At the Breaking Point
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“We are in Myanmar, and nothing is clear cut.”
Nearly five years on, the ongoing conflict continues to be complex, brutal, and ongoing, and Anthony Davis delivers a hard-edged analysis that cuts through illusions and sentiment. Davis has spent decades studying guerrilla conflict from Afghanistan to Southeast Asia, and in his earlier appearance on this podcast he described Myanmar’s struggle as nothing less than a revolution—a spontaneous national uprising without precedent in the region. Building on that framing, Davis now examines how the revolution and the war have evolved into an even more dangerous and unpredictable confrontation.
Davis begins his analysis with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a thirty-thousand-strong force running a state the size of Belgium. “It would be entirely wrong to see the Wa as simply Chinese puppets or Chinese proxies,” he insists, noting that the UWSA is heavily armed and commercially minded. Chinese pressure has forced them to scale back overt arms transfers to other ethnic armed groups, but Davis stresses they will not simply abandon their influence. Their most immediate goal, he argues, is recognition as a state on par with Kachin or Shan. Central to this would be linking their two territories—Special Region 2 on the Chinese border and Military Region 171 near Thailand. If the regime were to implode, Davis suggests, the Wa would act with extraordinary speed, moving “before breakfast” to unite them and “by lunchtime” to consolidate their state. He also highlights their rapid rearmament after 2009–2011, which established a level of deterrence they have maintained ever since.
Since the coup, the Wa have steadily expanded their influence west of the Salween, forging deep ties with the Ta’ang (TNLA), leveraging the Shan State Progress Party, and sidelining rivals like the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). Davis characterizes this not as reckless expansion but as a strategy of ascendancy—quiet dominance across Shan State. The presence of Wa troops disguised in TNLA uniforms in Mogok, deep inside Mandalay Region, illustrates the reach of their networks and the subtle shifts in Myanmar’s wars.
“The Wa have become a critical player in the overall struggle for Myanmar,” Davis concludes, emphasizing that their ambitions are as political as they are military: to preserve autonomy on their own terms while avoiding the regime’s familiar cycle of ceasefire, rearmament, and betrayal. He draws a parallel with the Arakan Army (AA), which is now following a similar path toward near-total autonomy in Rakhine State.
From there he turns to drones, which he identifies as a decisive new factor. Davis recalls how PDFs first experimented with small quadcopters, which the Burmese military initially dismissed. By late 2023 and into 2024, drones had become central to resistance victories, especially during Operation 1027. Shocked, the junta created a directorate for drone warfare, importing Chinese systems and benefitting from Russian expertise drawn from Ukraine. What resistance fighters improvised, the regime scaled into an organized machine. By 2025, drones, artillery, air power, and a flood of conscripts came to be used in concert, transforming the military from a faltering force into a more dangerous adversary. As Davis underscores, “you are looking at a machine which is still very much an operating machine, with an integrated command and control structure, with a strategy. It’s an army in the way that the resistance, clearly, by definition, is not.”
Morale, Davis warns, is now split. Among soldiers in the military, battlefield confidence has rebounded, while conscripts are often treated as expendable and suffer heavy casualties. Resistance morale remains fierce—they fight knowing there is no way back—but the logistical strain is immense. Ammunition shortages, drone attrition, and fragile coordination threaten to blunt their determination. As Davis puts it, courage cannot refill empty magazines.
On the subject of morale, past guests, such as Mie Mie Wynn Byrd, have pushed back, arguing that the spirit of local fighters remains unbroken, that communities continue to support them, and that belief in eventual victory is as strong as ever. Davis acknowledges this view, adding that morale is fluid, varying from unit to unit and day to day. What matters most, he argues, is how capability and morale interact—whether the junta can sustain battlefield momentum, and whether the resistance can endure losses without breaking. To him, there are more factors that need to be considered. “It’s not morale," he says. "They have got plenty of morale. They’re not short of guns. But if you don’t have enough ammunition, then you’re in trouble.” The core problem, in his view, is material, not spirit.
On the problem of overstretch, Davis notes that it is now an issue on both sides. The military can seize towns and reopen roads like the Mandalay–Lashio corridor, but every capture creates vulnerable outposts isolated among hostile populations. The resistance risks the opposite—burning through scarce munitions and exhausting itself before decisive action. Davis suggests the junta may deliberately aim to drain the resistance’s ammunition stocks before the planned December elections. And on that point, Davis is clear-eyed: “elections will happen come hell or high water,” but they will not resolve the conflict nor restore legitimacy to the regime.
China, he emphasizes, overshadows everything. It backs the junta to safeguard pipelines and trade routes, betting on stability through rigged elections. Yet this creates a dangerous paradox. If the resistance turns to striking Chinese interests, Beijing may face dilemmas it cannot manage at arm’s length. Davis draws parallels to China’s frustrations in Pakistan, where it demands protection of its assets while distrusting the very security forces assigned to guard them. Myanmar presents the same risks. He also notes the curious naivety of NUG officials, such Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, who continue to appeal to Beijing to “get on the right side of history,” a line he finds detached from political reality. He feels that the NUG has repeatedly misread Beijing, clinging to wishful rhetoric rather than grappling with China’s cold strategic calculations.
Looking ahead, Davis is blunt. Elections may proceed but will not bring peace. The military could overextend itself, while the resistance might be too depleted to mount a coordinated counterstrike. Rakhine State looms as the true pivot: if the Arakan Army seizes Kyaukphyu, with its seaport and pipeline terminals, the political and diplomatic board will change overnight. China’s leverage, the junta’s credibility, and the resistance’s standing would all be recalibrated.
Davis concludes that Myanmar is heading toward a reckoning. “The bottom line is, you can have a ceasefire today, but [the Burmese military is] going to come back, they're going to rebuild, they're going to re-equip, and they're going to come back at you.” He warns that this cycle of conflict leaves little room for complacency and makes the coming months especially uncertain. “By the end of January, we’ll be looking at a very different situation, and it’s not clear whether that very different situation will favor the military’s project in Myanmar, or, as I think many of us would hope, the resistance’s project.”