Episode #338: Emergency Declined
“[The quake] revealed the tragic disconnect between the government's understanding—or perhaps, willingness to communicate—the severity of the disaster and the actual level of risk facing the population.”
Professor Dean Kyne, a disaster management expert at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, presents a detailed critique of Myanmar’s disaster response capacity in the wake of the country’s recent, devastating earthquake. His analysis is informed by decades of data that demonstrate how military rule in Myanmar has continually prioritized authoritarian control over public welfare, making effective disaster management nearly impossible.
Kyne first explains that Myanmar is very vulnerable to cyclones, floods, landslides, and earthquakes due to its geography, but that despite recurring natural disasters, lacks both the infrastructure and political will to manage such crises. He uses the catastrophic 2008 Cyclone Nargis as an illustrative example of massive incompetence and state failure: the military government ignored 48-hour early warnings, withheld risk communication, and downplayed the storm so it could carry out its planned constitutional referendum (which then tentatively moved the country towards some degree of democratization while simultaneously solidifying the military’s political power). The human toll—over 138,000 dead—was magnified by the entrenched system of secrecy, mismanagement, and obstruction.
Kyne argues that rather than learn from the Nargis catastrophe and build domestic disaster response capacity, the junta has only further weaponized management. He says bluntly, “Their goal is to weaponize the disaster and to enhance their power and control over the country.” Kyne explains that, under authoritarian regimes, saving lives is not the goal—control is. Consequently, capacity building for preparedness, mitigation and recovery has not occurred. For example, he recounts the experience of a humanitarian responder, Kiran Verma, whose relief convoy, equipped with medical staff and supplies, was stopped at gunpoint and barred from entering the hardest-hit regions. This wasn’t logistical failure, Kyne stresses, it was “humanitarian suppression under authoritarian rule.”
According to Kyne, the three basic, essential actions of effective humanitarian response are: the immediate deployment of trained rescue teams; the use of helicopters to evacuate the injured; and logistical coordination for medical aid. Yet after the earthquake, the military government employed not one of these! Moreover, corruption remains rampant. He relates that “community leaders who support the junta stole the aid, repurposed it for profit, and did not distribute it to the affected people.” But it is much worse than just complete negligence, incompetence and corruption: Kyne affirms credible reports that the regime used the crisis to forcibly recruit young male relief workers into the army. Legitimate aid workers have been restricted in their movement, denied access to opposition-controlled zones, seen their supplies confiscated, and subjected to intimidation by pro-junta paramilitaries such as the Pyu Saw Htee.
Regarding international aid, Kyne characterizes three critical dimensions that need to be considered: pragmatic, political, and moral. Regarding the moral dimension, Kyne is unequivocal: the international community must act now. He points to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and warns that without support, disasters like this will reverse progress on addressing poverty, fostering resilience, and solidifying human rights. “If we don’t help to rebuild after the disaster—to build back better—the world cannot achieve the sustainable development goals as we wish, and Myanmar will remain in poverty.”
From a practical perspective, Kyne emphasizes that recovery will require not only emergency supplies, but long-term rebuilding of infrastructure and housing as well. Clearing debris, which should be the responsibility of the state, now falls on the residents of impoverished communities who survived. To fully recover, he says,”[it] may take more than ten years!” Finally, in terms of the political considerations, as far as some estimates, the military controls just 20% of the country. Therefore, Kyne recommends distributing aid through trusted networks within these opposition-held zones rather than official, military channels, to ensure it reaches those truly in need. International agencies must resist normalizing or strengthening the junta through traditional aid pipelines.
Kyne is clear-eyed about the challenges of developing resilience in conflict zones but remains hopeful about bottom-up approaches. He calls for investing in local NGOs to begin community-level disaster education and volunteer response training. Models like the U.S. Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) could be adapted in Myanmar’s context, with training of trainers who then deliver instruction within their own communities. Even online tools like Zoom and Starlink, he notes, can be leveraged to build this knowledge without endangering trainers or trainees. He also stresses that building community resilience does not always require expensive infrastructure, and that education alone can even save lives. Training people in preparedness, response, and recovery, and equipping volunteers to serve as local first responders, could be a foundational step toward reducing future disaster impacts in a country that cannot rely on its central government.
Kyne concludes with a powerful message of solidarity and hope: “To the people in Myanmar, you have to be very strong. And for the international community members, please continue with what you have been doing, and please support the affected individuals.”