ASEAN In The Balance
Coming Soon…
“What is really important… is the fact that [the Burmese people] are being seen, right?!” exclaims Lilianne Fan, a long-time Myanmar policy expert who serves as a member of the Malaysian Advisory Group on Myanmar and as an adviser to the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar. She frames ASEAN’s regional response to the post-2021 crisis as one that has often been misunderstood from the outside. Drawing on her decades of work experience, Fan explains that what appears to many Myanmar observers as paralysis or indifference has in fact involved significant internal shifts in how ASEAN understands legitimacy, inclusion, and its own institutional limits.
She anchors her analysis in ASEAN’s structure, noting how it operates through consensus. Its public statements reflect only what all member states can agree upon, not the views of its individual, constituent governments. Fan acknowledges that this policy frequently results in language that feels inadequate when measured against the scale of violence and civilian suffering in Myanmar. Yet within ASEAN’s political culture, even modest consensus can mark a substantial departure from precedent, and she insists that ASEAN’s response to Myanmar after the coup has represented just such a departure: it resolved to exclude the Myanmar military leadership from ASEAN meetings at the highest levels, a step the organization had never taken before. She characterizes this decision as both innovative and strategically consequential.
For example, Fan unpacks the Five-Point Consensus, which many observers felt was a weak, or even pro-military response by the organization in the wake of the 2021 coup. She explains that it was never designed as a peace agreement per se, or a comprehensive solution to Myanmar’s crisis, even if others wanted it to be. ASEAN recognized both its limited leverage over the junta and the need to navigate its own internal dynamics and competing interests among member states, and therefore could not impose punitive measures or enforce compliance. Instead, she says the Consensus functioned as a diplomatic framework that allowed ASEAN to maintain limited, conditional engagement with Myanmar’s military authorities at a moment of acute uncertainty, while simultaneously withholding political legitimacy. Agreed in April 2021, the Five-Point Consensus articulated five broad areas: an immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar; inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders; mediation by an ASEAN special envoy; the provision of humanitarian assistance; and the envoy’s visit to Myanmar to facilitate these efforts.
The implicit consequence of rejecting or ignoring this framework was not sanctions or suspension, but deeper political exclusion—namely the denial of ASEAN-level representation, voice, and institutional access—something ASEAN already moved to impose early on by excluding the junta from representing Myanmar at summits and high-level meetings. In the end, the junta neither reduced its violence nor engaged in dialogue, and its continued non-compliance reinforced ASEAN’s decision to maintain that exclusion and to narrow engagement to the Special Envoy and humanitarian coordination rather than normalize relations. In sum, while the Five-Point Consensus did not resolve the crisis and was widely seen as insufficient, it preserved ASEAN unity and prevented the military from claiming regional legitimacy by default, even as some individual member states continued bilateral dealings outside the ASEAN framework. In this sense, Fan views the Consensus as a success overall, given the limitations within which ASEAN was operating.
At the same time, however, she admits that ASEAN’s early, post-coup approach also had serious shortcomings. The organization initially defaulted to its habitual mode of engagement: government-to-government diplomacy, which reflected both its institutional reflex as well as uncertainty about how to respond to a crisis of this magnitude without violating its non-interference norms. But this approach was deeply frustrating in Myanmar’s case, not only for Myanmar stakeholders and ASEAN officials, but also for the ASEAN chairs themselves, who were responsible for implementing a consensus-based strategy that offered little leverage and exposed them to criticism from all sides. Executions and escalating violence shortly after high-level visits made clear that personal persuasion would not moderate the military’s conduct. Over time, even member states that were initially reluctant to broaden engagement concluded that exclusive focus on the junta was both ineffective and damaging to ASEAN’s credibility.
A shift began when Indonesia assumed the ASEAN chair in 2023, and attempted to operationalize the Five-Point Consensus’s call for inclusive dialogue. Fan describes this as an important breaking of the ice, as Indonesia sought to engage a wider range of Myanmar stakeholders beyond the military. Yet these early efforts were also limited by an initial misunderstanding of Myanmar’s internal dynamics. For example, resistance forces were asked to meet alongside groups that maintained ties to the junta without safeguards or taking the time to create the conditions for a safe and open discussion. The experience underscored the need for deeper conflict analysis and more careful structuring of engagement spaces.
When it was Malaysia’s turn to assume the ASEAN chair after Indonesia in 2024, their approach, Fan explains, was shaped directly by those past lessons. Knowing that it was their turn to be the chair in 2024, Malaysian officials invested in detailed preparation, including political mapping and sustained consultation with Myanmar stakeholders well before they actually assumed the position. The Malaysian Advisory Group on Myanmar, established shortly after the coup, provided confidential, bipartisan advice across changes in government. Malaysia more carefully planned out a blueprint for moving forward both within ASEAN and with Myanmar stakeholders, prioritizing methodology, documentation, and institutional memory.
Central to this approach were the Track One Stakeholder Engagement Meetings held in Malaysia. Resistance leaders, ethnic political actors, civilian representatives, women, youth, and minority groups were engaged as political interlocutors at a formal diplomatic level, even without conferral of recognition as a government. This treatment signaled respect and seriousness, allowing participants to articulate positions openly rather than perform for optics. The meetings were conducted under strict confidentiality and security because just participating alone exposed many stakeholders to significant personal and political risks, including retaliation by the junta.
Malaysia also confronted a fundamental question early on: were stakeholders prepared to sit with the military? Fan recounts that the answer from resistance actors was overwhelmingly negative. So rather than forcing premature dialogue, Malaysia accepted this refusal as a legitimate position. This choice, she argues, preserved trust and avoided reproducing past failures where dialogue was imposed without regard to legitimacy or safety.
Fan distinguishes between those Track One meetings and what is called Track 1.5 diplomacy. The former refers to official government-led engagement, while the latter creates a hybrid space where experts, think tanks, and civil society interact alongside officials. Malaysia deliberately expanded Track 1.5 processes to complement their formal engagement. The Malaysian Advisory Group convened multiple Track 1.5 roundtables addressing humanitarian access, the junta’s planned elections, and political transition. These discussions produced documented analyses that could be transmitted into ASEAN’s formal decision-making structures, strengthening institutional continuity beyond a single chairmanship.
Humanitarian access, Fan argues, marked one of ASEAN’s most consequential areas of progress. The devastating March 2025 earthquake created a narrow political window that Malaysia leveraged to elevate humanitarian urgency to highest tier of ASEAN’s decision-making leadership. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim engaged other ASEAN heads of government directly to build momentum around humanitarian pauses and ceasefires. The result was a formal acknowledgment that the organization’s existing mechanisms for delivering humanitarian aid, particularly the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre), were insufficient on their own. Under Malaysia’s leadership, ASEAN leaders came to recognize the need for alternative and parallel channels of assistance, including cross-border aid and support for local service providers in conflict-affected and resistance-controlled areas. For Fan, this shift was profound for ASEAN because it aligned official policy more closely with on-the-ground realities long understood by local actors.
Throughout this process, Malaysia also continued to engage the military, but Fan is clear about the limits of that engagement. The junta consistently rejected ASEAN’s definitions of violence and civilian protection, justified airstrikes and village destruction as counterterrorism, and insisted that its own political roadmap and peace forums were sufficient. Fan argues that ASEAN cannot force either side to change its position, but it can create space for positions to be articulated clearly and recorded accurately. By documenting both resistance demands and military responses, ASEAN clarified the depth of the divide and reduced the plausibility of claims that dialogue could be achieved without addressing legitimacy and violence.
All in all, Fan summarizes the crisis in Myanmar as placing ASEAN’s credibility under sustained strain, particularly because of the scale of violence perpetrated against civilians. She argues that this pressure has catalyzed a gradual evolution within ASEAN, increasing comfort with discussing conflict, peace, humanitarian protection, and human rights more openly. Initiatives such as the promotion of the right to peace reflect a growing recognition that regional stability cannot be separated from civilian protection and political legitimacy.
Looking ahead, Fan expresses cautious optimism about the Philippines’ becoming the next ASEAN chair. Malaysia has worked to ensure continuity of ASEAN policies and information sharing so the Philippines does not have to start from scratch. Fan highlights the Philippines’ own history of democratic transition and long peace negotiations as relevant experience. Familiarity with humanitarian crises, refugee protection, and civilian-centered policy positions the Philippines, in her view, to deepen ASEAN’s engagement in ways that are principled but realistic.
Fan closes by returning to the issue of recognition and agency. She reflects on the significance of resistance actors who once expressed anger toward ASEAN now choosing to engage in sustained, structured dialogue. For her, this shift does not signal naïveté or lowered expectations, but a belief that ASEAN can still provide space where Myanmar’s political actors are treated with dignity and seriousness, even within severe constraints. “The people of Myanmar are the people of ASEAN, and they should never forget that.”