Episode #181: Scot Marciel
“Frankly, there's been relatively little written… on Southeast Asia as a whole, certainly on US relations with Southeast Asia, so I wanted to make a book that I thought would be useful for people early in their careers working in Southeast Asia,” says Scot Marciel of his recently published book, Imperfect Partners. “Writing just about pure policy can be very dry, [but] if you humanize it or make it seem a little bit more real by including anecdotes… that tells a little bit more of the story that you can't get out of this dry policy stuff.”
Marciel was the US Ambassador to Myanmar during the pivotal years of 2016 to 2020, until just before the coup. This was the period that welcomed the democratic transition process, but also witnessed the Rohingya genocide and its fallout. While today’s conversation focuses only on his time in Myanmar, Imperfect Partners covers Marciel’s 37 year career as a diplomat, with chapters devoted to the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand, along with commentaries on ASEAN and China. Today, Marciel is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center and Senior Advisor at BowerGroupAsia.
Marciel already had extensive experience with Myanmar before he became Ambassador. He first visited there in 2005, and he still vividly recalls his impression of the city: “Yangon at the time seemed—I hate to use the term sleepy, but it just seemed like it hadn't moved for a long time.” During the 2007 Saffron Revolution, Marciel was serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the East Asia Bureau at the State Department. The military’s violent crackdown prompted the Bush administration and Congress to find ways to pressure the military junta to bring about change. The White House convened regular meetings, led by the deputy national security adviser, to strategize ways to sanction Myanmar and seek support from allies in the region. “I spent a huge amount of my time… traveling around the region, trying to drum up support for more pressure on the generals,” he recalls.
Around this time, Marciel describes how most of the aid coming from the US was delivered cross-border from Thailand, which was limited in its geographic scope and reach. However, after Cyclone Nargis caused enormous devastation in 2008—exacerbated by the military’s ineffective response—there were signs of an emerging civil society. Although some in Washington were advocating ending aid several months after the cyclone, Marciel strongly argued for continuing aid. “It doesn't matter whether they're overtly political or not, but helping to support this nascent civil society was probably one of the best things we could do,” he recalls thinking, adding that then this planted seeds for the approaching transition period. “Once there was an opening, you had some organizations that were already in place and experienced that could build on it.”
The question over providing aid or imposing sanctions reflects the wider challenges and limitations of Washington's approach when dealing with problematic regimes, such Myanmar’s military junta. Typically, there is a push to pressure, squeeze, and impose sanctions, but Marciel explains that while this may provide moral satisfaction, it isn't always very effective. “In the late 2000s, our policy was driven by anger, an anger that I shared, that the military was just hurting people, and killing people! Maybe it's an American thing, or maybe it's a universal thing, but you just feel this is so wrong, and you want so much for things to get better… The trouble is sometimes it gets in the way of thinking analytically about what actually might be helpful. So the anger and frustration just says, ‘Now let's keep punishing with sanctions,’ and after a while when you realize that's not working, it becomes harder to offer a different approach or to convince other people to take a different approach.”
When Marciel was appointed US Ambassador in 2016, Myanmar was in the midst of a dramatic transformation. The country was experiencing a transition towards openness, with increased access to information, of freedom of travel and formation of political parties, expansion of media outlets, and the growth of a civil society, as well as substantial economic reforms. “I was walking into a country that was in the middle of what was significant change,” Marciel states. Moreover, the National League for Democracy was just about to be voted into power for the first time in history. This was the moment when expectations and euphoria were at their peak…
However, according to Marciel, this picture is incomplete. “This is a country [where] the military has been digging the country into a very deep hole for 50 years,” he says. “It's just begun to climb out of that hole. So you can look down and say, ‘Wow, look how far we've climbed.’ Or you can look up and say, ‘Oh my God, look how much more we have to do!’ And that's exactly where Myanmar was.” Marciel was particularly concerned about military's continued influence, ongoing human rights violations, as well as the lingering effect of the problematic 2008 Constitution, the general lack of strong institutions, and a weak rule of law. Yet despite these obstacles, he also observed that many people remained hopeful about the prospect of things getting better and moving in the right direction.
Marciel also admits that he had much to learn about the country’s complexity. He notes how the international community often perceives the situation in reductionist terms, such as “the pro-democracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi against the military regime.” However, he says, “It wasn't as simple as the military mindset versus the pro-democracy mindset.” For example, he became more appreciative of the significant struggles faced by ethnic minority communities and their ongoing efforts to address grievances. He also experienced how many people, especially the Bamar, reacted quite negatively even to the mere mention of the word “Rohingya,” insisting that the correct term was “Bengali,” which carried the stigma of an outsider who had illegally crossed the border. This developed into a deeper understanding of not only the country’s complex diversity, but also how ethnicity had historically been used as a means of dividing the Burmese people.
During the dark days of military dictatorship, the US had such limited relations with the regime that very little was known about its individual leaders, and so the transition period also presented American diplomats with the opportunity to become acquainted with the country’s leading personalities. Marciel met with many of them, including: Shwe Mann, the speaker of the lower house of parliament, who he remembers as “thoughtful” and “quite a different type of thinker” who asked a lot of questions; Navy Vice Admiral Soe Thein, who “very much seemed to be one of the people who was most open to engaging and promoting reforms”; Aung San Suu Kyi, who was “a fascinating figure and obviously very intelligent, very charismatic,” and had a “tendency to be a little bit firm or tough,” though tempered by a sense of humor; and finally, future dictator Min Aung Hlaing, who seemed to be “superficially smooth and reasonably polished,” but untrustworthy, and who had “pretty strong racist views that most clearly manifested itself vis-à-vis the Rohingya.”
When Marciel first took up his post, the issue of sanctions was a major topic. He explains that the US felt that the gradual easing of sanctions they had been effecting since 2011 had not had their desired impact, which was to reinvigorate the Burmese economy. As the country’s economic development was seen as a crucial support for political reforms they hoped would follow, discussions arose about the possibility of lifting sanctions entirely to facilitate accelerated economic growth. Marciel fully supported this view, arguing that when a country undergoes significant, positive change after a prolonged period of stagnation, waiting for a complete transformation before acting is not practical. Additionally, the prior sanctions that had been in place had never managed to prevent the junta from engaging in widespread human rights abuses anyway, largely against ethnic populations. “You can't wait until it's Norway or Switzerland to act, you've got to come in and try to do what you can to support and encourage more change! And so I think it was the right move, because again, if you want to have influence at all, you got to be there.”
With this in mind, the US eventually decided to remove all sanctions, a decision that Marciel acknowledges had many detractors. “We all knew there was a lot of work to do, and a lot more that had to happen,” he notes. “But the argument, and I believe it to this day, was that the NLD needs to succeed, and… part of succeeding means delivering economically. If we've got sanctions in place that are inhibiting that, then we should lift those sanctions to give them the best chance. And that was the basis for the decision.”
Another urgent issue facing Marciel and the American mission was the serious turn that the Rohingya crisis had taken. In October 2016, ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) attacked several police outposts, and the military hit back hard, with disproportionate force, mainly targeting Rohingya civilians. Along with other diplomats, Marciel traveled to the region, where he visited several burned-down villages. While talking to a survivor, the military intervened and actually tried to arrest the man for alleged involvement in the attacks! Marciel objected, stating that arbitrarily arresting people who spoke to diplomats would hinder access and create an impression of withholding information. This incident highlighted the significant gap in understanding and perspectives between the Myanmar government and the diplomatic community. “I was just shocked,” Marciel admits. “And I said, ‘Minister, if you arrest this guy, that's the end of the trip! We're not going to continue on with this.’”
In all of Marciel’s years as a diplomat, he hadn’t faced anything even remotely close to how devastating the Rohingya crisis turned out. “It was certainly, by far, the most difficult period of my career,” he notes, adding that people at the Embassy were barely sleeping during that time. “Very few people in the society shared our views or offered any support for the Rohingya community. It was very difficult to fathom and to deal with.” Additionally, some outside observers began to blame foreign diplomats for being complicit in what was later determined to be a genocide, a charge Marciel responds to strongly: “I just think that's nonsense! It's one thing to say the international community made some mistakes. Fair enough. Again, we should be open to criticism. But it was Myanmar that carried out this horrific operation against the Rohingya, led by the military. Of course, that wasn't the international community! So I think people get a little carried away on that front, and I feel strongly about that.”
As the crisis worsened, it became critical for the Embassy to gain a better understanding of what was really happening on the ground, yet that was no easy task. They found themselves under intense pressure from both sides, with the military (and much of the Bamar population) trying to convince them that the alleged atrocities had been exaggerated, and human rights groups urging them to immediately corroborate their findings of mass killings and forced migrations. “Thant Myint U wrote at some point that you can't fix Rakhine if you don't fix Myanmar,” he recalls. “I took that to heart, and so that's what we tried to do. But it was a struggle. It was a lot of anguish, and not everybody agreed, and there weren't any great options.”
When he left in 2020, Marciel felt that the challenges the country was facing could be categorized into three basic areas: the military's power, the grievances of ethnic minority communities, and the need for a generational change in thinking. Only months later, all three were borne out: the military reversed the prior years of democratic progress and launched its brutal coup; there has been a significant generational change in the resistance, indicating that many people who experienced greater liberty, democracy, and economic opportunities in the 2010s are now taking active part in pushing back against oppression; and ethnic minority populations are asserting their rights and fighting back. “It's horrific to see the coup, the violence, the day-to-day suffering of so many people who were displaced or lost their jobs and are victims of violence. It makes me feel even more strongly! I both admire the courage and resilience of people in Myanmar and hope and wish that somehow they can find a way to move forward.”
As a diplomat, Marciel certainly believes in engagement, but he finds that the current situation in Myanmar is different. Because the military junta is waging brutal war against its own population and seems impervious to reason, he believes any form of engagement would be unproductive. He believes that the military should be the ones to show a genuine desire for dialogue if there is any possibility for it in the future; until then, there is no reason to talk to the junta directly, as it would only legitimize them. Instead, he suggests putting more pressure on the regime to try and weaken it, to enable key players in the military to seek an exit strategy.
As for the responsibility of the international community, Marciel calls for greater assistance, in the form of financing, training, and support for local governance and public services for the ethnic groups and resistance elements opposing the military junta. Regarding perhaps the most controversial topic, the acquisition of lethal weapons by resistance groups, Marciel is cautious and highlights several factors to consider. Firstly, logistical challenges may arise in delivering weapons to some resistance groups because of their geographical proximity to neighboring countries. There is also a risk that overt US support through weapons delivery could enhance the perception of the conflict as a US-China confrontation, leading China to increase its support to the junta.
“First and foremost, I think 80 to 90% of whatever happens is going to be decided within the country by people of Myanmar, and that's just a reality,” he says in closing, adding that there are also ways the international community can help. “More thinking about what can be done, longer term planning about economic rebuilding, and so on. Support for local governance, more support for people who are displaced… more money and creative approaches to help provide education to people in Myanmar or people who had to flee Myanmar. Otherwise, you have a whole generation that's lost.”