Episode #375: The Art of No Deal
“I think the main message here… is don't fall for the junta's attempt to try to propagandize,” says Derek Mitchell, the former American diplomat and a longtime architect of Washington’s Myanmar policy. This is Mitchell’s second appearance on the podcast. In his first interview, Mitchell spoke about his time as U.S. ambassador to Myanmar — a landmark 2012 posting that filled a position left vacant since 1990. In this conversation, Mitchell provides a sobering yet clear-eyed assessment of U.S. strategy towards Myanmar under the Trump administration. His informed perspective is particularly germane in light of the recent “de-listings” of four individuals from the U.S. Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) sanctions list who have ties to Myanmar’s military, which has stirred confusion and concern.
Mitchell agrees with a recent guest, Sean Turnell, stating that these de-listings do not represent a systematic change in U.S. policy. Rather, they appear to be the result of bureaucratic inconsistencies, possibly initiated during the prior administration and carried forward without adequate interagency coordination. “It could be the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing,” Mitchell explains, adding that the absence of a functioning National Security Council has made policy coherence nearly impossible.
Myanmar is rich in rare earth metals, a crucial natural resource for high-tech devices and clean energy technologies. At the heart of this conversation is the question of whether the U.S. might consider loosening sanctions or even recalibrating its overall Myanmar policy in order to secure access to these critical minerals, or as a way to try to blunt Chinese influence in the country. President Trump reportedly became interested in Myanmar after learning about its rare earth deposits, prompting a review of U.S. engagement. Mitchell acknowledges that rare earths have put Myanmar on the administration’s radar but still does not believe that any strategic decisions have been made. The Trump administration, he says, is discovering just how complicated the situation is: Myanmar’s rare earth deposits lie in conflict zones largely outside junta control, and only China possesses any real capacity for processing them.
Mitchell thinks that any assumption that the junta could be a reliable partner in helping secure mineral access for the U.S. is misplaced. Instead, he encourages more serious engagement with ethnic forces like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and other resistance groups that control areas rich in natural resources. In his opinion, any move to broker peace between the junta and the Kachin for the sake of resource access would be “beyond strange.”
Addressing a troubling suggestion—that Trump would indulge his propensity for engaging with strongmen and attempt to legitimize the junta as part of a geopolitical strategy to counter China—Mitchell acknowledges that engagement with the junta is possible, especially given Trump’s history of prioritizing transactional gains over democratic concerns.. However, he emphasizes that even in the Trump administration, there are officials who continue to reject the junta’s legitimacy and speak openly against its planned elections, calling them a sham.
The conversation then turns to the information war being waged between the resistance and the junta. The latter has attempted to spin the de-listings, correspondence with Trump, and other symbolic events into a narrative of growing international acceptance. In contrast, the resistance portrays them as isolated and unrelated decisions, and points to the fact that Congress has strengthened its support of pro-democracy forces, and that the sanctions regime against the junta is still basically in place. “When you leave a vacuum of information, then others are going to fill that with speculation,” Mitchell says about the U. S. administration’s silence on these questions, which only fuels confusion and empowers the junta’s messaging.
Despite the chaos in Washington, Mitchell points to encouraging signals. Besides Congressional support of pro-democracy forces, he says the State Department still has senior officials who speak out on behalf of Myanmar’s people. One example he highlights is Michael Schiffer, the nominee for U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, who, according to Mitchell, declared during his confirmation hearing that the junta’s elections should not be legitimized — an especially notable stance given the Department’s previous guidance discouraging embassy staff from commenting on electoral legitimacy.
Looking back at his own time as ambassador, Mitchell reflects on the policy that prevailed at the time of framing Myanmar engagement as a tool of U.S.-China competition. Mitchell says that he, personally, never saw Myanmar as merely a wedge against China. “We needed to engage on its own terms,” he recalls. Still, he recognizes that others in the Obama administration, and certainly today’s officials, view Myanmar through a geopolitical lens, particularly in the context of strategic rivalry with Beijing. The use of that lens, however, can distort: it tends to shift focus away from Myanmar’s internal dynamics—its democratic resistance, ethnic complexities, and humanitarian crisis—reducing the country to a pawn in great power competition, thereby reducing the amount of attention the U.S. pays to issues more directly affecting the Burmese people.
Expanding on this geopolitical theme, Mitchell also warns against any return to Cold War-style, covert engagement reminiscent of 1950s CIA operations in Myanmar’s borderlands geared towards influencing the Chinese civil war. He notes that any U.S. support for armed resistance or attempts to create a “Western Front” against China would provoke a harsh response from Beijing and could backfire, potentially into a proxy war, or worse. “If the United States is partly in and they're playing games, the Myanmar people are going to get hurt, because the Chinese are not playing games, and they're not partly in! They're all in.” Mitchell recounts how, during his tenure, the Chinese ambassador directly told him not to visit Kachin or Shan states — a demand he found both audacious and unacceptable. He had already planned to go, but the warning only strengthened his resolve: his final trip as ambassador was to Kachin State, partly to demonstrate that China had no right to dictate U.S. diplomatic relationships inside Myanmar.
Mitchell reiterates a proposal he made in his earlier appearance: appoint a special envoy to Myanmar. He believes this could facilitate more coherent engagement, both with ethnic actors inside the country and with regional players in ASEAN. However, he questions whether the Trump administration would appoint someone with the appropriate knowledge, background and sensitivity.
Turning to the wider region, Mitchell expresses disappointment with the current U.S. neglect of Southeast Asia: multilateral offices have been shut down, many ambassadorial positions remain vacant, and the administration appears unwilling to engage consistently with this part of the world. He also speaks about his mixed feelings regarding ASEAN. On the one hand, he praises the bloc for refusing to seat junta representatives in high-level meetings, but laments its overall lack of assertiveness on the other. Countries like Malaysia and Indonesia have shown more leadership, but others remain passive. In addition, he believes that ASEAN should work in concert with the U.S., Japan and India to prevent the junta from legitimizing itself through fraudulent elections.
All this leads to a critical dilemma for U. S. policy: is it better for Myanmar to remain under the radar entirely and face continued neglect, or to attract engagement that might end up being counterproductive, especially for the Myanmar people? Mitchell describes a best-case scenario as being “a robust diplomatic corps” working under the radar; he says the worst would be Myanmar coming to the attention of a President known for favoring dictators and undermining human rights. Overall, Mitchell adamantly believes U.S. policy should not be aligning with the junta which, he argues, is “a devalued asset,” and a policy that would be both morally and strategically wrong. He urges support for civil society and the resistance, arguing that “if we can do something in their interest to bring dignity to the people of this country, that will automatically serve the strategic interests of the United States over time.”
In conclusion, Mitchell emphasizes that while the junta may be attempting to create an illusion of legitimacy, they are clearly on a losing course. The real task, he argues, should be ensuring that U.S. policy doesn’t inadvertently help them prolong their grip on power. “We must do no harm in what we do, and we must do more,” he says.