Understanding Rakine politics
Kyaw Hsan Hlaing provides a comprehensive overview of the complex political and military landscape in Myanmar, particularly focusing on Rakhine State. He begins by discussing the historical relationship between the Rakhine political parties and the NLD (National League for Democracy), highlighting the shifts in alliances and the evolving political dynamics over the years. He emphasizes the initial strong relationship between the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) and the NLD, which gradually deteriorated due to various political conflicts and the NLD's perceived alignment with the military. He then delves into the formation and rise of the Arakan Army (AA) and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA). The AA has become a significant force in Rakhine, gaining substantial support from the local population due to its leadership, strategic vision, and military prowess. The AA's rise is contrasted with the declining influence of traditional Rakhine political parties like the ALD, ANP (Arakan National Party), and AFP (Arakan Front Party), which have lost credibility and support among the Rakhine people. Kyaw Hsan Hlaing also touches upon the complexities of inter-ethnic relations in Rakhine, particularly the tensions between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities. He notes the efforts of younger generations and organizations to bridge these divides and foster a more inclusive political environment. The discussion concludes with an analysis of Operation 1027, a coordinated offensive by the Brotherhood Alliance, including the AA, against the Myanmar military. This operation marks a significant shift in the conflict, showcasing unprecedented coordination among various resistance groups and posing a substantial challenge to the military junta. Kyaw Hsan Hlaing highlights the strategic importance of AA's involvement in this operation and its implications for the broader resistance movement in Myanmar.
“They changed to the view that only the armed struggle against the central government is the answer, because all these years, Burmese-central-political-party politicians have ignored the Rakhine people’s demand.”
Host: The landscape is getting even more complex. I hope our listeners are following along with us as they try to track this. So basically, what you're describing is up until the AA's formation or before they have the strength, the political power that they develop through ULA, and through the armed AA, you have this kind of old-boy network, I might call it, these three parties that are holding the power, which have their different alliances, divisions, splits and everything else. Then it sounds like AA just breaks the mold, they come from a place where these political leaders don't usually come, and their way of thinking is different. They make alliances that have never been made before among those in Rakhine State, and they have this meteoric rise in terms of their importance and what they're doing. As they're doing this, the ground is kind of changing in Rakhine State and in the whole country as well in this new direction that they're charting. So, the question would come, how are other people seeing the AA/ULA? The ULA is the political arm of the AA. When we look at the strength and the power that their rise is starting to claim, I'm wondering about the relationships. I guess there are three relationships that come to mind first, how do other traditional Rakhine political parties view what the AA's doing? How are they aligned or opposed to it? Then of course, you have the military and the NLD. So, as the AA is gaining in strength and becoming a force to reckon with how are these three different power centers, the other Rakhine political groups, the military, and the NLD, relating to the undeniable strength and presence of the AA?
Kyaw San Hlaing: Thank you very much for this question. I mentioned previously, the relationships between three Rakhine political parties, ULA/AA, and the Rakhine political parties, NLD, and the military. Here, we can also think of another possibility that came to my mind is that three Rakhine political parties are really the parents of the ULA/AA leaders, because here's the point, after the 2015 election, NLD ignored their demand. We also must mention in 2018 in Rakhine State, I think around January 18, there was a kind of celebration of Arakan Kingdom, a movement, also like a political literature talk. At the time, the government shutdown and killed at least twelve people and many suffered injuries. So, people were forced to hide these events, you know, it happened in Mrauk U in 2018. So, these kinds of events also ignited the people to change their mind. Rakhine political parties working to gain self-determination, for self-rule or self-government in Rakhine State is impossible for the people of the Rakhine state. They changed to the view that only the armed struggle against the central government is the answer, because all these years, Burmese-central-political-party politicians really ignored the Rakhine people's demand, Rakhine public sphere, and long internet shutdowns. Rakhine people are really on their own, especially after a year or more of internet shutdown, Rakhine State people broke themselves from being part of Burma, because most of the other parts of country are using the Internet and especially during COVID-19, in Rakhine State people are really worried about the COVID-19, also worried about the military. All these things really forced [the Rakhine people] to support the ULA/AA. And that's why ULA/AA become the key factor.