Transcript: Episode #300: Revolutionary Road

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Unknown Speaker 0:04

The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is seating an arrest warrant.

Host 0:16

Thank you for joining us for the next hour or two in this episode of Insight. Myanmar podcast, in an age of nearly limitless content, we appreciate that you're choosing to take valuable time out of your day to learn more about what is happening in Myanmar. It's vital for this story to be heard by people around The world, and that starts right Now with you. Joah,

Brad 1:00

it will be and welcome back inside Myanmar is very excited to bring you a special panel discussion with me right now are mark and Azad, two people who have unique perspectives and insights on the ongoing conflict At a very micro level, very direct hands on level. We are hoping to be joined by a third guest, technically, she's pending, and I also have the privilege of being joined by previous guest channel, Anthony Davis, who will be providing some additional context and some penetrating questions if and when appropriate. So Anthony, I'd like to start with you and just give you the floor to introduce yourself for those of our listeners who, by some miracle, may not yet know who you are and be familiar with your work.

Anthony Davis 2:33

Thank you. You're much too kind. My name, as you just mentioned, is Anthony Davis. I am a security analyst and consultant based in Bangkok, Thailand, where I've been for pretty much all of my career. In terms of what I write in the public domain, it's mostly for the Jane's defense and security group of publications based in the UK. So I've been working for them for a good 30 years. Most of my experience on the ground has been from West Asia, namely Afghanistan, where I spent a lot of time in the 80s and 90s, and 2000s Pakistan, by extension, Kashmir. And then closer to home, Myanmar, slash Burma, southern Thailand, Southern Philippines. I've had an interest in Islamic insurgencies, hence southern Thailand and Southern Philippines in this part of the world. So as I said, I'm based in Bangkok following these conflicts, and since the coup in Myanmar in February of 2021, the large proportion of my work has been focused on tracking events in Myanmar, but unlike the guests on your program today, I don't have that granular on the ground experience that they will bring to this discussion.

Brad 4:21

Excellent, excellent. Excellent. And we're very fortunate to have you, and I'm sure that that contrast between the granular, micro scale and the much broader contextualization is going to be very valuable for our guests. So I'd like to turn now to Azad, whom I believe we've interviewed twice at this point, and I'd like to ask you, just to explain briefly, what it is that you've been doing for the Myanmar conflict, most most recently, and potentially even what you were doing before that.

Azad 4:51

Sure. My name is Azad. I'm a internationalist from the USA. Here in Myanmar, I've been here coming up on 10 months now. I think. Uh, before I came here to Myanmar, I was a member of the YPG, which is the armed forces of the revolution in northeastern Syria. I was there for four years before coming here. Yeah, in my year here in Myanmar, I have been working with different groups in the chin resistance, mostly within the chin brotherhood Alliance in western Myanmar, doing training in certain specialist matters, as well as participating on the front lines where appropriate. And, you know, helping with whatever training or with whatever structural advice I can give. Also, as of recently, I'm now a member of the AIF, the Anti Fascist internationalist front, which is a formation of, we can say, revolutionary internationalists, who are coming to Myanmar to fight in the revolution alongside the people here.

Brad 5:46

Excellent, excellent, and turning then to mark. Finally, can you, can you do the same and briefly explain your involvement since the coup and the expertise that you brought?

Marc 5:58

Yeah, so I believe I became involved sometime in March, in April of 2021, and it was, it was really more organic my involvement, because I was brought in just to answer a few questions. And that at that time, of course, it was still focused on, on the early peaceful protests, and and kind of the the uprising that happened in the capital cities, just just right after the coup. And so my background just in, in the fact that I was known by some of the people that were working more closely inside Myanmar and Thailand, and it was just a luck of the draw that my background after university led me overseas, and I spent four and a half five years in southern Africa, working through about 16 different countries, and I became a professional hunter, and then that led into being an American over there as an asset, and the Department of State asking me to do some things in that area to help stabilize different different regions. And so that was kind of my background when I was in my 20s. And so I'd left that a little bit aside, and then getting back into the the I guess this is it was before this was really a known global conflict, the coup happened, but it wasn't sure what. No one was sure what was going to play out. And so I've had the honor to be a part of just trying to help and advise and give as much information, technical information with regard to tactics and things like that. And so I have a background in training. When I was over in southern Africa, where I'd gotten to train with the recces, and then being an honorary game Ranger, and then doing the work with the Department of State, and getting kind of involved in some of those operations that the US had in Central and Southern Africa. And so that's kind of my my background for this project, and being brought in early on. And so my knowledge base goes from basically early 2021 into into mid to late 2022.

Brad 8:10

Absolutely. And so I appreciate that that experience that you bring in, the knowledge that it's bringing. And I want to start with you, Mark, and I want to ask you about the framework that I'm hoping we can have this discussion within, and that is what I perceive. But please correct me if I'm wrong. But what I perceive as a four layer structure that sits on top of conflict, such as the Myanmar conflict, and that is the tactical layer, the strategic layer, the logistical layer, so obtaining things and getting those things to people who need them, and then ultimately, the highest layer, which I refer to as the home front, and that would be whoever is running an insurgency force or a military force, having to have the economic power, having to have the industrial power, and having to have the manpower and the public support to continue their operations. And I'm wondering if you can elucidate a little bit on how you see these four layers affecting the conflict in Myanmar and affecting the ability of the tamado to continue their operations, and likewise, how they affect and potentially limit the resistance forces.

Marc 9:16

With regard to how I saw things as I entered the picture, You know, as I was kind of analyzing the information that was coming to me originally. And one of the things when you talk about tactics is, is, is, you know, the conflict has gone so long, and the tacticians are so widely spread, so the the different ethnic organizations that have been, you know, in conflict, you know, directly associated with with their desires and and so when I started looking into how all of this formed up, it became kind of obvious that that communication. Organizations were one of the limiting factors between the organizations, between the armed ethnic groups and trying to get consensus right. And that's part of tactics. It's what to do, when to do it, and then the force that you're going to need to deploy in order to accomplish whatever goal you have. And the organizational structure in the beginning, this was a really grassroots pickup. And again, this is a an unarmed society that has kind of been subject to the conflict around it for the past, you know, 7080, years plus. And so the people themselves, once they became, you know, willing or the desire hit the hit the breaking point to where peaceful protest was no longer going to remain their focus. It was real clear that there wasn't any overarching organization. And as badly organized as the junta might have been there, it was still a command structure, and so the effectiveness of being able to deploy communications and command structures and and really were a challenge for organization as this, this movement grew from being strictly, or more strictly, peaceful protests, you know, civil disobedience into more conflict. And I remember the discussions being, you know, weeks, if not months, about the negatives and the positives of of going through that conflict. And I think the understanding, it's so hard to grasp when you're in that space, when you there's no knowledge base about how to do, how to organize, what you know, even weapons tactics, we talk about those things you know. When you talk about tactics, it's a it's everything from, you know, small consortium tactics, where you have small groups, three to five, five to 10 operating, and then you have the larger tactical organizations where we're almost separated out from that original kind of movement, the growing resistance, and then trying to get the acceptance, because There's so much distrust, or mistrust between the different groups and factions in Myanmar that we, that we were trying to coordinate with because of the long duration history, like the mistrust had built so so long and so tactically we It was like it was taking sandbox, you know, Child's Play kind of up against an organized force. And so trying to relay the hazards of going down that pathway and and, and having people understand the duration of beginning a civil conflict, an armed conflict like that, was very difficult and and tactically, there was just, there was the reliance on a lot of the the ethnic organizations to accept and adopt these displaced people that were coming to join the resistance that you know, had been bolstered up by by the resistance that they'd found from the junta. And it kind of pushed them into these areas to seek out, not only arms, but training. And so in a in a in a country where there was no general training of a large portion of the population in any type of conflict, it was the the conflict was structured in such a way for so long that there were just small pockets fighting back. It's that's kind of separated from one another. And so as we tried to organize and define what tactics were and what was acceptable, again, you know that was defining what what would be acceptable in international eyes. Because there was, you know, again, there was a huge desire to gain international support for the the resistance and and putting forth the national unity government and the organization there, you know, those were all attempts to gain more international help, because the just the base logistical need was so great because of, again, a disarmed population, there's not arms just floating around. And even though Myanmar has had the conflict, and arms have been, you know, flowing in from from different places, other, you know, neighboring countries, they were typically kept in in small locales, and so again, starting from the ground up, you're starting with, and I know relating this back, but more urban, more urban mentalities. You. It was, it was just an interesting way to jump into this. And it was like starting over. So usually in a conflict situation, there's defined groups that have their initial organizations, and you can kind of jump in and and just give guidance, and they're they'll starve to take that guidance. In this case, it was a little different, because culturally, there was, there's a lot of separation between the West and and understanding like my basal understanding, again, is tainted because I'm was born in the United States, and so I have a different idea of what is available and what could be and and it was a learning process for both, you know, for for, for not only the the ethnic groups, but for the people that were displaced, that were fleeing into those areas to try and gain this and and it's like starting over. So you're, you're starting at this, like, childlike level of education and warfare that is so foreign to a certain, you know, group of of people that you really do have to start at the base and and then build that up. And the time lag that that takes, and the understanding it's not just like it is on the movies or TV, and there's so much media out there that that puts this false idea of what conflict looks like really in real time. And so tactics that was, that was one of those, you know, we started with sticks and stones. You know, the groups started, literally with sticks and stones to try and gain some sort of recognition by the the the ethnic groups that this was a serious, you know, this was serious. And the people of of Burma as a whole, were now standing in resistance instead of just ethnic minority groups. And so tactically, it really is a challenge to get through that, that initial level of introduction, of what this is going to look like. And then there, you know, the the language barrier in and of itself, you know, between the groups and who could understand what. And then the translators that were being used to pass information, it's like, well, was the information truly passed as it was delivered, you know, as it was given. And there was a lot of that mistrust in that and that that we can see, you know, Communications has, communications have expanded in the year or so that I've kind of been more in the background in this conflict. And that's a that's a huge benefit when, when you can talk across geographic boundaries so that you can, you can, you can organize and coordinate. And that helped with everything too, with, you know, between the free Burma rangers and the, you know, the strong arm and some of the other, you know, humanitarian groups that we were, we were helping with. They also recognize those same limitations. And in, you know, bringing that technology up to speed was, it was a long duration stint. So that's part of your tactical arrangement, too. Is a strategy, and you have to have an overarching strategy that is accepted by, you know, your cooperators, and we just that was a struggle, and it may still be a struggle. I didn't see a whole lot of movement in the positive when I was involved. But just months after, you know, I kind of had to step back a little bit, I could see and watch that there was definitely more coordination and more unification of of the alliances against the junta, and that that, in and of itself, strategically, being able to communicate with one another on a routine basis, that's a big deal. So because it's a familiarity you know with your your your surrounding resources and what their conflicts look like, and so that you can share the burdens, so to speak, and you know that you're not isolated and in your own you know your own independent conflict, which is demoralizing, whereas now we have much more communication, much broader communication and information sharing, and that helps with the strategic side of what to do, like, How, where are we going to focus resources in what areas and who is willing? And then getting those commitments and trusting those again, seeing that from the very beginning, start to form up at kind of this grassroots and then move into the ethnic areas where camps, more training camps were being set up literally weekly at a time, and then organizing, who's doing the training and how that went, and who, who would be acceptable? Because, again, we have a difference of, you know, strategies and tactics from from different cultural backgrounds and viewpoints and world views, and so bringing in West.

That we saw initially had a lot to do. You know, in later 2021 there with the national unity government, was just this, this inability to agree to move down a singular path, right? And so there was just too many ideas, and nobody wanted to give anything. And I think we still kind of see that, and I'm hoping Azad can speak a little bit more of the day and day on the ground, and if those sentiments have started to shift, or if you've seen different alignments. But in the initial start of this again, there was a lot of desire to have assistance, but not a lot of trust to gain that assistance, that this is what we can do. This will help you. This will we can bring this in. No, that's not what I want. I want, you know, 50 bmgs. And I'm like, Well, you're not going to get those right. And so it was an it was a desire versus a reality. That was a struggle in the initial formation as this grassroots kind of picked up and started moving people had missed huge misconceptions about what they were getting into. And we spent, you know, there was weeks spending talking with people and trying to explain, you know, how that looked and how long it would take. And I think we even said, you know, three to five years, five to seven to be expected was, was that, and it was kind of a disbelief that that would take that much effort to overthrow, you know, the the little junta and and it, and it bears out in conflict. It usually does. Now we just were discussing Syria, and it's remarkable flip flop, but that was not the case here, and circumstances are vastly different there as well.

Brad 26:53

I want to jump as quickly as I can to Azad, actually, because you were talking about very you know, earlier on in your response, you were talking about things like command and control and establishing that centralization of of direction. And that's something that it seems to come up a lot. It's not enough to have a population who's willing and who has individual tools. You need collaboration. So I'm wondering, Azad, speaking from your perspective, sort of on the ground in chin how, how do the command structures look? I understand that there are defense groups that have been around for quite some time, organizations that have been around and established themselves and have internal rank structures, but it's not quite the same as a as a nationwide military. So how solid is the command and control structure? How? How much faith do the people in positions of power have that their instructions are going to be followed, and to what extent is there genuine collaboration between different groups in the state?

Azad 27:48

Yeah, I think one of the most important things that Mark mentioned is a little bit about how we can say the mindset of war. No, at least with our western audience, we can understand that in the West, we have a very particular philosophy of war that is different than in the east, or, you know, in other parts of the world, I would describe it as like, almost a positivistic or like scientific or almost like mathematical approach to war. Now, if you ask someone like this, they say, Okay, we need to have this many resources organized in this fashion and deployed in this manner, and that's what will give us a victory, almost as if the victory is itself some kind of like math equation, which, you know, in a way, can be true in some cases. But here the philosophy is much different, where not just the war, but the revolution and the entire social aspect is itself a much more social act. It's it has a lot more political and social dimensions that add increased complications. You You know, it's one thing to if you're in a Western military that has a bunch of resources, it's very easy to say, Okay, well, we just need these assets deployed in these way, and we can get certain results with them. But in this revolutionary case, obviously, to attain such assets requires not, as Mark mentioned, a lot of investment, and to get that investment pulled from certain places takes a lot of effort and a lot of social sway as well as material sway. I'll give, like, I think, a really good example of this. Let's say you want to have a unit that's able to fight, to fight, they need to have their weapons, their equipment, and let's say magazines. No, just the magazines to hold your MOE. Normally, soldiers here, at least, from what I've seen, don't have so many magazines. So let's say you're coming from the west, you need to go to the commander, and you need to tell the commander, okay, look, our soldiers need to have magazines. Now, it's one thing to say this kind of theoretically, like, look, to have a long fight to make sure our soldiers are able to stay in the fight and maneuver. They need to have enough ammo. They need to have magazines. And someone can agree with you on principle. But then you look at the reality of the Myanmar black market, where even AK magazines are 60 to $80 a piece. We're not even talking about m4 magazines, no. And suddenly, when you want to have five, six magazines for every soldier, when you talk. About even getting enough magazines for one platoon, let alone one company. Now you're talking about 10,000 15,000 $20,000 and that's just for the magazines. So there's kind of like a chicken and an egg situation where, you know, we're chasing effectiveness. We want to increase our training, we want to increase our capability, and there are certain steps that you have to do to reach that capability. But because, as Mark said, No, there is a the level of development until now is not so high. There isn't the basis of understanding of that. So how do you then convince someone without that basis that, hey, just for 40 people, I'm gonna need $20,000 just for their magazines. Now that's suddenly a lot harder of a sale to make, but I think I'll give another example to where this has kind of worked in a positive light. If you remember the first episode that we recorded, I was at that time fundraising for a thermal for our group, and since that thermal site came, we got it for a couple $1,000 at the time, we had, anyways, been telling the people we're working with, look, you should really be looking into, you know, optics like this that we can get. They make a big difference in the battlefield. But of course, there are 1000s of 1000s of dollars for just one optic, so the money isn't very easily found. But after we got this thermal, the luckiest thing about it is it has recording features. And after it was used in the battlefield, and they saw directly, oh, hey, this thing is has a lot of efficacy and can be used in a lot of good ways. Suddenly, there's all this money for the thermals, and now everyone is buying thermal scopes. So it is a situation like this where you can make the material argument. Look, we need to do this. We need to change this. We need to organize in this way. But until there is something that you can grab and hold on to and look at and say, oh, when we do this, it's effective. It's very difficult to organize the social sway, especially coming from the outside, insofar as command structure and collaboration. Yeah. I mean, I think, as Mark mentioned, there's hundreds and hundreds of groups in the country, and even here in Chin State. I mean, there's dozens of groups right now. I am around the chin brotherhood operation areas, and in our battles, we're fighting with more than a dozen groups all working together, of course, the groups in chin brotherhood, but also Alliance groups from sayagyiyang, from mugwe region, and from elsewhere, coming and fighting alongside us. On one hand, obviously, it is a very good sign that many different groups from all over the country are working together for a common goal. Now, chin brotherhood officially has alliances with the bpla as well as with the Arakan army. You know, two vastly different organizations as well as all of the different groups within chin brotherhood who are working together, these are all really good signs. But at the end of the day, when you get onto the battlefield, there's not so much to be said for the efficacy of 12 different groups, each working with their own varying level of training and equipment and philosophy and something like this, of course, going forward, if you look at the war in a mathematical sense, then obviously the answer is to consolidate and to come up with unified structure and logistics and strategy. But there's a lot of, as we said, social dimensions that make that not even not Yeah, I don't, I don't want to be pessimistic on that, but there will be a lot of roadblocks towards that direction. I think with Shin brotherhood, specifically in Shin state, we're seeing a lot of positive developments in that direction, where it's not as much of an influence block as much as it is a legitimate alliance of different military groups all around Chin State. So we are seeing positive steps in that direction, but conversely, we are seeing the very real situation in Chin State, this whole divide between Qin LAN Council and Qin brotherhood, and the very frequent problems that it causes, and also the, I won't say, roadblock, but the inhibitor to the speed at which progress could be achieved against the junta. So there's definitely things to be said, you know, both optimistically and pessimistically, about the varying groups that currently exist. But of course, the most effective mathematical way to go forward would be as much consolidation and as much professionalization as possible against the junta. Would, you know, undoubtedly bring results. But the question is, what is the most pragmatic and, uh, practical way to achieve that going forward?

Brad 34:31

Absolutely. And it's that very strange chicken and egg situation of of funding that seems to exist everywhere you need to already have the thing in order to demonstrate why you needed to have the thing in the first place, but I want to open the floor here. Anthony Davis, do you have anything to add, or any follow up questions you'd like to ask? I know there's quite a lot of information there, and I'm just wondering whether you have any thoughts.

Anthony Davis 34:55

Let me make a few sort of overarching comments, some of them perhaps obvious, but I think. Really important to put on the table. What makes the whole Myanmar situation different and difficult is the fact that this is, as Mark was pointing out initially, this is really a grassroots from point zero, revolutionary struggle, and that is sort of unique on two fronts. One is there was no, and still is not any revolutionary party that could attempt to actually pull things together. So when you when you look at most sort of revolutionary struggles in the post world war two era, you will see that they are led by a revolutionary party, be it in Vietnam, be it in China, be it in Mozambique, wherever, wherever we're talking and that has been lacking in this in this instance, because clearly the NLD, the National League for Democracy, which was taken down by the coup, is not a revolutionary party. It's a parliamentary party which has now been essentially decapitated and largely destroyed on the ground. So that's one level at which this is extremely difficult. The other level is that there has been no external power willing at any significant level to support this struggle. So all of the neighbors, be that, Thailand, China, India, Bangladesh, none of these countries are prepared to actively support the struggle. And that's quite unusual, because if you look at again revolutionary struggles that have occurred in the post world war two era, you will usually, in terms of the successful ones, see a neighboring power willing to support this revolution. And my own direct experience is very much in the 1980s in Afghanistan, where, again, Afghanistan was following the Soviet invasion in December 79 this was a spontaneous, grassroots struggle involving hundreds of different local groups, different tribal groups, different ethnic groups, a group in every valley, a group in every town, right, very much the same sort of spontaneous reaction to an event imposed on them, which the society revolted against. However, what you saw in the first two years, year and a half, two years in Afghanistan, was Pakistan, Pakistani military intelligence coming into this struggle and essentially knocking heads and saying to various groups, look 3040, different groups represented in Peshawar, inside Pakistan, on the border. That's not going to cut it, guys, if you want to have a viable fight in the coming years, we're only going to put up with seven groups, and that's how it's going to be, and you're going to have to work with us on that basis. We understand that there are differences in the country, inside Afghanistan, and we will accommodate those differences in seven different Mujahideen was the term used. Then, obviously, we will accommodate seven different groups. That's it. Anybody else is out of the picture, and we will fund and channel supplies only to those seven groups. As a result, all the plethora of different groups inside Afghanistan had to ally with one of those seven groups based in Pakistan dealing with Pakistani military intelligence. Therefore you had a consolidation process. So if you were a commander in northern Afghanistan, you would be probably alive with one group based in Peshawar, and you would send your guys down to that group, there would be an office in Peshawar. You would knock on the door. You would say, we need this, that and the other in terms of ammunition. You would wait around a couple of weeks, and the Pakistanis would basically provide what they saw as a suitable uh. Uh, amount of ammunition, or amount of weaponry, whatever, and it will be taken back inside. So the overall point is that in Myanmar, the problem is there has been no consolidation process other than that which the nug is still attempting to impose on this array of PDFs of BA Mar, ethnic ba Mar PDFs inside the country. So broadly speaking, in Myanmar, you have, there has been two wars being fought. One war has been fought by ethnic groups right Khin in the north tnla in northwestern San state, khuren Chin, where Azad is right now, Rakhine, etc, etc, Khin on the Thai border, and those groups have been at the beginning of the fight in 2021 they already had a significant degree of military organization experience. And know how. Then there is the spontaneous uprising in the BA Mar, heartland of the country, which occurred as Mark was explaining, with essentially no experience of anything, of how to fire a gun, as he said, sticks and stones, right? Which is a whole different dynamic. So what we've seen over the last coming up four years now, is an interaction between a lot of PDFs, not all of them, by any means, but a lot of PDFs and those ethnic armed organizations, or ethnic revolutionary organizations, Eros, which have training, weaponry experience, etc, etc, on the one hand, and PDFs have also been dealing on the other hand, with the nug, which is sort of everywhere and nowhere. And some PDFs are prepared to deal with the nug and to benefit from what it can provide in terms of funding and munitions and to a degree guidance and other groups are not, and that's a huge problem. So how all this is coming together is is very difficult to foresee. It is changing, but it's happening slowly, and it's not clear how these two wars are basically going to coalesce into one war, which ultimately is what you require to overthrow the incumbent regime.

Marc 43:07

With regard to what Anthony was saying, this, that multifaceted kind of conflict right from the middle of the country, kind of moving out, and then the mistrust and the distrust that the ethnics had for some of the BA Mar coming up, and there was, there. There wasn't a man in the beginning. It was that was really a struggle, was to convince the the ethnic groups to take on these refugees, almost these people that were the resistance, people that wanted to come up and fight because it was, it was logistically, a tax on them with no benefit initially, right? And so the the there was almost a feeling of of like they the people coming for help, the brymar that were coming up and seeking those who had the training and had some experience in this conflict, in the durational conflict, there was, there was this animosity almost toward them for not having participated, from the beginning in the ethnic struggle. And so, like you said, the logistics and how to get around that where I'd like to, you know, again, hearing more from what's on the ground today going on, if we're if they're seeing those cooperations, and I know Azad talked that it's improving, but these are barriers that are very much there. And in the beginning, again, I go back to communications. All of these things really depend on open communication. And geographically speaking, you know, Myanmar is a very difficult place to get signal across, just because of the terrain structure, especially as you get further into the north and and that's you know, again, why the the ethnic groups, you know, kind of migrated up into those as they got pushed. And pushed is because it's, as you've mentioned, in Pakistan and things places like that, fighting in that type of area and being able to resist insertion into your territory is so much more attainable for small forces guerrilla warfare and things like that. And so getting past the mistrust and the distrust, and then Mr. Davis, the the the the cultural aspect of this too. And when you talk about the neighboring country, somebody has to come in and cut or seeing some entity come in and provide a unification. It's not in the best interest of some of the neighbors to do that. Now we're seeing the drug trade and things like that starting to spark, you know, in the last year, with Bangladesh and India becoming concerned with regard to what's coming through. And so we see actors, foreign actors, using Myanmar and the conflict is just kind of a pawn to get their own way and and in prior conflicts, like you said that something, some neighboring force, would come in. And the problem is, is the West has been kind of well, in my opinion, again, I say it's a problem, but it's just my, my view on things, which is quite limited. But the the the view that the West should come in that was like such the appeal and the West is so far separated and and the cooperation, again, you know, talking with CIA, entities that have been in country and out and and assets and things like that, that again, you you show up in in country with a solution that nobody wants to accept, and then you're kind of your aid is rejected. And that that, again, goes to this kind of misunderstanding of of what conflict means, and back to what Azad said with regard to this idea of how this should work, and culturally speaking, the deep wounds that are between the ethnics and the Burma and and trying to heal those in a unification, I'd be interested to hear, you know, Anthony's idea, or with regard to a nation that would be suitable to provide such logistical guidance, I guess that would be accepted, because, again, there's the mistrust of the neighboring countries that goes pretty deep in Myanmar, just from Cambodia history, the Khmer Rouge History, and driving of the different tribal groups out.

Anthony Davis 47:43

Yeah, I guess the problem is essentially, as far as the let's call it the Myanmar revolution, is concerned, is that none of the neighbors have an interest in seeing what they regard, arguably incorrectly, as a primary, the primary pillar of national stability, namely the tatmadaw the military, right? That's their default position. And it doesn't matter whether you're talking India, China, Thailand or Bangladesh, they all in different ways, for different reasons and at different degrees, have come around to the conclusion that this revolutionary upsurge is not going to overthrow the military and in a definitive manner, and therefore there is no point in providing support to revolutionary forces inside the country.

Marc 49:09

Anthony, does that have to do a lot with the internal conflicts and the lack of stability in even states inside Myanmar, like the there's, like Anthony said, 12 or so different factions and an outside entity looks at that and says, Well, no one's in charge, and no one is accepting, you know, no one's organized in a, in a in a bulk group that we can get behind, because there's so much internal, you know, we would, we would be be organizing to bring materials in, and one group, one would would steal the other groups, materials that were being brought in and kill the people that were bringing them in, even though they were on the same facade.

Anthony Davis 49:58

I got the question. Marc, and my response would be that the primary initial mindset on the part of all the neighbors is that this is, by definition, a very complex, ethnically complex and divided society, right? You've got all these different ethnic groups based in border areas around the BA, Mar heartland. So by definition, it's complex, and therefore it requires a stabilizing agent at the center, and that traditionally, historically, since pretty much independence in 48 that has been the Myanmar military, they have acted in that manner, and they have become the neighbors have become used to seeing them as providing that glue, if you like, that holds the place together. Therefore, there is a fundamental reluctance to entertain the idea that they could or should be overthrown in a definitive manner, and it's only when the situation inside the country has reached the point that It appears there is a prospect of an overthrow, that they are prepared to change their basic mindset, their basic policy towards what's happening in Myanmar. So clearly what you saw after 1027, after the ethnic offensives that began in october 23 right last October of last year, and continued pretty much up until the present, through most of 2024 up until now, China suddenly realized that these successes in which you had revolutionary forces a mixture of ethnic and PDF, ba, Mar threatening. Mandalay, the country's second biggest city that represented an existential threat to what they saw as the pillar of national stability which guaranteed their interests and objectives, namely the tatmadaw. And only then did they come down very firmly on the side of the tatmadaw. That's where they are today. The Chinese shifting of position in the last few months has been very clear, very marked. Thailand is much more it's a traditional Thai mindset. They tend to bend with the wind, to follow the trends of the of the month or of the of the moment, more so Thailand still maintains good relations with the with the junta, and at the same time, obviously, a lot of different revolutionary elements are living and operating quietly under the radar inside Thailand, which is no obviously the Thai authorities, Thai military, are fully aware of that, so it's a slightly different dynamic. But the basic point here is that only when the internal dynamic reaches a point that it is becoming indisputable that this regime, this tatmadaw regime, is coming down. Only then will you see some neighbors and Thailand is probably the most important player here, actually being willing to lean in actively, proactively being willing to lean into the way that this is going. So as long as it's uncertain, and it's very uncertain now, Thailand will maintain this sort of balanced approach to what's happening. Right? China has already made its decision. They're going to go with the military full on to the extent, as we're all aware, that they're basically threatening large Eros like the tnla mdaa. And even the Arakan army, they're threatening them with sanctions if they continue to fight. So, yeah, the dynamics here are different, but basically, I mean the fundamental point here is that this revolutionary struggle is on its own, and that is pretty in historical context that's pretty unusual. The West cheers from the from the wings, but is not prepared for a whole raft of issues that we don't need to get into here. Is not prepared to push the envelope on this in any meaningful way, either diplomatically or left, basically, until the internal dynamic can prove that this regime is coming down, then the neighbors will Continue, either to support the tatmadaw or the hedge.

Brad 56:03

And I think this is a good time to turn back to Azad, because one thing that has been clear in everything that's being discussed here is just how important that solidarity is between the different groups who are fighting extensively or all fighting on the same side. And Azad, I know that there's a very high degree of, comparatively speaking, of collaboration and cooperation within chin, as you were discussing previously, what I'm wondering, however, is, do you have any insight as to the interaction between the various chin based resistance groups and the national unity Government itself? Is there any real strong line of communication? Is there any line of of support and logistics? I would imagine it would be a very, very tall order for any of the chin defense groups to turn around and say, We swear fealty to the national unity government. I think that would be pretty extreme. But I wonder to what, to what extent is that relationship there? And to what extent is that relationship being shown to external stakeholders who might be looking on?

Azad 57:08

Sure, so that, in itself, is a huge can of worms, like, not just to talk about the nug and you G's position in Myanmar, but specifically in Chin State. Again, as an outsider, I'm giving the understanding that I've come to have collected based on people I've been around. You know, excuse me if there are some factual errors. But this is my understanding. In the beginning, when the nug formed the nucc, the National Unity Coordinating Council, or rather, vice versa. I believe the nug was formed out of this council, the members from varying ethnic groups sent, how can we say, like representatives to the nucc on behalf of their ethnic groups, which was a very big point of departure in the revolutionary history of Myanmar. Now, as as Anthony mentioned, there have always been two, or there's now two wars. There is the ethnic war, and then there is the this new kind of post coup uprising. So the formation of the nucc in the inclusion of these representatives from ethnic groups, marked a very big departure from the previous revolutionary history of Myanmar. Now the envoy to the nucc on behalf of Chin State, is now what we would say, someone who is aligned with chin Lin council. So in 2022 2023 after the kind of breakdown in relations of the ICN CC, the interim chin National Coordinating Committee, or council, I forget when that after chin Lin Council, and led mostly by the CNA CNF, withdrew from that chin Coordinating Council and formed the chin Lin Council, thus also began the question of, okay, well, then who inherits the relationship with the nucc and the nug, because that person who was before a member of the chin the we can say, like overarching chinland Coordinating Council now withdrew to one of two big political blocks that exist in Chin State. Now we have chin brotherhood and chin then council. So I would say, functionally, there is an impasse. But from what I've seen, the influence of the nug and Chin State has always been relatively limited. I mean, that could just be me. I'm fairly neck deep in like military matters, and I haven't touched a lot of political or social spheres here, like humanitarian or education or things like that. But at least as far as I can see, interaction with the energy is limited to occasionally. There is like stipends given to help cover Moe. I was under the assumption, or I'm under the understanding, that a while ago, the energy sent some drones to the to certain CDF resistance groups. Yeah, but the degree to which there is any kind of like strategic cooperation or collaboration, I I'm not under the understanding that there is any kind of strategic collaboration other than the mutual understanding that we're fighting against the junta and the nug is in the unique position to be able to coordinate some kind of supplies and aid and things like this. But in so far as any kind of, like direct working relationship, at least from what I've seen, I haven't seen anything to too high of a level. What I can say, however, is that the on the civil side, I am aware that things are being done like, for instance, the nug has their alternative schooling system, as well as certain NGO programs for medical aid and things like this.

Brad 1:00:55

To my knowledge, there is some degree of collaboration on that front that's very heartening to hear. And I mean the fact alone that there isn't animosity between the AUG and the various chin groups is itself, I think, a very positive step, and the fact that there is this type of interaction is something that gives us some optimism. I do want to look at the more granular level, because I want to take advantage of the knowledge that you have and the experiences that you've had while we've got you here, and eventually, I'd like to bring Mark in to see if we can identify any differences and any changes in the way that the the military has been operating. So I'm wondering whether you can give us a bit of an overview of the tama doors operations and and strategies and tactics such as they are in in chin land. I understand that at this point in the revolution, especially in the liberation of chin the tama do is very hamstrung and is very limited in what it can accomplish, but it is still doing quite a bit of damage. It is still killing both combatants and civilians. So I'm wondering if you can sort of elaborate on on what they're doing, how frequently they're doing it, and what tactics do they rely on most frequently, whether it's artillery shelling, mortars, aerial bombardments or just surprise raids to achieve their goals?

Azad 1:02:10

Yeah, last time we talked fighting was ongoing in falam, Min dot and TANF as of just two days ago, recently, in min dot, the chin brotherhood operation is completed, and the remnants of the SEC soldiers in min dot either surrendered or were captured, which is obviously like a very big morale boost for everyone. And in fact, after the defeat of the base, in mind.in neighboring Khan petlet, which everyone assumed would be kind of like our next step, like the next battle after MnDOT, the entire sac Garrison actually ran away. They got in their cars, they loaded everything up, and they ran away back to the plains areas, to their main bases in anticipation of a future operation. So really we're seeing that now defeats are coming, and maybe not at the speed that some people would like to see, but they are coming now in falam, the fighting is still ongoing. No what we're seeing is, of course, they have they're able to supply themselves. They still have the advantage of their air force, they still have the advantage of their heavy weapons and artillery. But ultimately, their ability to fight is not good. I can say that their advantage of having a very high elevation, isolated and well entrenched position is definitely there. But in every instance in which we've met, and we can say open battle, as well as some attempts by the tatmadaw to reinforce via helicopter, bringing in extra soldiers have been resoundingly defeated, and I can't go into too many details, but we can say that when they are actually engaged in combat, they are unable to they're unable to leverage the advantage in material that they have, no the extra equipment. They have, the functionally unlimited amount of bullets and bombs that they can throw at us, their willingness to fight and their, I would say, level of training also renders that advantage that they have fairly useless. Now I'll give a brief example. We were on a front line. The distance was very close. They were shooting 40 millimeter at us, and it seemed like they had no clue how the 40 millimeter works. They were shooting at like mortars, and they were landing like landing like 200 meters behind us. And in another example, they brought helicopter reinforcements. The people they're bringing for reinforcements are militia members, which seems to imply that they are somehow running out of conscripts, or running out of their own soldiers that are stretched thin across the country. They are trying to bring together whatever they can to delay their defeats wherever they can as long as possible, but wherever they're engaged in one on one direct combat, they're losing, and they're losing very badly. They're routing, leaving their guns, leaving their wounded, leaving their equipment and running away. So yeah, now min.is victory camp. That they have left. Falam, we believe the victory will be coming very soon. I don't want to you know, mention anything specific to jinx it, but the situation is very good. Tan Phuong, battles are also still going, which really after this series of battles, means that only Hakka and tetem, the two largest towns in Shin state, will have any kind of SEC presence remaining in them. And when you have a state full of 1000s and 1000s of rebels, and you have only two military bases that have maybe one company or two companies at best, then the math doesn't support your position.

Marc 1:05:32

For very long, something had stuck in my mind as a question for Azad and for Anthony with regard to selling democracy. And I know this is going to be a very americentric kind of idea, but democracy has a lot of different forms, and for a minority group, uh, straight democracy is, is not advantageous, and it's, it's like the West has bastardized that word democracy. And we've, we've forgotten that there are consequences to democracy without guide rails around it. And I say it's americentric a little bit, because, again, we're a constitutional republic, a representative democracy. And it seems like there's, and I've seen this in the you know, it's plastered globally in the news. Democracy, democracy, democracy, democracy. We need this. Democracy is everyone gets a vote. That means the majority rules. And you can see how the ethnics are looking at the processes that are being pushed forth as we're going to give the Burma power once again and have nothing. And it seems like the conversation, and again, I'm asking this as an americentric I'm asking a perspective as to, is there not maybe a better system that is is more conducive if we just stay that we're demanding democracy, then, then the majority will rule once again, there has to be an understanding, I would think, in my mind, an understanding that there's something beneficial to the ethnics, and as in a flat democracy, as it's being sold globally, currently, in today's world, it does not offer that for The ethnic minorities.

Anthony Davis 1:07:18

I mean, what we know about the Myanmar revolution, pretty much from the beginning, is the term used is federal democracy, right? I mean, Mark's totally aware of that. So this is not, if you like, in a an optimum scenario. We're not talking we're not talking democracy as it might be practiced in in, for example, United Kingdom. We're talking something else, a federal democracy. There's a federal democracy in the United States. There's a federal democracy in Australia. There's a federal democracy in Switzerland. I mean, there are all different brands of federalism. And the point that basically is the challenge that confronts revolutionary Myanmar. What is federalism going to look like? Because obviously, as Mark pretty much laid out the ethnic groups that have been oppressed by the BA Mar and they are essentially ba Mar dominated armed forces, they are not going to go back to the way things were before. So how that federalism, or on federalism, is going to be shaped is the big challenge for the future, and the opinions of for example, the Korean are going to be different from what Tun miat Nine, head of the Arakan army and the United League of Arakan are looking at so and then the Khin have their own ideas about what a federal democracy would look like. But so far, it appears that none of these different ethnic groups are saying outright, we want out. We're looking at Independence, so they're all essentially acknowledging the need to stay under a Myanmar roof. How they achieve that is going to be, as I said, the big challenge for the future. So I don't think Mark need worry too much that the ethnics who essentially now hold the whip hand right. Right power right now in Myanmar is primarily in the hands of ethnic revolutionary organizations, obvious, most obviously, the Arakan army, the Khin independence army, the tnla, MND, etc, etc, the KNU. So they hold the power. They're not going to go back to the way things were before.

Azad 1:10:22

I think for us in the West, from a political perspective, the state and the nation and the country and the people are all to us synonymous. But from a real revolutionary perspective, we can look at a lot of places in the world and realize the state is actually, you know, in best case scenario, not so necessary. And if you're someone like me, or if you're someone like a lot of revolutionary people all over the world, you believe the state is actually a negative actor in the circumstance. So no, there's a lot of approaches going forward. For instance, you have the nug approach, which is a reformed federal government, which removes the power of the military from the equation. But some people are seeing this kind of as like, you know what you mentioned, an American system where it's just okay, it's just gonna be Western liberal democracy that is going to have elements of ethnic participation. Now, if you contrast that with the B PLA, for instance, which is also the BA Mar People's Liberation Army, which is itself a BA Mar ethnic group. And in fact, some people are even calling them like a BA Mar ero to make an analogy with the existing euros in the country. Their political position is much more confederal in nature, like not saying, Okay, we need to have a new centralized state that has good ethnic participation, but explicitly calling for a confederation of federal entities that are in their own way, instituting democracy in their own constituencies. Now of course, I think that is, at least for me personally, one of the big political motivators that brought me here to Myanmar, because at the end of the day, we're not fighting for a Western democracy, or the reinstitution of a democratic state. What we're fighting for is the removal of the influence of the military junta and the institution of the will of the people, however, that in the end, will constitute itself.

Brad 1:12:15

The big question then becomes, what should the trajectory be? Because not looking at the granular looking at the tactics and the strategies and the logistics, but looking at the larger scale. You know, for context, for example, I was contacted while we were having this discussion. I was receiving messages from from a contact of mining Yangon, who is telling me that there is panic now, because not only is the military once again forcibly recruiting, but the roads leading to Yangon are currently being contested by the Arakan army. Her estimation was that the conflict is about six hours drive out of the city and and closing in on on Yangon proper, so still quite a distance away, but enough that the military within Yangon have have definitely the Hornets Nest has been kicked, and they've gone into into high activity, and everyone's sort of trying to keep a low profile. So things are definitely continuing to progress. The country is not in a complete stalemate, as as some people like to portray. But the question is, what do the various groups need to be doing is, should the focus just be attacking the military at all opportunities on all fronts, to put as much pressure on them as possible? Or is it more important that the post tatmadaw situation be discussed behind closed doors now, between the national unity government, between the eaos Anthony, as you pointed out, the power functional is in the hands of these eeos, and that's something that the national unity government has to has to reckon with. So I'll first throw the floor to Mark, just because you've been around in those early nascent days looking at the development of these PDFs and the creation of an armed ba Mar non Tama do force. I'm wondering what your thoughts are. What should the PDFs be doing, and what should the eaos be doing to ensure their success? What should their focus be?

Marc 1:14:13

In my mind, it's kind of simplistic. I think communication between them needs to be facilitated and that needs to be a priority. Broadband communication across the country, between the eaos and opening those channels of communication across geographical boundaries where there's there's difficulty in coordination and and I say that not flippantly, I really believe that, you know, 25% or 50% of of of the effort should be driven toward, in my mind, and again, as odds on the ground, you'd know better, but needs to be driven toward that cooperation. I mean literally, liaisons between the different groups need to be set up that are trusted. That can be worked with, and that has to expand. And in the early days, we were trying to push the mesh tastic networking technology up into Myanmar, and trying to get that to take a foothold so comms could be better. And now we have, of course, Starlink mobiles that are much better and and I mean money wise and expenditure coordination is going in my mind in any conflict is, is the necessity coordination and communication you can do a lot on, you know, onesie twosies, small groups, you know, bands, you know, small fighting forces can, can cause havoc, but in order to secure and hold ground and do it effectively, logistically, soundly, you have to be able to communicate, and you have to be able to do that with entities that that you understand are on the same sheet of music as you are. And you're, you're, you're, you're coordinating those efforts, first, you know, locally, then small regionally, and then you start expanding that and again, trying to communicate the necessity of that cooperation, and that the sheer requirement of it in order to succeed in a in a fashion that's recognized as stable, has to be in place before in my mind, and that's, again, kind of a single individual's perspective. That's kind of I would, I would be focusing on that coordination and communication, honestly, the the bonds between the smaller groups that are fighting together. Build bigger bonds, build bigger bonds, build more trust, more successes.

Anthony Davis 1:16:42

I'd like to both agree with Mark and push back a little bit. I don't think at this stage in the conflict, communication between different groups that want to be in communication is any problem, right? Senior members of the nugs Ministry of Defense can talk with senior elements in major Eros more or less whenever they want to and on a regular basis. So the problem is not communication at this point. It may have been three years ago, but not anymore. The problem is organization. And what I think is is worth considering in this context, is the fact that today, in Myanmar, you have two, as I said before, two wars. What you've seen in the last, particularly in the last year in the ethnic Borderlands, is a more or less, let's say, semi conventional, conventional, semi conventional war of movement, right, In which major operations have been taking place, and we've seen this in chan state. We've seen it in Khin state, and most particularly and dramatically in Rakhine State. So this is a war of movement, a war of a war of movement, and a semi conventional war then in the heartland, in the BA Mar areas, what you have is a war that is pretty much still stuck in guerrilla mode. This is the mode that Mark described as emerging in 2021 right small groups forming, getting hold of weaponry, linking up with the group next door, conducting hit and run operations, defending their villages against tatmadaw incursions, hence the term people's Defense Forces right now. Ultimately, this conflict in Myanmar is not going to be concluded satisfactorily until the tatmadaw is defeated in a conventional or semi conventional manner in the heartland, because the heartland is where the major urban centers are and the major lines of communication. So what is required is for the Heartland resistance to move from guerrilla mode to where the Eros are in the borderland, which is essentially conventional mobile warfare. And that is not a simple process. It's going to take in my assessment, at least the coming year 2025 if my prefer. COVID vision of what might happen in terms of the resistance moving successfully in the coming year is to see, with the help of both the nug and the nug, in coordination with key Eros, the formation of regular units in what I might call PDF land in a BA Mar heart land. So they cease to be PDFs, and they move to a higher stage of warfare that the ethnics have already achieved, and in some cases, achieved 1020, years ago. So only when that happens is there a prospect of actually defeating this military, because you're not gonna they will not be able to defeat the military in hit and run guerrilla mode, because you're dealing with a regular army with a unified command structure, communications capability, etc, etc. So at the end of the day, to defeat an army, you need an army. And right now in the BA Mar heartland, the that army has yet to be formed.

Azad 1:21:22

Yeah. I mean, I would totally agree. I would totally agree. Look, just from the math, in Chin State, there's probably more than 20 different CDFs aligned either with chin Brotherhood or chin Lin Council in neighboring Sayagyi, let's take the city that's closest to us in Chin State, Khali kalimu. In kalimu, there's probably six, seven or eight different PDF or CDF or groups operating in and around Calais city. Just north of Calais, there's temu town, which has two or three different PDFs and rebel militias working in Moe region. There's a dozen different PDFs just in our immediate operational area. There are dozens and dozens and dozens of groups. You put all these groups together, all of their guns, all of their arms, all of their men. You steamroll the junta. I mean, it's not even a question like the the tactical, strategic, the equipment, the logistics, the public support. If you're looking at this from like, Okay, what needs to be done? Then, of course, we can very easily say, look, there needs to be consolidation. There needs to be cooperation, increased levels of training and properly equipped and outfitted military units that can properly fight the junta, if something like that was established. I mean, it would be almost trivial. It would be almost hilarious to battles. But I think in every single you know, in every single place that you look it's not for nothing that there's more than 20 CDFs. You know, I'm not saying that this is like malicious but going back to what Mark mentioned earlier, about very deep seated mistrusts, and, you know, needing to bridge this mistrust and establish communication, maybe he didn't mean this in the literal infrastructural sense of like Starlink and something like this, but definitely, there is the very real hesitation from two groups, even right next to each other, who are both fighting the junta, who are both putting their lives on the line and whose comrades are sacrificing themselves every day to fight the dictatorship. There is still a reluctance to talk with each other on certain issues. So No, before we can even dream about like, let's, let's envision a chin Liberation Army, for instance, a unified armed structure of all of the chin groups working together under some kind of unified command structure, strategic framework and logistical structure. Such a such a formation would steamroll Chin State like without question. But obviously the roadblocks that exist to form that in Chin State are the same roadblocks that exist, I would say, almost everywhere now we are seeing some success stories, you know, especially some places in the east. Like just last week, there was a announcement of several different San groups coming together to create like one unified command, and slowly, we are seeing more cooperation, like the chin brotherhood, as I mentioned earlier, is actively cooperating with both the Arakan army as well as BP la as well as other different allies in the plains region next to usagyi and Moe. We are seeing that cooperation go forward. Now the catalyst, I think this is my personal opinion. Until now, there has been no big setback, no big slap in the face, no big defeat for the resistance that has, as we say in America, there has been no coming to Jesus moment, which is where there has been the realization, which is, hey, we really can't do this anymore, like this. It's not going to work, because the junta everywhere has been backpedaling and been defeated. I mean, look at the embarrassing defeat in Lashio. Look at the defeats now in Shin state, look at the defeats in Rakhine State. No, everywhere is defeat and defeat and defeat with what is comparatively on behalf of the resistance, not really. Such a developed army, there's lots of weaknesses. There's lots of areas to be improved, but the punishments for having those weaknesses have not been lived, at least to the degree that I've seen by the resistance yet. So definitely, I absolutely agree with both mark and Anthony that the way forward, the strategic victory, the end game to to fully defeat the tatmadaw has to come about as some kind of consolidation and some kind of increased cooperation. But at the moment, the in the same way that it's hard to convince them to buy some magazines, it's also hard to convince them to all come together suddenly and all unify when that's something that's more abstract, but what is very practical and what is very real is these tribal issues and these frictions between them, and these disputes over land and these disputes over control of areas, that's something that's in their hands right now, tangible, controllable, and anyway, everyone is still somehow experiencing marginal victories against the tatmadaw Now, I think going forward, That won't always be the case. The Heartland is going to be a lot different story than the ethnic areas where we have total support and total control and total freedom of movement. But I'm not I say that. I'm not pessimistic at all. I believe that eventually the realities of the revolution here and the I do genuinely believe that every faction in this is coming at this conflict with good intentions, with pure intentions, and with the genuine intent to have a better system in Burma that works for everybody. And I'm hoping that the realities of the conflict will help remove some of those roadblocks as we go further down the line, I don't know when that will be, but I'm confident in the resistance of the people and in their desire to achieve a desirable outcome.

Brad 1:26:50

But let me actually just very quickly follow up with you, Azad, because you mentioned these very tangible tribal issues. You mentioned disputes over land and so on, and a comment that I remember receiving from another guest when we were discussing the conflict in Karen, was that something that I found very, very surprising, the assertion that there were bases in Karen, that it was either Karen or Karen. I apologize, I can't remember clearly, but the assertion was that there were bases that were being kept alive. Tama door bases that could have been overthrown, and one of the very important reasons that the base was not overthrown and the Tampa door was not pushed out of that region was that the ethnic groups that the various armed organizations were aware that without the unifying factor of a common enemy in the tamador, they would predominantly focus on not pushing the conflict to wherever the border currently is between the tama donde and the unified resistance, but rather, would go back to squabbling between themselves and trying to settle those old scores and establish control of the territories that they that they claim to be theirs. I don't know what the situation is like in chin, but not only speaking of unification as a tool to become more effective in the face of the tama door, is there, in your opinion, a very real risk that without unification, even if the tama door defeated, there's no hope for a smooth transition, because The conflict against the tama do will be replaced by internal conflict between different groups who still haven't settled the exact borders of their respective spheres of control.

Azad 1:28:31

Yeah. On that topic, I'm optimistic. I'll have to say right now, the situation state is not great. However, it's a lot better than it could be, and there's been lots of opportunities for it to go worse, and it didn't because of cooler heads that prevailed. And my belief is fundamentally that everybody in this even different factions with fundamentally different political issues and positions on certain like tribal issues, everybody is coming at this with the best intentions, and I think that in Chin State, this is something we'll have to contend with very soon, because, as I have mentioned before, I believe that by next year, the tatmadaw will be out of Chin State. I believe that actually, once the tatmadaw is totally gone, I think that will be a catalyst of warmer relationships between the factions in Shin state, I think that it will have the opposite effect of what you described. I think that once the enemy is actually gone and we can stop thinking with our guns so much, to use a phrase, I think that at the end of the day, the people here really do just want some kind of autonomous democratic system. Now that's just me being optimistic, and that's just what I've seen in Shin state. I can't speak to the realities of maybe how other ethnic groups interact, either between themselves or within themselves, but yeah, that's just been my experience. I'm optimistic.

Anthony Davis 1:29:50

I just like to endorse what Azad has just said. What I believe is that any post. Dispensation regime in Myanmar is by definition, going to be messy, because you are taking down this central and ultimately destructive pillar, and that is going to require a lot of different groups, both ba Mar and ethnic, to make new accommodations with each other. It's going to be a messy process. However, I think the key factor here is that if you look at the situation across the country today, there are no real civil wars in the making that I can see now. Again, my experience, a lot of it comes from Afghanistan. I saw the collapse of the communist regime very close up in 1992 in Kabul. And as soon as that regime came down, a civil war which had been sort of bubbling under the surface between different resistant groups broke out overnight, literally overnight, the situation in Myanmar is totally different. There are no to the best of my understanding, major groups or factions that are itching to get stuck into each other. Essentially, there is a commonality of purpose, which is to bring down this military regime. Once that's happened, there will be a messy process of sorting out the future, but that's very different from a descent into civil war.

Marc 1:31:41

I just just the encouragement, same, same thing I, you know, from the from the start, you know, for a sake, when this thing kicked off and and I started really getting entrenched into, you know, the regional conflicts in history. There was very little cooperation between any of the ethnic groups. I mean, we worked with San Chen, Eric Khan, down into Corinne and Karen and I mean, it was, it was a struggle. And so to hear you talk the way you are now, with regard to the positivity, that's the same positivity I felt going in as I analyzed this whole ordeal and what people were going through, and the emotional, mental state of the populace, and the support and the amount of energy that was being put in by The people I I knew from the beginning that this was going to be a win. I just saw the the the power struggles, the internal power struggles, being so it would be slow to to flip and to hear in just this, you know two years that the headway is being made, and more communications, more cooperations and holding ground that we're taking again, that was something that didn't happen in the early days the ethnics, when they'd get involved, they'd hit a place and run and and now we're starting to see ground being taken and kept. And so I'm in that positive mentality too. I see this taking, you know, another two years to kind of come to that fruit fruition. If I, if I'm gaging, you know, human nature correctly. But the, again, the concern, I think, that that Anthony brought up is, is the vacuum that is left, and, yeah, there will be messes. It's, it's going to be up to the the Burma to to kind of smooth that over with the ethnics, in my opinion, and and how that looks in in a year, two years time, you know, and as they roll through the Burma proper, and that that conflict is more will be more ba Mar centric, because that will be the predominant ethnic group of of in the conflict, just because of regionally. So my part in this was just to say, I too see this has grown in in a relatively short amount of time, with the amount of of barricades that kind of are in this conflict. And so for Azad, you know, like I said, I'm with you. I see the positivity, and I see the movement, and I see this becoming a win. And like Anthony, I see it in a year maybe two, taking and then we're in that situation. We're in this post fight situation that's going to be interesting as it unravels, and the players that come into into power, I guess, or into the limelight.

Brad 1:34:50

So with with regards to all of these things, it seems that the international perspective is still relatively negative towards Myanmar, as Anthony was saying that. Change that Beijing has demonstrated is quite sudden and quite stark, and all analyzes seem to come down to the idea that, well, China looks at the military as more stable and the resistance, anytime you speak to external stakeholders, the resistance seem to come across as well. Yes, the resistance might be doing well, but it's going to fall apart. It's going to fall to infighting. Everyone here seems to be on the same page. Everyone here is saying that, no, the resistance is doing well. The resistance is not going to collapse into bickering and backstabbing and and just a prolonged, uh, civil war. Everyone has has good intentions and good faith. The the question that I wonder, and I know that Azad being boots on the ground this might be a little bit above your sort of pay grade, as it were, but is effort being made to get this message internationally, to show the stakeholders that no, we are reliable. We are able to collaborate, we are able to cooperate. We are not going to be the tama do 2.0 as many external stakeholders feared, because if everyone's on the same page, I think that's very optimistic and that's very positive, but without that international perspective, that international support and the International vote of confidence, I don't know whether that's going to translate to a, the support that the revolution needs and potentially more importantly, be the lack of international support, particularly from Russia, particularly from China, for the tamado. So I'm wondering, is anything being done to try to spread this message internationally and to show to the stakeholders that this is not what they think it might be. This is not going to devolve into a protracted civil war if the revolution wins.

Azad 1:36:40

Yeah, well, no, to the degree to which there's some kind of coordinated effort, I can't say that. I'm aware of anything like that, other than obviously the nug has their offices and their people who are talking with foreign governments and things like that. And, you know, some efforts from the US State Department and talking with like, various rebel groups also somehow exist. But to what level I'm, again, like you said, that's a little bit above my head. However, I would like to kind of punch back against the main point, I think, which is the which is this assumption that there has been some kind of, like seismic shift in the position of neighboring countries, especially China, as to the position of the junta. I think in terms of cost benefit analysis, it costs China nothing to support the junta. And when we look at actually the support that they're giving anyway, it's not so in my opinion, it's not anything compared to what China could do, like, if we're talking about China, wanted to actually, okay, just end this whole situation and put their finger on the scale. Then there are some very serious and very drastic actions that China could take that would flip the scales tomorrow. And I think a lot of the frustration that we can see between the junta and China, and a lot of the frequent trips now to Beijing and these kind of political things that the junta is trying to secure, is really a reflection of the fact that China has not done all it can to secure the position of the junta. Now we're talking about sending some private security confirms and supporting these elections, which, anyway, everybody knows, won't have any effect anywhere, and now mediating some ceasefires with these groups, but in every instance that, at least in my opinion, that you look that China has taken some kind of decisive actions, like enforcing ceasefires or especially closing off borders in Kachin State, these are all mostly economic pressures that China themselves is in some ways very much beholden to, especially in regards to, like, certain mineral and Jade mines and no these economic interests that China has along the border. No, I, myself would say that I don't think there has been such a seismic shift, and especially what we can see here in Shin state. No, of course, India has their formal relationship with the SAC junta, but the degree to which they could cause a serious headache for the rebels in Shin state currently isn't being exercised in the same way that the real headache that China could cause for the Rebels along the border isn't being exercised. So I would say that China and India and Thailand, unlike us, they're not reading opinion pieces and trying to get analysis from, you know, the newspapers that we're reading and the articles that we're reading, they're the ones that are actually some way, in their own way, no more than we do, if you will. So, yeah, I would say that there has not been such a crazy shift. And conversely, I don't think there is any fear that the that the rebels will be collapsing sometime soon. And conversely, there is no fear that the junta will be collapsing sometime soon. For these neighboring countries, it costs them almost nothing to continue supporting the junta. And likewise, it costs them nothing to continue turning a blind eye to resistance activity happening across their border. I mean, when we're seeing the Kyaw. Shooting down junta helicopters. They're not getting anti air rockets from nowhere. You know, to use an example.

Marc 1:40:05

Yeah, I think that the from, you know, from my, my perspective over here, my limited perspective that I have, you can see the global economic system, global economic situation, as being a little bit tight for everybody, like every, every country, China is worried about it. You know, everyone's worried about their dollar and SEO and bricks and, you know, there's just a lot going on. I see that the global community being becoming tiresome of this type of regime. I I see, I see China's struggles with their, you know, economic struggles at the moment, and civil struggles that there's there's, they're starting to spool up, and countries are becoming more isolationistic in their viewpoint and trying to maintain what they have now, that doesn't mean their fingers aren't reaching out. Still, China still has their same goals in America, you know, the United States, you we all have economic goals, trade, everything else. What Myanmar has, what the junta has done, is basically removed Myanmar from its effectiveness in the in the global community. And I think the community is is tired of that a little bit in this region, I don't, I don't see support for min online and the junta being growing at all. I see it diminishing, and this almost ridiculousness starting to be a viewpoint of ridiculousness being being levied against. You know that that type of regime. And I the man this, their ability to strike and and, and the the amount of information that is leaking out and getting out and getting away from them, the negativity, the global perspective is, is negative and, and it's, it's not improving at all. Um, so, so more humanitarian, uh, issues will be, will be damned and, and, and seen as in poor taste. The more the junta utilizes their their firepower, as limited as it is, but still more so than what the ethnics have. But like you said, as you see helicopters go down and planes and, you know, trying to early on, trying to get the drone operators to load those things up like they're doing in the Ukraine and sacrifice them on the airfields was was like pulling teeth. It was they couldn't understand the payoff of a 600 to $800 investment destroying millions of dollars worth of equipment. And so that's changing that in and of itself, and they're figuring it out on the ground, independent of of a lot of foreign action, right? A lot of foreign intervention. And I think that's actually healthier for the conflict and the Burma than it is to be beholden to another power once this goes the way of the revolution and and so the junta's ability to continually strike is being diminished. For one you know, supply chains are a struggle for them as well. They're limited on who can trade now. We are still seeing, you know, US trade in Myanmar goods. I have a set of optics here, built in Myanmar, contracted and shipped to the United States, to company, to a company here, that kind of thing needs to be cut off. You know, wholeheartedly we discussed this with regard to France and other countries that we were getting, you know, we were seeing parts and things coming into early on, those types of support legs have to be, have to kind of be cut off. But in order to do that, the international pressure has to, has to engage once again in that, and we haven't. In the West, at least, we have some very ineffective governments going on right now, UK, United States, our administrations and those in charge are really struggling with their own France, you know, their economic system, they've had some collapse in the last week, you know, we're seeing these disruptions. And that is also it is increasing the distaste for more conflict. We're seeing these things rise up almost weekly, from, you know, Africa to, you know, South America into Asia. And of course, the Middle East is just a nightmare right now. And so the palatability of this continuing is die is waning, in my opinion. Now Anthony is going to have a much better read on this because of just who he is. Is, but the ability of the junta to continue this fight for much longer, I do see being hamstrung now that's that kind of is dependent on China. And see, we were mocked two years ago for even suggesting that China would get involved in this, and it was just like a disbelief that there could ever be, you know, that China would side with the junta and and here, you know, China will side with whoever makes it easier for them to manage economically, like to get what they they kind of want. And every country is the same way they're going to go in with deals that they want. Well, this was something that we brought up early on in the conflict with the national unity government to start reaching out to corporate, you know, the mining we talked about, the natural resources that that Myanmar has at its at its access point, that have been completely undeveloped, and starting to open up those economic opportunities, with regard to the national unity government, reaching out and striking those deals for support. And I, again, I'm fairly limited in my international knowledge of how those back door deals kind of go about, and Anthony would have much better insights into that. But in my opinion, like I said, this is weakening, and you will see less and less support going to the junta and because the rebellion, you know, the has been self sustained for the most part. If they can maintain that to the end, they will have much more national autonomy at the end of this and in directing their own future. That's kind of where I sit in that.

Anthony Davis 1:46:39

Yeah, I think, I mean, obviously, things have shifted pretty dramatically. But I think it would be a mistake to underestimate the manner in which 1027 and its results came as a real wake up call to this regime, I think, up until the last three months of 2023 In other words, 1027 started on the 27th of October, and then you saw November, December and the ceasefire in January. Over that period, this regime really woke up to the fact that it was dealing with something that it had just not considered possible before, and it was facing severe defeats, that's been a real wake up call, and what we've seen since then, as a result of that, is an attempt, and it's still in the balance, to get a handle on manpower right through conscription, through the reserve forces, law, through a variety of mechanisms, to check the wastage of manpower, and also to ramp up. And this goes back before 1027, but nonetheless has been accelerated since then, to ramp up the air war, particularly in terms of drones, and what's been happening in the last months in terms of drone warfare does not bode well for the coming year. So where do they stand now that clearly their confidence has been shaken. But it would be a real mistake to write these folks off. And I can't remember whether it was Azad or Mark who made the point earlier, these guys are not coming down in the coming year. The coming year is going to be, I believe, decisive in terms of defining the trajectory of this war, whether the resistance, and this goes back to what I was talking about with regard to PDFs in the heartland, whether the resistance, with the assistance of Eros, in terms of training, munitions advice can in the heartland form essentially something approaching a more regular armed force, right as distinct from a plethora of different groups that on the one hand and on the other hand, whether the tatmadaw continues to build on the limited, still limited, I'm not going to call them successes, but the limited extent to which it has been able to check the slide initially that 1027 began right? There was a slide, a disastrous slide, that began with 1027 that continued through much of this year. What I'm looking at now is a process of their checking that slide. Side of digging in, of saying enough and we need to build back up again. So you got two in the coming year, you're going to have these two conflicting trends in in conflict. On the one hand, whether the resistance can get its act together in the heartland, and on the other whether the the tatmadaw can build on its very limited capacity to prevent ongoing defeats. So I think that that's how I would see the situation right now, this coming year, in short, will be very decisive. I don't see this, this war. I mean, the war could go on for several more years, but the fundamental trajectory will, in my assessment, be decided in 1025, in 2025 and I think that's a very, very sage way to put it.

Brad 1:50:54

I think, I think we've had a lot of disappointments in the past with make or break years where people say, Well, this is the year where the conflict will end. And so I appreciate that perspective of saying, well, the coming year will not necessarily end the conflict, but it will be decisive, and it will tell us what the trajectory certainly is. And I appreciate that turning for our final comment back to Assad. You know, I'm sure it might come across as very strange. We're sitting here from our respective countries, outside of Myanmar, talking about the trajectory of the war, talking about what we think will and will not happen, and you're the one there, boots on the ground experiencing it firsthand. So I'm wondering, do you have any final comments, any final thoughts on what, what we've been saying, on what we've been using about, and anything that you would like the audience to think about.

Azad 1:51:48

Yeah, I'll just plagiarize my last two closing comments to be not so creative in that ultimately, if it hasn't been obvious through what we've talked about today, I'm very, very optimistic about the situation. I mean, I really don't try to listen too much to, you know, no offense to our friend Anthony here. He is obviously a very prominent analytical expert and has had his opinions featured in lots of very important places. But I myself, really don't peg so much of my personal emotions about the battle, or my perspectives about the revolution, to what I consider a very overwhelmingly pessimistic foreign opinion. I think I don't know. Maybe I'm not the only person with that opinion that a lot of the coverage about Myanmar is kind of this very nitpicky surface level, at least from the mainstream outlets, this very surface level overlook at a very complicated situation that leaves a lot of people who maybe don't know the entire situation. Leaves them feeling very uneasy, like, how will it go? Okay? They're fighting the dictatorship, but the situation is very difficult, really, from my experience here in the last year, from every trajectory that I can see is that no matter how difficult the road will be ahead of us, surely it won't be one more year. It won't be two more years, maybe it will be a very long time. I cannot imagine a in the short future, some kind of rapid collapse of the junta in the same way that we're seeing in other places. So ahead of us is a very long struggle that will have lots of sacrifice. But if I had any kind of like overarching message, it's one of absolute optimism. I think what we're looking at here is fundamentally a people struggle, where, across dozens and dozens of ethnic and religious and community lines, people from all different kinds of backgrounds, different class backgrounds, different ethnic backgrounds coming together universally to fight against the concept of the influence of military in a political system of administration of a people. And obviously, while that will have many, many different implementations and many, many different ways that the water will flow to get to that end goal of getting rid of the military and creating some kind of alternate system, the writing is on the wall that the junta is losing. And while I think it is true that this next year, the trajectory will kind of determine, like the Yeah, the trajectory of the battle will be determined sometime during this next year, it's my opinion that unless there is some kind of serious tipping of the scale, unless there is some kind of Angel intervention on on behalf of the junta from some foreign power, power, most likely China, then I do not see it feasible in the long term for the junta to survive. Now, how long that will be with, how much sacrifice that will be, and under what circumstance that will arise, I'm not sure. And of course, you know, we can't predict the future, what kind of intervention will come or won't come, but in our current situation, I can say, for anybody who is looking at this very complicated conflict from the outside, if there's one thing to. Take away it should be the inspiration from the people who are fighting here for democracy, for a free life, against fundamentally fascism, state control and inequality. So yeah, I take a lot of inspiration for that, for myself, and I hope that other people who are watching also share an optimistic perspective.

Host 1:55:24

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