Episode #336: Between The Junta and A Hard Place
“We just want the war to end.”
These seven words from Wong Chen, Malaysian MP and chair of his Parliament’s International Relations and Trade Committee, sum up ASEAN’s perspective on the Myanmar crisis. Speaking in Bangkok shortly after delivering a regional policy speech, he offers a sober analysis and pragmatic roadmap for regional engagement, underscored by a moral imperative to act.
Wong opens by framing Malaysia’s current chairmanship of ASEAN as a fleeting but critical window within which to redirect its regional focus toward resolving Myanmar’s conflict. While Malaysia does not share a border with Myanmar and has limited trade ties, it hosts a substantial Rohingya refugee population and its Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, has his own personal experience of political imprisonment and human rights violations. “Being Chair of ASEAN this year, we will try our best… to improve the situation in Myanmar, including human rights,” Wong asserts.
In laying out Malaysia’s potential leadership, Wong identifies a two-pronged approach. The first is disincentivizing armed conflict by halting the flow of revenue and weapons to both sides. “We have to make sure that where possible, we don't fuel the fight,” he says. That includes targeting revenue streams like the jade and rare earth trade, internet scams, rail and power links to neighboring countries, and banking facilities. The second is leveraging Malaysia’s comparatively positive relationship with China to push for a diplomatic resolution before the ASEAN chair rotates to the Philippines, a country whose relationship with Beijing is more adversarial.
Confronted with a critique of ASEAN’s apparent “both-sides-ism” approach, and the question of whether the resistance would ever sit down at the table with a military guilty of such terrible atrocities, Wong acknowledges the brutality of the junta but emphasizes that Malaysia’s potential role requires neutrality. Facilitators, he insists, must suspend moral judgment in order to open channels for negotiation. However, he also adds, “[Personally] I'm not a fan of the junta at all… They are conscripting people who don't want to fight!” He re-emphasizes that only by cutting off weapons, revenue, and other war-enabling resources to both sides might they then become willing to shift toward peace negotiations. He acknowledges that while certain factions may persist in their pursuit of conflict, the Malaysian leadership of ASEAN is poised and ready to facilitate positive developments, provided there is a genuine willingness to explore a potential resolution.
Wong explains China’s importance here. He describes the layered nature of Chinese involvement in Myanmar, and sees the timing for China’s involvement as being especially ripe: with attention soon to shift globally from Gaza and Ukraine to remaining active conflicts like Sudan and Myanmar, China will have a unique opportunity to act like a regional superpower, to step up and gain goodwill; this is especially true following the extreme shifts in American foreign policy under the Trump administration. For all these reasons, China is a pivotal piece in Wong’s overall strategy.
Asked whether Chinese mediation might prioritize stability over democracy, Wong is cautiously optimistic. “Of course [China is] going to be maybe 60% pro-SAC and 40% for ‘the rebels’… We try to achieve 50/50, but it’s not likely.” Still, he says that any sustained diplomatic engagement would better than none.
Among ASEAN member states, Wong identifies Thailand as the most important player for practical engagement with the SAC. Thailand has “skin in the game,” he explains, noting that their border security and national interests are directly affected; moreover, it has established links with both the junta and the resistance groups. Wong proposes a novel but, he believes, realistic plan: namely, to appoint the Thai military as a semi-permanent adviser to ASEAN on Myanmar matters, a role to continue even after Malaysia’s chairmanship ends.
Wong believes that if the Thai military acts as a conduit for talks, other powerful nations besides China—in particular, Russia and India—might be convinced to support a short-term cessation in the flow of weapons, money and trade. “Let’s try a window of three months with no weapons… and see what kind of pressure we can put [on] them.”
But does Wong really think that SAC can be trusted, given its history of exploiting international engagements in bad faith to mainly just gain legitimacy through photo ops official meetings and the like? His belief is that fruitful engagement can happen indirectly without granting SAC any degree of legitimacy— which he also firmly believes they should not be given. He returns to his suggestion of curbing trade in its major financial lifelines (rare earth metals, jade, and arms) with the rationale that this could trigger dissent within the junta ranks and force them to the table.
The discussion turns to the National Unity Government (NUG), which many see as the democratic representative of the people, but which remains diplomatically isolated and militarily sidelined. While referencing his friends within the NUG leadership that he knew as NLD members pre-coup, Wong describes the NUG’s current political reality as deeply constrained. They are lawmakers, and because they do not field an army, Wong argues that this has eroded the their legitimacy as a national government in the eyes of the ethnic armed groups (EAGs) leading the fight. Still, he believes the NUG can play a role post-conflict … provided they organize better. He says they need to identify a clear leader, raise a lot of money, and energize core supporters in the diaspora. But without a stronger presence, he believes the NUG risks being locked out of future negotiations unless mediators like Malaysia advocate for their inclusion.
A third major stakeholder group—Myanmar’s myriad EAOs—presents perhaps the thorniest challenge. The previous Indonesian ASEAN chair had concluded, after speaking to 146 ethnic stakeholders, that further dialog was unlikely to produce new progress. However, Wong proposes a shift in narrative about justice/identity to a situation where “it makes more economic sense [for them] being together as a country called Myanmar rather than being separate.” He floats the idea of a federal system where states retain significant control over education, language, and tax revenues while cooperating on infrastructure and defense. “Maybe there's a structure where they keep 60% of the revenue themselves and give 40% to a central government.”
Yet he recognizes the challenges of working with so many separate entities, and compares it to working at the United Nations where little is ultimately accomplished. He suggests that some states, like the well-resourced Chin or Kachin, could thrive autonomously, but that such fragmentation could invite further geopolitical meddling and undermine ASEAN’s economic bloc vision.
Wong is openly critical of ASEAN’s self-imposed limitations in addressing the crisis. The five-point consensus, he notes, has gone nowhere. “ASEAN is run by civil servants… Until we get political will from politicians, then you will see some real movement.” To remedy this, he proposes forming a small, politically empowered ASEAN parliamentary body—five MPs from each country—to ensure continuity and strategic follow-through on major crises like Myanmar.
Wong is also frustrated by ASEAN’s narrow focus on symbolism over substance: “We need an ASEAN image beyond the ASEAN handshake or singing the ASEAN song or a new logo every year.” He sees broader reform potential too, especially in areas like climate change, where collective economic strategies—such as carbon trading between Laos and Singapore—could strengthen regional cohesion.
Ultimately, Wong strikes a balance between hope and pragmatism. “It's super ambitious to get a miracle… but we have to try,” he says, describing a nine-month window before ASEAN’s chair rotates. The stakes are clear: with global conflicts shifting, Myanmar risks becoming a new focal point—or being forgotten altogether. In either case, ASEAN must act decisively.
Wong’s tone throughout is pragmatic, sometimes blunt, but always committed to regional cooperation. He doesn’t sugarcoat Malaysia’s limitations, ASEAN’s inertia, or the NUG’s organizational weaknesses. Yet his consistent throughline is a call to action: for regional players to step up, use their access and leverage, and try everything possible to halt the suffering. He concludes, “We cannot give up.”