A Borderline Personality
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“I’m morally attached to the peoples of Myanmar.”
So says Dr. Lalita Hanwong, a Thai historian, political analyst, and academic whose work bridges colonial history, contemporary politics, and the humanitarian realities between Myanmar and Thailand. Her life’s trajectory—beginning with her study of colonial Burma at the British Library and extending to her advisory role within Thailand’s parliament and military—reflects a long commitment to understanding and improving Thai-Myanmar relations. “I just want to talk to everybody,” she says, describing her approach to both research and diplomacy.
Lalita trained at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, where she completed her MA and PhD in history. Her early academic work was driven by curiosity rather than ideology. Her supervisor, Professor Ian Brown, discouraged theory and told her the best history was a good story. Lalita followed that advice, immersing herself in colonial archives for years, reading gazetteers, police records, and administrative reports from British Burma. She became fascinated by how the British governed a multiethnic colony and how they relied on Indian soldiers and police to control Burma. “The British were pretty paranoid and suspicious of the Burmese," she says. "The specific race that they found the most difficult to rule and police was actually the Bamar.” This resulted in a series of policies that would forever change the trajectory of the colony. “Their solution was pretty simple," she adds, "'Let’s bring somebody to scare the Burmese!' Hence the presence of the Gurkhas, the Sikhs and so on.” To Lalita, the story of policing revealed how colonial power operated through mistrust of the Burmese (and primarily Bamar) population and manipulation of ethnic difference. Her study of colonial policing gave her a foundation for understanding how Burma’s internal divisions and structures of control were built long before independence.
During her time in London, Lalita also met Burmese and Karen activists and artists, people she describes as working to make a better Burma. These relationships expanded her interests from history to politics. It was also during these years that she began intensively studying Burmese language, doing so with Professor John Okell, whom she describes with deep affection. She spent two years studying with him, even living with his family for a time when she had nowhere else to stay. Okell, she recalls, was humble, kind, and devoted to peace and to Burma. After his death, she returned to London to visit his grave, though she discovered he had no tombstone, a detail that stayed with her as a reflection of his modest life.
After finishing her PhD, Lalita returned to Thailand and began teaching history at Mahasarakham University in the northeast. Her decision to come home was guided by family expectations—she is an only child—and not by career calculation. She remained in the northeast for about ten years before returning to Bangkok, where she continued her academic career.
This time also coincided with the early democratic transition that was then taking place in Myanmar, and Lalita was excited by what was unfolding there—the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the elections, the rise of the NLD—and soon became a public voice explaining Myanmar to the Thai audience. Because so few Thais specialized in Burmese history and politics, the media repeatedly sought her out for commentary. The demand for her perspective intensified after the 2021 military coup. She recalls being interviewed twelve times by phone in the days following February 1, 2021. The Thai public, having its own history of coups, was fascinated and alarmed by events in Myanmar, and Lalita found herself in constant demand as an interpreter of the crisis.
Her visibility led to advisory work in Thai politics. She became an advisor to the House Committee on National Security, Border Affairs, and National Reform, chaired by opposition MP Rangsiman Rome. Rangsiman wanted to raise awareness of refugee issues, scam centers, and cross-border corruption, and Lalita’s expertise on Myanmar made her an important part of that work. Through this committee, she met Thai generals and officials, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Songwit Noonpakdee. She describes him as unusually progressive, shaped by his training in the United States, and genuinely concerned about security and humanitarian issues along the Thai-Myanmar border. “There are some good-hearted [Thai] soldiers who mean well, who want to help Myanmar as well,” she says. Working with these kinds of individuals changed her perception of the Thai military, an institution she had always been wary of it.
Lalita's involvement with parliament and the army gave her access to border areas and to the people living and working there. Mae Sot, in particular, became central to her life. “Mae Sot is a really fascinating place. There’s no place like Mae Sot,” she says. She calls it her second home and visits monthly, sometimes twice a month, describing the drive from Bangkok as therapeutic. Mae Sot, for her, is a meeting ground of different worlds— Thai and Burmese, urban and rural, legal and informal. She meets NGO workers, ethnic leaders, monks, soldiers, and ordinary people affected by the war. “Thailand has been the hub of resistance from Myanmar for generations,” she notes. She points out that many ethnic leaders were born and raised in Thailand, holding two nationalities and moving between cultures and languages with ease. For her, Mae Sot is a microcosm of what she calls “the other Burma,” a place of cultural fusion and enduring struggle.
Lalita speaks openly about the empathy she feels for Myanmar’s ethnic peoples, adding that anyone who meets them cannot help but sympathize with their cause and their suffering. Over time she has met leaders from nearly every group, including the Karen, Mon, and Kachin, and even figures from the DKBA, BGF, and other factions often labeled as bad actors. She insists that understanding the war requires talking to everyone, even those with blood on their hands, because each is trying to survive in an impossible situation. “As long as there’s conflict, BGF leaders carry this yoke of responsibility to pay their soldiers," she says. "And the only way to get money quick is to do some sort of business… That’s why they agreed with the Chinese businessmen to establish the scam centers." Lalita does not excuse these activities but frames them as the predictable outcome of endless war. Ending the illicit economy, she argues, requires ending the conflict, not punishing its participants.
Her solution, informed by her work as both scholar and advisor, is to push Thailand toward a greater role as mediator. She believes Thailand is uniquely positioned to help, with its long border, its ties to all sides, and its experience hosting over a hundred thousand refugees for decades. “Thailand could do a lot more,” she says. She argues that Thailand should take practical steps, such as allowing refugees in camps to work legally, especially as international aid declines. “The Thai government finally wanted to let people from the nine camps to work," she says, "so they would not fall into the victims of human trafficking, in order that they could live their life with dignity.” She also wants Thailand to use its diplomatic access to the junta to open channels of communication that other countries cannot. “I don’t buy this theory that Thailand should boycott and just completely ignore the Myanmar leadership in Naypyidaw, because at the end of the day, you need somebody who can still negotiate and get an access to Naypyidaw,” she says. Lalita also rejects boycotts and isolation as self-defeating and emphasizes that mediation, not condemnation, is Thailand’s moral and strategic duty. “The border is a gray zone," she says. "We cannot use the ubban mindset to get the border fixed however we like it.” For Lalita, it's essential to understand local realities rather than impose central solutions.
Her assessment of the Burmese military’s strength is sobering. She believes the regime is weak but not near defeat, due to support from Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. “As long as China still wants Myanmar, it’s very difficult for the Tatmadaw to be defeated anytime soon,” she says simply. Describing Min Aung Hlaing’s position in Naypyidaw as one of near-royal authority, surrounded by subordinates who treat him like a king, she argues that as long as friendly countries keep supplying weapons and political backing, the military will survive, even if it loses control of some regions. This, she warns, ensures that the conflict will continue without decisive victory for either side. “As long as this war is still around, we cannot expect peace along the border,” she says.
For Lalita, the only way forward is negotiation. “There must be a talk," she says. "You need to be able to locate the right leadership of each EAO; otherwise, there’s absolutely no way that peace would be settled in Myanmar.” She acknowledges the deep mistrust that the resistance and ethnic groups have toward the military, and she does not deny the military’s record of manipulation and brutality. But she insists that refusing to talk will only prolong the suffering of civilians. “War is never good for anybody except war business people,” she asserts, arguing that the human cost has become unbearable.