Hope Deferred

“This is a battle between lightness and darkness, between good and evil. I think we have to be really clear on our position on this issue, and to do everything that we can to make sure that the good triumphs over the evil.”

Celito “Lito” Arlegue, the executive director of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD), shares his experiences and insights regarding the political landscape of Southeast Asia, with a particular focus on Myanmar. Throughout the interview, he delves into his personal journey, the challenges of democratization in the region, and the role of international organizations in promoting democratic values and human rights. 

Arlegue's passion for Asian politics began during his undergraduate studies, when he focused on civil society engagement in ASEAN. This interest led him to become a program officer for a project on political parties and corruption in 2002. After returning to academia for a time, he eventually became the Executive Director of CALD in 2010, motivated by his enduring passion for Asian politics and desire to see improvements in the region. “I am always disappointed in the way this region has been progressing in terms of democracy and human rights,” he says. “Maybe ‘regressing’ would be more appropriate, but we have to recognize that democracy in this part of the world has never been very strong to begin with, even prior to the so-called declined democracy, which has been happening for 17-18 years. Democracy in Southeast Asia in particular, has never been strong.” 

Nevertheless, he has spotted some glimmers of hope in the modern histories of many Asian nations “When CALD was founded in the early 1990s there were significant positive developments that time, reflecting the global trend after the demise of the Soviet Union,” he says. “We saw in this part of the world, some countries opening up to a more democratic, more liberal political situation.” He illustrates his points with three examples within Southeast Asia: his own native Philippines, along with Thailand and Indonesia. He examines the democratic and civil progress in each, and the ramifications of their domestic policies for the region.  

No country’s transition to democracy has been smooth, and for Arlegue, the Philippines is no different. In what will be familiar to those following Myanmar's road to democracy, Arlegue describes his own country’s political system as a “Cacique democracy,” or maybe a “pseudo-democracy.” He laments the dominance of powerful elites within society, including the country’s political parties, which inhibits the creation of strong, democratic institutions. Arlegue feels that, besides the Labor Party, Filipino political parties are weak, which leads to frequent party-switching among politicians.

Because Filipino politicians have leaned so heavily into populism, this has resulted in political leaders who capitalize on their own “brand,” rather than focus on party beliefs and policies, or even the good of the country as a whole. He cites as examples figures like Rodrigo Duterte, who uses populist rhetoric to his advantage, and Ferdinand Marcos, who manipulated social media to rehabilitate the negative image of his political family dynasty. But Arlegue also argues that the political system’s imperfections are counterbalanced by a strong Filipino civil society organizations. “Weak state, strong society,” is how he characterizes it. He explains that these CSOs have historically played a significant role in mobilizing support for democratic and social causes, helping counteract the challenges posed by personality-driven politics. For this reason, Arlegue remains optimistic about the potential for democratic renewal and future reforms in the Philippines. 

Turning next to Thailand, Arlegue describes its politics as something of a regional bellwether, reflecting the broader, up-and-down trends of democratic aspirations across Southeast Asia. The recent elections in Thailand were a “down,” leaving many disappointed that the unpopular conservative government was not ousted. Although the opposition party, Move Forward, surprisingly won at the polls, and attempted to form a government according to constitutional procedure. However, it could not ultimately take control because a number of conservative forces, otherwise opposed to each other, united to prevent it. Moreover, the unelected Senate also plays a significant role in selecting the country’s Prime Minister; with many of its present members appointed by prior, military-backed governments, they joined the effort to prevent progressives from taking power. Says Arlegue wryly, “Winning an election and forming a government are two different matters.”

However, Arlegue worries that thwarting the democratic process may eventually lead to a major crisis in Thailand. “The tensions are there,” he says. “We may not see it now, but it's there, and eventually, this will erupt. And that's scary.” Unless political institutions are reformed, Arlegue argues that Thailand will continue to experience a “vicious cycle” of being a notional democracy in that the electorate can vote while conservative forces can consistently thwart the people’s will. 

Arlegue is somewhat more optimistic about Indonesia, although, like the Philippines, the electorate continues to stress personality politics and perceptions of political influence over party affiliation. Other challenges remain, too; for example, during the previous President Jokowi's rule, policies were adopted that restricted the country’s civic space. That said, Arlegue argues that Indonesia has otherwise made significant progress in terms of democratic development since its transition to democracy in 1998, at least compared to other Southeast Asian countries. It has usually been able to effect relatively peaceful transfers of power in spite of its previous history military-backed governments, which he says is a positive indicator of democratic consolidation. He also points to the fact that Indonesia has a large number of stable political parties that are solidly embedded in the political system. 

So overall, Arlegue believes there is a lot still to be worked out by the various countries in this region. And while one might hope that ASEAN could have a positive impact on regional democratization, they have thus far come up far short (a criticism that former Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya launched in a recent interview, as did former AHA Centre Executive Director Adelina Kamal). Indeed, ASEAN is now characterized as being state-centric and conservative, and its principles of non-intervention, along with a preference for national sovereignty above all else, usually preclude the possibility of meaningful action. “ASEAN has a critical role to play. I always think, ‘What would this region be without ASEAN?’ Probably it would be worse! ASEAN definitely can do more, especially when it comes to democracy and human rights, and since they committed themselves to these principles,  they have to do more when it comes to realizing these in reality.” Still, Arlegue is a realist at the end of the day, and acknowledges the organization’s ultimate shortcomings. “It appears that these principles of non-intervention and respect for national sovereignty really restricts what ASEAN could do.” Arlegue says that this clash of organizational principles and aspirational mission is especially clear regarding the crisis in Myanmar. 

In describing the situation there, he first recalls the initial enthusiasm and determination of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to advance democracy in Myanmar after years of military rule. He recalls Suu Kyi's strong stand in meetings, when she emphasized national reconciliation based on principles of justice. It was in that environment of optimism and hope in which CALD began to engage with the NLD in collaborative efforts, such as inviting NLD representatives to international events and providing training workshops on political party management in the run-up to the 2015 election. “It was, I can even say, life changing!” Arlegue exclaims. “Many of the people who attended our trainings .…[told] us about their life in prison; how they were tortured, how they were separated from their family, and the impact of these things on them. But what really struck me is that these people did not have any antagonism towards the military regime! … They were just interested about moving the country forward, they were very excited about the elections, they were really thrilled to learn about the the experiences of other countries.” 

Arlegue states that the positive focus on the country’s future, without vengeance, is what initially gave CALD so much hope for Myanmar’s future. “These were people who are willing to set aside whatever personal hardships that they experienced during the regime to democratize the country! Looking at the experience of other countries, like South Africa, this is critical for success, to set aside those personnel miseries and hardships and think of the country as a whole.” 

Unfortunately, that initial enthusiasm and close relationship with the NLD did not last, particularly in the aftermath of the Rohingya crisis.“We tried to understand where they are coming from, and we recognize that there are some constraints that the NLD had to address or to confront,” he says, describing the internal crisis that developed within CALD in trying to figure out how to respond to this growing humanitarian disaster, and the NLD’s lackluster response. “From the outside, [the NLD’s perspective] may not have been given proper attention, so that's why, while we're concerned about the Rohingya, we as a network decided that it's still worthwhile to continue the relationship [with the NLD]. Because we're also thinking that them being part of CALD, even informally, we can at least talk to them, and tell them maybe behind closed doors, that these things should not have been happening.” Nevertheless, relations with the NLD cooled significantly after CALD came out in support of the Rohingya. “We attempted to revive the relationship by visiting Myanmar in 2017,” he says, “and we even met with the president at the time. We also took the opportunity to reiterate our invitation for the NLD to become to become a full member of CALD. But after this, we had very limited engagement,” and adds that they have not had contact with them since late 2018.

The heavy weight that this continues to cast over Arlegue is evident in his voice as he processes this today. “I don't know whether I can speak on behalf of CALD, but personally, I think we could have done more during the time, especially when the crisis was unraveling,” he says. “We had these connections with political leaders in Myanmar at that time, and I wish we could have done more. I have to say, though, that we really tried. Because of the international criticism, they were starting to close international contacts, so it was also a struggle for us. But one the values of CALD are these personal relations that we have built with these people, and and I think we could have tapped this more, so that we could make an impact. I think in some instances, we just chose the path of least resistance.”

Following the coup, CALD put out a statement of condemnation, and since then, has only had limited contact with the National Unity Government (NUG,) mostly through representatives such as Dr Sasa, who spoke at the CALD 2020 General Assembly conference via video call. Arlegue strongly advocates for the international community to keep a focus on Myanmar, and to actively back the NUG, in spite of conflicts elsewhere that pull global attention away. He says, “I was reading an article about the meeting between Biden, the Japanese prime minister, and [the Philippine] president, and Myanmar was not even raised as an issue, which is most unfortunate, considering that the Philippines will become the next ASEAN chair! Biden could have use that opportunity as well to raise the issue. But it wasn't discussed!” Arlegue believes CALD could offer an effective platform for Myanmar to be brought back onto the global agenda, and there have been proposals within CALD to formally invite the NUG to become a member. Interestingly, this is not the first time CALD has considered relations with a government-in-exile, or governments subsequently declared illegal, but to date no such invitations to the NUG have been acted on. 

In the face of ASEAN’s relative inaction regarding the crisis in Myanmar, Arlegue does not hold back his criticism. “I have to say that I'm really surprised that ASEAN is not recognizing this as a regional security issue …The mere fact that it's happening within our borders, and as ASEAN, we could not do anything about it, it really baffles me why ASEAN is not doing enough on this particular issue!” Arlegue calls on ASEAN to recognize the NUG and CRPH as “the legitimate voices of the Myanmar people,” and to bring in support from other Asian nations such as Japan, whose relative investment potential and standing economic ties to Myanmar make it a powerful ally. He also advocates for the critical need to provide lethal aid to the resistance, though somewhat tentatively, as he ends with a lingering question: “Realistically speaking, we have to do more, and to give military support to the forces that are fighting in Myanmar. [but]… are we really giving armaments to those forces?”