Episode #268: The Art of War
“It became even clearer that these people were uncompromising, not interested at all in changing their behavior! They wanted the legitimacy that came with international recognition and better relations for Myanmar, but they weren't willing to change their behavior. And that became very clear, with the Rohingya crisis making it crystal clear! Plus the fact of the coup itself, and the brutality of the military in the aftermath of the coup. For me, there's no dealing with these people. They're beyond the pale.”
The former US ambassador to Myanmar, Scot Marciel, does not mince words as he discusses the role that diplomacy can— and cannot— play in international crises, in particular the Myanmar conflict. In his first appearance on this platform, he discussed his book, Imperfect Partners, and provided an overview of the consequential years he spent in Yangon, Here, he speaks about the challenges that diplomats face when confronted with situations for which there are no easy, textbook answers, a category that the current crisis in Myanmar certainly falls into.
“Since the coup in 2021, you have seen multiple times, the occurrence of this tendency of international states, men and women, to think that the best way to resolve this is through some kind of dialogue, and leading to compromise,” he says. “That's a failure on the part of lot of diplomats and statesmen and -women to understand the real situation.” This is not to say that Marciel is opposed to dialogue—far from it, in fact, as he is quite keen to point out how often the US pushed for peaceful resolutions and dialogue between parties in the past in Myanmar. But for Marciel, diplomacy is “just one tool out of many,” and should not be used if all the parties involved are not trustworthy and open to compromise.
And quite frankly, being a good-faith and trustworthy partner are not traits that the junta has a good track record of having demonstrated. Marciel points out that the military leadership has historically been uninterested in compromise, and even when they do sign agreements, they are then unwilling to be bound by the very terms they signed onto. “The coup reminded everybody that as long as the military is unaccountable to civilian control, they can step in whenever they want,” he says. “So there was no deal to be had, and you see this regularly now: ‘Well, I'll go in and talk to the generals, and we can have a political dialogue and agree to a compromise.’ Well, what will a compromise be?! Presumably, a compromise would allow the military to continue to hold a fair amount of political power, and the resistance would get maybe some prisoners released or some promise of badly-run elections in the future or what have you. So there's not a viable compromise to be had at this point! And that's why it's so frustrating to see people trying to push for something when the conditions just aren't there.”
Sadly, this has not stopped many voices within ASEAN and the broader international community from making the same, standard appeals for negotiations and de-escalation, which Marciel attributes to a combination of good intentions with a poor understanding of the real nature of the Myanmar crisis. “I think it's a fundamental misreading of the situation inside Myanmar, that some of the people who have been involved in this, really, with all due respect, just don't know very much about Myanmar!” he exclaims, and goes on to describe the stereotypical thinking about this kind of situation. “From their perspective, it's a political disagreement, and it's really hard for one side to get 100% of what it wants. So the smart thing to do, or the appropriate thing to do, [they think] is bring people together to hammer out a compromise and solve the problem.” The result of this approach is futile attempts at urging compromise, when one side is not a good faith partner and the other side knows it.
“There is the tendency for people and governments to want to show that they're doing something, and the Five Point Consensus is a perfect example that,” he says. “The intentions behind it, by some of the ASEAN leaders, were pretty good. But … the notion that the junta would stop using political violence, and that there could be some kind of a political dialogue to resolve this, was wildly optimistic and unrealistic.” Marciel feels that ASEAN remains divided on how to address the situation. Consequently, despite recognizing that the Five Point Consensus would be ineffective at its inception, many ASEAN governments nonetheless continue to endorse it. “This gives them the ability to show that they are supporting something, perhaps because they don't have better ideas, or they just aren't willing to put the time and effort into it.”
Marciel believes that ASEAN and Myanmar’s neighbors do not really know what to do at this point since typical diplomatic approaches have failed, but they still want to at least look like they’re trying. This echoes the words of Timothy McLaughlin, who on a recent podcast said that the situation is disappointing and wholly undesirable for parties on all sides. “There is also a tendency to say, ‘Well, it’s bad, but the military is going to win. They've got all the guns, and so there's not much point in supporting this resistance.’” Marciel notes that in spite of the fact that many now recognize that the situation on the ground has changed—the resistance’s gains are now undeniable—the notion that the military is invincible continues to be used as a justification for a lack of bold new approach. And Marciel adds a couple of other knee-jerk assumptions held by many international actors that influence their thinking about whether or not to support the resistance: that the resistance is incapable of long-term, stable governance, and that if they win, the country may fracture and fall prey to so-called “Balkanization.”
Marciel describes another factor that inhibits the motivation to engage with Myanmar. “At least in the West, you don't have a lot of public pressure to move to act, because it's not in the media very much. In the United States for example, you don't have the media, human rights groups, or members of Congress really demanding action. And so in that environment, when you've got other major crises in the world that are on the news every single day, it's unfortunately natural that senior people and governments will focus on those other crises.”
And yet, optimistically, Marciel does not believe it would be difficult to take meaningful action regarding Myanmar, if only the political will were there. He acknowledges that a full-scale military intervention, especially so close to China and following two unpopular and prolonged US deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, would never be seriously considered. However, smaller investments in financial assistance and similar measures would not be a hard sell. “Most Americans honestly don't even know where Myanmar is, so I don't think that would be particularly controversial,” he adds.
The larger issue in Marciel’s mind, at least in the Washington sphere, is more personal. The democratic struggles of the Myanmar people have been in the eye of the West since at least the 1988 Uprising. Following this, many diplomats fought hard to see democracy come to Myanmar which, to some limited extent at least, was beginning to take shape during the transition period. However, the subsequent Rohingya crisis in 2016-17 was a huge blow to the image of a democratic Myanmar, and to the NLD in particular. “There was a feeling from a lot of people in Washington that they got burned for supporting [the NLD],” Marciel explains.
Indeed, the Rohingya crisis (officially termed a genocide, as noted in a recent podcast conversation with Andrea Gittleman) has left an even deeper imprint on the diplomatic world than is widely known, according to Marciel, who was personally involved in the US’s response to the crisis: there was a general loss of faith in both sides—military and civilian government alike—which Marciel believes might well be the genesis of the current lack of enthusiasm in Washington for the Spring Revolution. He explains that diplomatic efforts focused on aid and systemic change within Myanmar, and “ending the institutionalized discrimination against the Rohingya, and making some progress toward implementing those Kofi Annan Commission recommendations. That involved talking to different people in the elected government, in the military, and in the media within Rakhine state itself, other people who might have influence to encourage change.” This of course included negotiations with the military. “They were obviously a big part of the problem,” Marciel acknowledges. “But if they weren't going to move, it was going to be hard to make much progress. So it was essential to talk to them.” With the benefit of hindsight, Marciel acknowledges that those attempts did not yield any real positive results. He concludes, “It was a disaster on multiple levels, for the Rohingya first and foremost, but for the country as a whole, because it led to a significant loss of support.”
However, this does not mean that the US views the current crisis in the same light as the Rohingya genocide, where both the military and civilian government shoulder the blame. “Now you have a situation where the military has suddenly grabbed control and engaged in brutality against those who disagree with it, and in effect, there is a national uprising or even revolution against it. It's just a completely different situation.” Marciel points specifically both to the Rohingya crisis and the military’s violent repressions in Kachin state as watershed moments that undermined any real hopes on the part of Western diplomats that the military would ever be willing to make any concessions or genuinely respect human rights.
Given the grim realities that confront the Burmese people, Marciel suggests that even lethal aid should not be entirely off the table for any international entities that do support the resistance. While concerns naturally arise about an influx of US weapons potentially inflaming China’s anxieties, and the serious moral and logistical issues of tracking weapons to ensure they are used as intended, he wonders if the US might be open, at least in principle, to sending some sort of lethal aid to hasten the end of this prolonged conflict. He thinks it is more likely, however, that the US could consider sending non-lethal military materiel such as radios. Nevertheless, Marciel explains that in the Myanmar context, a strong case can be made that weaponry is needed not only to prosecute the war but, more directly and morally defensibly, to protect highly vulnerable civilians from the junta’s repeated aerial attacks.
When inevitable comparisons are made to Ukraine, Marciel points out that shipping weapons to Ukraine and formally handing them over to a duly-elected government is fundamentally easier than smuggling munitions to Myanmar would be, given that its borders and ports are largely militarily controlled, and most of its neighbors leaning pro-junta. And this leads to the complex, underlying issue of “legitimacy”.
Marciel explains how the concept is broadly understood in international relations. Most states and supranational organizations adhere to the principle of recognizing states rather than governments. However, the default position is often to consider the government in power, whether good or bad, as representing that state. Officially recognizing a group or entity as a legitimate player without necessarily recognizing it as the official representative of the entire nation—what Marcel calls a “self-declared state”—is inherently challenging, but what may be required given the multifaceted political landscape in the country. In other words, a group may be acknowledged for its role or legitimacy in a certain sphere, but that does not necessarily equate to it being recognized as the official government of that nation. This nuanced perspective can help navigate complex diplomatic situations where full recognition would imply unintended political stances or legitimacy. This difficulty is compounded when choosing between a nominal government in power and an internal movement in conflict with it. This complicated situation is what diplomats face in Myanmar. (A parallel example to consider would be the Kurdish forces in Syria. These groups have been recognized for their role in fighting ISIS and maintaining stability in certain regions, but they haven't been recognized as the official government of Syria. This approach allows countries to support and acknowledge their contributions without fully endorsing them as the official representatives of the state. This method can navigate diplomatic challenges, avoiding the unintended political consequences that might come with full recognition. We invite guests to listen to a previous episode with Azad, an American sniper who is now fighting with the Chin, and had spent 4 years previous in the Rojava Revolution.)
That said, Marciel does not see international conferment of legitimacy as essential; however, he does recognize its advantages. “[Legitimacy] would help,” he affirms. “There's a symbolic value to being recognized as the legitimate government. It's very hard when you don't hold the seat of power to be recognized as legitimate government, [but that] doesn't mean people don't think you're a very legitimate player.” Marciel notes that most governments have also not recognized the SAC (State Administration Council), because it lacks legitimacy due to its seizure of power and lack of popular support, despite physically controlling Naypyitaw.
An important perk of being recognized as a legitimate government is the ability to engage in formal, official diplomacy. As Marciel explains from his own experience as a diplomat, he was required to present his credentials to the head of state of the host nation. The effectiveness of official diplomacy exchange is predicated on the tacit acknowledgement that both the ambassador and the head of state represent the authority of their respective nations. “This is why there's been a lot of controversy around the decision of various UN agencies and leaders going to present their credentials to the SAC,” he says. “Because to a certain extent, you're basically saying, ‘We recognize you as the legitimate representatives of the State.’ Now, they might argue, ‘Well, look, we're just being practical, we've got to get our work done, and that's the price you pay.’ I wasn't privy to these conversations, and I don't know the reasoning. But it's perhaps not a coincidence that the US has chosen not to send a new ambassador to Myanmar, because to be able to play the role of ambassador, even to be able to get a visa, would have to present credentials, presumably to the SAC.”
Furthermore, Marciel points out that whatever the justification of a home country, sending an official ambassador to the SAC would doubtless be used for great propaganda value by the military. “In effect, the SAC would try to argue that whether they're presenting credentials or otherwise meeting with us, it shows… legitimacy. That may not be the intention at all of the person who's meeting them, but it will be used that way.” And this fear of tacitly legitimizing a military dictatorship has left Myanmar in something of an international political limbo, as it continues to be recognized as a State—just with no universally recognized government. In other words, Myanmar exists, but is in many ways silenced from the world stage, and cut off from many forms of diplomatic, financial, and material support which “legitimate” governments would be able to call upon in times of crisis. Because the country is in a sort of diplomatic limbo, Marciel believes that widespread recognition of the National Unity Government will not happen anytime soon, which he fears will hamper their ability to unify various resistance groups, secure resources, and gain broader support from the international community.
So what can be done to support those seeking a better future in Myanmar? First and foremost, Marciel is firm in his belief that “80-90% of what happens is going to be determined by Myanmar people.” This dovetails with his informed perspective that real political change cannot be not foisted on countries by foreign actors. Still, he believes that international observers have an important role to play, as they must stop calling for compromises with the military, and international entities should withhold international support, money, and legitimacy from the junta. In addition, Marciel believes that the international community must overcome its diplomatic inertia, with countries of different regional and geopolitical interests coordinating together to funnel billions of dollars to Myanmar, while at the same time keeping their fingers out of the pie.
And all this is in addition to the herculean task of helping sustain a vulnerable and traumatized population as the country slowly rebuilds after years of war. He acknowledges that this is far from easy; it almost seems impossible. However, he maintains a cautious optimism, suggesting that where there’s a will, there’s a way. While the challenges are immense, he believes that with concerted effort and genuine commitment, it can and will happen.
Marciel emphasizes aid and capacity-building as essential for Myanmar’s future stability and well-being, but letting the Myanmar people take the lead in rebuilding their country.
“I do think the solution is for the military to be forced to relinquish political power, and to me, that means for the international community to put maximum pressure on that military, [doing] nothing to confer legitimacy on it,” Marciel says in closing. “At the same time, of course, you also have to figure out what comes next… but to me, the answer is, rather than to be paralyzed by the risks, what can the international community to do now to help the various various elements of the resistance, the Civil Disobedience Movement, civil society, other political actors, and prepare for some kind of transition process?”