Transcript: Episode #238: The Great Escape
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Host 0:17
If this is your first time was sent to our podcast welcome. Our programming brings a diversity of voices connected to Myanmar to share their perspectives, thoughts and reflections about what has been happening there since the military coup in 2021. All of our guests share one thing in common, a deep personal stake in the ongoing crisis. And it is an honor for us to be able to bring their voices into your ear buds. But however difficult it may be to hear some of their stories, we hope that you will come away with a deeper and more nuanced understanding of what is happening there.
Brad 1:46
And welcome back. Today, I'm joined by Halina and she's going to be helping us to investigate an issue that we've long wanted to understand from deeper perspective, and that is the defections in the military, what's driving them? How are they working? And what impact are these having. It's something that we've spoken about very often on this channel, but we rarely have the opportunity to really dive into this phenomenon, in and of itself. So, Elena, thank you very much for for coming on, and sharing your insights with us. And I'd like to give you the chance to introduce yourself and your work for our audience.
Helene Maria Kyed 2:18
Thank you very much. And thank you for inviting me to talk about this topic. So I'm Linda Marie, and I'm a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, which is based in Copenhagen, in Denmark, and I'm a social anthropologist by training, particularly focused on political and legal anthropology. And I've worked on Myanmar since 2014. So I guess 10 years now. And my first project was on local justice systems and local security, especially in the border regions. And currently, I'm also coordinating a new research project that looks at the interfaces between climate change and conflict from an anthropological perspective. And I've also seen some military coup done research together with colleagues on defections from the Myanmar military, especially using digital is not ethnographic methods. And yeah, I think that's about it.
Brad 3:19
Excellent. And so I think this interview comes at a very significant time, because we'll we'll probably touch on this a little bit later in our discussion, but the conscription law that that's been on everyone's minds recently, is sort of a reaction to the military losing, losing manpower, and the the defections have been, have been huge. So if, if we can, let's start historically, let's go to before the coup. What can we talk about? What can we say about the military retention of their of their staff, particularly among those lower ranks? Even before the Civil War occurred? Were they reasonably good at maintaining discipline and retaining their their personnel? Yeah,
Helene Maria Kyed 4:07
that's very much the reputation and actually the concept of defection as we know it in the English language, which means that someone belongs to a security force actually goes over on the other side, so not just just cert or run right re but actually joins the enemies of the parent institution was not something that was spoken about in Myanmar, there's also not a language in Burmese word in Burmese language for defection. What we saw prior to the military group word assertions, people sort of leaving the military running away, but not like sort of joining neither the ethnic armed organizations or any kind of resistance to to the military. So it's kind of historical since the coup that this notion of defection of leaving the military or leaving the police services and joining that The Other Side joining the revolutionary resistance movement is something quite historical in Myanmar. And that doesn't mean that you didn't have to surgeons before annually, there have been decisions. But in general, the overall reputation of the Myanmar military is that it's been quite successful in, in, in voluntary recruitment, and particularly in Burma, areas of Myanmar. And that it's also been repetative for being relatively good and instilling discipline and, and keeping also lower ranking soldiers within its ranks. Both by creating these kinds of economic pattern client relationships between lower ranks and the military, but also in terms of ideological sort of teaching and training, like creating forms of loyalty and devotion to the military as the protector of the nation, and also the protector of religion. So there has been sort of a strong history and culture within the military of relatively successfully keeping low ranks within the military. But, of course, also with forms of desertion, people leaving people not wanting to stay in the military before, but not for sort of ideological, political reasons, joining and oppose the movement, as I said earlier,
Brad 6:27
so. Okay, so I want to look at just some of the points that you've raised there. And the first one, the distinction between defection and desertion prior to the coup, would they even have been a possibility for defection at all? Because as you as you note, the recruitment of the military is predominantly and the strongest among the ethnic Mamaw. And the opposition to the military has been typically ethnic minorities. And so there is a an inherent contrast there. You know, would there have been any reason for a Bama soldier to see something sympathetic in an ethnic armed organization? Would would there have been reason for them to build bridges and decide, I think these guys have a have a good mission, or I think these guys are treating their personnel better, or is the distinction between the ethnic minority forces and the Obama majority military just too great for a defection to exist? And it's
Helene Maria Kyed 7:32
definitely been deep prior to the military coup and also there's not been an opening or a space for Obama soldiers to join the ethnic resistant that that cleavage that ethnic cleavages has definitely, I think, been a background for why we have not seen the phenomenon of defections before desertion. Yes, runaways but not soldiers. Going over to the other side. I think the enemy lines were pretty entrenched. And I mean, this is also historical phenomenon because at the time of independence in, in, in Myanmar, at that time, Burma, you did see a lot of ethnic minorities being part of the military. You had especially Quranic chin, being part of the of the of the National Military at the time of independence, this also has colonial legacies behind it. And, and in the late 1940s and 50s, we did see the phenomenon of defections and mutinies, but that was a very ethnic defined movement where you had the kitchen and the Koran, joining the ethnic resistance forces at that time, but you didn't see a Burmese doing that during the long course of, of the military regime since the coup in 1962. So I do think that previously in history, these ethnic divisions have played a role in both defining why we haven't seen defections before and why we saw it only in that early period. So I think you're right, in saying that the the military coup, in a way has has changed or has shifted that kind of scenario that we saw previously, where the with the military coup, the resistance to the military has been much more tan ethnic, and has also strongly involved the bomber majority. So I think you're right in saying that, that that is part of explaining this historical shift after the military coup.
Brad 9:34
Okay, and so there's the other side of that then is desertion. And I know that you said that there was a reasonably good recruitment among the military and I wonder whether you can speak to rumors and stories that have, you know, circulated widely, that in times past, let's say in the 1980s, for example, that it was common practice for military or even For corrupt police to effectively abduct youths from the streets, you're arresting them on some pretense and then handing them off to merit military recruiters, who would then bring them into the military, and would basically, press gang or forcibly conscript. People, Is there truth to these stories? And if so, does that not bring into question? The strength of the military's recruiting pass?
Helene Maria Kyed 10:29
So I have not done research on this topic. So like you it's also things that I've been reading other people's write about, like, Korean Mahane has written about these things and other sort of more historical literature on the military. I think it's a little bit more mixed. Yes, I do think that these kinds of forced arbitrary conscription, so to speak, that you're talking about, not using any conscription law in the sense that's been reactivated now. But sort of tricking young in particularly by mom, and after the 1962 military coup, and particularly after 1988. These are rumors that I think do hold some sway, if we are listening to some of the stories that are coming out of the military defectors that I have studied. So some of them some of their sort of personal stories of how they got into the military fit with these kinds of rumors or these kinds of tellings of the past previously, before the military coup, but they were all there is also a lot of them that really believe that being in the military was doing the honorable thing amongst them are us it was like getting into the military was like serving their people, it was doing an honor to their nation. So that was also amongst those who have defected later on a true belief that they were doing the right thing, and they were serving their country. So that's one side of the story. The other is also like when we're talking about sort of voluntarily joined the military is also that a lot of the recruitment happened among poor families in particularly in in Skyn Maguey. In other Palma majority areas where it was also a way of surviving a way that young men from poor families could get some kind of education could get a job, a salary job. So I think there was also a certain kind of indirect exploitation of, of poverty, or poor families in that sense bringing young men into the military. And typically, they would not be those who would go into the prestigious Defense College Academy, but they would be the ones that would get sort of lower ranking positions in the system. So I think it's much more complex than that. I think it's not like either a complete voluntary, sort of joining the military or these kinds of tricking into I think there's there's a much more blurred landscape here of different ways that young people got into the military got attracted. But you also have pressure from family, some of the defectors that I've listened to, also said that, well, my grandmother, or my father, or my mother, were also encouraging me to go into the military, it was associated with access to status, access to salary. Maybe people also came from a military family themselves, even though they perhaps personally had other aspirations of taking another kind of education or not from a job. They were also encouraged strongly by their parents or their grandparents of joining the military. And here, we're particularly talking of the bomber majority population.
Brad 13:52
That's interesting. And you also mentioned the the retention, the ideological sort of motivation and retention within the military. And that's, that's something that has fascinated me for a very long time. Early. Early on in the coup, for example, we saw the military were successfully delayed in Yangon, when the women strung up their clothing across the street and that, you know, it was very humorous and everyone, everyone sort of laughed at that. But I started digging, I started investigating and coming to to better understand the the almost religious belief system of the military and the culture that the military has with regards to retention. I, I have gone so far and I stand by this as to describe the culture of the Dumbledore as a cult with with various sort of religious overtones and a very strong emphasis on retaining military families within that military fold. But I recognize that my position may be a little bit extreme in this so I wonder what your position would be with regards to the military's culture, its view of itself. And its view of not just the military personnel, but the role of non serving spouses, children of military members, how would you describe the dynamic and the culture that they have towards maintaining the folds?
Helene Maria Kyed 15:20
I do think definitely that does play a role, I wouldn't say that it would account for all members of the military and low ranks and their families. But I do think that it definitely has played a role in also parents and grandparents encouraging people to join the military, or if we're talking about already existing military families that have grown up in military barracks, in relatively isolated parallel societies have definitely had an expectation of their sons and daughters continuing within the military, continuing within that sort of society that is not just an army, as we see in some other countries, but that is sort of like a culture in itself. And then you would have people who don't come from military families and who may be joined because of poverty because of lack of other opportunities. But then as they join, they do come become subjected to these kinds of some people call it propaganda, if we were listening to some of the defectors who have now left some college brainwash. Others would call it perhaps more diplomatically ideological training within the military is becomes part of the training, not just military training itself, but also this kind of ideological training is a completely integrated part of how the Tet Madore has both cultivated the culture within its ranks. It's also been a way to keep people tied to the military. Even though we know from defectors now that lower ranks have been abused, their salaries have been cut. There has been also internal forms of violence, even physical violence against them and their families abuses of wives that have had to be almost like slaves for military officers that this ideological propaganda or dissemination almost on a daily basis has has has been part of sustaining the military itself. So I think it's, it could be worthwhile to call it a cult in a way, it's definitely more than just an army. It is sort of a culture or a parallel society in itself, if we're looking at some of these internal mechanisms. And, you know, some of the defectors that have come out, they also said that, you know, even though we were like, sensing that there was something wrong, and we were seeing, you know, the actions of the military that we were also struggling internally, morally, with breaking with, with being such an integrated part of, of the military and having been subjected to these kinds of teaching ideological teaching or propaganda over so long time that it was only after we left that actually, we could open our eyes to seeing what it really was that we had been part of. So I think this is, this is something that's extremely important in, in understanding just also the historical legacy and strength of the military in Myanmar, but also how difficult it is and what kind of profound transformation it can be for some of those who defect. And I'm writing I've just about to publish an article, where I use conversion, as a concept to try to understand the kind of change process that soldiers that defect, go through from the time that they get sort of disaffected and dissatisfied with being in the military and then coming out on the other side, and actually opening their eyes to these kinds of ideological training. And of course, conversion is also like called a religious concept, right. But I do think that we need to try to understand it in these terms as well beyond just being an army that's trained to defend the country or fight internal resistance. It
Brad 19:15
very interesting, actually sort of reminds me of the terminology that is used by a lot of cold anti cold activist groups of deprogramming people after years and years of whatever we call it, whether it's brainwashing indoctrination, what have you. And it's actually very interesting, because I remember I worked for a while with members of the military before the coup, and they they seem to be living in this alternate world, all of their sources of information were from the military, and it was a very broad array of information that they were being given about history, about culture, about politics about national security, they all had on lot of opinions on these topics, but their opinions did not gel with what we understand from actual history and actual strategy. But they were all getting their information from the same, same sources. And specifically, what you said about the women is very interesting because the wives, it was sort of said to me that you, women are sort of a conduit for power. You you try to marry a woman who is related to a higher ranking officer. But also, there's an expectation that your wife, as you say, works almost as a domestic servant for higher ranking, higher ranking of officers, or the wives of higher ranking officers, the dynamic with regards to the civilian women, the wives of soldiers seems to be I would, I would call it perverse. To be honest. Ken, can you delve a little bit into into the role that these women play within the structure and the society of the military? Yeah,
Helene Maria Kyed 21:01
so I haven't done specifically research on that itself. I mean, the kinds of voices of wives of soldiers that I'm familiar with other wives of soldiers that have defected. And there has been, after the military coup, we saw these defector organized groups that developed and under the one of the significant groups that develop after the coup, the People's soldiers, which has now been renamed pupils gold, there has also been a subgroup of that, of wives of soldiers that have developed which is is where you have the wives of soldiers coming out and telling about some of these stories of lives within the military. And also, how are connecting with wives of soldiers that are still inside the military. And this movement, by the wives of soldiers that have defected, is very much confirming what you're saying is that the wives of the soldiers play a pivotal role in either encouraging their husbands to leave the military, or in encouraging them to stay within the military. So that's why the whole space of family and wives around soldiers is so, so significant, and I think we need to understand it in in kind of different ways. I think the one, you know, a significant part of this is that when you're a member of the Myanmar military, you're not just individual soldier that goes to work and works for an army or works in office spaces on the military, but it's whole families that are part of the institution of, of the military itself. It's a very, sort of, in that way, very integrated world around that. And that's why I think we we can't separate, you know, the individual soldier from that family setup. And that's why the wives also play a very significant role. But I think giving the wives the role of, you know, being sort of the moral high ground in terms of, you know, convincing their husbands of not participating these kinds of violence against civilians, is too simplistic, because there's also been stories the other way around, were the other ones, you know, like, for survival for sustainance of the family for the future of the kids. It has been just as much wives that have also been part of, you know, convincing their husbands of staying within the military. So it's quite complex. In that way, I don't know if that completely answered your question. But at least it's touching upon some of the things that you raised.
Brad 23:55
No, and I really appreciate that insight, because I think we do have this habit of trying to put people into groups and try to paint the entire group as doing one thing or acting in one way. And, and the difficulty there is when we start ascribing simplistic attributes to an entire group of people, we we blind ourselves to reality and reality is always that people are varied people are complex, the relationships between people are very difficult to simplify. And we want to blame someone and say, well, you're you're being evil or you're being narrow minded or you're being this but the genuine motivations of individuals are very difficult to, to account for and to and to predict from from the outside. So I really appreciate the balanced perspective that you that you bring to that but it just sort of as you were speaking, it reminded me of in, in popular culture In in cartoons and memes and and internet discourse, the role of family in soldiers making decisions was was very heavily empty. Sighs that that soldiers will often portrayed as wanting to escape the military, to protect their families, and to give their families better opportunities. And it reminded me of another very popular, very salacious claim. And I don't know whether you, you would be able to speak to this at all. But I just wonder whether you've heard this as well, the allegation that if a, if a soldier dies in combat, his wife is essentially put into a lottery and is married off to one of the other men of her deceased husband's unit, as a sort of grotesque culture of ensuring that, that these women do not leave the military and that they're their potential service to the military and making future soldiers and then and then sort of connecting soldiers to hiring soldiers is not lost. I'm just wondering, have you also heard this rumor? Can you can you confirm it? Or can you deny it as as just propaganda,
Helene Maria Kyed 26:01
as well. And I've also heard people referring to actual examples of that happening. So within the military, from what I know, from defectors voices, is that the, the cohort that you've trained with, either at the more prestigious Defense College and academies, or in sort of lower training, is that there is kind of like a brotherhood, among among those who've trained together. And that even also includes at the general level, including the top of the current military unit as well, that there is kind of that brotherhood, horizontal brotherhood. And yes, I have heard that in connection with that there is this culture or its practices that have been pursued of of marrying women, of deceased soldiers. So yeah, I've heard that it's not something I've done research on. So it's not something I had solid evidence. But I do think that the if we're speaking about defections, and both, you know, obstacles to defecting, but also motivations to defect, the family is absolutely key. And that's also shown in the research that I've been conducting since the military coup. And it is key in various ways, it works both ways as an obstacle and motivation. And an obvious obstacle that is quite tangible is that if you as a soldier defect, you of course, will be potentially traced down and punished by the military. But in many cases, the punishment will also go potentially, to your family members. So they will be threatened, they will be contacted to locate where you are, they will be subjected to different kinds of potential violences. Apart from, of course, being cut off from the forms of livelihood that they perhaps dependent on from within the military. And this is like a strategy that is very deliberately used, both sort of at a battalion level and in military camps, but also at higher levels. So that's key. I mean, there's even was even a case that we followed where a sister of a defector who lived in Dubai was subjected to these kinds of threats over the phone by the military, threatening that she would not be able to ever return to Myanmar. So even people who are living abroad have been subjected to these kinds of these kinds of threats and potential punishments. So that's one very key part of it. But we've also seen cases where families have been absolutely key to motivating soldiers to defect because a lot of those stories that we hear is that people you know, they were, like I said before, they were morally conflicted, and personally conflicted, like they didn't like what was going on whether they were sent themselves into these violent crackdowns, initially after the coup or they were, you know, witnesses to what was going on. They were still very sort of attached to their organization, but it families sort of like, encouraged them or convinced them of the moral righteousness of leaving the military. Also, in certain situations, feeding them with information that they maybe didn't have access to, of what was actually going on for those who were far away from the initial atrocities that they were also part of, sort of, you know, switching this initial disaffection amongst Soldiers inside to actually convincing them that it was, it was morally accepted. And it was a good act to actually leave the military. So, so families have been so essential in this whole movement of either, you know, staying within the military or leaving, but also in terms of the strategies and the practices of actually getting out. So, a lot of the soldiers that have defected, they said they had to wait until they could find a way to also get the family with them. Or they would have to cut completely family ties to protect families when they left. So a lot of these, you know, issues surrounding the family had been part of defining the way that they have left. And on the other side, you know, the organizations that have helped whether these are the ethnic resistance organizations, or these are the CDM movement, or the national unity government, helping defectors, they have also had to really think about ways of securing that families were also protected and supported in terms of livelihood once the soldiers get out. And that's been quite early on that was realized or recognized by these groups that were encouraging. defections, of course, also informed by by those who had already defected themselves.
Brad 31:30
That's fascinating. And, and I really want to get into in a second the the actual ways in which people can carry out these defections, because that's, that's a that's a huge topic. Because it's not as simple as just sort of walking out the front door of a military camp. But the final thing that I wanted to ask about the state of the military, pre coup, and in general, is something that you mentioned a while ago, and that is the abuse. And I, you know, we recently interviewed a police captain who joined the CDM. And he spoke of, of rampant purposeful abuse in police training, as a way to sort of harden the police so that they would be inured to violence, they would be inured to torturing people later on in their their careers. So I wanted to check with you the abuse that the physical abuse that you're talking about within the military, is this a sort of post coup phenomenon, or was this always part of the military, it's always
Helene Maria Kyed 32:31
part of the military culture. And there's a wonderful PhD written by sailor about this topic where he, a few years prior to the coup, I interviewed people who had deserted from the military and who were willing to speak about some of these internal abuses, particularly among amongst a lower rank. And he speaks about these hierarchical structures of violence. That combined with sort of like, I think what he explains, is there a pattern client relationships, but they're patching client relationships that are embedded in forms of violence. So it's not just you know, as we see in certain kinds of organizations, higher ranks, like, you know, sharing benefits from whatever income comes from the way that the military is operating, and then providing protection to lower ranks. But it's very much embedded also, in these benefits inherent to the institutions being combined with different forms of punishments, and different forms of repression. And this ranges from what I previously alluded to, to physical punishments of not living up to strict discipline, not living up to orders, not being able to secure incomes, to military officers, or sharing of incomes, to military officers, to force reduction of salaries into shares and insurances that are linked also to military companies I mentioned before also abuses of family members, but always at the same time, combined with nurturing this idea amongst lower ranks, that they were also dependent in terms of livelihood, and in terms of survival and in terms of status of keeping these sort of links to their patrons to the higher ranks. So a very sort of conspicuous connection between benefits and punishments all the time is oscillating between these two sets of practices between higher ranks and lower ranks all the way up in the system. That's at least what we've learned from some of the defectors and from this research also pursued prior to the coup by Dr. C lab. And what is really, really interesting in terms of the defection movement is that even though some of the sort of the reasons that the factors would give in the beginning was very much focused on this kind of disapproval, or even disgust for the physical violence and killings of civilians after the coup. But as they started to come out, these kinds of internal abuses also started to become articulated as a strong reason for leaving the military, in which defectors also express that it's not just civilians that have been victimized or that are victims of military violence, we as particularly lower ranks are also victims of a very abusive and oppressive military system. And in addition to that, what they have also spoken about at is these forms of brainwashing, which, of course, are less physical and less tangible than these forms of violence is put as sort of part of that whole culture, as I mentioned before, so yes, well known for being an oppressive and abusive system. And I think this is part of the disciplinary culture and the training itself. But I think the economy or political economy of these kinds of violent Petrograd relations, is also very much linked to the fact that at battalion level, whether we're talking about out in the ethnic border regions, or also further in the country, is also that the military at those levels, to a large degree have also been made self sustainable. So they have had to feed themselves, so to speak. And not only in terms of farming, but also in terms of business activities, like there has been an expectation or decentralization, from the center of having to sustain those military systems at lower levels, right, which created these kinds of internal economies of battalion battalions. And I think that's also nurtured even further these kinds of abuses. So you couldn't rely on getting sufficient supplies from the center in terms of food and in terms of salaries, but you always have to rely on some kind of self reliance or, or creation of these kind of local economies. And I think that's also been part of, of, of sustaining these violent patron client relationships among offices and lower ranks. I mean, there's stories that come out from defectors, also of you know, when a general or top officers was visiting, from NATO, or from a higher level of the military to some of these bases, or battalions, they had to themselves, collect money to make a feast and feed these top level generals when they arrived. So so this kind of expectation that they could sort of create their own economy and their own earnings to serve the system, I believe, has also been part of, of sort of creating this culture of internal abuse. And of course, that is, again, linked to a whole other story about military engagement enlisted economies and engaging with militias, but that's not a topic we're talking about today. But it's part of that wider, wider system. Yeah.
Brad 39:05
Okay. I mean, there's, there's so much there and I definitely want to get into this the battalion level particularly because the Myanmar military's concept of a battalion is such a, such a different approach to to the idea of a battalion the functioning of a battalion compared to a Western military. But what I what I want to sort of lead to is the emergence, first and foremost of defections, because you'll walk us through this 2021 We have the coup, the military takes over. Presumably, the majority of the people in the military have been conditioned to view this as necessary and beneficial for preserving the state, preserving the unity of Myanmar preserving the security of Myanmar and reestablishing what they would perceive to be a non poisoned In a non fractured democracy, so they seem to be okay. Early on, we saw some evidence of them taking money out of temples, they certainly were on camera, murdering unarmed civilians in the streets, that they didn't appear to have a problem with that, at what point does the military that the individuals within the military start turning around thinking, I don't really want to be a part of this. It's a very
Helene Maria Kyed 40:28
complex story, because I think the overall point I want to make is that you have to think about defections, also in different phases. And you have to think about a whole set of different motivations and different trajectories of how a soldier or someone working for the military in different kinds of affix office or specialist functions came to actually defect. And actually the first, were not frontline soldiers. They were people working in different kinds of military departments. And they were not necessary that that sort of general description that you have, that they were okay with the killings, or that they were completely loyal to the kind of military that we're seeing today, or the line of the military leadership. A lot of the early defectors were people who had voted for the NLD. Or maybe not voted for the ener D, but they were supportive of the changes that were going on in Myanmar, prior to the military coup, and had also already aspirations of the military becoming more of a professional army and military that did not commit atrocities against ethnic minorities. So those that were driving what I call the defection movement, people like Captain Anita and Captain limpid. were people that were already sort of politically enlightened war, we're already thinking in terms of, of a different kind of military than we have seen since 1962. With the military coup and until 2010. So we can't speak about the fiction based on a notion of the Myanmar military as a homogenous institution, where people think the same way or have the same positions or same interests, and, and experiences, we need to kind of understand the defection movement as something that was very much driven by members of the Myanmar military that had another kind of thinking and orientation already, prior to the coup. And they were the first defectors were articulated very much, of course, a moral disdain for the atrocity and violence against civilians. Now we're talking about late February, early March after the coup. So quite early on, the police came earlier, we can maybe return to the police force later, to how I see the difference between police and soldier defects. They were already on the ninth of February, some of the first police came out. So they focus very much on this, on acceptance of the violence against civilians, but very quickly, they also articulated a much deeper critique of the military institution of the tap middle of the culture of the military, prior to the coup, the kinds of corruption, the kinds of internal abuses within the military, the fact that it was not a professional army, but in military driven by the greed and economic and political power interests of the top of the military. That came out very, very quickly, from the voices of these very vocal, early defectors that kept the need to TA and capital into now that I mentioned, but also others that joined them quite quickly. So So I think that's my first point is that we need to understand the ministry not as a modulus, but that we did have at the beginning of the coup, people within the military that were thinking in different ways, and I think we also know from some of the analysis that was done prior to the coup that we do know that very likely and potentially We did have members of the military that were pro NLD that were that were pro democracy, and that was thinking in different in different ways. But then why were they able to defect? And historically this did not happen before. Why did it happen during the Rohingya crisis? Why didn't it happen in connection to some of these atrocities against other ethnic minorities and the Rangers? Well, they were also ongoing fighting in current state, prior to the coup, and for me, and according to the research that I've done with colleagues as well, that was very much that some of these early defectors in alignment with people in the CDM movement, and younger activists also open to space, both discursively and politically, of the CDM also becoming a space, the civil disobedience movement, also becoming a movement that could include people from the security forces. And I think, without that discursive, and political opening, I'm not sure in what ways the defection movement would have developed in the way that it did, because there was not a kind of historical presidency in Myanmar for having that space for having a space to identify with and that potentially open up and welcome people from the security forces, which if we take the sort of, like, very bifurcated picture are the enemies, right? So, yeah.
Brad 46:36
So I just, again, like every time you give an answer, there are just so many different things that you you touch on so many different doors that you open that I want to investigate. The one thing is looking at the comparison here, because you speak about the CDM as a concept, having that discursive impact. I wonder whether you would have any information on on whether there was anything in 1988, or during the Saffron Revolution, that would have hinted at the military or some personnel in the military, wanting to to defect or to stand down or to protest in some way, shape or form? Because I admit, I'm ignorant of it. But I've never heard stories of the military in those time displaying this defection. And I wonder whether you would you say was it was just a different time different military, or whether this discursive impact of the presence of the CDM would be one of the major distinguishing
Helene Maria Kyed 47:33
lessons. I mean, there were a few in 1988 that joined the resistance against the military at that time, but it was not discursively articulated as defectors, they did it individually, and they got absorbed into the resistance, but there was not a movement around it. That is completely correct. We have to go back to the 40s and 50s, with these muted knees that were ethnic based to sort of find something that's similar. In terms of actually, you know, deliberately defecting to the other side, we didn't have that in, in in 98. So you're completely correct in that this is new, this is unprecedented in Myanmar history, that there is actually a discursive articulation of soldiers and police defecting and joining his other side. And I do think that the civil disobedience movement with also other public sector workers joining that, allowing that space to also be open to police and soldiers, and I think that it's, it's there two things in this. I mean, one is the early days in the protests, where you see protesters give police roses and water and cigarettes inside, welcoming come over to our side. So they were like these, perhaps more sporadic street movements around that. But then there was also quite early on, gradually a strategy developing around it. So historically, we have not seen a pro democracy movement in Myanmar, appropriating defection as a strategy of resistance. And of course, in the early days of February, end of February, when we saw the first effects, we didn't have that. But it came quite quickly. It came already around May 2021, where you did have members of the national unity government. You had especially also the Grand National Union, coming out brigade five of the Korean national union coming out with videos showing soldiers that had surrendered or kind of being captured. I don't think they themselves call themselves defectors but with the can use oxytocin coming out and saying these are CDM soldiers that are part of the revolution. And they were like saying, We don't want me to tear a dictatorship. So there was a space created with different actors, people in the street protests, people from the CDM movement, you had also, pro democracy activists like things that you Lee, who appropriated that, and I think coming together those forces is what was the background for defections, for the first time in Myanmar history becoming actually a resistance or a revolutionary strategy. That then later in August 2021, actually became not a law or policy but but a policy statement that was issued by the National Unity government and, and similarly, some of the ethnic resistance organizations like the cane U and the CNF, and also the kitchen movements and also appropriated or supported in in various ways. So that has played a very significant role, but also these individual defectors like and of course, there's a whole story which of course, you have also, probably covered in this podcast series is also the role of social media, I mean, has been tremendously important for facilitating these connections, both with between these defectors and others in the resistance movement, but also in developing a discourse or what I, in my writings call a narrative of deflection, a collective narrative from these very individual stories and motivations to defect, to actually developing a collective narrative around what defection means and Myanmar, what motivates it and how it fits in to the revolution, very much been articulated as a non violent part of the revolution. So like diminishing the number of the military, but also creating ideological shifts of people from the security forces to be able to join and support the revolutionary movement. So, so put together these different sets of actors, the defectors themselves with sort of a different mindset than our usual homogenizing description of what the tap Madore is, with the availability of information technologies, is key to understand this first phase of the defection movement.
Brad 52:28
Interesting. And there's just one thing that that stands out to me like about this, and it may seem like a very minor thing. But you were at the beginning of this discussion, you you made clear the difference between a defection and a desertion. And that the defection positively means not just leaving an organization, but then joining an opposing organization. And you speak about defections, in particularly with regards to the police in the first months of the coup. This is before the NUJ is established, it's definitely before the PDF were established. And yet you still refer to these as defections. And I'm very curious, how are you? How are you characterizing this? What What about this makes it a defection to you? And what do you perceive these defecting police and defecting soldiers as joining in opposition to them. So
Helene Maria Kyed 53:22
first of all, defection as we define it in English doesn't necessarily mean that you defect to another armed group. But it does mean that you deliberately articulate that you have not only left your parent organization, in this case, the police force or the Myanmar military, but that you identify yourself with an organization that is opposed to your previous parent organization. And in the early days, this was the CDM so you would have police coming out and calling themselves CDM police and that sort of self identification is what sort of makes us at least in the English language use the concept of defection because this is a very deliberate, very direct way of articulating that you have not just run away or gone on the ground or left your parent organization to do something else like the definition of disorder would be but that you have made that deliberate jump or shift to an organization that is defined as in opposition to your parent organization. So in the beginning, the police that said they will see them police didn't come out and and use the term defection. There is not a similar word in Burmese language. In any case, in my own language, we also do don't have distortion and perfection, we just have desertion. So but in English as we began our research and as the movement started to, to gain ground, that English concept was also used to describe these deliberate shifts. So that's what I base it on. Because we don't know us doing research. We don't know how many are deciders, we don't know how many police, we don't know how many soldiers that have simply run away or gone underground. The estimation that Quilliam Hain and others that I have also been collaborating with around this research is that desertion is likely much higher than defection, because it's less risky than, you know, self identifying with the resistance. So although we know that right now, there's 14,000, that have registered as CDM 10,000 of those are police and 4000 are soldiers. This doesn't mean that the numbers are not necessarily higher, because it's very risky to assume that kind of self identification as being a defector. So it's quite clear to see the difference because the moment you choose to self identify as a CDM soldier or CDM police, you choose to register through the national unity government. This was a process that began after August 2021, where you could register or you choose to go on social media, or be interviewed by the independent media or even international media, several of the factors have been, you know, cited in the guardian or been on the BBC or the LG Zerah. In that moment, you are, you know, defect defect to a defector.
Brad 56:51
Interesting. And I'm glad that you, you bring up these statistics. So you say 4000, CDN, military and 7000 CDN police. Now, I wonder what what can we know about the actual realities of defection? I know desertion is something that no one has given me any figures for because everyone says it's it's unmeasurable. But for desertions, I've seen numbers much, much, much higher than 4000. Yes, well, north of 10,000. What's your view on that? I'm
Helene Maria Kyed 57:24
an anthropologist by training. So numbers for me is always very difficult. And I don't work with numbers. But I do think, of course, they're really important because they do boost the morale of the defection movement and numbers is significant, also in the resistance, or, you know, to the military. And also, they do also mean something in the responses that we are seeing from the military at the moment, but I am very hesitant to put numbers on it, because the number of 14,000 that we're speaking about here, right? This, this is numbers that are about a year old. This is numbers of soldiers and police that have gotten a CDM card or registration number with the national unity government. It's not those that have necessarily joined one of the ethnic resistance organizations, it could be that they have, and then they've later registered with the national unity government. It also takes around three months, at least to get verified and vetted, to get registered. It's also potentially very risky for a defector to go through a registration process. Because if you're not in a completely safe space, that can be risky to you. So I think that what we can use these numbers to say anything about is that we have an oppositional government, we have a revolutionary movement, that is bringing soldiers in allowing them and police to be registered and to identify with the resistance movement. But it doesn't necessarily tell us the real numbers of those who are with left the police or the military, and are supporting the Resistance movements, whether this is like on the battlefield or it is ideologically or in other ways with training are with the Intel or other ways of supporting or have ended up being in in other countries because of the security situation. It doesn't tell us much about that. I think then when we compare with the service and surrenders, it's also very hard to categorize individual soldiers in terms of the trajectory that they will then lead or follow. I mean A lot of discussion came up after Operation 1027, we can come back to that, about all of those like, I think it's around 5000 The number last time I had since 1020 20, that have surrendered? How many of these will go back to the military? How many will try to go home? How many will go underground? How many will actually go the detection way? Right? And what are the possibilities for doing that, at the moment with the security risks that are there. So it's, it's important to keep these categories and understandings of the differences between, you know, the movement of defection, that has searched after the military coup, but not be caught up too much in numbers as what is the most significant for this moment. It's more the the political, the symbolic, the moral depth of this being a movement, and of soldiers and police identifying with that, and identifying with the wider resistance by rather than it being so centered on, you know, then people are sitting with the 14,000. And oh, how many are then in the military, you know, who will then win on the battlefield? I think the trajectory of of the conflict in Myanmar, on the battlefield has shown us that these numbers are, we can't use them to analyze in what direction the resistance is going or in what direction the military is going. And it's so clear in some of these, also, military analysts that have have commented on the conflict, since the military coup that they have been mistaken, so many times, especially been mistaken about the resistance movement, right, because of being caught up in numbers. So that would be my very anthropological answer to your question, in refusal of trying to actually come up with with some numbers that then will be taken up by newspapers and others to kind of make these estimates. So this, this obsession with numbers is something that I'm very cautious about.
Brad 1:02:07
And I definitely respect that not not just with regards to Myanmar, but also those people have been following the conflict in in Ukraine have have also seen the analysts who are obsessed with numbers, you know, predicting that bigger number wins more soldiers means victory, have had to take a step back. And I've had to recognize that we were wrong, because numbers have to be backed up with quality, they have to be backed up with organization and material and support and all these other things that that, you know, the the conventional explanation that I that I get is that everything in the military has a hard element and a soft element. And the hard elements can be quantified and measured. And they're very easy to discuss. But the hard elements are only effective because of the soft elements that make them effective. And those are very difficult to quantify. So, so I definitely respect the point that you're making, I think it's a very important point to make. But just latching on to one thing that you that you mentioned, which was very surprising to me, the surrendered soldiers, I had been under the assumption that when a camp surrenders or a battalion surrenders, that that is effectively the same as as defecting to the PDF, you seem to be implying that these are two very different things. Can Can you talk us through what what it means then for for a soldier or a unit, surrender.
Helene Maria Kyed 1:03:33
And here, there are good examples from the northern Shan State in connection with the operation 1027. So these are battlefield surrenders. It's a situation where the ethnic resistance organizations attacks military bases, and instead of fighting back, they basically either raise the white flag or they draw back. And in the cases, we've seen this as involved in particularly surrendering, and stopping to fight against the resistance, but also surrendering weapons. So basically, allowing the resistance forces to take the weapons that are at that given moment available in that military battalion or military outpost or camp have different degrees and, and sizes. But that doesn't necessarily mean that those who in that moment on the battlefield, Join the Resistance Movement, either in terms of joining them in fighting them back their own military. We've seen very few examples of that recently. Also, because there's a lot of suspicion on the resistance postures side in just immediately absorbing soldiers who have surrendered on the battlefield for good historical reasons, but also, there's a big difference between an individual's soldier this Fighting, I'm disaffected with the military, I'm going to lead planning, their defection going to a liberated area in the border regions, joining up with a defection group or a CDM group, or an ethnic resistance organization, and then someone in the moment of battle, surrendering or giving up in terms of fighting back, that's very different, because they haven't been through necessarily been through that kind of personal soul searching or moral, political decision of actually switching sides. Because that is a process of transformation. And I'm not saying that those we have seen the pictures that have gone viral on social media have not had a desire to leave, or not morally and politically against what their own military is doing, because we know how hard it is to discern or defect. So that could be amongst those who are surrendering, especially over this past month, could be those who have been had that desire for a long time, and would be quite readily available to self identify as defector join the other side, switch the other side. But there will also very likely be others who have not gone through that process of making that kind of decision. And for the defection movement. Obviously, this is a momentum, the moment of surrender is a moment also when potentially, you could recruit more defectors. But there are a lot of practical obstacles to doing that because you also need the place to host them. You need food to feed them. You need to think about what happens to their families back to some of the issues I said before. And with the escalation in surrendered soldiers over the past month. This has been a very, very big obstacle and non of the ethnic resistance organizations in the Brotherhood. Alliance in the northern Shan State, I think the American army has had some experience already in Rakhine State, previous to operations and 27. But both for the tnla. And for the NDA, they have not been at least officially part of this defection movement at this setup that some of the other ethnic resistance organization and the new GE have had before of of creating specific camps and support mechanisms for defectors. So what we saw in that case was also just handing out cash, like go home, you know, give us your weapons go home. So so. So it's both in terms of like the individual sort of soldier that surrendering might have a different kind of mindset or being in a different space of how they see themselves in relation to the conflict, but it's also the capacity of those they surrender to have given giving them a space and a possibility to become a defector. So it's it works both ways. Does that make sense? It
Brad 1:08:26
absolutely does. Although the obvious question comes up. If you've surrendered, does the military as an entity really care about the distinction between surrender and defection to do these people? If they've ever surrendered? Do they have the opportunity to go back to the military? Or are they effectively going to be executed as as traitors or defectors or something along these lines?
Helene Maria Kyed 1:08:53
So I think the top ranks definitely punished because we saw the five brigadier generals that that surrendered in northern Shan state being persecuted early this year. I think three of them got the death penalty. And two of them got life sentences or, or it was the other way around, perhaps, I think, two dependencies or three gap life sentences, because they, they were flown back. They were not. They did not stay with the Northern Alliance with a brotherhood Alliance or became absorbed into or tried to flee across the country. They were flown back to nipa door and were put before the military court and try it. But for the lower ranks, I don't know how much capacity. I don't I don't know how much energy the military wants to use now to try to track these lower ranks down. We also don't know how many have returned to the military. We don't know what the possibilities are for them to return home. We don't know how many have been able to seek sanctuary in some of the ethnic resistance organization areas, or how many have fled across borders. But I do think that, back to your question, I do think that for the military top, there is a numbers game going on here where in terms of the numbers game, I do think that it doesn't make that big of a difference. If we're talking about a defector or surrender. In the bigger picture. I mean, the end we will come back to the conscription, activation of the conscription law later, but definitely, I think in that bigger picture, a loss lost troops on the ground, or lost troops on the ground in this case, but for the defection movement. As such, there is also a qualitative importance of, of whether we're talking about defections or surrenders, because when you have people from the military, that Join the Resistance Movement, this has an immense, a demoralizing effect on the rest of the military. And this has some, this has been something that early defectors and the groups around defectors like people to embrace and people's goal have also been using in their counter military propaganda to kind of create both role models for people who are still in the military, of people who are righteous, who have left to stand on the side of the people who are doing the right thing. That has also contributed to this demoralization amongst the troops. They are also speaking about these internal abuses that the lower ranks can relate to in this kind of counter military propaganda. So there is a qualitative depth to defection that you don't find in surrender, of course, when inside of soldiers see a lot of people surrendered, that can also have a demoralizing effect. But in terms of the defection, it has a deeper sort of transformative depth in terms of we can be a different military, we can be different kinds of soldiers, we can be soldiers that are loved by the people, we can be soldiers that love the people that defend our country that wants a professional military. Now, I'm just basically quoting some of the words or phrases that has been significant in this counter military campaign by the defector movement and those civil society activists that have supported them. You know, so and also, you know, some of the debates that had been going on within this defection movement is all about what what is the future military that we want, we want to reform the military, we don't want corruption, we want a military that's under civilian control. So all of these kinds of like, ideas and visions about an alternative military that that comes out from soldiers that have defected have joined the other side have have switched beliefs and ideology. From you know, what is represented by the Tet middle has a qualitative way that goes beyond numbers. And I don't know how I don't know how the top of the military thinks, and I don't know how much that is important to them. I know the number game is important to them. But my guess would also be that it does have a political weight that you have had such a strong movement of soldiers that have deliberately joined the resistance movement, politically, not just like, you know, fighting against its own military, which says still quite minor, it's mainly been a non violent form of defection, but that politically and morally have contested and become some of the harshest critics of their own, you know, parent organization, after they have defectors and been able to put words to, to to what the military is and what it could be instead.
Brad 1:14:16
And so, I want to sort of map out the the entire process of becoming a defector, and that would have to start with the messaging and you've referenced the propaganda, you've referenced the importance of social media. But the thing is, I I very much had the impression from the military that that I worked along with, that they exist in a sort of social media bubble, most of the people that they connect with other soldiers, they they have a lot of private telegram chats. They have a lot of private Facebook Messenger chat groups, they they exist in their own little bubble, and I've heard rumors of a new G radio that soldiers will tune into and secretly listened to in the camps and and things like this. But the question is, how is it possible for a military that is this heavily indoctrinated by centralized propaganda material from the military is isolated, physically and informationally, how is it possible to appeal to them and to present without, without, you know, prejudice, propaganda, trying to convince them that the military can be reformed, the military can be improved, we can address the abuse, we can address the corruption and so on and so forth. How can we successfully get that messaging through to them,
Helene Maria Kyed 1:15:32
you are completely right. But one of the key obstacles that we identify in our research as well is that they live in this restricted potential information bubble, and that one of the obstacles that are very structural to defection is that it's, they are not getting the same information that people outside of the military are getting. And we have also had testimonies from defectors coming out saying that they were not even aware of in the early days of the kinds of violence that were committed by the military in cities like Yangon, and against the street protests. But also, a lot of them tell us that in some ways that they are in any way allowed in certain moments to get access to some kind of information, or they get it through colleagues and comrades. So So there has been possibilities in covert ways of getting information in. So that's one part. But it's also clear that the first effectors that came out, were not frontline, low rank sitting in isolated battalions of camps, there were very few of them, it was mainly people who were in sort of working in urban spaces or in military offices that had more access to this kind of information that in the first phase, at least, were able to come come out. So that has been those kinds of limitations. But there's also been extremely clever, what they call counter military propaganda, there's also a group called tatmadaw, de brainwash, and what they have done, and this includes the wives of soldiers group, what they have done is that they have basically tried to infiltrate some of these telegram groups that you're talking about. They have also created false Facebook profiles, and try to get into some of these other drawing on there, if it's the factors, early, the factors that are involved, that drawing on their own networks, that they still have with people inside. So they've tried to sort of infiltrate and get information in through these channels. And that has been a way to break down this kind of isolation. So that is, is is quite a significant part of the defection movement itself is of course, there's been all these public webinars and stuff like that, where we also know that the fact is that we're able to access the internet and that we're not so strongly surveilled, have participated, like the people's goal, I've had these weekly discussion programs that have also been significant. But there's also been these covert, more secret ways of infiltrating. And then you were probably familiar with the concept of watermelons. So these are those that are, you know, green on the outside military rich for the revolution on the inside that have not left the military, but that are still inside, but that are secretly supporting the revolution. And they have also played a key role in sort of countering the internal propaganda and also sending Intel and connecting people defectors on the outside with with people still inside. But I think that it's still, despite this, and it has nurtured defection it has had the impact of getting more defectors, it still continues to be an immense kind of obstacle. And I think that some of the defectors that came out, I mean, they said if they people could leave, and they could get this kind of information, we would have massive defection movement going on in Myanmar. But even though there's a there's a high number, still, like over the first two years, it was still like a gradual, slowly people coming out. It wasn't like big collective defections that we saw it was this sort of small, incremental and that has a lot to do with this form of isolation that you're talking about. So it is definitely effector. So So I think also that's why you know, at a certain point the the end Mount of the factors that came out. It didn't stop, but it reached kind of a limit. And that's when you saw a shift, then from people who individually then decided to leave and go through this difficult process of reaching a liberated area to defections happening on the front line. So you started to see that, particularly in the beginning of 2022, during the year of 20, trade two, you did start to see that that was the only possibility that they had was like on the, on the battlefield. And you started also to see, like these pressures from the resistance movement, fear of losing lives in battles, combat fatigue, also becoming like a push factor for soldiers to defect. And then it was only after they defected, and came into liberated areas, came in contact with these defective supportive groups, that these sort of more political ideological changes start started to emerge among soldiers where they could start to self identify as as defectors. So it's very complicated in that way. And I think we need to see these phases and steps. And again, back to my point earlier on that, that it's not homogenous. It's not like every single soldier has been completely isolated from, from inflammation, there's different ranks, there's different access to information within the military. So we also need to make these distinctions in terms of the different ways and different trajectories of, of becoming a
Brad 1:21:34
defector. And so then the flip side to that, because inflammation is a two way street. If you defect, you're putting a target on your back. You know, we when we interviewed the police captain who joined the CDM, you know, he had not even defected, he was already labeled, as you said, a watermelon. And he basically got the tap on the shoulder and told you should probably escape the country with your family as quickly as possible, because people know, and they are, they are coming for you. So the issue there is you're not necessarily in a position, if you want to defect as an individual, you're not necessarily in a position to just put your hand up and say I declare defection because things will happen to you. And as you say, getting to a liberated area is very difficult. So is there a process where people interested in defection can try to covertly reach out to people who will somehow help them or somehow facilitate this defection? We'll be waiting for them at night, if they sneak out of the camp, that there'll be a meeting point and they can be, you know, taken away to a safe place or something like this. Is there some way for them to actually reach out to the Democratic side to facilitate that defection? Or is it all just you're on your own? Good luck? If you make it to a liberated area? Congratulations. If not, well, yeah, so
Helene Maria Kyed 1:23:00
in the beginning, it was very much your on your own. That was the first three, four months after the military coup. So this first wave of defectors was very much that individuals, somehow maybe someone was on leave, or they made an excuse that they needed to just go out to camp and resolve some family issue, or we've also had some talking about that they pretended to be ill and had to go outside and like all these different kinds of individual strategies, we also had people that were called and brought back in and that they tried again, this so many varied stories in the beginning, where people were more or less left to their own creative devices of trying to get out but as the these defective groups graded by Anita and didn't pan out, and who connect with democracy activists, and later with energy, started to form and also get had some resources to, to help defectors, they these campaigns like come to us connect us telephone numbers were shared with them, and that an infrastructure was created around getting help, both money and logistic help to get to liberated areas, but also promises that they would get a stipend or a small money to, to survive and help to the families as well. So So later on in the process, the support structures definitely facilitate that we saw quite a bit of growth during 2021 of the factors towards sort of like the last half part of 2021, there was a surge in defections because of these support structures. So they both of course, gave, like I said earlier, an opening of the CDM sort of a space to identify with but also moral support that what you're doing is the right thing, but also very sort of like material and logistic support structures that did help, especially at this time, individuals to escape sometimes two people at a time, but not whole groups that we've been seeing later on as the resistance movement gave more territory and more cloud, we saw, you know, also groups defecting on the battlefield. Yeah.
Brad 1:25:27
And I think I think it's a very interesting point that you that you bring up with regards to the financial support, because the I should I put it when you were talking previously about the, the process going through that internal growing process, the the introspection and coming to your conclusions, that seems well and good when it comes to the morality of the situation saying, Well, maybe maybe the military is not telling me the truth, maybe the military really does do some bad things. Maybe I don't want to be part of that. But an other avenue that I can imagine, just as easily is someone saying I don't care about morality, one way or the other. I care about feeding my family, I care about survival. And the military is not providing me that security. And that safety that it wants did, I'm not getting paid, my family is being held as a hostage. Physical abuse is rife. I don't want to be here, I don't want my family to be healed. And so we've we've heard that the revolution has been offering to soldiers who defect along with their weapons, a bounty of 1 million chat, which in realistic exchange rate terms is probably equivalent to about 300. US dollars. But still, that's that's not a terrible amount of money to have cash in hand. Is is this kind of financial incentive, really helping to tip the scales for for some of the soldiers who are sort of sitting on the fence? Or is it more just good to be announced to be able to announce something like this, but it's not really going to be
Helene Maria Kyed 1:27:06
some effect? I think, especially in our conversations with the Qin National Front, they also were the first actually to promise rewards, especially if, if so just left with the weapons or military material of some kind. But in that area, they did say that it did have sort of it did increase the numbers of soldiers that, that turned them in subs into this to the CNF and wanted to join the civil disobedience movement, but it's not. And then then ug did it later on as well. And it also increased the amount later on again, if if soldiers left with military equipment, right, but it's not been decisive in seems such like a massive search suddenly in defections. And I would say that this reflects that. Yes, there are a plethora of motivations to defect. And I do think the defection movements need to respond to these kinds of motivations for pragmatic reasons, because you want people to get out and you want to reduce the number of members of the military. But I think economic incentives will be for certain individuals will be a pull factor. But in very few situations, will it be a standalone, because a lot of soldiers from within the military, you know, they are still, even though their salaries are bad and reduced and not always paid out. It is still a place where you get a salary, where as leaving the military, it's quite insecure, their promises of these kinds of livelihood sustainance, but it's still quite minor and what's your future? What's my livelihood going to be? Yes, there are promises that that the defection movement and the ethnic armed organizations of assistance organizations and energy will give some kind of support. But my sort of impression from the research we've done is that the economic incentive very very seldom stands alone, it is often combined with some kind of, of the push factor as well, dissatisfaction with the military, or in, in in as the resistance. Forces have gained strength, also fear of being killed on the battlefield security for the families. And these are very pragmatic, push and pull factors, of course that have combined but in certain cases, people have also then become more morally and politically sort of motivated to join the systems later on to stay in that movement as they moved out of the military. I think I mentioned that earlier on, as well. So I think that if the defection movement had only been about economic incentives, first of all, I don't think the available resources are there. Why? No, they're not there. Because there's a lot of expenses for the energy and the resistance, there's a lot of CDM to support, there's a lot of, you know, lack of financial resources in general. So I think they would have not been available, but I also don't think that they could have stood alone.
Brad 1:30:39
And so this raises a very important question. Because the, the, as is often the case, I find with any social movement, any important historical shift, it never comes down to one element, one dimension, there are always multiple pressures and factors at play. And, and we can never sit back and say, Well, which one of them was responsible? Now they were all responsible, they play different roles. So I'm not trying to get you to pick, you know, dichotomously. But it seems then that there is a contrast between what the revolutionary movement is saying, right, going to people and saying, Well, you know, there's a moral imperative, and you can be a hero of the revolution here of the people, and we'll pay you money and all this sort of stuff, versus the soldiers themselves, having deep dissatisfaction, whether it's pragmatic, whether it's ethical, whether it's, you know, survival, whatever, deep dissatisfaction with the military. So the question then is, is it that the revolution is actively and successfully convincing the soldiers that they don't want to be in the military? Or is it that the soldiers have independently or organically realized, I don't want to be here. And the revolutions best contribution is creating a pathway a viable pathway for soldiers to leave this system and have at least some form of protection and some form of of economics?
Helene Maria Kyed 1:32:15
I don't think it's an either or question. I think it's a combination of both. And and, again, I think we need to look at the individual level as well. I think it very much depends. Also an educational level on rank and experiences on the way that you are infiltrated in the military networks, your history within that, to what extent one or the other is, is the most significant explanation for that I think that both in combination have been already quite significant. I think they still continue to, they still should still continue to be combined as part of the strategy or diminishing the military in terms of numbers, but also of creating this space for morally and politically changing members of the military. Because I mean, on the day of reckoning, or their, you know, you haven't still, even though the numbers of the media have diminished, you still have a lot of members of the military, right? And defecting and preparing for defecting and creating an a narrative and support structures around that is also part of planning the future of thinking about what the military would look like in the future, what people will have been members of the military will do, what position they will have in society. So I think already now, even though there's still a conflict going on, defection is also already part of questions of reintegration. Questions of the disarmament, the whole process that is usually set in motion, after an armed conflict with there's some kind of resolution or settlement going on. So I think those questions plays into also very much thinking about the trajectory ahead or the future ahead.
Brad 1:34:17
And so, thinking about, you know, the trajectory ahead from the perspective of an individual, can you can you give us an insight into what actually awaits a defector because, you know, you can, you can have a big moment as a defector and you can you can be on social media, and you can say yes, I've done this and everyone goes in the comment section and applauds you for what you're done for the revolution. But then, people move on and they forget about you. So what, what does life look like for someone who's who's defected? I imagine there are many different versions of this story. But Can Can you give us an idea of what they're facing in the weeks and the months following the defect? Yeah,
Helene Maria Kyed 1:34:57
it's a hardship. In different respects, of course, there's been exceptions. With a few defectors getting asylum in Australia, I think it's actually the only three. And some people also taking up sort of like, perhaps more sustainable positions within the revolutionary movement. But from this initial period in the beginning in 2021, parts of 2022 were, you know, this euphoria, almost of leaving and coming into the arms of the people, as the people's embrace group uses that metaphor as well, for CDM soldiers, it's been a lot of hardship for them, because the resources to support their families have been limited. It's better survival. In a lot of places, it's also been very hard for the ethnic resistance organizations to sustain support for defectors in let's say, current state, current national union areas or Qin state in CNF. camps where defectors are to begin with, and a lot of them have ended up going to border spaces in Thailand, or in India, where they live undocumented lives like a lot of other cdmos. But also where it's not been not to say that it's not hard for other CDMS. But in a lot of respects for defectors, it's been even harder to be either undocumented, migrant abroad, because there's still been foreign forms of suspicion and not complete trust towards defectors. Of course, there's been a lot of awareness raising amongst other cdmos, and civilians trying to sort of also say that these are people, good people, also, that can leave the military. And they've done it because they support the revolution. But still, underlying this, there's been that those forms of suspicion. There's also been, despite the fact that some material and financial support has been given to defectors, there's also been a reluctance amongst various private and non private donors to deliberately direct support towards the factors. And I have been, also, as a foreign scholar been part of also, you know, motivating also foreign countries to give support this month, but it's very hard to convince international aid agencies that funding should go towards ex armed members of the military. So it's been the lives of defectors, despite the fact that a lot of them are still saying they don't regret anything, they would prefer still this life outside the military than being inside. It's very, it's been very hard for them in the long run, to keep up disseminating a story to those, we're still inside, that life is easy, and everything is good when we get out and there's jobs for us, or, you know, we are living completely perfect lives. And, and, you know, we haven't steady income, this is not this has been hard to sort of, or impossible for a lot of them to disseminate that story. And that's also created a lot of, you know, debates amongst these defection groups and these support groups and like, you know, how many can we absorb? Like, is it still worth encouraging soldiers and police to defect or should we rather try to encourage that they are watermelons that they are doing forms of defiance and resistance within sharing Intel disciplining orders, because the epsa patient capacity in ethnic resistance organization areas and PDF areas and across the border has just been, you know, mad by lack of resources, given the constraints and dental have access to resources, so, so, this has been a new obstacle that emerged in particularly during 2020 20 Is this, you know, constraints in terms of creating proper lives for defects as they come out. And of course, that can also reduce the incentive for others to defect because, you know, what is for me on the other side, whether you are thinking pragmatically or morally and politically, you still need to somehow survive and find find security. So it's, it's, it's an area where there is really strong need for more support. And of course, there's almost only so much pressure you can put up people in Myanmar already on the diaspora. So So I think forms of international support within when this field would be a hugely important way to support the situation changes in Myanmar for the better.
Brad 1:40:24
And I think what you what you mentioned about the international support, and specifically about NGOs, that's something that I find very vexing because the, the international response has largely been well, you know, we will contribute to a very limited extent, but we will contribute. But the contribution is in things like, you know, food, medicine, shelter, the standard humanitarian stuff. And you point out the obvious and you say, Look, if if you know, someone is sick, it's not enough for you to stand there holding their hand, prolonging the illness without actually attacking the illness, we need to be investing in ways that allow us to end the fighting. Otherwise, there will never be an end to the refugees, and there will never be an end to the displaced people who require the food aid and the shelter aid and the medical aid and so on. But if you say lethal aid, give us give us ammunition, everyone shuts down. Nobody wants to do that and fine. But funding defections is a non violent, non lethal way to accelerate the end of the conflict. It seems like this is the holy grail of of NGO work and funding of like we can put money into a thing that will help to stop the fighting without ourselves in any way contributing to the fighting or contributing to death. Why is there such a hesitancy to support? Yeah, it's a very
Helene Maria Kyed 1:41:57
good question. I think there is a need to there is a strong need to frame the narrative in the right way, because a lot of international agencies have very little experience with working on defections. And when people this is what I need as well, when people hear the word defection, they immediately think that it's soldiers that then have started to fight on the other side. So not necessarily kind of non violent, non lethal strategy, that defection can also be and the way that it has principally evolved and the way that it has been articulated as part of the revolutionary strategy in Myanmar, but immediately, international agencies, associate it with armed actors. And then you're back to what you said before this giving weapons and supporting armed resistance is like, then the doors are closed amongst the internationals. So part of it is basically framing the narrative and kind of like me making international agencies understand that, that in Myanmar, defection is principally a non lethal and non violence strategy of undermining military atrocities by reducing the number of people who can commit those atrocities by reducing the number of people who are supportive of this repressive regimes committing these atrocities against civilians. And that's a step by step process. And I can't mention international agencies right now, because everything is in the pipeline, but there are organizations that are being convinced are starting to understand this, based on, you know, also researchers like me and others, pro democracy activists that have been, for a long time been trying to work on you know, also trying to explain what it's about in the context of Myanmar because and I think one of the ways that you can go around this is also saying that you support those organizations or communities that are hosting effectors. So, if organizations or countries are unwilling to give direct support to the factors themselves, which would also you know, be quite difficult because often you need some kind of partner partner organization or some intermediary that facilitates that would be to support those that are hosting them in various ways. So I think that is one way to go around and go about that. And I think it's also a quite sustainable way of doing it. And it could it can also be combined with ways of, of building relationships trouts thinking about future reintegrate not reintegration, but integration of soldiers into civilian society, giving support in this way. So there's a lot of possibilities. around that which which also brings call disturb.
Brad 1:45:04
So then looking back at the knowledge, the individuals who are trying to defect, but the individuals who have not affected the individuals who are in the military. What impact is the prevalence of the factions? And what seems to be the acceleration of the factions having on the remainder of the military? Is it something that the majority of the soldiers would be aware is happening? Is that something that the upper leadership is trying to aggressively suppress informationally trying to suppress with increased abuse of violence? Are they trying to bribe soldiers into staying loyal? Or are they just ignoring the problem entirely,
Helene Maria Kyed 1:45:44
not ignoring the problem entirely at all. I think, right from the beginning of the first defections, it is something that has really been on the attention list of the military. And that is evident in how they have strengthened their anti defection strategies, both in terms of tightening the security restrictions on movement, restrictions on access to information, some of these topics that we've talked about before. But I think a very, very clear example of it was also that back in late 2022, that was a major who had been a defector, actually quite active also in the defection movement that had been in May a thought that went back to the military, there are different stories of why he went back whether it was voluntarily or whether it was pressured, whether his family was pressured, and he felt compelled to go back. But immediately, the military used him as kind of a counter propaganda to the defection movement, saying that, you know, like having him say that when you defect, you live under miserable conditions. And, you know, you're not treated well. And different kinds of ways of telling people inside the military that defecting is not is not going to give you a better life, and you're not treated well. And we also know from defectors that the propaganda within the military was very strong, and some who have now defected, believed in it initially, when they were still inside, that they would be killed. If they came to the liberated areas that this, you know, welcoming defectors and welcoming soldiers by the ethnic resistance organizations and by the energy was just a tactic to learn them into them being killed once they arrived at the in the liberated areas. So that kind of propaganda has been prevalent within the military. And I think that reflects pretty well that it is something that's really seen as a threat to, to the power and the sustenance of military troops, by the leadership and by off officer rank level as well, at the different levels of the military.
Brad 1:48:17
That's interesting. And so sort of touching that on on the conscription law. The conscription law itself was was an old mechanism, it already existed. It's not a new piece of legislation, it was just historically inactive. And that probably is, is indicative of what we were discussing at the very beginning of the interview, that pre coup, the levels of recruitment and all personnel retention, were sufficient that the military did not see the need to enact their forcible conscription power. But now they seem to be pulling that trigger, although they have recently backtracked, and they've said that they will no longer be expecting women to be conscripted. Is this in reaction to the defections? Is this an attempt by the military to shore up their numbers after they've already bled 1000s of men to defections? Or is this just the unrelated tactic to to suppress or control the civilians?
Helene Maria Kyed 1:49:19
Well, I think I'm very much in agreement with a recent article by hemo Hain in United States Institute for Peace article recently, I do also see activation and potential we'll see over the next month enforcement of this conscription law as an act of desperation on part of the military junta and as a reaction to the depletion of Military Manpower, especially in terms of ground troops. I think it is not only linked to the factions, or the kinds of mass surrenders we saw in particular In relation to Operation 1027, in northern Shan State, I do also think it is very strongly linked to a realization within the top of the military that they cannot rely alone on aerial bombardments. But that they're the decrease of their troops on the ground has also had a significant impact on losing territorial control. And I think operation 1027 was a really good example of that, because it was so big and so massive in such a short time that the Brotherhood alliances were able to take over these territories on the border to China northern Shan State. And not like putting that together with this gradual territorial expansion that we've seen in other spaces as well, both by the PDFs in central Burma, but certainly also by how the age old ethnic resistance organizations like the Korean national union, have also been able to expand that territorial control that ground troops numbers of ground troops are still significant, you can't rely alone on aerial power, which of course is where the tablet or the Myanmar military sit that is still a superior when compared to the resistance forces. So I think that we need to understand it not cautiously as alone, the effect of, of the military looking at the number of defectors as such.
Brad 1:51:39
That's fascinating. And one thing that I also hopeful that we can get a bit of an insight from is, is the actual realities within the military, the state of the military currently, because we've heard on this podcast from quite a few different analysts and experts and commentators, how the military actually, ah, and, you know, a lot of places, particularly in conflict areas, it seems like you were talking about the self sustaining battalions and the descriptions, we're getting basically of exactly that. A battalion in a camp that can't go anywhere, can't do anything, is effectively besieged, but he's still self sustaining, they, they raise livestock, and, you know, they they have civilians living with them on the military base, but they're fundamentally cut off. And that's, it's a fascinating situation. It's a fascinating culture within those those battalions. And they all seem to be quite different. I wonder whether the defecting soldiers have spoken about how life in the military the reality of the military have shifted since the coup, and whether the general state and the general morale of the general quality of life in the military has has significantly declined.
Helene Maria Kyed 1:53:02
I do think that, as we spoke about earlier that, you know, being a lower rank, soldier, frontline troop member has never been a dancer, roses, so to speak. There's been these kinds of abuses. But the stores we are definitely hearing is that it has deteriorated since the military coup, and that the morale is extremely low amongst these troops. I mean, there's both in terms of just surviving and eating and getting supplies, they're neglected. The military, of course, it's also stretched, and some of the infrastructure routes to supply these battalions have also in certain respects, or in certain areas being caught off and are challenged by the resistance movement. So I do think some of these issues that were problematic for troops on the ground, or people living in, in military camps in the past have just, you know, increased. And then of course, there's also, you know, the active armed conflict that's going on in every space almost of the country, right? Like, before the military was able to shift around its life infantry battalions and divisions around the country who are trained specifically in these kinds of fighting these ethnic resistance organizations, but in a lot of spaces for a very long time, you had like almost dormant military bases and outposts that were not engaged in fighting. But now they have all more or less all, or the vast majority of them have been subjected to the threat of these kinds of attacks, and fighting with the either the PDF so the LDS or the ethnic resistance organizations. So that has changed the situation and I mean, the fear of dying of you losing lives and battle has just enormously increased. And even if you know soldiers are not dissatisfied or disaffected morally, or politically, then certainly they are dissatisfied with with these fears and the lives that living within these spaces and and what we hear from defectors is also that there is a general understanding of a complete disregard from the military leadership of the lives of these lower ranks. You know, we also hear these stories about you know, when they die on the battlefield, the bodies are not returned to the family. So there's this whole sense of not being regarded as a human or, you know, not having your human rights, you know, cherished or you as a person being recognized and cherished by the top military leadership, you're just like, cannon fodder, if you could say that in English, you're just you know, you're just not valued as a person. And that's huge demoralizing also for people within the these battalions and camps. These are some of the stories that we hear from defectors, because I don't obviously don't have access to converse with people who are still inside. So based on the defectors, Moore's is that that is what we are hearing. And I think, coming back to the conscription law enforcement of the conscription law, the whole question also raises of like, how, you know, these young people who are going to be recruited, now, as you say, possibly only men or young men being recruited, you know, how is the fighting spirit, or the loyal T's to be nurtured within the military, because one thing is giving them these short term trainings, sending them out on the frontlines, but, you know, it's not enough just to have a gun, you also have to have a will. And a lot of sense of loyalty and, and connection to the to the organization that you're fighting for. So that raises a whole set of questions of, you know, whether this is just about showing that now that the military is able to increase its numbers, but it's what is the like, what kind of quality? And what kind of impact is it actually going to have on the ground? And I think it's going to have a huge backlash, but we can talk more about that.
Brad 1:57:28
I mean, the backlash is, it's actually interesting, let's, let's discuss that, because I'm hearing very different thing. On the one hand, you know, I will have the video of Myanmar people attempting to flee into Thailand. And it was, I mean, it was shocking, like, I mean, the the people tried to smuggle themselves in vegetable trucks and things of this nature, it's seeds that we've seen from conflict areas in the past. And it's very demoralizing to, to see something like that. But we, you know, we also have other people, I interviewed someone a few days ago, and I asked, I asked him his opinion on the conscription law. And he basically said, Well, I mean, this is a joke, like, obviously, no one is voluntarily going to join the military in the military are not in much of a position to enforce a conscription law. Because I mean, how and where are they going to going to do that? And are you really going to take a population who hates you, and put a loaded weapon in their hands? So I sort of hear different different things. And it's, it's really jarring to hear opinions from these extreme polar opposites. So I am curious, like, are you hearing anything? What are you hearing about this? Because nobody really knows how this is going to, to play out the military doesn't seem to have actually done anything, besides making announcements. Are people generally taking this seriously and seeing it as a sign that like, hey, now is the time that we got to leave? Or are people sort of saying that the military will never be able to actually, action this? So what are you hearing?
Helene Maria Kyed 1:59:17
I'm hearing both of the things or the different things that you're hearing as well, because I also think it depends very much where you are. Because if you are a military analyst, or you were political analyst, or you're sick and sitting in exile, and you're looking at this, I very much agree with the analysis that this is a joke. It's not a strategy to save the military from decreasing power. I think there's going to be a huge backlash, first of all, how are they going to organize these kinds of conscription sounds, you're going to be able to train people properly, to actually be able to increase the fighting capabilities of the military, against the resistance forces. So in all the was respect and we can go on and on in terms of the how it could backfire. It's not a joke because people who are living in Myanmar young people who are living in Myanmar are scared, and they're panicking. And this is real. I mean, and it's people are trying to get out, but they're roadblocks. That's what we're hearing. They can't get out. They don't know how to get to the liberated areas. They're like staying indoors, but is that enough, but they're gonna come and knock on their doors when this enforcement of this is this. conscription is starting. We know already that in the cities, there has been arbitrary conscription already going on where they have grabbed young men and brought them into the military. This has been going on for the past month, especially after operations and 27, but probably also before, so it's not a joke on the ground, because it's part of this fear campaign. And it's created a sort of a sort of panic and increase the sort of like, already existing chaos around what's going on. So. So it's very real, and it's felt very real amongst young people. And I haven't heard both, you know, through people I know really well are people on the ground, saying that having this ability to analyze things from afar is very different than when you were there and and you're still living in spaces that are controlled by the military, because this is mainly what we're talking about, right? We're not talking about, realistically speaking, the military recruiting young men, potentially women in areas that are now under the nominal territorial control of ethnic resistance organization of PDFs. We're talking about people were still living in Yangon and Monia Mendeley villages that are still somehow under military influence. That's what we're talking about. Right, that have still are in those spaces. But how do you leave those spaces? Right. So it's a very real critical situation. And I know that there's a lot of the organizations in the liberated areas, including some of the affected groups that I'm familiar with, that are, you know, struggling at the moment and trying to find strategies, how can we help these people to get out like thinking in similar terms as the defectors? What can we do? Is there space for them in the liberated areas? How can we absorb them? So? So it's, it's real, like, and there's a lot of thinking, a lot of strategizing at the moment on how, you know, we can say these young people and find pathways and ways of them to to avoid this kind of conscription, which, as we know, the military said, can give if you try to evade it, it can give you between two to three years of prison. And I think, in some cases, five years of prison, if I'm not mistaken. So it's something we have to take. quite seriously. What I'm also hearing, and again, I'm not doing research on conscription, I'm not an expert on conscription. So again, this is what I'm hearing based on opinions and views, is that very likely, the conscription will start in in what are still USDP. So the military alliance, political party probably likely start in USDP controlled areas, so in villages and spaces that where there is still a certain degree of military support, usually also combined with support from months that are dominant in these kinds of spaces. But I mean, it's, we had to wait and see to what extent it will be forced, or to what extent it is more like a fear fear campaign.
Brad 2:04:01
Absolutely. And I think this is the kind of the theme that always comes up, we have to wait and see we have to wait and see and nobody can predict the future, unfortunately. But I'm going to ask you to do it anyway. What do you use see as the trajectory of defections here, because for all we've discussed, it is clear that defection is not a golden bullet. It is not a panacea for the individual soldier who, who wants to defect, maybe even for the individual soldier who has no way of defecting with their family, and they have to recognize that they've been kept deliberately separated from their family in order to prevent infection. Once you defect, you know your financial prospects are not looking great. You you employment prospects are not great. You've just lost your access to the military hospital, you've lost the access to education for your family and so on. So there There are a lot of hardships is a very difficult decision for an individual to make to to try to defect and potentially a decision that could get them executed. Do you think that defections are likely to to increase likely to continue their sort of upward trend, that this is going to continue snowballing into a major, major element that is sort of wearing away the military's ability to claim control of the country? Or do you think that the people who have defected represent a large part of those who were able to defect, and that an increasing number of the soldiers who remain remain in situations where the faction is just not functionally an option for them? Can you make any sort of conjecture as to the future of defections as a phenomenon?
Helene Maria Kyed 2:05:47
Yeah, I think I can, I think, definitely the there are different elements here, let's take the conscription law itself, let's, you know, envision that it will be enforced. And I think that in itself will contribute to it to an increase in infections. And I think it will do that in two different ways. One would be that the new recruits, if there are avenues to escape, they will do so. But it could also have a demoralizing effect on those who are already serving, because you fill up the battalions with these poorly trained, disloyal, potentially unwilling young people that you have to fight alongside, it becomes very dangerous to engage in military warfare with resistance organizations. So it could also have a spillover effect on those who are already inside. Besides that, I think we will see, especially in those areas, where the ethnic resistance organizations have the upper hand, we will see a lot of surrenders and defections happening in those spaces, also with this new enforcement of this age old conscription law. So that's one part of it. The other part of it is that if we see a strengthened support for host communities, host organizations that are supporting defections, and we strengthen those infrastructures, around that spaces where they can be i, if that happens at this moment, and it's time to support that and escalate that support, then it will have an immensely huge effect, I think, on increasing defections, from at least from lower ranks. And then the last part, I think, I would like to highlight is also that and that's been the case all along is that the way that the resistance organizations, whether the PDFs or the ethnic, armed resistance organizations are gaining more and more territorial control. Every time we've seen that expand, we've also seen an increase, if not in defections than at least in soldiers that are surrendering. And then if it's possible, to in those moments of surrender, to strengthen the mechanisms to absorb those who surrender, not into necessarily fighting back their own military, their parent organization, but places to stay to be hosted in those spaces. I think also, we will see a huge enlargement of of defections and crumbling of the military from below, which has been the strategy all along for the defection movement. So that definitely I'm I'm I'm predicting will, will happen. But it also depends on the military strategy. So obviously, you know, is the military going to withdraw to urban centers, that are highly police with roadblocks, like you know, is that the scenario we are going to see, because then it's going to be very hard for even those who want to get out to get out. But once they're out close to liberated areas, or to ethnic resistance group areas, it's easier to get out. But if there is going to be that retraction to urban centers, then it's going to be much very difficult for soldiers to get out. So it again, like we've argued in our research all the way from beginning the dynamics of the Depression movement and how it evolves is very much dependent both on what goes on in Resistance Movement and what goes on in terms of military strategies.
Brad 2:09:46
Interesting. So I wonder whether you can talk a little bit about the size of the defections because the drip feed of individual soldiers defecting has been consistent, it has been growing But what we have also seen in more recent times, is defections at the unit level. It might not be a large unit, it might be, you know, like a squad level or something akin to a to a platoon. But do you think there is that possibility for higher level officers to sort of create a culture within their camps or within the within the company, so hopefully even battalions for the battalion or the company as a whole and sort of say, we all don't want to be here. We don't like drones flying overhead dropping explosives on us. We don't like the fact that we can't leave the camp, we don't like the fact that we are entirely dependent on on air drops for food and medicine and ammunition. And let's just all defect in and you know, get a little bit of money, because that's still more secure than than just surrendering and then sitting in in limbo. Do you think there is that possibility for much larger formations defecting? In unison?
Helene Maria Kyed 2:11:06
Yeah, so we've seen that happening. Initially, mainly amongst the military militias, like in current state, the main militia there that defected and joined the KPP, the current ethnic armed organization there. So that was one of the first that we saw happening. So that had also an ethnic dimension. And it was also linked, again, back to what I said before, to a space where it was increasingly clear that the revolutionary movement in this case, the combination of PDF forces, in current estate, and, and the age old, ethnic armed organizations, they're taking up more territory and getting gaining sort of, with the exception of the of local for a long time, gaining that space that is highly motivating for these more collective forms of defections. So we have seen that we've seen it in some of the surrenders, as well. But I think when it comes to the higher ranks, there is a different set of obstacles to defection and surrendering. So one is that the risks in terms of if you were caught by the military, are much higher, not only in terms of losing status, and economic incomes, and, you know, being detached for those kinds of economic networks that you are, or have been involved in as part of the military, but also in terms of the kinds of punishment and we saw that with a brigadier generals that were given life sentences and death penalties back early this year, linked to the operation 1027 and the surrenders there, but also in terms of how they will be dealt with, both in the here and now and also in in the future by the revolutionary movement. Because there you have questions of transitional justice, coming up very clearly. And questions about traditional justice is something that's been debated for a couple of years, at least amongst people engaged in the defection movement and amongst the ethnic resistance organizations, in not least the Grand National Union, but also some of the others. Is that what do we do with high ranks that have been part of the command structure of ordering atrocities against civilians? So are we just going to pardon them? Is there going to be a general amnesty, and that's not settled yet. So we know that in the statements from the N ug, and also in this joint statement that came the day before the three year anniversary of the coup, we know that there are demands for accountability linked to atrocities against civilians and to these crimes against humanity. And that will be obviously much more directed towards the higher rank you are these kinds of questions of transitional justice, whereas people who are low ranked, we know it from other contexts, we know from history that they tend to either be pardoned or be subjected to forms of amnesty in processes of transitional justice. So that is also there's a lot of insecurity for higher ranks surrounded by those questions of transitional justice. And there's no like clear policy yet amongst the revolutionary forces or their energy on how to approach that or a clear policy on how to approach it if and at what time, a higher rank defects we've seen in connection to operation 1027 higher ranks coming out in a apologizing and saying they recognize the atrocities but also admitting that they have been part of them and ordering them. And then what do you do with that in the current moment and in the future, and I think clarity around that will also be very much defining in terms of to what extent we will see, you know, higher ranks brigadier generals, and others that higher level actually making those those decisions of defecting with a whole battalion or a division. So I think those are questions that are being discussed. So it's not something I'm coming up with. It's very serious questions that are being discussed as we speak. And these are questions that really needs to be addressed and resolved in some respect, in order to encourage these kinds of collective defections, as opposed to these battlefield surrenders that we've been speaking about earlier.
Brad 2:16:00
So are you saying and I want to get this clear? And I understand this is a difficult question to pose, but point blank, are you suggesting that it would be potentially beneficial from the perspective of the factions, if the national unity government or generally the the pro democracy, future implementation of justice or instruments of justice, were to publish and stand by a policy a, a sort of schema of who it is, who is going to be held accountable for their actions, and who it is who is going to receive a general amnesty, taking into consideration factors such as whether someone has defected or whether someone has committed certain types of crimes? I know that it's very difficult to make these types of determinations. But I just want to to drive on to this point and ask you directly. Are you saying that this would be beneficial for the the national unity government or for a relevant entity to to publish?
Helene Maria Kyed 2:17:04
I think it's a very difficult question. And I'm not an expert in in transitional justice. But I think that it's the decision that the new T should make together with the wider revolutionary movement. Because it's also I mean, having worked on on questions of justice, which are not universal, but people have very different conceptions of what justice is, in certain contexts. Forgiveness, and Amnesty is also something that's preferred. So it's also about it's also about healing and reconciliation. So if the sentiment in Myanmar and amongst the Myanmar people is that we need to see these higher ranking officers getting punished for the kinds of crimes that they have done, then I think it's immensely important that that's the kind of policy that that's adopted. But if if the sense is that at a certain to a certain extent, and a certain level of rank, that an amnesty and a kind of forgiveness, of people who have been in these kinds of positions, is seen as sufficient for future political Reckoning and healing, then that might be a better route to go. But I would feel very, in a very difficult position to kind of defined what would be the preferred, like what the sense of justice would a sense of justice would require in a Myanmar context? I think these are discussions that has to be taken amongst people from Myanmar and people were part of the revolutionary movement. I think that, you know, one possible way at the moment, which is something that's been argued by the Korean national union is that, you know, that one could make a distinction between between those who order atrocities, and those who are sent to commit the atrocities, like you can make that form of distinction. But then what does that mean, in the present? Does that mean then that if a whole battalion defects or surrenders is that then that you capture the the higher ranking, you know, Commander, as prisoner of war, and you keep them and put them before a trial? And then you give general MC to those who have not ordered atrocities committed them and integrate them into society? Or into those spaces that are created for surrendered or defectors or do you make everybody prisoners of war? I think these are practical questions that would aid the defection moment if those were resolved now, but the bigger question of trials in the future and who should be put before work Times courts, whatever these will be. And whatever approach will be, I think those it would be probably better to take longer time to discuss that, because these are very deep questions. But I think the more practicalities around the here and now on, you know, is it beneficial to just, you know, send back commanding officers to Naypyidaw. And then the, you know, tap Madol, or the Myanmar military will deal itself with punishing them, which is defective, what happened in the operations and 27, right? I mean, they took care of the punishment, not revolutionary movement. And then you let lower rank sort of like, you know, go free, and you even give them money to travel home. So that's been a de facto practice that's been going on, but kind of perhaps creating more solid principles around how you would deal with those situations, I think would be helpful for the defection movement at the moment, but maybe not needing like a very sort of like, clear cut policy, where it's totally clear at the moment of reckoning, what, you know, what will happen? I think it's, it's hard, it requires really, like inclusive and deep discussions or debates about senses of justice, about the kinds of transition that Myanmar would like to see. And also, what do we want to integrate former military personnel into a new federal armies? Or, like, those are really big questions that are being debated. But, you know, I'm not I would not expect, you know, in this current moment, that they're clearly answers to that.
Brad 2:21:44
So I I, I accept the difficulty of the decision that the statement that you're making and how hard it is, especially considering how many different layers there are and how complex transitional justice can be in restorative justice can be to make any definitive statement or really sort of, in a binary saying, this is the way we should go, that's the way we should go. Especially because we as we've said before, we can't delve into all of the different, different layers, and we can't necessarily deselect everything. And we can't necessarily speak from a position of authority on on these matters. So I certainly respect your your hesitation to say definitively one way or the other. And you still, I think you've brought a very solid understanding about the complexities around transformative justice, of course, but most of the complexities around this very deep, very large issue of defections, this this phenomenon that we've spent the last 20 Something hours discussing. And I really want to thank you for coming on, I really want to thank you for, for sharing your insights and your knowledge and your time with us and with our audience. I
Helene Maria Kyed 2:23:01
think that having you know, looked at defections in Myanmar for quite some time now, since after the coup. I think it is extremely impressive and courageous, the way that this movement has been moving forward, and also the way that people have welcomed people from the military, in joining the people in this kind of revolutionary space, and the way that, you know, despite the divisions and the disagreements, that people have been able to come together around this strategy of defection as part of the revolution, I think that is historically and comparatively, it is quite unprecedented, and quite impressive. How, you know, not only in terms of the materials support, but also the way that these different talk shows and these different activities online had been able to move this defection forward in Myanmar and of course, that is part of my offer for the wider revolutionary in Myanmar revolutionary movement in Myanmar, which has also been really really impressive, and which I of course, support as well. And I think that there's a lot to be said, but I think we need to despite all the setbacks and despite you know, all the obstacles that are which are quite natural in the current situation, I think we need to keep in mind the historical unprecedented Vnus not only in the Myanmar context, but worldwide of of the resilience and, and, and impressive sort of strategies and practices of the revolutionary movement in Myanmar. I think that's really important. To keep in mind we'll be discussing also all these challenges.
Host 2:25:05
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