Episode #369: Oslo’s Lost Accord
RELEASE DAte: july 27, 2025
“I promised Aung San Suu Kyi and committed myself to work for democracy and human rights in the country as long as necessary. And still it is necessary!”
Kjell Magne Bondevik is a former, two-term Prime Minister of Norway and longtime advocate for human rights and democracy in Myanmar. He sits down with Insight Myanmar to speak about his decades of political engagement, diplomatic efforts, and international collaboration aimed at supporting the Burmese people in their struggle against military rule. Drawing on his wide-ranging personal experience, institutional efforts through the Oslo Center, and his tenure as a head of state, Bondevik discusses both the moral imperative and political complexity of responding to authoritarian regimes.
Bondevik began his political career at age 26, serving more than three decades in Norwegian politics. His involvement with Myanmar dates back to 1997, when he first met Aung San Suu Kyi. Describing this pivotal visit to Yangon, he recounts how he surreptitiously obtained a tourist visa by referencing his background as a Lutheran pastor, and was then able to meet Suu Kyi in the residence of the NLD’s deputy chair when she was temporarily out of house arrest. He pledged to support Myanmar’s democracy movement—a promise he has kept through advocacy and institutional engagement for nearly 30 years.
Bondevik founded the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights in 2006. This initiative evolved from interfaith dialogue and human rights work to supporting political institutions and civil society in fragile democracies. In Myanmar, this included collaboration with the National Democratic Institute to assist political parties in coalition-building, parliamentary functioning, and party development. Although Bondevik has since retired from the center, he remains emotionally and intellectually invested in its continued mission, particularly its work around post-coup Myanmar.
Explaining Norway’s governmental approach to Myanmar, Bondevik notes that during his time in office, it combined principled opposition to authoritarianism with practical support for pro-democracy actors. He encouraged Norwegian businesses to refrain from investing in Myanmar during periods of strict military control, and helped foster international networks of democratic leaders to apply diplomatic pressure on the junta. Yet he also endorsed conditional engagement when the military appeared to be transitioning, especially during the tentative liberalization of the 2010s. Reflecting on these years, Bondevik believes it was made possible by a combination of international pressure, along with the country’s democratic movement finally gaining critical momentum. This stems from his deeper belief that authoritarian rule is not sustainable in the long term when resistance rises to a certain level; he pleads with the country’s current military leaders to realize this and steer the country toward peaceful transformation.
Yet Bondevik also speaks about that period somewhat ruefully. “Maybe [the] Norwegian government and Norwegian business life were too optimistic,” he reflects, pointing to the hopeful signs that accompanied Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, the NLD’s electoral victories, and her assumption of the state counselor role. At the time, Bondevik and others believed foreign investment might improve the lives of ordinary Burmese citizens and thereby solidify democratic reforms. He underscores that engagement was predicated on the belief that economic progress and political liberalization would reinforce one another. Of course, the 2021 military coup reversed all of this progress and destroyed the pathways to change that the opening was trying to create.
Asked whether he believes Norway should formally recognize the National Unity Government (NUG), Bondevik acknowledges the dilemma. The official diplomatic position of most states is to recognize governments that exert territorial control, and the junta no longer fully meets that criterion. On the other hand, he explains that the NUG, while widely supported by pro-democracy movements and many in the international community, does not control the full territory either, nor does it run the state in the conventional sense. So he defers this determination to the judgment of Norway’s contemporary decision-makers. His more general recommendation is for governments to adopt a dual strategy—"support to the democracy movement and a pressure and sanctions on the military regime to pave the way for a new revolution.”
Bondevik is also critical of ASEAN’s limited engagement. Although he respects the geopolitical constraints ASEAN faces, given the diversity of its members’ own political systems, he argues that it should have played a much more active role. He acknowledges that countries with poor democratic records are unlikely to prioritize political reform in Myanmar, but he holds out hope that international diplomacy and grassroots democratic movements can re-align the political trajectory. He urges international actors to work through both regional and global mechanisms, particularly the UN. While faulting the international body for not doing enough to keep Myanmar in focus amid competing global crises, he still believes it has the best chance of galvanizing international support.
On China’s role, Bondevik unequivocally states, “It is an obstacle.” Beijing’s relationships with both the military and ethnic armed organizations makes it the real power to be reckoned with, thereby acting as a buffer for the junta against international pressure, and its economic entanglements with the junta shield it from the deepest impacts of international sanctions. The military leadership in Myanmar is almost completely dependent on China for the technology, armaments and capital that keep it in power.
Having retired from government and the Oslo Center, Bondevik says he cannot speak definitively about whether some international actors might be engaging in quiet diplomacy with stakeholders on both sides of the Myanmar conflict. Still, he assumes that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is maintaining open channels with both the junta and the democratic resistance. Unlike the 1990s, Norway now has an embassy in Yangon, providing a direct link to developments on the ground. He urges Norway and other like-minded states to “coordinate their efforts with other countries that have the same approach and use channels both towards the regime and towards a democracy movement.”
Expressing sorrow over Aung San Suu Kyi’s latest stint behind bars, and the overall isolation of pro-democracy leaders, Bondevik remains in touch with exiled members of the democratic movement and continues to support efforts personally from abroad. He calls on Norway to use its diplomatic weight within international institutions to help end the conflict, and keep Myanmar on the global agenda.
Bondevik closes by acknowledging the challenging reality of the present situation, while expressing a determined hope. “It’s very easy to be pessimistic and to give up, but we know from history that it’s possible to change the situation. It has happened before. It may happen again.”