, he has fought to restrict American corporate involvement in Myanmar, beginning with shareholder campaigns against Unocal and later Chevron over their investments in the Yadana gas project. In 1997, those efforts helped secure President Bill Clinton’s executive order banning new U.S. investment in Myanmar—a landmark that demonstrated, he says, how congressional pressure could force the executive branch to act. “If there’s one thing I’ve learned in 30 years doing this,” he explains, “it’s that whoever the administration is, they don’t act on Burma unless there’s pressure from Congress.”
That lesson underpins the current push for three major pieces of legislation. The first is the Brave Burma Act, a sanctions bill targeting the junta’s main financial arteries: Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the Myanmar Economic Bank, and foreign companies supplying aviation fuel. While the bill does not impose sanctions directly, it creates overwhelming political pressure on the administration to act. Billenness emphasizes that the bill’s mere progress through Congress can be enough to compel the White House, Treasury, and State Department to move. The second measure, the No New Funds for Burma Act, would block U.S. support for World Bank disbursements to Myanmar while the junta remains in power. The third, the Burma Genocide Accountability and Protection Act (GAP Act), expands earlier legislation focused on the Rohingya to include other ethnic groups, authorizes humanitarian aid for refugees, supports atrocity investigations, and calls for a special envoy to coordinate U.S. Burma policy. All three bills recently cleared key House committees with overwhelming bipartisan support, two of them unanimously.
Billenness underscores how unusual this kind of political unity is in today’s polarized Congress. “Burma is one of the few issues in D.C. that is bipartisan,” he says, crediting decades of advocacy for keeping the issue above partisan divides. He names Representatives Bill Huizenga and Betty McCollum, co-chairs of the Congressional Burma Caucus, along with Gregory Meeks, Young Kim, and Ami Bera as crucial champions, while citing Senators Jeff Merkley, Todd Young, Chris Van Hollen, Chuck Grassley, and Mitch McConnell as key allies in the Senate.
He notes, however, that even with this support, passing standalone legislation in Washington is challenging. Billenness explains that provisions from the Brave Burma Act and GAP Act will likely be attached to “must-pass” bills such as the National Defense Authorization Act or the State Department Reauthorization Act, a procedural workaround that has become standard practice. “That’s how we got the Burma Act passed,” he says, referring to the 2022 legislation that codified U.S. policy of support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement.
The conversation then turns to the deeper mechanics of how congressional activity exerts influence even without final passage. When a bill gains momentum, its co-sponsor count signals political strength. State and Treasury officials, Billenness explains, “always know exactly how many co-sponsors the Burma bills have,” and this awareness directly affects policy deliberations inside the administration. He describes this dynamic as “the tip of the spear,” where congressional pressure—backed by grassroots mobilization—drives executive action on sanctions, humanitarian aid, and diplomatic engagement.
The GAP Act, in particular, highlights the complex interplay between legislation, funding, and executive discretion. While the bill authorizes money for humanitarian assistance and atrocity investigations, actual funding depends on the appropriations process. Even then, Billenness warns, the current administration has begun “impounding” appropriated funds by simply refusing to spend them, a break from precedent that raises constitutional questions. “This is new,” he says, “and it’s part of the storm we’re trying to navigate in our little Burma policy boat.”
This uncertainty also extends to refugee resettlement. Under the current administration, the U.S. has sharply curtailed refugee admissions, a move that Billenness argues has weakened American leverage with countries hosting Burmese refugees, especially Thailand. He does not expect this policy to change soon. Instead, he calls for other governments—including the UK, EU, Canada, and Australia—to take on greater leadership. Yet he insists that sustained pressure from U.S. advocates can still influence the broader international response, particularly when coordinated with allied governments.
Despite these obstacles, Billenness sees real hope in the growing power of advocacy networks. He points to the successful campaign to secure strong Senate language on Burma in a previous State and Foreign Operations appropriations bill as proof that organized lobbying can shape outcomes. The same applies to corporate campaigns, where consumer and shareholder pressure has historically pushed over 100 companies to withdraw from Myanmar.
As the interview closes, Billenness is asked what ordinary people can do, and he replies that “just one letter, one phone call from a constituent to get a member of Congress to co-sponsor a bill.” This claim is rooted in years of mobilizing faith-based groups, activist networks, and Burmese diaspora communities across the United States. And he returns to the message that has sustained his decades of work: collective action can—and has—changed U.S. policy. “What we do matters. It has always mattered. It has been proven to change things for the better, and we can keep doing it.”