The International Dimension
The following submission was written by a member of the National Unity Government. For safety reasons the author has requested anonymity. This is the latest essay in a series of reflections, and the first submission can be read here.
“To answer this question we must not look at what the West has done for Myanmar, but rather look at what they have stopped others from doing.”
The strategic harm of these acts extends to the international arena as well. These videos are not hard to find if one is in the right groups, and far from being suppressed, they are being actively spread and shared. If we can see these videos, the security officers monitoring the conflict in western countries can see them too. And they certainly have. Many would ask, not without reason, why we should concern ourselves with the west's opinions. After all, they have shown no willingness to even entertain the notion of arms and armament shipments to the PDF, nor do the overwhelming majority even accept the legitimacy of the NUG. What loss is it to us if the west rejects the revolutionaries?
To answer this question we must not look at what the West has done for Myanmar, but rather look at what they have stopped others from doing. It is Western pressure which has slowed and complicated the sale of arms and materiel to the junta. It is western sanctions which limit the ability of the cronies and generals to raise funds and travel to meet with powerful benefactors. It is the veto power of the US, UK, and France which ensures that Russia and China cannot pass Security Council resolutions recognising the SAC as legitimate, and supporting international action against the PDF. It is the west which ultimately keeps the Tatmadaw hamstrung, and makes it difficult for foreign powers to support the coup.
While less than we want, this is all that we need. Purely strategically, we are winning. The Tatmadaw is bleeding men, both to casualties and to defections and their ability to replenish their forces and materiel is limited. Meanwhile the PDF are growing in number, developing their skills and training, and are increasingly gaining access to military grade weaponry. Analysts who at first thought the victory of the junta was a certainty, today view the victory of the NUG as a distinct possibility, and if the current trends continue, the pro- democracy forces will soon reach parity with the remaining SAC forces, and from there the military will have nowhere to go but retreat. This is all if current trends remain. A sudden influx of personnel, training, equipment, or external logistic support could undo all the gains the PDF and EAO's have painstakingly made over the last year and a half. It is imperative that international actors not have the opportunity to support the junta and tip the balance in their favour.
However, if the PDF are seen as criminals and terrorists by the international community, if the NUG's command and control structure is perceived as weak and incapable of preventing crimes, the argument will inevitably be made that the military, with all its flaws, is the best chance Myanmar has to stave off complete collapse and lawlessness. An unimaginable line of thought for anyone in Myanmar, certainly, but a very easy story to sell to an ignorant audience, and one readily supported by hundreds of companies and state actors eager for an excuse to once again gain access to Myanmar's resources and labour.
Western political philosophy is, at its core, selfish. Western elections are won and lost on narratives, not on facts. What the west has done it has done because it saw a narrative it could embrace. Plucky young peaceful protesters taking on a military dictatorship. This fits well into western narratives and captures the imagination. But now the conflict has evolved into civil war. Western involvement in foreign wars is unpopular. More so now that ever before, coming off the heels of the costly and lengthy failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the midst of a new engagement in Ukraine; one which western voters are already grumbling about after only 5 months. No politician will risk being seen to openly support yet an other intervention as this would mean being associated with the ongoing costs, the lives lost, the length of the conflict, the corruption and incompetence of subsequent governments, and ultimately being seen to support and fund groups which often wind up being investigated for war crimes, extremism, drug trafficking, environmental exploitation, unfavourable political ideologies, or other unsavoury issues. All of these can be and routinely are weaponised in the political arena to destroy the careers of well-meaning politicians who left themselves open to what in political circles is known as "bad optics".
This is why the junta's international media goals have shifted. They no longer seek to be seen as legitimate themselves – even they have learned that they can never be the heroes of the story – but they can sow discord and paint the PDF and NUG as fundamentally no better than the military. The SAC understands that in order to secure international support, the NUG needs to sell the revolution as:
a conflict which can be won in a short time frame.
a conflict which will lead to a stable and progressive democracy.
a conflict fighting for goals which are in line with western principles and values. d) a conflict fought by blameless “good guys” against cartoonish “bad guys”.