The Strategic Dimension
The following submission was written by a member of the National Unity Government. For safety reasons the author has requested anonymity. This is the latest essay in a series of reflections, and the first submission can be read here.
“Those who may have contemplated defection will now fear being tortured or killed in the attempt, and be more likely to remain with the military.”
Furthermore, as a simple matter of strategy, it is foolish to think that the torture and execution of captured enemies can advance the cause of the revolution. Simplistic arguments can always be made: it demoralises the enemy, it saves on food and logistics costs associated with keeping prisoners, it provides valuable information from captured agents, it serves justice against those whose are certainly criminals, even if we can't prove it. All arguments which are no doubt even now being made in telegram channels and Facebook groups. But ultimately, all arguments which are easily dismissed. Setting aside the legalistic argument that punishment must be in response to a specific crime, not a vague sense of criminality, let us examine the strategic implications of this manner of thinking.
A captured or surrendered prisoner is well worth the cost and difficulty of their care. Threats and torture have been noted to yield poor results. Those subjected to pain and fear will say whatever they believe will bring them relief, whether or not it is true. In the worst cases prisoners will provide misinformation in the hopes that they can lead their captors into a trap. Dead prisoners can provide no information at all. On the other hand, prisoners treated well are more likely to provide information which is valuable and accurate. They may even be willing to work for the revolution to help others to defect. The Tatmadaw's cruelty and barbarity towards their own must not be forgotten, and we would do well to realise the value of a sympathetic prisoner, and the power of compassion, even in a war.
Since the revolution began multiple victims of the PDFs' operations have been shown after the fact to have been quiet supporters of the revolution, and likely would have defected and assisted the PDF had the opportunity presented itself. Let us consider that those who have defected, and have subsequently provided vital informational and logistical support to the revolution would have been treated just as cruelly and criminally had they been captured even a day before making good their escape from the military bases. How much potential strategic leverage has been squandered by resorting to vile and bestial acts of retaliation?
And what impact do these acts have on the remaining forces of the SAC? Certainly not the fear and trembling that the PDF hope. Rather, we can be sure that the spread of these videos hardens the hearts of the military against the revolution. Those who may have contemplated defection will now fear being tortured or killed in the attempt, and be more likely to remain with the military. Those who were unsure whether the revolution can end the cycle of violence and war will be convinced that this conflict cannot hope to establish a lasting democracy and will err on the side of “the devil you know”, quietly supporting the military. Even among the civilian population, these crimes are sure to be weaponised as pro-military propaganda, and will incite a desire for revenge and retaliation. Those who were afraid before to support the junta openly will be emboldened out of rage or fear to join the Pyu Saw Hti and similar paramilitary gangs.