A true fight for democracy
A member of the National Unity Government has written a series of essays which we have published over the course of the past week. In this post, for ease of reading, we have grouped all these together in one post. For safety reasons the author has requested anonymity.
A difficult topic, and not without controversy, but something which must be addressed.
The man portrayed in the image has gained widespread recognition and fame. As a one- armed RPG-wielding freedom fighter from Lion Battalion, he strikes a fearsome pose with an attitude to match. The similarly portrayed members of Cobra Column have likewise won recognition and fame for their actions and bravery in the fight for freedom. It therefore makes sense that they would be immortalised in flattering caricatures by the people.
However, footage has recently emerged of Eh Say Wah with members of Cobra Column torturing and subsequently executing captured prisoners. In blunt terms, this is a war crime. Cobra Column have since admitted their part in the events captured on video. This incident is merely one of a string of videos - some truly horrific - showing abhorrent crimes being committed in Myanmar.
Even as early as November of 2021, Bo Thamani, commander of the sizeable Yinmarbin defence forces was accused of murdering civilians and members of a rival PDF group. By March 2022, media outlets began publishing the story and the NUG Ministry of Defence issued a press statement claiming that they conducted an investigation and concluded that persons under the command of Bo Thamani had committed crimes. the statement went on to say that the investigation would continue, punishments would be meted out at some point in the future, and "[t]he NUG will not allow any other judgement to the findings of this incident". No action was known to have been taken against Bo Thamani or the Yinmarbin PDF by any ministry of the NUG. Bo Thamani continues to be at large.
It is true that early on in the coup videos of war crimes were shared which, upon closer inspection, were years old and did not take place in Myanmar at all. And even recent videos in which the subjects are clearly Burmese are often difficult to identify. Videos of war crimes have been shared which both the PDF and SAC attribute to the other side. Certainly many videos of war crimes carried out by the military exist, as do videos of soldiers boasting of their crimes. But this does not change the fact that however small, we are faced with a stream of reports and videos of incidents which violate the international rules of war, and the NUG code of conduct. Incidents which at the worst can definitively be tied to PDF or other pro-democracy forces, and at the best still cannot definitively be dismissed as fraudulent or as crimes carried out by the junta.
None of this is surprising. If recent figures are to be believed, the number of pro- democracy fighters compares very favourably to the total remaining forces of the military. There are at present some 750 PDF Battalions under NUG command, with dozens if not hundreds of other informal PDF and LDF groups loosely allied to the NUG, not to mention the myriad EAO/ERO's and the new resistance groups which have formed under their aegis. All this means that the combined pro-democracy forces number well above 100,000 fighters, and probably double that. Given the sheer scale of the conflict, the number of people involved, and the lack of training, enforcement, and oversight, it is tragic but inevitable that some people - whether pro-democracy or not - would stoop to such base and inhumane actions. No military in history can claim to be blameless of war crimes, and the pro-democracy forces of Myanmar are battling greater disadvantage than most.
What we should be surprised by is the lack decisive reaction to these incidents. Some individuals, PDF groups, and political organisations have raised concerns about the cavalier and frankly criminal way in which some pro-democracy fighters have behaved. And rightly so. Yet their concerns continue to go largely unheeded. Put simply, if the NUG, the PDF, the EAO's, and the people as a whole continue to ignore or sweep crimes under the rug, they are jeopardising the revolution and Myanmar's dreams of democracy.
First, the objectives of the revolution must not be forgotten. The junta fight only to preserve their strangle-hold on the people, but the people fight not only to defeat the military, but also to establish a modern democratic state. One with the rule of law, and one which respects the international customs and laws of war. As such, the NUG have repeatedly called for Myanmar to become a party to the International Criminal Court, and have stated that all war crimes will be investigated and punished once the revolution is over. The prevalence of these violations of the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute, and the NUG's own Code of Conduct are not only an embarrassment for the revolution and the NUG, but pose a serious impediment to the establishment of the future Federal Democratic Union of Myanmar. Each crime committed by revolutionary forces must be investigated and dealt with before Myanmar can truly take her rightful place on the world stage as a fellow democracy and state-of-law. Those who fight for victory over the military by engaging in these criminal actions must reckon with the fact that they are either fighting for the victory of a democratic government which has sworn to arrest, try, and sentence them for their crimes after victory, or else these fighters intend to live as outlaws after victory, fighting against the very democratic government they are ostensibly supporting today. Such thinking is nonsensical.
They may hope that their service to the cause of victory will grant them pardons for their crimes, but to think this is to spit in the face of the very principles of democracy, accountability, and justice for which these and all other revolutionary groups claim to be fighting. Indeed, some PDF groups have taken a very public stance against those PDF's and ERO's which engage in criminal actions. This is causing rifts and tension between groups which should be allied, standing shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy. Instead, we see revolutionary groups diverting valuable resources to controlling other revolutionary groups which have passed beyond the bounds of honourable and lawful conduct in a time of war.
Furthermore, as a simple matter of strategy, it is foolish to think that the torture and execution of captured enemies can advance the cause of the revolution. Simplistic arguments can always be made: it demoralises the enemy, it saves on food and logistics costs associated with keeping prisoners, it provides valuable information from captured agents, it serves justice against those whose are certainly criminals, even if we can't prove it. All arguments which are no doubt even now being made in telegram channels and Facebook groups. But ultimately, all arguments which are easily dismissed. Setting aside the legalistic argument that punishment must be in response to a specific crime, not a vague sense of criminality, let us examine the strategic implications of this manner of thinking.
A captured or surrendered prisoner is well worth the cost and difficulty of their care. Threats and torture have been noted to yield poor results. Those subjected to pain and fear will say whatever they believe will bring them relief, whether or not it is true. In the worst cases prisoners will provide misinformation in the hopes that they can lead their captors into a trap. Dead prisoners can provide no information at all. On the other hand, prisoners treated well are more likely to provide information which is valuable and accurate. They may even be willing to work for the revolution to help others to defect. The Tatmadaw's cruelty and barbarity towards their own must not be forgotten, and we would do well to realise the value of a sympathetic prisoner, and the power of compassion, even in a war.
Since the revolution began multiple victims of the PDFs' operations have been shown after the fact to have been quiet supporters of the revolution, and likely would have defected and assisted the PDF had the opportunity presented itself. Let us consider that those who have defected, and have subsequently provided vital informational and logistical support to the revolution would have been treated just as cruelly and criminally had they been captured even a day before making good their escape from the military bases. How much potential strategic leverage has been squandered by resorting to vile and bestial acts of retaliation?
And what impact do these acts have on the remaining forces of the SAC? Certainly not the fear and trembling that the PDF hope. Rather, we can be sure that the spread of these videos hardens the hearts of the military against the revolution. Those who may have contemplated defection will now fear being tortured or killed in the attempt, and be more likely to remain with the military. Those who were unsure whether the revolution can end the cycle of violence and war will be convinced that this conflict cannot hope to establish a lasting democracy and will err on the side of “the devil you know”, quietly supporting the military. Even among the civilian population, these crimes are sure to be weaponised as pro-military propaganda, and will incite a desire for revenge and retaliation. Those who were afraid before to support the junta openly will be emboldened out of rage or fear to join the Pyu Saw Hti and similar paramilitary gangs.
The strategic harm of these acts extends to the international arena as well. These videos are not hard to find if one is in the right groups, and far from being suppressed, they are being actively spread and shared. If we can see these videos, the security officers monitoring the conflict in western countries can see them too. And they certainly have. Many would ask, not without reason, why we should concern ourselves with the west's opinions. After all, they have shown no willingness to even entertain the notion of arms and armament shipments to the PDF, nor do the overwhelming majority even accept the legitimacy of the NUG. What loss is it to us if the west rejects the revolutionaries?
To answer this question we must not look at what the west has done for Myanmar, but rather look at what they have stopped others from doing. It is western pressure which has slowed and complicated the sale of arms and materiel to the junta. It is western sanctions which limit the ability of the cronies and generals to raise funds and travel to meet with powerful benefactors. It is the veto power of the US, UK, and France which ensures that Russia and China cannot pass Security Council resolutions recognising the SAC as legitimate, and supporting international action against the PDF. It is the west which ultimately keeps the Tatmadaw hamstrung, and makes it difficult for foreign powers to support the coup.
While less than we want, this is all that we need. Purely strategically, we are winning. The Tatmadaw is bleeding men, both to casualties and to defections and their ability to replenish their forces and materiel is limited. Meanwhile the PDF are growing in number, developing their skills and training, and are increasingly gaining access to military grade weaponry. Analysts who at first thought the victory of the junta was a certainty, today view the victory of the NUG as a distinct possibility, and if the current trends continue, the pro- democracy forces will soon reach parity with the remaining SAC forces, and from there the military will have nowhere to go but retreat. This is all if current trends remain. A sudden influx of personnel, training, equipment, or external logistic support could undo all the gains the PDF and EAO's have painstakingly made over the last year and a half. It is imperative that international actors not have the opportunity to support the junta and tip the balance in their favour.
However, if the PDF are seen as criminals and terrorists by the international community, if the NUG's command and control structure is perceived as weak and incapable of preventing crimes, the argument will inevitably be made that the military, with all its flaws, is the best chance Myanmar has to stave off complete collapse and lawlessness. An unimaginable line of thought for anyone in Myanmar, certainly, but a very easy story to sell to an ignorant audience, and one readily supported by hundreds of companies and state actors eager for an excuse to once again gain access to Myanmar's resources and labour.
Western political philosophy is, at its core, selfish. Western elections are won and lost on narratives, not on facts. What the west has done it has done because it saw a narrative it could embrace. Plucky young peaceful protesters taking on a military dictatorship. This fits well into western narratives and captures the imagination. But now the conflict has evolved into civil war. Western involvement in foreign wars is unpopular. More so now that ever before, coming off the heels of the costly and lengthy failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the midst of a new engagement in Ukraine; one which western voters are already grumbling about after only 5 months. No politician will risk being seen to openly support yet an other intervention as this would mean being associated with the ongoing costs, the lives lost, the length of the conflict, the corruption and incompetence of subsequent governments, and ultimately being seen to support and fund groups which often wind up being investigated for war crimes, extremism, drug trafficking, environmental exploitation, unfavourable political ideologies, or other unsavoury issues. All of these can be and routinely are weaponised in the political arena to destroy the careers of well-meaning politicians who left themselves open to what in political circles is known as "bad optics".
This is why the junta's international media goals have shifted. They no longer seek to be seen as legitimate themselves – even they have learned that they can never be the heroes of the story – but they can sow discord and paint the PDF and NUG as fundamentally no better than the military. The SAC understands that in order to secure international support, the NUG needs to sell the revolution as:
a conflict which can be won in a short time frame.
a conflict which will lead to a stable and progressive democracy.
a conflict fighting for goals which are in line with western principles and values.
a conflict fought by blameless “good guys” against cartoonish “bad guys”.
By pointing to these videos of torture and murder, the junta can claim that either the NUG is so weak that it cannot prevent its own forces from brazenly violating the Code of Conduct on video, or the NUG is complicit in the crimes. This, the junta will argue, demonstrates that an NUG victory will not establish a strong central government under the rule of law, but rather usher in an age of warlords and local armies. The revolutionary forces will be painted as “bad guys” fighting “bad guys” – a situation no western government wants to be embroiled in – and as more and more civilians bolster the ranks of the Pyu Saw Hti and related groups, the junta will claim that the end of the conflict is nowhere in sight. In the meantime, the junta has worked hard to hide its own crimes. Gone are the early days of 2021 when crimes by soldiers and police flooded social media every day. The military have moved their operations further out into the rural and border areas where internet and electricity have been cut off, thereby stemming the flow of evidence of their atrocities and crimes against humanity. While those in Myanmar may not have noticed the subtle shift in the regime's messaging and the gradual reduction in the severity of content on social media, these changes are shaping attitudes and opinions in the west, and may play a key role in softening the junta's image, and undermining the NUG's diplomacy.
For the SAC this would be a major victory. If the SAC cannot directly gain foreign support, it can do the next best thing and prevent the PDF from getting that same support. Of course, as western powers slowly slink away from the conflict, regional and major powers with a vested interest in suppressing democracy and keeping Myanmar poor and cheap will find it easier to circumvent sanctions and aid the junta without fear of global condemnation. From a strategic standpoint, this is the junta's only hope, and they have been quietly but consistently laying the foundation for a PR victory on the world stage for some time.
In light of this, we should be deeply concerned that the motto of the revolution has become အလှည့်ကျ မနွဲ့စတမ်း (now it's our turn). Many on social media and many within the revolution have echoed this sentiment. That just as the military has brutalised and violated Myanmar for decades, now the revolution has the moral right to do unto the military as the military did unto their families and communities. The simple fact of the matter is that while many revel in the sight of Tatmadaw soldiers being killed and beaten, these acts are what drives new recruits to violent pro-junta paramilitaries, and prolongs the revolution.
We can accept that war is, by its very nature, a dark and grotesque thing, loathsome and detestable to humanity. The fact that war crimes are being committed, regardless of who the perpetrators are, is horrific, but it is an inevitable consequence of the continuation of this bloody conflict. The best cure for war crimes is a swift and decisive end to the war.
However this cannot and must not excuse inaction on the part of the leadership of the PDF, EAO's, or the NUG itself in response to war crimes. There is a long standing custom in Burmese politics to initially ignore issues when they arise. When the people will no longer accept ignorance, the issue must be denied. When the people will no longer accept denial, the issue must be downplayed. When the people are angry, blame must be shifted, and when the people demand answers, their very motivations must be called into question. A public figure should remain aloof of public concerns, and the public should not be so presumptuous as to involve itself in political affairs. And above all, under no circumstances must a public figure accept or admit error.
It is unfortunate that this mentality, to some extent, continues to pervade the upper echelons of the NUG and indeed much of Myanmar society itself. The people as a whole must demand better from their government. This is after all, the very purpose of democracy. And those who do raise their voices, must be able to do so without fear of being labelled dalan or accused of undermining the revolution. We cannot succeed if we cannot be honest with ourselves. If we cannot stand by our principles.
Investigations which lead to no action, a general silence in the face of mounting evidence, and the lack of capacity or will to remove known criminals from positions of power and leadership are all inexcusable failures of the highest order. A commander in a time of war must make decisions between bad and worse. It is an unenviable position. But the decision to not expel or rein in known and documented criminals is immoral, it flies in the face of the NUG's stated values, and it undermines the revolution strategically. Far more must be done to openly acknowledge crimes when they have occurred, to admit fault, to censure and condemn criminals, and to lay out a clear and transparent road map for justice. Far more must be done by people to engage with and to put pressure on the NUG and their allies. Far more must be done by all to call out and condemn war crimes – no matter who commits them. Only in this way can the SAC's global strategy be preempted, only in this way can the revolution continue to fight for genuine principles of justice and freedom, only in this way can we hope to win the support of the international community, and only in this way can we hope for a decisive and imminent victory.