Episode #325: Cracks in the System
“It's going to take days, if not weeks, to really get a full picture on how devastating this initial earthquake was, let alone these aftershocks that were expected,” says Michael Martin.
In the wake of a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake that struck central Myanmar, followed by a significant aftershock of 5.5, the country now faces a humanitarian catastrophe of massive proportions. The earthquake’s impact extended across borders, with tremors felt in Thailand and Vietnam, but Myanmar bore the brunt of the destruction, particularly along the central corridor from Yangon to Mandalay, including key areas such as Naypyidaw, Magway, and Bago. Michael Martin, a seasoned analyst and adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, joins the podcast to give a sobering assessment of the crisis and its far-reaching implications.
The disaster comes at a time when Myanmar is engulfed in conflict and political instability, which had already severely compromised the country’s infrastructure. The earthquake has only exacerbated the situation, rendering major highways and bridges completely unusable. As a result, Martin says that accurate, comprehensive data about the scope of the catastrophe remains scarce, but as expected, preliminary reports indicate widespread devastation. In Sagaing and other areas, as many as 80% of structures have collapsed. Fortunately, it appears that some regions such as Chin State and the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh have been spared significant damage due to their geographical insulation by surrounding mountains.
The conflict has also splintered the country into zones of control held by various groups: the military junta (SAC), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). This fragmentation makes coordinated disaster relief extremely difficult. Some areas are fully inaccessible to the regime, while others are under firm EAO control. In this environment, aid delivery becomes a logistical and political puzzle, with no single authority capable of orchestrating a national response.
Martin explains how aid delivery is further complicated by the fact that international humanitarian organizations—in particular, the International Red Cross—have traditionally insisted on engaging only with what they determine to be recognized governments. In Myanmar, they have defined this as working strictly with the SAC, which many Burmese rightly perceive as implicitly endorsing the junta. What is worse, the Myanmar Red Cross is known to be close to the SAC and senior military leaders. These political affiliations of so-called humanitarian organizations unfortunately undermine the sense of neutrality regarding any aid delivered through traditional channels.
And Martin emphasizes that there is good reason to view partnering with SAC as extremely problematic. Historically, the military has shown little interest or ability in functioning as a relief agency; instead, they focus on security and logistical control, which enables them to more easily either siphon off aid in blatant corruption, divert it to supply its troops, or withhold it from areas perceived as hostile, weaponizing it as a tool of control and punishment. In other words, Martin believes that the SAC views incoming aid not as humanitarian relief for the benefit of the citizenry (much of whom it has been attacking for the last four years), but rather as a way to benefit itself. Any aid that does not serve this purpose or that they cannot control may be blocked, delayed, or redirected, particularly if it’s destined for regions under opposition control.
In contrast, regarding the EAOs, Martin notes that while many lack formal diplomatic channels or established relations with international agencies, they have shown a consistent ability to manage relief in their territories through affiliate civil society groups. Some NGOs have successfully worked with these local entities for decades, especially along the Thai-Myanmar border. But again, a persistent challenge remains: the bureaucratic instincts of many international aid bodies lean toward “government-to-government” interactions, which causes them to lead towards the junta. While field staff on the ground may prefer engaging flexible, local networks for their effectiveness, headquarters may hesitate to bypass what they insist on as “official” channels—even when those channels are non-functional or even worse, complicit in obstructing aid.
The National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel administration formed in opposition to the SAC, has stepped forward to propose itself as a coordination hub for aid distribution. However, while the NUG has garnered some international sympathy and diaspora support, it lacks widespread recognition from the EAOs and controls minimal physical territory. Even if granted international support, the NUG would still need to negotiate with local actors—many of whom remain wary or outright dismissive of its legitimacy. Martin suggests that while involving the NUG might provide a symbolic gesture toward alternative governance, it would not necessarily improve the delivery of aid on the ground unless it could build trust with key stakeholders.
In Martin’s opinion, due to Myanmar’s complex, political landscape, successful aid delivery should be coordinated in collaboration with the hundreds of small, locally embedded organizations, each with its own degree of affiliation and trustworthiness. This decentralized approach may be the only way to deliver meaningful relief across Myanmar’s fractured terrain. Many of these groups have been operating since the onset of the conflict, and have filled the vacuum left by state institutions, especially in regions where the SAC cannot or will not operate. But it will not be easy. Their ability to communicate needs to international donors is limited by poor connectivity and the absence of reliable intermediaries. And sadly, the fact remains that given Myanmar's fractured political landscape, partnering with any group, even non-political, civil society organizations, still risks being seen as taking sides, as any group may be associated—rightly or wrongly—with one side or the other based on location, partnerships, or operational history.
Martin next turns his attention to the state of the international response. In the short term, he expects a flurry of assistance, especially from regional neighbors and diaspora networks. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the quake. China and India quickly pledged funds and logistical support. The United Kingdom did as well. But he notes that unfortunately, the United States is not stepping up now like it has historically done during such disasters. It has only pledged a modest $2 million in embassy funds, and its broader involvement is now hampered by the degradation of USAID’s operational capacity. According to reports, USAID’s entire workforce has been reduced to just 15 employees, woefully insufficient for its ability to respond to large-scale, humanitarian crises. Though senior U.S. officials have voiced commitments to supporting Myanmar, Martin doubts Washington can or will play a significant leadership role in this crisis.
Another complicating factor according to Martin is the “donor fatigue” that has historically accompanied protracted emergencies. The United Nations, for instance, recently appealed for $1 billion just for the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh—a crisis now entering its seventh year! If resources become scarce, Myanmar’s immediate and overwhelming humanitarian needs may be forced to compete for limited dollars in a world beset by overlapping, global emergencies.
In explaining the intricacies of international aid, Martin notes that traditionally, it is of two kinds: for short-term emergency relief, and longer-term, large scale development needs. That means that support for the intermediate stage of recovery and reconstruction in communities affected by natural disasters has often been neglected. For example, even when tents, water, and food arrive promptly, the effort to rebuild housing, infrastructure, and essential services in local communities is underfunded and uncoordinated. This resource gap is particularly acute in Myanmar, because the impending rainy season will soon render many regions inaccessible; entire swathes of land will be submerged, disease-bearing mosquito infestations will soar, and venomous snakes will be more commonly encountered. Without swift efforts to provide stable housing and sanitation, preventable diseases and deaths could surge.
Martin also addresses the challenge of food supply during the near and intermediate future because of all the collapsed buildings in the earthquake zone: even if food aid can be sent, there is now a lack of storage facilities. With the imminent monsoon rains, any food aid could quickly be rendered unusable. He believes that the logistical capabilities of the Myanmar state are woefully inadequate and will likely fall far short of what's needed.
Another issue that concerns Martin is the attention span of the international media. As it begins to look for new stories and other global emergencies emerge, it may abandon Myanmar again, as happened after Cyclone Nargis and the initial Rohingya exodus.
But he ends on a cautiously hopeful note: the Burmese people’s resilience. Despite repeated setbacks, cycles of repression and natural disasters, communities across Myanmar continue to organize, resist, and survive. This earthquake, however devastating, may be just another chapter in a long history of endurance. Even if the international community falls short, he is confident that the Burmese nation will still find ways to persevere. That said, the world’s support—especially during this critical window—can help not only to reduce suffering in the short term, but also to plant the seeds for a more just and democratic Myanmar in the future.
“I was talking to one close friend, and we commented on the fact that this is the first time, really in the history of the people, going back over a century, that they've had an opportunity to select the government of their choice. Up till now, either the British or the Burmese military have been dictating, ‘Okay, this is how you're going to be governed.’ And now you're seeing people all over the country, in different communities or whatnot, not only taking up arms to get rid of the military, but also gathering and saying, ‘Okay, now that we got them out of here, how do we want to be governed in our town, in our township, in our ethnic state, in our region, however It may be.’ I suspect that if the international community doesn't fully pull the weight that it probably should, that the people in the country will find a way of getting by, because that's what they've done for decades. They get by in their terrible circumstances.”