Episode #244: Spirals and Snowballs
“From a from a military perspective, Operation 1027 was a resounding success for the Northern Alliance. It was consequently a resounding defeat for the junta.” So says
Matthew Arnold, who joins the podcast for a second appearance. In his first conversation, he shared his firm belief that the Spring Revolution was destined for victory; in today’s discussion, he gives an updates on the progress that he has seen since then, and touches on the obstacles that he believes still remain. Arnold holds a PhD from the London School of Economics, and is an aid worker experienced in strategic studies and conflict analysis. He has worked with the World Food Programme and the Asia Foundation in fragile states, most notably in Myanmar.
Characterizing 1027 as the Myanmar military’s “biggest defeat” in its history, he points to the massive troop surrenders and loss of territory. Some observers have expressed concern that the ceasefire signaled that resistance forces might be coming to an agreement with the military. However, Arnold feels it was more a face-saving measure for the junta, influenced by external pressures, most notably from China, and highlights the tactical rather than strategic nature of the agreement. Emphasizing the recent and ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the junta, and the continued resistance in northern Shan and other regions, he underscores the unrealistic expectations of continuous combat by opposition forces and the importance of strategic pauses for regrouping and planning.
Here, Arnold differentiates between "truce" and "ceasefire.” While a truce has a more generally tangible, clearer feel to it, a ceasefire is more variable; it can be anything from a temporary halt in fighting to something that leads to a long-term political agreement. He notes the junta’s historical propensity for “tactical ceasefires,” which they have used transactionally to stabilize military situations. Emphasizing that the military has rarely won outright against armed opponents, it has therefore relied on selected ceasefires to stabilize situations to its temporary advantage. In some cases, past ceasefires were arranged simply in order to avoid an impending political negotiation. As for the ceasefire that was negotiated following Operation 1027, he sees this as “tactical,” as its goal was only to pause immediate hostilities in northern Shan. (Arnold adds that the EAOs agreed to the ceasefire in order to consolidate their territorial gains and give some temporary respite to their troops.) In contrast, he describes the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) as “strategic”; although not successful, it was ultimately aimed at facilitating extended political negotiations to shape Myanmar's future. This also highlights a historical pattern of the junta in agreeing to selected ceasefires with armed groups, while promising political negotiations that seldom materialize into anything meaningful. And while the military is signing ceasefires in one part of the country, they are known to mercilessly attack another region simultaneously. “We have to be very clear that completely integrated into not just the culture, but the doctrine of this military is systematic violence against civilians. This is arguably the biggest tool that the junta uses!”
Despite the 1027 ceasefire, Arnold notes that the overall trajectory of the conflict still remains one of substantial resistance and territorial gains by the opposition throughout the country. “If the junta doesn't actively defend an area, it will lose it,” he says. “We've also passed a threshold where when the junta does lose something, [that] it [can’t] get it back.” He explains that the regime has been so hollowed out and depleted since the coup, that even before 1027 they were stretched thin everywhere. He also notes the serious issue of the military’s supply lines, and asks rhetorically: “How does the junta resupply so many different units spread out and so many different places that are faced with daily attacks and the outright possibility that those locations might be overrun?”
Arnold sees an increasingly diminishing window of possibility for the army to remain in power. “Overall, this is a military that that has ever-worsening options,” he says. As far as the claims that the conflict has become a prolonged stalemate, or that the junta has more cards up its sleeve, Arnold insists that the military’s fighting strength is decreasing, and he expresses anger that the international community has done so little to help put the building blocks of a post-coup Myanmar in place. “This thing isn't going to slow down or assume a steady pace, because that's not how military defeat works,” Arnold adds, referencing his background in strategic studies. “It starts to spiral and then snowball… This is a military that is collapsing.” Similarly, Arnold does not believe that the military can simply accept a loss in one place and regroup in a weakened state elsewhere, because the entire country is in upheaval! He likens the military’s loss of key territory to a person losing an appendage, that is, something that is simply unrecoverable.
In his estimation, regional actors are already beginning to see this writing on the wall and act accordingly, particularly Beijing. “China, from a strategic perspective, has come to a realization that the junta is weakening, if not collapsing, and that from their perspective, there's also a desire to manage how, or attempt to put some parameters on how that starts, and how that unfolds,” Arnold says. He adds that Beijing likely had growing concerns that the escalating conflict would come to threaten key investments in the country, and so hopes to do whatever steps are necessary to keep the unrest from spreading.
But to make matters still worse for the generals, they can no longer defend the critical areas where their industrial centers are located, such the Magway region. “This is a national uprising. There's resistance across vast parts of the country,” he says, echoing Anthony Davis’ recent affirmation that this is a bona-fide revolution. In addition, Arnold points out that the regime does not have any real supporters, only transactional ones like the Border Force Guards (BFG) who would switch allegiances at the slightest sign that they’re betting on the wrong horse. “The junta has very few sincere allies,” he says simply. “Its value added as a partner is rapidly declining. Now, that's true not just for the Border Guard Forces, but also for neighboring countries.” And while some have worried that the pyusawhti, or pro-junta militias, might eventually be a game-changer, Arnold dismisses this out of hand, saying that they “never transpired into what they were intended, which was a popular militia force that was able to spread out and prevent the emergence of resistance, or at least to keep it relatively tamped down.”
Arnold is well-aware that some of his views do not agree with those of other analysts, whose work he openly calls into question. “At some point, you have to question these analysts because they've been wrong about so much from the beginning! I mean, simple things like,’ Would there be a resistance? Would there be armed resistance by the Bamar? Would EAOs work with other EAOs? Would EAOs work with Bamar armed groups?’ Time and time again, look at the big picture questions. And these same analysts have been wrong!” And in his estimation, bad analysis leads to bad policy decisions, namely the continued advocacy for an accommodation with the military. Arnold sees this as both grossly misguided and ethically flawed.
Moreover, Arnold asserts that because 1027 burst the bubble in military superiority, it demonstrates that it can—and likely will—be defeated. “There's an onus on all of us to help support the creation of a new country that doesn't accommodate a genocidal military, and I don't think we have to agonize over that point,” he says. “There's always been the notion that the military can't be defeated, it's too powerful. Well, this is an utterly moronic statement: like any military, [it] can be defeated!” Arnold posits that the junta has been ensnared by its own deceptive narrative of invincibility, a byproduct of its relentless chase for economic gains through corrupt enterprises. This self-deception, rooted in the illusion of its unassailable power, has the regime effectively drinking its own Kool-Aid. He says, “We've had a military that has really struggled to deal with a reality that it wasn't prepared for, because it never thought that the majority [Bamar] would partner with Ethnic Armed Organizations and wider ethnic minority communities to push for the outright ouster of the military.”
Another trope often heard about Myanmar is that without a strongman, the region will dissolve into endless Balkanization and continued strife. “These make for nice sound bites and media interviews, but it doesn't sync with reality,” Arnold asserts. “It starts to present a false choice, like either you centralize everything, or else you fracture. This is a false choice! This doesn't sync with the Myanmar context.” Having extensively studied revolutions around the world, Arnold believes the most effective way forward after the fall of the military is for stakeholders to engage in political dialogue. And one thing to him is absolutely clear: “Having a genocidal military still involved in the country, and this horrible notion that only this genocidal military can keep the country together, we need to move on [from his idea].” Arnold contends that there's an often-overlooked complexity to historical revolutions, offering up the American struggle for independence as an example: The narrative frequently glorifies George Washington as a singular hero, overshadowing the collective efforts of numerous other key players. Furthermore, he highlights a commonly neglected fact, that the creation of the American Constitution didn’t occur until after the British had been vanquished, underscoring that revolutions are multifaceted, somewhat messy processes, and not single-event/linear narratives.
As far as the resistance movement goes, Arnold expresses optimism that in addition to the armed struggle, he sees a commitment to inclusive and largely non-violent activities, which involves civil servant boycotts, public tax boycotts, and extensive youth participation. Condemning the cynical view that disregards these efforts, along with the concrete steps already taken towards federal democracy, human rights, and intergroup collaboration within Myanmar, Arnold calls out what he sees as “shifting goalposts” and persistent skepticism that undermines the significance of the NUG’s achievements in these past few years. For instance, the NUG has drafted and promoted a Federal Democracy Charter, outlining a vision for a future federal system in Myanmar. Additionally, it has established a Ministry of Human Rights to document abuses and advocate for justice, demonstrating its commitment to protecting human rights. Arnold says that these efforts, alongside the collaboration between various ethnic armed organizations and Bamar groups, illustrate a clear and genuine movement towards a more inclusive and democratic Myanmar.
Regarding the ethnic forces, Arnold again calls out analysts for putting out distorted views that rely on warped information, as he feels that they routinely disregard both the formal statements as well as the actions of these militias. In addition, he is troubled by a narrative that these ethnic groups can’t ever be trusted to commit to a post-coup, federal democratic country because they don’t seek anything beyond total control of their own territories. “We still deserve to give them the benefit of the doubt about their political intentions and public statements,” he says of the armed ethnic forces. “They have been very clear that they do want a different country to emerge, and that they do want a different type of political arrangement, and that they're not outright secessionist. There are some tropes that are thrown out there, people latch onto them, because they can be summarized into a sentence.”
Arnold concludes with a powerful message to those in the resistance movement: “The Myanmar people should take heart! This has been your revolution, you have been the ones who have pushed it, you've succeeded more than any other country has when confronted with a deeply entrenched, genocidal military, and one that is willing to use mass violence against the population. All of this has been through the determination and dedication of the Myanmar people!”