Myanmar’s Minorities in the Driver’s Seat
Saw Htee Cher (စီၤ ထံဆၢ) appeared recently on a podcast episode to discuss the conflict in Karen and Karenni State. He shares this essay submission, written on April 23, 2024, to update the most recent developments.
“International supporters of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution must not fixate on a continued national unity that may not be forthcoming. A change in borders need not be a catastrophe.”
A foreign commentator recently claimed that nobody among Myanmar’s dissidents is angling for independent ethnic homelands, but rather, that they all want a unified federal democracy.[1] That may be true among the expatriate activists he meets abroad, but the picture is very different inside some of those ethnic minority areas he was referring to. There, when asked their opinion on that question, people frequently name independence as their aspiration, particularly those directly involved in the fight against the illegal Naypitaw regime following the 2021 attempted coup d'état.
As an example, a group of twenty resistance paramilitary trainees in their early twenties from the Karen, Arakan, and Karenni ethnicities were asked their preference between independence, federal union, or another option, during interviews in March 2024. Of those expressing an opinion, sixteen wanted independence, with only one preferring federal union. That’s not a scientific survey, but other interviews among ethnic minorities yield similar majorities for independence, especially among the young and politically or militarily active.
A school under the Kawthoolei Education and Culture Department
This gravitation toward independence stems from a historical suppression of self-determination among Myanmar’s ethnic minorities. They suspect that any federal union would be dominated by the majority Bamar ethnicity, as the civilian NLD government was during the 2015-2020 period of partial democracy. They worry that minority rights will be shunted aside and the Bamar political class will resume power as soon as the ethnic armies have served their purpose of destroying the military junta.
Ethnic elites who make up the leadership of the minority regions express greater optimism than the youth regarding union with the majority Bamar. With well-designed safeguards for self-governance and equality, they say, minority rights could be protected under a federal system. This is the position of the Karen National Union and the United League of Arakan, the governments of the minority regions considered to be among the most likely to break away. They have made unequivocal statements in the past two months that their aim is self-determination within a federal union, rather than outright independence.
Thus, there is a possible disconnect between the views of the ethnic leaders and their rank and file. That may not be surprising, given that these minority regions do not yet have democratic elections for selecting their leaders. The latter therefore do not yet have to cater to public opinion. Only the Karenni have thus far built a system for making leadership responsive to their public.
The youth who are giving the best years of their lives for the liberation fight can be counted on to assert their priorities as soon as the military struggle turns to political reconstruction. They will soon be of an age to move into leadership ranks, and to challenge the old guards. If independence is popular among them, that option will have to be considered when the guns fall silent.
It can be argued that the ideal of independence would soon be confronted with the practicalities of gaining international recognition, establishing central banks and currencies, and serving small domestic markets that may not easily stand alone. The pro-independence blocs may then see the value of a loose union with limited central powers.
A poster from the Kawthoolei Forestry Department
On the other hand, there are established and viable nations with populations smaller than some of Myanmar’s ethnic minority homelands. Examples include Slovenia, Jamaica, Cyprus, Lithuania, and Uruguay. There are other parallels among existing nations: Mongolia is landlocked like the Kachin, Karenni, and Chin; Estonia has no oil or other natural resource extraction, like most of Myanmar’s homelands; Montenegro emerged from the break-up of a larger country. Some Myanmar minority homelands have minerals, ports, and/or enviable trading locations between larger countries. There is no impediment that would necessarily disqualify the Kachin, Arakan, Karen, or others from succeeding as independent countries if they chose that route. In that case international recognition would have to catch up to reality, as it did with Timor Leste, Eritrea, South Sudan, and the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics.
One thing that will certainly not happen is ethnic minority disarmament in favor of a new federal army. As KNU founder Saw Baw Oo Gyi unequivocally asserted in 1949, “We shall retain our arms.” The Spring Revolution has demonstrated, if it were necessary, the value of each ethnic homeland maintaining its own self-defense force, and that will not change.
This military decentralization means that ethnic minority membership in a union can only be voluntary, not compulsory. The homelands may set different conditions for their participation; the Arakan may want as little as possible to do with the central administration, while the Mon may embrace it, for example. That could reflect the differential in their military strength, or their historic relationship with the majority Bamar.
The passive spectators to the Spring Revolution, particularly the Shan and the Wa, may want things to change very little, since they have been left mostly alone by Naypyitaw.
The war has forced some minority areas to increase their cross-border engagement. The northern homelands have more interaction with China than previously, many Chin have resettled temporarily in India, and the Karen have built economic ties with Thailand. Those relationships could prove to be centrifugal forces during efforts to build a new union. Why, for example, should Kawthoolei, the Karen nation, prefer partnership with less-developed Myanmar over its more prosperous trading partner, Thailand?
If the illegal regime manages to hold on in some form in central Myanmar, that may be further reason for the minority regions to make a clean break. If they can expel the hated occupiers from their territory, but cannot eliminate the regime entirely, they may content themselves with administering their own areas and populations independently. That is what the Wa have always done, and the Kokang and Ta’ang may be joining them. Others could follow suit.
Sign on a Kawhtoolei Health and Welfare Department clinic
International supporters of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution must not fixate on a continued national unity that may not be forthcoming. A change in borders need not be a catastrophe. Foreign governments and international advisors can counsel unity, even contribute to it, but they can’t force it. It is important to be prepared for all possible outcomes.
One implication of that is maintaining channels of communication with the ethnic homelands individually, in addition to relationships with the National Unity Government and other central structures. The homelands all have de facto governments with which foreigners can interact. These are the public sector bodies that provide education, health, business licensing, and other services that foreign governments, the United Nations, and international organizations may wish to support. That is reason enough to forge relationships with the ethnic homeland governments, notwithstanding their potential to emerge as independent states.
Likewise, “Balkanization” must not be dreaded as necessarily tragic, as it wasn’t in the Balkans. Aside from Bosnia, the former Yugoslav republics all managed to move on from their former union in relative peace and stability. Like Myanmar, the successor to the pre-colonial Burmah empire, Yugoslavia was also a compulsory union assembled under a domineering central ethnic group. When the minorities saw a chance to break free, they took it. Nobody questions their choice now. That lesson should be kept in mind for Myanmar.
[1] Peter Morris, interviewed by Insight Myanmar, “At the crossroads of conflict in Myanmar: A call to the USA,” in Mizzima English Edition, May 28, 2024, https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/05/28/10317